MAO'S PROTRACTED WAR: THEORY VS. PRACTICE

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN W. WOODMANSEE. JR., USA

In the spring of 1938, Mao Tse-tungdelivered a series of lectures at the "YenanAssociation for the Study of theAnti-Japanese War." The Japanese War hadbeen going on for almost a year. TheCommunists and the Nationalists had joinedin a tenuous "United Front," and theCommunists' Eighth Route Army,commanded by Chu Teh, was in the field.Japanese forces, driving out of Manchuria,had overrun the northern area of China downto the Shantung peninsula and in the southwere well established on the Yangtze River.Chiang Kai-shek had borne the brunt of theJapanese attack and, despite heavy lossesaround Shanghai, had managed to preservethe fighting strength of his army. TheCommunists, in the meantime, had begun thepolitical organization of the thinly-heldJapanese territory in Shansi-Hopeh provinces.Their base area in northwest Shensi had notbeen reached by the Japanese.

Chairman Mao was being pressured to bemore active in the military fight against theinvading Japanese Army. Some werediscouraged and felt there was little hope of

Lieutenant Colonel John W. Woodmansee, Jr.,Annor, graduated from the United States MilitaryAcademy in 1956 and received a master of sciencedegree in Public Administration from GeorgeWashington University in 1965. He has held commandand staff positions with Armor, aviation, and aircavalry units and was a White House Fellow assignedto the Secretary of State fromSeptember 1968 toSeptember 1969. He wrotethis paper while he was anArmy Research Associate atthe Hoover Institution on War,Revolution and Peace,Stanford, California. He isnow assigned to the Trainingand Doctrine Command atFort Monroe, Virginia.

30

defeating the relentless Japanese militarymachine. Mao used the theory of "protractedwar" to encourage and unify his people andto turn the energies of his party to expandingpolitical control over the peasants andestablishing guerrilla bases. Mao's brilliantexamination of the existing contradictions inthe Sino-Japanese struggle and his three-stageportrayal of China's victory plan has becomea modern military classic. It is taught in manyservice schools and widely used by scholars inexplaining the Vietnamese Communiststrategy, first against the French and lateragainst the US/South Vietnamese forces inthe unending Indochina War.!

The purpose of this paper is to look at theessentials of this strategy and to see if thehistorical evidence of the Sino-Japanese Warsupports the contemporary acclaim accordedto Mao's theoretical opus.

ON THE PROTRACTED WAR

Mao left no doubt that his thesis ofprotracted war was not philosophical innature, but was specifically related to the warat hand:

The Sino-Japanese War is not just anywar, it is specifically a war of life anddeath between semi-colonial andsemi-feudal China and imperialist Japanfought in the nineteen thirties.2

Mao's conclusion that the Chinese struggleagainst the Japanese could not be a quickvictory, but that China would win in aprotracted struggle stemmed directly from hisassessment of the "contrasting features" ofthe two protagonists. "Japan's advantage," hereasoned, "lies in her great capacity to wagewar, and her disadvantages lie in thereactionary and barbarous nature of her war,

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in the inadequacy of her manpower andmaterial resources, and in her meagerinternational support."3 In contrast, Maoexplained: "China's disadvantage lies in hermilitary weakness, and her advantages lie inthe progressive and just character of her war,her great size and her abundant internationalsupport."4

Mao Tse-tung concluded that the initial

In order to be more precise in evaluatingwhether or not this process took place, onemust look more closely into Mao's descriptionof the three phases of the protracted war andsee how he describes the tactics andcharacteristics of each stage.

In the first phase, Mao explained, Japanwould be on the strategic offensive whileChina would remain on the strategic

Mao Tse-tung (third from left) with some survivors of the Long March in May 1937.

disparity in military strength would allow theJapanese to advance deep into thecountryside. At the point where her limitednational resources of manpower and rawmaterials could not support a sustained attackand a significant occupational force as well, astalemate would ensue. But with the passageof time, because of the "just" nature of theChinese cause, the impact of internationalsupport, and "provided ... we make nomistakes of principle and exert our bestefforts,"5 Mao predicted that the balance offorces would shift in China's favor, andpermit her victorious counteroffensive.

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defensive. During this period the enemyspearhead after initial success would losesome of its sharpness, enemy troop moralewould begin to deteriorate, the Japanesenation would start to grow war-weary andwould feel the condemnation of the court ofworld opinion. The correct tactic for China toemploy in this phase was "mobile warfare,"executed by regular forces. Neither guerrillaactivity nor positional warfare was to assumea major role in this phase. Mobile warfare,Mao carefully defined as "the form in whichregular armies wage quick-decision, offensivecampaigns and battles on exterior lines along

extensive fronts and over big areas ofoperations."6

The second stage of war would be one ofstrategic stalemate. Japan would shift to thestrategic defensive, while China was preparingfor the counteroffensive. This would be thetransitional and, Mao predicted, the mosttrying stage. The enemy's advance will havebeen stopped, but there will still be large-scalefighting. China could expect Japan to set uppuppet governments and plunder theoccupied zones. Since China would not yet betechnically capable of launching acounter-offensive, the principal tactic of thisphase would be guerrilla warfar« rather thanmobile warfare. Guerrilla warfare would resultfrom large numbers of Chinese troops "basingthemselves on all areas not actually occupiedby the enemy, and coordinating with thepeople's local armed forces; they will launchextensive, fierce guerrilla warfare againstenemy-occupied places."7 Another purposeof guerrilla warfare in this phase was to evolveinto mobile warfare in phase three. Thesecond stage, Mao proposed, would be thepivotal one. Victory for China would bedetermined "not by the retention or loss ofthe big cities in the first stage, but by theextent to which the whole nation exerts itselfin the second."8

China's counteroffensive would mark thebeginning of the third stage of the struggle.This stage would demonstrate the increasedcapability of China's military forces andreflect considerable international support.Japan, having been worn down militarily,war-wearied through heavy losses andcondemned internationally, would fall beforethe Chinese offensive. Mobile warfare wouldregain preeminence in this phase; "positionalattack" (i.e., assault of defended positions)would also be important; guerrilla warfarewould be less useful, but could contributesome strategic support.

Mao admitted that the road to victory wasnot an easy one and could be traveled only ifthe Chinese people became "tempered," thepolitical parties became "steeled," and theUnited Front was "persevered in."9

This in brief is the theory of the protractedwar against the Japanese which Mao laid

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before his colleagues in 1938. We must nowaddress the historical evidence to see how thisplan unfolded.

DEVELOPMENT OF THENORTHWEST BORDER REGION

An understanding of Mao's political andmilitary strength at the beginning of theSino-Japanese War is necessary to appreciateboth what action was taken and what waspossible.

The northern part of Shensi provinceoffered an ideal sanctuary for Mao and theremnants of the Long March. The terrain is

AN UNDERSTANDING OFMAO'S POLITICAL ANDMILITARY STRENGTH AT THEBEGINNING OF THESI NO-JAPANESE WAR ISNECESSARY TO APPRECIATEBOTH WHAT ACTION WASTAKEN AND WHAT WASPOSSIBLE.

rugged. Hills were generally deforested, butadequate agricultural land existed in thevalleys. After very successful diplomatic andmilitary measures to expand and secure hisbase area, Mao turned to the internalproblems of developing and administering hisdomain. Land was redistributed moreequitably to the peasants; small industriesbegan producing paper, soap, shoes, andtextiles; sewing machines were brought in,and the Red Army soldiers appeared inuniform. An arsenal was begun; radiocommunications were established. The:re wascoal in the area, giving Mao a vital source offuel. Salt, a near-precious commodity, wasalso available; thus, the Reds had an itemwhich could readily be exported in exchangefor manufactured goods, particularly militarysupplies. The key element in the developmentof the base area however lay in Mao'semphasis on training and indoctrination. A

An artist's impression of the Long March titled "Comrade Mao Tse-tung at Wenchiashih_"

political-military school in Pao-An had, by1936, gained an enrollment of some 2,000.The school offered a variety of courses toofficers, noncommissioned officers,communications specialists, etc. A vastprogram to eliminate illiteracy in the annywas also begun because it is very difficult toassimilate the "glorious thought of ComradMao Tse-tung" if one cannot read or write.Meanwhile, Chu Teh and the remainder of theRed forces on the Long March arrived in thebase area, swelling the Red Anny to about94,000.1 0

FORMATION OF THE UNITED FRONT

After the Sian incident in December 1936,and in return for Chiang's agreement to forma united front, the Communists reportedlypromised to abolish their soviet fonn ofgovernment, stop propagandising the people,follow the goals of Sun Yat-sen, and allow theRed Anny to be incorporated into the

33

Nationalist forces.l 1 Thus, the Eighth RouteArmy, under Chu Teh, was created. Mao wasquick to dispel any misapprehension that hisparty members might harbor concerning theagreement. In a booklet entitled "PresentStrategy and Tactics of the ChineseCommunist Party-very confidential," Maoexplained:

... Our present compromise is designedto weaken the Kuomintang and tooverthrow the National Governmentunder the Kuomingtang dictatorship byutilizing the name of a democraticrepublic.... For the sake of strategy and duringthe initial stage of the United Front, theRed Anny can change its insignia andaccept a united command. However, inreality, the Red Anny should maintain itsindependent entity so that it can act as amodel army and become the center andreliable force of the Communistmovement in China.

· .. For the present, the organization ofthe Communist Party should still be keptsecret while the members of the partyshould openly participate in all patrioticorganizations, forming a nucleus inthem. 12

PHASE ONE

The Marco Polo Bridge incident of 7 July1937 rapidly expanded into a full-scaleinvasion of North and Central China, and abitter 8-year struggle had begun.

The Japanese in 1937 had a regular army inChina, plus an indigenous ManchukuoanArmy of 100,000 to 150,000 officered byJapanese. To support this force, Japan hadthe third largest navy in the world-some 200warships-plus an air force of 2,000 first-rateairplanes manned by a pool of surprisinglyeffective pilots.! 3 Although Japan lacked thenatural resources to feed her war machine, herindustries had great capacity and were capableof rapid wartime mobilization. Japan could

easily supply the required munitions,provided the raw materials were madeavailable.

Chinese Nationalist forces in 1937 totaledaround 2 million men. The quality of thesesoldiers ranged from miserably-armed,ill-trained men of questionable loyalty, to100,000 well-armed, German-trained andadvised elite troops. China had some German75mm and 88mm guns, but in general lackedartillery, tanks, and air support. The Chinesenavy was, of course, no match for theJapanese. It consisted of a few old destroyers,gunboats, and 12 light cruisers. While Chinawas well endowed with natural resources, shehad no war industrial capability beyond thefew mills and factories that the Germans hadconstructed as part of their advisory effort.China could not even satisfy her ownammunition requirements.

The Communist Eighth Route Army,commanded by Chu Teh, was supposedly,45,000 strong, but some estimates put itbetween 80,000 and 90,000.14 The Eighth

A sentry on the Marco Polo Bridge.

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Route Army was organized with threehand-picked divisions: the I 15th, commandedby Lin Piao; the I 20th, commanded by HoLung; and the I 29th, commanded by LiuPo-cheng.

Japanese operations in 1937 aimed for arapid victory over the di~ointed Chineseforces. An early dash across theKalgan-Paotow railway cut the main Chinesesupply routes to Russia and protected theright flank of the attack. The main attackthen plunged south towards Taiyuan. Theplan was to drive the Chinese forces back tothe North China Sea, cut off all lines ofcommunications and administer a swift coupde gr/tce15 To assist the main attack, asecondary attack was launched into theShanghai area on 13 August. This would fixChinese forces in the defense of Shanghai,obtain an excellent port from which to supplyfurther operations, gain control of theYangtze and so cut off the Chinese lines ofcommunications from the south, and, finally,deal an economic blow to China by capturingthe financial center and cutting off revenuefrom customs duties.

Meanwhile, the Eighth Route Army crossedthe Yellow River from Shensi to Shansiprovince in September 1937. Its orders wereprobably to produce a significant victory inorder to cement the "United Front" and thento organize and sovietize the peasants. Certainconditions led to the successful execution ofthese missions. The Japanese commander ofthe 5th Division, General Itagaki, was knownas an arrogant, over-confident leader, and hewas marching blindly into the ruggedPinghsing Pass.l 6 The great lesson ofproviding front and flank security formarching columns was to be relearned. NiehJung-chen, the deputy commander of LinPiao's I I 5th Division, conducted theambush'! 7 As described by Chu Teh:"... two regiments struck the enemy's flankand two battalions enveloped his rear. TheJapanese were caught in a trap."18 A largeportion of the Japanese division was defeated,the remainder dispersed. The 115 th capturedfive tanks, five armored cars"50 field guns,and another I 00 assorted vehicles. However,all this material had to be destroyed except

35

some of the artillery,19 The victory provideda tremendous boost to Communist moraleand gave the Reds a "show-piece" battle onwhich Chairman Mao could claim thecorrectness of the concept of mobile warfare.

It was, however, as one authority noted,"the first, last, and only occasion during theAnti-J apanese War when the Communistscommitted a unit as large as a division toformal battle-despite the fact that there weremany opportunities to have done SO."2 0

Despite this setback to the Japanese FifthDivision, the remainder of the Japanese forcespoured around the Communist 115th Divisionand seized Taiyuan on 8 November 1937.This left the Red division completely isolatedin Japanese-held territory. There, in the Wutaimountains of the Shansi-Hopeh-Chaharborder region, Mao's forces began the secondpart of their mission, the conversion of themasses and the organization of a Communistbase area, Meanwhile, the 129th Division wasin southeast Shansi facing the Japanese onthree sides. The other division of the EighthRoute Army, the I 20th, remained out ofcontact in northwest Shansl. All of the areaspicked by the divisions were mountainous,were not occupied by large Japanesegarrisons, and thus were quite suitable for thedevelopment of guerrilla baseareas.21

One must recall that Mao's discussion ofthe protracted war assumed a united front.Although it is facetious to suggest that ChiangKai-shek's strategy conformed to Mao's, it isworthwhile to see what type of militaryactivity the Generalissimo was adopting.

In Hopeh province, Chiang Kai-shekrefused decisive battle and withdrew hisforces to the south. Chiang's strategy for thewar was surprisingly similar to Mao's conceptof a protracted struggle, Recognizing theJapanese need for a battle of annihilation,Chiang proposed instead a war of attrition. Itwas to be a trading of space for time, astrategy of "accumulating minor successesinto major victory,"22 By late October theJapanese had crossed the Yellow River andcaptured Tsinian. Then winter fell, andoperations ground to a halt. In November,Chiang moved the capital inland to Hankow.

While the advance in the north had been

making rapid progress, the invasion ofShanghai had met determined resistance.Japan had been forced to reinforce this effortwith troops from the north. After severaJcostly frontal assaults, the Japanese envelopedthe Chinese on the peninsula by theimaginative employment of amphibiouslandings on the north shore of Hangchow Bayand the south shore of the Yangtze River.Shanghai fell in early November. On 13December, Nanking was evacuated andJapanese troops began the infamous "Rape ofNanking." Chiang again withdrew his armiesbefore they were destroyed. While the Battlefor Suchow was raging, Chiangcounterattacked at Tai-erh-chuang trapping60,000 Japanese troops and inflicting 30,000casualties. It was the fIrst time in modernhistory that a Japanese army had sufferedsuch a military disaster. After the fall ofSuchow in early June, the Japanese turnedsouthwest and drove to Wuhan, occupyingthis area by the middle of November, Chiangdefended stubbornly and, in a last resort,destroyed the dikes of the swollen YellowRiver. Water inundated the countrysidespoiling the offensive and miring down largequantities of trucks, tanks, and artillery, all ofwhich the Japanese had to abandon. Hankowfell in October, and Chiang was forced tomove the capital further inland to Chunking,also on the Yangtze River. While the attackon Hankow was in progress, an amphibiouslanding struck Canton and secured it in 9days. By the end of 1938 the Japaneseadvance had stalled, with the Japanesegenerally controlling the major cities andcommunications routes in the eastern third ofChina. With I million totaJ troops in Chinaand Manchuria, almost one-half of them(450,000) were required as support troops tomaintain the lines of communication. Inretrospect, the strategies of both Mao andChiang seemed to have properly estimatedthat the Japanese advance would extend itselfuntil the problem of defending and organizingits conquered territory out-weighed thecapability to continue advancing. ThoughMao's prescription for mobile warfare inPhase One may be judged to have beensomewhat euphoric, it should be noted thatadaption of basic strategy to the

36

circumstances of time and place is afundamentaJ tenet of Mao's doctrine. Withthe exception of the Red ambush at PinghsingPass and Chiang's counterattack atTai-erh-chuang, the main activity of theCommunists was politicaJ agitation, while theNationaJists were paying rigid adherence tothe fIrst part of Mao's basic principle ofwarfare: preserve your forces and destroy theenemy.2 3

PHASE TWO

The Japanese plan for consolidation of theoverrun territory followed Mao's prediction.

The next important step for theJapanese army is to create conditionsfavorable to the sound development ofthe new central regime in China, inprocess of being set up. It is notconsidered necessary to conduct alarge-scale, prolonged war against theChiang Kai-shek regime but rather toestablish a new regime which willcooperate with Japan, at the same timemaintaining sufficient Japanese strengthin China to secure peace and order. 24

In a country which had traditionally beenunder the oppressive rule of landlords, anenlightened occupying power, workingthrough a liberal indigenous puppetgovernment, should have been able to createstable conditions. In fact, Japan did establisha puppet regime. In December 1937 the firstprovisional government was established atPeking. It was moved to Nanking in 1938 andbolstered in March 1939 by the defection ofthe Nationalist Prime Minister, WangChing-wei, who was immediately installed asthe head of the Chinese Government. Overthe next 3 years Wang was to build anindigenous force of over 800,000-many. ofwhom defected from Chiang Kai-shek'sforces. 25 However, the Japanese Armygenerally outdid the previous warlord regimesin cruelty and plundering. As a result, theCommunist cadres found that all areasoccupied by the Japanese Army were readytargets for their ideology and organiZation.One authority has significantly observed tha,in north China, in areas where the Japanesehad not penetrated, there was little

The inauguration of the Japanese Ambassador to the puppet Manchukuo.

enthusiasm for communism from thepeasants. 26

Despite Chiang's many demoralizing battlesand continual retrograde movement, his armywas growing, exceeding 3 million by late1939. When compared to the Japanese Imillion, it seems that more could have beenexpected of the Nationalists. But Chiang,instead of directing his power at the Japanese,was more concerned with the progress of Redpolitical activities. Chiang still refused to givethem arms, discounted any of their claims oflarge-scale military operations, and orderedthem to adhere to their earlier agreement torefrain from political organization. InDecember 1939, the Generalissimo evendirected one of his major forces in the northto attack the Red Northwest Border Region.General Hu Tsung-nan responded with adriving assault, to include air strikes, againstthe southwest corner of the base. TheJapanese, obviously pleased about thesi tuation, attacked simultaneously. Mao

37

struggled against both his "friends" and"enemies" and after shifting troops downfrom the north, managed to stabilize hispositions. 27 General Hu then dug in and wassatisfied to contain the Reds in their reducedbase area. The "United Front," shaken by thisassault, still held together, but hardly inaccord with Mao's protracted war scenario.

When the Chinese Nationalists had beendriven out of the northern zone, most of thepublic administrators pUlled back with them.The combination of the oppressiveoccupation by the Japanese and theadministrative vacuum provided fertile groundfor Communist indoctrination. Much of theCommunist progress was similar to the successin the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh region where the115 th Division had established its base. 2 8 Inthis region, administrative committees andeven local officials were elected among thepeasants. Land reforms based on the NationalGovernment's plan of 1930 were also put intoeffect. As one author noted, "Although most

landlords escaped with their lives, they paidfor them. "2 9

T ax reform was' also instituted. Inwell-organized soviets there were regularincome and property taxes. Michael Lindsaystates that the rates for 1941 would haveassessed a peasant about 5 percent of hisincome, while a well-to-do landlord couldexpect to pay around 45 percent. 30 This wasquite a change over the old system which wasboth "inequitable and inefficient."31 Localsecurity police kept the community purged of"suspected collaborators, overt Nationalistsympathizers, local bullies, evil landlords, andrich peasants"32 whose social attitudes wereumicceptable. The women and children of avillage were particularly encouraged tovolunteer for one of the numerous auxiliarygroups. In this way all members of a villagedeveloped a feeling of loyalty for aparty-sponsored organization and a sense ofparticipation in community affairs.

The peasants could also expect equallywell-organized military programs. At villagemeetings the people would be asked to formlocal self-defense units and eventually regionalmilitia units. Thus, cadres were developedwhich would ultimately swell the ranks of theRed Army.33 Weapons were easily obtainedfor these local forces. Wars had been waged inand around these villages literally since theadvent of gunpowder. And, although manytypes of weapons had been used, the Chinesearmies had apparently used the samecartridges since the 1890's; therefore,ammunition was limited but obtainable. 34

The political indoctrination of theCommunist military forces was perhaps thekey factor in its success. Emphasis had beenplaced on relationships between the soldierand the peasant. One eyewitness account toldof seeing insurgent forces who "were preparedto do without a meal rather than override acantankerous old peasant woman who refusedthe loan of a cooking vessel."35 Each memberof the Eighth Route Army was required tomemorize a code called "Three Rules andEight Remarks."

Rules - All actions are subject tocommand; do not steal from the people;be neither selfish nor unjust.

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Remarks - Replace the door when youleave the house; roll up the bedding inwhich you have slept; be courteous; behonest in your transactions; return whatyou borrow; replace what you break; donot bathe in the presence of women; donot without authority search thepocketbooks of those you arrest.

The administration and supply of theguerrilla forces were also well handled. Troopson the move were issued "grain-tickets"which they could use to pay the peasants forany food required. The peasant could, in turn,use these tickets to pay his taxes to theCommunist government. Supply proceduresreached impressive standards. In one instancein the main base area of the 115th Division,the Japanese in 1943 had launched along-term sweep that dragged on into thewinter. The supply agencies were reputedlyable to distribute winter uniforms to the men"although Japanese columns were movingabout all over the area."3 6

Neither was the psychological weaponneglected. In each soviet the propagandasection arranged for schools to eliminateilliteracy, "staged theatrical and otherentertainments," and saw to the posting oflarge anti-J apanese slogans on wallnewspapers. 37 Local newspapers tried tomaintain publication even during Japanese"mopping-up" operations,38 Japaneseprisoners were usually treated with kindnessand after a short period of indoctrination,might be released to rejoin their units.39 This,of course, discredited the official Japanesepolicy that prisoners of the Chinese would betortured. It also must have had someinfluence on the Japanese soldier's will toresist the next time he found himself in atight position. Some of the more cooperativeprisoners were used in combat against theirown forces, while others were organized intoa Japanese Communist-front, called thePeople's Emancipation League and were usedfor propaganda work against the JapaneseArmy.40

As the Communist military organizationdeveloped, there were some efforts directed atharassing Japanese troops and employing theguerrilla warfare which Mao had predicted

province: "Japanese-tooKuomintang-too many

would characterize phase two of hisprotracted war. These actions did, to a degree,fix Japanese troops and maintain the image ofRed participation in the "United Front," butthey did not accomplish the attrition whichMao had predicted in his earlier thesis. Maolater admitted that their overall efforts weregenerally divided into "seventy percentself-development, twenty percent compromiseand ten percent fight the Japanese."41

Michael Lindsay analyzed the Communistsuccess in North China as being due primarilyto superior administration.

The Communists carne to dominate theresistance movement in North Chinalargely because they were able to providethe essential elements of effectiveorganization, while, in most cases, forcesunder National Government leadershipfailed to do so.42

Or, as similarly analyzed by the cryptichumor of one local saying in a peasant area in

southeast Shansimany killed;meetings."43

THE HUNDRED REGIMENTS CAMPAIGN

By late 1939 the Communists wereprogressing quite well. The areas infiltrated bythe troops of the Eighth Route Army weredeveloping from a condition of temporaryinfluence through guerrilla presence to acondition of solid political support for andsustenance of the revolutionary forces. (Maod;escribed this process as the transitioning of a"guerrilla zone" into a "base area.") In themeantime, Red forces made small attacks toantagonize and harass the Japanese. But therewas no major attack or increasing intensity ofmilitary activities to coincide with Mao'sproposed phase two of this protracted war. If,as Mao stated, the purpose of guerrilla warfarewas to support and evolve into mobilewarfare, it was obvious that the Redoperations in North China were dragging theirfeet.

Chiang Kai-shek.

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As Mao's organization grew, he also becamemore dependent on outside support. Despitethe fact that the United States was showingincreasing support for Chiang, very fewsupplies were filtering down the Nationalistchannels to the Reds. Neither could the Redsexpect to get aid directly from the NationalistAmericans because the newsmen anddiplomatic representatives of foreigncountries were only accredited to andreceived news releases from the headquartersin Chunking.44 Needless to say, Chiang wasnot extolling the virtues of the Eighth RouteArmy. In fact, Chiang constantly complainedabout both the Red political activity and theirmilitary inactivity.

Besides the Nationalist neglect, a newJapanese officer, Lieutenant General TadaHayao, had taken over command of the NorthChina Area Army and was determined toeliminate the Red guerrilla bands and pacifythe countryside. His plan was similar toChiang's "Fifth Encirclement andSuppression" plan of 1934, in which theGerman advisers proposed a massive networkof barriers, ditches, and blockhousessurrounding and dissecting the infested area.Although it was a slow, costly plan, Tadabuilt hundreds of miles of new roads withprotecting ditches and blockhouses. Theseroads began to divide and seal the area intomanageable compartments. Thecompartments could then be dealt with one ata time.45 Not only would Tada's "cagepolicy" threaten the guerrilla movement, butit would bring the Japanese administrationdown to a closer working level with thepeople, and thus destroy or endanger thecrucial factor of party influence in the area.

Thus, in order to prove his theories ofprotracted warfare, to defend his growingbases against the new Japanese plan, torepudiate the Nationalists' claims ofinactivity, and to try to gain someinternational recognition for his movement,Mao was forced to attempt the "HundredRegiments Campaign."

The campaign, a well-coordinated series ofsurprise attacks executed by most of theelements of the growing Eighth Route Army,began on the night of 20 August 1940. The

40

initial objectives were rail lines, roadnetworks, and industrial areas (principallymines). After these attacks, the Reds turnedto the reduction of isolated blockhouses andsmall garrisons. For several weeks the Redguerrillas seemed to be everywhere, takingprisoners, seizing arms and ammunition, andavoiding engagement by any of the Japanesebrigades that were beginning to respond tothe crisis.46 Then with their momentumspent, the guerrillas resought anonymity andrefuge from the reprisals which they knewwould be forthcoming.

The Communists claimed to have killedmore than 20,000 Japanese and 5,000 puppettroops. In addition, they reportedly cutseveral hundred miles of railroads, anddestroyed almost 3,000 forts. The Japaneseadmitted that "these totally unexpectedattacks caused serious damage, and it wasnecessary to expend much time and money inrestoration work."4 7 Communist losses musthave been quite serious. After the Japaneseretaliation and "mopping-up" operations,Japanese records indicate that the "heavy

TH E JAPANESE REPRISALSPROBABL Y EXCEEDED INFEROCITY AND BRUTALITYTHE WORST REDEXPECTATIONS.

blow suffered by the Communist forces andtheir bases ... forced them to resort toguerrilla warfare, and thereafter they offeredvery little resistance in this area."4 8

The Japanese reprisals probably exceededin ferocity and brutality the worst Redexpectations. In July 1941, General OkamuraYasuji instituted the "Three-All" policy-killall! burn all! destroy all! His wrath wasdirected toward the guerrilla bases in the hillsand the nearby towns and villages that hadapparently supported the Reds. Villages wereburned to the ground, inhabitants shot, andlivestock slaughtered. This policy remained ineffect throughout 1942,49 andunq uestionably hurt the Communists.Strength figures of the Eighth Route Army

showed that from the end of 1940 to the endof 1941, Red forces decreased from 400,000to 350,000. Also, the population base whichthe Reds controlled was almost halved, from80 million to 50 million. The "Three All"retaliation had been successful in the shortrun. In the long run, the troop shortagerendered it ineffective and the peasants, ifthey had been uncommitted before, were nowflocking into the communist camp.

FRACTURE OF THE UNITED FRONT

The Communist New Fourth Army, whichhad been created in the lower Yangtze inSeptember 1937, never reached the size andinfluence of its sister unit, the Eighth RouteArmy. For one reason, the terrain did notpermit the' Fourth to develop secure baseareas. Most of the valley was open plain,criss-crossed with waterways and irrigationcanals.s 0 But, if a permanent camp could notbe built and defended, the Reds c.ould stillavoid major engagements with the Japaneseand continue an active program of politicalindoctrination of the countryside. In therainy season, the technological superiority ofthe Japanese Army was especially nullified,and the Reds could move about much morefreely and openly. Certainly the major threatto the Fourth Army was the Nationalisttroops to their south and west. Clashes hadoccurred as early as 1938, and they grew insize and frequency as the months passed. Bylate 1940 Chiang was upset with the politicalmachinations of the Fourth, and since thiswas taking place in an area felt to be aNationalist stronghold, Chiang Kai-shekordered the Fourth to move north across theriver. On 7 January 1941, most of the RedArmy had crossed over; its headquarters andperhaps 8,000 - 10,000 troops remainedbehind. Chiang, claiming that the army wasrefusing his orders, attacked the forces on thesouth bank, capturing the commander, YehTing, and inflicting 9,000 casualties on thesurprised Reds. s 1 The Fourth reorganizedafter this incident and consolidated itsposition in North Kiangsu. The facade of a"United Front" between the Nationalists andthe Communists had finally been shattered.

41

With the Japanese forces in a static position,the Reds and the Nationalists stared eachother down in what might best be called anarmed truce.

The "Three All" policy had been effectivein reducing the size and influence of the Redmovement. But other international designscrippled the Japanese occupational effortsand these designs were not (as Mao hadpredicted) associated with condemnation ofthe court of world opinion. In 1941 Japanmade the fatal mistake of bombing PearlHarbor. By 1943 the tide of the war hadchanged, and the Japanese were forced todraw seven experienced divisions fromoccupational duty in China to more necessarybattlefronts in the central and southwestPacific. The few replacements received inChina were inferior in quality and lacked anyexperience in counterinsurgency warfare.S 2

General Okamura, Japanese Commander inNorth China, stated to an American officer:

If you people had not come into thePacific when you did, there would be noCommunists in Peking. My operations in1942 and 1943 reduced their strength bymore than 100,000. But the troops thatreplaced my good divisions wereworthless. For one thing, the average ageof the men was ten to fifteen years older.These older men could not campaign asthe youngsters could, and they had noheart in it a11.S3

This decrease in priority gave the Redsanother chance to develop and expand theirorganization and to prepare for the real testafter the war. There were several main facetsof this Communist expansion that should bestressed: the continual improvements in theNorthwest Base Area, the development andrefinement of the "militia," and the divisionof the regular forces into regional and mainforces.

In 1942 Mao brought Liu Shao-chi in fromthe New Fourth Army to organize and trainthe political cadres. It became Liu'sresponsibility to see that all the developingbase areas had trained party officials whowere loyal to Mao and who "thought" and

could be expected to "perform" along theparty line. Each of the base areas was alsodirected to strive toward self-sufficiency. Inthe Northwest Base Area, the number of"industrial" workers rose to 12,000 andlimited quantities of radios, grenades, rifles,and mines were produced.5 4

As previously stated, Mao relied primarilyon his "regular" army to go forth and

to rush to the defense of a base area or to beused in mobile warfare to attack the Japanese.

To assist the regular army, the Redsdeveloped the concept of a Ming Ping orMilitia. The idea originally grew out of theneed for village "Horne Guard" or"Self-defense Corps." By 1944 the militia hadreached the staggering size of 2 million andcontributed significantly to the capabilities of

Chinese guerrillas.

organize the people. The army was toeducate, mobilize, assist and protect themasses. To do this task Mao divided hisregular army into two distinct groups-themain forces and the regional forces. Theregional forces were to be permanentlyassociated with a geographic area. The troopswere encouraged to marry into thesettlements and develop the area into aself-sufficient "base area." 5 5 The "main"forces were to act as the military reserve.They were not to be tied down to one areabut were to remain "mobile" and to be able

42

the regional and main forces. Mostimportantly, the militia furnished the soundintelligence on which military plans could bebased. They would act as guides to theChinese forces and provide the guerrilla forceswith vital knowledge of the terrain. The othermain contribution was the militia'sdevelopment of mine warfare. Realizing thatthe Chinese guerrillas fought with almost noexternal assistance, it is easy to appreciatethat as the size of the Eighth Route Army andits militia forces expanded, there wereincreasing demands placed on the

conservation and local fabrication ofammunition. "Frequently the first shots a(militia) recruit ever fired were at a real, liveenemy."56 Since land mines and handgrenades were types of weapons which couldbe locally produced, they naturally becamethe prime weapons of village self-defense. Oneauthor described the various tactics which themilitia employed to increase the effectivenessof its mines.

When the Japanese compelled civiliansto walk ahead of them, the Chinesedeveloped mines with the firing devicesome 15 to 20 yards behind the mine, sothat the mine would explode among theJapanese. When the Japanese sent outdetector squads whQ marked the placeswhere mines Were buried, the militiaobserved their marks and duplicated themto show almost impenetrable minefields.57

To increase the effectiveness of local unitsand base areas to defend themselves,insurgents in some areas developed anelaborate underground tunnel system. At firstair raid shelters were built to protect thevillagers from Japanese bombers. Then theseshelters were later expanded to connecthouses within a village or to provide an escaperoute out of the village. In central Hopeh,where the sub-soil was particularly easy totunnel and required few supports, tunnelnetworks were constructed which evenconnected villages.5 8

One additional measure that aided the Redswas the ability of local militia and regionalunits to reach an "understanding" withChinese puppet troops employed by theJapanese. In some cases guerrilla units wereordered not to attack puppet garrisonswithout specific permission. In another case,puppet troops later sent word to guerrillasthat they apologized for firing on them andhoped that no one had been hit, but thatJapanese had been in the garrison, and theywere forced to shoot at them.59

The development of the R,ed base areascontinued in this manner until 1945. In April1945 Mao ordered the expansion of themilitia units to regular anny units. The size of

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the Red forces then immediately jumpedfrom 507,000 to 1,029,000. In June as theJapanese began to pull back the Communistscould boast of controlling a "population of95 million, [that] held over 300,000 squaremiles of territory, and had over 500 miles ofcoast line."6 0

The situation of the Nationalist armyduring the period of stalemate had been verydifficult. The China theater was at thecomplete end of the allies' lines ofcommunication. Supplies were scarce;inflation weakened the economy; graft,hoarding, and speculation were unwelcomeoffspring. Despite the determination ofChiang Kai-shek, his administration wasunable to make good use of the remainingindustrial capacity of the nation and unableto mobilize and train the manpower resourcesavailable to him.

JAPANESE OCCUPATIONAL TECHNIQUES

In occupied areas that were relativelysecure, Japanese measures for controlling thepopulation were basically sound and havebee nus e d successfully in othercounter-revolutionary experiences. First,there was complete registration of thepopulation and the issuance of identificationcards. (In the Peiping area these cards evenin eluded photographs.61) An additionalcontrol measure was a block warden systemwhereby the residential population wasorganized into cells of ten families (called apao). Five of these groups constituted atai-pao. The Japanese then appointed aresponsible, respected Chinese in charge ofthe tai-pao. He in turn appointed subordinatesand was responsible to the Japaneseauthorities for the actions of the familiesunder him.62

In areas where control was marginal ornon-existent, such as the Red base areas, themethods generally centered around the fortand barrier plan and, in North China, the"Three All" plan.

In the spring of 1944 there was one massiveJapanese offensive that interrupted thestalemate condition. The Japanese code namewas 0 peration Ichi-g6. This operationinvolved 620,000 first-line troops and wasundertaken because the reverses in the Pacific

had endangered the Japanese positions on themainland and exposed them to possible B-29raids from airfields under Chiang's control.Objectives of the plan were basically to"destroy the backbone of the Chinese Armyand force increased pressure on the politicalregime in Chingking" and "to forestall thebombing of the Japanese homeland byAmerican B-29's from (the Chinese) base ofKweilin and Uu-chow" (in Kwangsi ChuangAutonomous Region). Despite a gallantdefense of Hengyang wherein 16,000 Chinesetroops fought off six Japanese divisions for 47days, Ichi-go was successful in seizing the airbases and in severely punishing Chiang'sarmies.63 In Honan province Japanese troopsoverran 30 Chinese divisions led by the ableGeneral Tank En-po. The local peasants,racked by famine and burdened with taxes,refused to assist the government troops and insome cases rose to help the invadingJapanese.64

Phase Two of the theoretical "ProtractedWar" thesis can hardly be equated to thatcorresponding portion of the Sino-JapaneseWar. The "United Front" was a myth.Communist political activities were excellent,but the "fierce guerrilla warfare" that was tokeep the enemy on the move so he could beattacked and destroyed in mobile warfareonly materialized in rare instances. On theseoccasions the Japanese reprisals dealt a severepunishment that must have driven theCommunist leaders back to their theoreticalroots to see what had gone wrong. Chiang, ofcourse, never accepted Mao's protracted wargame plan; he seemed to be as muchconcerned with the Red Eighth and FourthArmies as with the whole Japanese force. Thedecay in Japanese strength did occur, as Maohad predicted, but for other reasons-theUnited States advance through the westernPacific.

END OF THE WAR

Perhaps the Third Phase of the protractedwar began in the summer of 1945, as theJapanese forces were withdrawing fromChina. But they had not been defeated by apeople's war; they had been defeated by theoverwhelming power of the Allies,spearheaded by the attack aircraft carrier

44

AS FOR MAO'S THEORY OFTHE PROTRACTED WAR, ITREMAINS A CLASSIC OF THEMILITARY ART.

forces of the US Navy and the land power ofthe US Marines and Army. In August, Russiadeclared war on Japan and marched intoManchuria. On 14 August 1945, 9 days afterthe first atomic bomb was dropped onHiroshima, the 8-year Sino-Japanese war cameto an end.

Both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tunghad been farsighted in planning their "joint"struggle against the Japanese. Each hadrealized that the Japanese would ultimatelybe defeated by the Allies and that the crucialstruggle for control of China would bebetween themselves.

As for Mao's theory of the protracted war,it remains a classic of the military art. Maowas wrong when he stated that the thesisspecifically applied to the Sino-Japanese warin the nineteen thirties. There is enough ofthe literary value of universality for thattheory to be applied to many similarconditions both in the past and the future.His essays "On the Protracted War" will beread, digested, and admired by many towhom it will be completely irrelevant that thewar never worked out that way.

NOTES

1. Par example, see George K. Tanham's highlyregarded study Communist Revolutionary Warfare(New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 23.

2. Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," SelectedMilitary Writings (peking: Foreign Language Press,1963), p. 195.

3. Ibid., p. 197.4. Ibid.5. Ibid, p. 211.6. Ibid., p. 245.7. Ibid., p. 214.8. Ibid.9. Ibid., p. 215.

10. Information on the development within thebase area was taken from O'Ballance, The Red Armyin China (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp.107-109.

11. "'Communism in China," Committee onForeign Affairs, Subcommittee, No.5, pp. 23 asquoted in Oron P. South, The Rise ofCommunism inChina, 1919-1949 (Maxwell AFB: Air UniversityDocumentary Research Study, May 1952), p. 47.

12. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2dSession, Vol. 92, Part 12, pp. A 4495-96, as quotedin South, op. cit., p. 48.

13. Most of the discussion of the strengths of theopposing forces was taken from T. Dodson Stampsand Vincent J. Esposito, editors, A Military Historyof World War II (West Point: United States MilitaryAcademy, 1956), Appendix 5, pp. 525-528. For thestrengths of the Red forces I have used Griffith, TheChinese People~ Liberation Army, p. 61, andO'Ballance, The Red Army of China, p. 123. $

14. See Samuel B. Griffith II, The ChinesePeople's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-HillBook Company., 1967), p. 61, and Robert C. North,Chinese Communism (New York: McGraw-Hill BookCompany, 1966), p. 147.

15. General discussion concerning main attack andsecondary attack is based on Stamps and Esposito,op. cit., pp. 529-534.

16. Griffith,op. cit., p. 62.17. Ibid.18. Evans Fordyce Carlson, Twin Stars of China

(New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1940), pp.70-71.

19. O'Bailance,op. cit., p.125.20. Griffith,op. cit., p. 63.21. This discussion is based on Michael Lindsay,

"China (1937-1945)" (an unpublished paper writtenfor the Center of Research in Social Systems undercontract to the Department of Army), p. 7; andGriffith,op. cit., pp. 65-68.

22. F.F. Liu, A Military History ofModem China(princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp.104-5.

23. Mao,Ibid., p. 153.24. US Armed Forces in the Far East, Chinese

Area Operations Record, July 1937 - November 1941(Tokyo: Military History Section: Headquarters,Army Forces Far East, 1957), "Japanese Monograph70," p. 29.

25. O'Bailance,op. cit., p. 130.26. Lindsay,op. cit., p. 14.27. O'Bailance,op. cit., p. 133.28. Discussion of this example is based iUmost

entirely on Lindsay, op. cit., pp. 21-27.29. Griffith,op. cit., p. 68.30. Lindsay,op. cit., p. 23.31. Ibid., p. 22.32. Griffith,op. cit., p. 68.33. Ibid.34. Lindsay,op. cit., p. 15.

45

35. Ibid., p. 25.36. Ibid.37. Griffith,op. cit., p. 68.38. Lindsay,op. cit., p. 25.39. Ibid., p. 26.40. Ibid.41. Taken from O'Bailance, op. cit., in a footnote

at the bottom of p. 131, referring to an interviewwith Mao, quoted in Time magazine, I December 1958.

42. Lindsay,op. cit., p. 17.43. Ibid., p. 25.44. Griffith,op. cit., p. 69.45. Taken from U.S. Senate, Committee on the

Judiciary, Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearingsbefore the Subcommittee to Investigate theAdministration of the Internal Security Act andOther Internal Security Laws, 82d Congress, 1stSession (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1951-52), Part 7A,Appendix h, "The Chinese Communist Movement,"p. 2366. Quoted in Griffith, The Chinese People ~

Liberation Army, p. 70.46. O'Ballance, The Red Army of China, pp.

134-5; Griffith, The Chinese Peopld LiberationArmy, pp. 70-71; and US Army, Forces in the FarEast, North China Area Operations Record, July1937-May 1941 (Tokyo: Military History Section;Headquarters, Army Forces Far East, 1955),"Japanese Monograph 178," pp. 316-20.

47. "Japanese Monograph 178," pp. 316-17.48. Ibid., p. 320.49. Griffith,op. cit., pp. 70-71.50. Lindsay,op. cit., pp. 30·31.51. Ibid., p. 32; O'Bailance, op. cit., p. 135.52. Griffith,op. cit., p. 75.53. Conversation between General Okamura

Yasuji and B.G. Samuel R. Griffith II, Office of WarHistory, Tokyo, November 1963, as quoted inGriffith,op. cit., p. 75.

54. O'Bailance,op. cit., p. 139.55. Ibid., p. 140.56. Ibid., p. 141.57. Lindsay,op. cit., p. 36.58. Ibid., p. 51.59. Ibid., p. 40.60. O'Ballance,op. cit., p. 145.61. Lindsay, op. cit., p. 51.62. Ibid, p. 53.63. For a more complete discussion of Ichi-go,

refer to F.F. Liu, A Military History of ModemChina, pp. 219-20; also US Army, Forces in the FarEast, China Area Operations Record, Command ofthe China Expeditionary Army (Tokyo: MilitaryHistory Section, Headquarters, Army Forces FarEast, 1952), "Japanese Monograph 129," pp.22-40.

64. Liu,op. cit., p. 220. ill