Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations 3-40.4.pdf · USMC USMC US Marine Corps PCN 143...

USMC

USMC

US Marine Corps

PCN 143 000140 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MCWP 3-40.4

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.

To Our Readers

Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes through the Universal Need Statement (UNS) process. The UNS submission process is delineated in Marine Corps Order 3900.15_, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System, which can be obtained from the on-line Marine Corps Publications Electronic Library:

http://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/ELECTRONICLIBRARY.aspx.

The UNS recommendation should include the following information:

• Location of changePublication number and titleCurrent page numberParagraph number (if applicable)Line numberFigure or table number (if applicable)

• Nature of changeAddition/deletion of textProposed new text

Additional copies: If this publication is not an electronic only distribution, a printed copy may be obtained from Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from the United States Marine Corps Doctrine web page:

https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

1 July 2013

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-40.4, Marine Air-Ground Task ForceInformation Operations, operationalizes the Marine Corps Operating Concept for Infor-mation Operations. This publication contains doctrine for employment of the variousinformation-related capabilities integrated as information operations in support of theMarine air-ground task force (MAGTF).

The purpose of this publication is to provide MAGTF commanders and their staffs guid-ance in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing information operations in support ofthe MAGTF’s operational objectives. It gives Marines a warfighter’s orientation to infor-mation operations, providing a basis to understand the relevance of information opera-tions and a framework to implement information operations.

This publication is intended for Marines assigned to a MAGTF that are responsible forinformation operations planning.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

RICHARD P. MILLS Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

Publication Control Number: 143 000140 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

1-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 4-11.6

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations ______________________________________________________ iii

MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE INFORMATION OPERATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Fundamentals

Legal Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2Information Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

Cognitive Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3Informational Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3Physical Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

Use of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3Information Superiority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4Information-Related Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4Information Operations Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Chapter 2. Integration and Planning

Staff Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1Operations Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1Intelligence Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2Communications Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2Special Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3Information Operations Cell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Integrated Information Operations Planning and the Marine Corps Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Problem Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4Course of Action Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6Course of Action War Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7Course of Action Comparison and Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8Orders Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

Transitioning From Planning to Battle Rhythm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

Chapter 3. Key Information-Related Capabilities

Military Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1Types of Deception Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1Deception in Support of the Offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Deception in Support of the Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Operations Security and Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Special Considerations for Deception Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

iv _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

Staff Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Deception and the Operation Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

Electronic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Electronic Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Electronic Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Electronic Warfare Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Marine Corps Electronic Warfare Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4Staff Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4Electronic Warfare Addendums to the Operation Order . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Operations Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5Operations Security in Support of the Offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5Operations Security in Support of the Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5Operations Security Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5Staff Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5Support Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5Operations Security and the Operation Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

Military Information Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6Staff Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7Additional Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7Military Information Support Operations and the

Operation Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8Cyberspace Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8

Staff Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9Cyberspace Operations Addendums to the Operation Order . . . . . . . . 3-9

Physical Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9Information Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Defense in Depth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10Education, Training, and Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10Training and Certification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11System Certification and Accreditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11Staff Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11Support Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11Information Assurance Addendums to the Operation Order . . . . . . . . 3-12

Physical Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13Staff Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13Physical Security Addendums to the Operation Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13

Counterintelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13Staff Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13Counterintelligence Addendums to the Operation Order . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14

Public Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14Public Affairs, Military Information Support Operations, and

Civil-Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations _______________________________________________________ v

Public Affairs and Military Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15Public Affairs, Cyberspace Operations, and

Electronic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15Staff Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15Public Affairs Addendums to the Operation Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15

Civil-Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17Staff Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17Civil Information Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17Civil-Military Operations Addendums to the Operation Order . . . . . . 3-17

Combat Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17Defense Support to Public Dilpomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-18

Chapter 4. Information Operations Intelligence Integration

Intelligence Support to Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2Intelligence Support to Operations Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2Intelligence Support to Military Information Support Operations . . . . . . . . 4-3Intelligence Support to Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3Intelligence Support to Electronic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4Intelligence Support to Physical Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4Targeting and Enabling Support to Cyberspace Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4Intelligence Support to Information Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Appendices

A Information Operations Cell Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1B Information Operations Planning Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1C Sample of Appendix 3 to Annex C Information Operations . . . . . . . . C-1

Glossary

References and Related Publications

vi _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4


CHAPTER 1 FUNDAMENTALS

As defined in Marine Corps Reference Pub-lication (MCRP) 5-12C, Marine Corps Supple-ment to the Department of Defense Dictionary ofMilitary and Associated Terms, informationoperations (IO) are the integration, coordination,and synchronization of all actions taken in theinformation environment to affect a relevantdecisionmaker in order to create an operationaladvantage for the commander. The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) executes IO as aninherent element of all operations to enable andenhance the overall ability to conduct successfulmilitary actions. In order to apply informationoperations across a range of military operations,the MAGTF commander integrates his militaryactions, forces, and capabilities throughout theoperational environments (air, land, maritime,and space doma ins and i n fo rma t ionenvironment). These efforts can create and/orsustain desired and measurable effects on theadversary’s leaders, forces (regular or irregular),information, and information systems and otheraudiences; while protecting and defending theMAGTF commander’s forces, information, andinformation systems.

As with other elements of combat power, there isno universal formula for the application of infor-mation operations; therefore, information opera-tions should be viewed as an element of combatpower, focusing on when and where it best sup-ports MAGTF operations. The factors of mission,enemy, terrain and weather, troops and supportavailable—time available and, when required,civilian considerations are the major determinants.

Information operations are primarily concernedwith affecting decisions and decisionmakingprocesses while at the same time defendingfriendly decisionmaking processes in order to

achieve information superiority. Informationoperations affect and defend decisionmaking basedon six fundamental assumptions:

Decisionmakers generally value the quality ofinformation they receive.

The influences of geography, language, cul-ture, religion, organization, experience, andpersonality of the decisionmaker impact therelative value placed upon the informationreceived.

Decisions are made based on the informationavailable at the time.

It is possible, with finite resources, to under-stand the relevant aspects of the informationenvironment to include the processes decision-makers use to make decisions.

It is possible to affect the information environ-ment in which specific decisionmakers actthrough psychological, electronic, or physicalmeans.

It is possible to measure the effectiveness of IOactions in relation to an operational objective.

Although each of these assumptions is an impor-tant enabling factor for information operationsthey may not all be true for every operation. Forany specific operation where one or more ofthese assumptions are not met, the risk assess-ment provided to the commander would be ad-justed accordingly.

Marines deploy as unique, task-organizedMAGTFs and their ability to task-organize andintegrate the necessary combat power to achievethe objective is part of their expeditionary mind-set. Therefore, the integration of informationoperations into the Marine Corps Planning Pro-cess (MCPP) is critical.

1-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

Legal Considerations

Information operations may involve complexlegal and policy issues requiring careful review.Similar to operations in the physical environ-ment, MAGTF activities in the information envi-ronment are bounded by policy, societal values,and a fundamental respect for human dignity.Marines, whether operating physically from basesor locations overseas or from within the boundar-ies of the United States, are required by law andpolicy to act in accordance with US law and otherstandards of conduct (e.g., law of war [oftencalled the law of armed conflict], rules of engage-ment). Because of the potential numerous legalissues associated with information operations, itis critical to obtain a legal analysis of the pro-posed operation within the context of the applica-ble law, ideally through the judge advocate’sparticipation within an IO planning cell. Thisindividual should be consulted early and often toensure compliance and eliminate potential delay.If, based on lack of capacity, a judge advocate

cannot be a permanent member, an open and con-tinuous dialogue must be established with thestaff judge advocate (SJA).

Information Environment

The information environment is the aggregate ofindividuals, organizations, and systems that col-lect, process, disseminate, or act on information.(Joint Publication [JP] 1-02, Department ofDefense Dictionary of Military and AssociatedTerms) Therefore, a solid understanding of theinformation environment must be achievedbefore any planning can begin. Refinement of thecommand’s understanding of the informationenvironment continues throughout the planningprocess and the execution of operations. Theinformation environment consists of three interre-lated dimensions: cognitive, informational, andphysical. Table 1-1 represents a typical view ofthe three interrelated dimensions and some oftheir characteristics.

Table 1-1. Dimensions of the Information Environment.

Cognitive Dimension

Exists in the minds of human beings.

Consists of individual and collective consciousness.

Exists where information is used to shape perceptions and make decisions.

Significant characteristics include values, beliefs, perceptions, awareness, and decisionmaking.

Informational Dimension

Created by the interaction of the physical and cognitive dimensions.

Exists where information is collected, processed and disseminated.

Significant characteristics are information content and flow.

Physical Dimension

Consist of the tangible, real world.

Exists where information environment overlaps with the physical world.

Consists of individuals, organizations, information systems, and the physical networks that connect them.

Significant characteristics include terrain, weather, civilian information infrastructure, media, populace, and third party organizations.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations _____________________________________________________ 1-3

Cognitive Dimension

The cognitive dimension consists of the beliefs ofa person or persons whose decisions can impactthe commander’s end state and is the hardestdimension to assess. The key to understanding thisdimension is understanding that decisions aremade based on culture, life experiences, re-lationships, outside events, ideology, and theinfluences of those inside and outside a de-cisionmaker’s group. Added to these variables arethe perceptions that are built on informationcollected on current events and the plans and be-liefs of others. Ultimately, the commander mustdetermine how a targeted decisionmaker will acton his beliefs and perceptions and how that actionwill impact the commander’s end state.

Informational Dimension

The informational dimension consists of the con-tent of information and the way it flows to andfrom a decisionmaker to form a message. Thecontent of the message is the idea or thought thatis conveyed to key audiences. The message mustflow so its intended audience can actually hear,read, or see it.

Physical Dimension

The physical dimension consists of both key indi-viduals and human networks and a technical andphysical infrastructure that supports the informa-tion flow to its intended audience:

Key individuals are those that provide accessto audiences of interest, have the ability toinfluence target audiences, or may be the audi-ence of interest themselves.

Human networks are groups that support theprocess and dissemination of information to anaudience. They can also shape the beliefs ofothers based on their own ideology and goals.

Technical infrastructure is what is needed toproduce, process, receive, send, and store in-formation so that the decisionmaker can inter-act with others and make decisions.

The physical infrastructure supports the flow ofinformation and is what houses the technicalinfrastructure, as well as key individuals andhuman networks.

Use of Information

Part of understanding a target audience’s informa-tion environment is to understand how the targetaudience leverages information within that envi-ronment. When assessing a target audience’s useof information, it is important not to mirror thediscussion with US abilities. Depending on thesophistication of the audience, they may or maynot have the same capabilities as the United States.An IO planner must fully validate any assump-tions about a target audience’s capabilities toleverage information prior to the end of the plan-ning phase. The IO planner’s analysis of an adver-sary target audience’s methods of leveraginginformation must address the target audience’sability to protect, collect, and project information:

How will the target audience leverage informa-tion within their operational environment inorder to achieve their goals?

How will the target audience protect informationthat is deemed critical (information required tomake decisions without being interrupted)?

How will the target audience collect—eitherovertly or covertly—information on its adver-saries so they can make decisions that best sup-port their goals?

How will the target audience project informa-tion to others in order to persuade others to sup-port their goals?

1-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

Information Superiority

Information superiority is the operational advan-tage derived from the ability to collect, process,and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of infor-mation while exploiting or denying an adver-sary’s ability to do the same. (JP 1-02) Obtainingthe operational advantage described within thedefinition of information superiority is the over-arching focus of information operations. Just aseach mission’s end state is different, so is infor-mation superiority. For example, during combatoperations, information superiority can gain sur-prise over the adversary or prevent the adversaryfrom employing its reserve forces. During coun-terinsurgency operations, information superioritycan gain populace support for friendly operationsor prevent adversary freedom of informationflow. In each case, information superiority isdefined specifically for the mission in terms ofwhat advantage is sought for the MAGTF.

Gaining information superiority over the adver-sary should always be the main effort of informa-t ion opera t ions . To achieve informat ionsuperiority, the MAGTF uses information toactively attack the adversary and to shape theinformation environment to the MAGTF’s advan-tage. This duality of operations is analogous tofire and maneuver where fires equate to attack-ing the adversary’s ability to use information andmaneuver equate to actions that seize and retaininformation nodes for the purpose of gaining apositional advantage. To be effective, informa-tion operations must balance activities that shapethe information environment with those thatattack the adversary. Through a combination ofboth, the MAGTF seeks information superiorityover its opponent.

The MAGTF will rarely achieve absolute anduniversal information superiority. The actions ofopposing forces, as well as the informationcontent and flow in the operational area, are notstatic. Therefore, information superiority is alocalized and transitory condition over the

adversary. The MAGTF seeks informationsuperiority at certain times and places, usually ator before the decisive point of the operation.

Information-Related Capabilities

Military operations are not planned for the pur-pose of employing any particular capability. Mis-sion requirements (such as campaign objectives,the operational environment, and adversary andfriendly forces) dictate what capabilities a com-mander uses and how they are employed. Infor-mation operations are no different.

Although often described as a discrete set of capa-bilities, information operations are really muchmore. The capabilities used for information opera-tions should be selected based on mission require-ments. Such a capability is, according to JP 1-02,a capability, function, or activity that uses data,information, or electromagnetic spectrum to pro-duce lethal or nonlethal effects in the physical orinformational dimensions with an expressed intentto cause deliberate effects within the cognitivedimension of the information environment.

Some information-related capabilities (IRCs),such as electronic warfare (EW), military infor-mation support operations (MISO), combat cam-era (COMCAM), and cyberspace operations,require trained specialists and equipment. How-ever, each element of a MAGTF must be able toemploy other capabilities, such as operations se-curity (OPSEC), military deception (MILDEC),key leader engagements, and a rewards programto support its operations. Refer to chapter 3 for adiscussion on capabilities relevant to informa-tion operations.

Information Operations Effects

Commanders use IRCs to create or produceeffects that contribute to the achievement of mili-tary objectives. Numerous common terms, such


as the following, are used but have unique mean-ings when describing IO effects:

Destroy. Destroy is to damage a system orentity so badly that it cannot perform any func-tion or be restored to a usable condition with-out being entirely rebuilt.

Disrupt. Disrupt is to break or interrupt theflow of information.

Degrade. Degrade is to reduce the effective-ness or efficiency of an adversary’s commandand control (C2) or communications systemsand information collection efforts or means.Information operations can also degrade themorale of a unit, reduce the target’s worth orvalue, or reduce the quality of an adversary’sdecisions and actions.

Deny. Deny is to prevent the adversary fromaccessing and using critical information, sys-tems, and services.

Deceive. Deceive is to cause a person tobelieve what is not true. Military deceptionseeks to mislead an adversary’s decision-makers by manipulating their perception ofreality.

Exploit. Exploit is to gain access to an adver-sary’s C2 systems to collect information or toplant false or misleading information.

Influence. Influence is to cause others tobehave in a manner favorable to US forces.

Isolate. Isolate is to seal off both physicallyand psychologically an adversary from itssources of support, to deny an adversary free-dom of movement, and prevent an adversaryunit from having contact with other adver-sary forces.

Protect. Protect is to take action to guardagainst espionage or capture of sensitive equip-ment and information.

Restore. Restore is to bring information andinformation systems back to their original state.

Respond. Respond is to react quickly to anadversary’s IO attack or intrusion.

Note: The preceding effects terms can havedifferent interpretations. The above list is ac-cepted in joint doctrine for information oper-ations. They may not align with MarineCorps terms for the effects of fires (lethal). Itis always best to define how the term is beingapplied with respect to IO tasks.

1-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4


CHAPTER 2 INTEGRATION AND PLANNING

The primary focus of MAGTF IO activities willbe at the operational and tactical levels of war.The Marine Corps organizes, trains, equips, andfights as a total force. Effective IO integrationrequires that the total capability of the MarineCorps be used to support the warfight ingMAGTF. Information operations are conductedacross the range of military operations. Informa-tion operations can make significant contribu-tions to all levels of warfare. Informationoperations should not be relegated to just onetype of military operation. Information opera-tions are conducted during all phases of militaryoperations. Information operations are planned,prepared, executed, and assessed during allphases of an opera t ion in suppor t of theMAGTF’s mission.

Since MAGTFs may fight as a part of a largerjoint force, their IO efforts will support and becoordinated with the campaign plans of the com-batant commander, joint force, and adjacent com-mands. The joint force commander may havestanding IO procedures and perhaps a standing IOplan based on the combatant commander’s guid-ance for the theater of operations and the nature ofthe conflict. The joint force and component com-manders will develop their own IO plans in sup-port of their respective objectives. These IO plansare typically at the operational level. The MAGTFwill develop an IO plan that will support MAGTFmission requirements while integrating the jointforce commander’s IO plan. The major subordi-nate commands must develop supporting IO plansthat are appropriate for their level of command.

Staff Responsibilities

Although information operations are not limitedto the IRCs, they do encompass all actions taken

to affect the decisionmaking within the in-formation environment; therefore, IO planningrequires a whole-of-staff approach in order to beeffective. Those staff sections involved in IOplanning include, but are not limited to, theoperations section, intelligence section, com-munications sections, special staff, and IO cell.

While the commander has overall responsibility todecide and design how and who he wants to influ-ence, his IO cell chief—residing within the G-3—has responsibility to plan, prepare, execute, andassess information operations in support of opera-tions. All staff sections have a role to play in infor-mation operations. To relegate informationoperations to just one subsection of the G-3severely limits the command’s IO program and itseffectiveness. Information operations that are notintegrated with other staff actions often lead toinstances where actions interfere with each otherand are counterproductive to achieving the com-mander’s desired effects. At best, nonintegratedinformation operations reduce the effectiveness ofthe action and, at worst, confuse the target audi-ence leading to undesired effects.

Operations Section

The commander is responsible for implementingplans that incorporate information operations intooperations, but the operations section (G-3/S-3) isresponsible for executing the plans. The futureoperations (FOps) section is responsible for over-seeing the planning and coordination of the IOeffort. The MAGTF IO officer, within G-3/S-3FOps, is responsible for the following:

Integrating and coordinating IO efforts. Responding directly to the commander via the

G-3/S-3 for MAGTF information operations. Ensuring that the IO cell is incorporated into

and provides input to the operational planning

2-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

team (OPT) during planning to ensure coordi-nated operations.

Preparing the IO appendix to the operationorder (OPORD).

Directing personnel within the MAGTF IO cellas well as augmentees from external agencieswho are assigned to the IO cell.

Ensuring that all information operations arecoordinated within the MAGTF staff, higherheadquarters, and external agencies.

Coordinating and collaborating with the intelli-gence staff section (G-2/S-2).

The electronic warfare officer (EWO) will inte-grate EW operations through the EW coordina-tion center or the IO cell when it is established.

The fire support coordinator, supporting armscoordinator, target information officer, and targetintelligence officer will oversee the formation ofthe target list and the engagement of those tar-gets, to include accepted targets nominated by theIO cell.

Public affairs officers (PAOs) will identify keypublic or target audiences with interest andimpact in the area of operations, to includeforeign and domestic audiences and local,regional, and international media. Public affairsand IO planners must plan, coordinate and de-conflict activities, release of public information,and media analysis/assessment to achieve maxi-mum effect, consistent with the Department ofDefense (DOD) principles of information,policies, and public affairs (PA) guidance.

The COMCAM planner ensures that priorities areestablished for the provision of visual documen-tation for operational and combat support.

The civil affairs (CA) officer identifies key civil-military operations (CMO) targets and coordi-nates with the targeting cell. He provides thelocal populace news and information about CMOactivities and support, which aids in neutralizingmisinformation and hostile propaganda directedagainst civil authorities.

The current operations officer will assist the IOofficer in the supervision and coordination of IOactivities that support or are integrated into ongo-ing operations. The current operations officersupervises battle captains/watch officers andcommunicates with subordinate commanders toidentify and monitor IO events within theMAGTF’s area of operations. Additionally, thecurrent operations officer must be prepared toexecute IO battle drills if required.

The FOps officer will work closely with the IOofficer to monitor current operations and ensurethat planned MAGTF operations are conductedin order to achieve objectives across the opera-tional environment. The FOps officer must beparticularly mindful to ensure that operations inthe physical dimension support the com-mander’s objectives in the informational andcognitive dimensions.

Intelligence Section

Intelligence is critical to the planning, execution,and assessment of information operations andmust provide support across a range of militaryoperations at all levels of war. The G-2/S-2 is thecentral point of contact for all intelligence sup-port to information operations for the MAGTFstaff. Coordination and interaction between theG-2/S-2 and the G-3/S-3 may be enhancedthrough liaison representatives embedded withinthe IO cell. See appendix A.

Communications Section

The communications section (G-6/S-6) overseesthe communications security (COMSEC) pro-gram, supports the installation and maintenanceof information systems, assists the EWO indeconflicting EW jamming operations in order toavoid electronic fratricide, and coordinates activeOPSEC measures and facilitation of specializedcommunications in support of IRCs and informa-tion operations.


Special Staff

In support of the MAGTF mission, public affairsassists the MAGTF IO officer in keeping localpopulations informed by putting MAGTF actionsinto context, countering propaganda and misin-formation, and by communicating proposedMAGTF actions in order to deter the adversary’sactions. These efforts build support for militaryoperations, help the local population developinformed perceptions about MAGTF activities,undermine adversarial propaganda, and shape theadversary’s planning.

Chaplains, though not a traditional IRC, have avery important role to play in information opera-tions. Recent operations in both Iraq and Afghan-istan have seen the adversary use religion tobolster and justify recruiting and terrorist activi-ties. Chaplains participating in key leader engage-ments can assist in co-opting religious leadersand degrading the adversary’s use of religion.

The civil affairs officers from the G-9/S-9 sec-tion assist the MAGTF IO officer in integratingplanned CMO into the information operations toensure that information operations and CA arecreating the most favorable effects for theMAGTF commander and are not at odds with theeffects created in specific areas of the opera-tional environment.

The SJA supports the MAGTF IO officer byensuring all phases of the operation, to includeany branches and sequels, are conducted in com-pliance with the applicable laws. In so doing, theSJA plays a critical role in the development andrefinement of a proposed course of action (COA).The SJA should be involved early in IO planningin order to avoid delays in the execution of IO-related actions.

Information Operations Cell

The IO cell is a task-organized group that will beestablished within a MAGTF and/or higher head-quarters to integrate a variety of separate disci-plines and functions pertaining to information

operations for the command. A fully functioningIO cell integrates a broad range of potential IOactions and related activities that contribute to ac-complishing the mission. Information operationsintegration requires extensive planning andcoordination among all the elements of the staff.The IO cell, when established, is a mechanism forachieving that coordination.

The IO cell is composed of intelligence per-sonnel, augmentees supporting IO activities, andrepresentatives from staff elements and subjectmatter experts (SMEs) from appropriate war-fighting functions. The size and structure of thecell are tailored to meet the mission and thecommander’s intent.

During planning, the IO cell should facilitatecoordination between various staffs, organiza-tions, and the MAGTF staff elements responsiblefor planning specific elements of informationoperations. During execution, the cell shouldremain available to assist in coordination, provid-ing support or adjusting IO efforts as necessary.The IO cell should have the required communica-tions connectivity, either through the combatoperations center or separately, in order to effec-tively coordinate changing IO requirements.

Integrated Information Operations Planning and the Marine Corps Planning Process

The commander and his planners must ensurethat information operations planning begins at theearliest stage of operational planning, is consis-tent with the IO plans of the higher headquarters,and is fully integrated into the MAGTF’s con-cept of operations. Military deception, MISO, andcyberspace operations require more time to plandue to the authorities that are required to executethese activities and the time required to establishand prepare observables for these activities.

Marines use the MCPP and the targeting process(D3A [decide, detect, deliver, assess]) in the

2-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

development of the IO concept of support and IOplans. Two notable requirements in IO planningare as follows:

A longer lead time is required to plan certaininformation operations (i.e., MILDEC, MISO,and cyberspace operations).

The impact and threat of hostile informationfrom outside the operational area due to theease of information flow through informationnetworks and the media, which creates operat-ing boundaries in the information environmentthat are larger than the area of operations andare porous to outside influences.

During the planning process, the IO officer mustbe prepared to quickly articulate IO objectivesand provide detailed information on how the inte-gration of discrete IRCs will support the com-mander’s desired end state.

The MCPP establishes procedures for analyzing amission, developing and wargaming COAsagainst the adversary, comparing friendly COAsagainst the commander’s criteria and each other,selecting a COA, and preparing an OPORD exe-cution. Information operations planning is alignedwith the MCPP steps and ensures that IO actionsare coordinated with all six warfighting functionsand the operations of higher, adjacent, and subor-dinate commands. See Marine Corps WarfightingPublication (MCWP) 5-1, Marine Corps Plan-ning Process, for detailed information.

Problem Framing

The purpose of problem framing is to gain anenhanced understanding of the environment andthe nature of the problem. This understandingallows a commander to visualize the operationand describe his conceptual approach, providingcontext for the examination of what the commandmust accomplish, when and where it must bedone, and most importantly, why the operation isbeing conducted. Since no amount of subsequentplanning can solve a problem insufficientlyunderstood, problem framing is critical.

The higher headquarters order is analyzed toextract IO planning guidance, such as limitationsand planning factors. This guidance establishesthe boundaries for IO planning, identifies targetlimitations based on policy and rules of engage-ment, and helps reduce the uncertainty associ-ated with IO planning. This process also ensuresthat the MAGTF will nest its IO plan with that ofthe higher headquarters.

During problem framing, intelligence prepara-tion of the battlespace (IPB) planning supportsthe commander as he develops his battlespacearea evaluation. Assisted by the intelligence sec-tion, the MAGTF IO cell reviews known factsabout the adversary and the information environ-ment. Key actors must be identified early in theplanning process. A key actor is a person or per-sons whose decisions will have an impact, eitherpositively or negatively, on the commander’s endstate. As the planning process matures, these keyactors may become the command’s target audi-ence, at which time, effort and resources areapplied in order to effect their decisions. Intelli-gence preparation of the battlespace products rel-evant to further IO planning are developed orrequested. Adversary centers of gravity (COGs)are determined, while potential risks and friendlyvulnerabilities are also identified. Informationgaps must be determined and requests submittedto resolve the uncertainties necessary for furtherplanning. During the planning process, IO plan-ners conduct an analysis that links national, com-batant command, or joint strategic objectives tothe MAGTF’s operational and tactical tasks. Bylinking operational level objectives and tasks tostrategic objectives, the IO planner will ensurethat MAGTF activities are in concert with higherheadquarters’ desired end state.

An initial IO concept for support can be devel-oped during problem framing. Friendly IO assetsand capabilities, either organic or supporting theMAGTF, as well as additional IO force structurerequirements, are identified. As problem framingis conducted, resource or capability shortfalls arenoted. The IO cell identifies critical shortfalls and


requests support from higher headquarters orexternal agencies to achieve projected, desiredresults. The IO concept of support must befocused by and in accordance with the com-mander’s initial guidance. A staff estimate for IOis the most formal form of this IO concept of sup-port and should be developed.

The IO cell must fully participate in MAGTFplanning activities and coordinate its planningefforts with those of the MAGTF FOps section.An ad hoc organization known as the OPT (the IOcell should have a representative in the OPT) isusually formed by the FOps section. The OPT willbe conducting problem framing. The results ofeach group’s OPT and IO cell analyses should becombined. Friendly vulnerabilities can be incorpo-rated into force protection planning, while theadversary’s critical vulnerabilities determinedthrough the OPT’s COG analysis could includepotential IO targets. Emerging themes and mes-sages that can influence the battlespace to theadvantage of the MAGTF can become the basisfor an overall perception management operations.

During problem framing, IO planning resultsshould be incorporated into the commander’splanning guidance, IPB products, commander’scritical information requirements (CCIRs), COGanalysis, and other staff estimates.

At the end of problem framing, IO personnelshould have developed the following:

Staff estimate for information operations. A combined information overlay and a tem-

plate of adversary operations in the informa-tion environment.

An understanding of which decisionmakersshould be targeted.

IO essential tasks. Shortfalls in IRCs. IO limitations. IO critical information requirements.

Appendix B provides several examples of IOplanning products.

Essential Tasks for Information Operations

Rarely will the MAGTF conduct informationoperations by itself. There will always be higherheadquarters guidance and tasks. While sometasks may have been specifically assigned by thehigher headquarters, others may be implied,meaning they are necessary to accomplish speci-fied tasks or the overall mission. Implied tasksrequire resources and may not be administrativein nature. From the specified and implied tasks,IO personnel identify tasks that the commandmust accomplish to successfully affect adversaryand friendly use of information. These becomethe unit’s essential tasks for information opera-tions. Essential tasks for information operationsshould be limited to no more than five; any morethan that will overburden the subordinate ele-ment with developing tasks in support of essentialIO tasks or may create an information operationthat is too complex to execute.

A rule of thumb for validating an essential task isto ask: If the MAGTF accomplishes all othertasks marginally and does this one well, will itaccomplish the mission? If the answer is no, thenthe task is not essential. If more than five essen-tial tasks are identified, then IO personnel shouldquestion the validity of each essential task or thenature of the requirements levied on the MAGTFby higher headquarters.

Shortfalls in Information Operations Capabilities

Information operations personnel should deter-mine if the MAGTF has the assets to perform theassigned tasks. This is done by identifying anyand all organic and supporting IO-capable assets.Organic assets are resident in assigned orattached forces. Supporting assets are available tothe MAGTF from a higher headquarters or USGovernment agency. Available assets are thencompared with the IO mission requirements(specified and implied tasks) in order to identifycapability shortfalls and any additional assets thatare required. To ensure use of these assets, IOpersonnel must start coordination early.

2-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

Information operations planners face a challengein expressing IO capabilities to the commanderand staff. A simple list of IO-capable assets orunits—such as, three ground-based jammers,three tactical MISO teams, or two COMCAMteams—does not help the commander visualizethe command’s capabilities in the informationenvironment. In developing its product, IO per-sonnel should consider three basic questions:

What IO effects can be created or producedusing the command’s organic assets?

What IO effects can be created or producedusing supporting assets from the higher head-quarters?

What IO effects cannot be created or producedwith available assets?

Restraints and Constraints for Information Operations

Restraints are the things that you cannot do andconstraints are the things that you must do that donot qualify as specified tasks, but need to be iden-tified and carried forward into COA develop-ment and subsequent planning as they can affecthow operations will be conducted.

Like most other operations, information operationsare restrained by rules of engagement; US nationalpolicy; international politics; and other legal,moral, cultural, and operational factors. Addition-ally, IO personnel should consider that IRCs haverestraints of their own; in particular, MILDEC,MISO, cyberspace operations, and electronic war-fare. Common restraints include approval authori-ties for deception operations, MISO products,MISO themes to avoid, allied forces’ national pol-icies and capabilities, restricted targets and fre-quencies , and PA guidance . To enhanceunderstanding, limitations for information opera-tions can be organized in terms of informationcontent and flow.

Information content is the substance, value, ormeaning of the information, normally comprised

within the words and images; includes theintended action or inaction the information wasdesigned to elicit. Examples include the following:

Avoid themes that favor any ethnic group. Receive MISO product approval from the com-

batant commander. Receive deception approval from joint task

force (JTF) commander. Stress themes that highlight the importance of

reconciliation.

Information flow describes how information istransferred or exchanged between a transmitter/source and a receiver and includes the means,mediums, and paths utilized in the exchange.Examples include the following:

No cross-boundary electronic attack. US MISO products cannot be disseminated by

allied forces. PA posture for the operation is passive. Religious structures are identified on the

restricted target list. COMCAM priorities.

Critical Information Requirements for Information Operations

Only the commander decides what information iscritical, but the staff may propose CCIRs to thecommander. The CCIRs are continually reviewedand updated or deleted as required. Initially,CCIRs may reflect the nature of planning andidentify intelligence or information requirementsto assist with the planning and decision process.As the planning moves forward and executionlooms, CCIRs will normally change to reflect keyinformation/intelligence requirements tied todecision points or needed for execution.

Course of Action Development

During COA development, planners use the mis-sion statement, commander’s intent, and com-mander’s planning guidance to develop COAs.


Course of action development provides optionsfor how the mission and commander’s intentmight be accomplished while continuing to refinethe understanding of the problem. The IO plan-ner’s goal is to develop a concept of support thatwill generate effects that create information supe-riority over the adversary at the proper time andplace. An IO concept of support should be exam-ined to ensure that it is suitable, feasible, accept-able, distinguishable, and complete with respectto the current and anticipated situation, mission,and commander’s intent.

Planning that is started during problem framingwill continue during COA development. The IPBproducts that are requested and developed will bereviewed for applicability with the commander’splanning guidance. As necessary, IO-related IPBproducts will be modified and updated. As newinformation is received, CCIRs may be revisedand additional requirements submitted.

Information operations cell planning efforts willcontinue to be closely linked with those of theOPT. The IO planner can assist the OPT bygraphically displaying the significant characteris-tics of the information environment, allowing theOPT to see the capabilities of both friendly andadversary forces. See JP 2-01.3, Joint IntelligencePreparation of the Operational Environment, fora detailed discussion on the combined informa-tion overlay. In coordination with the red cell andthe G-2, the IO cell will conduct nodal analysis toassess relative IRCs and provide the OPT with anunderstanding of the strengths and weaknesses ofboth friendly and adversary forces. The IO cellwill conduct an assessment of friendly vulnerabil-ities to adversary information actions. The IO cellwill also continue to refine its analysis of theadversary COG to determine the critical adver-sary vulnerabilities most susceptible to informa-tion operations. The refined COG and criticalvulnerabilities are used in the development of theinitial COAs.

The IO cell will closely follow the developmentof the OPT’s COAs to ensure that the IO conceptof support adequately supports these COAs. The

IO cell may formulate an IO concept of supportthat will identify IO actions to be implementedregardless of the eventual COA that is adopted. Inaddition, the IO cell may create a concept of sup-port for every COA developed by the OPT. Justas every COA will have to meet the OPT’s crite-ria for suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distin-guishability, and completeness, the IO cell mustensure that the IO concept of support can passsimilar review. Each IO concept of support mustaddress the following:

What IO tasks will be accomplished? Who will execute the IO tasks (IO assets capa-

bilities)? When will IO tasks be executed? Where will the IO tasks occur? Why is each IO task required (intended effect)? How will the MAGTF employ IRCs and other

organic capabilities to accomplish the tasks? How is the IO concept nested with the higher

headquarter’s IO plan and scheme of manuever?

At the conclusion of COA development, the OPTor IO cell should have developed the following:

An overall IO concept. An IO concept of support for each COA to

include objectives and purposes for essential IOtasks, target nominations, and an assessmentplan to measure the effectivness of the tasks.

Recommendations for the commander’s war-gaming guidance and evaluation criteria.

Updated IO-associated IPB products. Input to the COA graphic and narrative. An initial staff estimate for information opera-

tions with additional asset requirements orrequired support from higher headquarters.

Course of Action War Game

The COA war game examines and refines thebroad option(s) in light of adversary capabilitiesand potential actions/reactions as well as thecharacteristics peculiar to the operational

2-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

environment. Each friendly COA is wargamedagainst selected adversary COAs. Course of actionwargaming assists the planners in identifyingstrengths and weaknesses, associated risks, andasset shortfalls for each friendly COA. The IOcell’s objective in the war game is to refine andvalidate both the overall IO concept of support aswell as the specific IO concepts of support foreach COA, while also fully participating in theCOA war game. The IO actions are integrated intothe COA war game in an interactive process todetermine the impact on both friendly andadversary capabilities. The IO cell should observeand record the advantages and disadvantages ofeach COA and the capability of informationoperations to support each COA. For futureplanning, it should also identify possible branchesand potential sequels based on the IO concept.

At the conclusion of the COA war game, the IOcell reviews its planning products and refinesthem to support the next step in the MCPP. Theseplanning products include the following:

Updated input to IPB products. Refined staff estimate for information opera-

tions. Refined input to CCIRs. Task organization and asset shortfalls for IO

resources. Information operations input to COA synchro-

nization matrix.

Course of Action Comparison and Decision

In COA comparison and decision, the com-mander evaluates all friendly COAs against hisestablished criteria, against each other, and thenselects the COA that will best accomplish themission. As appropriate, the IO cell will provideadditional comparison criteria directly relevant toinformation operations that may assist the com-mander in his decision. The IO results from theCOA war game may be briefed as a separate,supporting concept by the IO cell or presented bythe OPT as an element of the overall plan.

In any event, the IO cell is responsible forensuring that the commander is apprised of theeffects that have been created by operations in theinformation environment. The IO cell is alsoresponsible for ensuring that the impact andanticipated effect of IO act ions upon theadversary targets for each COA and the relativemerit of each COA from an IO perspective areprovided to the commander.

Orders Development

During orders development, the staff takes thecommander’s COA decision, mission statement,intent, and guidance and develops orders to directthe actions of the unit. Orders serve as the princi-pal means by which the commander expresses hisdecision, commander’s intent, and guidance.

The information operations cell is responsible fortaking the overall IO concept of support and theconcept of support specific to the COA selected bythe commander and turning them into appropriatesections of the OPORD under the direction of theMAGTF IO officer. Specifically, Appendix 3(Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations)describes the information operation as a whole andhow information operations will gain informationsuperiority in support of the scheme of maneuver.See appendix C for a sample format of anOPORD. The IO cell must be careful to not let therequirement to develop and explain IRCs and con-tributions to the operation overwhelm the primarypurposes of the IO appendix, which are to—

Provide operational details on information oper-ations.

Focus element and unit tasks on creating spe-cific effects in the information environment.

Provide the information needed to assess infor-mation operations.

Because information operations are multidisci-plined, it is found in various portions of theMAGTF OPORD. The disciplines of IO areincluded as tabs to Appendix 3 (InformationOperations), Annex C (Operations) to the


OPORD and in the OPORD annexes for commu-nication systems, public affairs, CMO, informa-t ion management , and spec ia l t echn ica loperations (STO).

During orders reconciliation and crosswalk, theinformation operations cell may be called uponto review the IO sections of the orders, identifygaps in planning or discrepancies, provide cor-rective action, and finalize IPB products. If frag-mentary orders are issued, then the IO cell willensure that appropriate instructions are given toIO-capable units.

Transition

Transition is the orderly handover of a plan ororder as it is passed to those tasked with execu-tion of the operation. It provides those who willexecute the plan or order with the situationalawareness and rationale for key decisions neces-sary to ensure that there is a coherent shift fromplanning to execution and may involve a widerange of briefs, drills or rehearsals (subject to thevariables of echelon of command), mission com-plexity, and, most importantly, time.

The IO cell monitors the transition from plan-ning to execution and continues to support bothcurrent and future operations. The IO cell assistsin the transition briefings for the remainder of thestaff and subordinate commands to ensure thatthe IO portions of the order are known and under-stood. If drills are held, then the IO cell will assistas necessary. During the confirmation brief, theIO cell will ensure that the IO-capable unitsaddress their tasked IO actions as part of theiroverall plan to identify any remaining discrepan-cies or gaps in planning.

Successful information operations give sub-ordinates maximum latitude for initiative, and

postures the unit for follow-on missions. Likewise,with a little foresight, IO personnel can use oneinformation operation to jump start another.Occasionally, a tactical level information opera-tion may be the perfect jump start for an opera-tional level information operations and so on.

Transitioning From Planning to Battle Rhythm

Having completed the MCPP steps and arrived atan executable COA, the MAGTF will be chal-lenged to monitor the execution of the IO planand make changes that are consistent with evolv-ing operations. The MAGTF IO cell is useful inproviding IO support to the steps of the MCPPand can help the MAGTF develop the followingessential building blocks:

Stated objectives (based on desired opera-tional effect).

IO synchronization matrix that links mutuallysupporting IO actions.

Integrated target list.

These building blocks help sustain ongoing infor-mation operations. Sustained information opera-tions are supported by the MAGTF intelligencecycle, battle damage assesment (BDA) cycle, tar-geting cycle, and the MAGTF operations battlerhythm. These processes allow the MAGTF toanalyze the information intelligence cycle, assessthe functional capability (or destruction) of theadversary BDA cycle, re-engage as necessary tomaintain constant pressure on the adversary’s tar-geting cycle, and modify and issue changes toongoing plans. It is the integration of these cyclesthat determines the daily IO battle rhythm.

2-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4


CHAPTER 3 KEY INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES

Information operations are multidisciplined andinclude a variety of elements that must beemployed together within an integrated strategy.Some of these elements are more offensive,defensive, or informational in nature, but it istheir integration into the concept of operationsthat ensures successful employment of informa-tion operations in support of the MAGTF. Inte-gration of information operations is an essentialpart of MAGTF operations in expeditionary andjoint environments. Information operations canmitigate the effects of a crisis and can help pre-vent or resolve conflict.

When deterrence fails, information operations helpMarines win in war by providing essential protec-tion and enhancing the effective use of force.Information operations enhance the operationalcapability of the MAGTF through employment ofa wide range of organic and external capabilities.

Military Deception

The purpose of MILDEC is to cause adversariesto form inaccurate impressions about friendlyforce capabilities or intentions by feeding infor-mation through their intelligence collection orinformation assets. Military deception targets theadversary decisionmaker’s intelligence collec-tion, analysis, and dissemination systems andrequires a thorough knowledge of adversaries andtheir decisionmaking processes.

Military deception operations are actions exe-cuted to deliberately mislead the adversary’s mil-itary decisionmakers as to friendly militarycapabilities, intentions, and operations; thereby,causing the adversary to take specific actions thatwill contribute to the accomplishment of thefriendly mission.

Military deception operations depend on an inte-grated effort by all warfighting functions to createa credible story. Intelligence operations identifyappropriate deception targets, assist in developinga credible story, identify and focus on appropriatetargets, and assess the effectiveness of theMILDEC plan. Military deception operations area powerful tool, but are not without cost. Forcesand resources must be committed to the deceptioneffort to make it believable, possibly to the short-term detriment of some other aspects of the oper-ations. Feasible COAs rejected during planningcan be particularly effective as the basis forMILDEC operations. For more information onMILDEC, see JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, orthe classified MCRP 3-40.4A, Multi-Service Tac-tics, Techniques, and Procedures for MilitaryDeception (MILDEC) Operations.

Types of Deception Operations

A deception operation may contain one or moreof the following: feint, demonstration, ruse, and/or display.

A feint is a limited objective attack that involvescontact with the adversary. A feint is conductedfor the purpose of deceiving the adversary as tothe location and/or time of the actual main offen-sive action. Feints may vary in size from a raid toa supporting attack. A feint may occur before,during, or after the main attack and may be inde-pendent of the main effort. Feints may beemployed to cause the adversary to react in oneof three predicable ways: employ his reservesimproperly, shift his supporting fires, or revealhis defensive fires.

A demonstration is an attack or show of force ona front where a decision is not sought and madewith the aim of deceiving the adversary. A dem-onstration differs from a feint in that no contactwith the adversary is intended.

3-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

A ruse is a trick of war that places false informa-tion in the adversary’s hand. Ruses are generallysingle, deliberate actions. It may be necessary togroup several ruses together to ensure credibilityof a deception story. Ruses are extremely suscep-tible to detection because of inconsistencies andmay present the adversary with a windfall ofinformation that he is inclined to reject.

A display is a static portrayal of an activity forceor equipment intended to deceive the adversary’svisual observation. Displays are simulations, dis-guises, or portrayals that project to the adversarythe appearance of objects that do not exist orappear to be something else. Displays include sim-ulations, disguises, decoys, and dummies. Theymay include the use of heat, smoke, electronicemissions, false tracks, and fake command posts.

Deception in Support of the Offense

The adversary commander is the target forMILDEC in support of the offense. Goals mayinclude the following:

Achieve surprise. Preserve friendly forces, equipment, and instal-

lations from destruction. Minimize a physical advantage the adversary

may have. Gain time. Cause the adversary to employ forces, includ-

ing intelligence, in ways that are advantageousto the MAGTF.

Cause the adversary to reveal strengths, dispo-sitions, and future intentions.

Influence the adversary’s intelligence collec-tion and analytical capability.

Condition the adversary to particular patternsof friendly behavior that can be exploited at atime chosen by the MAGTF.

Cause the adversary to waste combat powerwith inappropriate or delayed actions.

Deception in Support of the Defense

Military deception can help protect the MAGTFfrom the adversary’s offensive IO efforts. Decep-tion that misleads an adversary about friendly C2capabilities or limitations contributes to friendlyprotection. An adversary commander who isdeceived about friendly C2 capabilities and limi-tations may be more likely to misallocateresources in his effort to attack or exploit friendlyC2 systems.

Operations Security and Deception

Operations security and deception have much incommon. Both require the management of indica-tors. Operations security is used to deny informa-tion or to hide what is real and seeks to limit anadversary’s ability to detect or derive usefulinformation from his observations of friendlyactivities. Deception is used to feed informationor to show what is not real and seeks to create orincrease the likely detection of certain indicatorsthat the adversary can observe and that will causean adversary to derive an incorrect conclusion.

Special Considerations for Deception Planning

When planning for deception operations, the staffmust consider classification requirements as wellas any possible unintended effects that may be aresult of the operation:

Classification Requirements. Due to the sensi-tive nature of deception operations, deceptionplanning is restricted to those personnel whohave a need to know. Deception operationsdepend on the knowledge and utilization ofadversary intelligence collection systems todeliver a deception story to an adversary. Com-promise of friendly knowledge of adversaryintelligence systems would be harmful andcould have far-reaching strategic and opera-tional effects.


Unintended Effects. Third parties, such as neu-tral or friendly forces not aware of the decep-tion, may receive and act upon deceptioninformation that is intended for the adversary.Deception planners should minimize the risk toother parties.


The G-3/S-3 has primary responsibility fordeception. Normally, a deception officer isappointed and is responsible to the G-3/S-3 fordeception planning and oversight.

Deception and the Operation Order

Tab A to Appendix 3 (Information Operations) ofAnnex C (Operations) of the OPORD is thedeception tab. This tab implements the recom-mended COA for deception. The deception tabdetails the specific tasks to be performed andspecifies coordinating instructions for the controland management of deception missions.

Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare is military action involving theuse of electromagnetic and directed energy tocontrol the electromagnetic spectrum or to attackthe adversary. (JP 1-02) Electronic warfareconsists of three divisions: electronic attack,electronic protection, and electronic warfaresupport. Electronic warfare denies the opponent anadvantage in the electromagnetic spectrum andensures friendly unimpeded access to the elec-tromagnetic spectrum portion of the informationenvironment. Electronic warfare can be appliedfrom air, sea, land, and space by manned andunmanned systems, and it is employed to supportmilitary operations involving various levels ofdetection, denial, deception, disruption, degra-dation, protection, and destruction. Contributing to

the success of information operations, electronicwarfare uses offensive and defensive tactics andtechniques in a variety of combinations to shape,disrupt, and exploit adversarial use of theelectromagnetic spectrum while protectingfriendly freedom of action in that spectrum. Formore information on electronic warfare see JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, or MCWP 3-40.5,Electronic Warfare.

Electronic Attack

Electronic attack is a division of electronic war-fare involving the use of electromagnetic energy,directed energy, or antiradiation weapons toattack personnel, facilities, or equipment with theintent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroyingenemy combat capability and is considered aform of fires. (JP 1-02) Electronic attack includesthe following:

Actions taken to prevent or reduce an adver-sary’s effective use of the electromagneticspectrum, such as jamming and the use of anti-radiation weapons.

Employment of weapons that use either elec-tromagnetic or directed energy as their primarydestructive mechanism such as lasers, radio fre-quency weapons, and particle beams.

Electronic Protection

Electronic protection is a division of electronicwarfare involving actions taken to protect person-nel, facilities, and equipment from any effects offriendly or enemy use of the electromagneticspectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroyfriendly combat capability. (JP 1-02)

Electronic Warfare Support

Electronic warfare support is a division ofelectronic warfare involving actions tasked by, orunder the direct control of, an operational

3-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

commander, to search for, intercept, identify, andlocate or localize sources of intentional and unin-tentional radiated electromagnetic energy for thepurpose of immediate threat recognit ion,targeting, planning and conduct of future opera-tions. (JP 1-02)

Electronic warfare support provides informationrequired for decisions involving EW operationsand other tactical actions such as threat avoid-ance, targeting, and homing. Electronic warfaresupport data can be used to produce signals intel-ligence, provide targeting for electronic ordestructive attack, and produce measurement andsignature intelligence.

Marine Corps Electronic Warfare Organizations

The Marine Corps has two types of EW units: theradio battalion (RadBn) and the Marine tacticalelectronic warfare squadron (VMAQ).

The RadBn provides COMSEC monitoring, tacti-cal signals intelligence (SIGINT), electronic war-fare, and special intelligence communicationssupport to the MAGTF. The role and structure ofthe RadBn continue to evolve with the evolutionof communications technology.

A VMAQ provides EW support to the MAGTFand other designated forces. The VMAQ con-ducts tactical jamming to prevent, delay, or disruptthe adversary’s ability to use early warning, acqui-sition, fire or missile control, counterbattery, andbattlefield surveillance radars. Tactical jammingalso denies and/or degrades enemy communica-tion capabilities. In addition, the VMAQ conductselectronic reconnaissance and electronic intelli-gence operations. There are four VMAQs (desig-nated VMAQ-1 through VMAQ-4) assigned toMAG-14 [Marine Aircraft Group-14], 2d MAW[2d Marine Aircraft Wing]. Each squadron hasfive EA-6B Prowler aircraft.


Electronic warfare is the responsibility of the G-3/S-3. An EWO is normally appointed to be

responsible for planning, coordinating, and taskingEW operations and activities. The EWO coor-dinates with the G-2/S-2 to establish prioritiesbetween EW and SIGINT missions. The EWOalso coordinates with the G-6/S-6 to facilitatemaximum use of the electromagnetic spectrumthrough electronic protection and to minimizeelectromagnetic interference.

Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell

The electronic warfare coordination cell (EWCC)is a dedicated EW planning cell that may beestablished to coordinate EW activities. TheMAGTF commander will normally plan, syn-chronize, coordinate, and deconflict EW opera-tions through the EWCC, which facilitatescoordination of EW operations with other fires,communications systems, and information sys-tems. This center coordinates efforts by the G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and G-6/S-6 to eliminate conflictsbetween battlespace functions. The EWCC isunder staff cognizance of the G-3/S-3. Assignedpersonnel identify and resolve potential conflictsin planned operations. The EWCC includes anEWO, a communications system and informationsystems representative, and other liaison officerssuch as RadBn or VMAQ SMEs, Marine air con-trol group radar officer, or representatives fromother Services as needed.

MAGTF staffs will provide personnel to incorpo-rate an EWCC with the Marine expeditionaryforce G-3/S-3. Personnel will also be providedfor liaison teams to higher headquarters EW coor-dination organizations when required.

Electronic Warfare Addendums to the Operation Order

Tab B (Electronic Warfare) to Appendix 3 (Infor-mation Operations) of Annex C (Operations) ofthe OPORD is the EW tab. Tab B details specificEW tasks to be performed and specifies coordi-nating instructions for the control and manage-ment of EW missions.


Appendix 2 (Signals Intelligence) to Annex B(Intelligence) of the OPORD contains specificinstructions for SIGINT operations.

Operations Security

Operations security is the key to informationdenial. It gives the commander the capability toidentify indicators that can be observed by theadversary’s intelligence systems. These indica-tors could be interpreted or pieced together toderive critical information regarding friendlyforce dispositions, intent, and/or COAs that mustbe protected. The goal of OPSEC is to identify,select, and execute measures that eliminate orreduce indications and other sources of informa-tion, which may be exploited by an adversary, toan acceptable level.

Operations security is a process of identifyingcritical information and subsequently analyzingfriendly actions attendant to military operationsand other activities to—

Identify those actions that can be observed bythe adversary’s intelligence systems.

Determine indicators that the adversary’sintelligence systems might obtain that could beinterpreted or pieced together to derive criticalinformation in time to be useful to the adversary.

Select and execute measures that eliminate orreduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabili-ties of friendly actions to adversary exploita-tion. For more information on operationssecurity see JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, orMCWP 3-40.9, Operations Security (OPSEC).

Operations Security in Support of the Offense

Although primarily associated with defensivemeasures, OPSEC contributes to the offense bydepriving the adversary of information that slowsthe adversary’s decision cycle, thereby providingopportunity for attainment of friendly objectives.

Operations Security in Support of the Defense

The overall goal of OPSEC is denial and theestablishment of essential secrecy. The key ele-ment that OPSEC protects is the commander’sconcept of operation. A good OPSEC plan deniesinformation to the adversary intelligence system,reducing its ability to orient combat poweragainst friendly operations.

Operations Security Process

Operations security planning is accomplishedthrough the OPSEC process. The OPSEC pro-cess has five distinctive steps that provide aframework for the systematic identification, anal-ysis, and protection of information necessary tomaintain essential secrecy (see JP 3-13.3):

Identification of critical information. Analysis of threats. Analysis of vulnerabilities. Assessment of risk. Application of appropriate OPSEC measures.


The G-3/S-3 has primary responsibility forOPSEC. Normally, an OPSEC officer is ap-pointed and is responsible to the G-3/S-3 forOPSEC planning and overs ight . In jo in toperations, an OPSEC working group may beestablished to recommend OPSEC measures,coordinate or conduct OPSEC surveys, and writethe OPSEC portion of the OPORD.

Support Agencies

The counterintelligence (CI)/human intelligence(HUMINT) teams perform a wide range of dutiessuch as security briefings, countersabotage, coun-terespionage, and countersurveillance inspec-tions. Counterintelligence measures enhancesecurity, aid in reducing risks to a command, andare essential in achieving operational surpriseduring military operations. Counterintelligence

3-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

can provide a significant contribution to a unit’sOPSEC program. Counterintelligence personnelcan support a command’s OPSEC program byconducting the following:

Counterintelligence surveys. Physical security evaluations. Security inspections. Vacated command post inspections. Penetration inspections. Security education.

Normally, there is a CI/HUMINT company lo-cated within the intelligence battalion. Additionalinformation on CI/HUMINT is provided inMCWP 2-6, Counterintelligence.

The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)operates a worldwide organization to fulfill theinvestigative and counterintelligence responsi-bilities of the Department of the Navy. Within itscharter, the NCIS has exclusive jurisdiction inmatters involving actual, potential, or suspectedespionage, sabotage, and subversion includingdefection. In a combat environment, this CIjurisdiction is assigned to Marine counter-intelligence, assuming that NCIS assets are notlocally available.

Operations Security and the Operation Order

Tab C (Operations Security) to Appendix 3(Information Operations) of Annex C (Opera-tions) of the OPORD is the OPSEC tab. This tabimplements the recommended COA for OPSEC.It details specific OPSEC tasks to be performedand specifies coordinating instructions for thecontrol and management of OPSEC tasks.

Military Information Support Operations

Military information support operations areplanned operations to convey selected informa-tion and indicators to foreign audiences to influ-ence the i r emot ions , mot ives , ob jec t ivereasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign

governments, organizations, groups, and individ-uals in a manner favorable to the originator’sobjectives. (JP 1-02)

At the strategic level, MISO may take the form ofpolitical or diplomatic positions, announcements,or communiques. At the operational level, MISOcan include the distribution of leaflets, radio andtelevision broadcasts, and other means of trans-mitting information that provide informationintended to influence a selected group. It may beused to encourage adversary forces to defect, des-ert, flee, surrender, or take any other action bene-ficial to friendly forces. At the tactical level,MISO enables the tactical commander to directlycommunicate and empathize with target audi-ences. Tactical level MISO includes face-to-facecontact and the use of loudspeakers or othermeans to deliver MISO messages.

Military information support operations shapeattitudes and influence a foreign audience’sbehavior. The mere presence of Marine Corpsforces may be a MISO activity in itself, bringinginfluence on a situation through a display of pur-pose. Military information support operationsmay also support military deception operations.

Integration

Military information support operations is onlyone of the means available to influence adver-sary attitudes and behaviors. When MISO is usedconcurrently with other information-related activ-ities, it must be closely integrated with thosecapabilities in order to convey selected informa-tion in a synchronized way. Information opera-tions personnel will coordinate public affairs (thedelivery of the truth), OPSEC (the protection offriendly critical information), MILDEC (the con-cealment of friendly intentions and creation ofmisleading perceptions), and CMO (the deliveryof friendly civil actions) with MISO operations.

Employment

During peacetime, MISO activities that supportcombatant commanders take the form of overt


peacetime MISO programs. These programs areproposed by combatant commanders through theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)who, in turn, refers them to the Assistant Secre-tary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict for review and approval. Dur-ing contingencies, a MISO concept plan that isbroad in scope is forwarded from the combatantcommander to the joint staff for approval of over-arching themes, objectives, and guidance, but notproducts. Once the concept plan is approved, amore detailed theater MISO plan is developed.Once a campaign plan is approved, the combatantcommander or joint force commander is dele-gated MISO approval authority. This does notmean that the supported combatant commanderhas also been delegated approval for MISO prod-uct dissemination. In some cases, MISO productsmay be politically or religiously sensitive andmay require separate approval for dissemination.The CJCS execute order, which is authorized bythe Secretary of Defense, should designate whohas authority for MISO product approval andwho has authority for MISO product dissemina-tion. The MAGTF’s MISO actions must comple-ment and support ongoing theater and joint forceMISO activities.

The MAGTF will not normally identify, plan, orexecute complex MISO activities; such as thoserequiring detailed theme development, intricatetarget analysis, or the use of sophisticated media.These missions will typically be conducted byexternal MISO units such as, a US Army mili-tary information support group (MISG), or USAir Force 193d Special Operations Wing. How-ever, the MAGTF commander is responsible forproviding MISO support and conducting tacticalMISO (primarily through words and actions) insupport of the MAGTF’s mission. The presenceand actions of Marines on the battlefield has aninherent psychological impact on the adversary.Marines execute observable actions that supportpsychological objectives.

The adversary is likely to employ MISO to influ-ence the local populace, attempt to weaken thepolitical and military will of US forces, and

degrade the US and world community support formilitary action. The MAGTF’s counteractionsshould be tailored to limit the adversary’s oppor-tunities to exploit the presence of Marines andtheir actions for MISO purposes. Behavior maygenerate either negative or positive support fromthe local population. Detailed knowledge of thehost nation’s culture and individual self-disci-pline is required.

Military information support operations may beintegrated as a nonlethal fire support asset and areplanned by the G-3/S-3 and coordinated withpublic affairs and CMO.


Overall responsibility for the conduct of MISOfalls under the cognizance of the G-3/S-3. TheMISO officer is responsible to the G-3/S-3 forMISO planning and oversight. The MISO officerwill write the MISO portion of the OPORD andcoordinate and conduct approved MISO activi-ties in support of tactical operations. If a desig-nated MISO officer is not on hand, a MISOofficer may be appointed to provide control andmanagement of the MISO effort and to meet liai-son requirements.

Additional Support

Cont ingency opera t ions tha t requi re theactivation of a JTF normally require the forma-tion of a joint military information support taskforce (JMISTF). When established, the JMISTFis responsible for planning and supervising thejoint MISO effort. The JMISTF is subordinate tothe combatant commander or the JTF J-3. Liaisonbetween Marine Corps units serving as theMarine Corps force component of the JTF andthe JMISTF is required.

The Marine Corps has a limited-capability MISOsection that is dedicated to conducting tacticalMISO. The MISO section is located within theMarine Corps Information Operations Center. Ifrequired, additional MISO support may be pro-vided by one of the US Army’s MISGs.

3-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

The Army has the preponderance of MISO assetswithin DOD. There is one Active ComponentMISG with a worldwide capability under the USSpecial Operations Command (SOCOM) andthree Reserve Component MISGs under the USArmy Civil Affairs and Psychological Opera-tions Command. A MAGTF serving as a JTFcould potentially be augmented or supported byany number of US Army MISO elements fromeither the Active or Reserve Component.

Note: On 15 August 2011, the US Army di-rected the provisional establishment of theMilitary Information Support OperationsCommand (MISOC) with an initial opera-tional capability to provide military informa-t i on suppor t f o rce s t o comba tan tcommanders, US ambassadors, and otheragencies in order to synchronize plans andto execute, inform, and influence activitiesacross the range of military operations. Theprovisional status is expected to be rescind-ed in Fiscal Year 2014, when the Force De-sign Update is fully funded and implementedby the US Army.

The Air Force’s 193d Special Operations Wing ofthe Pennsylvania Air National Guard flies theEC-130E Commando Solo. This provides an air-borne radio and television broadcast capabilitythat can be used for MISO purposes. The ActiveAir Force Component maintains additional dis-semination capability for airborne leaflet drops.

Military Information Support Operations and the Operation Order

Tab D (Military Information Support Opera-tions) of Appendix 3 (Information Operations) toAnnex C (Operations) of the OPORD implementsthe recommended COA for MISO. Tab D detailsspecific MISO tasks to be performed and speci-fies coordinating instructions for the control andmanagement of MISO missions.

Cyberspace Operations

Cyberspace operations are one of the latest capa-bilities developed in support of military opera-tions, which stems from the increasing use ofnetworked computers and supporting informationtechnology infrastructure systems by military andcivilian organizations. In order to attack, deceive,degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend elec-tronic information and infrastructure, cyberspaceoperations are used along with electronic warfare.For the purpose of military operations, cyberspaceoperations are divided into offensive cyberspaceoperations (OCO) and defensive cyberspace oper-ations (DCO):

Offensive cyberspace operations are intendedto project power by the application of force inor through cyberspace. (JP 1-02)

Defensive cyberspace operations are passiveand active cyberspace operations intended topreserve the ability to utilize friendly cyber-space capabilities and protect data, networks,net-centric capabilities, and other designatedsystems. (JP 1-02)

Cyberspace ISR is an intelligence action con-ducted by the joint force commander autho-rized by an executive order or conducted byattached signals intelligence units under tem-porary delegated signals intelligence opera-tional tasking authority [SOTA] (see JP 3-12for more information).

Cyberspace operational preparation of theenvironment (OPE) consists of the non-intelli-gence enabling activities conducted to plan andprepare for potential follow-on military opera-tions (see JP 3-12 for more information).

Department of Defense information networkoperations are operations to design, build,configure, secure, operate, maintain, and sus-tain Department of Defense networks to createand preserve information assurance on theDepartment of Defense information net-works. (JP 1-02)


Due to the continued expansion of wireless net-working and the integration of computers andradio frequency communications, there will beoperations and capabilities that blur the linebetween cyberspace operations and EW and mayrequire case-by-case determination when elec-tronic warfare and cyberspace operations areassigned separate release authorities.


Cyberspace operations encompass a broad rangeof mutually supporting staff functions. Key staffelements include the MAGTF G-2/S-2, G-6/S-6,and G-3/S-3. Additionally, the MAGTF informa-tion management officer, information securitymanager, special security officer, and informationsystems security officer perform important sup-porting functions.

Cyberspace Operations Addendums to the Operation Order

Several appendices of the OPORD relate tocyberspace operations: Appendix 1 (InformationSystems Security) to Annex K (Combat Informa-tion Systems) and Appendix 2 (CommunicationsSecurity) to Annex K. Annex B (Intelligence) ofthe OPORD is the basic intelligence annex andcontains elements related to cyberspace ISR andOPE; for example, Tab A (CommunicationsIntelligence Collection Requirements) to Appen-dix 2 (Signals Intelligence).

Physical Attack

Physical attack is the application of combatpower to destroy or neutralize adversary forcesand installations. It includes direct and indirectfires from ground, sea, and air platforms and alsodirect actions by special operations forces.

Physical attack applies friendly combat poweragainst the adversary. It reduces adversarycombat power by destroying adversary forces,

equipment, installations, and networks. Withininformation operations, physical destruction isthe tailored application of combat power to createdesired operational effects.

Rules of engagement play a major role in deter-mining if destruction is a viable option during aparticular phase of the operation. Target plannersmay use physical destruction against commandand control elements of the adversary’s C2 system.However, the adversary may be able to recoverfrom physical destruction given sufficient time,resources, and redundancy. Planners should havesome preplanned measure of effectiveness (MOE)to judge the results of physical destruction and beprepared to monitor targets after attack todetermine their operational status. Critical adver-sary C2 nodes identified as effectively reconsti-tuted should be considered for reattack if analysisdetermines that they are still operationallyeffective. Information operations integration withthe BDA cycle is essential.

As an integrated part of information operations,physical attack is the systematic degradation ordestruction of selected adversary C2 systems thatallows the MAGTF to gain an informationaladvantage. Command and control nodes must befunctionally destroyed. If an adversary C2 nodereceives only cosmetic structural damage, it mayremain operational despite its structural damage.The adversary may be able to reconstitute C2nodes and re-establish effective command andcontrol via alternate means. Therefore, C2 targetsmay need to be attacked in depth to create desiredeffects. Restrike may be required to maintain sup-pression of adversary command and control.

However, the total destruction of the hostile C2system may not be attainable or desirable.Friendly forces may need to use adversary C2systems during the post-conflict phase of mili-tary operations. The careful selection and prioriti-zation of C2 physical destruction targets build thestrongest case when competing against other type

3-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

missions for weapons and delivery platforms. Seealso MCWP 3-16, Fire Support Coordination inthe Ground Combat Element.

Tab E (Physical Attack) of Appendix 3 (Informa-tion Operations) to Annex C (Operations) of theOPORD is the physical attack/destruction tab.This tab implements the recommended COA forattack. Tab E details specific IO-related attacktasks to be performed and specifies coordinatinginstructions for the control and management ofIO-related attack missions if required.

Information Assurance

Marines depend on information to plan opera-tions, deploy forces, and execute missions. Whileinformation and information systems enable andenhance warfighting capabilities, they are alsovulnerable to attack and exploitation and must beprotected. The security of friendly informationand information systems is critical to gaining andmaintaining information superiority. For moreinformation on information assurance (IA), seeJP 3-13, Information Operations.

Information assurance is actions that protect anddefend information systems by ensuring avail-ability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality,and nonrepudiation. This includes providing forrestoration of information systems by incor-porating protection, detection, and reactioncapabilities. (JP 1-02) Information assurance capa-bilities include information security (INFOSEC),computer security, and COMSEC:

Information security includes those measuresnecessary to detect, document, and countersuch threats. Information security is composedof computer security and COMSEC.

Computer security is the protection resultingfrom all measures to deny unauthorized accessand exploitation of friendly computer systems.(JP 1-02)

Communications security is the protectionresulting from all measures designed to denyunauthorized persons information of value thatmight be derived from the possession and studyof telecommunications, or to mislead unauthor-ized persons in their interpretation of the resultsof such possession and study. (JP 1-02) Com-munications security includes cryptosecurity,transmission security, emission security, andthe physical security of COMSEC materialsand information.

Defense in Depth

The primary method for protecting information andinformation systems is through defense in depth. Inorder to prevent potential breakdown of barriersand invasion of the innermost or most valuable partof the system, defenses must be constructed in suc-cessive layers and safeguards positioned at differ-ent locations. These different locations mayinclude local computing networks, enclave bound-aries, networks, and supporting infrastructures. Useof a deliberate risk analysis process can ensure thatthe most effective defense in depth strategy isemployed given the resources available.

Education, Training, and Awareness

A key component for success in information pro-tection is education and training of informationand information systems users, administrators,managers, engineers, designers, and require-ments developers. Awareness heightens threatappreciation and the importance of adhering toprotective measures. Education provides the con-cepts and knowledge to develop appropriate tech-nologies, policies, procedures, and operations toprotect systems. Training develops the skills andabilities within the system administrator and usercommunities to mitigate system vulnerabilities,implement and maintain protected systems, anddetect any attempts at exploitation.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations ____________________________________________________ 3-11

Training and Certification

Headquarters, Marine Corps, Command, Con-trol, Communications, and Comptuers overseesthe Marine Corps Certification and AccreditationProgram. The program is based on the ComputerSecurity Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235)requiring “Each Federal agency shall provide forthe mandatory periodic training in computersecurity awareness and accepted computer secu-rity practice of all employees who are involvedwith the management, use, or operation of eachFederal computer system within or under thesupervision of that agency.”

All Marines, Marine Corps civilian employees,and contractor personnel who perform MarineCorps duties as system administrators will be cer-tified as a level 1, 2, or 3 system administrator.Once all requirements have been met by the sys-tem administrator for certification at a specificlevel, a System Administrator Information Assur-ance Certificate can be awarded.

System Certification and Accreditation

All DOD information systems and networks willbe certified and accredited in accordance withDODI [Department of Defense Instruction]8510.01, DOD Information Assurance Certifica-tion and Accreditation Process (DIACAP). Certi-fication and accreditation of information systemsthat process Top Secret sensitive compartmentedinformation will comply with the requirements ofDCID [Director of Central Intelligence Direc-tive] 6/3, Protecting Sensitive CompartmentedInformation Within Information Systems.

Additionally, all Marines, Marine Corps civilianemployees, and contractor personnel whope r fo rm Mar ine Corps du t i e s i n t headministration of DOD computer systems in theMarine Corps enclave will be identified as eitheran information assurance manager (IAM) orinformation assurance technician (IAT), level 1,

2, or 3 in accordance with Department of DefenseDirective 8570.01, Information AssuranceTraining, Certification, and Workforce Manage-ment. All personnel designated as an IAM or IATare required to complete the appropriatecertification level commensurate with their IAMor IAT classification in accordance with theguidelines set forth in Department of DefenseDirective 8570.01.

Risk Management

Risk management decisions determine limits forapplying countermeasures. Risk managementincludes consideration of information needs, thevalue of the information at risk, system vulnera-bilities, threats posed by adversaries and naturalphenomena, and resources available for protec-tion and defense. These risks, once identified,must be categorized by severity and probability.Another important part of risk management is thedevelopment of means to mitigate those risks thatmay have severe impacts on the commander’sdesired end state.


Overall responsibility for the conduct of informa-tion assurance falls under the cognizance of theG-6/S-6. Defense of the network includes otherdiscrete supporting functions, such as OPSEC,which are the responsibility of the G-3/S-3.

Support Agencies

The Marine Corps Network Operations andSecuri ty Center (MCNOSC) is located inQuan t i co , VA. The MCNOSC p rov ide scontinuous, secure, global communications andoperational sustainment and defense of theMarine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) forMarine Corps forces worldwide in order tofacilitate the exchange of information across thedefense in format ion in f ras t ruc ture . TheMCNOSC exists to supply customer support tothe MCEN and maintains a 24/7 helpdesk.

3-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

The responsibility of all Marines to report a virushit or a threatening attempt to access a system iscrucial. Because an attempt on a Marine Corpssystem could be part of a larger, overall attemptto disrupt or exploit Marine Corps informationsystems, the attempted breach can only be dis-covered and defended against if all attempts arereported. When a virus or attempted compromiseoccurs, the local IAM is contacted to obtainimmediate assistance. Initial reports are initiatedaccording to the local/regional base or station’sguidance. At minimum, the MCNOSC help deskis contacted to report the incident.

The Service computer emergency response teamfor the Marine Corps is the Marine Corps Com-puter Emergency Response Team (MARCERT),which is an element of the MCNOSC located inQuantico, VA. The MARCERT provides real-time, 24-hour observation of the MCEN for net-work and host-based intrusion incidents basedupon specified criteria. Valid incidents are ana-lyzed from strategic and operational perspectivesfor impact upon the MCEN. This data is alsowarehoused to provide Marine Corps force DCOwith usable information to perform incident pro-filing, trend analysis, and predictive analysis. TheMARCERT provides guidance and support toMarine Corps organizations’ vulnerability test-ing and malicious code incident response teams.

Joint Task Force–Global Network Operations(JTF-GNO) serves as the focal point within DODto organize a united effort to defend computernetworks and systems. It monitors incidents andpotential threats to DOD systems and establisheslinks to other Federal agencies through theNational Infrastructure Protection Center. Whenattacks are detected, JTF-GNO is responsible forDOD-wide recovery operations to stop or containdamage and restore network functions to DODoperations. The JTF-GNO is collocated with, andsupported by, the Defense Information SystemsAgency (DISA) in order to take advantage of theexisting operational computer network cap-abilities of DISA’s Global Operations andSecurity Center.

Defense Information Systems Agency operates aprogram known as the DISA Vulnerability Anal-ysis and Assistance Program, which specificallyfocuses on automated information system vulner-ability. Upon customer request, this program col-lects, identifies, analyzes, assesses, and resolvesINFOSEC vulnerabilities.

The National Security Agency has a COMSECmonitoring program that focuses on tele-communications systems using wire and elec-tronic communications.

The INFOSEC program management office is ajoint DISA and National Security Agency organi-zation charged with the execution of the defenseINFOSEC program. The primary responsibilityof the joint program office is to assure the effec-tive and coherent application of INFOSEC mea-sures to the overall defense information systemand its individual component parts: the defenseinformation system network, the defense inte-grated secure network, the defense data network,the defense message system, the interoperabletactical/strategic data network, and the defensedata centers.

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity is the first lineof defense with relation to the certification andaccreditation of information systems that processTop Secret sensitive compartmented informationwithin the Marine Corps operating structure.Marine Corps Intelligence Activity is also thefirst point of contact for issues dealing with DCOin the sensitive compartmented information com-puting environment.

Information Assurance Addendums to the Operation Order

Appendix 1 (Information Systems Security) toAnnex K (Combat Information Systems) of theOPORD is the IA appendix. This appendiximplements the recommended COA for in-formation assurance. It details specific tasks to beperformed and specif ies coordinating in-structions for the control and management ofinformation assurance.


Physical Security

Physical security is that part of security con-cerned with physical measures designed to safe-guard personnel; to prevent unauthorized accessto equipment, installations, material, and docu-ments; and to safeguard them against espionage,sabotage, damage, and theft. (JP 1-02)

Physical security contributes directly to informa-tion protection. Information, information-basedprocesses, and information systems—such as C2systems, weapon systems, and information infra-structures—are protected relative to the value ofthe information they contain and the risks associ-ated with the compromise or loss of information.For more information on physical security see JP6-0, Joint Communications System.


In general, physical security is an operationsfunction and is the responsibility of the G-3/S-3.However, specific measures related to the protec-tion of information and information systems aredeveloped and implemented by the G-6/S-6.

Physical Security Addendums to the Operation Order

Tab B (Physical Security) to Appendix 15 (ForceProtection) of Annex C (Operations) of theOPORD is the physical security tab. However,physical security activities related to the protectionof information may also be included in Appendix1 (Information Systems Security) or Appendix 2(Communications Security) to Annex K (CombatInformation Systems) of the OPORD.

Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence is information gathered andactivities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit,disrupt, or protect against espionage, otherintelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations

conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers,organizations or persons or their agents, orinternational terrorist organizations or activities.(JP 1-02)

Counterintelligence is the intelligence functionconcerned with identifying and counteracting thethreat posed by hostile intelligence capabilitiesand by organizations or individuals engaged inespionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism.The principal objective of counterintelligence isto assist with protecting friendly forces. Counter-intelligence enhances command security bydenying adversaries information that might beused against friendly forces and to provideprotection by identifying and neutralizing espio-nage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism orga-nization or efforts.

Counterintelligence provides critical intelligencesupport to command force protection efforts byhelping identify potential threats, adversary capa-bilities, and planned intentions to friendly opera-tions while helping deceive the adversary as tofriendly capabilities, vulnerabilities, and inten-tions. Combating terrorism makes us a less lucra-tive target. Counterintell igence increasesuncertainty for the adversary, thereby making asignificant contribution to the success of friendlyoperations. Counterintelligence also identifiesfriendly vulnerabilities, evaluates security mea-sures, and assists with implementing appropriatesecurity plans. Physical security reduces vulnera-bility. Operations security reduces exposure. Theintegration of intelligence, counterintelligence,and operations culminates in a cohesive unit forceprotection program. See MCWP 2-6.


The unit intelligence officer plans, implements,and supervises the CI effort for the commander.The G-2/S-2 may have access to or request sup-port from MAGTF CI units and specialists toassist in developing CI estimates and plans.Members of the command are involved in execut-ing the CI plan and implementing appropriate CI

3-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

measures. Key participants in this process andtheir responsibilities include the following:

Unit security manager: overall integration andeffectiveness of unit security practices.

G-3/S-3: force protection, OPSEC, counterre-connaissance, and deception.

G-6/S-6: communications system security. G-1/S-1: information and personnel security. Headquarters commandant: physical security.

Counterintelligence Addendums to the Operation Order

Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B(Intelligence) of the OPORD is the CI appendix.

Public Affairs

Public affairs are those public information, com-mand information, and community engagementactivities directed toward both the external andinternal publics with interest in the Department ofDefense. (JP 1-02) The Marine Corps PA missionis to communicate and engage; building an under-standing, credibility, trust, and mutually benefi-cial relationships with domestic and foreignpublics on whom the Marine Corps’ mission suc-cess or failure depends.

Public affairs methods range from direct commu-nication with key publics, such as face-to-faceengagement or social media outreach, to indirectcommunication through traditional media chan-nels or other third parties. Additionally, publicaffairs provides the MAGTF commander a meansby which to communicate with all publics sincepublic affairs can legally engage American, inter-national, and host-nation audiences, as well asfriendly, neutral, or adversary audiences.

In its operational role, MAGTF PA efforts haveimpacts within the battlespace that may oftenhave a strategic effect on the mission. As such,public affairs and information operations areconsidered related activities that contribute

significantly to the commander’s communicationstrategy. While PA and IO are separate functionalareas for authoritative and organizationalpurposes, each directly supports military objec-tives, counters adversary propaganda and mis-information, and deters adversary actions.Effective employment of both requires planning,message development, and media analysis; but,each effort may differ with respect to audience,scope, and intent. For maximum effectiveness,PA and IO planners will coordinate their effortsand deconflict activities consistent with DODprinciples of information, organizational policy,statutory limitations, and OPSEC. Commanders,therefore, must ensure continual collaborationbetween PA and IO activities as part of opera-tional planning. (For more information, seeMCWP 3-33.3, Marine Corps Public Affairs.)

Enlisted PA Marines, called combat correspon-dents, are trained still photographers, videogra-phers, and writers who can support the MAGTFacross the range of military operations and canaid the IO officer by creating truthful content andcommunication products for dissemination. Pub-lic affairs Marines also possess disseminationcapabilities that can help the MAGTF transmitfirst truth accounts from the battefield or operat-ing environment to key publics.

Public Affairs, Military Information Support Operations, and Civil-Military Operations

In an expeditionary setting, public affairs, MISO,and CMO all may disseminate information tolocal populations. Public affairs elements haveprimary responsibility for dealing with newsmedia outlets and will assist the other functionsin passing information to the public throughappropriate news outlets. However, MISO andCMO are not otherwise restricted from usingother available message channels to disseminatetheir message, to include electronic media. Pub-lic affairs efforts that may affect MISO and CMOmissions include electronic information activities,imagery release, and news media engagement.Accordingly, MISO, CMO, and PA planners


must actively coordinate within the IO workinggroup or cell or coordinate directly when there isno IO coordination capability established.

Public Affairs and Military Deception

Public affairs should plan, coordinate, anddeconflict with MILDEC operations consistentwith policy, statutory limitations, and operationssecurity. The primary purpose of this coordi-nation is to safeguard essential elements offriendly information and preserve the effec-tiveness of deception efforts. The public affairsofficer is responsible to ensure that PA actionsrelated to MILDEC maintain the integrity, repu-tation, and credibility of public affairs as a sourcefor truthful information.

Public Affairs, CyberspaceOperations, and Electronic Warfare

Various PA activities, such as facilitating embed-ded news media access, are often impacted bycyberspace operations and EW capabilities. Pub-lic affairs officers are responsible for coordinat-ing with cyberspace operations and/or EWactivities within the IO working group or cell inorder to ensure PA operations are not inadver-tently affected.


Public affairs is a command responsibility and afunction of command and control and is consid-ered a special staff function executed by theMAGTF PAO.

Public Affairs Addendums to the Operation Order

The PAO participates in the MCPP to ensure PAconsiderations are included in problem framing,COA development and selection, and are inte-grated into the OPORD. Throughout the plan-ning process, the PA planner contributes to thedevelopment of the combined information over-lay, and he also develops, uses, and updates the

PA estimate, the PA guidance (if developedalready), and Annex F (Public Affairs) of theOPORD. Annex F defines the PA mission, articu-lates communication goals, details specific PAtasks, identifies communication assumptions, andspecifies coordinating instructions for the controland management of PA efforts.

Civil-Military Operations

Civil-military operations are the activities of acommander that establish, maintain, influence, orexploit relations between military forces, govern-mental and nongovernmental civilian organiza-tions and authorities, and the civilian populace ina friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area inorder to facilitate military operations, to consoli-date and achieve operational US objectives.Civil-military operations may include perfor-mance by military forces of activities and func-tions normally the responsibility of the local,regional, or national government. These activi-ties may occur prior to, during, or subsequent toother military actions. They may also occur, ifdirected, in the absence of other military opera-tions. Civil-military operations may be per-formed by designated civil affairs, by othermilitary forces, or by a combination of civilaffairs and other forces. (JP 1-02) Civil affairs isthe designated Active and Reserve componentforces and units organized, trained, and equippedspecifically to conduct civil affairs operations andto support civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

Each military operation has a civil dimension.The civil dimension requires commanders to con-sider how their actions affect, and are affected by,the presence of noncombatants. Accordingly,CMO have become an integral element of mili-tary operations. Through careful planning, coor-dination, and execution, CMO can help theMAGTF win by shaping the battlespace, enhanc-ing freedom of action, isolating the adversary,meeting legal and moral obligations to civilians,and providing access to additional capabilities.

3-16 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

Civil-military operations are applicable at thestrategic, operational, and tactical levels. Marinesare deployed across the globe to support regionalengagement strategies. Marines further nationalgoals through the forward presence of expedition-ary units and are involved in multinational train-ing activities and exercises that contribute tointernational cooperation and stability. TheMarines respond to complex emergencies, suchas natural disasters, that overwhelm civil authori-ties and they contribute to peacekeeping andpeace enforcement missions and are prepared touse force and/or the threat of force to deter con-flict. If efforts to preserve peace fail, Marinesemploy carefully focused military capability toaccomplish national objectives swiftly and withas little loss of life as possible. Once hostilitiesare concluded, MAGTFs contribute to stabiliza-tion, recovery, and peaceful transition of controlback to civil authorities.

In most cases, Marines will operate in close con-tact with civilians and their governments. Theycarefully develop, nurture, and maintain positiverelations between the people, governments, andnongovernmental organizations in the area ofoperations. The activities that the commanderundertakes to create and foster positive relationsbetween military forces and civilians are includedin CMO. Effective CMO further national goals,help military commanders meet their interna-tional obligations to civilians, and enhance theeffective use of combat power. Effective CMOmaximize civilian support for, and minimizecivilian interference with, the mission.

There is a CMO component to each and every mil-i tary operation, even though the MAGTFresources devoted to CMO will vary during eachoperation and throughout the various phases ofeach operation. Civil-military operations are notlimited to operations in which the MAGTF pro-vides support or services to civilians or their gov-ernments, such as humanitarian and civicassistance or disaster relief efforts. Civil-militaryoperations are conducted to facilitate militaryoperations, achieve military operational objec-tives, and satisfy US policy goals. For more

detailed information on CMO see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, and MCWP 3-33.1, MarineAir-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations.

Civil affairs describes designated personnel anddistinct units. It is neither a mission nor an objec-tive, but the name of a particular force that assiststhe MAGTF commander in planning, facilitatingcoordination, and conducting CMO. Expertise isavailable to CA forces that is not normally avail-able to the MAGTF, they are organized andequipped specifically to support CMO. Civil-mil-itary operations build and use relationships withcivilians and other groups to facilitate opera-tional tasks across the full range of military oper-a t ions . Any e lement of the MAGTF mayparticipate in the planning and execution ofCMO. Whether a Marine is an operational plan-ner dealing with a member of a foreign govern-ment, a member of a team working with aninternational relief organization, or a rifleman at acheckpoint talking with a local farmer, thatMarine is conducting CMO. Civil-military opera-tions occur throughout the planning and execu-tion of military operations and are not merely anadjunct specialty that occurs before or after hos-tilities. Civil affairs operations (CAO), however,are distinguishable from CMO to the extent thatCAO are characterized by the application of func-tional specialties in areas that are normally theresponsibility of the local government or civilauthority. Civil affairs operations are accom-plished by functional specialists with the requisiteMOS [military occupational specialty], and theyreside in the Army Reserve Component only. TheMarine Corps only has two legal and publichealth functional specialists within the ReserveComponent. Although the Marine Corps doeslimited CAO and can certainly leverage supportfrom the whole of government to do it whenrequired, the Marine Corps is not manned,trained, or equipped to specifically conduct CAO.

Civil-miliary operations, executed by all mem-bers of the MAGTF, may include performance bymilitary forces of activities and functions nor-mally the responsibility of local government.


Civil-military operations can assist to supportfriendly or host-nation civilian welfare, security,and developmental programs, and CAO can pub-licize the existence or success of these activitiesto generate target population confidence in andpositive perception of US and host-nation actions.See MCWP 3-33.1.

Tasks

Civil-military operations focus on the relation-ship between military forces, governmental andnongovernmental civilian organizations andauthorities, and the civilian populace in areaswhere military forces are present. While execut-ing CMO, the MAGTF is responsible for fivecore tasks:

Facilitating populace and resources control. Facilitating foreign humanitarian assistance. Facilitating nation assistance. Managing civil information. Facilitating support to civil administration

responsibilities.


Civil-military operations are a function of opera-tions. The CA officer normally operates under thestaff cognizance of the G-3/S-3. However, ifcivil-military considerations are a priority, theMAGTF commander may choose to designate theCA officer as a member of the general/executivestaff. When trained CA personnel are not imme-diately available, the commander may designate astaff member to undertake the function.

Civil Information Management

Civil information management is the process thatincludes the planning, collection, analysis, andproduction of civil information that is consoli-dated in a central database and shared with thesupported elements, higher headquarters, otherUS Government and DOD agencies, interna-tional organizations, and nongovernmental orga-nizations. Civil affairs teams and all Marines

within the MAGTF will conduct civil reconnais-sance and push/pull civil information such asASCOPE [areas, structures, capabilities, organi-zations, people, and events] and PMESII [politi-cal, military, economic, social, information, andinfrastructure] to higher headquarters. Informa-tion operations, as well as all other warfightingfunctions, can use this information and analysisin their planning process and make betterinformed recommendations to the commander.

Civil-Military Operations Addendums to the Operation Order

Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) of theOPORD is the CMO annex. This annex imple-ments the recommended COA for CMO. Thisannex details specific CMO tasks to be per-formed and specifies coordinating instructionsfor the control and management of CMO mis-sions, if required.

Combat Camera

Combat camera is the acquisition and utilizationof st i l l and motion imagery in support ofoperational and planning requirements across therange of military operations and during exer-cises. (MCRP 5-12C) Official visual docu-mentation is used for operational and combatsupport as well as public information purposes. Itis an essential visual record of Marine Corpscommands throughout significant and oftenhistorical events. Complete access to areas ofoperations and timely exploitation of collectedimagery are key to COMCAM success. For moreinformation on COMCAM, see MCWP 3-33.7,MAGTF Combat Camera.

The mission of COMCAM is to provided thePresident, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, MilitaryDepartments, combatant commanders, and onscene commander with a directed image capabil-ity in support of operational and planning require-ments during world crisis, contingencies,exercises, and wartime operations. (Marine Corps

3-18 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

Order 3104.1_, Marine Corps Combat CameraProgram) Combat camera is a fundamental toolof commanders and decisionmakers and—

Provides commanders with combat traineddocumentation teams that are primarily suppli-ers of operational imagery.

Supports combat, information, humanitarian,special force intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR); engineering; legal; andPA missions.

Provides valuable imagery, simultaneously, atthe strategic, operational, and tactical levelsof war.

Speeds decisionmaking and facilitates the exe-cution of missions at lower levels through ver-tical and horizontal information flow.

Marine Corps COMCAM teams are organized,trained, and equipped to provide rapid deploy-ment of COMCAM assets in support of exercises,operations, and contingencies that support theoperating forces and are available for tasking by—

The Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, and Fed-eral agencies as directed.

Unified and subunified combatant commanders. Joint and combined task force commanders

and their staffs. Marine Corps component commanders and

their staffs.

Challenges faced by commanders on today’s bat-tlefields make COMCAM operations more criti-cal and difficult to execute. Commanders willexploit imagery at various times and varioussources such as ISR, public affairs, coalitionforces, or civilian media. Therefore, MAGTFCOMCAM Marines must be prepared to incorpo-rate COMCAM assets into missions across thefull range of military operations and be flexible totask-organize COMCAM for any size MAGTFand operation.

The COMCAM Marines support a commander’ssituational awareness, IO, PA, and CA objectives

to include ISR, BDA, MILDEC, legal, andhistory functions. Combat camera supports thecommander’s imagery requirements and producestimely products supporting the commander’sintent and mission objectives.

The MAGTF COMCAM officer serves as abattlestaff officer who advises the MAGTFcommander on issues, capabilities, and re-quirements pertaining to COMCAM operations.Normally assigned to the assistant chief of staff,G-3, or the IO cell, the COMCAM officer man-ages all the MAGTF commander’s COMCAMassets to include table of organization, table ofequipment, and augmentation tasks from highercommand; task-organizes COMCAM personnelfor any operational commitments; and developsMarine expeditionary force/Marine expeditionarybrigade operational annexes and OPORDs per-taining to COMCAM.

Combat camera personnel are assigned to theMarine expeditionary unit command element.Additional assets within ground combat element,aviation combat element, and logistics combatelement support these personnel based onrequirements. Regardless of size, COMCAMunits maintain the capability to acquire, edit, dis-seminate, archive, manage, and transmit imag-ery. All COMCAM units are equipped to acquireimagery in darkness and inclement weather.

Defense Support to Public Diplomacy

Defense support to public diplomacy consists ofactivities and measures taken by DOD compo-nents, not solely in the area of information opera-tions, to support and facil i tate the publicdiplomacy efforts of the US Government.

Department of Defense contributes to publicdiplomacy, which includes those overt interna-tional information activities of the US Govern-ment designed to promote US foreign policyobjectives by seeking to understand, inform, andinfluence foreign audiences and opinion makers


and by broadening the dialogue between Ameri-can citizens and institutions and their counter-parts abroad. When approved, MISO assets maybe employed in support of defense support topublic diplomacy as part of security cooperationinitiatives or in support of US embassy public

diplomacy programs. Much of the operationallevel IO activity conducted in any theater will bedirectly linked to public diplomacy objectives.Defense support to public diplomacy requirescoordination across US Government departmentsand agencies, and amongst all DOD components.

3-20 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4


CHAPTER 4 INFORMATION OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION

Critical to the planning, execution, and assess-ment of information operations is informationoperations intelligence integration (IOII). Infor-mation operations require accurate, timely, anddetailed intelligence if it is to be successful. Earlyintegration between Marine IO staffs involved inplanning and executing IO actions and IOII staffsis imperative. The complex nature of the informa-tion environment levies requirements on the intel-ligence cycle not normally associated withnormal operational planning. Information opera-tions planners must understand that limited intel-ligence resources, legal constraints, long leadtimes, and the dynamic nature of the informationenvironment have an affect on IOII. The IOrequirements are almost limitless, while collec-tion resources are limited. The information envi-ronment changes over time according to differentfactors. The intelligence needed to affect adver-sary or other target audience decisions oftenrequires specific sources and methods to be posi-tioned and employed over a long period of timeto collect and analyze the needed information.

In order to effectively engage the intelligencesystem, the IO staff should clearly articulateintelligence requirements so that the G-2/S-2 staffcan effectively work on behalf of the IO staff.The IO staff should establish relationships withthe G-2/S-2 staff that will facilitate successful IOplanning and execution initiatives.

Information operations intelligence integration isconducted as part of the IPB process. The samefour-step IPB process that is used for traditionaloperations is also used for information operations:

Define the battlespace environment. Describe the battlespace effects.

Evaluate the adversary. Determine adversary COA.

The primary difference between IPB for tradi-tional operations and IO is the focus and thedegree of detail required. Intelligence prepara-tion of the battlespace is critical for the conductof information operations in support of stabilityoperations, civil support operations, and counter-insurgency operations.

The function of intelligence for information opera-tions in support of counterinsurgency is to under-stand the operational environment/battlespaceenvironment, with emphasis on the local popula-tion, host nation, and insurgents. Commanders andplanners require insight into cultures, perceptions,values, beliefs, interests, and decisionmaking pro-cesses of individuals and groups. An early analysisof a key target audience’s information environ-ment must be conducted prior to the execution ofany detailed planning efforts. This analysis contin-ues throughout the planning and execution inorder to achieve a better visibility and understand-ing of that information environment. Theserequirements are the basis of collection and analy-tical efforts.

Information operations intelligence integration insupport of stability operations or defense supportof civil authorities operations utilizes IPB thatintegrates adversary doctrine and operationalpatterns with terrain, weather, and civil consi-derations such as cultural, religious, ethnographic,political, social, economic, legal, criminal, anddemographic information. Intelligence preparationof the battlespace relates these factors to thespecific mission and situation. See MCRP 2-3A,Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/

4-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

Battlespace, for further information on IPB insupport of these operations.

Intelligence Support to Assessments

Intelligence support to information operationspresents new and unique challenges to intelli-gence professionals throughout the PDE&A [plan-ning, decision, execution, and assessment] cyclebecause information operations must be worked inways that do not fit neatly into the patterns appliedin other forms of intelligence support. This is truein the combat assessment phase and its subse-quent impact on the collection phase. Early inplanning, operations and intelligence personnelmust develop MOEs and tailor an intelligence col-lection plan that adequately assesses those MOEs.Measures of effectiveness are continually refinedthroughout the process so that the impact of opera-tions on the information environment can be eval-uated. Analysts must have a major role in definingsuitable MOEs for specific IO actions in order toproperly resource collection assets.

Intelligence analysts help assess task accomplish-ment by supporting MOE, measure of perfor-mance, and reattack recommendations. At thestrategic and operational levels, IPB productsprovide much of the substantive baseline analy-sis and characterization of systems and func-tional capabilities required for target systemanalysis and task assessment. At the operationallevel, the IPB process supports target develop-ment by determining the anticipated times andlocations where adversary targets are expected toappear. At the tactical level, IOII support mayalso include analysis of specific target composi-tion and vulnerability. This data enables targetsystems analysts to develop the specific battledamage indicators and measures of performanceto assess task accomplishment. Intelligence pro-fessionals must work with operators to establish

IO MOEs, and must seek to develop and applyintelligence efforts in the fields of signals andHUMINT earlier in the planning process. Collec-tion must be tailored to evaluate MOEs to aid thecommander making operational decisions.

Intelligence Support to Operations Security

An adversary will seek to collect critical informa-tion in order to achieve an operational advantage.Critical information consists of the significantinformation and indicators that can be used by theadversary to gain real advantage, decisivelyassure success, or preclude failure. Operationssecurity, an operations function, seeks to reduceor deny the adversary’s ability to collect informa-tion concerning friendly dispositions, capabilities,vulnerabilities, and intentions regarding bothtraining and operations.

Intelligence support to OPSEC will focus onanalysis of the adversary’s ability to collectagainst friendly forces. Intelligence effortsinvolve the research and analysis of intelligence,counterintelligence, and open source informationto identify the likely adversaries within theplanned operation. Once identified, intelligencepersonnel will analyze and interpret collectedinformation to identify indications of how anadversary could collect critical information andwill seek to understand the adversary’s decisioncycle and any bias towards certain friendly infor-mation/intelligence collectors or disciplines.

Intelligence personnel also will assist operationsin assessing friendly vulnerabilities and an adver-sary’s ability to exploit those vulnerabilities inorder to counter command implemented OPSECmeasures. In addition, they will recommendphysical and virtual offensive and defensivemethods that will degrade an adversary’s commu-nications systems and ISR capabilities.


Intelligence Support to Military Information Support Operations

Military information support operations are anoperations function that aims to influence adver-sary attitudes and behavior, thereby affecting theachievement of military objectives. EffectiveMISO can degrade adversary command and con-trol. The MISO staff works closely with the intelli-gence staff to plan MISO and effectively integratethese with the other IO elements. Operations secu-rity may be essential to the MISO plan. Equally, itmay be desirable in support of MISO to revealcertain aspects of friendly dispositions, capabili-ties, and intentions for MILDEC purposes.

Intelligence support to MISO includes identifyingtarget audiences and other groups, their loca-tions, conditions, strengths, vulnerabilities, sus-ceptibilities, political environment, culturalenvironment, cultural norms, values, percep-tions, attitudes, public opinion, tribal connec-tions, alliances, beliefs, ideology, and behaviors.Several organizations (including Marine CorpsIntelligence Activity, the Defense IntelligenceAgency, and the Joint Information OperationsWarfare Command) can provide the basic psy-chological intelligence on the cultural, religious,social, and economic aspects of the target coun-try/population and its government/leadership,communications, and media. Sometimes referredto as human factors analysis, this data is oftencompiled during peacetime. During operations,this data is supplemented by intelligence pro-vided by the G-2/S-2.

The intelligence assessment contributes to thedevelopment of psychological assessments. Theconditions and attitudes of target groups are likelyto change as the situation develops. Current all-source intelligence, in particular HUMINT andSIGINT, is vital in the planning phase andthroughout the execution of MISO. Intelligencewill help assess the effectiveness of current MISOactivites, reinforce success and assist the

commander in the allocation of limited resources.The intelligence staff also monitors the effect ofthe adversary’s MISO on the MAGTF force inorde r to suppor t de fens ive opera t ions .Counterintelligence provides intelligence onsubversion (and can be tasked to counteractsubversion), which forms part of the adversary’sMISO campaign.

Intelligence Support to Deception

Deception is an operations function that aims topresent a deliberately false picture to the adver-sary to cause him to act contrary to his interestsand in favor of the commander’s objectives.Deception is highly complex, in particular thoseaspects that seek to exploit adversary commandand control, and it demands security at the high-est level. Operations security is essential todeception, because it conceals those aspects andindicators that would allow the adversary todetermine the reality behind the deception.

Deception uses selected conduits, identified byintelligence, to feed information to the targetedadversary decisionmaker. Electronic warfare,cyberspace operations, counterintelligence, andphysical attack support deception by shaping theconduits that feed information to the targetedadversary. While the selected conduits are nottargeted, other conduits with information thatmay degrade the deception’s effectiveness andsuccess are targeted for electronic attack orphysical attack. Intelligence must monitor andsupport the identification of deception conduits aswell as conduits targeted with electronic attack,cyberspace operations, or physical attack.

Intelligence supports deception by identifying thecapabilities and limitations of the adversary’sintelligence-gathering systems as well as theadversary’s biases and perceptions. This requiresthe identification of the adversary’s decisionmak-ing processes and patterns. The analysis of the

4-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

capabilities and limitations of the adversary’s CIand security services is also required.

During the execution of deception operations, theadversary’s response must be monitored to deter-mine whether the deception operation is achiev-ing its aim. In analyzing this intelligence,attention must also be paid to possible adversarydeception operations.

Intelligence Support to Electronic Warfare

The interception, identification, analysis, and,where possible, the understanding of the adver-sary’s electromagnetic spectrum can provideearly warning of adversary action and supportforce protection. It is especially important for IOplanners to locate the adversary’s C2 means inorder to identify his communications architecture,including his offensive EW capability, and tohighlight critical/vulnerable C2 systems.

Intelligence support to EW establishes targetacquisition priorities based on the CCIR and con-cept for future operations. The decision to targetadversary command and control must be based onan assessment of the balance between destruction,neutralization, and exploitation, and betweenhard-kill and soft-kill methods. For example, inorder to support the electronic deception plan, itmay be necessary to ensure that certain adver-sary EW support systems are protected fromattack. Such key decisions must be made at thehighest level and included in the commander’sguidance. Decisions on targeting will also have tobe coordinated with allies.

Intelligence Support to Physical Attack

Information operations intelligence integrationshould not be considered as supporting onlynonlethal actions. Information operations has anextremely important function in supporting attacksthat cause physical destruction, but can only be

effective if strongly supported by intelligence re-sources. Careful intelligence integration can deter-mine what targets to select for physical destructionand whether such an attack will support, or hinder,the effect a commander wants to create on a targetaudience. The target audience may be a decision-maker whose decisions can impact a commander’send state or others who are influenced by thatdecisionmaker. A target can be a system thatsupports the flow of information to a decision-maker, a person who provides advice and counselto that decisionmaker, or a mechanism that allowsa decisionmaker to project information.

Intelligence support can help determine the pro-per target and how its removal or degradationwill impact the decisionmaker by—

Assessing if a physical attack will create oralter perceptions, interrupt the flow of informa-tion forcing a decisionmaker to make decisionsbased on incomplete information.

Driving an adversary to use certain exploitableinformation systems.

Preventing the projection of an adversary’spropaganda.

Removing decisionmakers resulting in a dis-ruption in an adversary’s chain of command.

Likewise, it can assess the second and third ordereffects the attack may produce on different targetaudiences. Information operations intelligenceintegration support to physical attacks must workin conjunction with IO planners and be fully inte-grated into the targeting cycle.

Targeting and Enabling Support to Cyberspace Operations

Cyberspace operations consist of OCO, DCO,cyberspace ISR, cyberspace OPE, and Depart-ment of Defense information network operations.Cyberspace ISR and OPE are conducted pursu-ant to military authorities and must be coordi-na t ed and decon f l i c t ed w i th o the r US


Government departments and in accordance withthe Department of Defense, the Department ofJustice, and the intelligence community agree-ments and Executive Order 12333, United StatesIntelligence Activities. Cyberspace ISR includesISR activities in cyberspace conducted to gatherintelligence from target and adversary systemsthat may be required to support future opera-tions, including OCO or DCO. These activitiessynchronize and integrate the planning andenable operation of cyberspace sensors; assets;and processing, exploitation, and disseminationsystems in direct support of current and futureoperations. Cyberspace ISR focuses on tacticaland operational intelligence and on mapping theadversary’s cyberspace to support military plan-ning. Cyberspace ISR requires appropriate decon-fliction and cyberspace forces that are trained andcertified to a common standard with the intelli-gence community.

Cyberspace OPE seeks to gain and maintainaccess to systems and processes and to positioncapabilities to facilitate follow-on actions. Thisincludes identifying data, software, system/net-work configurations and identifiers, or physicalstructures connected to (or associated with) thenetwork for the purposes of determining systemvulnerabilities, actions taken to assure futureaccess and/or control of the system, network, ordata during anticipated hostilities (e.g., taggingmalware for recognition by network defenses,delivering dormant payloads for future activation).Cyberspace OPE requires cyberspace forcestrained to a standard that prevents compromise ofrelated intelligence community operations.

Cyberspace ISR and OPE are critical enablingactivities supporting OCO and DCO. The RadBnand Marine cryptologic support battalion areorganic, major contributors of intelligence infor-mation supporting cyberspace operations. TheMarine Corps Service component in US CyberCommand provides additional support to cyber-space operations. All cyberspace ISR efforts con-ducted by tactical units must be coordinated anddeconflicted with other US Government depart-ments and appropriate national agencies and theIO cell of the supported and/or higher unit.

Intelligence support to cyberspace operationsrequires an assessment of adversary informationcapabilities including friendly systems likely tobe targeted by the adversary; the adversary’s abil-ity to exploit friendly systems; the adversary’sability to detect, attribute, and mitigate operationsagainst their network and likely COAs.

Intelligence Support to Information Assurance

A coordinated IA plan to protect friendly C2 sys-tems from adversary attack will make an adver-sary’s information operations more difficult.Information operations activities must also pro-tect the intelligence and information conduits thatfeed the C2 system and friendly commanders.Intelligence provides the assessment of adver-sary IO capability and intentions.

4-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4


APPENDIX A INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL RESPONSIBILITIES

The IO cell is composed of intelligence person-nel, augmentees supporting IO activities, repre-sentatives from staff elements, and SMEs fromappropriate warfighting functions. The size andstructure of the cell is tailored to the mission andthe commander’s intent. The IO cell is responsi-ble for the following:

Planning the overall IO effort including prepar-ing Appendix 3 (Information Operations) toAnnex C (Operations), to the MAGTF OPORD.

Coordinating to ensure synchronization withAnnex F (Public Affairs), Annex G (Civil-Mil-itary Operations), Annex K (Combat Informa-tion Systems), Annex S (Special TechnicalOperations), and Annex U (Information Man-agement).

Developing IO concepts of support. Recommending IO priorities. Coordinating subordinate IO plans. Coordinating the planning and execution of IO

activities between organizations responsiblefor each IO element.

Coordinating nodal analysis and compiling IOtarget list.

Submitting IO targets for inclusion in MAGTFtargeting plans.

Ensuring the OPSEC plan provides necessarycommand and control and communicationsprotection and is coordinated with the decep-tion plan and operations.

Ensuring that other IO elements support thedeception effort.

Ensuring MISO themes support, and are sup-ported by, the other IO elements.

Coordinating IO intelligence integration. Coordinating and deconflicting IO with STO.

Recommending additions, deletions, and modi-fications to rules of engagement.

Coordinating EW and cyberspace operationsactions with the appropriate staff planner.

Information Operations Officer

The IO officer is responsible to the commander viathe G-3/S-3 for synchronizing IRCs that support IOtasks. He also has the following responsibilities:

Establishes the IO working group (IOWG) tocoordinate, synchronize, and integrate IOefforts and develops measurements of effec-tiveness and performance in order to assess theeffectiveness of IO actions.

Owns no assets and must work with the staff inorder to integrate information operations intoplanning functions.

Ensures IO representation and input are pro-vided to MAGTF OPT.

Ensures the staff understands the IRCs andlimitations.

Identifies the commander’s end state in con-junction with the command’s planning effortsand formulates an IO plan and/or IO concept ofsupport to achieve end state.

Is responsible for preparing the IO annex to theOPORD.

Assists in the integration and synchronizationof the execution of IO actions.

Determines the effectiveness of the IO conceptof support and makes recommendations to theG-3/S-3 to adjust accordingly.

Oversees personnel within the IO cell and callsplenary IO cell meetings to include externalsupport augmentees as appropriate.

A-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

Coordinates all IO matters with higher, adja-cent, and subordinate units.

Requests external support from and coordinatesIO activities with IO organizations such asJoint Information Operations Warfare Center,Joint Warfare Analysis Center, National Secu-rity Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency,as required.

Intelligence (G-2/S-2) Member

The G-2/S-2 member provides timely anddirected IO intelligence integration and has thefollowing responsibilities:

Coordinates the development and prioritiza-tion of IO intelligence requirements.

Satisfies IO intelligence requirements throughthe fusion of all-source intelligence to includeopen source.

Provides an information environment assess-ment of the area of operations and continuallyrefines that assessment.

Identifies target audiences/potential actorswhose decisions may impact a commander’send state.

Recommends methods that will impact anadversary’s ability to collect, protect, or projectinformation.

Provides intelligence gain/loss analysis andreconciles restricted C2 targets on the re-stricted frequency list.

Assists in the development of measures of effec-tiveness and coordinates mechanisms needed tocollect the required data to determine the levelof success of the IO concept of support.

Coordinates with intelligence analysts to iden-tify collection requirements based on specificneeds identified by the IO cell.

Coordinates development of targeting prod-ucts to support IO planning.

Assists with the preparation of IO portions ofMAGTF operation plans.

Informs MAGTF G-2s/S-2s of IO planning orexecution activity to engage appropriate ISRcapabilities for targeting and impact assessment.

Provides assistance (through the IO cell) inassessing the operational impact and recom-mends appropriate recovery/response actionsfor computer intrusions affecting MAGTFcomputer infrastructures in support of the G-6/S-6 mission supporting information assurance.

Coordinates COMSEC monitoring support inconcert with G-3/S-3 and G-6/S-6 from theJoint Communications Security MonitoringActivity (JCMA), including JCMA’s forceprotection communications support and theRadBns, during operations and exercises.

Identifies areas of OPSEC concern for JCMAand the RadBn focus.

Integrates COMSEC monitoring activities withtrusted agents for other IO activities; such as,MISO, deception, OPSEC, and CI functions toenhance IO efforts.

Identifies, in coordination with headquartersstaff representatives, critical MAGTF informa-tion resources outside the MAGTF area ofoperations.

Prepares notification messages for supportingcommands or agencies to highlight the need tomonitor and protect critical nodes.

Participates in the IOWG, as required.

Communications System (G-6/S-6) Member

The G-6/S-6 member provides information onsignal security and COMSEC efforts and recom-mends adjustments. The G-6/S-6 also has the fol-lowing responsibilities:

Identifies critical command and control andcommunication system nodes for protection.

Provides protected and restricted frequenciesto the restricted frequency list.

Coordinates and reports on JCMA monitoringof MAGTF communications architecture.


Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations _____________________________________________________ A-3

Operations Security Officer

The OPSEC officer oversees overall OPSECefforts and is responsible for the following:

Develops and updates the OPSEC plan. Initiates an OPSEC feedback program to moni-

tor OPSEC effectiveness. Coordinates all OPSEC activities with exter-

nal agencies and organizations. Participates in the IOWG, as required.

Military Information Support Operations Officer

The MISO officer maintains a thorough knowl-edge of all MISO plans and actions. He also isresponsible for the following:

Provides expert advice on MISO matters. Coordinates MISO plans, actions, and support

with other IO elements, especially OPSEC anddeception.


Deception Officer

The deception officer heads the deception celland has the following responsibilities:

Coordinates development and update of decep-tion plan, including obtaining higher-levelauthority if required.

Monitors and controls dissemination of decep-tion-related information; ensures security ofmaterial is maintained.

Coordinates deception plans with other IO ele-ments.

Coordinates with the G-2/S-2 for feedback ondeception success.

Monitors and controls execution of the decep-tion event schedule.


Electronic Warfare Officer

The EWO oversees the EWCC under the direc-tion of the G-3/S-3 and has the following addi-tional responsibilities:

Prepares EW plans. Coordinates EW operations with internal units

and external agencies. Coordinates EW operations with other IO ele-

ments. Establishes and maintains the restricted fre-

quency list with the G-6/S-6. Participates in the IOWG, as required.

Cyberspace Operations Officer

The cyberspace operations officer plans and coor-dinates offensive cyberspace, defensive cyber-space, cyberspace ISR, cyberspace OPE, andDepartment of Defense information network oper-ations with internal units and external agencies.He also coordinates cyberspace operations withother IO elements and US Government depart-ments and agencies, and participates in the IOWG,as required.

Special Technical Operations Officer

The STO officer plans, coordinates, and de-conflicts STO activities. He also has the fol-lowing responsibilities:

Ensures the IO cell is aware of STO activitiesas required.

Conducts liaison with higher STO representa-tives to facilitate coordination and release andexecution authority for STO.

Participates in the IOWG, as required

Public Affairs Officer

The PAO provides advice to the IO cell on all PAmatters and ensures PA considerations and themessupport and are supported by the IO plan. ThePAO also coordinates PA plans, actions, and

A-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

programs with IO efforts with particular emphasison MISO, OPSEC, EW, and MILDEC activities.

Targeting Representative

The targeting representative provides entry for IOtargets into the targeting cycle and is responsiblefor the following:

Ensures IO targets are given proper consider-ation in the targeting process.

Provides IO cell recommendations to therestricted target list.


Counterintelligence Officer

The CI officer assesses defensive IO posture froma CI perspective and recommends corrective

actions. The CI officer also participates in theIOWG, as required.

Other Representatives

Other IO cell members have the followingresponsibilities:

Attends IO cell sessions as invited by IO officer. Provides expert advice and opinions. Coordinates with parent organizations in sup-

port of MAGTF IO. Participates in the IOWG, as required. Conduct legal analysis of proposed operations

within the context of applicable laws andauthorities.

APPENDIX B INFORMATION OPERATIONS PLANNING PRODUCTS

Information Operations

The staff estimate for information operations isan estimate focused on the information environ-ment and the use of information by adversary andfriendly forces. It assesses the situation in theinformation environment and analyzes the bestway to achieve information superiority for theassigned mission. See figure B-1 on page B-2.

Combined Information Overlay

The impact of the information environmentshould be analyzed to consider how significantcharacteristics affect friendly, neutral, andadversary capabi l i t i es and broad COAs.Significant characteristics, further analyzedwithin the physical, informational, and cognitivedimensions, can be graphically represented on acombined information overlay (see fig. B-2 onpage B-3). The analyst can use this overlay toidentify strengths and/or vulnerabilities within

the informat ion environment that can beexploited by friendly or adversary forces. Theintelligence analyst works closely with the IOofficer to ensure the combined informationoverlay is continually updated throughout theplanning process.

Information Operations Concept of Support

The information operations concept of supportshown in figure B-3, on page B-4, describes howavailable forces will achieve informationsuperiority. It states when and where informationsuperiority needs to be achieved and describeshow information operations will support theoperation and how information operationscapabilities will be employed. Informationoperations personnel develop an IO concept ofsupport for each assigned mission or COA basedon what the command’s assets and resources cando to achieve the IO objectives.

B-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

Key

Lea

der a

nd P

opul

ace

Bel

ief:

Am

eric

ans

fight

onl

y fo

r Am

eric

an in

tere

sts

Sub-

IE: N

orth

Popu

lace

: Sup

ports

adv

ersa

ry, m

ultip

le ru

ral T

AsIn

fo F

low

: Cel

l pho

ne, i

nter

net,

TV, r

adio

Info

Infra

stru

ctur

e: W

ell-d

evel

oped

and

mul

tiple

cond

uits

, sup

ports

adv

ersa

ry C

2C

OA

Con

side

ratio

ns: A

dver

sary

pro

paga

nda

flow

Con

ditio

ns: I

nner

LO

Cs

favo

r adv

ersa

ry

Sub-

IE: C

entr

alP

opul

ace:

Sup

ports

gov

ernm

ent,

urba

n hu

bsIn

fo F

low

: Mul

timed

ia, c

ell p

hone

, bro

adca

sts

affe

cted

by

CF

vers

us b

orde

r sta

teIn

fo In

frast

ruct

ure:

Unr

elia

ble,

freq

uent

pow

er

outa

ges,

follo

ws

mai

n LO

Cs

CO

A C

onsi

dera

tions

: Adv

ersa

ry fo

cus,

intim

idat

ion

mai

n ef

fort

Con

ditio

ns: F

avor

frie

ndly

forc

es

Sub-

IE: S

outh

Pop

ulac

e: S

uppo

rts g

over

nmen

t, ru

ral

stro

ng tr

ibal

/cla

n lin

ksIn

fo F

low

: Slo

w, F

2F, T

V, ra

dio

Info

Infra

stru

ctur

e: D

ilapi

date

d, u

nrel

iabl

e,

frequ

ent p

ower

out

ages

, fol

low

s m

ain

LOC

sC

OA

Con

side

ratio

ns: A

rea

is a

n in

form

atio

n va

cuum

, req

uire

s m

ultie

ngag

emen

tsC

ondi

tions

: Fav

or fr

iend

ly fo

rces

Adv

ersa

ryC

olle

ct:

Cap

abili

ties:

HU

MIN

T, S

IGIN

TVu

lner

abili

ties:

Loy

alty

of f

ollo

wer

s, c

ell

para

noia

Rec

ent A

ctiv

ity: P

enet

ratio

n of

loca

l pol

ice

Prot

ect:

Cap

abili

ties:

Intim

idat

ion

of p

opul

ace

Vuln

erab

ilitie

s: C

ourie

rs, i

nter

net,

cell

phon

esR

ecen

t Act

ivity

: Uns

ecur

e co

mm

unic

atio

nsPr

ojec

t:C

apab

ilitie

s: F

2F, r

adio

, int

erne

tVu

lner

abili

ties:

C2

Rec

ent A

ctiv

ity: A

nti-U

S th

emes

Like

ly C

OA

: Inc

ite c

ivil

unre

st in

cen

ter o

f A

OR

, dis

cred

it C

F ac

tions

; bui

ld

legi

timac

y/re

crui

t with

loca

l mili

tia

Frie

ndly

Org

anic

:

EA:

PA:

MIS

O:

Supp

ortin

g:

EA:

Vuln

erab

ilitie

s:- N

on-s

ecur

e ha

ndhe

ld ra

dios

CO

A C

onsi

dera

tions

:- I

ntel

loss

ver

sus

gain

with

EA

- Int

erdi

ct b

orde

r sta

te in

fo fl

ow

EAPr

ophe

t

307

PA25 1

3

EA6-

B

3

LEGE

NDAO

R ar

ea of

resp

onsib

ility

BXP

bord

er cr

ossin

g poin

tCF

co

alitio

n for

ceEA

ele

ctron

ic att

ack

F2F

face t

o fac

eGo

vt go

vern

ment

IE inf

orma

tion e

nviro

nmen

tInf

o inf

orma

tion

Intel

intell

igenc

eLO

C lin

e of c

ommu

nicati

ons

MISO

mi

litary

infor

matio

n sup

port

oper

ation

sTV

tel

evisi

on

Fig

ure

B-1

. Exa

mp

le o

f a

Sta

ff E

stim

ate

for

Info

rmat

ion

Op

erat

ion

s: G

rap

hic

al D

isp

lay.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations _____________________________________________________ B-3

Info Subenvironment A: Northern Plains

Info Subenvironment B: Central MountainsY

Info Subenvironment C: Southern PlainsY

W

LEGENDcoax coaxial cableInfo informationLOCs lines of communications

Figure B-2. Example of Combined Information Overlay.

B-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

3-5

IO e

ffect

s in

the

IE T

ask:

Effe

ct +

Tgt

(TA

) + a

ctio

n/be

havi

or

Esse

ntia

l IO

act

ions

requ

ired

to a

chie

ve IS

(the

ope

ratio

nal

adva

ntag

e):

Task

: Effe

ct +

Tgt

(TA

) + a

ctio

n/be

havi

orPu

rpos

e:M

etho

d:En

d st

ate:

An

esse

ntia

l IO

task

obj

ectiv

e.

IO E

ssen

tial T

asks

:K

LE1.

Info

rm2.

Isol

ate

MIS

O3.

Isol

ate

Civ

il A

ffairs

T6.

Dec

reas

e ID

inte

rface

EW 8. J

am

PA 10. I

nfor

m T

A1 M

aneu

ver

12. I

ncre

ase

Con

cept

of S

uppo

rt:

IO O

bjec

tives

:1.

Isol

ate

Tim

eline

Pha

se I

P

hase

II

LEGE

NDIE

inf

orma

tion e

nviro

nmen

tID

P int

erna

l disp

laced

perso

nsIO

inf

orma

tion o

pera

tions

IS inf

orma

tion s

uper

iority

OP

oper

ation

alPD

pu

blic d

iplom

acy

TA

targe

t aud

ience

Tgt

targe

t

KLE

MIS

OC

AE

W

Fig

ure

B-3

. Exa

mp

le o

f an

Info

rmat

ion

Op

erat

ion

s C

on

cep

t o

f S

up

po

rt S

ketc

h.

APPENDIX CSAMPLE OF APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C INFORMATION OPERATIONS

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no. ____ of ____ copiesOFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMANDPLACE OF ISSUEDate/time groupMessage reference number

APPENDIX 3 (Information Operations) TO ANNEX C (Operations) TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)INFORMATION OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

(a) Any relevant plans or orders. (b) Required maps and charts. (c) Other relevant documents.

1. (U) Situation. Summarize the overall operational situation as it relates to information operations.

a. (U) Adversary. Summarize the adversary situation, force disposition, intelligence capabilities, and possible courses of action. If applicable, reference intelligence estimates or summaries. Address any specific information that bears directly on the planned information operations.

b. (U) Friendly. Summarize the situation of those friendly forces that may directly affect attainment of information operations objectives. Address any critical limitations and any other planned information operations.

c. (U) Assumptions. List any assumptions made of friendly, adversary, or third party capabilities, limitations, or courses of action. Describe the conditions that the commander believes will exist at the time the plan becomes an order. Omit in orders.

2. (U) Mission. Provide the command’s mission from the base order.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

C-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

CLASSIFICATION

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Concept of Support. Summarize how the commander visualizes the execution of information operations from its beginning to its termination. Describe how information operations will support the command’s mission. Summarize the concepts for supervision and termination of information operations.

(1) (U) The concept of support may be a single paragraph or divided into two or more paragraphs depending upon the complexity of the operation.

(2) (U) When an operation involves various phases, such as peace or prehostilities or crisis, war, or post-hostilities, the concept of support should include subpara-graphs describing the role of information operations in each phase.

b. (U) Information Operations Tasks. Identify the major tasks for each of the five elements of information operations. The five elements of information operations listed below are covered in tabs A through E.

(1) (U) Military deception.

(2) (U) Electronic warfare.

(3) (U) Operations security.

(4) (U) Military information support operations.

(5) (U) Physical attack.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Address any mutual support issues relating to the elements of IO.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics. Address any IO administrative or logistic requirements.

5. (U) Command and Control. List any IO command and control instructions. State the command structure for information operations. Identify any special IO communications and reporting requirements.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations ____________________________________________________ C-3

CLASSIFICATION

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name Rank and Service

Title

TABS:

A – Military DeceptionB – Electronic WarfareC – Operations SecurityD – Military Information Support OperationsE – Physical Attack

OFFICIAL:s/NameRank and ServiceTitle

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

C-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4


GLOSSARY

SECTION I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battle damage assessment

C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .command and controlCA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . civil affairsCAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . civil affairs operationsCCIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . commander’s

critical information requirementCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .counterintelligenceCJCS . . . . . Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCMO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .civil-military operationsCOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . course of actionCOG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . center of gravityCOMCAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat cameraCOMSEC . . . . . . . . . . . communications security

DCO . . . . . . . . . defensive cyberspace operationsDISA . . . . .Defense Information Systems AgencyDOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Defense

EW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .electronic warfareEWCC. . . . . .electronic warfare coordination cellEWO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . electronic warfare officer

FOps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . future operations

G-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . personnel staff section G-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence staff sectionG-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operations staff sectionG-6 . . . . . . .communications system staff sectionG-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .civil affairs staff section

HUMINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . human intelligence

IA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . information assuranceIAM. . . . . . . . . . . information assurance managerIAT . . . . . . . . . .information assurance technicianINFOSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . information securityIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . information operationsIOII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . information operations

intelligence integrationIOWG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . information operations

working groupIPB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence preparation

of the battlespace

IRC . . . . . . . . . . . . information-related capabilityISR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance

J-3 . . . . . . . . operations directorate of a joint staffJCMA . . . . . . . . . Joint Communications Security

Monitoring ActivityJMISTF . . . . . . . . . . . . .joint military information

support task forceJP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint publicationJTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint task forceJTF-GNO . . . . . . . . . . .Joint Task Force - Global

Network Operations

MAGTF . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task forceMARCERT . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Computer

Emergency Response TeamMCEN. . . . . . . .Marine Corps enterprise networkMCNOSC . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Network

Operations and Security CenterMCPP . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Planning ProcessMCRP . . . . . .Marine Corps reference publicationMCWP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps

warfighting publicationMILDEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military deceptionMISG . . . . . . military information support groupMISO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military information

support operationsMOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . measure of effectiveness

NCIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Naval CriminalInvestigative Service

OCO . . . . . . . . . offensive cyberspace operationsOPORD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operation orderOPSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operations securityOPT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operational planning teamOPE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operational preparation

of the environment

PA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . public affairsPAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .public affairs officer

RadBn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . radio battalion

Glossary-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

S-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . personnel officerS-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence officerS-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operations officerS-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . communications system officerS-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . civil affairs officerSIGINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .signals intelligenceSJA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . staff judge advocate

SME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subject matter expertSTO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . special technical operations

US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States

VMAQ . . . . . . Marine tactical electronic warfaresquadron

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations ____________________________________________ Glossary-3

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

area of operations—An operational area definedby the joint force commander for land and mari-time forces that should be large enough to accom-plish their missions and protect their forces. Alsocalled AO. (JP 1-02)

branch—4. The contingency options built intothe base plan used for changing the mission,orientation, or direction of movement of a forceto aid success of the operation based on antici-pated events, opportunities, or disruptions causedby enemy actions and reactions. See also sequel.(JP 1-02, part 4 of a 4 part definition)

center of gravity—The source of power thatprovides moral or physical strength, freedom ofaction, or will to act. Also called COG. See alsodecisive point. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs—Designated Active and ReserveComponent forces and units organized, trained,and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairsoperations and to support civil-military opera-tions. Also called CA. See also civil-militaryoperations. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs operations—Those military opera-tions conducted by civil affairs forces that (1)enhance the relationship between military forcesand civil authorities in localities where militaryforces are present; (2) require coordination withother interagency organizations, intergovernmen-tal organizations, nongovernmental organiza-tions, indigenous populations and institutions,and the private sector; and (3) involve applica-tion of functional specialty skills that normallyare the responsibility of civil government toenhance the conduct of civil-military operations.Also called CAO. See also civil affairs; civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil information management—The processwhereby civil information is collected, consoli-dated in a central database, and shared with thesupported elements, higher headquarters, other

US Government and Department of Defenseagencies, international organizations, andnongovernmental organizations. (This term andits definition are proposed for inclusion in thenext edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

civil-military operations—The activities of acommander that establish, maintain, influence, orexploit relations between military forces, govern-mental and nongovernmental civilian organiza-tions and authorities, and the civilian populace ina friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area inorder to facilitate military operations, to consoli-date and achieve operational US objectives.Civil-military operations may include perfor-mance by military forces of activities and func-tions normally the responsibility of the local,regional, or national government. These activi-ties may occur prior to, during, or subsequent toother military actions. They may also occur, ifdirected, in the absence of other military opera-tions. Civil-military operations may be performedby designated civil affairs, by other militaryforces, or by a combination of civil affairs andother forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

combat camera—The acquisition and utiliza-tion of still and motion imagery in support ofoperational and planning requirements across therange of military operations and during exer-cises. Also called COMCAM. (MCRP 5-12C)

communications security—The protectionresulting from all measures designed to denyunauthorized persons information of value thatmight be derived from the possession and studyof telecommunications, or to mislead unauthor-ized persons in their interpretation of the resultsof such possession and study. (JP 1-02)

computer security—The protection resultingfrom all measures to deny unauthorized accessand exploitation of friendly computer systems.(JP 1-02)

Glossary-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

counterintelligence—Information gathered andactivities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit,disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelli-gence activities, sabotage, or assassinationsconducted for or on behalf of foreign powers,organizations or persons or their agents, or inter-national terrorist organizations or activities. Alsocalled CI. (JP 1-02)

cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and re-connaissance—An intelligence action conductedby the joint force commander authorized by anexecutive order or conducted by attached signalsintelligence units under temporary delegatedsignals intelligence operational tasking authority.

cyberspace operational preparation of the en-vironment—Consists of the non-intelligenceenabling activities conducted to plan and preparefor potential follow-on military operations.

cyberspace operations—The employment ofcyberspace capabilities where the primarypurpose is to achieve objectives in or throughcyberspace. (JP 1-02)

decisive point—A geographic place, specific keyevent, critical factor, or function that, when actedupon, allows commanders to gain a markedadvantage over an adversary or contribute materi-ally to achieving success. See also center ofgravity. (JP 1-02)

defensive cyberspace operations—Passive andactive cyberspace operations intended to preservethe ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabili-ties and protect data, networks, net-centric capa-bilities, and other designated systems. Also calledDCO. (JP 1-02)

demonstration—2. In military deception, a showof force in an area where a decision is not soughtthat is made to deceive an adversary. It is similarto a feint but no actual contact with the adversaryis intended. (JP 1-02 part 2 of a 2 part definition)

Department of Defense information networkoperations—Operations to design, build,configure, secure, operate, maintain, and sustainDepartment of Defense networks to create andp r e s e r v e i n f o r m a t i o n a s s u r a n c e o n t h eDepartment of Defense information networks.(JP 1-02)

display—In military deception, a static por-trayal of an act ivity, force, or equipmentintended to deceive the adversary’s visual obser-vation. (JP 1-02)

electronic attack—Division of electronicwarfare involving the use of electromagneticenergy, directed energy, or antiradiation weap-ons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipmentwith the intent of degrading, neutralizing, ordestroying enemy combat capability and isconsidered a form of fires. Also called EA. Seealso electronic protection; electronic warfare;electronic warfare support. (JP 1-02)

electronic protection—Division of electronicwarfare involving actions taken to protect person-nel, facilities, and equipment from any effects offriendly or enemy use of the electromagneticspectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroyfriendly combat capability. Also called EP. Seealso electronic attack, electronic warfare; elec-tronic warfare support. (JP 1-02)

electronic warfare—Military action involvingthe use of electromagnetic and directed energy tocontrol the electromagnetic spectrum or to attackthe enemy. Also called EW. (JP 1-02)

electronic warfare support—Division of elec-tronic warfare involving actions tasked by, orunde r d i r ec t con t ro l o f , an ope ra t i ona lcommander to search for, intercept, identify, andlocate or localize sources of intentional and unin-tentional radiated electromagnetic energy for thepurpose of immediate threat recognition, target-ing, planning and conduct of future operations.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations ____________________________________________ Glossary-5

Also called ES. See also electronic attack; elec-tronic protection; electronic warfare. (JP 1-02)

feint—In military deception, an offensive actioninvolving contact with the adversary conductedfor the purpose of deceiving the adversary as tothe location and/or time of the actual main offen-sive action. (JP 1-02)

information assurance—Measures that protectand defend information and information systemsby ensuring their availability, integrity, authentica-tion, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. Thisincludes providing for restoration of informationsystems by incorporating protection, detection,and reaction capabilities. Also called IA. (JP 1-02)

information environment—The aggregate ofindividuals, organizations, and systems thatcollect, process, disseminate, or act on informa-tion. (JP 1-02)

information operations—The integration, coor-dination, and synchronization of all actions takenin the information environment to affect a targetaudience’s behavior in order to create an opera-tional advantage for the commander. Also calledIO (This term and its definition are proposed forinclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C)

information operations intelligence integra-tion—The integration of intelligence disciplinesand analytic methods to characterize and fore-cast, identify vulnerabilities, determine effects,and assess the information environment. Alsocalled IOII. (JP 1-02)

information-related capability—A capability,function, or activity that uses data, information,or electromagnetic spectrum to produce lethal ornonlethal effects in the physical or informationaldimensions with an expressed intent to causedeliberate effects within the cognitive dimensionof the information environment. Also called IRC.(Proposed for inclusion in the next edition ofMCRP 5-12C)

information superiority—The operationaladvantage derived from the ability to collect, pro-cess, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow ofinformation while exploiting or denying anadversary’s ability to do the same. See also infor-mation operations. (JP 1-02)

measure of effectiveness—A criterion used toassess changes in system behavior, capability, oroperational environment that is tied to measuringthe attainment of an end state, achievement of anobjective, or creation of an effect. Also calledMOE. (JP 1-02)

measure of performance—A criterion used toassess friendly actions that is tied to measuringtask accomplishment. Also called MOP. (JP 1-02)

military deception—Actions executed to delib-erately mislead adversary, paramilitary, or violentextremist organization military decision makers,thereby causing the adversary to take specificactions (or inactions) that will contribute to theaccomplishment of the friendly mission. Alsocalled MILDEC. (JP 1-02)

military information support operations—Planned operations to convey selected informa-tion and indicators to foreign audiences to influ-ence the i r emot ions , mot ives , ob jec t ivereasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreigngovernments, organizations, groups, and individ-uals in a manner favorable to the originator’sobjectives. Also called MISO. (JP 1-02)

offensive cyberspace operations—Cyberspaceoperations intended to project power by the appli-cation of force in or through cyberspace. Alsocalled OCO. (JP 1-02)

operations security—A process of identifyingcritical information and subsequently analyzingfriendly actions attendant to military operationsand other activities. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

physical attack—The application of combatpower to destroy or neutralize enemy forces and

Glossary-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

installations. It includes direct and indirect firesfrom ground, sea, and air platforms. It alsoincludes direct actions by special operationsforces. (This term and its definition are proposedfor inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C)

physical security—1. That part of security con-cerned with physical measures designed to safe-guard personnel; to prevent unauthorized accessto equipment, installations, material, and docu-ments; and to safeguard them against espionage,sabotage, damage, and theft. (JP 1-02, part 1 of a2 part definition)

public affairs—Those public information,command information, and community engage-ment activities directed toward both the externaland internal publics with interest in the Depart-ment of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)

public affairs guidance—Constraints andrestraints established by proper authority regard-ing public information, command information,and community relations activities. It may alsoaddress the method(s), timing, location, and otherdetails governing the release of information to thepublic. Also called PAG. See also public affairs.(JP 1-02)

public diplomacy—1. Those overt internationalpublic information activities of the United StatesGovernment designed to promote United Statesforeign policy objectives by seeking to under-stand, inform, and influence foreign audiencesand opinion makers, and by broadening thedialogue between American citizens and institu-tions and their counterparts abroad. 2. In peacebuilding, civilian agency efforts to promote anunderstanding of the reconstruction efforts, ruleof law, and civic responsibility through public

affairs and international public diplomacy opera-tions. (JP 1-02)

ruse—In military deception, a trick of war de-signed to deceive the adversary, usually involv-ing the deliberate exposure of false informationto the adversary’s intelligence collection system.(JP 1-02)

security cooperation—All Department ofDefense interactions with foreign defense estab-lishments to build defense relationships thatpromote specific US security interests, developallied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provideUS forces with peacetime and contingency accessto a host nation. Also called SC. (JP 1-02)

sequel—The subsequent major operation orphase based on the possible outcomes (success,stalemate, or defeat) of the current major opera-tion or phase. See also branch. (JP 1-02)

staff judge advocate—A judge advocate sodesignated in the Army, Air Force, or MarineCorps, and the principal legal advisor of a Navy,Coast Guard, or joint force command who is ajudge advocate. Also called SJA. (JP 1-02)

target—1. An entity or object considered forpossible engagement or other action. 2. In intelli-gence usage, a country, area, installation, agency,or person against which intelligence operationsare directed. 3. An area designated and numberedfor future firing. 4. In gunfire support usage, animpact burst that hits the target. (JP 1-02)

target audience—An individual or groupselected for influence. Also called TA. (JP 1-02)

REFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Federal Publications

Executive Order12333 United States Intelligence Activities

United States CodeTitle 10 Armed Forces

Department of Defense Issuances

Department of Defense Directives (DODDs)S-3600.1 Information Operations8570.01 Information Assurance (IA) Training, Certification, and Workforce Management

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI)8510.01 DOD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP)

Joint Publications (JPs)

1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment3-13 Information Operations3-13.1 Electronic Warfare3-13.2 Military Information Support Operations3-13.3 Operations Security3-13.4 Military Deception3-57 Civil-Military Operations3-61 Public Affairs6-0 Joint Communications System

Marine Corps Publications

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)2-1 Intelligence Operations2-6 Counterintelligence3-16 Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element3-33.1 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations3-33.3 Marine Corps Public Affairs3-33.7 MAGTF Combat Camera3-40.2 Information Management3-40.3 MAGTF Communications System3-40.5 Electronic Warfare3-40.6 Psychological Operations

References-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-40.4

3-40.9 Operations Security (OPSEC)5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)2-3A Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace3-33.7A Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Camera Operations3-40.4A Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Deception (MILDEC)

Operations (classified)5-12C Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms

Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)3070.2 The Marine Corps Operations Security (OPSEC) Program3104.1_ Marine Corps Combat Camera Program3120.10 Marine Corps Information Operations Program

MiscellaneousMarine Corps Operating Concept for Information Operations

Miscellaneous

Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/3, Protecting Sensitive Compartmented InformationWithin Information Systems

Date post:	19-May-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	dodiep
View:	217 times
Download:	2 times

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations 3-40.4.pdf · USMC USMC US Marine Corps PCN 143...

Documents