Martinez-Rivera v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 1st Cir. (2016)

7/26/2019 Martinez-Rivera v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 1st Cir. (2016)

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United States Court of AppealsFor the First Circuit

No. 13- 1772

EDNA MART NEZ- RI VERA, on her own behal f and on behal f of hermi nor chi l d, RCM; LYDI A RI VERA- O' FARRI L; LYDI A MART NEZ- RI VERA,

Pl ai nt i f f s , Appel l ant s ,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RI CO; DEPARTMENT OF J USTI CE OF PUERTORI CO; DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES OF PUERTO RI CO;VOCATI ONAL REHABI LI TATI ON ADMI NI STRATI ON; NYDI A COLN- ZAYAS,

MYRNA CAMBRELEN, J UAN ORTI Z- ORTI Z, ENRI QUE DEL CUETO- PREZ, al li n t hei r of f i ci al and per sonal capaci t i es,

Def endant s, Appel l ees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURTFOR THE DI STRI CT OF PUERTO RI CO

[ Hon. Gust avo A. Gel p , U. S. Di st r i ct J udge]

Bef oreTor r uel l a, Li pez, and Thompson,

Ci r cui t J udges.

Car l os Rodr guez Garc a, wi t h whom Rodr guez Garc a PSC wason br i ef , f or appel l ant s.

Rober t o Ar i el Fer nndez, wi t h whom Gonzl ez Cast aer PSC wason br i ef , f or appel l ees.

J anuar y 29, 2016


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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

Overview

Edna Mar t nez Ri ver a ( "Mar t nez" ) i s a f ormer empl oyee

of Puer t o Ri co' s Vocat i onal Rehabi l i t at i on Admi ni st r at i on ( "VRA") ,

an agency t asked wi t h i nt egr at i ng per sons wi t h di sabi l i t i es i nt o

t he wor kf or ce. Somet i me af t er t he VRA l et her go, Mar t nez f i l ed

a f eder al - cour t sui t agai nst t he def endant s l i st ed i n our capt i on.

Essent i al l y bel i evi ng t hat t hey had di scr i mi nat ed agai nst her

because of her di sabi l i t y, age, and pol i t i cs, her compl ai nt

seemi ngl y al l eges var i ous vi ol at i ons of f eder al and l ocal l aw. 1

We say "essent i al l y" and "seemi ngl y" because her compl ai nt i s qui t e

muddl ed i n key ways, f orci ng us t o spend a l ot of t i me pi eci ng

t oget her what cl ai ms she makes agai nst whom ( whi ch i sn' t f ai r t o

ot her l i t i gant s wai t i ng i n l i ne f or our at t ent i on, by t he way) .

Addi ng t o t he conf usi on, t he di st r i ct j udge homed i n on one f eder al

cl ai m ( under 42 U. S. C. 1983) , concl uded t hat i t ought t o be

di smi ssed f or f ai l ur e t o exhaust admi ni st r at i ve remedi es, and t hen

wi t hout expl ai ni ng why di smi ssed t he r emai ni ng cl ai ms t oo.

Mar t nez appeal s. Unf or t unat el y, her br i ef s ar e, l i ke

her compl ai nt , di sor gani zed and opaque t hey f l oat l egal t heor i es

1 Mar t nez' s son, mot her , and si st er j oi ned as par t i es pl ai nt i f f s.The di st r i ct j udge f ound and Mar t nez does not ar gue ot herwi se t hat t hei r cl ai ms ar e der i vat i ve of her s. So we t r eat t he caseas i f Mar t nez wer e t he onl y pl ai nt i f f and appel l ant .


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but do not al ways gr ound t hem i n t he case, f or exampl e. 2 Yet she

st i l l ends up wi t h a par t i al vi ctor y, as we af f i r m i n par t and

r ever se i n par t . We expl ai n our t hi nki ng bel ow. Fi r st , a l i t t l e

backgr ound.

How the Case Got Here

A l awyer by t r ai ni ng, Mar t nez wor ked f or year s as a

Puer t o Ri co gover nment empl oyee. I n t he l ate 2000s, f or exampl e,

she hel d key post s di r ect or of t he of f i ce of l egal af f ai r s and

auxi l i ar y admi ni st r at or of t he of f i ce of admi ni st r at i on wi t hi n

t he VRA. A member of t he Popul ar Democr at i c Par t y one of Puer t o

Ri co' s t wo mai n pol i t i cal par t i es, t he ot her bei ng t he New

Pr ogr essi ve Par t y Mar t nez has a vi si bl y- appar ent di sabi l i t y

t hat af f ect s her mobi l i t y. And our def endant s knew about her

pol i t i cal af f i l i at i on and her di sabi l i t y.

Mar t nez' s prof essi onal l i f e was goi ng al ong swi mmi ngl y

unt i l t he New Pr ogr essi ve Par t y' s Lui s For t uo Bur set became

Puer t o Ri co' s gover nor i n J anuar y 2009. Sadl y f or Mar t nez, over

t he next si x mont hs VRA per sonnel st r i pped her of meani ngf ul

2 Her openi ng br i ef ' s j ur i sdi ct i onal st at ement , f or i nst ance, makespassi ng r ef er ence t o t he possi bi l i t y t hat def endant s vi ol at ed herFi f t h- and Four t eent h- Amendment r i ght s. But she never expl ai nshow or why t hi s i s so. Obvi ousl y t hen, any ar gument based on t heset heor i es i s wai ved. See, e. g. , HSBC Real t y Cr edi t Cor p. ( USA) v.O' Nei l l , 745 F. 3d 564, 577 ( 1st Ci r . 2014) ( expl ai ni ng t hatar gument s " not devel oped i n a par t y' s openi ng br i ef ar e wai ved") .


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dut i es, bani shed her t o a subpar of f i ce, and made f un of her

di sabi l i t y ( t o l i st j ust a f ew of t he i ndi gni t i es i nf l i ct ed on

her ) . As a coup de gr ce, t he VRA t ol d her i n a l et t er dat ed

J anuar y 14, 2010 whi ch she acknowl edged r ecei vi ng t he next day,

J anuar y 15 t hat she was "bei ng t er mi nat ed" ef f ect i ve Febr uary

19, 2010 as par t of a government downsi zi ng r equi r ed by l aw. That

l aw ( known as "Law 7" ) cal l ed f or ( among other t hi ngs) t he

t er mi nat i on of cer t ai n commonweal t h empl oyees based on seni or i t y,

al l i n t he hopes of put t i ng Puer t o Ri co on a bet t er f i nanci al

f oot i ng. See gener al l y l amo- Hornedo v. Pui g, 745 F. 3d 578, 580

( 1st Ci r . 2014) ( di scussi ng Law 7) . She coul d not wor k af t er

J anuar y 20, 2010, t he compl ai nt says, because t he st r ess caused by

al l t he "pol i t i cal [ and] di sabi l i t y di scr i mi nat i on" per pet r at ed by

def endant s " exacer bat ed her physi cal di sabi l i t y. "

Not wi l l i ng t o go away wi t hout a f i ght , Mar t nez

"at t empt ed" ( her wor d, not our s) t o f i l e an admi ni st r at i ve appeal

wi t h t he Publ i c Ser vi ce Labor Rel at i ons Commi ssi on on Febr uary 12,

2010. Accusi ng t he VRA of di scr i mi nat i ng agai nst her because of

her pol i t i cal af f i l i at i on and di sabi l i t y, her "at t empt ed" f i l i ng

asked the commi ssi on to "decl ar e voi d and nul l t he l ayof f t hat was

not i f i ed. " As best we can t el l , Mar t nez never says what became

of her "at t empt ed" f i l i ng. Anyway, t he VRA l et her go 7 days

l at er , on Febr uar y 19, 2010.


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St i l l upset about t he t er mi nat i on, Mar t nez f i l ed a

compl ai nt wi t h the EEOC on J ul y 12, 2010 and an amended compl ai nt

on August 17, 2010, al l egi ng pol i t i cal and di sabi l i t y

di scri mi nat i on. 3 Her amended EEOC compl ai nt speci f i cal l y accused

t he VRA of r epl aci ng her wi t h t wo nondi sabl ed " f emal e l awyer s" who

"are pol i t i cal l y af f i l i at ed [ wi t h] t he gover ni ng par t y. " She asked

t he EEOC f or a r i ght - t o- sue l et t er on Febr uar y 2, 2011. But bef or e

get t i ng one, she sued our def endant s i n f eder al cour t on Febr uar y

17, 2011. The EEOC gave her a r i ght - t o- sue l et t er about a mont h

l at er , on Mar ch 18.

Mar t nez' s 103- par agr aph f eder al compl ai nt i s har dl y a

pi ct ur e of cl ar i t y. Gi vi ng t hat document a gener ous read, she

seemi ngl y al l eges ( as best we can di scer n) f our cat egor i es of

cl ai ms. The f i r st i nvol ves a pol i t i cal - di scr i mi nat i on cl ai m t i ed

t o 42 U. S. C. 1983 ( deal i ng wi t h depr i vat i ons of f eder al l y-

pr ot ect ed r i ght s at t he hands of st at e act or s) , 42 U. S. C. 1981

( decl ar i ng al l per sons "have t he same r i ght " t o be f r ee f r om

di scri mi nat i on i n speci f i c act i vi t i es, l i ke maki ng and enf or ci ng

cont r act s and br i ngi ng sui t s) , and 42 U. S. C. 2000d ( f or bi ddi ng

r aci al di scri mi nat i on by f eder al - gr ant r eci pi ent s) . The second

i nvol ves a di sabi l i t y- di scr i mi nat i on cl ai m under Ti t l e I of t he

3 EEOC st ands f or Equal Empl oyment Oppor t uni t y Commi ss i on.


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Amer i cans wi t h Di sabi l i t i es Act ( "ADA") , 42 U. S. C. 12101 et seq.

The t hi r d i nvol ves an age- di scr i mi nat i on cl ai m under t he Age

Di scr i mi nat i on i n Empl oyment Act ( "AEDA") , 29 U. S. C. 621 et seq.

And t he f our t h i nvol ves a gr ab- bag of cl ai ms under Puer t o Ri co

l aw.

To Mar t nez' s compl ai nt , def endant s r esponded wi t h a

mot i on t o di smi ss f or l ack of subj ect - mat t er j ur i sdi ct i on. See

Fed. R. Ci v. P. 12( b) ( 1) . Basi cal l y t hey ar gued t hat t he st at ut e

of l i mi t at i on had r un out on any sect i on 1983 cl ai m: t he

appl i cabl e one- year l i mi t at i ons per i od, t hey wr ot e, st ar t ed

r unni ng no l at er t han J anuary 20, 2010 ( t he dat e when she coul d no

l onger wor k because of al l t he al l eged di scr i mi nat i on she had

exper i enced) but she f i l ed her compl ai nt on Febr uar y 19, 2011,

t hey added, near l y one mont h af t er t he l i mi t at i ons per i od had

expi r ed. Oddl y, def endant s ci t ed no aut hor i t y ( as f ar as we can

see) f or t he i dea t hat a l at e- f i l ed sect i on- 1983 cl ai m i s

j ur i sdi ct i onal l y bar r ed f r om f eder al cour t . See gener al l y

Wi l l i ams v. Hender son, No. 14- 5150, 2015 WL 5638015, at *1 n. 3

( 10t h Ci r . Sept . 25, 2015) ( unpubl i shed) ( agr eei ng wi t h cases f r om

t he Sevent h and Ni nt h ci r cui t s hol di ng t hat sect i on 1983' s

l i mi t at i on per i od i s not j ur i sdi ct i onal ) . Odder st i l l , t hey ar gued

wi t hout suppor t i ng r easoni ng t hat because she f i l ed her

sect i on- 1983 cl ai m out of t i me, t he j udge had t o di smi ss al l


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f eder al cl ai ms (not j ust t he sect i on- 1983 cl ai m) . And t hen t hey

suggest ed t hat t he j udge shoul d decl i ne j ur i sdi ct i on over t he

l ocal - l aw cl ai ms.

Focusi ng wi t h l aser - l i ke i nt ensi t y on t he sect i on- 1983

cl ai m, Mar t nez f i r ed back t hat t he one- year l i mi t at i ons cl ock di d

not st ar t t i cki ng unt i l af t er Febr uar y 19, 2010, when she l ear ned

t hat t he VRA had r epl aced her wi t h persons who unl i ke her were

pol i t i cal l y af f i l i at ed wi t h t he new admi ni st r at i on ( she does not

speci f y t he pr eci se dat e, r egr et t abl y) . Al t er nat i vel y, she ar gued

t hat her August 2010 EEOC f i l i ng t ol l ed sect i on 1983' s l i mi t at i ons

per i od ( t ol l i ng t ypi cal l y oper at es t o i nt er r upt and so post pone

t he l i mi t at i on per i od' s r unni ng) , maki ng her sect i on- 1983 cl ai m

( f i l ed l ess than a year l at er ) t i mel y.

Taki ng up def endant s' Rul e 12( b) ( 1) mot i on, t he di st r i ct

j udge ( l i ke t he par t i es) zer oed i n on sect i on 1983. And he r ul ed,

f i r st , t hat t he l i mi t at i ons per i od began r unni ng on J anuar y 15,

2010 when Mar t nez got t he t ermi nat i on l et t er , not when t he VRA

hi r ed her r epl acement t hough he t hen concl uded t hat t he

l i mi t at i ons cl ock r eset when she f i l ed her EEOC compl ai nt on J ul y

12, 2010. So f ar , so good, f or Mar t nez. But not i ng t hat she had

sued def endant s bef or e get t i ng an EEOC r i ght - t o- sue l et t er , t he

j udge r ul ed t hat she had not exhaust ed her sect i on- 1983 cl ai m

admi ni st r at i vel y ( r emember , t he j udge keyed hi s anal ysi s t o


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sect i on 1983) . And her e' s t he ki cker he t hen di smi ssed al l

cl ai ms ( not j ust t he sect i on- 1983 cl ai m) wi t h pr ej udi ce: as best

we can di scer n, he j et t i soned al l f eder al cl ai ms on exhaust i on

gr ounds and r el i nqui shed j ur i sdi ct i on over t he suppl ement al l ocal -

l aw cl ai ms.

Whi ch br i ngs us t o t oday, wi t h t he par t i es f i ght i ng over

t he j udge' s sect i on- 1983- dr i ven deci si on. Essent i al l y, Mar t nez

ar gues t hat she di d not have t o exhaust her sect i on- 1983 cl ai m f or

pol i t i cal di scr i mi nat i on wi t h t he EEOC. 4 She al so i nsi st s t hat

she t i mel y f i l ed her f eder al compl ai nt , ei t her because she br ought

i t wi t hi n a year af t er l ear ni ng t hat t he VRA had r epl aced her wi t h

per sons pol i t i cal l y si mpat i co wi t h t he par t y i n power ( she di d not

know about t he VRA' s pol i t i cal l y- di scr i mi nat or y mot i ves unt i l t he

r epl acement s appeared, t he theory goes) or because her EEOC f i l i ngs

r eset t he l i mi t at i ons cl ock. And, wr appi ng up, she cont ends t hat

4 Reader al er t : Recal l how Mar t nez' s compl ai nt seemi ngl y suggest st hat t hr ee stat ut es dr i ve her pol i t i cal - di scr i mi nat i on cl ai m sect i on 1983, sect i on 1981, and sect i on 2000d. Wel l , her br i efdoes not ser i ousl y di scuss whet her or how sect i ons 1981 and 2000dappl y i n t he cont ext of t hi s case, meani ng she has wai ved anypossi bl e ar gument s t i ed t o t hose pr ovi si ons. See, e. g. , Ri ver a-

Mur i ent e v. Agost o- Al i cea, 959 F. 2d 349, 351 n. 2 ( 1st Ci r . 1992)( ci t i ng Uni t ed St at es v. Zanni no, 895 F. 2d 1, 17 ( 1st Ci r . 1990) ,f or t he canoni cal r ul e t hat ar gument s not devel oped i n anymeani ngf ul way are wai ved) ; see al so Rodr guez v. Mun. of San J uan,659 F. 3d 168, 175 ( 1st Ci r . 2011) ( addi ng t hat "cl ai ms not made"and cl ai ms " ' conf usi ngl y const r uct ed and l acki ng i n coher ence' "ar e consi der ed wai ved t oo ( quot i ng Uni t ed St at es v. Ei r by, 515F. 3d 31, 36 n. 4 ( 1st Ci r . 2008) ) ) .


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her r ecei pt of t he EEOC' s r i ght - t o- sue l et t er bef or e t he j udge

di smi ssed t he case cur ed her f ai l ur e t o exhaust her di sabi l i t y-

and age- di scr i mi nat i on cl ai ms. Def endant s' br i ef di sagr ees wi t h

j ust about everyt hi ng Mar t nez says t hough t hey changed t hei r

t une a bi t on t he di sabi l i t y- di scri mi nat i on i ssue at or al ar gument ,

as we' l l soon see.

Ti me t o r ol l up our sl eeves and sor t t hi s al l out .

Standard of Review

Rel yi ng on Rul e 12( b) ( 1) , t he j udge ( t o r epeat

our sel ves) deci ded t he st at ut e- of - l i mi t at i ons and exhaust i on

i ssues as i f t hey i mpl i cat ed t he cour t ' s subj ect - mat t er

j ur i sdi ct i on. On bot h scor es, we have our doubt s. As a gener al

mat t er , st at ut es of l i mi t at i ons ar e af f i r mat i ve def enses r at her

t han j ur i sdi ct i onal bar s. See, e. g. , Bowl es v. Russel l , 551 U. S.

205, 218- 19 ( 2007) . And, f or r easons t hat we get t o shor t l y, t he

exhaust i on r equi r ement s i nvol ved her e t hough compul sor y are

not j ur i sdi ct i onal ei t her . Per haps t hen t he j udge shoul d have

anal yzed t he case under Feder al Rul e of Ci vi l Procedur e 12( b) ( 6)

( f ai l ur e t o st at e a cl ai m) r at her t han under Rul e 12( b) ( 1) ( l ack

of subj ect - mat t er j ur i sdi ct i on) . See Mer cado v. Ri t zCar l t on San

J uan Hot el , Spa & Casi no, 410 F. 3d 41, 46 n. 6 ( 1st Ci r . 2005) .

No mat t er , because under ei t her r ul e we r evi ew t he

j udge' s or der de novo, accept i ng Mar t nez' s wel l - pl eaded f act s as


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t r ue and dr awi ng al l r easonabl e i nf er ences i n her f avor . See

McCl oskey v. Muel l er , 446 F. 3d 262, 266 ( 1st Ci r . 2006) ; see al so

RomnOl i ver as v. P. R. El ec. Power Aut h. , 655 F. 3d 43, 45 ( 1st

Ci r . 2011) . And we can af f i r m a di smi ssal under ei t her r ul e on

any gr ound suppor t ed by t he r ecord. See, e. g. , McCl oskey, 446

F. 3d at 266. The par t i es ( and we) r el y on f act s out si de t he

pl eadi ngs. But t hat i s okay gi ven t he par t i cul ar ci r cumst ances

her e. See, e. g. , Aver sa v. Uni t ed St at es, 99 F. 3d 1200, 1210 ( 1st

Ci r . 1996) ( expl ai ni ng t hat a cour t can "consi der what ever evi dence

has been submi t t ed" i n deci di ng a Rul e 12( b) ( 1) mot i on) ; Ar t ur et

Vl ez v. R. J . Reynol ds Tobacco Co. , 429 F. 3d 10, 13 n. 2 ( 1st Ci r .

2005) ( not i ng, among ot her t hi ngs, t hat a cour t f aced wi t h a Rul e

12( b) ( 6) mot i on can consi der "f act s" suscept i bl e t o "j udi ci al

not i ce" and "concessi ons" i n pl ai nt i f f ' s "r esponse" t o t he

di smi ssal mot i on) ; Wat t er son v. Page, 987 F. 2d 1, 3 ( 1st Ci r . 1993)

( addi ng al so that a cour t conf r ont ed wi t h a Rul e 12( b) ( 6) mot i on

can consi der "document s t he aut hent i ci t y of whi ch are not di sput ed

by t he par t i es") .

Political Discrimination (Section-1983 Claim)

Admi ni st r at i ve Exhaust i on

Whet her Mar t nez had t o admi ni st r at i vel y exhaust her

sect i on- 1983 cl ai m f or pol i t i cal di scr i mi nat i on i s easy.

Cont r ol l i ng casel aw hol ds t hat f or a per son i n her shoes,


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exhaust i on i s not a pr econdi t i on t o br i ngi ng a sect i on- 1983 cl ai m

i n f eder al cour t . See, e. g. , Pat sy v. Bd. of Regent s of St at e of

Fl a. , 457 U. S. 496, 501- 02, 516 ( 1982) ; l amo- Hornedo, 745 F. 3d at

581. 5 So we have no t r oubl e concl udi ng t hat t he j udge er r ed i n

hol di ng ot her wi se.

Now on t o t he mor e di f f i cul t i ssue: whet her t he st at ut e

of l i mi t at i ons r an out on Mar t nez' s sect i on- 1983 cl ai m.

St at ut e of Li mi t at i ons

For anyone not up- t o- speed on how a st atut e- of -

l i mi t at i ons anal ysi s wor ks f or a sect i on- 1983 cl ai m, her e' s a qui ck

pr i mer .

Because sect i on 1983 does not have i t s own st at ute of

l i mi t at i ons ( i . e. , a pr ovi si on i nt ended t o pr ot ect def endant s f r om

havi ng t o def end agai nst st al e cl ai ms) , cour t s use t he per sonal -

i nj ur y l i mi t at i ons per i od adopt ed by t he st at e wher e t he i nj ur y

supposedl y occur r ed i n Puer t o Ri co, one year . 6 See, e. g. , Mor r i s

v. Gov' t Dev. Bank of P. R. , 27 F. 3d 746, 748 ( 1st Ci r . 1994)

5 Fyi : A f eder al st at ut e pr ovi di ng t hat "' [ n] o acti on shal l bebr ought wi t h r espect t o pr i son condi t i ons under sect i on 1983 . . .by a pr i soner . . . unt i l such admi ni st r at i ve r emedi es as ar e

avai l abl e ar e exhaust ed' " r equi r es pr i soner s ( and onl ypr i soner s) t o exhaust admi ni st r at i ve remedi es bef or e br i ngi ng asect i on- 1983 sui t . See Woodf ord v. Ngo, 548 U. S. 81, 87- 88 ( 2006)( quot i ng 42 U. S. C. 1997e( a) ) .

6 Our cases t r eat Puer t o Ri co as a st at e f or sect i on- 1983 pur poses.See, e. g. , Gr aj al es v. P. R. Por t s Aut h. , 682 F. 3d 40, 46 ( 1st Ci r .2012) .


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( ci t i ng, among ot her t hi ngs, P. R. Laws Ann. t i t . 31, 5298( 2) ) .

Cour t s use f eder al l aw, t hough, t o f i gur e out when t he l i mi t at i on

cl ock st ar t s t i cki ng. So f or , say, an oust ed publ i c empl oyee

pushi ng a pol i t i cal - di scr i mi nat i on cl ai m, our r ul e i s t hat t he

t i cki ng st ar t s when she knew or had r eason t o know of t he i nj ur y

on whi ch her cl ai m r est s. And t hi s i s t r ue even i f she di d not

know t hat pol i t i cal ani mus had caused her i nj ur y. See i d. at 749-

50 ( expl ai ni ng t hat a pl ai nt i f f "need not know al l t he f act s t hat

suppor t [ her ] cl ai m i n or der f or [ t he l i mi t at i ons] count down t o

commence" ) ; see al so Moral es- Taon v. P. R. El ec. Power Aut h. , 524

F. 3d 15, 18 ( 1st Ci r . 2008) ( ci t i ng Mar r er o- Gut i r r ez v. Mol i na,

491 F. 3d 1, 5- 6 ( 1st Ci r . 2007) ) . But j ust as we bor r ow t he

st at e' s l i mi t at i ons per i od i n sect i on- 1983 cases, so t oo we bor r ow

t he st at e' s t ol l i ng r ul i ngs unl ess of cour se t hey ar e host i l e t o

f eder al i nt er est s. See, e. g. , Rodr guez, 659 F. 3d at 173; Lpez

Gonzl ez v. Mun. of Comer o, 404 F. 3d 548, 552 ( 1st Ci r . 2005) .

One t ol l i ng r ul e a r ul e cour t s const r ue nar r owl y agai nst t he

per son seeki ng i t s pr ot ect i on pr ovi des t hat an "ext r aj udi ci al

cl ai m" can "i nt er r upt [ ] " t he st at ut e of l i mi t at i ons, causi ng t he

l i mi t at i ons per i od t o r est ar t . See P. R. Laws Ann. t i t . 31, 5303;

Rodr guez Nar vez v. Nazar i o, 895 F. 2d 38, 43- 44 ( 1st Ci r . 1990)

( di scussi ng Puer t o Ri co l aw) .


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Back t o our case. Li ke t he di st r i ct j udge, we bel i eve

t he l i mi t at i ons count down began on J anuary 15, 2010 t he day

Mar t nez l ear ned aut hor i t at i vel y of her t er mi nat i on, pl us t he

r eason f or i t ( t he l egi t i macy of whi ch she coul d t hen assess) ,

even t hough, as she poi nt s out , t he mi ssi ve made t he oust er

ef f ect i ve Febr uary 19, 2010. And we r each t hi s concl usi on because

"i n empl oyment di scr i mi nat i on act i ons, l i mi t at i ons per i ods

normal l y st ar t t o r un when the empl oyer ' s deci si on i s made and

communi cat ed t o t he af f ect ed empl oyee. " Mor r i s, 27 F. 3d at 750

( col l ect i ng casel aw) ; see al so Ri ver a- Mur i ent e, 959 F. 2d 349, 353

( emphasi zi ng t hat " [ i ] n empl oyment di scr i mi nat i on cases i nvol vi ng

wr ongf ul di schar ges, t he st at ut e of l i mi t at i ons begi ns t o r un when

t he pl ai nt i f f l ear ns of t he deci si on t o t er mi nat e hi s empl oyment

( even i f t he not i ce he r ecei ves i s i nf or mal ) ") .

"Nor mal l y" i mpl i es t hat except i ons exi st , Mar t nez

pr ot est s. And she t hi nks t hat t he ci r cumst ances of her case ar e

among t hem because ( her ar gument cont i nues) she di d not know t hat

pol i t i cal ani mus l ay behi nd her f i r i ng unt i l t he VRA r epl aced her

wi t h per sons af f i l i at ed wi t h a par t y di f f er ent f r om her s somet i me

af t er Febr uar y 19, 2010 meani ng ( by her l i ght s) t hat she t i mel y

f i l ed her sect i on- 1983 cl ai m on Febr uar y 17, 2011 ( i . e. , bef or e

t he one- year l i mi t at i on per i od had expi r ed) .


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We are unmoved. Put t o one si de t hat Mar t nez' s

compl ai nt suggest s she knew ( or at l east had char geabl e knowl edge)

of t he pol i t i cal ani mus wel l bef ore her r epl acement s came on boar d

don' t f or get , t he compl ai nt al l eged t hat t he st r ess caused by

t he "pol i t i cal . . . di scri mi nat i on" heaped on her af f ect ed her

abi l i t y t o wor k i n and ar ound t he t i me of J anuary 2010. What dooms

her ef f or t her e i s t hat our cases ( as we not ed a f ew par agr aphs

back) f l at l y r ej ect t he i dea t hat a cl ai m onl y accr ues and t he

l i mi t at i ons count down onl y st ar t s when "t he pl ai nt i f f knows of

bot h t he i nj ur y and t he di scr i mi nat ory ani mus. " See Mar r er o-

Gut i r r ez, 491 F. 3d at 6. St at ed di f f er ent l y ( and mor e

col or f ul l y) , a pl ai nt i f f ' s "cause of act i on" does not "exi st[ ] i n

what amount s t o a st at e of suspended ani mat i on unt i l " she i s " aware

of t he . . . pol i t i cal mot i ves behi nd t he adver se empl oyment

deci si on. " See Mor r i s, 27 F. 3d at 749- 50.

So agai n, t he l i mi t at i ons per i od expi r ed one year af t er

J anuar y 15, 2010 i . e. , about a mont h bef or e Mar t nez f i l ed sui t .

Her onl y hope t hen i s t o convi nce us t hat some t ol l i ng act

occur r ed. And she t r i es t o do j ust t hat . Ci t i ng sect i on 5303,

Mar t nez argues t hat her August 2010 EEOC f i l i ng i s an

"ext r aj udi ci al cl ai m" t hat caused t he l i mi t at i ons t er m t o st ar t

anew meani ng ( at l east i n her mi nd) t hat she di d f i l e her Febr uar y

2011 f eder al compl ai nt wi t hi n t he one- year per i od.


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Cal l us unconvi nced. The par t i es ci t e no t r ansl at ed

case f r om t he Puer t o Ri co Supr eme Cour t ( and no case f r om us or

t he Uni t ed St at es Supr eme Cour t i nt er pr et i ng Puer t o Ri co l aw)

hol di ng t hat an EEOC compl ai nt can t ol l t he l i mi t at i ons per i od f or

a sect i on- 1983 cl ai m based on t he same cor e of f act s. But ,

t hankf ul l y, t he casel aw out t her e does provi de enough l i ght t o

i l l umi nat e t he pat h t o deci si on.

For i nst ance, cases say t hat t o have any t ol l i ng ef f ect ,

an ext r aj udi ci al cl ai m must be i dent i cal t o t he l at er sui t i n

sever al r espect s: t he t wo "must be asser t ed agai nst t he same

def endant s i n t he same capaci t i es" "new def endant s shoul d not be

added" ; t hey "must be based on t he same subst ant i ve cl ai ms" ; and

t hey "must seek t he same f or m of r el i ef . " Rodr guezGar c a v.

Mun. of Caguas, 354 F. 3d 91, 98 ( 1st Ci r . 2004) ( di scussi ng t ol l i ng

under sect i on 5303) . The pur pose behi nd t he i dent i cal i t y

r equi r ement i s t o st op pl ai nt i f f s f r om si dest eppi ng "t he not i ce

f uncti on of t he st at ut e[ ] of l i mi t at i ons" when t hey f i l e t hei r

"bel at ed f eder al cour t compl ai nt s. " I d. at 97.

The f i r st pr obl em f or Mar t nez al l but l eaps of f t he

pages of t he r ecord: her EEOC char ge named onl y t he VRA and i t s

admi ni st r at or , Nydi a Col n Zayas conspi cuousl y absent ar e t he

other def endant s named i n t hi s sui t . And so we easi l y concl ude

t hat t he l i mi t at i ons per i od cannot be t ol l ed as t o t he par t i es


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unnamed i n t he EEOC charge, even wi t hout get t i ng i nt o t hi cket of

whet her an EEOC compl ai nt can t ol l a pol i t i cal - di scr i mi nat i on-

based sect i on- 1983 cl ai m.

But we cannot avoi d t hi s t hi cket i n deal i ng wi t h t he VRA

and i t s admi ni st r at or . Taki ng i t one st ep at a t i me, t hough, we

see t hat t he Puer t o Ri co Supr eme Cour t says t hat t he f i l i ng of an

admi ni st r at i ve compl ai nt wi l l not t ol l t he st at ut e of l i mi t at i ons

i f t he agency l acks j ur i sdi ct i on over t he char ge t he i dea

appar ent l y bei ng t hat i n such a si t uat i on, t he admi ni st r at i ve

compl ai nt and t he l at er - f i l ed j udi ci al cl ai m cannot be i dent i cal

f or t ol l i ng pur poses. See Ci nt r n v. E. L. A. , 127 D. P. R. 582, 594

( 1990) ( Engl i sh t r ansl at i on avai l abl e at 1990 WL 658719) ; see al so

Secretar i o del Tr abaj o v. Fi net ex Hosi er y Co. , 16 P. R. Of f i c.

Tr ans. 1014, 1019- 20 ( 1986) . The par t i es who agree on l i t t l e

el se agr ee t hat t he EEOC does not have j ur i sdi ct i on over sect i on-

1983 cl ai ms f or pol i t i cal di scri mi nat i on. 7 Havi ng uncover ed no

aut hor i t y t o t he cont r ar y, and gi ven Puer t o Ri co' s t ol l i ng casel aw,

we concl ude that Mar t nez' s EEOC f i l i ng di d not r eset t he

7 Af t er st r essi ng t hat t he EEOC i s r esponsi bl e f or enf or ci ng l awspr ohi bi t i ng empl oyer s f r om di scri mi nat i ng agai nst j ob appl i cant sor empl oyees on t he basi s of r ace, col or , r el i gi on, sex ( i ncl udi ngpr egnancy) , nat i onal or i gi nal , di sabi l i t y, age ( 40 or over ) , orgenet i c i nf or mat i on, Mar t nez, f or exampl e, wr i t es t hat not abl ymi ssi ng f r omt hi s l i st i s anyt hi ng gr ant i ng t he EEOC "j ur i sdi ct i on"over " pol i t i cal di scr i mi nat i on cl ai ms. "


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l i mi t at i ons cl ock f or her secti on- 1983 pol i t i cal - di scr i mi nat i on

cl ai m.

As f or whet her t hi s r esul t j i bes wi t h f eder al i nt er est s,

we t hi nk t hat i t does. Her e i s why. Our j udi ci al super i or s have

sai d t hat Reconst r uct i on- Er a ci vi l - r i ght s act s l i ke sect i ons 1981

and 1983 "exi st i ndependent of any ot her l egal or admi ni st r at i ve

r el i ef t hat may be avai l abl e as a mat t er of f eder al or st at e l aw. "

Bur net t v. Gr at t an, 468 U. S. 42, 50 ( 1984) ( emphasi s added) . They

have al so sai d t hat a di scr i mi nat i on char ge f i l ed wi t h t he EEOC

does not t ol l t he l i mi t at i ons per i od f or a sect i on- 1981 act i on

based on t he same f act s ( sect i on 1981, r emember , pr otect s cer t ai n

r i ght s agai nst r aci al di scr i mi nat i on) . See J ohnson v. Ry. Expr ess

Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 466 ( 1975) . For our par t , we have i ndi cated

wi t hout hol di ng t hat t he l ogi c of J ohnson suggest s "no" i s t he

r i ght answer t o t he quest i on of whet her f i l i ng an EEOC charge

af f ect s t he l i mi t at i ons per i od f or a sect i on- 1983 cl ai m. See

Ci nt r n- Lor enzo v. Fondo del Segur o del Est ado, 634 F. 3d 1, 2 ( 1st

Ci r . 2011) . And ul t i mat el y, Mar t nez of f er s no compel l i ng ar gument

as t o why today' s deci si on whi ch makes expl i ci t what Ci nt r n-

Lor enzo i mpl i es cont r avenes f eder al i nt er est s.

The net r esul t of al l t hi s i s t hat Mar t nez' s sect i on-

1983 cl ai m i s t i me- bar r ed. So we af f i r m t he di smi ssal of t hi s

cl ai m ( al bei t on di f f er ent gr ounds) and push ahead.


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Disability Discrimination (ADA Claim)

As we sai d many pages ago, t he j udge di d not expl ai n why

he ki cked out Mar t nez' s ADA cl ai m of di sabi l i t y di scri mi nat i on.

But based on our r eadi ng of hi s or der , we bel i eve t hat he i nt ended

t o di smi ss t hat cl ai m on t he same gr ounds as t he sect i on- 1983

cl ai m: i . e. , f ai l ur e t o exhaust admi ni st r at i ve r emedi es, because

she sued about a mont h bef or e get t i ng t he r i ght - t o- sue l et t er .

The par t i es ar e of t he same vi ew, appar ent l y, because t hei r br i ef s

spi l l much i nk over whet her t he ADA cl ai m f ai l s on f ai l ur e- t o-

exhaust gr ounds.

Let ' s st ep back t o gai n some perspect i ve. The ADA,

br oadl y speaki ng, pr ohi bi t s "cover ed ent i t [ i es] " f r om

"di scri mi nat [ i ng] agai nst " qual i f i ed per sons because of t hei r

di sabi l i t i es. See 42 U. S. C. 12112( a) , ( b) ( 1) . Model ed on Ti t l e

VI I of t he Ci vi l Ri ght s Act of 1964, t he ADA i ncor por at es t hat

st at ut e' s enf or cement pr ovi si ons, i ncl udi ng ( as r el evant t o t he

t ype of ADA cl ai m i n pl ay her e) t he r equi r ement t hat a pl ai nt i f f

exhaust her admi ni st r at i ve remedi es bef or e seeki ng j udi ci al

r edr ess. See, e. g. , Boni l l a v. Muebl es J . J . Al var ez, I nc. , 194

F. 3d 275, 277- 78 ( 1st Ci r . 1999) . Mor e speci f i cal l y ( and

si mpl i f yi ng sl i ght l y, wi t hout af f ecti ng t he anal ysi s) , one par t of

t he st at ut or y schemat i c cr eat es f eder al j ur i sdi ct i on over al l

"act i ons br ought under " t he st at ut e, see 42 U. S. C. 2000e- 5( f ) ( 3) ;


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and anot her set s out condi t i ons precedent t o br i ngi ng sui t , among

whi ch ar e f i l i ng a t i mel y char ge wi t h t he EEOC, see i d. 2000e-

5( e) ( 1) , and r ecei vi ng an EEOC r i ght - t o- sue l et t er bef or e sui ng i n

f eder al cour t , see i d. 2000e- 5( f ) ( 1) .

As f ar as pr ecedent s go, t he Supr eme Cour t hol ds t hat

t he t i mel y- char ge r equi r ement i s mandat or y but not j ur i sdi ct i onal

t he r at i onal e bei ng t hat t he t i mel i ness pr ovi si on i s ent i r el y

separ at e f r omt he st at ut e' s j ur i sdi ct i onal pr ovi si on and "does not

speak i n j ur i sdi ct i onal t er ms. " See Zi pes v. Tr ans Wor l d Ai r l i nes,

I nc. , 455 U. S. 385, 393, 394 ( 1982) . Al l of t hi s means t hat t he

t i mel i ness r equi r ement i s subj ect t o wai ver , est oppel , and t ol l i ng

when equi t y r equi r es. See i d. at 393; see al so gener al l y Ar baugh

v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U. S. 500, 516 ( 2006) ( st r essi ng t hat "when

Congr ess does not r ank a st at ut or y l i mi t at i on on cover age as

j ur i sdi ct i onal , cour t s shoul d t r eat t he r est r i ct i on as

nonj ur i sdi ct i onal i n char act er ") . The pr ovi si on r equi r i ng not i ce

of a r i ght t o sue i s al so separ at e f r om t he j ur i sdi ct i onal

pr ovi si on. And i n a case t ouchi ng on t hat r equi r ement , we sai d

t hat "[ a] l t hough [ pl ai nt i f f ] f i l ed her or i gi nal cour t compl ai nt

bef or e she f i l ed her EEOC compl ai nt , [ she] di d r ecei ve a r i ght t o

sue l et t er " event ual l y and def endant s have not ar gued t he poi nt ;

so consi st ent wi t h Zi pes' s hol di ng about del ay i n f i l i ng char ges

not af f ecti ng j ur i sdi cti on and t he appl i cabi l i t y of equi t abl e


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except i ons l i ke wai ver we f ound "t he poi nt . . . wai ved. "

O' Rour ke v. Ci t y of Pr ovi dence, 235 F. 3d 713, 725 n. 3 ( 1st Ci r .

2001) ( quot i ng Zi pes) ; see al so Fr eder i que- Al exandr e v. Dep' t of

Nat . & Envt l . Res. of P. R. , 478 F. 3d 433, 440 ( 1st Ci r . 2007)

( hol di ng "t hat t he exhaust i on r equi r ement i s not a j ur i sdi ct i onal

pr er equi si t e, but r at her i s subj ect t o" equi t abl e except i ons, but

not i ng t hat "f ut i l i t y" does not f al l wi t hi n t he smal l f i el d of

except i ons) . O' Rour ke echoes t he pr evai l i ng vi ew el sewher e, whi ch

we now expr essl y adopt as our own: i . e. , t hat whi l e t he r i ght -

t o- sue- l et t er r equi r ement r emai ns, i t i s si mpl y "a pr econdi t i on t o

br i ngi ng" sui t , not a j ur i sdi ct i onal bar , and t hus "can be wai ved

by t he par t i es or t he cour t . " Pi et r as v. Bd. of Fi r e Comm' r s of

Far mi ngvi l l e Fi r e Di st . , 180 F. 3d 468, 474 ( 2d Ci r . 1999)

( col l ect i ng casel aw) ; see al so Sur r el l v. Ca. Wat er Ser v. Co. , 518

F. 3d 1097, 1104- 05 ( 9t h Ci r . 2008) ; Wor t h v. Tyer , 276 F. 3d 249,

259 ( 7t h Ci r . 2001) ; J ones v. Am. St ate Bank, 857 F. 2d 494, 499,

500 ( 8t h Ci r . 1988) .

At oral argument , def endant s' l awyer changed hi s

posi t i on, wai vi ng any ar gument about t he r i ght - t o- sue l et t er by

essent i al l y agr eei ng wi t h Mar t nez t hat t he j udge shoul d not have

di smi ssed t he ADA cl ai m on t hat gr ound. Consi st ent wi t h O' Rour ke,

we accept def endant s' wai ver and rever se t he di smi ssal of t hat


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cl ai m. 8 And gi ven our concl usi on, we need not ponder Mar t nez' s

t heor y that t he EEOC' s event ual l y gi vi ng her a r i ght - t o- sue l et t er

cur ed any i ssues wi t h her pr emat ur el y f i l i ng sui t .

Age Discrimination (ADEA Claim)

As f or Mar t nez' s supposed ADEA cl ai mt he ADEA, r oughl y

speaki ng, pr ot ect s per sons 40 year s ol d or ol der f r om age- based

empl oyment di scr i mi nat i on, see Adamson v. Wal gr eens Co. , 750 F. 3d

73, 78 ( 1st Ci r . 2014) we need onl y say t hi s. Mar t nez' s had t o

exhaust her admi ni st r at i ve r emedi es bef ore br i ngi ng an age-

di scr i mi nat i on cl ai m under t he ADEA t o cour t . See J or ge v.

Rumsf el d, 404 F. 3d 556, 561 ( 1st Ci r . 2005) ( ci t i ng 29 U. S. C.

626( d) ) ; see al so gener al l y Kal e v. Combi ned I ns. Co. , 861 F. 2d

746, 751- 52 ( 1st Ci r . 1988) ( not i ng t hat t he char ge- f i l i ng

r equi r ement i s mandat or y, t hough not j ur i sdi ct i onal ) . And she

r i ght l y concedes as much. But she di d not ment i on age

di scr i mi nat i on i n her EEOC char ge; she al l eged onl y pol i t i cal and

8 Def endant s' counsel di d not e bef or e us t hat he t hought Mar t nez' sADA cl ai m shoul d not get t o a j ur y. And hi s cl i ent s' br i ef doesar gue that Mar t nez has not shown t hat her di sabi l i t y

"subst ant i al l y l i mi t s" a maj or l i f e acti vi t y. But cour t s mustconst r ue t he " subst ant i al l y l i mi t ed" st andar d "broadl y i n f avor ofexpansi ve cover age, " wi t hout "demand[ i ng] extensi ve anal ysi s. "29 C. F. R. 1630. 2( j ) ( i ) , ( i i i ) . Mar t nez does al l ege t hat herdi sabi l i t y "i mpai r s her mobi l i t y at a r egul ar r at e t han ot hernondi sabl ed i ndi vi dual s. " And we must accept t hi s al l egat i on ast r ue at t hi s st age of t he l i t i gat i on. Def endant s' ar gument i s atbest f odder f or a summary- j udgment mot i on, not a mot i on t o di smi ss.


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di sabi l i t y di scr i mi nat i on. And gi ven her f at al f ai l ur e t o exhaust ,

her supposed ADEA cl ai m does not bel ong i n f eder al cour t whi ch

compel s us t o af f i r m t he di smi ssal of t hi s cl ai m.

Local-Law Claims

That l eaves one l oose end. The j udge ( we r emi nd t he

r eader ) di d not expl ai n why Mar t nez' s l ocal - l aw cl ai ms had t o go

( he spent no t i me on whet her any of t hese cl ai ms has l egs, f or

exampl e) t hough we assume t hat havi ng di smi ssed t he f ederal

cl ai ms, he decl i ned t o exer ci se suppl ement al j ur i sdi ct i on over t he

l ocal - l aw cl ai ms. The par t i es gi ve us no r eason t o assume

other wi se. Gi ven t hat assumpt i on, and because we are r ever si ng

t he di smi ssal of t he ADA cl ai m, t he j udge on remand must r ei nst ate

t he l ocal - l aw cl ai ms too. Of cour se i f t he j udge agai n get s ri d

of t he ADA cl ai m bef or e t r i al , he "can r eassess whet her t o keep

j ur i sdi ct i on over t he l ocal - l aw cl ai ms. " Ri ver a- Cor r al i za v.

Pui g- Mor al es, 794 F. 3d 208, 227 ( 1st Ci r . 2015) .

Final Words

To t he ext ent t hat Mar t nez' s br i ef s hi nt at ot her

argument s, t hey l ack coherence, devel opment , or bot h. 9 And i nst ead

9 One exampl e i s her ment i oni ng t he cont i nui ngvi ol at i on except i ont o t he sect i on- 1983 l i mi t at i ons per i od. Put t i ng asi de t he f actt hat she dbut ed t hi s concept i n her r epl y br i ef , see Ei r by, 515F. 3d at 37 n. 4 ( hol di ng t hat an ar gument omi t t ed f r om anappel l ant ' s openi ng br i ef i s gener al l y deemed wai ved) , she makesnothi ng more t han a passi ng r ef er ence t o i t . Thus any argument i nt hat di r ect i on i s wai ved. See Rol and M. v. Concord Sch. Comm. ,


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of t r yi ng t o hazar d our own guess as t o "what t hese ar gument s may

or may not por t end, " we do what we have done bef or e ( i ncl udi ng i n

t hi s ver y opi ni on) r el y on t he f ami l i ar r ul e t hat i nsuf f i ci ent l y-

devel oped ar gument s ar e wai ved. See Mar ek v. Rhode I sl and, 702

F. 3d 650, 655 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) ( quot i ng Zanni no, 895 F. 2d at 17) . 10

So our wor k i s at an end, wi t h t he bot t om l i ne bei ng

t hat we af f i r m t he j udge i n ever y respect , except t hat we r ever se

t he di smi ssal of bot h Mar t nez' s ADA cl ai m and her l ocal - l aw

cl ai ms.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs to

either side.

910 F. 2d 983, 997 n. 8 ( 1st Ci r . 1990) ( r el yi ng on Zanni no f or t hepoi nt t hat " i ssues adver t ed t o i n passi ng, wi t hout any at t empt atdevel oped argument at i on, are wai ved") .

10 See al so gener al l y Uni t ed St at es v. Cunni ngham, 429 F. 3d 673,678 ( 7t h Ci r . 2005) ( Posner , J . ) ( emphasi zi ng t hat "appel l at ej udges" ar e not r equi r ed " t o di scuss every ar gument made by al i t i gant ; ar gument s cl ear l y wi t hout mer i t can, and f or t he sake ofj udi ci al economy shoul d, be passed over i n si l ence") ; Uni t ed St at esv. Mena, 933 F. 2d 19, 30 ( 1st Ci r . 1991) ( i mpl i ci t l y r ecogni zi ngt hat ver y poi nt ) .

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