Kurt Salchert, CAPT (RCN Ret’d), PMPPresidentBeyond the Border Consulting Ltd.11288 Chalet RoadNorth Saanich, BC V8L 5M1Canada

Maritime Security Regimes

Round Table 2018

T +1 778 679 6292F +1 778 351 3106kurtrcn@gmail.com

Panel 2: Process - Functional Integrity

Beyond the Border Consulting Ltd. is a globally-focused professional services firm specializing in

risk management, performance excellence and decision-support solutions in the areas of defence

and public safety, global supply chain security and critical infrastructure resiliency.

2

• Introduce Panel Questions

• Background and Service Offerings

• The Call to Action

• Defining the Problem

• Solving the Problem

Agenda

3

1. Given that the purpose of Maritime Domain Awareness/Maritime

Situational Awareness (MDA/MSA) is to support well-reasoned

and timely decision-making, what is ‘effective understanding’ and

what does ‘good enough’ look like through the lens of the

decision-maker?

2. What are the barriers to ‘good enough’ and how can these be

realistically overcome?

3. What are the system-level building blocks (i.e. inputs, processes,

outputs and outcomes) required to achieve ‘good enough’?

4. Given that MDA/MSA is achieved within a ‘shared responsibility’

construct (i.e. multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional, multi-interest)

what might a management accountability framework look like to

measure and report on performance to hold people/organizations

accountable for results (or at least expose their shortcomings if

they cannot be held accountable)?

Panel Questions

My MDA Moment…

4

5

Service Offerings and Clients

Command and Control Platforms

• Disaster Risk and Emergency Management C2 Technology (EDMSIM)

• Unclassified/Classified Military C2 Technology (MILSIM)

• Distributed collaboration toolkit including resource optimization/tracking,

activity logs, chat rooms, interactive maps and social media/data analytics

Synthetic Environment Simulation Services

• Project Management

• Traditional and E-Learning Design and Delivery

• Interactive Multimedia Instruction (Level 3-4)

• 2D/3D Virtual/Constructive Simulations

• Hyper-Real Virtual and Augmented Reality

• Experiments and Demonstrations

• Mission Rehearsals

• Operational Training and Exercises

• Research and Development (R&D)

• System Design and Engineering

• Strategy, Concepts and Capability Development

• Investigations, Audits and After Action Reviews

6

Client-Focused Methodology

• Alberts Code of Best Practice: Experimentation

• Australian Emergency Manual Series

Handbook 3: Managing Exercises

• Canadian Army Simulation Centre Exercise Design,

Development & Delivery Guide

• CJOC Exercise Methodology Guide

• DND/CAF Modelling & Simulation Roadmap

• Guide for Understanding & Implementing

Defense Experimentation (GUIDEx)

• Justice Institute of BC Exercise Design Guide

• NATO Collective Training & Exercise Directive

• NORAD-USNORTHCOM Exercise Program

• RCN Maritime Operational Test & Evaluation Guide

• RCN Combat Readiness Training Requirements

• RCN Readiness & Sustainment Policy

• U.S. CJCS Joint Training System

• U.S. DOD Test & Evaluation Master Plan Guide

• U.S. Homeland Security Exercise & Evaluation

Program (HSEEP)

• U.S. Naval War College: Guide for Professional

War Gamers

Phase 6 Assess

Evaluate outcomes against SMART measurement criteria. Analyze results to determine contributing factors and root

causes. Develop After Action Report. Debrief findings and recommendations for improvement plan

Phase 5 Deliver

Phase 4 Plan

Phase 3 Design

Phase 2 Conceive Phase 1 Initiate

7

✓ Introduce Panel Questions

✓ Background and Service Offerings

• The Call to Action

• Defining the Problem

• Solving the Problem

Agenda

• Mumbai, terrorism from the sea (Dec 2008)

• M/V MAERSK ALABAMA, piracy, Somali Coast (Apr 2009)

• M/V ARCTIC SEA, hijacking, Atlantic (Aug 2009)

• M/V OCEAN LADY, illegal migrants, Victoria (Oct 2009)

• ROKS CHEONAN, torpedoed/sunk by N. Korea (Mar 2010)

• Deepwater Horizon, oil-rig explosion, Gulf Coast (Apr 2010)

• M/V SUN SEA, illegal migrants, Victoria (Aug 2010)

• M/V MOKAMI & NANNY, Arctic groundings (Aug & Sep 2010)

• M/V CLIPPER ADVENTURER, Arctic grounding (Aug 2010)

• M/V POLAR STAR, cruise ship grounding, Antarctic (Jan 2011)

• Fukushima earthquake/Tsunami (Mar 2011)

• Cyber-attack (drug smuggling), Port of Antwerp (Jun 2011)

• Cyber-attack (data destruction) on IRISL, Iran (Aug 2011)

• M/V RENDA - USCGC HEALY, Nome resupply (Jan 2012)

• M/V COSTA CONCORDIA, grounding (Jan 2012)

• Shell Oil drilling debacle, Arctic (Summer 2012)

• M/V SNOW DRAGON, 1st PRC Arctic crossing (Sep 2012)

• Superstorm SANDY, global supply chain disruption (Nov 2012)

• M/V OB RIVER (LNG), 1st winter crossing of NSR (Dec 2012)

• USS GUARDIAN, grounding, Philippines (Jan 2013)

• M/V CARNIVAL TRIUMPH, high seas SAR (Feb 2013)

• Sabotage of internet submarine cables, Egypt (Mar 2013)

• Atmospheric CO2 surpasses 400ppm (May 2013)

• M/Y WHITE ROSE, GPS Spoofing, Monaco (Jun 2013)

• Typhoon HAIYAN, global supply chain disruption (Nov 2013)

The Call to Action

• Ukraine Crimea/Black Sea Crisis (Mar 2014 - present)

• Malaysian Airlines Flt 370 search (Mar 2014 - present)

• Ferry SEWOL Capsize/SAR, South Korea (Apr 2014)

• LALB labour dispute, global supply chain disruption (Mar 2015)

• Fukushima radiation detected, Eastern Pacific (Apr 2015)

• F/V THUNDER, Scuttling, São Tomé and Príncipe (Apr 2015)

• M/V EASTERN STAR capsize, Yangtze River (Jun 2015)

• ISIS-affiliated missile attack on Egyptian navy ship (Jul 2015)

• First Submerged Missile Launch (SLBM), N. Korea (Apr 2016)

• HSV-2 SWIFT, C-802 missile attack, Red Sea (Oct 2016)

• Drug Crisis (W-18 & Fentanyl), Canada (Apr 2016 - present)

• Iran - US Naval confrontations (Jan 2017)

• Abu Sayyaf kidnapping attempt, Bohol, Philippines (Apr 2017)

• Sea Mines, Mokha/Midi in Red Sea (May 2017)

• Somali pirates, material support to al-Shabaab/ISIS (Jun 2017)

• Cyber-attacks (Maersk), Global Supply Chain (Jun 2017)

• Mass-GPS spoofing event, Black Sea (Jun 2017)

• Mediterranean migration crisis (Ongoing)

• S. China Sea “wall of sand” & imperialist intentions (Ongoing)

• Strategic disruptors, N. Korea, Russia, Iran, Syria (Ongoing)

• Opening Arctic Sea Lines of Communication (Developing)

• Catastrophic Fisheries Collapse (Developing)

• Transnational Crime, Weapons Proliferation, Espionage, Piracy,

Cyber-threats, Pollution, Environmental Exploitation, Lawfare,

Pandemic threats, Impacts of Climate Change (Daily)

8

9

✓ Introduce Panel Questions

✓ Background and Service Offerings

✓ The Call to Action

• Defining the Problem

• Solving the Problem

Agenda

Terminology

10

Maritime Domain Awareness: “The effective understanding of any activity

associated with the maritime environment that could impact upon the

security, safety, economy or environment”

• Includes the effective understanding of maritime related activities,

infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels, or other conveyances on, under, related

to, adjacent to, or bordering a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway.

• By the very nature of this definition, MDA cannot be looked at in isolation from

the land, aerospace or cyber domains.

The Decision-Maker’s Problem

11

In an inter-connected, inter-dependent and rapidly changing globalized world,

decision-makers put a premium on understanding their operating

environment and making well-reasoned and timely decisions before external

action and reaction as well as other variables of the operational environment

change the risk calculus…

Yet, despite incredible advances in technology and accelerating knowledge

about the world around us, decisions are often made on the basis of scanty,

ambiguous, erroneous, late-to-need information and untested assumptions…

Furthermore, decision-makers exist and interact in an arena that demands

quantification, which includes the acceptance and prioritization of bad data

over no data, and favours simple and visible metrics that can be highly

misleading and counterproductive...

Consequently, resources are employed in an ineffective and inefficient

manner while service providers invest time and resources developing “so

called solutions” which fail to satisfy “real operational requirements”.

The MDA Problem

12

Maritime Domain Awareness is neither an operation nor a mission...you do

not do MDA, you achieve it…

The maritime domain and MDA in particular is connected to nearly every

aspect of life on our planet and it has no boundaries…

Many agencies contribute to it; it has many masters, yet no one owns it…

There is no single agency or coordinating body, under a single policy

framework, supported by common tools and procedures, to ensure that the

right information gets to the right person, in the right organization, at the

right time, in the right format and lexicon, and with the right confidence,

precision, persistence and accuracy to achieve the desired outcomes…

Despite incredible advances in technology and knowledge of the world

around us, there continues to be an absence of daily, habitual and

persistent relationships - built on trust and mutual respect - between key

stakeholders across the Global Maritime Community of Interest...

In a nutshell, herein lies the problem with achieving MDA.

The Shared Responsibility Problem

13

“Responsibility is a unique concept... You may share it with others, but

your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, but it is still with

you... If responsibility is rightfully yours, no evasion, or ignorance or

passing the blame can shift the burden to someone else. Unless you can

point your finger at the man who is responsible when something goes

wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible.”

Hyman G. Rickover

What does leadership accountability look like and, more importantly, how does one measure, report on, and sanction shortcomings

and/or incentivize performance excellence in a shared responsibility enterprise such as MDA?

Global

Surveillance National

Decision-Makers

1. Collect & Cue

3. Share and Collaborate

6. Plan & Synchronize Effects

4. Fuse, Analyze & Make Actionable

5. Assess and Warn

Regional

Decision-Makers

Local Decision-

Makers &

Responders

Long Range

Surveillance

What level of awareness is required to ensure timely warning of threats, hazards and vulnerabilities in

order to manage risk and achieve the desired outcome?---------------------------

Can we detect, issue warning and mitigate the threat before it assembles and departs its point of origin? ---------------------------

When and where does collection, fusion and analysis need to be conducted? What is shared and with

whom do we share information and collaborate in order to achieve effective understanding?---------------------------

What are the 2nd and 3rd order effects of our decisions and actions (or inaction)? 14

Visualizing the Problem

Autonomous

Surveillance

2. Detect, Track, Classify & Identify

Maritime Interest Item

Autonomous

Surveillance

Coastal

Surveillance

7. Respond

8. Measure & Adjust

15

Barriers to Achieving Effective Understanding

Understanding

of the Law Privacy Charter/ConstitutionJurisdiction Intelligence Oversight

Fragmented

direction and

guidance Numerous and non-integrated visions, strategies, policies, plans and frameworks

Broken tools in

the toolkit

Outdated contact lists and websitesNo common collaboration tools

No common lexicon

Nothing ‘common’ about the COP

Disparate data exchange standards

Classification/Need to Know

Nothing ‘standard’ about SOPs

Whose plan?

Who leads?

Who supports?

What else?

Unilateral or Interagency?

Multinational?

What authority?What is the desired outcome?

Can we share information?

Whose rules?

How do we communicate?

Who pays?

Is there a plan?

Who has jurisdiction?

No single, integrated Watch Lists

Freedom of Information

Is private sector involved?

Poor delegation of authorities

Flawed or untested assumptions Executive participation and buy-in

Inadequate trainingReadiness, disposition and limitations of responders

Unified Command Structure?

Desired outcomes are not clearly articulated

Hidden agendas

Mission creep

Intellectual Property Rights

Lack of accountability for results in a shared responsibility construct

Poorly Defined

Critical Information

Requirements &

Desired Outcomes

Inadequate performance measurement & reporting system

16UNCLASSIFIED

MSOC(GL)

CANR

ANR

NATO & Partners

JTF(N)

CBP

AMOC

PACOM

NORAD

USNORTHCOM

CONR

CG PAC

MIFC

CG LANT

MIFC

USCG

NVMC

USCG

IRVMC

MARPAC

ADF C

JIATF-S

USCG

EPIC

MARLANTMSOC(W)

MSOC(E)

CFICC

NMIO

3rd FLT

PACFLT

CFINTCOM

Canadian Joint

Ops Command

SOUTHCOM

EUCOM

USCG

D-1

USCG

D-5USCG

D-7

USCG

D-14

USCG

D-11

USCG

D-13

USCG

D-17

USCG

D-8

Canadian IMSWG,

ASWG Committees

US Arctic Executive

Steering Committee

Embassy

USCG

D-9

ONI ICC

AFRICOM

Federal, State,

Local & Tribal

Government

GOC

ITAC

NCTC

TC

RCMP

NMCC

DHS NOC

DFO

CENTCOMCSEC

JIATF-W

NSA

Bi-National

Forums

NSS Interagency

Policy Committees

Private Sector

Stakeholders

USFF

Embassy

FBI

TSA

GMCC

NTC

DOT

NSA

CBSA

Federal, Provincial &

Local Government

CSIS

ICE

NJOIC

CBP

DNDO

DOE

STRATCOM

Diverse North American Stakeholders

Justice

CJOS COE

Academia

& Think Tanks

NRONGA

PM-ISE

PSC

Health

EC

CIC

CSA

DOS

GAC

International

Forums

AANDC

ONR

NRL

DRDC

OAS/IADBAsia-Pacific Partners

Arctic Stakeholders

16

Non-Military

Military

Fusion Centers

4

1

PACOM JIOC

MIFCPAC

Marine Security Operations Centre (MSOC) West, East and Great Lakes

EPIC

MIFCLANT

USSOUTHCOM (JIOC-SOUTH)

JIATF-SOUTH

USFJ

JIOC-K

Australian Maritime Information Fusion Centre (AMIFC), Canberra

NAVCENT

National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC), Trentham

JIOCEUR Analytic Center (JAC), Huntingdonshire

Joint Narcotics Analysis Centre (JNAC), London

FRONTEX – European Union

USAFRICOM (NAVAF)

Counter-Narcotics & Maritime Security Interagency Fusion Center (CMIC), Cape Verde

NATO Allied Maritime Command (CCMAR), Naples

Virtual – Regional Maritime Traffic Center (V-RMTC), Rome

Maritime Analysis & Operations Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N) EMSA Maritime Support Services Operations Centre, Lisbon

Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre (AMSOC), Canberra

Information Fusion Centre, Singapore

ReCAAP, Singapore

IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, Kuala Lumpur

JIOC-TRANS

JIOC-CENT

JIATF-WEST

NATO Allied Maritime Command (MCC) &NATO Shipping Centre (NSC),

NorthwoodNational Maritime Information Centre (NMIC), Northwood

OMAOC, CINFOCOM, INTERPOL-WAPIS,

Abidjan

Maritime Safety Agency, Barcelona

National Maritime Safety Agency, Madrid

National Maritime & Rescue Center (Joint RCC), Den Helder

CGFMC, Paris

UKMTO, Dubai

MSCHOA, Northwood

MARLO MOC, Bahrain

COMCONTRAM

Panama LRIT Surveillance Center

MRCC Chile

SUCBAS, Baltic States

ADF-C

N2C2

AMOCUSFF MOC

RMOCC, REFLECS3

Diverse Global Stakeholders

NMCC, Brunei

EUROSUR, Madrid

Maritime Trade Info Sharing Centre (MTISG-GOG), Accra

RMIFC

Mar. Sec Program of IAC against

Terrorism (CICTE)

ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC, ICC, CREMAC,

CRESMAO

17

ReMISC

18

✓ Introduce Panel Questions

✓ Background and Service Offerings

✓ The Call to Action

✓ Defining the Problem

• Solving the Problem

Agenda

Executed through…

To enhance…

By means of…

Variables of the Operational

and Mission Environments• Political

• Military

• Economic

• Social

• Information

• Infrastructure

• Physical

• Time

to c

op

e w

ith

th

ese

…

develo

p a

rep

eata

ble

pro

cess

we m

ust

…

to do this…

we must…

consider the requirements of multiple

stakeholders/partners and their respective

authorities, mandates, jurisdictions and interests

▪ Defence

▪ Security

▪ Law Enforcement

▪ Regulatory Compliance

▪ Intelligence

▪ Environment

▪ Resource Management

▪ Global Supply Chain

▪ Inter-modal Transport

Linking all steps from collection and surveillance planning, to

detection, tracking, fusion and analysis, to assessment and

warning, to response decisions and action.

HIGH-LEVEL CONCEPT

a comprehensive approach that integrates disparate data and

information sources, collaboration processes and tools, and

risk management techniques

the ability of the “decision-maker” to achieve “desired

outcomes” by making timely and well-reasoned decisions

based on the best available knowledge and understanding

a repeatable triage and case management process to help

detect, identify and respond to a wide range of “maritime

interest items”; understand their relationship to other objects;

and analysis to determine the relevance of those relationships

in order to support the decision-maker in achieving the

desired outcomes within acceptable risk tolerances.

be driven by operational requirements (balanced with privacy) based on a deliberate analysis of risk rather

than by hope/guesswork

▪ Anticipate

▪ Sense

▪ Warn

▪ Plan

▪ Mobilize Response

▪ Deploy/Pre-position

▪ Act/Sustain

▪ Defend/Shield

▪ Redeploy/Regenerate

consider all phases in the decision-making cycle

from collection planning, through surveillance,

warning, response and assessment

▪ Determine/Share CIRs

▪ Collect Relevant Data

▪ Detect

▪ Categorize/Classify

▪ Collect Attributes (EEIs)

▪ Fuse Related Objects

▪ Analyze Risk

▪ Make Decisions/Action

▪ Assess/Adjust

The Problem

• Decisions are made on the basis

of scanty, ambiguous, erroneous

or late-to-need information and

untested assumptions...

• Consequently, resources are

employed in an ineffective and

inefficient manner while

innovators invest time and

resources developing so called

“solutions: which fail to satisfy

“real” operational requirements.

to a

dd

ress th

is…

draw on diverse data sources relevant to building “case files”

around Maritime Interest Items (MII)

including

▪ Vessels

▪ Other conveyances

▪ Cargo

▪ Persons

▪ Real Infrastructure

▪ Virtual Infrastructure

▪ Transactional Information

▪ Operational Environment

▪ Physical Environment

measure and report on performance and be held accountable for results,

while pursuing continuous improvement

in capability/capacity

▪ Doctrine

▪ Organization

▪ Training

▪ Materiel

▪ Leadership

▪ Personnel

▪ Facilities

▪ Interoperability

▪ Policy

• Mission

• Threat/Hazard

• Oceanography

• Hydrography

• Geography

• Weather/visibility

• Friendly Forces

• Other Factors

19

20

Process Model(Hint – Step 8 is REALLY important)

21

What Data Needs To Be Integrated?(Non-Exhaustive List)

Level Essential Elements of Information (EEI)

Detect Position/Location

Time

Reporting Sensor (Active/Passive)

Contact Information of Reporting Source

Contact Information of Stakeholders/Partners

Reporting Confidence

Interest Category (Vessel, People, Cargo etc.)

Reporting Priority

Status (Initial, Update, False Contact)

Environmental data (predicted versus actual)

Track Position/Location

Time

Course and Speed

Surfaced or Depth

Reporting Sensor (Active/Passive)

Reporting Confidence

Contact Information of Reporting Source

Status (Initial, Update, False Contact)

Classify Size (Length, Breadth, Draft, Tonnage etc.)

Classification (Warship, Commercial, Fish etc.)

Weapons/Armament

Speed

Threat/Non-Threat or Hazard/Non-Hazard

Vessel Type

Propulsion Type

Configuration

Identify Flag (Nationality)

IMO or other Registration Number

Name

International Radio Call Sign

Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI)

Classification Society

Double Hull

Photograph

Acoustic Signature

Electronic Fingerprint

Make Actionable Cargo class, type, name and volume

Dangerous/Hazardous Cargo

Crew/non-crew nationality, numbers and names

Ports of Call (last, current, next)

Estimated Time of Arrival

History of Activity

History of Violations

Past Incidents (crew and passenger)

Current Activity

Operational, Mission and Friendly Force Data

Navigation Status

Compliance with reporting regulations

Agent

Beneficial Owner

Registered Owner

Charterer

Points of Contact

Actionable Intelligence

Exhibiting Hostile Act/Intent

Other Suspicious/Anomalous Behaviours

Set SMART Goals and Objectives(Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Timebound)

Goals Measures of Performance

Detect Change Probability of measuring how the attributes of a particular area have changed between

two or more time periods

Cue Probability that all-source information when fused, correlated and analyzed will provide

indications of a threat, hazardous situation or other maritime interest item in sufficient

time to achieve the desired outcome(s)

Detect Probability that routine surveillance and screening activities will detect a maritime

interest item in sufficient time to achieve the desired outcome(s)

Track Probability that a maritime interest item will be tracked with sufficient precision,

confidence and persistence to achieve the desired outcome(s)

Classify Probability that a maritime interest item will be classified in sufficient time to achieve the

desired outcome(s)

Identify Probability that a maritime interest item will be identified in sufficient time to achieve the

desired outcome(s)

Direct/Command Probability that the Command and Control architecture will enable timely assessment,

warning, planning and response efforts to achieve the desired outcome(s)

Respond Probability that the response effort will achieve the desired outcome(s) (i.e. a function of

readiness, location, disposition, capability, capacity, authority, mandate, jurisdiction and

willpower etc.)

Protect/Shield Probability that other protection layers, beyond the primary response force, will prevent

damage if the threat reaches a target or sensitive area

Deter/Dissuade Probability that the threat will be deterred or dissuaded from its intended purposes by

instilling doubt or fear of the consequences 22

• We usually fail because:

➢ We tried to solve the wrong problem

➢ We focussed on outputs, not outcomes

➢ We corrected only one problem, when

two or more problems exists

• Without knowing the root cause of a problem, effective

solutions to prevent recurrence are unlikely

• Experience shows that identifying the wrong cause leads to

taking the wrong corrective action

• Root cause analysis builds a causal chain answering How and

Why?

Why Measurement Matters

23

24

1. Failure to clearly define and communicate roles, responsibilities and accountabilities based

on legislative, regulatory and/or policy direction and guidance

2. Failure to clearly define and communicate SMART objectives and desired outcomes based

on acceptable risk thresholds informed by a risk assessment

3. Failure to clearly define and communicate Key Performance Indicators (KPI) and targets for

objectives and desired outcomes

4. Failure to measure and assess progress towards achieving desired outcomes informed by

both leading and lagging indicators

5. Failure to track and report on progress toward achieving desired outcomes through a

formalized oversight process

6. Failure to present and defend the criticality, affordability and impacts (positive and negative)

of changes to program direction and/or organizational design decisions

7. Failure to dynamically allocate/re-allocate resources as influenced/informed by changes in

priorities, acceptable risk thresholds, the operational environment or other factors

8. Failure to maintain accurate records to provide a complete, open and transparent history of

decisions/actions and their rationale

9. Failure to establish and institutionalize both internal and external reviews, inspections and

audits to monitor the overall health and trends of the management system

10. Failure to establish and institutionalize environmental scanning that systematically surveys

and interprets relevant data to identify external threats/opportunities and anticipate the

unexpected

Top 10 Leadership Accountability Failures

Kurt Salchert, CAPT (RCN Ret’d), PMPPresidentBeyond the Border Consulting Ltd.11288 Chalet RoadNorth Saanich, BC V8L 5M1Canada

T +1 778 679 6292F +1 778 351 3106kurtrcn@gmail.com

Beyond the Border Consulting Ltd.

Contact us with confidence, in confidence

Beyond the Border Consulting Ltd. is a globally-focused professional services firm specializing in

risk management, performance excellence and decision-support solutions in the areas of defence

and public safety, global supply chain security and critical infrastructure resiliency.

26

1. Given that the purpose of Maritime Domain Awareness/Maritime

Situational Awareness (MDA/MSA) is to support well-reasoned

and timely decision-making, what is ‘effective understanding’ and

what does ‘good enough’ look like through the lens of the

decision-maker?

2. What are the barriers to ‘good enough’ and how can these be

realistically overcome?

3. What are the system-level building blocks (i.e. inputs, processes,

outputs and outcomes) required to achieve ‘good enough’?

4. Given that MDA/MSA is achieved within a ‘shared responsibility’

construct (i.e. multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional, multi-interest)

what might a management accountability framework look like to

measure and report on performance to hold people/organizations

accountable for results (or at least expose their shortcomings if

they cannot be held accountable)?

Panel Questions

27

1. CAPT (Ret’d) Kurt Salchert (RCN). Panel Moderator

2. ADM Javier González-Huix (ESP N). Chief of Spanish Joint

Defense Staff

3. RADM Craig Baines (RCN). Commander Joint Task Force

Atlantic and Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic

Panelists