INVITED PAPER

Many Windows: Reflections on Robert Ulanowicz’sSearch for Meaning in Science

William Grassie

Received: 1 August 2011 / Accepted: 16 September 2011 / Published online: 27 September 2011

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract This paper is an extended discussion of Robert Ulanowicz’s critique of

mechanistic and reductionistic metaphysics of science. He proposes ‘‘process ecol-

ogy’’ as an alternative. In this paper I discuss four sets of question coming out of

Ulanowicz’s proposal. First, I argue that universality remains one of the hallmarks of

the scientific enterprise even with his new process metaphysics. I then discuss the

Second Law of Thermodynamics in the interpretation of the history of the universe. I

question Ulanowicz’s use of the terms ‘‘random’’ and ‘‘chance’’ in his definition of

process. Finally, I discuss what difference a relational and process metaphysics might

make in addressing the political and practical problems in the twenty-first century.

Keywords Robert Ulanowicz � Process � Ecology � Reductionism � Materialism �Determinism � Newtonian mechanics � Darwinian evolution � Thermodynamics �Universality � Epistemology � Chaisson � Complexity � Whitehead � Bateson �Historical sciences � Sagan

There are many windows through which we can look out into the world,

searching for meaning… Most of us, when we ponder on the meaning of our

existence, peer through but one of these windows onto the world. And even

that one is misted over by the breath of finite humanity. We clear a tiny

peephole and stare through. No wonder we are confused by the tiny fraction of

a whole that we see.

– Jane Goodall (1990, p. 10)

In his book, A Third Window: Natural Life Beyond Newton and Darwin (2009),

Robert Ulanowicz proposes to replace a mechanistic and reductionistic metaphysics

W. Grassie (&)

Metanexus Institute, New York, NY, USA

e-mail: grassie@metanexus.net

123

Axiomathes (2012) 22:195–205

DOI 10.1007/s10516-011-9173-9

of science with what he calls ‘‘process ecology’’.1 He means this ‘‘Third Window’’

to be both a supplement to and critique of the two other windows that scientists

use to understand nature—Newtonian Mechanics and Neo-Darwinian Evolution.

Ulavowicz develops a critique of the dominant scientific metaphysics of the

nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a metaphysics that is based on atomism,

reductionism, materialism, determinism, and universalism. In it’s place, he proposes

three fundamental postulates:

1. The operation of any system is vulnerable to disruption by chance events.

2. A process, via mediation by other processes, may be capable of influencing

itself.

3. Systems differ from one another according to their history, some of which is

recorded in their material configurations. (p. 115)

In short, ‘‘chance, self-reference, and history’’ (p. 129) disrupt much of the

dominant scientific metaphysics. Ulanowicz writes:

The first [postulate] is a direct contradiction of the Newtonian assumption of

determinism. It is unlikely to be embraced by those whose primary interest in

science is, following Bacon, to control nature. The second postulate becomes

controversial as soon as one realizes that it dispenses with obligate reductionism,

which as we have seen is supported by closure and atomism… The third axiom is

perhaps oldest and most familiar, as science has been confronted with history

since before the time of Darwin… But history extirpates reversibility. Finally,

the earlier faith in universality is, like our previous confidence in atomism, now

absent from our formation.’’ (p. 116)

He proposes a number of corollaries to these three fundamental principles of

science. First, his process ecology ‘‘window’’ leads to a shift from fixed laws to

descriptions of processes. Second, he see ‘‘agency’’ in nature residing in ‘‘the

configuration of propensities’’. And third, he understands patterns and forms in nature

as the result of ‘‘agonistic tendencies’’ and ‘‘dissipative losses’’ (pp. 116–118).

I would now like to pose four sets of questions for discussion. First, I want to

examine what kinds of universality remain in the scientific enterprise after we have

deconstructed the old metaphysics. Second, I want us to ponder together the

implications of building this new metaphysics upon ‘‘agonistic tendencies’’ and

‘‘dissipative losses’’. In other words, how do we understand the Second Law of

Thermodynamics in our process metaphysics. Third, I want to discuss the uses of

the terms ‘‘random’’ and ‘‘chance’’ in Ulanowicz’s definition of process. Fourth,

I want to examine process ecology as a political and practical undertaking in the

1 This essay is adapted from a paper presented at a seminar entitled ‘‘Beyond Mechanistic Biology—The

Relevance of Process Philosophy’’ hosted by John Cobb and Philip Clayton at Claremont School of

Theology’s Center for Process Thought, July 19—21, 2010. Other participants included Lawrence

Cahoone, Spyridon Koutroufinis, Brian Henning, Jesper Hoffmeyer, Adam Scarfe, Scott Turner, Robert

Ulanowicz, and Bruce Weber. Absent were Scott Gilbert and Jeff Schloss. A different version of this

essay was published by Grassie (2011a, b). Process Ecology in Process: A Review of Robert Ulanowicz’s

Third Window. Retrieved 7/28/11, 2011, from http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/109

98/Default.aspx.

196 Axiomathes (2012) 22:195–205

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twenty-first century. How might these scholastic debates matter (or not) to the

practical global challenges that motivate Ulanowicz and others.

1 Reconstructing the Philosophy of Science

Ulanowicz argues that ‘‘universality remains foreign to the world of process

ecology, which appears granular in all directions and dimensions’’ (p. 151). While I

am sympathetic to this more postmodern and perspectivalist epistemology, I want to

argue that a lot of ‘‘universality’’ remains in the domains of science, even if the last

50 years in the philosophy of science have rid us of the pretenses of Neo-Positivism

and a certain scientistic chauvinism.2

First, we need to recognize that the philosophy of science is to the practice of

science what linguistics is to the competent use of a human language. In other

words, one can be an excellent scientist and know nothing of the philosophy of

science, just as one can competently speak, read, and write a human language and

know nothing of linguistics, or for that matter, even formal grammar.

The philosophy of science, however, is necessary for translating between the

different domains of science, for understanding the differences between different

sciences and different non-sciences, and for the responsible interpretation of science

in human cultures. The philosophy of science is not necessary for doing ‘‘good

enough’’ science. I do think it is useful and sometimes essential for doing ‘‘great’’

science. That many of our colleagues advocate a philosophy of science that has been

falsified is a political and educational problem, but no longer a subject of serious

philosophical debate.3

The consensus in the philosophy of science today might be called pragmatic

operationalism or instrumentalism. In this view, there are many different scientific

specializations, each one having its own methods and history of discovery. Different

sciences have different rules of evidence and verification, different peer-review

processes and standards, different professional associations and journals. Depending

on what one wants to study, one pragmatically poses questions as appropriate to the

phenomenon. The established science then makes its way down into disciplinary

textbooks, which are regularly expanded and updated. There are many windows to

the universe and no grand unified epistemology of science. Within the many

domains of science, however, there are also exponentially more reliable facts.

2 See my essay ‘‘Entangled Narratives’’ (Grassie 2008) as well as chapter seven and eight in my book TheNew Sciences of Religion (Grassie 2010b). For a discussion of the collapse of neo-positivism in the

philosophy of science, see my essay ‘‘Ha! Philosophy of Science in the Comedy Club’’ Grassie (2011a, b).

Ha! Philosophy of Science in the Comedy Club. Retrieved 4/30/11, 2011, from http://www.metan

exus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/11002/Default.aspx.3 This, of course, is a bold claim that should be substantiated. The rise and fall of Positivism is the basic

outline of most introductory philosophy of science courses, though clearly many unreconstructed Neo-

positivists remain in our midst and can be quite vocal and influential. Contemporary positivists are

certainly not widely read in contemporary philosophy of science, typically having stopped with some

version of Karl Popper. For an excellent review of contemporary debates within this evolving field, see

Tauber (2009).

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And yes, science is certainly socially constructed, a point which can be both

trivial and profound. There are histories of sciences and histories of scientists that

are essential for understanding the process of discovery. The miracle of science is

that, in spite of our all-too-human imperfections, which scientists and scientific

institutions possess in equal distribution as the rest of humanity, science continues

to progress and evolve ever more factual insights into the workings of the universe

and ourselves. Science is a self-transcending learning process, but how do we

account for this miracle?4

In my recent book, I offer the following definition of science, which I submit to

you for critical evaluation:

Science is (1) different methods for detecting patterned phenomena and

explaining causal relationships, (2) applied by communities of specialists

(3) in rigorous ‘‘dialogue’’ with phenomena, (4) always implicated in lived

historical contexts and limitations, (5) resulting in a self-correcting, self-

transcending, and progressive learning process that (6) makes strongly

objective truth claims, (7) which facts are pragmatically verified in practical

applications (8) and cumulatively related in a unified body of knowledge (9)

that can be organized hierarchically by chronology of emergence, scales of

size, and degrees of complexity. (Grassie 2010b)5

Science, I am asserting, can no longer be thought of as a privileged epistemology,

but it is nonetheless a unified body of knowledge, knowledge that now presents

itself as a privileged and universal meta narrative that can be read historically,

forward and backwards. Science as a body of knowledge is progressively true. This

new evolutionary cosmology from the Singularity to the twenty-first century must

now amend earlier religious cosmologies. The latter might be interpreted

metaphorically and metaphysically, but in no sense, can we think of religious

cosmologies in a literal sense. Reading sacred scriptures as science textbooks, for

instance, is a huge and embarrassing category mistake.

The interpretation of science, in its parts and as an epic whole, is open to

numerous strategies. The Stoic and Existentialist interpretation favored by some

contemporary oracles of science is but one of many strategies. Theistic interpre-

tations of the new cosmology are not only plausible, but perhaps even more

probable than the Stoic and Existentialist interpretation, which, I argue, is self-

4 One implication from this is that we might better teach the actual history of discovery, the methods and

madness of real scientists, rather than teach the abstract formulation of some imagined hypothetical

deductive method.5 Point three is to grant the phenomena an active role in determining how they are to be understood. If the

‘‘social construction’’ of science includes the phenomenon as an active participant in the ‘‘conversation’’

and ‘‘construction’’ about how it is to be understood by the community of scientists, then social

constructionism loses its relativistic implications and instead results in a robust hermeneutics of critical

realism. I owe these insights in part to my studies of A.N. Whitehead’s process metaphysics, which

understands all actual entities to have an internal, self-creative ‘‘agency’’ or ‘‘subjectivity’’. Ulanowicz is

also influenced by Whitehead. I extend these insights with some provocations from Paul Ricoeur, arguing

that all of reality is also semantic-semiotic and that this intelligibility of nature is the precondition for

human language, including all of our scientific ‘‘translation’’ projects. Finally, this analysis dovetails

nicely with the work of C.S. Peirce.

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refuting in the actual purposeful lives of most scientists and the intricate patterns of

our phenomenal universe. A theistic interpretation of the Epic of Evolution,

however, requires that we also radically reinterpret our traditional understandings of

God and the universe. This, of course, is the larger agenda of Ulanowicz in his book,

which was published by the Templeton Foundation Press.

All of this is to say two things, which are perhaps obvious to all of you. First,

there are lots of universalities that remain in the domains of science. Let’s call these

simply ‘‘facts’’, which may be extremely complex, the quantity of which has grown

exponentially in the last century. And these universalities are the result of

reductionism and mechanism, which has been so successful that we can now talk

about emergent levels of complexity, process, and relationship that undermine

reductionist and mechanistic metaphysics. We should celebrate these successes

before we reject the partially antiquated metaphysics of scientism.

The second is that there is a difference between the contents of science and the

interpretation of science. The boundaries are more like membranes than hermetic

barriers, but we nevertheless need to be better at policing the differences between

the content of science and the interpretation thereof. Much of the current science

wars could be settled if such boundaries were better patrolled. As a result, we would

have as a much more scientifically literate and supportive public.6

2 The Letter and Spirit of the Law

My second set of questions for Ulanowicz concerns our understanding of the Second

Law of Thermodynamics, which figures prominently in his third postulate and its

corollary. Ulanowicz is trained as a chemical engineer, who then evolved into a

systems ecologist and process philosopher. Ulanowicz certainly understands the

mathematics, universality, elegance, and philosophical implications of the Second

Law better than I do, but let me pose some perhaps naı̈ve questions about the proper

interpretation thereof.

In the last point of my definition of science above, I argue that science can be

organized hierarchically in terms of time, size, and emergent complexity. The latter

is particularly problematic as we have no universally valid measurement of

complexity, though the term seems intuitively apt in diverse disciplines.

What emerges over time and also through different scales are layers of increasing

complexity. In outline form, we can talk about seven stages, each of which has a new

level of complexity and intensity. The earliest universe can be called the epoch of

particles, which then leads to the epoch of galaxy formation. The epoch of stellar

fusion leads to the epoch of planetary formation, and the chemical epoch leads to the

epoch of biology. Most recently, we find ourselves in the epoch of culture, with

the rapid evolution of intelligence and technology through collective learning. The

previous epochs do not disappear. Subatomic particles, for instance, are present

6 I address many of these cultural issues in my book Politics by Other Means: Science and Religion in theTwenty-First Century (Grassie 2010a). See also http://www.ourcommonstory.net.

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throughout, but new complexities are added onto the underlying structures (Chaisson

2006).

Eric Chaisson, who proposes this seven-staged schema, also calculates the energy–

density flows at different levels of complexity. Energy–density flow is the amount of

free energy flowing through a system in respect to its mass over time, in this case

measured as erg per seconds per grams (erg s-1 g -1). The earth’s climasphere, which

consists of the atmosphere and oceans, has roughly a hundred times the energy–

density flow of a typical star or galaxy. Through photosynthesis, plants achieve an

energy–density flow roughly a thousand times more than that of a star. The human

body is sustained by a daily food intake resulting in an energy–density flow about

twenty thousand times more intense than that of a typical star. Remember that we are

comparing the ratio of energy consumed to mass of the objects. Here is another way to

think of this. If a human body could be scaled up to the mass of our sun, it would be

twenty thousand times more luminous (assuming it could obtain enough food

energy!). The human brain, which consumes about 20% of our energy intake while

constituting about 2% of our body weight, has an energy–density flow 150,000 times

that of a typical star.7 And, finally, modern human civilization has an energy–density

ratio some five hundred thousand times that of a typical star (Chaisson 2001, 2006;

Christian 2004).

Energy–density flow turns out to be a useful way to think about increased

complexity, but it is not enough. We also need to introduce some concept of

information, but here too we do not have a universally recognized measurement for

and understanding of what constitutes information in the sciences (Gleick 2011).

In the background of this discussion of increasing complexity is the Second Law

of Thermodynamics, which states simply that entropy increases in any closed

system. Without new sources of energy flowing into a system, the system will

deteriorate into less complex, more diffuse states. In lay terminology, the Second

Law of Thermodynamics is the certainty of death and taxes. Everything tends

toward equilibrious disordered states (e.g., death), while disequilibrious ordered

states (e.g., life) can only be maintained by paying energy-intake taxes. In other

words, there are no free lunches, and you work until you die.

The complexity of life on earth is ultimately sustained by the flow of energy from

the sun to the planet, which energy is then captured by photosynthesis. The food we

eat, and with which we think and act, is ultimately solar energy passed along

through the food chain. Fossil fuels can be thought of as part of this photosynthetic

energy flow. Contemporary eco-romantics get it partly wrong and partly right. There

is always a cost to life, which we can refer to as the Great Eucharistic law: eat and

be eaten. Without killing and harvesting energy from other sources, which means

ultimately the sun, we would cease to exist. The slogan ‘‘reduce, reuse, recycle’’ is

only partly right because what drives the evolution of increasing complexity on our

planet and in the universe is actually ‘‘consume more energy in order to be more

7 Energy density flow is only indicative of complexity as we see in comparing the brain to the kidneys.

A pair of kidneys weighs about one-fourth as much as the brain, but consume roughly the same amount of

energy as the brain as measured by oxygen consumption rates. We need to combine the concept of energy

density flow with some understanding of informational complexity in order to develop a truly useful scale

of complexity. There is no universal, cross-disciplinary definition of information within the sciences.

200 Axiomathes (2012) 22:195–205

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complex’’. This is what Bertrand Russell calls ‘‘chemical imperialism’’, as cited by

Ulanowicz (pp. 72–73). The real evolutionary morality tale can be better summed

up in the new aphorism ‘‘minimize entropy, maximize creativity’’. What environ-

mentalists get right is the centrality of solar energy to our lives and the possibility

that we can do complexity better, more elegantly, and less destructively. Note that

sun-worshipping religions of the past intuited something profound about contem-

porary science and thermodynamics.

While nothing violates the letter of the law—the second law of thermodynam-

ics—the actual evolutionary history of the universe violates the spirit of the law.

Science offers no adequate explanation for why the particular complexity we

observe today should have evolved. Many other universes and many other types of

complexity can be imagined. The observed complexification of the universe allows

us to postulate a purposeful directionality in the universe. This purpose we shall

tentatively characterize as increasing complexification. This inference can be made

based on the observed history of the universe; the evolution of life on the planet; and

the development of human culture, economics, science, and technology.

At this point, it is useful to distinguish between teleonomy and teleology. The

latter refers to a goal to which something aspires, as in Aristotle’s notion of final

cause, a Platonic idea, or a Whiteheadean asymptote. Teleonomy, on the other hand,

can be thought of as an implied trajectory based on past history and need not make

reference to future purposes. The observed history of the universe—its teleonomy—

is indicative of increasing complexification as the ‘‘purpose’’ of the universe—an

inference and intimation of a possible teleos.8

Skeptics will immediately retort that the trajectory of the universe is death, in

either an entropic dispersal of matter-energy or a cosmic collapse in a so-called

‘‘Big Crunch’’. When the sun exhausts its nuclear fuel in another 4 billion years, we

can predict the end of the earth, if not sooner. Earth’s complexity will eventually

cease. The increased complexification that earth has experienced over the preceding

4 billion years is because of the energy flow from the sun. For the time being, the

earth is not a closed system, so increasing complexity overrules the intractable

necessity of entropy.

We do not really know, however, whether the universe as a whole is actually a

closed system, though this is the default assumption in cosmology.9 The theistic

hypothesis, of course, is that the universe is not a closed system, that there is some

kind of force—mind or being—that transcends the universe. In this formulation,

information may be the key to understanding what it means to talk of God-by-

whatever-name and the nature of divine intervention.10 This divine intervention,

however, would be something more like Adam Smith’s image of an ‘‘Invisible

Hand’’ at work within economic markets and therefore not something that is

available to scientific proof, only endless interpretations.

8 In other writing, I develop a natural law philosophy that is grounded in an interpretation of 21st century

science rather than Medieval Thomist theology. See The New Sciences of Religion (2010a, b).9 Multiverse Theory also proposes that the universe is an open system.10 This interpretation has been advanced by physicist-turned-theologian John Polkinghorne. See, for

instance, Polkinghorne (1989, 1994, 1998). See also the work of Clayton (Clayton 2004; Clayton and

Davies 2006).

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All of this is to say that I have questions for Ulanowicz about giving the

‘‘agonistic tendencies’’ and ‘‘dissipative forces’’ of the Second Law of Thermody-

namics the last word in our metaphysical reconstructions of contemporary science.

Certainly, we can point to the centrality of symbiosis as understood now by

Margulis and others in evolution as a counter to the competitive models of life

processes.11 Can we salvage the term ‘‘negentropy’’ and better formalize it? Can we

invent a better term? Should we understand our lives and consciousness through the

lens of death and taxes, mere survival and reproduction, or is there also an element

of extravagant generosity in the universe which demands appreciation and an

attitude of gratitude?

3 Chance and Necessity Revisited

Ulanowicz defines a process as ‘‘the interaction of random events upon a configuration

of constraints that results in a nonrandom but indeterminate outcome’’ (p. 29). I am

uncomfortable with the use of the terms ‘‘random’’ and ‘‘nonrandom’’. Instead let us

banish the use of the terms ‘‘random’’ and ‘‘chance’’ from evolutionary biology and

cosmology, in part because they are pernicious in implying meaninglessness and

purposelessness as the appropriate interpretation of science. Attributing probability

one way or another in these historical sciences is also problematic. We really cannot

know whether the macro-evolution of life on the planet is more the result of necessary

patterns being manifested or whether it is instead more a matter of happenstance.

Stephen Jay Gould can conduct a thought experiment about starting evolution over,

but we cannot in fact rewind the tape and create a real experiment to test whether his

thought experiment is really true (Gould 1989, p. 50).

The fine-tuning problem in cosmology leading to the so-called Anthropic

principle is another case in point. We have one universe and we have one case of the

evolution of life on the planet. Arguments about probability on this scale make little

sense when N = 1. We simply cannot tell whether necessities or chances are the

case in these historical sciences, and the use of these terms, which are loaded with

all manner of positive and negative connotations, is more ideological, than

scientific.12 Beauty, in the views of Whitehead and Teilhard, is the interplay of

order and chaos.

4 Process Ecology as Politics by Other Means

Ulanowicz artfully builds his case for process ecology with examples from

themodynamics, cosmology, logic, computer science, and history, though curiously

11 See Gilbert and Epel (2009) for a discussion of symbiosis in evolution.12 In a similar vein, I have criticized the Intelligent Design movement for the use of the metaphor

‘‘design’’. See (Grassie 2005a, b). I am happy to attribute distributed intelligibility/intelligence to natural

entities, which I maintain is a precondition for any science.

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not so much from the field of ecology, in which he is a specialist.13 I note again that

Ulanowicz was trained as a chemical engineer and I suppose once an engineer,

always an engineer, even after his long and productive detour into ‘‘the subversive

science’’ (Shepard and McKinley 1969). I would have enjoyed examples from

restoration ecology or failed ecological management projects, all of which would

have also strengthen his case and had immediate practical implications for industry

and policy makers.

Ulanowicz opens by citing Gregory Bateson as one of the inspirations for this

work. ‘‘If I am right’’, wrote Bateson in 1972, ‘‘the whole of our thinking about what

we are and what other people are has got to be restructured’’. Bateson criticized

what he referred to as ‘‘the pathology of epistemology’’, and warned that ‘‘we may

have twenty or 30 years before the logical reductio ad absurdum of our old positions

destroy us’’ (Bateson 2000) (Ulanowicz, p. 1).

Let’s pause to remember how much the world has changed since 1972. The number

of humans in the world increased from 4 billion to 7 billion (a 57% increase). World

energy consumption measured in quadrillions of BTU increased from 235 in 1972 to

495 in 2007 (a 47% increase).14 I really don’t have a way of assessing and appreciating

the loss of farmland, topsoil, forests, wildlife, watersheds, aquifers, and fisheries

around the world that have occurred over the last 38 years. I don’t know the proper

calculus for measuring the proverbial half-full and half-empty cup when it comes to

lost ecosystems. I don’t quite know how to mourn this and other losses, as I partake in

the benefits of our fossil fuel-driven economy.

Following Bateson’s lead, Ulanowicz is motivated by the idea that we can think

ourselves into new ways of acting, but recognizes in passing that this intellectual

endeavor may have little consequence for the world. ‘‘For I worry that most of us

have become reluctant to discuss deep assumptions about nature, preferring instead

the refuge of a determined pragmatism or technocracy’’, laments Ulanowicz. ‘‘It’s

as if fundamental principles are not somehow immaterial to our quest for a more

comfortable, healthier life’’ (p. 26).

So this brings up my last set of questions and a challenge for us all. In what sense

are these discussions more than just a new form of esoteric scholasticism. What

difference will it really make to the practices of science and society, if we get over

‘‘the logical reductio ad absurdum’’ that Bateson deplores and adopt the process

ecological metaphysics that Ulanowicz proposes? Is this really where we should be

putting major effort, and if so, how do we ensure that this ideological project is

maximally effective in reshaping attitudes and practices? How do we go from

process ecology to process politics and process education?

Here, and in closing, I will make common cause between Bateson, Ulanowicz,

and one of those metaphysically ill-informed public oracles of science, the late Carl

Sagan, who wrote prophetically about a dangerous schizophrenia in contemporary

13 In this respect, I want to recommend a wonderful book entitled Useless Arithmetic: Why EnvironmentalScience Can’t Predict the Future (Pilkey and Plkey-Jarvis 2007; Grassie 2007).14 Population and energy consumption data taken from the following Department of Energy sites:

http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/txt/ptb1101.html and http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/highlights.html.

Axiomathes (2012) 22:195–205 203

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technoscientific civilization. In his last book, The Demon-Haunted World, Sagan

wrote:

We’ve arranged a global civilization in which most crucial elements

profoundly depend on science and technology. We have also arranged things

so that almost no one understands science and technology. This is a

prescription for disaster. We might get away with it for a while, but sooner or

later this combustible mixture of ignorance and power is going to blow up in

our faces. (Sagan 1996, p. 26)

Hopefully these intellectual debates somehow also serve to help in the crafting of

a safer and healthier world, but if so, then we will need many more windows for

understanding the universe and ourselves.

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