MARTINHEIDEGGERBEINGANDTIMETranslated byJohn Macquarrie&Edward Robinson1]BLACI, define the signification of6yos so as to make clear inwhatsensephenomenology can be a 'scienceof' phenomena at aIl.B. The Concept of the Logos 32lnPlato and Aristotle theconcept of the oyos has manycompetingsignifications, withnobasicsignificationpositivelytakingthe lead. Infact, however, this is only asemblance, which will maintain itself as longas our Interpretation is unable to grasp the basic signification properly inits primarycontent.If wesaythat the basic signification ofoyosis"discourse",2thenthisword-for-wordtranslationwill not bevalidateduntilwehavedetermined whatisme3.ntby "discourse"itself. The realsignification of"discourse", which is obvious enough, gets cQr.stantlycovered up by the laterhistory of the wordoyos, andespeciallybythenumerous and arbitrary Interpretations which subsequent philosophy hasprovided. Aoyos gets 'translated' (and this means that it is alwaysgettinginterpreted) as "reason", "judgment", "concept", "definition", "ground",or"relationship".3Buthow can 'discourse'be so susceptible of modifica-tionthat oyoscansignifyaUthe thingswe have listed, andin goodscholarly usage?Evenif oyosisunderstoodinthesenseof "assertion",but of "assertion" as 'judgment', this seemingly legitimate translation maystill missthefundamental signification, especially if "judgment"iscon-ceived in a sense taken over from sorne contemporary 'theory ofjudgment'.Aoyos doesnot mean"judgment", andit certainlydoesnot meanthis1Cf. Critique ofPure Reason2,'Transcendental Aesthetic', Section l, p. 340.2 On .\0)'0., 'Rede', etc., see note 3, p. 47, H. 25 above.3' Vernunft, Urteil,Begriff, Definition, Grund,Verhaltnis.'56 Being andTime INT. IIprimarily-if oneunderstandsby''judgment'' away of 'binding' some-thing with something else, or the 'taking of a stand' (whether byacceptanceor byrejection).A6yoS" as "discourse"the same as ST)ovv: to makemanifest what one is 'talkingabout' inone's discourse.1Aristotle hasexplicated thisfunctionofdiscourse more precisely as 7Toatvu8a,.1vThe 6yoS" lets something be seen (atvu8a,), namely, what the dis-course is about; and it does so either for the one who is doing the talking(the medium)or for persons who are talking with one another,as the casemaybe. Discourse'letssomethingbeseen' 7T6 : that is, it lets usseesomething fromthevery thingwhich the discourse is about.2Indiscourse (7T6avu'S"), so far as it is genuine, what is said[was geredetist] is drawnfrom what the talk is about, so that discursive communication,inwhat it says [inihremGesagten], makesmanifest what it is talkingabout, and thus makes this accessible totheother party. This is thestructure of the 6yoS" as 7T6avu,S". This mode of making manifestinthe sense of letting something be seenbypointing it out, does notgowithaIl kindsof 'discourse'. Requesting (VX77), for instance, alsomakesmanifest, but in a different way.Whenfullyconcrete, discoursing(lettingsomethingbeseen) has thecharacter of speaking [Sprechens]-vocal proclamationinwords. The33 6yoS" is wvTJ, and indeed, wvq P.Td. avrautas-an utterance inwhich something is sighted ineach case.And only because the function of the 6yoS" as 7T6avu,S" lies inlettingsomethingbeseenbypointingit out, can the >.6yoS" have thestructural formofaVv8u,S". Here "synthesis" doesnot meana bindingand linking together of representations, a manipulation of psychicaloccurrences wherethe'problem"arisesof howthesebindings, assome-thinginside, agree withsomething' outside. Herethe uvvhasapurelyapophanticalsignificationandmeans lettingsomethingbe seenin itstogetherness [Beisammen] with something-Ietting it be seenas some-thing.Furthermore, becausethe6yoS" isaletting-something-be-seen, itcantherefore be true or false. But here everything depends on our steering clearof any conception of truth which is construed in the sense of 'agreement'.Thisideaisbyno means the primary one in the concept of8,a.The 'Being-true' of the 6yoS" as T)8vw means that in My,v as7Toatvu8a, the entities of which Oneis talWng must be taken out of theirhiddenness; one must let them be seenassomethingunhidden(T)8l,,);l'... offenbar machen das,wovon in der Rede "die Rede" ist.'2 ' von dem selbst her, wovon die Rede ist.'INT.II Being andTime 57that is, they must be discovered.1Similarly, 'Being false' ({JwSu8a,)amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering up[verdecken] : putting some-thing in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and therebypassing it off as something which it is not.But because 'truth' has this meaning, and because the 6yoS" is adefinite mode of letting something be seen, the 6yoS" is just not the kind ofthingthatcanbeconsideredastheprimary'locus' of truth. If, as hasbecome qute customary nowadays, one defines "truth" as something that'reaIly' pertains tojudgment,2and if onetheninvokes thesupport ofAristotlewiththisthesis, notonly isthisunjustified, but, aboveaIl, theGreek conceptionof truthhasbeenmisunderstood. Atu8T)uS", thesheersensory perception of something, is 'true'in theGreek sense, apd indeedmore primordiallythanthe 6yoS" whichwe have beendiscussing. Justasseeingaims at colours, anyatu8T)u,S" aims at its tS,a (those entitieswhicharegenuinelyaccessibleonly throughit and for it); andtothatextent this perception is always true. This means that seeing alwaysdiscovers colours, and hearing always discovers sounds. Pure vO"'V istheperceptionof the simplest determinateways of Being whichentitiesas suchmay andit perceives them just bylookingat them.3Thisvo"'vis what is 'true' inthepurest and most primordialsense; thatis to say, it merely discovers, and it does so in such a way that it can nevercoverup. This vo"'vcannevercoverup; itcanneverbefalse; itcan atworst remaina non-perceiving, yvo",v, not sufficingfor straightforwardandappropriateaccess.When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be 34seen, but is alwaysharking back to something elseto which it points, sothat it lets somethingbe seenas something, itthusacquresasynthesis-structure, and withthis it takes over the possibility oftovering up.4. The'truth ofjudgments', however,is merely the opposite of this covering-up,a secondaryphenomenonof truth, withmorethanonekind of foundation. IlBathrealismandidealismhave-withequal thoroughness-missedthemeaningof theGreekconceptionoftruth, intermsof whichonlythe1 The Greek words for 'truth'TO cU"I8/s) are compounded of theprivative prefix 0.- ('not') and the verbal stem ->'a9- ('to escape notice', 'to heconcealed'). Thetruthmaythus beIookeduponas that whichisun-concealed, thatwhich gets discovered or uncovered('entdeckt').li 'Wenn man .. Wahrheit ais das bestimmt, was "eigentlich" demUrteil zukommt 'a'das schlicht hinsehendeVernehmender einfachstenSeinsbestimmungendesSeienden ais solchen.'"Was nicht mehrdieVollzugsform desreinenSehenlassens hat, sondern je im Auf-weisen auf ein anderes rekurriert und so je etwas als etwas sehen Iasst, das bernimmt mitdieserSynthesisstruktur die Mglichkeit des Verdeckens.'6 '. einmehrfach fundiertes PhiinomenvonWahrheit.'A'secondary' or 'founded'phenomenonis one whichis based upon something eise. The notion of 'Fundierung' isone which Heidegger has taken over from Husserl. See our note l, p. 86, on H. 59 below.58 Being andTime INT. IIpossibility of somethinglikea 'doctrineofideas' canbeunderstoodasphilosophicalknowledge.And because the functionof the6yos lies in merely lettingsomethingbeseen, inlettingentitiesbe perceived[imVernehmenlassendesSeienden],6yoscansignifythereason [Vemunft]. Andbecause, moreover, ..\6yoS' isused not ooly withthe signification of Myw but also with that ofy6p.vov (that whichis exhibited, as such), and becausethelatter isnothing else than the tnroKlp.Vov which, as present-at-hand, alreadylies at the bottom[zum Grunde] ofanyprocedure ofaddressing oneselfto it ordiscussing it,OY0S' quayoP.VOV meansthe ground, the ratio. And finaIly,because 6yoS' as y6p.VOV can alsosignifythat which, as somethingtowhich one addresses oneself, becomes visible in its relation to something inits 'relatedness', 6yoS' acquires the signification of relation and relationship.lThisInterpretationof 'apophantical discourse' maysufficetoclarifytheprimary function of theOyoS'.C. The Preliminary Conception of PhenomenologyWhen we envisage concretely what we have set forth in our Interpreta-tion of 'phenomenon'and'logos',we are struck by an inner relationshipbetweenthethingsmeant bytheseterms. Theexpression"phenomen-ology" may be formulated in Greek as Myw'T ef>ulvop.vu, whereMYHV meanschroef>ulvu8ut. Thus "phenomenology"means 7TOef>ulvu8ut'T ef>uw6p.vu-to let thatwhichshowsitselfbeseenfromitselfin the verywayin which it shows itselffrom itself. This is the formaI meaning of that branchof researchwhich calls itself "phenomenology". But here we are expressingnothing else than the maxim formulated above: 'Tothe things themselves!'Thus the term "phenomenology" is quite different in its meaning froniexpressionssuchas"theology"andthelike. Thosetermsdesignatethe1 Heideggerhere out that thewordIIlFpos is etymologicallyakin to theverh Mrnv, .which among Its,numerousmeanings those of laying out, exhibiting, settingforth, recountmg, tel/mg atale, maJcmgastatement. Thus lIoros as Mrnv canhe thought ofas the faculty of'reason' ('Vernunft')which makes such activities possible. But lIoros can mean1'0(that which is out, exhibited, setforth, told); in this senseItthe matter (1'0 u.roKl/-,&ov) to which oneaddresses oneself andwhlch one discusses( Ansprechen und Besprechen'); as such it lies 'at the bottom' ('zum ofwhatis exhibited ortold, andisthusthe'ground' or 'reason'('Grund') forte!lmgIt. But isexhibitedor to!d, it isexhibitedinits('insemer Bezogenhelt ) j and mthlS way lIoros aslIro/-,&oV cornestostandfor Just such arelation or relationship ('Beziehung und Verhiiltnis'). The three senses here distinguishedcorrespond. to threeof the Latin 'ratio', by which lIoroS' wastraditionally translated,Heideggerattentionto only one of these. Notice that 'Beziehung'(whlch we translate as relation) can also he used in sorne contexts where'Ansprechen'(our 'addressing oneself') would he equallyNotice further that 'Verhiiltnis''relationship'), which is ordinarily a synonym for'Beziehung', can, like .\OroS' and'ratto', alsorefer tothe special kindof relationshipwhichonefindsinamathematicalproportion. Theetymological connectionhetween'Vernehmen'and'Vernunft' shouldalsohe noted.INT. II Being and Time 59objects of their respective sciences accordingtothe subject-matter whichthey comprise at the time [in ihrerjeweiligen Sachhaltigkeit]. 'Phe-nomenology' neitherdesignatestheobject of itsresearches, norcharac-terizes the subject-matter thus comprised. The word merely informsus ofthe "how"with whichwhat istobetreated inthis science getsexhibited 35and handled. To have ascience 'of' phenomena means to grasp its objectsin such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must betreated by exhibiting it directIy and demonstrating it directIy.l Theexpression 'descriptive phenomenology', whichisatbottomtautological,hasthesamemeaning. Here"description"doesnot signifysuchapro-cedure as we find, let us say, in botanical morphology; the term has ratherthe sense ofa prohibition-the avoidance ofcharacterizing anythingwithout such demonstration. The character of this description itself,the specific meaning of the 6yoS', can be established first ofaIl interms of the'thinghood' ["Sachheit"]of what istobe'described'-thatistosay, of whatistobe given scientific definitenessasweencounter itphenomenaIly. Thesignificationof"phenomenon", as conceivedbothformallyandintheordina.rymlinner, issuchthatanyexhibiting of anentityasit showsitself initself, maybecalled"phenomenology" withformaI justification.Nowwhat must be takeninto account ifthe formaI conceptionofphenomenonistobedeformalizedintothephenomenological one, andhow is this latter to be distinguished from the ordinary conception? Whatis it that phenomenology isto 'let us see'? What is it that must be calleda'phenomenon' in a distinctive sense? What is it that by its very essenceis necessarily the themewhenever weexhibit sOJllethingexplicitly?Mani-festIy, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not showitself at aIl: it is somethingthat lies hidden, incontrast tothat whichproximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time itis something that beiongs to wht thus shows itself, and it belongs to it soessentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground.Yet that whichremainshidden in an egregious sense, or which relapsesand gets covered up again, or which shows itself only 'in disguise', is not justthis entity or that, but rather the Being of entities, as our previous observa-tionshaveshown. ThisBeingcanbecoveredupsoextensivelythat itbecomes forgottenandnoquestionarisesabout it or about itsmeaning.Thus that whichdemands that it become a phenomenon, andwhichdemands this in adistinctive sense and in terms of its ownmost content asa thing, is what phenomenologyhas takenintoits graspthematicallyasitsobject.1 in direkter Aufweisung und direkter Auaweisung .'60 Being andTime INT. IIPhenomenologyisour wayof access towhat is to bethe themeofontology, anditisourway of giving itdemonstrativeprecision. Onlyasphenomenology, isontology possible. Inthephenomenological conceptionof"phenomenon"what onehasinmindasthat whichshowsitself is theBeing of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives.1 And thisshowing-itselfis notjust any showing-itself, nor isit somesuchthingas36 appearing. Least of aIl can the Being of entities ever be anything such that'behind it'stands something else 'which does not appear'.'Behind'the phenomena of phenomenology there is essentially nothingelse; on the other hand, what is to become a phenomenon can be hidden.And justbecausethephenomenaareproximallyandfor themostpartnot given, there is need for phenomenology. Covered-up-ness is the counter-concept to'phenomenon'.There are various ways in which phenomena can be covered up. In thefirst place, aphenomenoncanbecoveredupinthesensethatitisstillquite undiscovered. It is neither known nor unknown.2Moreover, aphenomenon can be buriedover [verschttet]. This means that it has at sometime been discovered but has deteriorated[verfiel]to the point of gettingcovered up again. This covering-up can become complete; or rather-andasarule-whathasbeendiscoveredearlier maystill bevisible, thoughonlyas a semblance. Yet so much semblance, so much 'Being'.3This cover-ing-up as a'disguising' is both the most frequent and the most dangerous,for here the possibilities of deceiving and misleading are especiallystubborn. Within a 'system', perhaps, those structures of Being-andtheir concepts-whicharestill availablebut veiledintheirindigenouscharacter, maydaimtheir rights. For when they have been boundtogether constructively in a system, they present themselves as something'dear',requiring no further justification, andthus can serve asthe pointofdeparture for a process ofdeduction., "Thecovering-upitself, whether inthesenseof hiddenness, burying-over, or disguise, has inturntwopossibilities. Therearecoverings-upwhich are accidentaI;there are also some which are necessary, groundedin what the thing discovered consists in[der Bestandart des Entdeckten].Whenever a phenomenological concept is drawn from primordial sources,l'Der phiinomenologische Begriff vonPhiinomen meint ais das Sichzeigende das SeindesSeienden, seinen Sinn, seine Modifikationen und Derivate.'Il 'ber seinen Bestand gibt es weder Kenntnis noch The earlier editionshavelatter have word'Bestand' aIwayspresents .dIfficultIes In Heidegger; here It permlts elther of t}Vo Interpretations, which wehave dehberately steered between: 'Whether there is any sucn thing is neither known norand'What it comprisesissomethingof whichwe neither knowledgenor Ignorance.',3 'Wieviel Schein jedoch, soviel "Sein".'INT. II Being andTime 61there is apossibility that it may degenerate if communicated in the formof anassertion.It getsunderstoodinanemptywayandisthuspassedon, losingitsindigenouscharacter, andbecomingafree-fioatingthesis.Evenintheconcreteworkof phenomenology itself therelurksthepos-sibilitythat what hasbeen primordially'within our grasp' maybecomehardenedsothat wecannolonger graspit. Andthedifficultyof thiskind of research lies in making it self-critical in apositive sense.The way in which Being and its structures are encountered in the modeof phenomenonisonewhichmust firstof aIl bewrested fromtheobjectsofphenomenology. Thus the verypoint ofdeparture [Ausgang] for ouranalysis requires that it be secured by the proper method, just as much asdoesour access [Zugang] tothephenomenon, orourpassage[Durchgang]through whatever is prevalently covering it up. The idea of grasping and 37explicating phenomena in a way which is 'original' and 'intuitive'["originaren" und"intuitiven"] is directlyopposedtothenavetof ahaphazard, 'immediate', andunrefiective 'beholding'. ["Schauen"].Nowthat we have delimitedour preliminaryconceptionofpheno-menology,the terms 'phenomenal' and phenomenological' can also be fixed intheir signification. That whichis givenandexplicableinthewaythephenomenon is encountered is called 'phenomenal'; this is what we havein mind when we talk about "phenomenal structures". Everything whichbelongs tothespeciesof exhibitingandexplicatingandwhichgoes tomake up the wayof c'Onceivingdemandedbythis research, is called'phenomenological'.; .Because phenomena, as understood phenomenologicaIly, are neveranythingbut whatgoestomakeupBeing, whileBeing isineverycasetheBeing of someentity, wemust first bring forwardtheentitiesthem-selves if it is our aim that Beip.g should be laid bare; and we must do thisin therightway. Theseentii:esmustlikewise showthemselves withthekindof accesswhichgenuinelybelongs tothem. Andin this waytheordinaryconceptionof phenomenonbecomesphenomenologicallyrele-vant. If our analysis isto be authentic, its aim is suchthatthe prior taskof assuring ourselves 'phenomenologicaIly' of that entity which isto serveas our example, has already been prescribed as our point of departure.With regardto its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of theBeing of entities-ontology. In explaining the tasks of ontology we foundit necessarythat thereshouldbea fundamental ontologytakingasitstheme that entitywhich is ontologico-onticallydistinctive, Dasein, inordertoconfront thecardinal problem-thequestion of themeaning ofBeingingeneraI. Our investigationitself willshowthatthemeaning ofphenomenological description as a methodliesin interpretation. TheOYos62 Being andTime INT. IIof the phenomenologyof Dasein has the character of a pp:rlvvW,throughwhich the authentic meaningof Being, andalso those basicstructures ofBeingwhich Dasein itse1fpossesses, are made known to Dasein'sunderstanding of Being. The phenomenology of Dasein is ahermeneutic inthe primordial signification of this word, where it designates thisbusinessof interpreting. But to the extent that by uncovering the meaning of Beingandthe basic structures of Dasein in general we may exhibit the horizonforany furtherontological study of those entities whichdonothavethecharacter ofDasein, this hermeneutic also becomes a'hermeneutic' in thesense ofworking out the conditions on which the possibility of any onto-logicalinvestigationdepends. Andfinally, totheextent that Dasein, asanentitywiththepossibility of existence, hasontological priorityover38 every other entity, "hermeneutic", as an interpretation of Dasein's Being,has the thirdandspecificsenseof ananalytic ofthe existentialityofexistence; andthisisthe sense whichisphilosophically primary. Then sofar as this hermeneuticworksoutDasein'shistoricalityontologicallyasthe ontical conditionfor the possibilityof historiology, it contains theroots ofwhat can be called'hermeneutic'only in aderivative sense: themethodology of those humane sciences which are historiological incharacter.Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities;yet it pertains toeveryentity. Its'universality' is to be sought higherup. Being andthestructureof Being liebeyondeveryentityandeverypossible character which an entity may possess. Being is thetranscendenspureand simple.1Andthetranscendence of Dasein's Being isdistinctive inthat it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individua-tion. Every disclosure ofBeing as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge.Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness cifBeing)is veritas transcendentalis.Ontologyandphenomenologyare' not two philosophical dis-ciplines amongothers. Theseterms characterizephilosophyitself withregardtoits object andits wayoftreatingthat object. Philosophyisuniversal phenomenological ontology, andtakesitsdeparturefromthehermeneutic of Dasein, which, as ananalyticof existence, hasmadefasttheguiding-line forall philosophical inquiry atthepoint whereit arisesand to which it returns.The following investigation would 'have have been possible if the groundhadnot beenpreparedbyEdmundHusserl, withwhoseLogischeUnter-suchungen phenomenology first emerged. Our comments on the pre1iminaryconceptionofphenomenologyhaveshown that wHat is essential init1und liegen i;iber jedes Seiende and jede m6gliche seiende Bestim-mthell emes Selenden hmaus. Sein !st fiastranscendens schlechthin.'INT. II Being andTime 63doesnotlie initsactualiry asaphilosophical 'movement' ["Richtung"].Higher thanactuality stands possibiliry. Wecanunderstandphenomeno-logy only by seizing upon it as apossibility.vWith regardtothe awkwardness and'inelegance'of expressionintheanalysestocome, wemayremarkthat it isonethingtogiveareportin which we tell about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. 39For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the'grammar'. Ifwe mayalludeto sorne earlier researchersontheanalysisof Being, incomparableontheirownlevel, wemaycomparetheonto-logicalsections of Plato'sParmenides or the fourthchapter of the seventhbook of Aristotle's Metaphysics with anarrative section from Thucydides;we can then see the altogether unprecedented character of those formula-tionswhichwereimposedupontheGreeksbytheir philosophers. Andwhere ourpowersareessentiallyweaker, andwheremoreovertheareaof Being to be disclosed is ontologically far more difficult than that whichwas presented to the Greeks, the harshness of our expression will beenhanced,andsowill theminuteness of detailwithwhich ourconceptsare formed. 8. Design cif theTreatiseThequestionof themeaningof Beingis themost universal andtheemptiest of questions, but atthe same time it ispossibletoindividualizeit very precise1y for any particular Dasein. Ifwe are to arrive at the basicconcept of 'Being' andtooutline the ontological conceptions whichitrequires and the variations which it necessarily undergoes, we need a cluewhich is concrete. We shall proceed towards the concept of Being by wayofanInterpretationofa certain special entity, Dasein, in which weshallarrive at the horizonfor the understandingof Being andfor thepossibilityof interpretingit; theuniversality of theconcept ofBeingisnot belied by the re1atively 'special' character of our investigation.But this veryentity, Dasein, is in itself 'historical', so that its own-most ontological e1ucidation necessarily becomes an 'historiological'Interpretation.Accordingly ourtreatment of thequestion of Being branchesoutintotwodistincttasks, and ourtreatise will thushavetwoparts:Part One:the Interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and theexplicationoftime as the transcendental horizon for the question ofBeing.Part Two: basic features ofa phenomenological destruction of thehistory of ontology, withtheproblematicof Temporalityasourclue.INT. II 64 Being and TimePart One hasthree divisionsJ. the preparatory fundamental analysisof Dasein;2. Dasein andtemporality;3. cime and Being.1Part Two likewise has three divisions: 1J. Kant'sdoctrine of schematism and time, as a preliminary stage ina problematic of Temporality;2. the ontological foundationof Descartes' 'cogitosum',andhowthemedieval ontology has been taken over into the problematic of the'res cogitans' ;3. Aristotle's essayontime, as providinga wayof discriminatingthe phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology.1 Part Two and the third division of Part One have never appeared.PARTONETHEINTERPRETATIONOFDASEININTERMSOFTEMPORALITY, ANDTHEEXPLICATIONOFTIMEASTHETRANSCENDENTALHORIZONFORTHEQUESTIONOFBEINGDIVISIONONEPREPARATORYFUNDAMENTALANALYSISOFDASEIN1Nthequestion aboutthemeaning of Being, what isprimarily interrog-ated is those entities which have the character ofDasein. The preparatoryexistential analytic of Dasein must, in accordance with its peculiar charac-ter, be expounded in outline, and distinguishedfromother kinds ofinvestigationwhichseemtorunparallel (Chapter 1.) Adheringtotheprocedurewhichwehavefixeduponfor startingour investigation, wemust laybare a fundamental structure inDasein: Being-in-the-world(Chapter2). Intheinterpretation of Dasein, this structureissomething'a priori'; it isnot piecedtogether, but isprimordiaHy andconstantlyawhole. It affords us, however, various ways of looking at the items whichare constitutive for it. The whole of this structure always cornes first; butif wekeepthis constantlyinview, theseitems, as phenomena, will bemadetostandout. AndthusweshaHhaveasobjectsfor analysis: theworld in its worldhood (Chapter 3), Being-in-the-world as Being-with andBeing-one's-Self (Chapter 4), and Being-in as such (Chapter 5)' Byanalysis of this fundamental structure, theBeing of Dasein canbe indic-ated provisionally. Its existential meaning is care(Chapter 6).1EXPOSITIONOFTHETASKOFAPREPARATORYANALYSISOFDASEIN~ 9. TheTheme of the Ana!Jtic of DaseinWE are ourse1ves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entityis ineachcase mine.lTheseentities, intheir Being, comport themselvestowards their Being. As entities with such Being, theyarede1ivered over 42to their own Being.2Being is that which is an issue for every such entity.3This way of characterizing Dasein has a double consequence:I. The 'essence' ["Wesen"] of this entity lies in its "to be" [Zu-sein]. ItsBeing-what-it-is[Was-sein] (essentia) must, so faras we can speak of it ataU, be conceived in terms ofits Being (existentia). But here our ontologicaltask isto show that when wechoose to designatethe Being of thisentityas"existence" [Existenz], thistermdoesnot andcannot havetheonto-logical signification ofthe traditional term"existentia"; ontologically,existentiaistantamount toBeing-present-at-hand, a kindof Being whichisessentiaUy inappropriate to entities of Dasein's character. To avoidgetting bewildered, we shaHalways use the Interpretative expression"presence-at-hand" fortheterm "existentia",whilethe term "existence",asadesignation of Being, will be aHotted sole1y to Dasein.Theessence of Dasein liesin its existence. Accordingly those characteristicswhich can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-handof sorne entity which'looks' soandsoand is itse1f present-at-hand;theyareineach case possibleways for it to be, andnomorethanthat.AlI the Being-as-it-is [So-sein] which this entity possesses is primarilyBeing. Sowhenwedesignatethisentitywiththeterm'Dasein', weareexpressing not its "what"(as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being.2. That Being whichisanissuefor thisentityinitsveryBeing, is ineachcasemine. ThusDaseinis never tobetakenontologicaHyasan1 'Das Seiende, dessen Analyse zur Aufgabe steht,sindwir jeselbst. DasSeindiesesSeiendenist jemeines.' Thereadermust not get theimpressionthat thereisanythingsolipsistic about the second of these sentences. The point is merely that the kind of Beingwhich belongs to Dasein is ofa sort which any of us may calI his own.2'Als Seiendes dieses Seins ist es seinemeigenenSein berantwortet.' Theearliereditions read ' ... seinem eigenen Zu-sein . .'3 See note 2, p. 28, H. 8 above.68 Being andTime I. 1instance or special case of sorne genus ofentities as things that arepresent-at-hand.1To entities such as these, theirBeingis'amatter ofindifference';2 or moreprecisely, they'are' suchthat theirBeing can beneither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite. BecauseDaseinhas l each case mineness [Jemeinigkeit] , one must always use apersonal pronounwhenoneaddressesit: '1am', 'youare'.Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another.Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it isin each case mine [je meines]. That entity which in its Being has this veryBeing asanissue, comportsitself towardsitsBeingasitsownmost pos-sibility. In each case Daseinis itspossibility, andit 'has' this possibility,but notjust as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-at-handwould. Andbecause Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility,itcan, in its very Being,'choose'itself and win itself; it can also lose itselfandneverwinitself; oronly'seem' todoso. But only insofar asitis43 essentially something which can be authentic-that is, something ofits own3-ean ithavelostitselfand not yet won itself. As modes ofBeing, authenticityand inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in astrict sense) areboth groundedinthe fact that any Dasein whatsoever ischaracterized bymineness.4But the inauthenticityofDaseindoes not signifyany'less' Being or any 'lower'degree of Being. Ratherit is the case thateven in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity-whenbusy, when excited, when interested, when ready forenjoyment.The two characteristics of Dasein which we have sketched-thepriority of 'existentia' over essentia, and the fact that Dasein is in each casemine[die Jemeinigkeit]-havealreadyindicatedthat intheanalyticofthis entity we are facing a peculiar phenomenal domain.Dasein does nothavethekindof Beingwhichbelongs tosomethingmerelypresent-at-handwithintheworld, nordoesit everhaveit. Soneither isit tobepresentedthematically as something wecome across inthe same way asl '. . ais Vorhandenem'. The earlier editions have the adjective 'vorhandenem'instead of the substantive.2 'gleichgltig'. This adjective must be distinguished from the German adjective'indifferent', though they might both ordinarily be translated by the English 'indifferent',whichweshall reserveexclusivelyfor theformer. Inmost passages, thelatter is besttranslatedby'undifferentiated' or 'without further differentiation'; occasionally, how-ever, it seems preferabletotran.late it by'Indifferent' with aninitial capital. We shallfollow similar conventions with the nouns 'Gleichgltigkeit' and 'Indifferenz'.3 'Und weil Daseinwesenhaft je seineMoglichkeitist, kanndiesesSeiendeinseinemSein sich se1bst "wiihlen", gewinnen, es kann sich verlieren, bzw. nie und nur "scheinbar"gewinnen. Verloren habenkann es sich nur und noch nicht sich gewonnen haben kann esnur, sofern es seinem'Vesen nach mogliches eigentliches, das heisst sichzueigenist.'lder editions have'je wesenhaft' and'zueigenes'. Theconnectionbetween'eigentlich'('authentic', 'rea!') and'eigen' ('own') is lost intranslation.4. ' dass Dasein berhaupt durch Jemeini$k!;it bestimmt ist.'I. 1 Being andTime 69we come across what is present-at-hand. The right way of presenting it isso farfromself-evident thattodetermine what formit shaUtakeisitselfanessential part of theontological analyticof thisentity. Onlybypre-senting this entity in the right way can we have any understanding of itsBeing. No matter how provisional our analysis may he, it always requirestheassurance that we have startedcorrectly.ln determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light ofa possibilitywhichit isitself andwhich, initsveryBeing, itsomehowunderstands. ThisistheformaImeaning of Dasein'sexistentialconstitu-tion. But this tells us that ifwe are to Interpret this entity ontologically, theproblematicof itsBeing mustbedevelopedfromtheexistentiality of itsexistence. Thiscannot mean, however, that"Dasein"istobeconstruedinterms of some concretepossible idea of existence. Attheoutset of ouranalysis it is particularly important that Dasein should not be Interpretedwith the differentiated character [Differenz] ofsome dcfinite way ofexisting, but that itshouldbeuncovered [aufgedcckt] intheundiffer-entiatedcharacterwhichit hasproximaUyandfor themost part. Thisundifferentiatedcharacterof Dasein'sevcrydayncssis not notlzing, but apositive phenomenal characteristic ofthis entity. Out ofthis kind of Being-and back into it again-is aIl existing, such as it is.1WecalIthis every-day undifferentiated character of Dasein "averageness"[Durchschnittlichkeit].And because this average everydayness makes upwhat is onticallyproximal forthisentity, it hasagain andagainbeen passed over inexpli-catingDasein. Thatwhichisonticallyc10sestandweIl known, isonto-logically the farthest and not known at aU; and its ontological significationisconstantlyoverlooked. WhenAugustineasks: "Quidautempropinquiusmeipso mihi?" andmust answer: "egocerte laborohicft laboro in meipso: 44factus sum mihi terra difficultatiset sudoris nimii",1this applies not only to theontical andpre-ontological opaquenessof Daseinbutevcnmoretotheontological taskwhichliesahead; for not onlymust thisentitynot bemissedinthatkindof BeinginwhichitisphenomenaUyc1osest, butitmust be made accessible by apositive characterization.Dasein'saverageeverydayness, however, isnot tobetakenasamere'aspect'. Heretoo, andeven inthemode of inauthenticity, the structureof existentiality liesa priori. AndheretooDasein's Being is an issue foritinadefiniteway; andDaseincomportsitself towardsit inthemode ofaverageeverydayness, evenif thisisonlythemodeof fleeinginthe faceof it and forgetfulnessthereof2l 'Aus dieser Seinsart heraus und in sie zurck ist alles Existieren, wie est ist.'2 'Auch in ihr geht es demDasein inbestimmter Weise um seinSein, zu dem es sichimModus der durchschnittlichen Alltiiglichkeit verhiilt undseiesauchnurim Modusder Flucht davor und des Vergessens seiner.' For further discussion, see Section 40 below.70 Being and Time I. 1But the explication of Dasein in its average everydayness does not giveus just average structures inthe sense of ahazy indefiniteness. Anythingwhich, takenontically, is in anaverageway, canbeveryweIl graspedontologicallyinpregnantstructures whichmaybe structurally indistin-guishable fromcertainontologicalcharacteristics[Bestimmungen] of anautkentic Being of Dasein.AlIexplicatato whichthe analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained byconsideringDasein's existence-structure. BecauseDasein'scharactersofBeing are defined in termsofexistentiality, we calI them" existentiali a".Thesearetobesharplydistinguishedfromwhat wecalI"categories"-characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein.1Herewe aretakingtheexpression "category" in itsprimary ontologicalsignification, and abiding by it. In the ontology of the ancients, the entitiesweencounter withinthe world2aretakenasthebasicexamples for theinterpretation ofBeing. Nov (or the 6yos, as thecasemay be) isacceptedasaway of accesstothem.3Entitiesareencounteredtherein.But theBeing of theseentities must be something which can be graspedina distinctivekindofMyw(lettingsomethingbeseen), sothat thisBeingbecomesintelligibleinadvanceas that whichit is-andas thatwhich it is already in everyentity. Inany discussion (.\6yoS') of entities,we have previously addressed ourselves to Being; this addressing islCaTTJyopu8a,.4oThis signifies, in the first instance, making a publicaccusation, taking someone to task for something in the presence of every-one. Whenusedontologically, thisterm meanstaking anentitytotask,as it were, for whatever itisas an entity-that is to say, letting everyone45 see it in its Being. ThelCaTT]Yopla, are what is sighted and whatis visiblein such aseeing.6They include the various ways in whichthenature ofthoseentities whichcanbeaddressedanddiscussedina.\6yoS' maybel 'Weil sie sichausder Existenzialitatbestimmen, nennen wir dieSeinscharaktere desDaseins Existenzialien. Sie sindscharf zu trennen vondenSeinsbestimmungen desnichtdaseinsmassigen Seienden,diewirKategorien nennen.'Il ' dasinnerhalbderWelt begegnendeSeiende.' More literally: 'theentitythatencounters withinthe world.' While Heidegger normally uses the verb'begegnen'inthisactiveintransitivesense, asimilarconstructionwiththeEnglish'encounter' isunidio-matic andharsh. We shaH as aruleuse either apassive construction(as in'entities en-countered')or an active transitive construction(as in 'entities we encounter').3 'AIsZugangsart zuihmgilt das VOEv bzw. der oyos.' Herewefollowthe readingof theearlier editions. Inthe later editions, 'Zugangsart', whichis usedrather often, ishere replaced by 'Zugangsort', which occurs very se1dom and is perhaps a misprint. Thislater versionmight betranslatedas foHows: 'voEv (or theoyos, as thecase may be)is acceptedas the locus ofaccess tosuchentities.'OnVOEv andoyos seeSection7above, especiallyH. 32-34.4. 'Dasje schon vorgiingige Ansprechen des Seins imBesprechen (,\Gyos) des Seiendenist das Ka:rrl'yopEa8al.'6 'Das in solchem Sehen Gesichtete und Sichtbare . .' On 'Sehen' and'Sicht'see H.1471. 1 Being andTime 71determined a priori. Existentialiaand categories are the two basic pos-sibilitiesfor characters of Being. Theentities whichcorrespondtothemrequiredifferent kindsof primaryinterrogationrespectively: anyentityis either a "who"(existence) or a "what"(presence-at-hand in the broadestsense). The connectionbetweenthese two modes of thecharacters ofBeing cannotbe handleduntil thehorizon forthequestion of Being hasbeen clarified.Inour introductionwehavealreadyintimatedthatintheexistentialanalyticof Daseinwealsomakeheadwaywitha taskwhichishardlylesspressing thanthatof thequestionof Being itself-thetaskof layingbare that a priori basis which must be visible before the question of 'whatman is' can be discussed philosophically. The existential analytic ofDaseincornes biforeanypsychologyor anthropology, andcertainlybeforeanybiology. While these too are ways in which Dasein can be investigated, wecandefinethe themeof our analyticwithgreater precisionif wedis-tinguish it from these. And at the same time the necessity of that analyticcan thus be proved more incisively.~ ID. Howthe Anaryticof Daseinis to be Distinguished fromAnthropology,Psychology, andBiologyMterathemefor investigationhasbeeninitiallyoutlinedinpositiveterms, it is always important to show what isto be ruled out, although itcan easily become fruitless to discuss what is not going to happen. We mustshow that those investigations and formulations of the question which havebeenaimedat Daseinheretofore, havemissedthereal philosophicalpro-blem(notwithstanding theirobjective fertility), andthat as long astheypersist in missing it, they have no right to claim that they can accomplishthat for which they are basically striving. In distinguishing the existentialanalyticfromanthropology, psychology, andbiology, weshall confineourselves to what is in principle the ontological question. Our distinctionswill necessarilybeinadequatefromthestandpoint of 'scientifictheory'simply because the scientific structure of the above-mentioned disciplines(not, indeed, the 'scientific attitude' of those who work to advance them)istodaythoroughlyquestionableandneedstobeattacked innewwayswhich must have their source in ontological problematics.Historiologically, the aimof the existential analytic can be madeplainer by considering Descartes, who is credited with providing the point 46of departurefor modernphilosophical inquirybyhis discoveryof the"cogitosum". Heinvestigatesthe"cogitare"of the"ego", at least withincertain limits. On the other hand,he leavesthe "sum"completely undis-c\lssed,even though it is regarded as no less primordial than the cogito. Our72 Being andTime I. 1analytic raises the ontological question of the Being of the "sum". Not untilthenature of thisBeinghasbeendeterminedcanwegraspthekindofBeing which belongs to cogitationes.At the same time it is of course misleading to exemplify the aim of ouranalytichistoriologicallyinthis way. Oneof our first tasks will betoprove that ifwe posit an "1" or subject as that which is proximally given,weshall completelymissthephenomenal content [Bestand] of Dasein.Ontologically, every idea of a'subject'-unless refinedby aprevious onto-logical determination ofits basic character-still posits the subjectum(woKt:lJLVov) along with it, no matter how vigorous one's onticalprotestations against the'soul substance' or the'reification of conscious-ness'. TheThinghooditselfwhichsuchreificationimplies must haveitsontological origin demonstrated if we are to be in aposition to ask whatwearetounderstandpositivelywhenwethinkof theunreifiedBeingofthesubject, thesoul, theconsciousness, thespirit, theperson. AlI thesetermsrefertodefinitephenomenal domainswhichcanbe'givenform'["ausformbare"]: but theyareneverusedwithout a notablefailuretosee the need for inquiring about the Being of the entities thus designated.Sowe are not being terminologically arbitrarywhenwe avoid theseterms--or such expressions as 'life' and 'man'-in designating thoseentities which we are ourselves. .Ontheother hand, if we understandit rightly, inanyserious andscientifically-minded 'philosophyof life' (this expressionsays about asmuchas "thebotanyof plants") there lies an unexpressed tendencytowards an understanding of Dasein's Being. What is conspicuous in suchaphilosophy(andhere it is d ~ f e c t i v e in principle)is that here'life' itselfas akind of Being doesnot become ontologically aproblem.Theresearchesof WilhelmDilthey werestimulatedbytheperennialquestion of 'life'. Starting from'life' itself as awhole, hetriedtounder-stand its 'Experiences'lin their structural anddevelopmentalinter-connec-tions. His'geisteswissenschoftlichePsychologie' isone whichnolongerseekstobe oriented towardspsychical elements and atomsor topiecethe lifeof thesoul together, butaimsrather at 'Gestalten' and'lifeasawhole'.Its philosophical relevance,however, is not to be sought here, but ratherin the fact that in aIl this he was, above alt, on his way towards the question47 of 'life'. Tobesure, wecanalso seehere veryplainly howlimited wereboth his problematic and the set of concepts with which it hadto be putl'Die "Erlebnisse" dieses "Lebens" .. .' The connection between'Leben' ('life')and 'Erlebnisse' ('Experiences') is lost in translation. An 'Erlebnis' is not just any'experience' ('Erfahrung'), but onewhichwefeel deeplyand'livethrough'. WeshaHtranslate 'Erlebnis' and 'erleben' by 'Experience' with a capital 'E', reserving 'experience'for'Erfahrung'and 'erfahren'.I. 1 Being andTime 73into words. These limitations, however, are found not only in Dilthey andBergson but in aIl the 'personalitic'movements to which they have givendirection andinevery tendencytowards a philosophical anthropology.ThephenomenologicalInterpretation of personality is in principle moreradical andmoretransparent; but thequestionof theBeingof Daseinhas a dimensionwhich this too fails toenter. No matter howmuchHusserlUandScheler maydiffer intheir respectiveinquiries, intheirmethods of conducting them, and in their orientations towards the worldas a whole, theyarefullyinagreement onthe negativesideof theirInterpretations of personality. Thequestion of 'personalBeing' itself isone which they no longer raise. We have chosen Scheler's Interpretationas an example, not only because it is accessible in print,lU but because heemphasizespersonal Beingexplicitlyassuch, andtriestodetermineitscharacterbydefiningthespecifieBeing of actsascontrastedwithany-thing 'psychical'. ForScheler, thepersonisnever tobethought of asaThingora substance; theperson'israther the uniryof living-through[Er-Iebens] whichis immediatelyexperiencedinandwithour Exper-iences-not a Thing merely thought ofbehind and outside what is immed-iately Experienced';lv The person isnoThinglike and substantial Being.NorcantheBeing of aperson be entirely absorbed in being a subject ofrational acts which follow certain laws.The person is not a Thing, not a substance, not an object. Here Schelerisemphasizing what Husserlv suggestswhenheinsiststhat theunity of 48the person must have a Constitution essentially different fromthatrequiredfor theunityof Thingsof Nature.lWhat Schelersaysof theperson, he applies to acts as weIl: 'But an act is never also an object; forit is essential to the Being of acts that they are Experienced only in theirperformance itself andgiveninrefiection.'vl Acts are somethingnon-psychical. Essentially thepersonexistsonly intheperformanceof inten-tional acts, and is therefore essentially not an object. Any psychicalObjectification of acts, andhenceany way of takingthem assomethingpsychical, is tantamount todepersonalization. Apersonis inanycasegiven as aperformer of intentional acts which are bound together by theunity of a meaning. .Thus psychical Being has nothing to do with personalBeing. Acts get performed; the person is a performer ofacts. What, how-ever, is theontological meaningof 'performance'? Howis thekindofBeingwhichbelongs toa person tobeascertainedontologicallyinapositive way? But the critical question cannot stop here. It must face theBeing of thewholeman, whoiscustomarilytakenasa unityof body,l'. wenn er fr die Einheit der Person eine wesentlich andereKonstitution fordertais fr die der Naturdinge.' The second 'der'appears in the later editions only.74 Being and Time I. 1soul, and spirit. In their turn "body", "soul", and "spirit" may designatephenomenal domains which can be detached as themes for definiteinvestigations; withincertainlimitstheirontological indefinitenessmaynot beimportant. When, however, wecome tothe questionof man'sBeing, this is not something we can simply compute1by adding togetherthosekindsof Beingwhichbody, soul, andspirit respectivelypossess-kinds of Being whosenaturehasnotasyet beendetermined. Andevenif weshouldattempt suchanontological procedure, sorneideaof theBeing of the whole must be presupposed. But what stands in the way of thebasic question ofDasein's Being (or leads'it off the track) is an orientationthoroughly coloured by the anthropology of Christianity and the ancientworld, whoseinadequateontological foundations havebeenoverlookedboth by the philosophyoflife and by personalism. There are two importantelements in this traditional anthropology:I. 'Man'is here definedasa'o/0v"-orovXoV, andthisisInterpretedtomeanananimalrationale, somethinglivingwhichhasreason. Butthekindof Beingwhich belongs to a 'o/0v is understoodin thesense ofoccurringandBeing-present-at-hand. The "-oros is sorne superior endow-ment; thekind of Being whichbelongstoit, however, remainsquiteasobscure as that of the entire entity thus compounded.2. Thesecondcluefor determiningthe natureof man's Beingandessenceisa theological onet7TV 08os. av8pw7Tov KaT'lKOVa. Ka8' ofLotwO'w-''faciamus hominem ad imaginemnostram et similitudinem"vl1 With this as its point of departure,49 the anthropology of Christian theology, taking with it the ancientdefinition, arrives at an interpretation ofthat entity which we caU"man". But just as the Being ofGad gets Interpreted ontologicaUyby means of the ancient ontology, so does the Being of the ens finitum, andtoanevengreaterextent. InmoderntimestheChristian definitionhasbeen deprived of its theological character. But the idea of 'transcendence'-that man is something that reaches beyond himself-is rooted in Chris-tiandogmatics, whichcanhardlybesaidtohavemadeanontologicalproblem of man'sBeing. The idea of transcendence, accordingto whichman is more than a mere something endowed with intelligence, hasworkeditself out withdifferent variations. The followingquotations willillustratehowthesehaveoriginated: 'His praeclarisdotibusexcelluit primahominisconditio, ut ratio, intelligentia, prudentia, judiciumnonmodoadterrenaevitae gubernationem suppeterent, sedquibus t r ans c end e r e t usqueadDeumet aeternamfelicitatem.'viU 'Denndass der mensch sin ufs e h e nhat ufCott und1 Reading 'errechnet'. The earliest editions have 'verrechnet', with the correct readingprovided in alist of errata.I. 1 Being and Time 75sin wort,er klarlichan, dasser nach siner natur etwas Cott niiher anerborn,etwas mee n a c h s chi li g t, etwasu ug su imhat, dasallesondarus Jlsst, dasser nach dem b i l d nus Cottes geschaffen ist' .lxThetwo sources which arerelevant for the traditional anthropology-the Greekdefinitionandthe clue which theology has provided-indicatethat over and above the attempt to determine the essence of 'man' as anentity, thequestionof hisBeinghasremainedforgotten, andthat thisBeingis rather conceivedas somethingobviousor 'self-evident' inthesense of the Being-present-at-hand of other created Things. These twocluesbecome intertwinedintheanthropology of moderntimes, where therescogitans, consciousness, andthe interconnectedness of Experience serve asthe point of departure for methodical study. But since even the cogitationesare either left ontologically undetermined, or get tacitly assumed assomething'self-evidently' 'given' whose'Being' isnot tobequestioned,the decisive ontological foundations of apthropological problematicsremain undetermined.This is no less true of 'psychology', whoseanthropological tendenciesaretodayunmistakable. Nor canwecompensatefor theabsenceof onto-logical foundations by taking anthropology and psychology and buildingthemintotheframeworkofa general biology. Intheorder whichanypossible comprehension and interpretation must foIlow, biology as a'science oflife' is founded upon the ontology ofDasein, even ifnot entirely. 50Life, in its own right, is a kind ofBeing; but essentially it is accessible onlyinDasein. Theontologyof lifeis accomplished bywayof a privativeInterpretation; it determines what must be the case ifthere can be any-thinglike mere-aliveness [Nur-noch-Ieben]. Lifeis not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein. Inturn, Dasein isnevertobe definedontologically by regarding it as life (in an ontologically indefinite manner)plus something else. 'Insuggestingthat anthropology, psychology, andbiologyaIl' fail togive anunequivocalandontologicallyadequate answertothequestionabout the kind of Being which belongs to those entities which we ourselvesare, we are not passingjudgment on the positive work ofthese disciplines.We must always bear in mind, however, that these ontological foundationscan never be disclosedby subsequent hypotheses derived fromempiricalmaterial, but that they are always 'there' already, even when thatempirical material simplygets collected. If positiveresearchfails toseethesefoundations andholdsthemtobeself-evident, this bynomeansproves that they are not basic or that they are not problematic in a moreradical sensethan anythesis of positive science can everbe.x76 Being andTime I. 1 1 1. TheExistential Ana?JticandtheInterpretationof PrimitiveDasein. TheDijficulties of Achieving a 'Natural Conceptionof theWorld'The Interpretation ofDasein in its everydayness, however, is notidentical with the describingof some primitive stage ofDasein withwhichwecanbecomeacquaintedempiricallythroughthemediumofanthropology.Everydayness does not coincide with primitiveness, but is rather amodeof Dasein's Being, evenwhenthat Daseinis activeina highly51 developed and differentiated culture-and precisely then. Moreover,evenprimitiveDaseinhas possibilitiesof a Beingwhichis not of theeveryday kind, and it has a specific everydayness of its own. To orient theanalysis of Dasein towards the 'life of primitive peoples' can have positivesignificance [Bedeutung] as a method because 'primitive phenomena'are often less concealed and less complicated by extensive self-interpreta-tion on the part of the Dasein in question. Primitive Dasein often speakstousmoredirectly intermsof aprimordialabsorption in'phenomena'(takenina pre-phenomenological sense). Awayof conceivingthingswhich seems, perhaps, rather clumsy and crude from our standpoint, canbepositivelyhelpful inbringing out theontological structuresof phe-nomena in a genuine way.But heretofore our information about primitives has been provided byethnology. And ethnology operates with definite preliminary conceptionsand interpretations of human Dasein in general, even in first'receiving'itsmaterial, andinsifting it and workingit up. Whethertheeverydaypsychologyor eventhe scientific psychologyand sociologywhichtheethnologist bringswithhimcan provide any scientific assurance that wecan have proper access to the phenomena we are studying, and can inter-pret themand transmit them in the right way, has not yet been established.Here too we are confronted with the same state of affairs as in the otherdisciplines we have discussed.itself already presupposes as itsclue an inadequate analyticofDasein. But since the positivesciences neither'can' nor should wait for the ontologicallabours ofphilosophy to be done,the further course of research will not take the form of an'advance' butwill be accomplished by recapitulating what has already been ontically dis-covered, andby purifying it in away which is ontologically more trans-parent.xl52 Nomatterhoweasyit maybetoshowhow ontological problematicsdiffer formally from ontical research there are still difficulties in carryingout an existential analytic, especiiIly in making a start. This task includesa desideratumwhichphilosophyhaslongfounddisturbingbut has con-tinually refusedto achieve: towork out the idea of a 'natural conception of theworld'. The rich store of information now available astothe most exotic1. 1 Being andTime 77and manifold cultures and forms of Dasein seems favourable to our settingabout this taskina fruitful way. But this is merelya semblance. Atbottom this plethora ofinformation can seduce us into failing to recognizethe real problem. We shall not get a genuine knowledge of essences simplybythe syncretistic activityofuniversal comparisonandclassification.Subjecting the manifold totabulation does not ensure any actual under-standing of what lies there before us asthus set in order. If an ordering is genuine, it has its own content as athing[Sachgehalt], whichIS never to be found by means ofsuch ordering, but is already presupposedin it. So if oneisto put various pictures of the world in order, one musthaveanexplicit ideaof theworldassuch. Andif the'world' itself issomething constitutive for Dasein, one must have an insight into Dasein'sbasic structures in order to treat the world-phenomenon conceptuaIly.In this chapter we have characterized sorne things positively and takena negative stand with regard to others; in both cases our goal has been topromoteacorrect understandingofthe tendencywhich underliesthefollowing Interpretation and the kind of questions which it poses.Ontology cancontributeonly indirectlytowardsadvancing thepositivedisciplines as we find them today. It has a goal ofits own, even if, beyondtheacquiring of informationabout entities, thequestionof Beingisthespur foraIl scientific seeking.IIBEING-IN-THE-WORLDINGENERALAS THEBASICSTATEOFDASEIN 12. APrelimiruzrySketchof Being-in-the- World, intermsof anOrientationtowards Being-in as suchINour preparatorydiscussions (Section9) we havebrought out somecharacteristics of Being which will provide us with asteady light for ourfurther investigation, but which wiH at the same time become structuraHy53 concrete as that investigation continues. Dasein is an entity which, in itsvery Being, comports itselfunderstandingly towards that Being. In sayingthis, weare calling attentiontotheformai concept ofexistence. Daseinexists.Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which in each case 1 myselfam. MinenessbelongstoanyexistentDasein, andbelongs to it as the condition whichmakesauthenticityand inauthenticitypossible. lneachcase Dasein exists inone or the other of these two modes, or else it is modaHy undifferentiated.1ButthesearebothwaysinwhichDasein'sBeingtakesona definitecharacter, andtheymust beseenandunderstooda priori as groundedupon that state of Being whichwehave caHed"Being-in-the-world'. Aninterpretation of thisconstitutive stateisneededif weareto set upouranalytic of Daseincorrectly.Thecomp'ound expression 'Being-in-the-world' indicates in the verywaywe have coinedit, that it standsfor aunitary phenomenon. Thisprimarydatummust be seen as a whole. But whileBeing-in-the-world cannot bebroken up into contentswhichmaybepieced together, thisdoesnotpreventit from having several constitutive items in itsstructure. Indeed the pheno-menal datum which our expression indicates is one which may, in fact, belooked at in three ways. Ifwestudy it, keeping the whole phenomenonfirmlyin mind beforehand, the foHowing items may be brought out for emphasis:First, the 'in-the-world'. Withregard to this there arises the taskofinquiringintotheontologicalstructureof the'world' anddefiningtheidea of worldhood as such. (See the third chapter of this Division.)l 'ZumexistierendenDaseingehiirt die Jemeinigkeit aIsBedingung derMiiglichkeitvon Eigentlichkeit undUneigentlichkeit. Dasein existiert je in einem dieserModi bzw.in der modalen Indifferenz ihrer.' 'I. 2 Being andTime 79Second, that entirywhichineverycasehasBeing-in-the-worldastheway in which it is. Here we are seeking that which one inquires into whenone asks the question 'Who?'By aphenomenological demonstration1weshaHdeterminewhoisinthe modeof Dasein's averageeverydayness.(See the fourth chapter of this Division.)Thi.rd,. [In-sein] a,s such. We must set forth the ontologicaloflll?ood [Inheit] itself. (See the fifth chapter of thisDIvIsIon.) Emphasis uponanyoneof these constitutiveitems signifiesthat the others are emphasized along with it;this means that in any suchcase the wholephenomenon gets seen. Of course Being-in-the-world is astate of Dasein2which is necessary a priori, but it is far from sufficient forcompletely determining Dasein's Being. Before making these three thethemes.for specialanalyses, weshaHattemptbyway ofonentatIOn to charactenze the third of these factors.What is meant by "Being-in"?Ourproximalreactionistoroundoutthis expression to "Being-in 'inthe world''', and wc are inc1ined tounderstandthisBeing-inas'Beinginsomething' ["Seinin ..."]. This 54lattertermdesignatesthekindof Being which anentityhaswhen it is'in' anotherone, asthe water is'in' theglass, orthegarmentis'in' thecupboard. Bythis 'in' we mean the relationshipof Beingwhichtwoentities extended 'in' space have to each other with regard to their locationin that space. Both water and glass, garment and cupboard, are 'in' spaceand 'at'a location, and both in the same way. This relationship of Beingcan be expanded: for instance, the benchis inthe lecture-room thelecture-room is intheuniversity, theuniversity is inthe city andon. ' ,until wecansaythat thebenchis 'inworld-space'. AHentitieswhoseBeing 'in' one another can thus be described have the same kind of Being-that of Being-present-at-hand-as Things occurring 'within'the world.Being-present-at-hand'in' somethingwhichislikewisepresent-at-handandBeing-present-at-hand-along-with [Mitvorhandensein] inthe of a definite location-relationship with something else which has the samekindof Being, areontological characteristicswhichwccaH"categorial":they are of such asort as to belong to entities whose kind of Being is notof the character ofDasein.Being-in, on the other hand, is a stateofDasein's Being; it is anexistentiale. So one cannot think of it as the Being-present-at-hand of sorne corporeal Thing (such as a hurnan body) 'in' anentitywhich is present-at-hand. Nor does the terrn "Being-in" rnean1 Here we followthe oIder editions in reading, 'Ausweisung'. The newer editions have'Aufweisung' ('exhibition').2' Verfassungdes Daseins .. .' TheearIiest editions read'Wesens' instead'Daseins'. Correction is made in a Iist of errata.80 Being andTime I.2aspatial 'in-one-another-ness' of thingspresent-at-hand,anymorethanthe word 'in' primordially signifies a spatial relationship of this kind.t 'In'is derived from "innan"-"to reside'',l "habitare", "to dwell" [sich auf hal-ten]. 'An' signifies"1 amaccustomed", "1amfamiliar with", "1 lookafter something".2It has the signification of"colo" in the senses of "habito"and "diligo". The entity to which Being-in inthis signification belongs isonewhichwehavecharacterizedas that entitywhichin eachcase1myself am[bin]. Theexpression 'bin' isconnected with'bei', andso'ichbin' ['1 am'] means in its turn "1 reside" or "dwell alongside" theworld, as that which is familiar to me insuch and such a way.3"Being" [Sein], as theinfinitiveof 'ichbin' (that is tosay, whenit isunderstoodasanexistentiale), signifies "toresidealongside ...", "tobefamiliar with ...". "Being-in"isthustheformal existential expressionfortheBeing of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state.'Being alongside' the world in the sense ofbeing absorbed in the world"1 Reading'innan-wohnen'. As Heidegger points out inhis footnote, thispuzzlingpassagehasitssourceinGrimm's Kleinere Schriften, Vol. VII, pp. 247 ff.,where we findtwo short articles, the first entitled 'IN' and the second'INUNDBEI'. Thefirstarticle beginsbycomparinganumber ofarchaicGermanwordsmeaning'domus', aUhavinga formsimilar toour English'inn', whichGrimmmentions. He goes on"topostulate'astrong verb"iMan", whichmust havemeant either "habitare", "domi esse",or"reciperein domum" , (thoughonlyaweakderivativeform'innian' isactuaUyfound),with a survivingstrong preterite writteneither as 'an' or as 'ann'. Grimmgoes ontoarguethat the preposition 'in' is derived fromthe verb, rather than the verb fromthepreposition.s'.. "an" bedeutet: ich bin gewohnt, vertraut mit, ich pflege etwas . .'ln Grimm's second article he adds: 'there was also an anomalous "ann" with the plural"lI1ItIum", which expressed "amo", "diligo", ''faveo'', and to whichour "gonnen" and"Gunst" are immediately re1ated, as has long been recognized. "Ann"reaUy means "ichbineingewohnt", "pflegezubauen"; this conceptual transitionmaybeshownwithminimal complication in the Latin "colo", which stands for "habito" as weU as "diligo".'It is not entire1y dear whether Heidegger's discussion of 'an' is aimed to e1ucidate thepreposition 'an' (which corresponds in sorne ofits usages to the English 'at', and which hehas just used in remarking that the water and the glass are both at alocation), or ratherto explainthepreterite'an' of 'innan'.The reader should note that while the verb 'wohnen' normaUy means 'to reside' or 'todweU',the expression 'ich bin gewohnt' means '1 am accustomed to', and 'ich bin einge-wohnt'means '1 have become accustomed tothe place where 1 reside--to my surround-ings'. Similarly 'ich pflege etwas' may mean either'1amaccustomedtodo something'or '1take care of something'or'1devote myse1f to it'. (Grimm's'pflege zu bauen' pre-sumably means '1 am accustomed to putting my trust in something', '1 can build on it'.)TheLatin, 'colo' hastheparaUe1meaningsof '1takecare of something' or'cherish' it('digo') and '1dweU'or '1inhabit' ('habito').3' ich wohne, halte mich aufbei ... der Welt, ais dem so und so Vertrauten.' Thepreposition 'bei', like 'an', doesnot have quite the semantical range of any English pre-position. Our'alongside', with which we shaUtranslateit whenother devices seem lesssatisfactory, especiaUyinthephrase 'Beingalongside' ('Seinbei'), is oftenquitemis-leading;the sense here is doser to that of 'at'in such expressions as 'at home' or 'at myfather's', orthat of theFrench'chez'. HereagainHeideggerseemstobere1yinguponGrimm, who proceeds(loc. cit.) to connect 'bei'with 'haum' ('build') and 'hin'.~ ' .. in dem .. Sinne des Aufgehens in der Welt .. .' 'Aufgehen' means literaUy 'to goup', or 'to rise' in the sense that the sun 'rises'or the dough 'rises'. But when foUowed bythe preposition 'in', it takes on other meanings. Thus 5 'geht au!, into go in the sense thatI. 2 Being andTime 81(a sense which calls for still doser interpretation)is an existentiale foundeduponBeing-in. Intheseanalysestheissueisoneof seeingaprimordialstructure of Dasein's Being-astructureinaccordancewithwhosephe-nomenalcontenttheconcepts of Being mustbeArticulated; because ofthis, and because this structure is in principle one which cannot begraspedbythetraditional ontological categories, this 'being-alongside' 55must be examined still more dosely. We shall again choose the method ofcontrastingit witharelationshipof Beingwhichisessentiallydifferentontologically-viz. categorial-but which we express by the same linguis-tic means. Fundamental ontological distinctions areeasilyobliterated;andif they aretobeenvisagedphenomenally inthisway, thismustbedoneexplicitly, even attheriskof discussingthe'obvious'. The status ofthe ontological analyticshows, however, that we have beenfar frominterpreting these obvious matters with an adequate 'grasp', stilliess withregardfor themeaningof their Being; andweareevenfarther frompossessing a stable coinage for the appropriate structural concepts.Asanexistentiale, 'Beingalongside' theworldnever means anythinglike the Being-present-at-hand-together ofThings that occur. There is nosuch thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an entity called 'Dasein' withanotherentitycalled'world'. Of course whentwothings arepresent-at-handtogether alongside one another,l we are accustomedtoexpress thisoccasionallybysomethinglike'Thetablestands"by" [Obei'] thedoor'or 'The chair "touches"['berhrt']the wall'. Taken strictly, 'touching' isnever what we aretalking about in suchcases, not because accuratere-examination will always eventually establish that there is a space betweenthe chair and the wall, but because in principle the chair can never touchthe wall, even if the spacebetween them should be equaltozero. If thechair could touch the wall, this would presuppose that the wall is the sortof thing'for' whichachair wouldbeencounterable.2Anentity present-at-handwithintheworldcanbetouchedbyanotherentityonlyif byitsvery nature the latter entity has Being-in as its own kind ofBeing---nly if,withits Being-there [Da-sein], somethinglike theworldis alreadyre-,vealedtoit, sothatfromout of thatworldanotherentitycanmanifestitself in touching, and thus become accessible inits Being-present-at-hand. Whentwoentitiesarepresent-at-hand withintheworld, andfur-thermoreareworldlessinthemselves, theycannever 'touch' eachother,it 'goes into' go without remainder;a country 'geht auf' into another country into whichit is taken over or absorbed; a person 'geht au!, in anything to which he devoteshimself fully, whether an activity or another person. We shall usuallytranslate'aufgehen'bysorneformof 'absorb'.l 'Das Beisammen zweier Vorhandener .. .'S 'Voraussetzungdafr wiire, dass dieWand"fr" denStuhl hegegnen k6nnte.' (Cf.also H. 97below.)82 Being andTime I.2norcaneitherof them 'he' 'alongside' theother. Theclause'furthermoreare worldless'must not be left out; for even entities which are not world-less-Daseinitse1f, for example-arepresent-at-hand'in' theworld, or,moreexactly, canwithsorneright andwithincertainlimitsbetakenasmerely present-at-hand. To do this, one must completely disregard or justnot see the existential state of Being-in. But the factthat'Dasein' can betaken as something which ispresent-at-hand and just present-at-hand, isnot to be confused with a certainwayof'presence-at-hand'whichisDasein'sown. Thislatterkindof presence-at-handbecomesaccessiblenot bydis-regarding Dasein'sspecificstructuresbut only by understanding them inadvance. Daseinunderstands its ownmost Being inthe sense of acertain56 'factual Being-present-at-hand'.iiAnd yet the 'factuality' of the fact[Tatsache]of one's own Dasein is at bottom quite different omologicallyfromthe factual occurrence of sorne kind of mineraI, for example. When-cver Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality ofsuch a Fact is what we calIDasein's''facticity''.1This is a definitewayof Being[Seinsbe-stimmtheit], andit has a complicatedstructurewhichcannot evenbegrasped as aprohlemuntil Dasein's basic existential states havebeenworked out. The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itselfas bound upinits 'destiny' with the Beingofthose entities whichitencounters withinits own world.In the first instance it is enough to see the ontological differencebetweenBeing-inas anexistentialeand the categoryofthe 'insideness'whichthingspresent-at-handcanhavewithregardtooneanother. Bythus delimitingBeing-in, wearenot denyingeverykindof 'spatiality'to Dasein. Onthe contrary, Daseinitse1f has a 'Being-in-space' of its0\\ n; but thisinturnispossibleonlyonthe hasisof Being-in-the-world ingcneral. Rence Being-in is not to be explained ontologically by sorneontical characterization,as if one wereto say, forinstance, that Being-inin a world is aspiritual property, andthat man's'spatiality' is a result ofhisbodilynature (which, atthesametime, alwaysgets'founded' uponcorporeality). RereagainwearefacedwiththeBeing-present-at-hand-together ofsorne suchspiritual Thingalongwith a corporeal Thing,while theBeingof theentitythus compoundedremains moreobscurel 'Die Tatsachlichkeit des Faktums Dasein, aIs welches jeweiligjedes Dasein ist,nennen wir seine Fakti::itiit.' We shaHasaruletranslate'Tatsachlichkeit' as'factuality',and'Faktizitat' as 'facticity', foHowingourconventionsfor 'tatsachlich' and'faktisch'.(See note2, p. 27,H. 7 above.) Thepresent passagesuggestsa comparabledistinctionbetween the nouns 'Tatsache' and 'Faktum'; so while wefindmany passages where theseseemtobeusedinterchangeably, wctranslate 'Faktum' as'Fact' with aninitial capital,using'fact' for 'Tatsache' andvarious other expressions. On'factuality' and'facticity'seealsoH. 135bclow.I.2 Being andTime 83thanever. Not until weunderstandBeing-in-the-worldasanessentialstructure of Dasein canwe have anyinsight into Dasein's existentialspatiality. Such an insight will keep us from failing to see this structure orfrompreviouslycancelling it out-aproceduremotivatednotontologi-callybut rather 'metaphysicalIy' bythenavesuppositionthat manis,in the first instance, aspiritual Thing which subsequently gets misplaced'into'aspace.Dasein's facticity is suchthat its Being-in-the-world hasalwaysdis-persed[zerstreut} itself or even split itse1f up into definite ways f Being-in. The multiplicity ofthese is indicated by the following examples: havingto do with something,producing something, attending to something andlooking after it, making use ofsomething, giving something up and lettingit go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, imerrogating, considering,discussing, determining....AlItheseways of Being-inhaveconcern1as 57their kind ofBeing-a kind of Being which we have yet to characterize indetai!. Leaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, taking arest-thesetooareways of concern; buttheseareall deficientmodes, inwhichthepos-sibilities of concemarekept toa'bareminimum'.2Theterm'concem'has, in the first instance, its colloquiai [vorwissenschaftliche] signification,andcanmean tocarryout something, toget it done [erIedigen], to'straighten it out'. It can also meanto 'provide oneself with something'.3Weuse the expressionwithstill another characteristictumofphrasewhen we say "1 am concemed for the success of the undertaking."4 Here'concern' means somethinglike apprehensiveness. Incontrast to thesecolloquiaionticalsignifications, theexpression'concem' will beusedinthis investigation as an ontological term for an existentiale, and will desig-natetheBeingof a possiblewayof Being-in-the-world. This termhasbeen chosen not because Dasein happens to be proximally andto alargeextent 'practical' andeconomic, but becausetheBeingof Daseinitse1fl 'Besorgen'. AJJ Heidegger points out, he will use this term in a special sense which is tobe distinguished frommany of itscustomaryusages. WeshaH, asarule, translate it by'concern', though this. is by no means an The word 'concern'isusedin many expressIOns where 'Besorgen wouldbemappropnatemGerman, suchas'Thisconcernsyou' 'Thatis myconcern', 'Hehasaninterest inseveral bankingcon-cerns'. 'Besorgen' rather for thekindof'concern' inwhichwe 'concernourselves'with activities which we perform or things which we procure.Z' a:Ie Modi des "Nur noch" in bezug auf Mglichkeiten des Besorgens.' The pointis that inthese cases concern isjust barely ('nur noch') involved.3' sich etwas besorgen im Sinne von "sich etwas verschaffen".'4' ichbesorge, dassdasUnternehmen!llisslingt.' Hereit is nottofindacorrespondingusage of 'concern', as ourversIOnsuggests. Butthe lS/mperfect.While we can say that we are 'concerned forthe success of the enterprlSe or concernedlest theenterpriseshouldfail,' wehardlyf?l1owtheGermanto theextent ofexpressing 'concern that' the enterprlSe should fatl; nor would the German express'Besorgen'at discovering thatthe enterprise has failedalready.84 Being andTime I. 2is tobemadevisibleascare.1Thisexpressiontooistobe taken as anontological structural concept. (SeeChapter6of thisDivision.) Ithasnothing to do with 'tribulation', 'melancholy', or the 'cares oflife', thoughonticallyonecancomeacrosstheseineveryDasein. These-liketheiropposites, 'gaiety' and'freedomfromcare'-areonticallypossibleonlybecause Dasein, whenunderstoodontologically, iscare. Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world[SeinzurWelt] is essentially concern.From what we have been saying, it follows that Being-in is not a'pro-perty' whichDaseinsometimeshas andsometimesdoesnot have, andwithout which it couldbe just as weIl as it could with it. It is not the casethat man'is' andthenhas, by way of anextra, arelationship-of-Beingtowards the 'world'-a world with which he provides himselfoccasionally.2Daseinis never 'proximally' anentitywhichis, sotospeak, freefromBeing-in, but which sometimes hasthe inclination totake up a'relation-ship' towards theworld. Takinguprelationships towardstheworldispossible onlybecause Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is. This state ofBeingdoes not arise just becausesomeother entityis present-at-handoutside ofDasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can 'meet up with'Dasein only in so far as it can, ofits own accord, show itselfwithin a world.Nowadays there is much talkabout 'man's havinganenvironment[Umwelt]'; butthis saysnothing ontologically as long asthis 'having'isleft indefinite. Initsverypossibilitythis 'having' is foundedupontheexistentialstate of Being-in. BecauseDaseinisessentially anentity withBeing-in, it can explieitly discover those entities whichit encountersenvironmentaIly, it can know them, it can avail itself of them, it can havethe'world'. Totalkabout 'havinganenvironment' isonticallytrivial,but ontologically it presents aproblem. To solve it requires nothing elsethandefiningtheBeing of Dasein, anddoing so in away which is onto-10gicaIly adequate. Althoughthisstateof Beingisone of whichusehasmadeinbiology, especiaIlysinceK. vonBaer, onemust not coneludethat itsphilosophical useimplies'biologism'. For theenvironment isastructure which even biology as a positive science can never find and cannever define, but must presuppose and constantly"employ. Yet, even as ana prioriconditionfor theobjectswhichbiologytakesfor itstheme, thisstructureitself canbeexplainedphilosophically only if ithasbeencon-ceived heforehand as a structure ofDasein. Only in terms ofan orientation1 'Sorge'. The important etymological connection between 'Besorgen' ('concem') and'Sorge' ('care') islost inour translation. On'Sorge' seeespeciallySections41and42below.2 'DerMensch"ist"nicht undhatberdiesnocheinSeinsverhaltnis zur "Welt" dieer sich gelegentlichz u l e ~ t . ' 'J. 2 Being andTime 85towards theontological structure thus conceived can 'life' as astateofBeing be defined a priori, and this must be done in aprivative manner.1Onticallyas weIl as ontologically, the prioritybelongs toBeing-in-theworldas concern. Intheanalyticof Daseinthis structureundergoesabasic Interpretation.But havewenot confinedourselves tonegativeassertions inaIl ourattempts todetermine thenatureofthis stateof Being? Though thisBeing-inissupposedlysofundamental, wealways keephearingaboutwhat it is not. Yes indeed. But there is nothingaccidentaI about ourcharacterizing it predominantly in so negative amanner. In doing so wehave rathermadeknownwhatispeculiar tothisphenomenon, andourcharacterizationisthereforepositiveinagenuine sense-asense appro-priatetothephenomenonitself. WhenBeing-in-the-worldis exhibitedphenomenologically, disguises andconcealments arerejectedbecausethisphenomenonitself alwaysgets'seen' inacertainwayineveryDasein.Anditthus gets'seen' because itmakes upabasic state of Dasein, andineverycase isalreadydiscIosedforDasein'sunderstanding of Being, anddiscIosedalong withthatBeing itself. But for themostpartthispheno-menonhasbeenexplainedinawaywhichisbasicaIly wrong, orinter-pretedin anontologicaIly inadequatemanner. Ontheotherhand, this'seeinginacertainwayandyet for themostpartwronglyexplaining'isitself baseduponnothingelsethanthisverystateof Dasein'sBeing,whichis such that Daseinitself-andthis means also its Being-in-theworld-gets its ontological understandingof itself in thefirst instancefromthoseentities whichititself isnotbutwhichit encounters'within'its world, and fromthe Being whichthey possess.Both inDasein andfor it, thisstate of Beingisalwaysinsornewayfamilial' [bekannt]. Nowif it is also to becomeknown [erkannt], theknowing which suchataskexplicitlyimpliestakesitself (asaknowing of 59the world [WelterkennenJ) as the chief exemplificationofthe 'soul's'relationship to the world.Knowing theworld(vov)-orratheraddress-ing oneselfto the 'world'and discussingit (..\6yos)-thus functionsastheprimary mode of Being-in-the-world, even though Being-in-the-worlddoes not as such get conceived. But because this structure ofBeingremains ontologicaIly inaccessible, yet is experiencedontically asa'rela-tionship' betweenone entity (the world) andanother (the soul), andbecauseoneproximaIlyunderstandsBeingbytakingentitiesasentitieswithin-the-worldfor one's ontological foothold, onetries to conceivetherelationshipbetweenworldandsoul as groundedin these twoentities1' auf demWege derPrivation ...'The point isthat in order tounderstandlifemerely as such, we must make abstraction from the fuller life ofDasein. See H. 50 above.86 Being andTime I. 2themselves and in the meaning of their Being-namely, toconceiveit asBeing-present-at-hand. And even though Being-in-the-world is somethingof whichone has pre-phenomenological experience and acquaintance[erfahren undgekannt], itbecomsinvisible if one interprets it in awaywhichis ontologically inappropriate. This state of Dasein's Being isnowone withwhichone is just barely acquainted(andindeedas somethingobvious), withthestampof an inappropriateinterpretation. Sointhisway it becomes the 'evident'point of departure for problems of epistemo-logyorthe'metaphysicsof knowledge'. For whatismoreobviousthanthat a 'subject' is relatedtoan'Object' and vice versa?This 'subject-Object-relationship' must bepresupposed. But whilethispresuppositionis unimpeachable in its facticity, this makes it indeed abaleful one, if itsontological necessity and especially its ontological meaning areto be leftinthe dark.Thusthephenomenonof Being-inhasfor themost part beenrepre-sented exclusively by a single exemplar-knowing the world., This has notonly been the case in epistemology; for even practical behaviour has beenunderstood as behaviour which is 'non-theoretical' and 'atheoretical'.Because knowing has beengiven thispriority, our understanding ofits own-most kindof Being gets led astray, andaccordinglyBeing-in-the-worldmust be exhibited even more precisely with regard to knowing the world,andmust itself be made visible as an existential 'modality'of Being-in.~ 13. AFoundedModeinwhichBeing-inisExemplified.lKnowingtheWorld.IfBeing-in-the-world is a basic state ofDasein, and one in which Daseinoperates not only in general but pre-eminently in the mode of everyday-ness, then it must alsobe something whichhasalwaysbeen experiencedonticaIly. It would be unintelligible for Being-in-the-world toremain60 totallyveiledfromview, especiallysinceDaseinhasat itsdisposaI anunderstanding of itsownBeing, nomatterhowindefinitelythisunder-standing may function. But no sooner was the 'phenomenon ofknowing the world' grasped thanit got interpretedina 'superficial',l'Die Exemplifizierung des In-Seins an einemfundierten Modus.' The conception of'founded'modesis takenfromHusserl, whointroduces the concept of 'founding' inhisLogischeUntersuchungen, vol. II, Part l, chapter 2 (secondedition, Halle, 1913, p. 261). Thispassage has been c10sely paraphrased as follows by MarvinFarberinhisTheFoundationofPhenomenology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1943, p. 297; 'If in accordance withessentiallaw anacanonly existinacomprehensive unitywhich connects it withap., then wesay, an aas such needs foundation through ap., or aIso, anaas such is in need of corn-pletionby meansof ap.. If accordinglyao , p.oare definiteparticular casesof the puregeneraa, orp., whichstandinthecitedrelationship, and if theyarememhers of onewhole,then we say that ao isfounded by p.o; and it is exclusiveQi foundedbyp.o if the needof thecompletionof aois alone satisfiedbyp.o. Thisterminology canhe appliedtothespecies themselves; theequivocationisharmless.' Thusafoundedmode of Being-inissimply amodewhich can subsist only when connected with something else.I. 2 Being andTime 87formaI manner. Theevidencefor thisistheprocedure (still customarytoday) of setting upknowingasa'relationbetween subject andObject'-a procedure in which there lurks as much 'truth' as vacuity. But subjectandObject do not coincide with Dasein andthe world.Even if it were feasibleto give anontologicaldefinitionof "Being-in"primarily in terms ofa Being-in-the-worldwhich knows, itwould still be ourfirst tasktoshow thatknowinghas the phenomenal character of a Beingwhich is in and towards the world. Ifone reflects upon this relationship ofBeing, an entitycalled"Nature" is given proximallyas that which becomesknown. Knowing, as such, is not to be met in this entity. If knowing 'is' ataIl, it belongs solely to those entities which know. But even in those entities,human-Things, knowingis not present-at-hand. Inanycase, it is notexternally ascertainable as, let us say, bodilyproperties are.lNow, inas-much as knowing belongs to these entities and is not sorne externalcharacteristic, it must be 'inside'.Now the more unequivocally one main-tains that knowing is proximally and really 'inside' and indeed has by nomeans thesamekindof Beingas entitieswhicharebothphysical andpsychical, the less one presupposes whenonebelieves that oneismakingheadway in the question of the essence of knowledge and in the clarifica-tionof therelationshipbetweensubject andObject. Foronlythencanthe problemarise of howthis knowingsubject cornesout of its inner'sphere' into one which is 'other andexternal', of how knowing canhaveany object atall, and of howonemust think of theobjectitself sothateventuallythesubject knowsit without needingtoventurealeapintoanother sphere. But in any of the numerous varieties whichthis approachmay take, the question of the kind of Being which belongs to this knowingsubject is left entirely unasked, though whenever its knowing gets handled,its way of Being is already includedtacitly in one'stheme.Of course weare sometimes assured thatwe arecertainly nottothink of the subject's"inside"[Innen]and its 'inner sphere'as asort of 'box' Gr 'cabinet'. Butwhenone asks forthepositive signification of this'inside'of immanencein which knowing is proximally enclosed, or whenone inquires how this'Being inside' ["Innenseins"] whichknowingpossesseshas its ownchar-acter ofBeing grounded in the kind of Being which belongs to the subject,then silence reigns. Andnomatter howthisinner sphere mayget inter-preted, if one does no more than ask how knowing makes its way 'out of'it and achieves 'transcendence', it becomes evident that the knowing 6rwhichpresentssuchenigmas will remainproblematical unless onehaspreviously clarified how it is and what it is.l 'Injedem Falle ist est nicht soiiusserlich feststellbar wie etwa leibliche Eigenschaften.The oider editions have' .. nicht ist es .. .' and place a comma after 'feststellbar'.88 Being andTime I.2With this kind ofapproach one remains blind to what is alreadytacitly implied even when one takes the phenomenon of knowing as one'stheme in themostprovisionalmanner: namely, thatknowingisamodeof Being of Dasein asBeing-in-the-world, andisfoundedontically uponthis state of Being. But if, as we suggest, wethus findphenomenally thatknowing is a kind ofBeing wmch belongs to Being-in-the-world, one might objectthat with such anInterpretation of knowing, theproblem of knowledgeisnullified; for whatis lefttobe askedif one presupposes thatknowing isalready 'alongside' its world, when it is not supposed to reach that worldexcept in thetranscending of the subject? lnthisquestion theconstruc-tivist 'standpoint' , which has not been phenomenally demonstrated, againcomes to the fore; but quite apart from this, what higher court is to decidewhether andinwhat sensethereistobeany problem of knowledgeotherthanthat of thephenomenon of knowingas such andthekindof Beingwhich belongsto the knower?If we nowaskwhat shows itself inthe phenomenal findings aboutknowing, wemust keepin mindthatknowingisgroundedbeforehandina Being-already-alongside-the-world, whichis essentiallyconstitutivefor Dasein'sBeing.1Proximally, thisBeing-already-alongsideisnot jtistafixed staring at something that is purely present-at-hand. Being-in-the-world,asconcern, is fascinated by the worldwithwhichit isconcerned. 2If knowingistobepossibleasaway of determiningthenatureof thepresent-at-hand by observing it,3then there must first be adeficiency in ourhaving-to-do with the world concernfully. When concern holds back[SichenthaIten]fromany kind of producing, manipulating, andthelikeitputsitself into what isnowthesoleremainingmodeof Being-in, modeof justtarryingalongside....[dasNur-noch-verweilenbei ...]This kindof Beingtowards theworIdis onewhich lets us encounterentities within-the-world purely in the way theylook(d8os), just that;onthe basis of this kind of Being, andas a mode of it, looking explicitly atwhat we encounter is possible.4Looking at something in this way is some- a definite wayof up a direction towards something--ofsettingour slghts towards whatIS present-at-hand. It takes over a'view-point' inadvance fromtheentity whichit encounters. Such looking-at enters thel'. dassdas .Erkennen selbst vorglingig grndet in einemSchon-sein-bei-der-Weltais welches das Sem von Dasein wesenhaft konstituiert.' . '2 'DasIn-der-\":e!t-seinist aisBesorgenvonder besorgtenWelt benommen.' Herewefollow the older edltlOns. The newer editions have 'das Besorgen' instead of 'ais Besorgen'8'D . .amlt ErkennenaisBestimmendesVorhandenenmoglichsei ...'Here too we follow the older editlons. The newer editions again have 'das' instead of 'ais'.4 'AufdieserSeinsart zurWelt, diedasinnerweltlichbegegnendeSeiende!lur .noch m pUrl;n Aussehen(.mo.) begegnenHi.sst, undalsModusdieserSeinsartl.5t em ausdruckhches Hmsehen aufdas so Begenende moglich.'I. 2 Being andTime 89mode of dwellingautonomouslyalongsideentitieswithin-the-world.1lnthis kind of 'dwelling' as aholding-oneself-back from any manipulation orutilization, theperceptionofthe present-at-handis consummated.2Per- 62ception is consummated when oneaddresses oneself to something as some-thing and discusses it as such.3This amounts to interpretation in the broadestsense; and on the basis of such interpretation,perception becomes an actof makingdeterminate.4Whatisthusperceived and made determinate canbe expressed in propositions,and canbe retained andpreserved as whathasthusbeenasserted. Thisperceptiveretentionof anassertionliaboutsomething is itself a way of Being-in-the-world; it is not to be Interpretedasa 'procedure' bywhichasubject providesitself withrepresentations[Vorstellungen] of something which remainstoredup'inside' as havingbeenthusappropriated, andwithregardtowhichthequestionof howthey'agree' withactualitycanoccasionallyarise.When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does notsomehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximallyencapsulated, but its primary kind ofBeing is such that it is always'outside' alongsideentitieswhichit encountersandwhichbelongtoaworld already discovered. Nor is any inner sphere abandoned whenDasein dwells alongside the entity to be known, anddetermines its char-acter; but even in this'Being-outside'alongside the object, Dasein is still'inside', ifwe understand this in the correct sense; that is to say, it is itself'inside' as a Being-in-the-world which knows. And furthermore, theperceiving ofwhat is known is not a process ofreturning with one's bootytothe'cabinet' of consciousnessafteronehasgoneoutandgraspedit;eveninperceiving, retaining, andpreserving, theDaseinwhichknowsremains outside, and it does soas Dasein. If l 'merely 'know[Wissen]aboutsomewayinwhichthe Beingof entities is interconnected, ifl 'only'represent them, if l 'donomore' than 'think' about them, 1 amnolessl 'SolchesHinsehenkommt selbstindenModuseineseigenstandigenSichaufhaltensbei dem innerweltlichenSeienden.'2 'Insogerateten"Aufenthalt"-alsdemSichenthaltenvonjeglicherHantierungandNutzung-vollzieht sich das VemehmendesVorhandenen.' Theword'Aufenthalt' norm-ally means a stopping-off at sorne place, a sojourn, an abiding, or even an abode or dwel-ling. Heretheauthorisexploitingthefact thatit includesboththeprefixes'auf-' and'ent-', which we findinthe verbs 'aufhalten' and'enth