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MANEUVERING THE ISLAMIST-SECULARIST

DIVIDE IN THE ARAB WORLD:

HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN PRESERVE

ITS INTERESTS AND VALUES IN AN

INCREASINGLY POLARIZED ENVIRONMENT

Gregory AftandilianU.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS


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Strategic Studies Instituteand

U.S. Army War College Press

MANEUVERING THE ISLAMIST-SECULARISTDIVIDE IN THE ARAB WORLD:

HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN PRESERVEITS INTERESTS AND VALUES IN AN

INCREASINGLY POLARIZED ENVIRONMENT

Gregory Aftandilian

October 2014

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ISBN 1-58487-642-5


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FOREWORD

The Middle East is again in the midst of turmoil.While much of the focus is on the sectarian divideand con ict between Sunni and Shia being played outin several countries and among different groups, anequally important division is occurring between secu-larists and Islamists in a number of Arab countries.This con ict is particularly acute in the countries ofthe so-called Arab Spring. The removal of the authori-tarian leaders in these countries has led to intensecompetition between Islamists parties and their secu-lar detractors, and the two sides of this divide havevery different visions of where they want their societ-ies to be headed. Islamists initially have an advantagepolitically because of their history of being a repressedopposition movement, their charitable work among

the poor, and their appeal to religion, but secularists,while weak in terms of grass-roots organization, of-ten have powerful institutional allies in these societ-ies, such as the military, judiciary, and trade unions.The secularists also tap into a particular strand thatis prevalent in many Arab countries—that religios-ity should be a personal decision and not somethingimposed by the state or a political movement.

In Egypt, where considerable U.S. interests are atstake, the Islamist-secularist divide caused problemsfor U.S. policymakers, as they were accused of favor-ing the excesses of either the ruling government or itsopponents, depending on to whom they were speak-ing. With the intense polarization that accompaniedthis divide, U.S. policies were easily misconstrued as

favoring one faction over the other. By the late-springand summer of 2013, U.S. standing had dropped to alow point.


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Mr. Gregory Aftandilian, a Middle East specialist,analyzes this division and explains why it has become

so intense. He also examines how the United Stateshas reacted thus far and offers cogent policy recom-mendations that would help U.S. of cials maneuverthrough this divide while preserving U.S. interestsand values. He puts forward speci c recommenda -tions dealing with countries in the beginning of thetransition period as well as countries already beset bypolarization.

The Strategic Studies Institute hopes the ndingsin this monograph will be of assistance to U.S. policy-makers and U.S. Army of cers as they deal with thedivide facing a number of Arab countries.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

GREGORY AFTANDILIAN, a consultant, scholar,and lecturer, is currently an associate of the MiddleEast Center at the University of Massachusetts-Low-ell, an adjunct faculty member of Boston Universityand American University, and a Senior Fellow forthe Middle East at the Center for National Policy inWashington, DC. He spent over 21 years in govern-ment service, most recently on Capitol Hill, wherehe was foreign policy advisor to Congressman ChrisVan Hollen (2007-08), a professional staff member ofthe Senate Foreign Relations Committee and foreignpolicy adviser to Senator Paul Sarbanes (2000-04), andforeign policy fellow to the late Senator Edward Ken-nedy (1999). Prior to these positions, Mr. Aftandilianworked for 13 years as a Middle East analyst at the U.S.

Department of State where he was a recipient of theDepartment’s Superior Honor Award for his analyseson Egypt and of the Intelligence Community’s Certi -cate of Distinction. His other government experienceincludes analytical work for the U.S. Department ofDefense and the Library of Congress. Mr. Aftandilianwas also a research fellow at the Kennedy School ofGovernment at Harvard University (2006-07) and anInternational Affairs Fellow at the Council on ForeignRelations in New York (1991-92), where he wrote thebook, Egypt’s Bid for Arab Leadership: Implications forU.S. Policy. He is also the author of the monographs:Looking Forward: An Integrated Strategy for SupportingDemocracy and Human Rights in Egypt (2009); Presiden-tial Succession Scenarios and Their Impact on U.S.-Egyp-

tian Strategic Relations (2011); and Egypt’s New Regimeand the Future of the U.S.-Egyptian Strategic Relationship (2013). He holds a B.A. in history from Dartmouth


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College, an M.A. in Middle Eastern studies from theUniversity of Chicago, and an M.Sc. in international

relations from the London School of Economics.

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SUMMARY

Mr. Gregory Aftandilian examines why the Is-lamist-secularist divide in such Arab countries asEgypt and Tunisia has become so intense and polariz-ing and what can be done, from the perspective of U.S.policy, to mitigate such divisions and preserve U.S.interests and values. He demonstrates that havingIslamist parties in dominant positions in Arab societ-ies often provokes a backlash from secular elementsbecause the latter see the Islamists as threatening theirsocial freedoms, which leads to unrest. For countriesbeginning the transitory process from authoritarian-ism to democracy, Aftandilian recommends that theUnited States press for a broad governing coalition anda delay in holding elections, similar to what took placein Italy and France toward the end of World War II

and which aided the moderate parties. Such practiceswould allow secular-liberal forces the opportunity tobuild their political parties and compete with Islamistparties. For Arab countries already facing polariza-tion, the United States should be consistent on humanrights, help build up institutions (such as parliaments)as a hedge against authoritarian presidents, and pressfor inclusionary politics. Aftandilian argues that U.S.assistance should be used as a positive re-enforcer—to reward moderate and inclusionary politics—ratherthan as a punitive lever (cutting aid) because the latteroften provokes a backlash against the United States.In addition, Aftandilian recommends that U.S. Armyof cers should reinforce to their Arab military coun -terparts the value and necessity of concentrating on

genuine external and internal terrorist threats as op-posed to using a coercive internal force that favorsexclusionary politics.


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MANEUVERING THE ISLAMIST-SECULARISTDIVIDE IN THE ARAB WORLD:

HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN PRESERVEITS INTERESTS AND VALUES IN ANINCREASINGLY POLARIZED ENVIRONMENT

When political analysts and policymakers dis-cuss divisions in the Middle East, they usually referto the Sunni-Shia split in the region and con icts, asin Syria, that have exacerbated this sectarian division.However, an equally important division in the regionis the Islamist-secularist 1 split, which is most appar-ent now in Egypt but is also affecting other countriesin the Arab world, such as Tunisia, Libya, and eventhe rebels in the Syrian civil war. This split has ledto increased polarization between the Islamist andsecular political camps in these countries, often ac-

companied by zero-sum politics. The challenge forU.S. policymakers is for the United States to preserveand promote its interests and values in these polar-ized societies, which are increasingly becoming a po-litical mine eld, and how to help mitigate such po -larization. In some countries, criticism by the UnitedStates of one side of the societal divide is seen by thatside’s supporters as aiding the opposite side. In thecase of Egypt, in particular, both the Islamists (par-ticularly the repressed Muslim Brotherhood) andthe secularists see the United States as having abet-ted the excesses of the other side in the tumultuoussummer of 2013.

Despite the so-called “Pivot to Asia” that has beentalked about in U.S. national security circles, the Unit-

ed States is likely to remain involved in the MiddleEast for some time to come. Even though new oil andgas discoveries in the United States have made our


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country depend less on Middle East oil, instabilityin the region can help drive up prices of these com-

modities, which would have an adverse effect on theU.S. economy and that of our allies. In addition, whilethere may be some progress in the P5+1 negotiationswith Iran leading to an eventual agreement on the Ira-nian nuclear issue, many of the Gulf Arab states andIsrael are likely to look warily on Iran and would wanta substantial U.S. security presence to remain in theregion as a counterweight to Tehran. Furthermore,while the leadership core of al-Qaeda has been weak-ened, there is a now a plethora of al-Qaeda af liatedgroups operating in several Arab countries, like Egypt.The United States has vital national security objectivesin Egypt, like ensuring the safe and expedited passageof U.S. naval ships through the Suez Canal and over-

ights for U.S. military aircraft to bring troops to the

Gulf region in the event of a crisis.2

Hence, the Middle East will continue to occupy theattention of U.S. policymakers and military plannersfor the foreseeable future despite the refocus on Asia.The United States needs to be able to deal better withthe Islamist-secularist division in the area if it hopes toretain its interests there.

WHY HAS THE ISLAMIST-SECULARIST SPLITBECOME SO VIRULENT AND POLARIZING?AN EXAMINATION OF EGYPT AND TUNISIA

Prior to the Arab Spring of 2011, most countries inthis region were ruled by authoritarian leaders whosuppressed both Islamist and secular-liberal opposi-

tionists. In so-called republican regimes, power wasconcentrated in the hands of the president, who wasaided by a ruling party that was, in essence, merely


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an extension of the state apparatus and not an inde-pendent institution. Such regimes repressed Islamist

parties, even those that eschewed violence, in partbecause they were afraid that these parties or orga-nizations would challenge the legitimacy of their ruleas heads of Muslim states. But these regimes also sup-pressed secular-liberal parties and dissidents becausethey challenged the repressive security apparatusand could be seen as alternative political players byWestern governments, particularly the United States.Hence, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak sup-pressed the Muslim Brotherhood by periodically ar-resting its activists to keep the organization off-balanceand from participating unhindered in the sham of thepolitical process that characterized his rule. He alsowent after liberal detractors, like Ayman Nour, whocriticized the Egyptian leader for the lack of democ-

racy and the repression of dissent, particularly whenthe United States seemed to look with favor on suchoppositionists. 3

Many citizens who could be classi ed as secular-liberals often muted their criticism of the regimes,especially when the countries faced challenges fromIslamist extremist groups who employed violence.The secular-liberals even lent tacit support at timesto the state under the adage that it is better to dealwith the devil you know than the devil you do notknow. Although they understood and resented thefact that these regimes were ossi ed and repressive,the secular-liberals at least could be free socially rath-er than conforming to a very strict interpretation ofsharia (Islamic law) that the extremists, and even many

nonviolent Islamists, seemed to favor. In other words,many saw the secular-orientated authoritarian state asa hedge against a takeover by the Islamists, who were


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seen as narrow-minded when it came to social normsand practices. The secular-liberals resented the im-

plicit message by the Muslim Brotherhood and otherIslamist groups that they were “not Muslim enough.”Such secular-liberals believed that neither the statenor a political organization should meddle in theirdecisions about how devout or not they want to be.In their minds, religiosity should be left to the indi-vidual or the family and not be imposed on society.Such sentiments—essentially a separation of mosquefrom state--were even accepted by many devoutMuslim citizens who were wary of Islamist parties. 4

Additionally, many secular-liberals questioned thepronouncements of the Islamists, even those from thenonviolent and more moderate groups, who claimedthat their organizations were committed to democ-racy. Attempts to form opposition alliances between

secular and Islamist groups were often rife with dis-cord, and many secularists were deeply troubled bythe writings of some Muslim Brotherhood leaders whoseemed to favor second-class status for Christians andwomen and an Islamic litmus test for laws passed byparliament. 5

At the same time, the authoritarian regimes, facedwith population pressures and increasingly scarcegovernment resources, ceded much of the social wel-fare space to the Islamists. For example, in Egypt,through their charitable organizations, the MuslimBrotherhood established food banks and health clinicsin poor urban and rural areas, often as an ancillaryextension of neighborhood mosques. Although occa-sionally hassled by government security agents, these

centers were generally tolerated by the state becausethey provided essential social services that the statecould no longer provide and helped to keep the popu-


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lation quiet. 6 From the Brotherhood’s perspective,such activities not only “proved” to the people that

the organization cared about their economic plightand ful lled Muslim obligations of charity to the poor,but also helped maintain the organization’s supportamong a signi cant segment of the population. In acountry rife with corruption, such activities were alsoseen as altruistic and “clean” by many ordinary citi-zens, particularly among the semi-educated strata ofsociety, who, along with many middle class liberals,resented the outward displays of wealth by the newclass of “crony capitalists” who emerged during theMubarak era.

The people who initially took to the streets dur-ing the revolutions in the Arab world in 2011 weremostly young people of secular-liberal middle-classbackgrounds. They were mainly educated and savvy

in the ways of social media; they wanted a meaning-ful and well-paying job, dignity, political freedom,an end to police harassment and brutality, and an ac-countable government. The Islamist parties initiallywere hesitant to join the demonstrations because theywere not sure of the outcome and did not want to setthemselves up for another round of repression by thesecurity services. But eventually some Islamist youth,in de ance of their elders in the organizations, did jointheir secular counterparts in the demonstrations in theearly days because they shared similar goals. 7

The toppling of several authoritarian leaders in theArab world was initially greeted by huge displays ofnational unity, by Muslims and Christians, as well asIslamists and secularists. However, this unity dissipat-

ed not long after the revolutions because Islamists andsecularists in particular had different visions of theirsociety, and these differences would soon play out in


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the political arena. Islamist parties seemed to under-stand their strength from early on in the process, and

pushed for elections. They successfully tapped intotheir networks across the country—particularly inEgypt—and into the perception among many citizens(both in Tunisia and Egypt) that they were a princi-pled opposition party during the dark days of the au-thoritarian regime who were not tainted by corruptionand hence would provide a good alternative to whohad ruled them before. The secular–liberal camp wasdivided and lacked grass-roots appeal. It was mostlycongregated in the major urban centers of Cairo andAlexandria and had little outreach to the urban poor,let alone the rural poor. Some were followers of theold liberal parties, like the Wafd, which was formed inthe nationalist ferment of the post-World War I years.Others were newly formed “revolutionary” parties

that took part in the 2011 revolutions and were goodat returning to demonstrations as a tactic but poor atorganizing politically, especially in rural areas. 8

It was not surprising, therefore, that in this context,the Islamist parties did very well in the immediatepost-authoritarian elections while the secular-liberalparties did poorly. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, forexample, won 47 percent of the seats in parliamentaryelections in late-2011 and early-2012, while the evenmore fundamentalist Sala parties won about 23 per -cent of the seats. These results compare with secular-liberal parties winning only about 20 percent of theseats overall. In Tunisia, the main Islamist party, En-Nahda, won the largest plurality of votes (37 percent)and the largest plurality of seats (41 percent), while

the second largest vote-getter, the secular Congressfor the Republic party, won only 8.7 percent of thevote and 13 percent of the seats. 9


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In Egypt, the presidential elections of May and June 2012 produced a Muslim Brotherhood president,

Mohammad Morsi, who edged out a secular candi-date, Ahmed Sha k, Mubarak’s last prime ministerand a former head of the air force, in a close race. Inthe rst round of these elections, which saw multiplecandidates, Morsi received only 25 percent of the vote,but he was able to win in the second round becauseof several factors: many Egyptians, disliking bothcandidates, stayed home, which worked to the advan-tage of Morsi because the Brotherhood mobilized itssupporters to come out and vote; many of the young,secular revolutionaries from 2011 could not stomach aSha k presidency because of his close association withMubarak and the old regime and thus threw their sup-port behind Morsi. Morsi cleverly portrayed himselfas being a presidential candidate for “all Egyptians,”

implying he would create an inclusive government.These factors were enough, in the end, to tip the votein his favor. 10 Egypt’s lower house of parliament,which was mentioned earlier and was dominated bythe Brotherhood, was disbanded by the courts overa technicality in early-June 2012, but the less power-ful Shura, or upper house of parliament, which hada Brotherhood majority, remained intact. Thus, bymid-summer 2012, the Brotherhood controlled boththe executive and legislative branches of the Egyptiangovernment.

In Tunisia, En-Nahda ruled in a coalition with twosmall secular parties, the Congress for the Republic(mentioned earlier) and Ettakatol. As a measure ofcompromise, the president and speaker of parliament

were from the secular parties, while the prime min-ister was from En-Nahda. But since the power in thenew Tunisian political system was titled much more


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heavily in the direction of parliament than the presi-dency, En-Nahda, because of its prominent role in the

coalition and its control of the premiership, becamethe dominant political force in the country. 11While in power, these leading Islamist parties acted

in ways that were seen as either authoritarian (Egypt)or as pursuing policies that were seen as eventuallychanging the nature of society (Tunisia and Egypt).Moreover, several actions by these Islamist partiesseemed to elicit the worst fears of the secularists inthose societies. President Morsi, immediately afterbrokering a truce between Hamas and Israel in No-vember 2012, which received praise from the interna-tional community and particularly the United States,issued a decree that said that his presidential decisionswould be exempt from judicial review—essentiallyplacing himself above the law. This decree touched

off a huge political restorm in Egypt, leading to vio -lent clashes between the Brotherhood and its liberaldetractors in late-2012 and early-2013. 12 In Tunisia, theassassination of two secular leaders—one, Chokri Be-laid of the Popular Front who was killed in February2013, and another, Mohammed Brahmi, a leftist tradeunion leader who was killed in July 2013 by probableIslamist extremists—caused Tunisia’s secular par-ties to blame En-Nahda for either not cracking downenough on such extremists or creating a permissiveenvironment in which the extremists could operate inthe open. 13

In retrospect, it appears that such policies or theseeming indifference of the Islamist parties to theextremists rekindled secularists’ fears of an Islamist

takeover of these societies, not just politically but interms of transforming them into strict and intoler-ant states whereby personal and cultural freedoms


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would be jeopardized. Ideological differences be-tween Islamists and liberals are quite profound,

as the scholar Shadi Hamid has pointed out. In arecent study, he noted that, while it was campaign-ing, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt espoused a“civilizational project” that, within the framework ofdemocracy:

offered a spiritual and philosophical alternative toWestern liberalism. For Islamists as well as their lib-eral opponents, it was a question—one that was in-tensely personal—of how societies would be ordered.Any moral project could be counted on to intrudeon private conduct and personal freedoms, on thevery choices that citizens made, or didn’t make, on adaily basis. 14

In the same study, he underscored:

Even what may have seemed, in retrospect, like mi-nor quibbles—over the particular wording of shariaclauses, for example—re ected fundamental dividesover boundaries, limits, and purpose of the nation-state. For liberals, certain rights and freedoms are, byde nition, non-negotiable. They envision the state as aneutral arbiter. Meanwhile, even those Islamists whohave little interest in legislating morality see the stateas a promoter of a certain set of religious and moralvalues, through the soft power of the state machin-ery, the educational system, and the media. For them,these conservative values are not ideologically drivenbut represent a self-evident popular consensus aroundthe role of religion in public life. The will of the people,particularly when it coincides with the will of God,takes precedence over any presumed international

human-rights norms.15


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In part because of these sharp differences in viewsabout how society should be governed, Egypt in late-

2012 and early-2013 witnessed violent clashes betweensecularists and Brotherhood supporters. Scores ofBrotherhood of ces were attacked and torched, evenin the city of Ismailiya, where the Brotherhood wasfounded in 1928. 16 In Tunisia, in 2013, the assassina-tion of two secular leaders, mentioned earlier, set offlarge street demonstrations against En-Nahda.

Some Islamist leaders like Morsi blamed “rem-nants of the former regimes” for much of this agita-tion. While there is an element of truth in this charge,it appears that the Islamist parties miscalculated bynot appreciating the depth of anger and fear that thenon-Islamist citizenry and political parties had towardthe Islamists. 17 In Egypt, this anger eventually gath-ered steam and support through the Tamarod (rebel)

movement—a petition drive to compel Morsi to holdnew presidential elections, which was supported bythe leading secular parties that formed a coalitioncalled the National Salvation Front. Millions of Egyp-tians signed the petition, though the exact number isthe subject of some dispute, and throngs of citizensgathered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and other venues todemand Morsi’s resignation. 18 These demonstrationsprompted the Brotherhood to stage counterdemon-strations in other parts of Cairo in support of Morsi.The Egyptian military then entered into the politicalfray by calling on both sides to compromise for thesake of the country’s stability, though it soon becameapparent that the military’s loyalties were with theanti-Morsi crowds. After Defense Minister Abdel Fa-

tah al-Sissi held a private meeting with Morsi, dur-ing which Morsi refused to compromise, the militarystepped in and ousted him, placing him under arrest.


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It then appointed an interim civilian governmentunder the leadership of Adly Mansour, head of the

Supreme Constitutional Court, who became interimpresident, though al-Sissi clearly was the powerbehind the scene. 19

During the course of the next several weeks inEgypt, the military and police forces mounted an ag-gressive campaign against the Brotherhood, arrest-ing hundreds of its leaders. In mid-August 2013, theEgyptian security forces violently broke up the pro-Morsi protest encampments in Cairo, during whichover 500 Brotherhood supporters and some 42 policewere killed. 20 Egypt then descended into a very vio-lent period, when scores of Coptic Christian churchesand police stations were attacked by Brotherhoodsupporters, while several hundred more Brotherhoodactivists were killed by the security forces and thou-

sands more were arrested.21

In the meantime, Islamistextremist groups emanating from the Sinai Peninsulaembarked on a terror campaign against the new re-gime, the police, and the military from the summerof 2013 to the winter of 2014; at least 300 security per-sonnel were killed by those extremists in either bombattacks or armed clashes. The new regime lumped theBrotherhood and the Islamist extremists together as acommon foe, and in late-December 2013 declared theBrotherhood to be a “terrorist organization.” 22

Facing widespread anger from secularists—partic-ularly from trade unionists and the liberal and leftistintelligentsia, some of whom formed their own “Ta-marod campaign”—and seeing what had happenedto the Brotherhood in Egypt, En-Nahda decided to

compromise. After many weeks of negotiations withsecular elements and parties, in September 2013, En-Nahda agreed to relinquish the premiership and its


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dominant position in the government. 23 A technocraticinterim government was appointed in its stead in ear-

ly-2014, and various elements within the Tunisian pol-ity convened and rewrote the constitution, which hassince been deemed to be one of the most progressiveconstitutions in the Arab world. 24 Elections to a newparliament are expected to take place later in 2014.

Thus, the Islamist-secularist divide has played outvery differently in Egypt and Tunisia. Although bothsocieties were and remain deeply split, the divide inEgypt resulted in extensive violence and the incar-ceration of over 10,000 oppositionists (mostly Brother-hood activists and supporters), whereas the divide inTunisia has resulted in peaceful political compromise,though with the Islamist party losing its dominantposition.

HOW HAS THE UNITED STATES RESPONDEDSO FAR TO THE ISLAMIST-SECULARISTDIVIDE?

The Arab Spring of 2011 brought about a new as-sessment within U.S. policy circles about the U.S. ap-proach to Islamist parties. Although prior to that, theUnited States did maintain ties with a few Islamistparties in some Arab countries—for example, in post-Saddam Iraq and Morocco—it was reluctant to upsetthe leaders of other Arab countries, like Mubarak ofEgypt and Ben Ali of Tunisia, who made it known thatthey would view as hostile any relationship betweenthe United States and such parties or organizations.When those regimes were overthrown and the Islamist

parties became legal, U.S. policy adjusted accordingly.U.S. policymakers sought to cultivate ties with theseparties because they were the best organized within


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the polity and appeared to be the most popular in sev-eral countries. Consequently, in Egypt, especially dur-

ing the rst year after the 2011 revolution, when U.S.of cials traveled to Cairo, they would usually visit theSupreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and theBrotherhood, while bypassing or giving short shriftto the secular-liberal parties. 25 Although the plethoraof such secular-liberal parties meant that it would bevery dif cult logistically to meet each one of them intheir own headquarters—U.S. of cials often preferredto meet them in a group setting in one location—itgave the impression that the United States was inter-ested only in the military and the Brotherhood, twoilliberal organizations, to the detriment of what theother parties believed were the true democratic andliberal forces. 26

As can be imagined, the U.S. approach did not sit

well with most of the secular-liberal parties. It becameconventional thinking among the secular-liberal intel-ligentsia in Egypt that the United States had put all ofits eggs in the Muslim Brotherhood’s basket, and thisfeeling was reinforced during the Morsi presidency. 27 The United States was relatively silent when, in late-November 2012, Morsi declared his decrees to be nolonger subject to judicial review, because he had justworked with Hamas to broker a truce with Israel aftera are-up occurred between the two belligerents. Af -ter praising Morsi for brokering this truce, the UnitedStates apparently did not want to upset him by turn-ing on his undemocratic domestic policies, but thatpolicy only fed conspiracy theories in Egypt of U.S.-Brotherhood collusion.

Perhaps more importantly, U.S. of cials, at leastinitially, did not seem to understand how polarizingthe Muslim Brotherhood was in Egyptian politics. The


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fact that Morsi won the presidency did not mean that amajority of Egyptians had adopted the Brotherhood’s

agenda. He won for the reasons mentioned earlier, andthe Brotherhood’s true support was probably around25 percent of the populace. 28 When Morsi issued hiscontroversial November 22, 2012, decree, this latentanti-Brotherhood sentiment came to the fore. WhenMorsi rushed through a referendum on a constitutionthat was drafted primarily by his Brotherhood alliesthe following month, the anger of his substantial num-ber of detractors also burst onto the surface. 29

Moreover, Morsi also seemed to have underesti-mated the strength of the secular-liberals in Egyptiansociety. The fact that the political parties represent-ing this segment of society did poorly at the polls anddid not have a mass base obscured the strength andresiliency of this group, which also had allies in the

Egyptian judiciary. Hence, by misreading the electionresults (both of the parliamentary and presidentialelections), U.S. policymakers seemed to have con-cluded that the secular-liberals were an insigni cantforce. It was not surprising, therefore, that U.S. of -cials seemed to have concluded that continuing theirrelationship with the Brotherhood—especially be-cause Morsi hailed from that organization—was theonly logical policy.

By the time the United States had a change of hearttoward Morsi—stepping up criticism of his repressivedomestic policies in early-2013—it had already lostthe support of Egypt’s entire secular-liberal intelligen-tsia.30 Although the United States was cognizant of thisestrangement on the part of the secular-liberals and

tried to mend fences with them—in early-March 2013,for example, Secretary of State Kerry stated upon hisarrival in Cairo, “I come here on behalf of President


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Obama, committed not to any party, not to any oneperson, not to any speci c political point of view.” 31

Such comments did little to assuage the concerns ofMorsi’s many detractors.That same spring, young, secular activists started

the Tamarod (rebel) campaign, which was essentiallya petition drive to compel Morsi to hold new presi-dential elections. The campaign hoped to receive moresignatures from Egyptian citizens than the amountof votes Morsi received as a presidential candidate,thereby delegitimizing his presidency. The Tama-rod activists were supported by a coalition of secu-lar opposition parties called the National SalvationFront, which was made up of some of the country’sleading oppositionists at the time—former ForeignMinister and Arab League Secretary General, AmreMoussa; former International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) and chief Mohammad El-Baradei, who washead of the Constitution party; and socialist politicianHamdeen Sabahi. 32

U.S. policymakers, while recognizing the mount-ing opposition to Morsi and the Brotherhood, stillbelieved they had no choice but to deal with Morsi,who, despite all of his faults, was the democratical-ly elected president of Egypt. On June 18, 2013, U.S.Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson delivered aspeech in Cairo in which she tried to dispel notions ofa U.S.-Brotherhood conspiracy and explain why theUnited States maintained relations with Morsi, sayingthat the United States would work with whoever wonelections that met international standards. However,the most controversial aspect of her speech was her

indirect criticism of the Tamarod campaign. She ex-pressed skepticism that street protests would producebetter results than elections and called on Egyptians to


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“roll up their sleeves” and work hard to join and buildpolitical parties “because there is no other way.” 33 A

few days later, Patterson met with Khairat al-Shater,not a government of cial but a Brotherhood leader, inan effort to have him persuade Morsi to reach out tothe opposition. Although this message did not makeany headway, the mere fact that such a meeting tookplace fed the secular-liberals’ conspiracy theories ofa U.S.-Brotherhood alliance. 34 From the standpointof many within this camp in Egypt, the United Stateswas not a neutral party but a facilitator of Morsi andthe Brotherhood’s authoritarian policies. 35 Anti-U.S.sentiment, already high, increased among the secular-liberals, and Patterson’s image was crudely depictedon placards carried by the anti-Morsi demonstratorswho gathered in Tahrir Square and elsewhere. 36

Thus, by the time that Morsi was overthrown by

the Egyptian military on July 3, 2013, with the con-currence of millions of Egyptian citizens, the U.S.standing in Egypt had reached a low point. There wasa widespread belief among anti-Brotherhood Egyp-tians that the United States had aided and abettedthe Morsi government and thus was complicit in itsauthoritarian and sometimes repressive policies. 37 TheUnited States tried to steer a middle course after Morsiwas overthrown. President Barack Obama, while ac-knowledging the “legitimate grievances of the Egyp-tian people,” nonetheless said the United States was“deeply concerned by the decision of the armed forcesto remove President Morsi and suspend the constitu-tion.” 38 Hoping not to burn its bridges with the Egyp-tian military, however, the United States did not call

Morsi’s removal a coup because that would have ledto an immediate cutoff of U.S. aid under existing U.S.legislation. This middle course, however, satis ed no


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one in Egypt. The Egyptian military and the secular-liberals were upset that the United States criticized

what had happened on July 3, believing it was a genu-ine revolution that should have been supported byWashington, 39 while the Muslim Brotherhood, seeingthe U.S. reluctance to call Morsi’s ouster a coup, be-lieved that the United States had given the Egyptianmilitary a “green light” to remove their president. 40

Subsequent attempts by the United States and theEuropean Union (EU) that summer to bring about rec-onciliation between the new Egyptian authorities andthe Brotherhood failed. Although the United Statesstill refused to call Morsi’s ouster a coup, it held upthe delivery of F-16 jets to Egypt, in early-August2013, probably as a lever on the new Egyptian gov-ernment led behind the scenes by Defense Ministeral-Sissi. But even this small slap on the wrist was

criticized by al-Sissi as “not the way to treat a patri-otic military.” 41 When the Egyptian military authori-ties, against the advice of the United States, violentlybroke up the pro-Morsi protest encampments in Cairoin mid-August 2013, with much loss of life, PresidentObama interrupted his vacation to denounce the ac-tions as “deplorable.” Obama then decided to suspendthe Bright Star joint military exercises with Egypt andadded that his administration would review U.S. mili-tary aid. In October 2013, the Obama administrationdecided to suspend most military equipment sales toEgypt, though it continued to provide the more mod-est economic assistance as well as some counterterror-ism aid. 42 The U.S. Congress also exerted its in uenceon the military assistance issue. While approving the

usual $1.3 billion in U.S. military aid in the FY14 Om-nibus spending bill, Congress attached conditions onit, such as dividing the aid into two tranches and tying


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this assistance to Egypt’s reaching certain democraticbenchmarks that would have to be certi ed by the

Obama administration.43

This military aid suspension and the conditional-ity placed on it led to even more friction in the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship. It did not, moreover,lead to any lessening of the Egyptian government’srepression of the Brotherhood (and some liberal de-tractors of military rule), as some policymakers mighthave hoped. Although in April 2014, Secretary ofState Kerry announced that the United States wouldresume the delivery of 10 Apache helicopters to Egyptbecause of their importance in counterterrorism op-erations against al-Qaeda af liated terrorists in theSinai, he emphasized that this delivery was related tocounterterrorism assistance 44 (which was exempt fromcongressional conditionality on U.S. aid to Egypt).

Kerry, while acknowledging some progress in Egypt,such as the passage of the new constitution, was re-luctant to certify that Egypt had met the democraticbenchmarks enunciated by Congress—in part becausean Egyptian court had just issued hundreds of deathsentences against Brotherhood activists and support-ers, which several in uential members of Congresshad criticized. Some members of Congress also werecritical of the Egyptian government’s arrest of some journalists and some secular activists, who came tocriticize the military’s rule. Given that these convic-tions and arrests were seen as egregious violations ofhuman rights, the U.S. State Department also issuedcondemnations of them. 45

In Tunisia, the United States was largely spared

the wrath it encountered in Egypt. Although a simi-lar (though smaller) Tamarod campaign took placein Tunisia against En-Nahda in the summer of 2013


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in the aftermath of the assassination of leftist leaderBrahmi, such demonstrations, 46 led in part by trade

unions, were not accompanied by an anti-U.S. agenda.This may be explained by the fact that the U.S. role inTunisia never matched that in Egypt, both in terms ofaid and visibility, and Tunisia’s closest relationship inthe West was with France (its former colonial power),not the United States.

In contrast to the situation in Egypt, which led U.S.policymakers to go through all kinds of political con-tortions to try to steer a middle course as the militaryand security forces cracked down hard against theMuslim Brotherhood, U.S. of cials heaped praise onTunisia’s political factions for reaching a compromisein 2013 without violence. U.S. of cials participated inthe inauguration ceremony marking the passage ofTunisia’s new constitution in January 2014, 47 and Sec-

retary Kerry ew to Tunis the following month andstated on his arrival:

I wanted to come here today to con rm on behalf ofthe American people and President Obama our com-mitment to stand with Tunisia and the people of Tuni-sia and to help move down this road to democracy. 48

He added that Tunisia’s new constitution “isgrounded in democratic principles, equality, freedom,security, economic opportunity, and the rule of law.”It is a constitution, Kerry continued, “that can serveas a model for others in the region and around theworld.” 49 In April 2014, Tunisia’s interim prime min-ister Mehdi Jomaa, an independent technocrat, waswelcomed in the White House by President Obama.Obama said that while some Arab countries havehad dif culty in the transition process, “in Tunisia,


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where it all began, we have seen the kind of progressthat I think all of us had been hoping for, although

it’s been full of challenges.”50

That same month, theUnited States announced it would provide Tunisiawith a $500 million loan guarantee that would makeit easier for Tunisia to borrow money abroad; this wasthe second loan guarantee that the United States pro-vided Tunisia; the rst one was given in 2012 for $485million. 51

Clearly, the United States was holding up Tuni-sia as a model for other Arab transition countries toemulate, and was rewarding it with nancial support.The underlying message was that the United Statesfavors compromise between Islamists and secularists,and wants such compromises to be settled peaceful-ly. The problem is that the con uence of forces thatmade peaceful compromise work in Tunisia—a strong

middle class, a secularist tradition going back to thedays of the French protectorate, a vibrant and seculartrade union movement, and a more politically savvyIslamist party that saw the writing on the wall (if itdid not compromise it might have faced the same fateas the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt)—may be, andprobably is, absent in other Arab countries. 52 Hence,while it was proper for the United States to praise andreward Tunisia (in contrast to Egypt) for the way ithandled its political disputes, U.S. policymakers can-not rely on other “Tunisias” to appear. Instead, it mustdeal with more complicated and problematic coun-tries that are likely to chart a different path. Nonethe-less, there are some lessons that can be drawn from theTunisian experience that U.S. policymakers can work

toward like the value of coalitions. Before countriesexperience extreme polarization and violence, as wehave witnessed in Egypt, where the United States does


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not have much room to maneuver, the United Statescan fashion policy prescriptions for what it would like

to see in Arab transition countries.

HOW DO U.S. INTERESTS AND VALUES LINEUP WITH POLITICAL FORCES IN THE ARABTRANSITION COUNTRIES?

The preceding analysis has shown that having Is-lamists in power either exclusively or in a dominantposition tends to be a lightning rod for non-Islamistgroups in Arab societies. Whether real or imagined,secularist elements of society see Islamist groups asthreatening their way of life, and more speci cally,their personal freedoms. The question arises whetherthe United States has any role to play in this process.In other words, should it simply stand aside and let

the politics play out in these societies, or should it tryto in uence the course of events to seek one outcomeover another? Would playing such a role in these so-cieties constitute egregious interference in their inter-nal affairs, or, because of the widespread perceptionin these societies that the United States is somehowinvolved in their internal affairs anyway, does it evenmatter that the United States declares that it has a pol-icy toward Arab transition countries?

In addition, would it make sense for the UnitedStates to have two policies on the Islamist-secularistdivide, one to be applied before the transition getsunder way and the other if and when these societiesare polarized and politics become a zero-sum game?This monograph argues that such a two-tier approach

is warranted, with the understanding that the Unit-ed States may not succeed in either case, because itwill be the peoples and leaders in these societies who


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will ultimately choose which path to follow, and theymay wish to disregard U.S. advice. Nonetheless, the

United States should at least try to develop and carryout a policy of dealing with this divide as opposed toreacting to events on an ad hoc basis.

This monograph also argues that it is in the U.S.interest not to favor a dominant position for Islamistparties in Arab countries for both foreign and domes-tic policy reasons. Although historically, secular-na-tionalists in the Arab world (such as Egypt’s GamalAbdel Nasser) have been as much opposed to U.S.foreign policies in the region as have Islamist move-ments, there can be a mending of fences between suchsecular nationalist governments if some foreign policyproblems can be addressed. For example, Nasser’s suc-cessor, Anwar Sadat, one of his comrades in the FreeOf cers organization, which overthrew the Egyptian

monarch in 1952, was able to establish close ties to theUnited States in the 1970s once U.S. policy was com-mitted to the peace process and helped Egypt retrievethe Sinai Peninsula from the Israelis. This is not to saythat an Islamist government cannot cooperate withthe United States from time to time on some issues, asoccurred between Morsi and the United States duringthe Gaza are-up in November 2012. But Islamist par -ties, because they are wedded ideologically to a par-ticular worldview, which sees the West not just as apolitical opponent but a nefarious power that wantsto change the nature of their societies, are particularlyloathe to be seen cooperating with the United Statesand the West in general. 53 It should be rememberedthat the Muslim Brotherhood’s main mission when it

was formed in the late-1920s was to counter Westernin uence in Egypt, believing that much of Egyptiansociety has forsaken its Islamic roots because of this


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Westernization, and the Brotherhood still believes inthe Islamization of society. 54 In other words, opposi-

tion by Islamists to the West and the United States isnot just political, but fundamentally cultural. Theycan still view the United States as an enemy even afterresolving some political issues. By contrast, secularistsby and large do not have this deep cultural antipa-thy toward the United States. For all of his anti-U.S.stances, for example, Nasser admired American soci-ety, and was particularly fond of American movies. 55

On domestic issues, the United States is more intune with the secular-liberal groups in terms of theirvalues and support for human rights. Although somesecular groups in the Arab world believe that the shar-ia has a role to play in the formulation of laws passedby parliament—for example, even the post-Morsi newEgyptian constitution, passed in January 2014, states

that the principles of sharia are the main source of leg-islation 56—secular-liberals generally believe that reli-giosity should not be forced on society by either thestate or a political party, and that political freedoms ofpress, speech, and assembly are sacrosanct. As of thiswriting, the con ict between sharia and human rightshas become problematic in Egypt because, while thenew constitution guarantees these rights (includinggender equality), the military-backed authorities inEgypt have restricted such freedoms in the interest ofstability and “preventing chaos.” 57 Nonetheless, withthese values and rights enshrined in the new consti-tution, U.S. of cials and secular-liberal activists canhold political leaders accountable to these standards.Moreover, old draconian laws can be done away with

by a new parliament that is committed to the applica-tion of international norms and rights.


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Finally, it is also in the U.S. interest for Arab coun-tries to be stable and not go through violent upheavals

on a monthly basis. This means that, while it is not inthe U.S. interest (for the reasons mentioned above) tohave Islamist parties in a dominant position in thesecountries because these parties are so polarizing, it isalso not in the U.S. interest for these countries undersecular rule to practice exclusionary politics in whichthey shut out nonviolent Islamist parties from par-ticipating in the political system. In Tunisia, after En-Nahda agreed to compromise and relinquished pow-er, a secular political leader said that he would not beaverse to having En-Nahda in a coalition governmentwith his party after new parliamentary elections areheld in the latter part of 2014. After the political tur-moil in Tunisia in 2013, this was seen as a statementof reconciliation of sorts. 58 Unfortunately, in Egypt

right now, we are witnessing the opposite situation.The Egyptian authorities have designated the MuslimBrotherhood as a terrorist organization, and there ap-pears no chance of reconciliation over the short term. 59 The severe crackdown on the Brotherhood in the sum-mer of 2013 may have driven some elements of theBrotherhood to commit acts of violence, and hencethe regime’s terrorist labeling of the Brotherhood mayhave actually become a self-ful lling prophecy. Thereare certainly genuine Islamist terrorist groups inEgypt to the right of the Brotherhood that have com-mitted numerous acts of violence against the regime,but the Egyptian government’s inclination is to lumpall Islamist groups together and say it faces a terroristthreat from them all. 60 This type of exclusionary poli-

tics is unlikely to bring stability to Egypt, and evensome secular-liberals who are opposed to the Broth-erhood understand the potential danger of exclusion-


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ary politics. 61 The following historical analogy maybe illustrative of what worked in the past in anoth-

er part of the world in which the United States wasdeeply involved, and may be of bene t to U.S. poli -cymakers who are seeking optimal outcomes in Arabtransition countries.

Post-World War II Strategy in Western Europeas an Analogy.

Although the Arab world and Western Europe rep-resent different cultures, and some observers may re-sent a comparison of Islamism (using Islam as a politi-cal ideology) with Communism, there are lessons thatthe United States can draw from the past about hownew political systems, parties, and elections emergedin post-war Italy and France that have applicability to

political transitions in the Arab world.In Italy, for example, after the liberation of Romein 1944 but before the end of the war in 1945, variouspolitical groups formed the Committee of NationalLiberation. This council was comprised of the newlyformed Christian Democrats, the Communists, Social-ists, the Action Party, and the liberals. This coalitionlasted until 1947. There were several reasons for thiscooperation: 1) the war was still going on in 1944 andin the rst half of 1945, and non-fascist Italians want -ed to show the outside world that Italians themselvescould take charge of their country while ghting theGermans and the remnants of Mussolini’s regime incooperation with the Allies; 2) the Communists wereunder instructions from Moscow to participate in co-

alition governments; and 3) the Christian Democrats,as a new party, needed time to develop and did notwant to hinder the anti-fascist coalition. The ItalianCommunist Party, because of its prominent role in


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In these elections held in June 1946, the ChristianDemocrats emerged as the party with the largest plu-

rality, winning 35.2 percent of the vote. The Commu-nists won 18.9 percent, while the Socialist party won20.7 percent of the vote. Although the combined voteof the Communists and the Marxist-oriented Socialistparty was slightly higher than the Christian Demo-crats, these two parties could not dominate the coali-tion government as they had initially hoped. Otherdevelopments occurred in subsequent years to furtherweaken the Marxist left in Italy. In May 1947, DeGas-peri, backed by the United States, which had just an-nounced the Marshall Plan for the recovery of WesternEurope, felt strong enough to dismiss the Communistsand Socialists from his cabinet; a more moderate fac-tion within the Socialist party broke away from theparty to form a new party; and Moscow gave instruc-

tions to Western European Communist parties to nolonger participate in coalition governments. Whennew elections were held in Italy in April 1948, theChristian Democrats scored even more gains, winning48.5 percent of the vote, while the combined Commu-nist and left-wing Socialist parties won 30.1 percent ofthe vote. 66

In France, the three main anti-collaborationist par-ties—Communists, the Socialists, and France’s equiv-alent of the Christian Democrats, called the PopularRepublican Movement—became part of a coalitiongovernment formed after Paris was liberated in Au-gust 1944, and was under the leadership of GeneralCharles DeGaulle of the Free French Forces until 1946.This government was called “The Provisional Govern-

ment of the French Republic,” and it governed Franceuntil 1947, similar to what had occurred in Italy. Ifelections had been held immediately after the war,there was a good chance that the Communists would


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have emerged as the dominant political party becauseof their prominent role in the resistance. 67 Instead,

elections were put off until the non-Communist forceswere in a better position to contest the elections.The lesson that can be drawn from these experi-

ences is that Italy and France were in a state of deeppolitical turmoil toward the end of World War II. Theold regimes—the collaborationist Vichy governmentand Mussolini’s fascist government—were discred-ited, and the anti-fascist groups were jockeying forposition. They settled on coalition governments in1944—with support from outside powers—as the bestway to bring stability and redemption to their coun-tries. The moderate parties realized that a rush to elec-tions would aid the Communists, because they werethe best organized of the resistance groups. Hence,national elections for parliament were delayed by the

moderate parties in order for them to build up theirnational followings. So, when national elections wereheld in 1946, the Communists were not in a positionto dominate the political scene. Outside powers alsocontributed to this process. Both the United States andthe Soviet Union aided the non-Communists and theCommunists, respectively, but the non-Communistswere able to prevail. 68 Although the Communists con-tinued to participate in the parliamentary systems inItaly and France, and were able to retain a signi cantfollowing in subsequent years—even winning controlof some municipalities—they were never in a posi-tion to dominate the national politics of either countrycompletely.

The lessons that can be drawn from these experi-

ences are: 1) political coalitions from a transitionalcountry’s political factions can be a stabilizing forcein the aftermath of the fall of a discredited regime; 2)delaying elections can give moderate parties a chance


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to develop and level the political playing eld; 3) in -clusionary politics—allowing all political factions,

including more radical elements, to participate inelections—can be a stabilizing factor; and, 4) outsidepowers can play a positive role by working with theirideological allies in support of coalition politics.

Although in 1947 the Communists were excludedfrom government in both Italy and France, non-Com-munists did not make them illegal. If they had doneso, it is likely that Italy and France would have experi-enced more instability in the post-war period, since theCommunists were in uential in the labor unions andamong the intellectual classes. Forcing the Commu-nists underground may have led to act of subversionand sabotage, which would have caused numerousproblems in these societies and hindered the develop-ment of a Western security umbrella under U.S. lead-

ership. Although at the time, the United States wasnot pleased that the French and Italian Communistparties, which were pro-Moscow, remained legal enti-ties in these countries, especially at the time when theCold War had solidi ed. In retrospect, keeping theseparties in the political system (though not in govern-ment) proved to be a wise policy.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

Dealing with Countries Immediately after theOverthrow or Resignation of the Autocrat.

This monograph posits seven recommendations:1. As the examples of Italy and France in the im-

mediate post-war years have shown (as has Tunisiapost-2013), it is best for achieving stability and less-ening the chances of polarization for Arab transition


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countries to adopt coalition governments immediate-ly after the fall of a discredited autocratic leader. The

United States should encourage the remaining institu-tions of the old regimes, such as the military and the judiciary, which perhaps have not been overly taintedby repression, and the countries’ political forces tocome up with a suitable formula of party representa-tion in these new governments. Given how polarizingIslamist parties are among secular groups, it should beemphasized to the power brokers that while Islamistsshould have a signi cant presence in these coalitions,they should not have a majority position in them. Ifa visible U.S. role in this endeavor would be seen ascounterproductive by the political players, the UnitedStates should work together with its regional allies be-hind the scenes, with the political factions over whichthe United States and its allies have some in uence.

This combination of inside and outside in uencemay succeed in bringing about a relatively stable andrepresentative coalition that will be accepted by thepopulace. As alluded to earlier, the post-war coalitiongovernments in Italy and France had a certain amountof legitimacy because they were made up of anti-fas-cist forces. But the United States and the Soviet Unionalso played a role in supporting their allies in thesecoalitions and encouraging them, at least initially, tocooperate with the other parties in the coalition.

2. The United States should promote that the coali-tion government be given both executive and legisla-tive powers. Decisions should be reached by consen-sus, which will lead to a buy-in by all of the politicalfactions. These political forces will thus see the co-

alition government as “their” government, becausethey will have an important role in the decisionmak-ing process. To avoid the appearance of domination


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5. The United States should privately encouragethe delay of presidential and parliamentary elections

for at least 3 years. It would nd the most receptivityfor this delay among the secular parties, which wouldbe starting out with a disadvantage politically andwould want the time to build their parties, develop acoherent ideology and party platform, and organizeoutside of the main cities. The United States is likely to

nd the most resistance to the delay from Islamist par -ties, which would want elections sooner rather thanlater to take advantage of their grass-roots appeal. 70 As long as the ruling coalition government retains anon-Islamist majority, the secular forces should beable to put off Islamist calls for early elections. If thegoverning coalition does enact political and economicreforms, the populace might be content in seeing thecoalition government continue for this 3-year period

and not clamor for elections. Moreover, a relativelylong period for a coalition government would work toequalize the political parties in the eyes of the popu-lace. Secular parties that were not well known priorto the revolution or ones that had been formed at thestart of the revolution would now be seen as on equalfooting as the Islamist parties, which presumably hadbeen more well known to the populace.

6. The United States should encourage Ameri-can and European nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) involved in democracy promotion to assistpolitical parties of all ideological persuasions (Islamistand secularist) in these countries to develop effectivepolitical party strategies, such as messaging, cam-paigning, and recruitment. If particular Arab countries

reject these NGOs as “interfering in their countries’internal affairs,” 71 the United States should weigh inwith the ruling coalition to underscore the fact that


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such efforts bene t all parties. If these U.S. appealsdo not work, the United States should encourage the

political parties to send some of their cadres to theUnited States for training by these NGOs.7. As in the case now with Tunisia, the United States

should reward the governing coalition politically andeconomically. The United States should praise the de-velopment of a progressive constitution and its pas-sage by the public, the settlement of disputes peace-fully through coalition politics, and the enactment ofpolitical and economic reforms. The U.S. administra-tion can also encourage the U.S. Congress to provideloan guarantees and bilateral direct aid to the country,which will help it deal with pressing problems likeinfrastructure and unemployment. All of these poli-cies will put the governing coalition in a good light.By the time elections are held, the secular parties will

be held in as high esteem as the Islamist party, andchances are they will do well in the electoral contestsbecause they will be seen as responsible and workingfor the welfare of the people. They will no longer beseen as merely debating clubs of urban intellectuals.Hence, they would stand a good chance of remaininga part of, and even becoming a dominant force in, anew ruling coalition. If the secularists do come outon top after the elections, the United States shoulduse its in uence with them not to turn against the Is -lamists and to allow the Islamists to continue to havea stake in the new political system by participating infuture elections.


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Dealing with Countries that are Already HighlyPolarized in Which Politics Is a Zero-Sum Game.

The most dif cult scenario for U.S. policymakersis the one Egypt experienced during the Morsi presi-dency (2012-13) and is currently experiencing undermilitary/secular rule (2013-14), when exclusionarypolitics is the name of the game. The winning sidebelieves that the losing side is not only its opponent,but its enemy, which needs to be suppressed. Howcan the United States maneuver through this sharpand exclusionary divide and still maintain its interestsand values?

1. The United States should be consistent on humanrights issues, no matter which side is committing theabuses. As mentioned earlier, one of the main reasonsthe U.S. standing fell to a low point in Egypt, particu-

larly among secular elements, was because the UnitedStates failed to criticize Morsi’s November 22, 2012,decree that set him above the law. U.S. quiescence wasinterpreted as U.S. support for Morsi’s policies, whileconspiracy theories abounded about some type of se-cret, back room deal between the United States and theBrotherhood. Although the United States was gratefulto Morsi for helping to broker the Hamas-Israel truce just days earlier, foreign policy cooperation should nottrump an egregious act like the November 22 decree.In addition, when violence is committed by both sidesof the divide, the United States should acknowledgethis fact as well. For example, it was proper for U.S.of cials to condemn the mid-August 2013 crackdownon pro-Morsi demonstrators in which more than 500

died in a single day, 72 but U.S. of cials should alsohave condemned the killing of 42 policemen on thatday as well. Granted, there was a large difference in


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the numbers of those killed, but some of the pro-Mor-si protestors did have arms and used them against

the security forces, so at least some of the pro-Morsidemonstrators were not innocent victims.2. The United States also needs to be consistent in

advocating inclusionary politics. When Morsi was inpower, it appears that the United States did not pressMorsi or the Muslim Brotherhood to bring secular op-positionists into the government until very late in thegame, mid-June 2013, 73 only a couple of weeks beforeMorsi was overthrown. Whether Morsi would havelistened to the United States earlier remains an openquestion. Even if he would not have done so, at leastthe effort by the United States to push for an inclusion-ary outcome may have lessened the virulent anti-U.S.sentiment that surfaced in June and July 2013. AfterMorsi was ousted by the Egyptian military, U.S. and

EU diplomats did try to convince Defense Minister al-Sissi and the interim civilian government to not crackdown violently on the Morsi supporters and to reachsome type of political arrangement with them, but tono avail. 74

3. The United States should understand that Egypt(and countries that might be in a similar situation oneday) is still undergoing a revolutionary period. His-torically, revolutions go through different phases, andlegalisms are often their rst casualty. For example,Mubarak’s ouster by the Egyptian military in Febru-ary 2011—with power transferring to the SCAF—wastechnically an illegal act. Under the then-existingEgyptian constitution, power should have been trans-ferred to the speaker of parliament, who would rule

for 60 days, followed by new elections for president.But in the heyday of revolutionary euphoria, no onequestioned this power transfer, including the United


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States, which was pleased that Mubarak had nallystepped down and a pro-U.S. military would rule in

his place until elections for parliament and presidentwould be held. In June 2013, as Egypt was in the midstof arguably a second revolution—this time againstMorsi—the U.S. response was legalistic. Impendingstreet protests were criticized by U.S. of cials; instead,the message was to work for political parties. 75 In anormal situation, this might have been sound advice,but by June 2013, with millions of Egyptians taking tothe streets to demand Morsi’s resignation, Egypt wasin the midst of additional revolutionary upheaval. Insuch a situation, U.S. of cials should have sided withthe demonstrators because they represented the majority of the populace. Even though Morsi had beenelected democratically, he acted in an authoritarianmanner; with the United States calling on Egyptians

to stick with Morsi for another 3 years, this messagewas viewed in Egypt as a policy of having the popu-lace to continue to suffer under authoritarian andincompetent rule.

4. U.S. of cials should also understand that in ahighly polarized political environment, it is impos-sible to please both sides. The United States can eitherdowngrade relations and cut off assistance to the win-ning side to show its dissatisfaction with the winningside’s repressive actions or continue its relations withthe winning side in the hope that the leverage thatcomes with such a relationship can be used to decreasethe suppression of the losing side. Either way, the ideais to make the winning side less repressive. In the caseof some countries that are very prideful of their his-

tory, like Egypt, maintaining a working relationshipwith the regime is usually preferable to cutting off aidbecause the latter policy will cause a nationalist back-lash and ultimately hinder U.S. leverage. 76


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5. In a highly polarized environment, the presi-dent of the transition country is usually the one who

is the most polarizing gure, as he represents the bestor worst of a particular ideology, depending on one’spoint of view. Hence, it is important for outside coun-tries like the United States to work with parliamentsas a check on the excesses of a president. Prior to theArab Spring, most parliaments in the Arab world weremerely mouthpieces of the ruling regime, but post-Arab Spring, parliaments have become more diverseand more independent of the presidency. Moreover,the new constitutions that have emerged and willemerge in Arab transition countries also tend to givemore power to parliaments than they had in the past.The United States can also increase funding for its Vis-itors Program, which brings foreign legislators to thiscountry as a way of persuading them of the bene ts of

political inclusivity.Additionally, U.S. of cials should encourage thenew regime to live up to the liberal clauses in its newconstitution, which was substantially rewritten in late-2013 and passed by public referendum in early-2014.Except for the clauses that give the military and thepolice wide autonomy, the constitution is a progres-sive document in which liberal freedoms (of speech,the press, and assembly) are protected. 77 It shouldbe the duty of the new Egyptian parliament that willlikely be elected in early 2015 to see to it that laws arein conformity to the constitution. If they are not, theyshould be removed. For example, there are still lawson the books that state a citizen can be arrested for“defaming Egypt.” Such a law can be so broadly in-

terpreted that it can easily be used to sti e politicaldissent. The United States can also use the advent ofparliamentary elections to push for as much inclusiv-


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ity as possible. Although there is little to no chancethat the Brotherhood’s political arm, the Freedom and

Justice party, will be allowed to run in these elections--and U.S. advocacy on this party’s behalf will likelyback re--the United States can and should push foras much political inclusivity as possible. This meansallowing non-Brotherhood Islamists like the variousSala parties to participate in the elections so thatthese elections are not simply a contest among secular-ists. Over time, once the new parliament is ensconcedand the terrorist threat subsides, the government maybe more willing to countenance even more inclusivity.

6. In a society under secular rule that is facing agenuine terrorist threat from Islamist militants, likeEgypt today, it is unlikely that the United States willbe able to convince the authorities that the designa-tion of the Muslim Brotherhood as a “terrorist or-

ganization” is both wrong and counterproductiveuntil the terrorist threat is brought under control. Aslong as terrorist acts are taking place in the country,the authorities will tend to lump all Islamist groupstogether. Given such strong sentiments, U.S. policy-makers must understand that they cannot realisticallychange the Egyptian government’s attitude and poli-cies toward the Brotherhood. Hence, the United Statesand Egypt, at least over the short term, will have to“agree to disagree” on the Brotherhood. What theUnited States can do (in conjunction with the EU) isto criticize the Egyptian government when it under-takes egregious human rights violations (such as thequick trials in the spring of 2014 in which hundredsof Brotherhood activists and supporters were given

the death penalty), the arrests of journalists for simplydoing their job of reporting on opposition activities,and the arrests of young activists for demonstrating


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in the streets against the military. Egypt’s new regimewants to gain international legitimacy, and, by with-

holding full legitimacy through the condemnation ofsuch arrests, the United States and the EU can hold theregime to a certain standard.

7. U.S. economic assistance, in a highly polarizedenvironment, should be geared to a high-visibilityproject that would be seen as bene ting the peopleover the regime. In this way, the United States canhelp enhance its image in the country and mitigate thesuspicions that the United States favors one side overanother in the societal divide.

8. During sharp Islamist-secularist polarization,which is usually accompanied by human rights abus-es, the United States should review its military aid tothat country to ensure that no U.S. military items arebeing used for the suppression of internal dissent. If

U.S. military items have been found to be used for thispurpose, the United States should discontinue anyfurther deliveries of such items and should warn theauthorities that continued use of them for such pur-poses would adversely affect future aid.

9. In general, however, U.S. military aid to coun-tries undergoing polarization should not be cut, be-cause doing so would lessen U.S. leverage either withthe regime in power or with that country’s military es-tablishment. In particular, if a country is facing an Is-lamist terrorist threat during heightened polarization,cutting military aid—especially aid that can be usedfor counterterrorism purposes—can work againstU.S. interests, because it will embolden the terroristgroups and give the perception, especially among sec-

ularists in the society, that the United States is some-how secretly in league with the Islamists to take overthe country.


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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

The following suggestions for the U.S. Army willpreserve and enhance the bilateral security relation-ship between the United States and Arab transitioncountries facing political polarization, such as Egypt.

Background.

Many of the countries in the Arab world, includingthose going through transitions, have had long secu-rity relationships with the United States. Such rela-tionships have often involved the sale of U.S. militaryhardware to the military establishments of these coun-tries (especially to their armies, which represent thelargest segment of their armed forces), joint militaryexercises, the sharing of intelligence for counterterror-

ism purposes, and, increasingly, help with counter-terrorism operations.Within the Islamist-secularist divide, the military

establishments of these countries are usually on theside of the secularists, because they have long seenthe Islamists not only as a threat, but as having loyal-ties outside of the nation-state. 78 Hence, it has been along-held view of these military establishments thatIslamists should not be allowed to join the of cercorps, and one of the main tasks of military intelli-gence in these countries has been to weed out thoseof cers who were suspected of having been mem -bers or supporters of Islamist organization like theMuslim Brotherhood and even more radical Islamistgroups. During his presidency, Morsi tried to change

this prohibition, and pressed the military to includesome young Brotherhood members into the militaryacademies. 79 It is likely that this action was one of the

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Maneuvering the Islamist-Secularist Divide in the Arab World: How the United States Can Preserve its...

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