1
Marine Vessel Support
Planning
2
3
4
Communications
5
Forecasting and Monitoring ServicesForecasting and Monitoring ServicesForecasting and Monitoring Services
6
Pre Storm Checklist Pre Storm Checklist
7
Management Contingencies
8
Remob after Hurricane
11
Pipeline Breakout SessionPipeline Breakout Session ––ReportReportOutOut
TomTom WicklundWicklundBP Pipelines NABP Pipelines NA
July 27, 2005July 27, 2005
2005 Offshore Hurricane Readiness and2005 Offshore Hurricane Readiness andRecovery ConferenceRecovery Conference
Observations
1.1. Failure modes in general were typical,Failure modes in general were typical,but there were some significantbut there were some significantexceptions: large lateral movements andexceptions: large lateral movements andextents and a problem with one crossingextents and a problem with one crossing
2.2. Currently available (reported)Currently available (reported)information on failures is not sufficientlyinformation on failures is not sufficientlydetailed and consistent to understanddetailed and consistent to understandroot causesroot causes
3.3. Mudslides alone may not have causedMudslides alone may not have causedthe major displacementsthe major displacements
22
Observations (cont’d)
nn Coordination of response betweenCoordination of response betweencompanies and agencies was a successcompanies and agencies was a success
nn Sonar techniques worked well for initialSonar techniques worked well for initialassessmentassessment
nn Pressure test with product wasPressure test with product wassuccessfully used to assure integritysuccessfully used to assure integrity
nn Incremental production loss due toIncremental production loss due topipeline damage was not necessarilypipeline damage was not necessarilylarge relative to other causeslarge relative to other causes
Future Needs
nn More accurate and detailed incidentMore accurate and detailed incidentreportingreporting
nn Joint industry and/or regulatoryJoint industry and/or regulatoryeffort to analyze Ivan failureseffort to analyze Ivan failures
nn Expand participation in API pipelineExpand participation in API pipelineteamteam
nn Improved postImproved poststorm integrity plansstorm integrity plansnn Changes in standards orChanges in standards or
regulations???regulations???
11
Kevin GaudetKevin GaudetChevron Pipe Line CompanyChevron Pipe Line Company
Hurricane Ivan Storm Impact onHurricane Ivan Storm Impact onPipelines and RisersPipelines and Risers
Hurricane IvanStatistics
n Formed: September 2, 2004 as Tropical DepressionNine.
n Named Tropical Storm Ivan, September 3 thenHurricane Ivan on September 5, 2004.
n Highest Wind Speed: 165 mph (270 km/h), Category 5.
n Areas Affected: The windward Islands, especiallyGrenada, Jamaica, Grand Cayman, Cuba, Alabama,Florida, and much of the eastern United States.
n After Ivan’s rebirth, it reentered the GOM affectedTexas and Louisiana border.
22
Hurricane IvanEffects
n September 7, 2004: Passed directly over Grenadacausing major damage and loss of life.
n September 11, 2004: Passed over Jamaica causingsignificant wind and flood damage. (Also effecting theCayman Islands)
n September 13, 2004: Brushed the western tip of Cuba.
n September 16, 2004: Struck the U.S. mainland near GulfShores, Alabama.
Hurricane IvanEffects Continued
n September 18, 2004: Remnants of Ivan drifted off themidAtlantic coast and unleashed tornadoes on theeast coast.
n September 23, 2004: The revived Ivan made landfallnear Cameron, Louisiana.
n Ivan damaged several Oil and Gas facilities in the Gulfof Mexico.
n Pipelines and Risers in the Gulf of Mexico weremoved, separated and damaged by the power of thestorm.
33
Hurricane IvanStorm Track
Hurricane Ivan MMS Data –Reportsof Pipeline and Riser Damage
169 Reports of Pipeline and Riser Damage receivedby the MMS from Operators in the Gulf of Mexicofor Liquid and Gas Pipelines.
The compiled list contained the following information:
5 –Dents on Pipelines and Risers7 –Kinks Reported on Pipelines and Risers60 –Separations Reported on Pipelines and Risers2 –Reports on Risers Pulled Up.4 –Ruptures on Pipelines and Risers.7 –Twisted / Bent Reports on Pipelines and Risers.
44
Hurricane Ivan MMS Data Reports ofPipeline and Riser Damage
31 –“Other” Categories that range from:Splits in the pipelinesCracks in the WeldsExposed pipelinesPipeline Crossing DamagePipeline Movements – (Some in excessof 1 mile)
Riser Clamp Damage
24 –Bent Risers25 –Unknowns4 Unclassified
Hurricane IvanMMS Data Locations of Damage toPipelines and Risers
Damage Report Locations and distance from the eye ofIvan:
East Cameron –1 Report –Approx. 272 mi. WestSouth Marsh Island –3 Reports –Approx. 218 mi. WestEugene Island –2 Reports –Approx. 200 mi. WestShip Shoal –7 Reports –Approx. 160 mi. WestSouth Timbalier 21 Reports –Approx. 125 mi. WestBay Marchand –3 Reports –Approx. 120 mi. WestGrand Isle –6 Reports –Approx. 110 mi. West
55
Hurricane IvanMMS Data Locations of Damage toPipelines and Risers
West Delta –6 Reports –Approx. 85 mi. WestBreton Sound –3 Reports –Approx. 63 mi. WestSouth Pass –15 Reports –Approx. 50 mi. WestMississippi Canyon –17 Reports –Direct ImpactMain Pass –73 Reports –Direct ImpactMobile Area –5 Reports –Direct ImpactViosca Knoll –7 Reports –Direct Impact
Hurricane IvanMMS Data Locations of Damage toPipelines and Risers
0204060
80100
EC272mi
SM218mi
EI200mi
SS160mi
ST125mi
BM120mi
GI110mi
WD85 mi
BS63 mi
SP50 mi
MC,MP,MOVK
66
Hurricane IvanHurricane Ivan ––Storm TrackStorm Trackand Lease Locationsand Lease Locations
Hurricane IvanMMS Data Damage Occurred
n Boarding Platform Risers Damaged –43n Departing Platform Risers Damaged –45n Platforms with Both Risers Damaged 7n Pipelines Damaged –53n Pipelines Damaged at Crossings or
Pipeline Exposures 9n Pipelines Damaged at Subsea Tieins –8n Unknowns 4
77
Hurricane IvanMMS Data Damage Occurred
n Number of Pipelines with multiple damagelocations:
3 pipelines with 2 damage locations2 pipeline with 3 damage locations
n Pipeline and Riser damage reports relative tosize:
2” –14” = 15316” –36” = 16
Hurricane IvanHurricane Ivan ––Pipelines and RisersPipelines and RisersDamaged by Number and SizeDamaged by Number and Size
103Total73Total
13242
16343
27484
266146
128148
610910
112512
014114
016116
118518
020320
124124
026326
036136
Number DamagedSize (inches)Number DamagedSize (inches)
RisersPipelines
88
Hurricane IvanHurricane Ivan ––PipelinePipelineand Riser Mudslide Activityand Riser Mudslide Activity
nn 21 Reports of Damage to Pipelines and21 Reports of Damage to Pipelines andRisers due to mudslides.Risers due to mudslides.
nn Reports of damage included:Reports of damage included:–– Separation of break away joints (safety devicesSeparation of break away joints (safety devices
designed to separate at predetermined loads).designed to separate at predetermined loads).–– Severed pipelines.Severed pipelines.–– Pipelines moving out of the Right of Way.Pipelines moving out of the Right of Way.–– Risers and Pipelines Damaged due to toppledRisers and Pipelines Damaged due to toppled
platforms.platforms.
Hurricane IvanHurricane Ivan ––PipelinePipelineMudslide ActivityMudslide Activity ––8” Pipeline8” Pipeline
99
Hurricane IvanHurricane Ivan ––PipelinePipelineMudslide ActivityMudslide Activity ––10” Pipeline10” Pipeline
Hurricane IvanHurricane Ivan ––Pipeline MudslidePipeline MudslideActivityActivity ––8”, 10” & 20” Pipelines8”, 10” & 20” Pipelines
1010
Hurricane IvanMMS Data
Thanks to Ms. Elizabeth Komiskey withThanks to Ms. Elizabeth Komiskey withthe Minerals Management Service forthe Minerals Management Service forproviding the pipeline and riser damageproviding the pipeline and riser damagereport information.report information.
1
MISSISSIPPI DELTAPIPELINE SURVIVAL
STRATEGIES
byJames R. Hooper
FugroMcClelland Marine Geosciences
BRIEF REVIEW OF DELTAGEOMOPHOLOGYFROM YESTERDAY
2
ELONGATE LANDSLIDES
MUDFLOW ORIGIN, SEDIMENTTRANSPORT, AND DEPOSITION
SlumpFailureat Headof Gully
MudflowLobe atEnd ofGully
From Coleman et al, 1980
Mudflowsin theGully
CHARACTERISTICS OFSEAFLOOR FAILURE
FEATURES•Mudflow gullies tend to be
geologically active. Down slopemudslide movements destructive topipelines may occur at intervalsfrom several times a year to onceevery few years.
3
CHARACTERISTICS OFSEAFLOOR FAILURE
FEATURES (cont.)•Mudflow lobes tend to be
geologically active, but not(generally) as active as the gullies.Down slope mudslide movementsdestructive to pipelines may occuronly every few years.
SEAFLOOR GEOMORPHOLOGY
From Coleman et al, 1980
Region ofMudflow Gullies
Region ofMudflow Lobes
4
SEAFLOOR COLLAPSEDEPRESSIONS
From Coleman et al, 1980
Region ofCollapse
Depressions &Mudflow Gullies
Region ofMudflow Lobes
Region ofMudflowGullies
COLLAPSEDEPRESSIONS
From Coleman et al, 1980
ExampleCollapse
Depressions
ExampleMudflowGullies
5
CHARACTERISTICS OFSEAFLOOR FAILURE
FEATURES (cont.)•Collapse depressions are locally
enclosed seafloor failures that aregenerally bounded by low scarps.
•They tend to be as geologicallyactive as mudflow gullies.
•Active depths of failure range from1020 ft to 4060 ft.
CONSIDER THEFOLLOWING PIPELINE
ROUTE SELECTIONSITUATIONS
6
SEAFLOORGEOMORPHOLOGYOFFSHORE FROM
SOUTH PASS
From Coleman et al, 1980
The wellsmust go
near here
ROUTE PROBLEM #1
From Coleman et al, 1980
The wells must gonear here
(water depths ~80ft)
7
ROUTE 1 RISKS
•The pipeline may have to cross one ormore collapse depressions.
•Seafloor lateral movements and/or lossof bearing support may cause periodicfailures.
•Over a period of years, new collapsedepressions may appear.
ROUTE 1 MITIGATION
•Failures are likely localized at collapsedepressions, and the pipeline can bererouted around the problem duringearly repairs, eliminating the problem.
8
ROUTE PROBLEM #2
From Coleman et al, 1980
These two failureareas likely to grow
with time.
Likely to becomemajor (expensive)
problems
ROUTE 2 RISKS
•The pipeline must cross a mudflowgully plus several collapse features.
•Seafloor lateral movements in thegully and/or loss of bearing supportin collapse depressions may causeperiodic failures.
•Failure activity region may enlarge,depending on future hurricanewave activity.
9
ROUTE 2 MITIGATION
•Failures may be “fixable” over time,by local rerouting during pipelinerepairs.
•On the other hand, conditions mayget worse, and the pipeline maybecome an economic burden.
From Coleman et al, 1980
The wellsmust go
near here
ROUTEPROBLEM #3
10
ROUTE PROBLEM #3
From Coleman et al, 1980
No data in this
region Futureproblem
areas
ROUTE 3 RISKS
•The pipeline must enter unmappedterritory that is very likely to containseveral mudflow gullies andnumerous collapse depressions.
•The narrow “safe seafloor” regionsalong the route may be cut bygrowing mudflow gullies, creatingmajor problem areas.
11
ROUTE 3 MITIGATION
•Failures may be “fixable” over time,by local rerouting during pipelinerepairs.
•On the other hand, conditions mayget worse, and the pipeline maybecome an economic burden.
From Coleman et al, 1980
ALTERNATIVEROUTE
CONCEPT
??
11
Pipeline Breakout SessionPipeline Breakout Session
July 27, 2005July 27, 2005
Pipeline Breakout SessionPipeline Breakout SessionIntroductionIntroduction
Michael GordonMichael GordonExxonMobil Production Co.ExxonMobil Production Co.
22
Pipeline Impacts from IvanPipeline Impacts from Ivan
nn 33,000 miles of pipeline in GOM; most33,000 miles of pipeline in GOM; mostpipelines performed satisfactorilypipelines performed satisfactorily
nn Multiple failure modesMultiple failure modes––Unprecedented pipeline movementUnprecedented pipeline movement––Anchor line/chain damageAnchor line/chain damage––Reefed or sunken vesselsReefed or sunken vessels––Rubbing of pipelines at crossingsRubbing of pipelines at crossings––TensionTension
Purpose of Breakout SessionPurpose of Breakout Session
nn Review efforts of industry pipelineReview efforts of industry pipelineworkgroupworkgroup
nn Address pipelineAddress pipelinespecific hurricane issuesspecific hurricane issuesnn Identify opportunities to improve onIdentify opportunities to improve on
technology, design practices, operatingtechnology, design practices, operatingpractices, regulations and standardspractices, regulations and standards
nn Share experiences and lessons learnedShare experiences and lessons learned ––Participate!!!Participate!!!
33
ObjectivesObjectives
1.1. Summarize ObservationsSummarize Observations(Successes and Failures)(Successes and Failures)
2.2. Summarize What Was LearnedSummarize What Was Learned3.3. Identify Needs for ImprovementsIdentify Needs for Improvements
•• Operating PracticesOperating Practices•• Design PracticesDesign Practices•• Regulations/StandardsRegulations/Standards•• TechnologyTechnology
Today’s ScheduleToday’s Schedule
–– IntroductionIntroductionnn Facilities & Geotechnical Storm ImpactFacilities & Geotechnical Storm Impactnn Response ManagementResponse Management ––Industry PerspectiveIndustry Perspective
–– BreakBreaknn Recovery (Operations, Assessment, Mitigation)Recovery (Operations, Assessment, Mitigation)nn Data GatheringData Gathering
–– LunchLunchnn Open Forum and Panel DiscussionOpen Forum and Panel Discussion
–– BreakBreak–– Plenary DiscussionPlenary Discussion ––Air & Marine VesselAir & Marine Vessel
SupportSupport–– Discussion on Breakout SessionsDiscussion on Breakout Sessions
–– 8:008:00 ––8:158:15nn 8:158:15 ––9:159:15nn 9:159:15 ––10:0010:00
–– 10:0010:00 ––10:2010:20nn 10:2010:20 ––11:3011:30nn 11:3011:30 ––12:0012:00
–– 12:0012:00 ––1:001:00nn 1:001:00 ––2:302:30
–– 2:302:30 ––2:502:50–– 2:502:50 ––3:203:20
–– 3:203:20 ––4:304:30
44
Facilities & GeotechnicalFacilities & GeotechnicalStorm ImpactStorm Impact
nn Pipeline damage locationsPipeline damage locations
Response ManagementResponse Management
nn Preparations and evacuationsPreparations and evacuationsnn Hurricane trackingHurricane trackingnn Reconnaissance flightsReconnaissance flightsnn Operational responseOperational responsenn Head office responseHead office responsenn Incident Command SystemIncident Command System
55
RecoveryRecovery
nn Three phases of recovery:Three phases of recovery:––Assessment of pipelinesAssessment of pipelines––Mitigation of pipeline damageMitigation of pipeline damage––Return to operationsReturn to operations
nn Regulatory approvalsRegulatory approvalsnn What went well? What needsWhat went well? What needs
improvement?improvement?
Data GatheringData Gathering
nn Pipeline Team’s effortsPipeline Team’s effortsnn JIP planningJIP planning
––PrePrestorm vs. poststorm vs. poststorm mapping ofstorm mapping ofseafloorseafloor
––StormStormrelated pipeline damage inventoryrelated pipeline damage inventory––Analysis of pipeline failure causesAnalysis of pipeline failure causes
nn Request for data or participation in JIPRequest for data or participation in JIP
66
Presenters and Panel MembersPresenters and Panel Members
nn Tom Wicklund, BPTom Wicklund, BPnn Kevin Gaudet, ChevronKevin Gaudet, Chevronnn Michael Gordon, ExxonMobilMichael Gordon, ExxonMobilnn Jim Hooper,Jim Hooper, FugroFugroMcClellanMcClellannn Alex Alvarado, MMSAlex Alvarado, MMSnn Mark Wrzyszczynski, ShellMark Wrzyszczynski, Shellnn Aaron Demo, USCGAaron Demo, USCG
11
2005 Offshore Hurricane Readiness and2005 Offshore Hurricane Readiness andRecovery ConferenceRecovery Conference
Pipeline Failures Data GatheringPipeline Failures Data Gathering
TomTom WicklundWicklundBP Pipelines NABP Pipelines NA
July 27, 2005July 27, 2005
nn How did pipelines on the OCS perform duringHow did pipelines on the OCS perform duringHurricane Ivan?Hurricane Ivan?
nn Does pipeline performance data raise concern for theDoes pipeline performance data raise concern for theadequacy of current design standards?adequacy of current design standards?
nn Did Ivan uncover pipeline installation or operationalDid Ivan uncover pipeline installation or operationalconcerns that warrant further consideration?concerns that warrant further consideration?
nn Was pipeline damage that resulted from Ivan differentWas pipeline damage that resulted from Ivan differentfrom historical experience infrom historical experience in GoMGoM??
Pipeline Team FocusPipeline Team Focus
22
Pipeline DataPipeline Data
nn MMS pipeline damage data based on post Ivan NTLMMS pipeline damage data based on post Ivan NTL
nn Detailed company data primarily provided by APIDetailed company data primarily provided by APIteam members (Shell, BP & Chevron)team members (Shell, BP & Chevron)–– Initial focus was on hurricane impacted lines;Initial focus was on hurricane impacted lines;–– Data collection effort expanded to include pipelinesData collection effort expanded to include pipelines
that performed well and were located within thethat performed well and were located within theswathswath
Data AnalysisData Analysis
––MMS post Ivan data obtained by API teamMMS post Ivan data obtained by API team
––Pipeline operators modified data and reevaluatedPipeline operators modified data and reevaluated
––Performed comparison of pipeline operators dataPerformed comparison of pipeline operators datato MMS datato MMS data
––Not prudent to draw firm conclusions regardingNot prudent to draw firm conclusions regardingcause of failures (based on MMS data)cause of failures (based on MMS data)
33
Pipeline Failure DataPipeline Failure DataSheetSheet
nn Segment ID:Segment ID: ______________________________________________________________________________nn Company:Company: ______________________________________________________________________________nn P/L NameP/L Name ______________________________________________________________________________nn Export or E&PExport or E&P ______________________________________________________________________________nn GoMGoM Block Location:*Block Location:* ______________________________________________________________________________nn Water Depth:*Water Depth:* ______________________________________________________________________________nn Pipeline Diameter:Pipeline Diameter: ______________________________________________________________________________nn Wall Thickness:Wall Thickness: ______________________________________________________________________________nn Pipe Grade:Pipe Grade: ______________________________________________________________________________nn Year Installed:Year Installed: ______________________________________________________________________________nn Design Basis:(psig)Design Basis:(psig) ______________________________________________________________________________nn Pipeline Orientation: (relative to shore)* _____________________Pipeline Orientation: (relative to shore)* _______________________________________________________nn Pipeline Contents:Pipeline Contents: ______________________________________________________________________________nn Failure Mode:Failure Mode: ______________________________________________________________________________nn S.G. w/contents:S.G. w/contents: ______________________________________________________________________________nn Burial Depth:Burial Depth: ______________________________________________________________________________nn Horizontal Displacement Distance:Horizontal Displacement Distance: ______________________________________________________________________________nn Horizontal Displacement Length:Horizontal Displacement Length: ______________________________________________________________________________nn Notes:Notes: ______________________________________________________________________________nn Weight CoatWeight Coat _____Type_____Type _____Amount_____Amountnn Mud Flow Area?Mud Flow Area? _____ Yes_____ Yes _____ No_____ Nonn Third Party Impact?Third Party Impact? _____ Yes_____ Yes _____ No_____ Nonn Pipeline Crossing?Pipeline Crossing? _____ Yes_____ Yes _____ No_____ No** Specific location of failure or damageSpecific location of failure or damage
Observations RegardingObservations RegardingFailure ModesFailure Modes
nn General observationsGeneral observations–– No predominant failure mode, pipelines experienced various typesNo predominant failure mode, pipelines experienced various types;;–– BP, CVX and Shell experienced similar types of failures;BP, CVX and Shell experienced similar types of failures;–– Performance in traditional mud slide areas consistent with histoPerformance in traditional mud slide areas consistent with historicalrical
performance;performance;–– Many failures in the delta area, west of the swath of the storm;Many failures in the delta area, west of the swath of the storm;
nn Failure modesFailure modes–– Large lateral displacement (several thousand feet);Large lateral displacement (several thousand feet);–– Anchor line/chain drag damage;Anchor line/chain drag damage;–– Reefed or sunken vessels being moved onto pipelines;Reefed or sunken vessels being moved onto pipelines;–– Req’dReq’d separation lost at crossings;separation lost at crossings;–– Pipeline failed due to tension;Pipeline failed due to tension;–– Only 1 riser was lost in shallow waterOnly 1 riser was lost in shallow water
44
FindingsFindings
nn More data analysis isMore data analysis is req’dreq’d to draw conclusions;to draw conclusions;–– failures from Ivan does not seem to be atypical to historicalfailures from Ivan does not seem to be atypical to historical–– possible exception of the nearpossible exception of the nearshore Mississippi River delta areashore Mississippi River delta area
nn Opportunities to explore:Opportunities to explore:–– Implications of disturbance and uplifting of sedimentation atImplications of disturbance and uplifting of sedimentation at
the mouth of the riverthe mouth of the river–– New mudflow areas possibly identified as a result of IvanNew mudflow areas possibly identified as a result of Ivan
»» May need to reconsider how we define mudflow areasMay need to reconsider how we define mudflow areas»» Potential for better mapping of unstable areasPotential for better mapping of unstable areas
–– Implications of storm surge; ebb or runImplications of storm surge; ebb or runoff; and turbid flowsoff; and turbid flowson design criteria or pipeline configuration/orientationon design criteria or pipeline configuration/orientation
Path ForwardPath Forwardnn Industry/government effort to identify/collect data critical toIndustry/government effort to identify/collect data critical to
assessing pipeline performanceassessing pipeline performance–– Understand possible factors which contributed to storm impactUnderstand possible factors which contributed to storm impact–– Collect additional data required to perform analysisCollect additional data required to perform analysis
»» Damage/failuresDamage/failures»» Mapping (pipe movement, mudslides, etc… )Mapping (pipe movement, mudslides, etc… )
nn Expand makeExpand makeup of API team to include representatives of oil andup of API team to include representatives of oil andgas transmission companies and/or pipeline design consultantsgas transmission companies and/or pipeline design consultants
nn Pursue value added study or research opportunitiesPursue value added study or research opportunities–– Geotechnical (mudslides, silting, seafloor mapping, etc..)Geotechnical (mudslides, silting, seafloor mapping, etc..)–– Storm trajectory impact on infrastructure configuration/orientatStorm trajectory impact on infrastructure configuration/orientationion
nn Outcome of pipeline performance assessment should determineOutcome of pipeline performance assessment should determineneed to revise pipeline standardsneed to revise pipeline standards
55
Immediate NeedsImmediate Needs
nn Additional participants on API team*Additional participants on API team*nn Industry dataIndustry data
––Sonar/mapping dataSonar/mapping data––Failure dataFailure data
*contact any current team member*contact any current team member
1
1
Hurricane Ivan PipelineSubcommittee
Pipeline Response Management inthe wake of Hurricane Ivan
July 27, 2005
2
Response ManagementHighlights
•Operations Preparatory Activities andEvacuation
•Hurricane Event and Tracking•Reconnaissance Flights•Field Operations Response•Head Office Response•National Response integrated with the ICS
2
3
Operations Preparation
•Evacuation of nonessential personnel•Shutdown of Crude pipelines•Evacuation of all personnel•Shell Utilized ICS for the Evacuation.•BP had ICS team on Standby during
evacuation
4
Hurricane Event and Tracking
•Twice Daily updates from Impact Weather•Wind and wave fields overlaid on pipeline
system maps•Located repair assets and placed on first
refusal•Shell, Chevron, & BP placed construction
vessels on standby before storm
3
5
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460450
470
182
441481
481 441
470460
45095 97 441481482183
504494
514
485525
525 485
514504
100 49498200 201 485525526202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209210
548538
558
529569
569 529
558548
101212 104211538
529570221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228229
592582
602
573613
613 573
602592
220 108 105 582573238614230
636626
646
617657
657 617
646
239 109636
113 626249 617257
680670
690
661701
701
248
661
690
117 114658 680670
266 258 661702267
724714
734
705745
745 705
118 119 120701734
724714
277 285 705746276
768758
778
749789
121743
789 749
778768
294 291 290 289 287 758286 749787295 790
812
786
802
822
793833
833 793
822812
305 307 308 802826 827304 829 793834
856846
866
837877
877 837
866
310 309856
846311 868 837878
900890
910
881921
921 881
910900
319 320 890911 912 881922
944934
954
925965
965 925
954944
934956 925966
988978
998
9691009
1009 969
998988
9781000 9691010
2010
30
141
41 1
3020
1030 141
6454
74
4585
85 45
7464
5474 4585
10898
118
89129
129 89
118108
98118 89129
152142
162
133173
173 133
162152
142162 133173
196186
206
177217
217 177
206196
186
240230
250
221261
261 221
250284
274
294305 265
338349 309
36
48
4561513 1421 22
MAXIMUM CONDITIONS AT OFFSHORE LOCATIONS
PAT
H O
F H
UR
RIC
AN
E IV
AN
100+ MPH 74+ MPH 58+ MPH
74+ MPH
58+ MPH39+ MPH
MC807”A”MC809”A”
MC685
MP289
SP62SP65VK956
MP252
MC194WD104
WD31
HM.ppt 09/17/04
6
Reconnaissance Flights
•Viewed what appeared to be extensivetopsides damage at many platforms
•Took several days to reman the platforms(weather, damage, debris, utilities).
•Shell released standby vessels to othercompanies
•BP staffed Fort Jackson the morning afterlandfall to manage a suspected release ontheir MPOG system
4
7
MURPHY MEDUSA
MC 528
8
Petronius VK786PETRONIUS PLATFORM1,750 FT WATER DEPTHQUARTERS & HELIPORT
DAMAGE
5
9PETRONIUS PLATFORM
10
MP 289 “B”
6
11
Operational Response
•Priority was given to production operationsto make safe, reman, clean up, repair andrestore production operations
•Pipeline Operators communicatedcontinuously with Production Operations tocoordinate restarts and prioritize work.
•Pipelines were leak tested for 2 hours inaccordance with Notice to Lessees
12MP 69 PUMP STATION
7
13
Operations Response (cont.)
• Overflights noted several sheens in MP 80 & 69• Began surveying pipelines subsea• Some pipelines were fully severed• Shell immediately dispatched a liveboat operation
manned by Stolt Divers and International Boats• Initially had indications that MPOG 18inch
pipelines may be compromised.
14
Drilling Rig Broke Loose from MooringCrossed Nakika Oil Line
With Rig Dragging Three Anchor Cables
Nakika North Drag Mark West Side Nakika North Drag Mark –East Side
8
15
Pipeline Head Office Response
• Sourced an available vessel to work in MP 69(relatively shallow water)
• Sourced survey vessels with Sidescan and/or ROVcapability to survey pipeline right of ways.
• Established a Project Command center tocoordinate assets
• Established Port Operations with full timeinspector to coordinate vessels
16
Inspection & Construction Equipment
• Survey: Moana Wave, Captain Blake, Emma McCall• Dive Support Vessels: Barge 1, CalDiver II, Mystic Viking, Sea Fox• Jackup Boats: Juan, Choctaw• ROV Vessels: Merlin, Mystic Viking, Uncle John, Ocean Intervention• Laybarge: Pecos Horizon• Spud Barge: BH300, BH103• Derrick Barge: Lili, Boaz• Various tugs, supply boats, crew boats, quarters barges, material
barges, etc.• Multiple Response vessels (LA, TX, FL Responders and support
craft) and equipment
9
17
Shell Pipeline ConstructionOutcome
• Safety: Over 190,000 man hours with no recordableincidents
• Construction Timing: 43 days total (averages 184 peopleper 12 hour shift)
• Total Costs for Inspection, Cleanup, Repairs in 2004:>$40MM
• Expected Costs for Construction & Repairs in 2005:>$10MM
• Minimal Impact to Production –Less than a week for Nakikaand 1 day for Cognac –Due to cooperation of all Agencies,Contractors and Operators.
18
• Site 1 –Severed Delta 20”line displaced ~2 miles to the east of itsoriginal position
• Site 2 –Nakika 18”line damaged at MPOG crossing in MP 69• Site 3 –Nakika 18”line severed in MP 151• Site 4 –Odyssey 12”line damaged in MP 70• Site 5 –Delta 20”piggable wye pulled away from Odyssey 20”• Site 6 –8”line pulled away from platform at SP 60 & pipeline
displaced• Site 7 –Connection on Bud 8”to allow BP’s MPOG production to
come online• Site 8 –Sunken Jackup barge on Odyssey 20”in MP 309• Site 9 –Disconnect Odyssey 12”from MP 289 “B”platform –
reconfigure SSTI
Shell Pipeline HurricaneIvan Worksites
10
19
Site 1Delta 20”Severed
(MPOG is insame ditch)
Site 2Nakika/MPOG
Crossing
Site 3:Nakika Spool
Severed
Site 4Odyssey 12””
MP 69 “P”Platform
16”
20”
Site 5Original Wye
Location
Odyssey 20”
MPOG 18”Nakika 18”
Pompano 12”
MP 69Station
Delta 20”to Nairn
Delta 16”Crude to
Loutre Jct.
Cobia 12”
ALL LOCATIONS SHOWNARE APPROXIMATE
AsFoundPosition of 20”
After Ivan
20
Special Considerations
•Return of Hurricane Ivan•Dynamic Bottom Environment•Local and Displaced Wildlife•New equipment•Sharing of resources•Different kind of leak•New Security Requirements
11
21Jackup Boat on Odyssey 20” in MP309 –Site #8
20” P
ipel
ine
Sidescan Sonar Image
22Jackup Boat Recovery to Surface
12
23
South Pass 60 Severed 8inch Riser –Site #6
24NAKIKA Spool Severed in MP151 –Site #3
13
25MSRC LOUISIANA RESPONDER AT NAKIKA SITE 2
26Nakika / MPOG Crossing –Site #2
End Connector
Spool Piece Repairs onboth MPOG & Nakika Pipelines
at Crossing Location
14
27
National Response Integratedwith ICS
• Established ICS to work with Federal, State andLocal Authorities in overall response.
• Main focus was MP69, since this was the sourceof the visible oil.
• Priorities were clearly established– Stop the oilregardless of where it was coming from– Protect the environment– Restore the pipeline systems– Do it all safely
28
Special Thanks
•Mike Coyne•Tommy Hutto•Jason Dollar•MMS•USCG
11
2005 Offshore Hurricane Readiness and2005 Offshore Hurricane Readiness andRecovery ConferenceRecovery Conference
Recovery From IvanRecovery From Ivan
TomTom WicklundWicklundBP Pipelines NABP Pipelines NA
July 27, 2005July 27, 2005
RecoveryRecovery Return to ServiceReturn to Service
nn 3 Phases of Recovery3 Phases of Recovery––AssessmentAssessment––MitigationMitigation––Return to operationsReturn to operations
nn What went wellWhat went wellnn What needs improvementWhat needs improvement
22
ScenarioScenario ––Displaced LineDisplaced Line
Acrobat Document
AssessmentAssessment»» OfficeOffice
nn Review SCADA data (immediately after storm)Review SCADA data (immediately after storm)nn Consultant studies (as data becomes available)Consultant studies (as data becomes available)
»» FieldFieldnn Visual of topsidesVisual of topsidesnn Over flightsOver flightsnn SonarSonarnn ROV surveillanceROV surveillancenn Diver inspectionDiver inspectionnn Pressure testPressure testnn PiggingPigging
33
Sonar Data of Displaced PipeSonar Data of Displaced Pipe
Sonar Image @ MP144Sonar Image @ MP144
44
Diver PhotoDiver Photo
MitigateMitigate
nn Equipment inspection & cleanupEquipment inspection & cleanup(topsides)(topsides)
nn StabilizationStabilizationnn Pipe repairPipe repairnn Pipe replacementPipe replacementnn Lift & moveLift & movenn Lay new pipeLay new pipenn Line loweringLine loweringnn Spill response supportSpill response support
55
Regulator approval requiredRegulator approval required
––MMS for pipe in OCSMMS for pipe in OCS»» Pressure testPressure test»» RepairsRepairs»» RelaysRelays»» New layNew lay»» Modify/relinquishModify/relinquish RoWRoW
––OPS for pipe in state watersOPS for pipe in state waters––LaF&WLaF&W for pipe in marshlandsfor pipe in marshlands
Rebuild CrossingsRebuild Crossings
66
Low Pressure Band ClampLow Pressure Band Clamp
Pipe ReplacementPipe Replacement
77
Separation/CoatingSeparation/Coating
Lift & MoveLift & Move
88
Sonar After Pipe MoveSonar After Pipe Move
Stabilize w/Screw AnchorsStabilize w/Screw Anchors
99
Return to OperationsReturn to Operations
nn Temporary operationsTemporary operations––Reduced pressuresReduced pressures––Temporary connectionsTemporary connections
nn Return to fully rated operationsReturn to fully rated operationsnn Idle/abandonIdle/abandon
What Went WellWhat Went Well
nn SonarSonar ––good 1good 1stst identifier of problemidentifier of problemnn Interaction w/AgenciesInteraction w/Agenciesnn “Oil out” minimized during repairs“Oil out” minimized during repairs
1010
Areas for ImprovementAreas for Improvement
nn Post storm integrity planPost storm integrity plannn PrePrestorm sourcingstorm sourcing
––VesselsVessels––PersonnelPersonnel––MaterialsMaterials––ServicesServices
Post Storm Integrity PlanPost Storm Integrity Plan