23
edited and with an introduction by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture University of Illinois Press Urbana and Chicago
edited
and
with
anin
troductio
nby
Cary
Nelson
and
Law
renceG
rossb
erg
Marx
isman
dth
eIn
terp
reta
tion
of
Cultu
re
University
ofIllinois
Press
Urbana
andC
hicago
The
originaltitle
ofthis
paperw
as“P
ower,
Desire,
lnterest.”Indeed,
whatever
power
thesem
editationscom
mand
may
havebeen
earnedby
apolitically
interestedrefusal
topush
tothe
limit
thefound-
presuppositionsof
my
desires,as
faras
theyare
within
my
grasp.T
hisIgarthree-stroke
formula,
appliedboth
tothe
most
resolutelycom
mitted
dto
them
ostironic
discourse,keeps
trackof
what
Aithusser
soaptly
med
“philosophiesof
denegation.”2
Ihave
invokedm
ypositionality
ins
awkw
ardw
ayso
asto
accentuatethe
factthat
callingthe
placeof
ther
intoquestion
remains
am
eaninglesspiety
inm
anyrecent
cii--
fthesovereign
subject.T
hus,although
Iw
illattem
ptto
foregroundthe
precariousnessof
my
positionthroughout,
Iknow
suchgestures
cannever
suffice.T
hispaper
willm
ove,bya
necessarilycircuitous
route,from
acritique
ofcurrentW
esternefforts
toproblem
atizethe
subjectto
thequestion
of howthe
third-world
subjectis
representedw
ithinW
esternd
isu
rse.
Along
thew
ay,I
will
haveoccasion
tosuggest
thata
stillm
ored
decenteringof
thesubject
is,in
fact,im
plicitin
bothM
arxand
la. And
Iw
illhaverecourse,
perhapssurprisingly,
toan
argumentthat
iintellectualproduction
is,in
many
ways,
complicit
with
Western
tionaleconom
icinterests.
Inthe
end,I
will
offeran
alternativean
alysisofthe
relationsbetw
eenthe
discoursesof
theW
estand
thepossibility
ofspeakingo
f(or
for)the
subalternw
oman.I
willdraw
my
specificexam
plesfrom
thecase
ofIndia,
discussingat
lengththe
extraordinarilyparadoxical
statusofthe
British
abolitionof
widow
sacrifice.
Som
eof
them
ostradical
criticismcom
ingout
of
theW
esttodayis
theresult
ofan
interesteddesire
toconserve
thesubject
ofthe
West, or
theW
estas
Subject.T
hetheory
ofpluralized
“subject-effects”givesan
illusionofunderm
iningsubjective
sovereigntyw
hileoften
pro
vid
inga
coverfor
thissubject
of
knowledge.
Although
thehistory
ofE
uropeasSubject is
narrativizedby
thelaw
,politicaleconom
y,and
ideologyofthe
West,
thisconcealed
Subject
pretendsit
has“no
geo-politicaldeterm
ina
Uayatn
hak
rav
orty
Spiv
ak
Can
the
Subaltern
Speak
?
tions.”T
hem
uch-publicizedcritique
of
thesovereign
subjectthus
actuallyinaugurates
aSubject.
Iw
illargue
forthis
conclusionby
consideringa
textby
two
greatpractitioners
of
thecritique:
“Intellectualsand
Power:
AC
onversation
between
Michel
Foucault
andG
illesD
eleuze.”3
Ihave
chosenthis
friendlyexchange
between
two
activistphi
losophersofhistory
becauseit
undoesthe
oppositionbetw
eenauthoritative
theoreticalproductionand
theunguarded
practiceof conversation,enabling
oneto
glimpse
thetrack
ofideology.
The
participantsin
thisconversation
emphasize
them
ost importantcontributions
ofFrench
poststructuralisttheory:
first,that
thenetw
orksof
power/desire/interest
areso
heterogeneousthat
theirreduction
toa
coherentnarrative
iscounterproductive—
aper
sistentcritique
isneeded;
andsecond,
thatintellectuals
must
attempt
todisclose
andknow
thediscourse
ofsociety’s
Other.
Yet
thetw
osystem
atically
ignorethe
questionof
ideologyand
theirow
nim
plicationin
intellectual
andeconom
ichistory.
Although
oneof
itschief
presuppositionsis
thecritique
ofthe
sovereignsubject,the
conversationbetw
eenF
oucaultandD
eleuzeis
framed
bytw
om
onolithicand
anonymous
subjects-in-revolution:“A
Maoist”
(FD,
205)and
“thew
orkers’struggle”
(FD,
217).Intellectuals, how
ever,arenam
edand
differentiated;m
oreover,a
Chinese
Maoism
isnow
hereoperative.
Maoism
heresim
plycreates
anaura
ofnarrative
specificity,w
hichw
ouldbe
aharm
lessrhetorical
banalityw
ereit
notthat
theinnocentappropriation
ofthe
propernam
e“M
aoism”
forthe
eccentricphenom
enonof
Frenchintellectual
“Maoism
”and
subsequent“N
ewP
hilosophy”sym
ptomatically
renders“A
sia”tran
sparen
t.4
Deleuze’s
referenceto
thew
orkers’struggle
isequally
problem
atic;it
isobviously
agenuflection:
“We
areunable
totouch
[power]
inany
pointof
itsapplication
without
findingourselves
confrontedby
thisdiffuse
mass,
sothat
we
arenecessarily
led...
tothe
desireto
blowit
upcom
pletely.E
verypartial
revolutionaryattack
ordefense
islinked
inthis
way
tothe
workers’
struggle”(FD
,217).
The
apparentbanality
signalsa
disavowal.
The
statement
ignoresthe
internationaldivision
of
labor,a
ges-
turethat
oftenm
arkspoststructuralist
politicalth
eory
.5
The
invocationof
thew
orkers’struggle
isbalefulin
itsvery
innocence;it isincapable
ofdealingw
ithglobal
capitalism:
thesubject-production
ofw
orkerand
unemployed
within
nation-stateideologies
inits
Center;
theincreasing
subtractionofthe
working
classin
theP
eripheryfrom
therealization
of
surplusvalue
andthus
from“hum
anistic”training
inconsum
erism;
andthe
large-scalepres-
enceof paracapitalist
laboras
well
asthe
heterogeneousstructural
statusof
agriculturein
theP
eriphery.Ignoring
theinternational
divisionof
laborrendering
“Asia”
(andon
occasion“A
frica”)transparent
(unlessthe
subjectis
ostensiblythe
“Third
World”); reestablishing
thelegalsubject o
f socializedcapital—
theseare
problems
ascom
mon
tom
uchpoststructuralistas
tostruc-.
turalisttheory.W
hyshould
suchocclusions
besanctioned
inprecisely
thoseintellectuals
who
areour
bestprophets
ofheterogeneity
andthe
Other?
The
linkto
thew
orkers’struggle
islocated
inthe
desireto
blowup
power
atany
pointof
itsapplication.
This
siteis
apparentlybased
ona
simple
valorizationofany
desiredestructive
ofanypow
er.WalterB
enjamin
comm
entson
Baudelaire’s
comparable
politicsby
way
ofquotations
fromM
arx:
Gay
atriC
hak
ravorty
Spiv
akM
arxcontinues
inhis
descriptionofthe
conspirateursde
professionas
follows:
“.
..T
heyhave
noother
aimbut
theim
mediate
oneof
overthrowing
theexisting
government,
andthey
profoundlydespise
them
oretheoretical
enlightenment
ofthe
workers
asto
theirclass
interests.T
hustheir
anger—not
proletarianbut
plebian—at
thehabits
noirs(black
coats),the
more
orless
educatedpeople
who
represent[vertreten]thatside
of them
ovement
andofw
homthey
cannever
become
entirelyindependent,
asthey
cannoto
f theofficial re
presentatives
[Repräsentanten]
ofthe
party.”B
aud
elaire’s
politicalinsights
donot
gofundam
entallybe
yondthe
insightsofthese
professionalconspirators.H
ecould
perhapshave
made
Flaubert’s
statement,
“Of
allof politics
Iunderstand
onlyone
thing:the
revolt,”his
ow
n.
6
The
linkto
thew
orkers’struggle
islocated,
simply,
indesire.
Elsewhere,
Deleuze
andG
uattarihave
attempted
analternative
definitionofdesire,
revisingthe
oneoffered
bypsychoanalysis:
“Desire
doesnot
lackanything;
itdoes
notlack
itsobject.
Itis,
rather,the
subjectthat
islacking
indesire,
ordesire
thatlacks
afixed
subject;there
isno
fixedsubject
exceptby
repression.D
esireand
itsobject
area
unity:it
isthe
machine,
asa
machine
ofa
machine.
Desire
ism
achine,the
objectof
desirealso
aco
nnected
machine,
sothat
theproduct
islifted
fromthe
processof producing,
andsom
ethingdetaches
itselffromproducing
toproductand
givesa
leftoverto
thevagabond,
nomad
sub
ject.”7
This
definitiondoes
not alterthe
specificityofthe
desiringsubject
(orleftover
subject-effect)that
attachesto
specificinstances
ofdesire
orto
productionof
thedesiring
machine.
Moreover,
when
theconnection
be
tween
desireand
thesubject
istaken
asirrelevant
orm
erelyreversed,
thesubject-effect
thatsurreptitiously
emerges
ism
uchlike
thegeneralized
ide
ologicalsubject
ofthe
theorist.T
hism
aybe
thelegal
subjectof
socializedcapital,
neitherlabor
norm
anagement,
holdinga
“strong”passport,
usinga
“strong”or
“hard”currency,
with
supposedlyunquestioned
accessto
dueprocess.
Itis
certainlynot
thedesiring
subjectas
Other.
The
failureof
Deleuze
andG
uattarito
considerthe
relationsbetw
eendesire,
power,
andsubjectivity
rendersthem
incapableof
articulating
atheory
ofinterests.
Inthis
context,their
indifferenceto
ideology(a
theoryof
which
isnecessary
foran
understandingof
interests)is
strikingbut
consistent.F
oucault’scom
mitm
entto
“genealogical”speculation
pre
ventshim
fromlocating,
in“great
names”
likeM
arxand
Freud,
watersheds
insom
econtinuous
streamof
intellectualhisto
ry.
8T
hiscom
mitm
enthas
createdan
unfortunateresistance
inF
oucault’sw
orkto
“mere”
ideologicalcritique.
Western
speculationson
theideological
reproductionof
socialre
lationsbelong
tothat
mainstream
,and
itis
within
thistradition
thatA
lthusser
writes:
“The
reproductionof
labourpow
errequires
notonly
are
productionof
itsskills,
butalso
atthe
same
time,
areproduction
ofits
submission
tothe
rulingideology
forthe
workers,
anda
reproductionof
theability
tom
anipulatethe
rulingideology
correctlyfor
theagents
of
ii
II
Gay
atriC
hak
ravortY
Spiv
aK
exploitationand
repression,so
thatthey,
too,w
illprovide
forthe
domi
nationof the
rulingclass
‘inand
byw
ords’[par
laparole].”9
When
Foucault
considersthe
pervasiveheterogeneity
ofpow
er,he
doesnot
ignorethe
imm
enseinstitutional
heterogeneitythat
Aithusser
hereattem
ptsto
schematize.
Sim
ilarly,inspeaking
ofalliancesand
systems
ofsigns,
thestate
andw
ar-machines
(mule
plateaux),D
eleuzeand
Guattari
areopening
upthat
veryfield.
Foucault
cannot,how
ever,adm
itthat
adeveloped
theoryof
ideologyrecognizes
itsow
nm
aterialproduction
ininstitutionality,
asw
ellas
inthe
“effectiveinstrum
entsfor
theform
ationand
accumulation
ofknow
ledge”(PK
,102).
Because
thesephilosophers
seemobliged
toreject
allargum
entsnam
ingthe
conceptofideology
asonly
schematic
ratherthan
textual,they
areequally
obligedto
producea
me
chanicallyschem
aticopposition
between
interestanddesire.T
husthey
alignthem
selvesw
ithbourgeois
sociologistsw
hofill
theplace
of ideologyw
itha
continuistic“unconscious”
ora
parasubjective“culture.”
The
mechanical
relationbetw
eendesire
andinterest
isclear
insuch
sentencesas:
“We
neverdesire
againstour
interests,because
interestalw
aysfollow
sand
findsitself
where
desirehas
placedit”
(FD, 215).A
nundifferentiated
desireis
theagent,
andpow
erslips
into
createthe
effectsofdesire:“pow
er..
.producespositive
effectsat
thelevel
ofdesire—
andalso
atthe
levelof
knowledge”
(PK,
59).T
hisparasubjective
matrix,
cross-hatchedw
ithheterogeneity,
ushersin
theunnam
edSubject,
atleast
forthose
intellectualw
orkersinflu
encedby
thenew
hegemony
ofdesire.
The
racefor
“thelast
instance”is
nowbetw
eeneconom
icsand
power.
Because
desireis
tacitlydefined
onan
orthodoxm
odel,it
isunitarily
opposedto
“beingdeceived.”
Ideologyas
“falseconsciousness”
(beingdeceived)
hasbeen
calledinto
questionby
Aithusser.
Even
Reich
implied
notionsof
collectivew
illrather
thana
di
chotomy
ofdeception
andundeceived
desire:“W
em
ustaccept
thescream
ofR
eich:no,
them
assesw
erenot
deceived;at
aparticular
mom
ent,they
actuallydesired
afascist
regime”
(FD,
215).T
hesephilosophers
will
notentertain
thethought
ofconstitutive
contradiction—that
isw
herethey
admittedly
partcom
panyfrom
theLeft.
Inthe
name
ofdesire,
theyreintroduce
theundivided
subjectinto
thedis
courseof
power.
Foucault
oftenseem
sto
conflate“individual”
and“sub
ject”;’°and
theim
pacton
hisow
nm
etaphorsis
perhapsintensified
inhis
followers.
Because
ofthe
power
ofthe
word
“power,”
Foucault
admits
tousing
the“m
etaphorof
thepoint
which
progressivelyirradiates
itssu
rroundings.”
Suchslips
become
therule
ratherthan
theexception
inless
carefulhands.And
that radiatingpoint, anim
atingan
effectivelyheliocentric
discourse,fillsthe
empty
placeofthe
agent with
thehistorical
sunoftheory,
theS
ubjectof
Europe.”
Foucaultarticulates
anothercorollary
ofthedisavow
aloftherole
ofideology
inreproducing
thesocial
relationsof
production:an
unquestioned
valorizationof
theoppressed
assubject,
the“object
being,”as
Dc
leuzeadm
iringlyrem
arks,“to
establishconditions
where
theprisoners
themselves
would
beable
tospeak.”
Foucault
addsthat
“them
assesknow
perfectlyw
ell,clearly”—once
againthe
thematics
ofbeingundeceived—
”theyknow
farbetter
than[the
intellectual]and
theycertainly
sayit
veryw
ell”(FD
,206,
207).W
hathappens
tothe
critiqueof
thesovereign
subjectin
thesepronouncem
ents?T
helim
itsof
thisrepresentationalist
realismare
reached
with
Deleuze:
“Reality
isw
hatactually
happensin
afactory,
ina
school,in
barracks,in
aprison,
ina
policestation”
(FD
,212).
This
foreclosingof
thenecessity
of thedifficult task
of counterhegemonic
ideological productionhas
notbeen
salutary.It
hashelped
positivistem
piricism—
thejustifying
foundationof
advancedcapitalist
neocolonialism—
tOdefine
itsow
narena
as“concrete
experience,”“w
hatactually
happens.”Indeed,
theconcrete
experiencethat
isthe
guarantorof the
political appealof prisoners,
soldiers,and
schoolchildrenis
disclosedthrough
theconcrete
experienceof
thein
tellectual,the
onew
hodiagnoses
theep
isteme)
2N
eitherD
eleuzenor
Fou
cault seems
aware
that theintellectual
within
socializedcapital,
brandishingconcrete
experience, canhelp
consolidatethe
international divisionof labor.
The
unrecognizedcontradiction
within
aposition
that
valorizesthe
concreteexperience
ofthe
oppressed,w
hilebeing
souncritical
aboutthe
historicalrole
ofthe
intellectual,is
maintained
bya
verbalslippage.
Thus
Deleuze
makes
thisrem
arkablepronouncem
ent:“A
theoryis
likea
boxof
tools.N
othingto
dow
iththe
signifier”(FD
,208).
Considering
thatthe
verbalismof
thetheoretical
world
andits
accessto
anyw
orlddefined
againstit
as“practical”
isirreducible,
sucha
declarationhelps
onlythe
intellectualanxious
toprove
thatintellectual
laboris ju
st likem
anuallabor.
Itis
when
signifiersare
leftto
lookafter
themselves
thatverbal
slippageshappen.
The
signifier“representation”
isa
casein
point.In
thesam
edis
missive
tonethat
severstheory’s
linkto
thesignifier,
Deleuze
declares,“T
hereis
nom
orerepresentation;
there’snothing
butaction”—
”actioflof
theoryand
actionof
practicew
hichrelate
toeach
otheras
relaysand
formnetw
orks”(FD
,206-7).
Yet
anim
portantpoint
isbeing
made
here:the
productionof
theoryis
alsoa
practice;the
oppositionbetw
eenabstract
“pure”theory
andconcrete
“applied”practice
istoo
quickand
easy.’3
Ifthis
is,indeed,
Deleuze’s
argument,
hisarticulation
ofit
isproblem
atic.T
wo
sensesof representation
arebeing
runtogether:
represen
tationas
“speakingfor,”
asin
politics,and
representationas
“re-presentation,”
asin
artor
philosophy.Since
theoryis
alsoonly
“action,”the
theoreticiandoes
notrepresent
(speakfor)
theoppressed
group.Indeed,
thesubject is
notseen
asa
representativeconsciousness
(onere-presenting
reality
adequately).T
hesetw
osenses
of representation—w
ithinstate
formation
andthe
law,
onthe
onehand,
andin
subject-predication,on
theother—
arerelated
butirreducibly
discontinuous.T
ocover
overthe
discontinuityw
ithan
analogythat
ispresented
asa
proofreflects
againa
paradoxicalsu
bject
privileging.14
Because
“theperson
who
speaksand
acts..
.isalw
aysa
mu
ltiplicity,”
no“theorizing
intellectual...
[or]party
or...
union”can
rep
resent “thosew
hoact and
struggle”(FD
, 206). Are
thosew
hoact and
strugglem
ute,as
opposedto
thosew
hoact
andspeak
(FD
,206)?
These
imm
enseproblem
sare
buriedin
thedifferences
between
the“sam
e”w
ords:co
nsciousness
andconscience
(bothconscience
inF
rench),representation
andre-presentation.
The
critiqueof ideological
subject-constitutionw
ithinstate
formations
andsystem
sof political
economy
cannow
beeffaced,
ascan
theactive
theoreticalpractice
ofthe
“transformation,
ofconsciousness.”
The
banalityof
leftistintellectuals’
listsof
self-knowing,
politicallycanny
sub
alternsstands
revealed;representing
them,
theintellectuals
representth
emselves
astransparent.If
sucha
critiqueand
sucha
projectare
notto
begiven
up,the
shiftingdistinctions
between
representationw
ithinthe
stateand
political
ayatri
(.;flaK
raV
OIty
economy,
onthe
onehand,
andw
ithinthe
theoryof
theSubject,
onthe
other,m
ustnot
beobliterated.
Let
usconsider
theplay
ofvertreten
(“rep-L
resent”in
thefirst
sense)and
darstellen(“re-present”
inthe
secondsense)
ina
famous
passagein
The
Eighteenth
Brum
aireofL
ouisB
onaparte,w
hereM
arxtouches
on“class”
asa
descriptiveand
transformative
conceptin
am
annersom
ewhatm
orecom
plexthan
Aithusser’s
distinctionbetw
eenclass
instinctand
classposition
would
allow.
Marx’s
contentionhere
isthatthe
descriptivedefinition
ofaclass
canbe
adifferential
one—its
cuttingoffand
differencefrom
allotherclasses:
.
“inso
faras
millions
of families
liveunder
economic
conditionsofexistence
thatcut
offtheirm
odeoflife,
theirinterest,
andtheir
formation
fromthose
ofthe
otherclasses
andplace
themin
inimical
confrontation[feindlich
1gagenuberstellen],
theyform
aclass.”5
There
isno
suchthing
asa
“classinstinct”
atw
orkhere.
Infact,
thecollectivity
offam
ilialexistence,
which
might
beconsidered
thearena
of“instinct,”
isdiscontinuous
with,
thoughoperated
by,thedifferentialisolation
of classes.Inthis
context,one
farmore
pertinentto
theF
ranceof
the1970s
thanit
canbe
tothe
internationalperiphery,
theform
ationof
aclass
isartificial
andeconom
ic,and
theeco
nomic
agencyor
interestis
impersonal
becauseit
issystem
aticand
heterogeneous.
This
agencyor
interestis
tiedto
theH
egeliancritique
ofthe
individualsubject,
forit
marks
thesubject’s
empty
placein
thatprocess
withouta
subject which
ishistory
andpoliticaleconom
y.H
erethe
capitalistis
definedas
“theconscious
bearer[T
rager]of
thelim
itlessm
ovement
ofcap
ital.”6
My
pointis
thatM
arxis
notw
orkingto
createan
undividedsubject
where
desireand
interestcoincide.
Class
consciousnessdoes
notoperate
toward
thatgoal.
Both
inthe
economic
area(capitalist)
andin
thepolitical
(world-historical
agent),M
arxis
obligedto
constructm
odelsofa
dividedand
dislocatedsubject
whose
partsare
notcontinuous
orcoherent
with
eachother.
Acelebrated
passagelike
thedescription
ofcapital
asthe
Faustian
monster
bringsthis
home
vividly.’7
The
following
passage,continuing
thequotation
fromT
heEigh.
Iteenth
Brum
aire,is
alsow
orkingon
thestructural
principleof
adispersed
anddislocated
classsubject:
the(absent
collective)consciousness
ofthe
small
peasantproprietor
classfinds
its“bearer”
ina
“representative”w
ho•Iappears
tow
orkin
another’sinterest.
The
word
“representative”here
isnot
“darstellen”;this
sharpensthe
contrastF
oucaultand
Deleuze
slideover,
thecontrast,
say,betw
eena
proxyand
aportrait.
There
is,of
course,a
relationshipbetw
eenthem
,one
thathas
receivedpolitical
andideological
exacerbationin
theE
uropeantradition
atleast sincethe
poetandthe
sophist,the
actorand
theorator,
haveboth
beenseen
asharm
ful.In
theguise
ofapost-M
arxistdescription
ofthe
sceneof
power,
we
thusencounter
am
ucholder
debate:betw
eenrepresentation
orrhetoric
astropology
andas
per-suasion.D
arstellenbelongs
tothe
firstconstellation,vertreten—
with
strongerj
suggestionsof
substitution—to
thesecond.
Again,
theyare
related,but
running
themtogether,
especiallyin
orderto
saythat
beyondboth
isw
hereoppressed
subjectsspeak,
act,and
knowfor
themselves,
leadsto
anessen
tialist,utopian
politics.H
ereis
Marx’s
passage,using
“vertreten”w
herethe
English
use“represent,”
discussinga
social“subject”
whose
consciousnessand
Vertre•tung
(asm
ucha
substitutionas
arepresentation)
aredislocated
andinco
herent:T
hesm
allpeasant
proprietors“cannot
representthem
selves;they.
must
berepresented.
Their
representativem
ustappear
simultaneously
as
their master, as
anauthority
overthem
, asunrestricted
governmental
power
that protectsthem
fromthe
otherclasses
andsends
themrain
andsunshine
fromabove.
The
politicalinfluence
[inthe
placeof
theclass
interest,since
thereis
nounified
classsubject]
ofthe
small
peasantproprietors
therefore
findsits
lastexpression
[theim
plicationof
achain
ofsubstitutions—
Ver
tretungen—is
stronghere]
inthe
executiveforce
[Exekutivgew
alt—lesS
per
sonalin
Germ
an]subordinating
societyto
itself.”N
otonly
doessuch
am
odelof social
indirection—necessary
gaps
between
thesource
of “influence”(in
thiscase
thesm
all peasant proprietors),
the“representative”
(Louis
Napoleon),
andthe
historical-political ph
enom
enon(executive
control)—im
plya
critiqueofthe
subjectas
individual agent
cbutacritique
evenofthe
subjectivityof
acollective
agency.T
henecessarily
dislocatedm
achineof
historym
ovesbecause
“theidentity
oftheinterests”
oftheseproprietors
“failsto
producea
feelingof com
munity,
national links,
ora
politicalorganization.”
The
eventof
representationas
Vertretung
(in
theconstellation
ofrhetoric-as-persuasion)
behaveslike
aD
arstellung(or
rhetoric-as-trope),taking
itsplace
inthe
gapbetw
eenthe
formation
ofa
(descriptive)class
andthe
nonformation
ofa
(transformative)
class:“In
so
ras
millions
of families
liveunder
economic
conditionsof
existencethat
separatetheir
mode
of life..
.theyform
aclass.
Inso
faras.
..the
identity
of theirinterests
failsto
producea
feelingof
comm
unity...
theydo
not
•forma
class.”T
hecom
plicityof
Vertreten
andD
arstellen,their
iden
tity-in
differenceas
theplace
ofpractice—
sincethis
complicity
isprecisely
what
Marxists
must
expose,as
Marx
doesin
The
Eighteenth
Brum
aire—can
only
beappreciated
ifthey
arenot
conflatedby
asleight
ofw
ord.It w
ouldbe
merely
tendentiousto
arguethat this
textualizesM
arx
toom
uch,m
akinghim
inaccessibleto
thecom
mon
“man,”
who,
avictim
of comm
onsense,
isso
deeplyplaced
ina
heritageof positivism
thatM
arx’s
irreducibleem
phasison
thew
orkof
thenegative,
onthe
necessityfor
de
fetishizingthe
concrete,is
persistentlyw
restedfrom
himby
thestrongest
adversary,“the
historicaltradition”
inthe
ajr.’8
Ihave
beentrying
topoint
out that theuncom
mon
“man,”
thecontem
poraryphilosopher
ofpractice,
sometim
esexhibits
thesam
epositivism
.T
hegravity
ofthe
problemis
apparentif
oneagrees
thatthe
development
ofa
transformative
class“consciousness”
froma
descriptive
class“position”
isnot
inM
arxa
taskengaging
theground
levelof
con
sciousness. Class
consciousnessrem
ainsw
iththe
feelingof com
munity
that
belongsto
nationallinks
andpolitical organizations, not to
that otherfeeling
of comm
unityw
hosestructural
model
isthe
family.
Although
not identified
•w
ithnature,
thefam
ilyhere
isconstellated
with
what
Marx
calls“natural
exchange,”w
hichis, philosophically
speaking, a“placeholder”
for usevalue.’9
“Natural
exchange”is
contrastedto
“intercoursew
ithsociety,”
where
the
word
“intercourse”(V
erkehr)is
Marx’s
usualw
ordfor
“comm
erce.”T
his
“intercourse”thus
holdsthe
placeof the
exchangeleading
tothe
production
of surplusvalue,
andit
isin
thearea
ofthis
intercoursethat
thefeeling
of
i.com
munity
leadingto
classagency
must
bedeveloped.
Full
classagency
(if
therew
eresuch
athing)
isnot
anideological
transformation
ofconscious
ness onthe
groundlevel,
adesiring
identityofthe
agentsand
theirinterest—
theidentity
whose
absencetroubles
Foucault
andD
eleuze.It
isa
contes
tatoryreplacem
entas
well
asan
appropriation(a
supplementation)
of some-
Gay
atriC
hak
ravo
rtyS
piv
akthing
thatis
“artificial”to
beginw
ith—”econom
icconditions
ofexistence
thatseparate
theirm
odeof
life.”M
arx’sform
ulationsshow
acautious
respect
forthe
nascentcritique
ofindividual
andcollective
subjectiveagency.
The
projectsofclass
consciousnessand
ofthe
transformation
ofconsciousness
arediscontinuous
issuesfor
him.
Conversely,
contemporary
invocations
of“libidinal
economy”
anddesire
asthe
determining
interest,corn-
1bined
with
thepractical
politicsof
theoppressed
(undersocialized
capital)“speaking
forthem
selves,”restore
thecategory
ofthe
sovereignsubject
within
thetheory
thatseem
sm
ostto
questionit.
No
doubtthe
exclusionof
thefam
ily,albeit
afam
ilybelonging
toa
specificclass
formation,
ispart
ofthe
masculine
frame
within
which
Marxism
marks
itsbirth
.2°
Historically
asw
ellas
intoday’s
globalpolitical
economy,
thefam
ily’srole
inpatriarchalsocialrelations
isso
heterogeneousand
contestedthat
merely
replacingthe
family
inthis
problematic
isnot
goingto
breakthe
frame.
Nor
doesthe
solutionlie
inthe
positivistinclusionof
am
onolithiccollectivity
of“w
omen”
inthe
listof
theoppressed
whose
unfracturedsubjectivity
allows
themto
speakfor
themselves
againstan
equallym
onolithic“sam
esystem
.”In
thecontext
ofthe
development
ofa
strategic,artificial,
andsecond-level
“consciousness,”M
arxuses
theconcept
ofthe
patronymic,
always
within
thebroaderconceptofrepresentation
asV
ertretung:The
small
‘
peasantproprietors
“aretherefore
incapableof
making
theirclass
interestvalid
intheir
propernam
e[im
eigenenN
amen],
whether
througha
parliam
entor
througha
convention.”T
heabsence
ofthe
nonfamilial
artificialcollective
propernam
eis
suppliedby
theonly
propernam
e“historical
•.
tradition”can
offer—the
patronymic
itself—the
Nam
eof
theF
ather:“H
is-3
toricaltradition
producedthe
French
peasants’beliefthat
am
iraclew
ou
ldoccur,
thata
man
named
Napoleon
would
restoreall
theirglory.
And
anindividual
turnedup”—
theuntranslatable
“esfandsic/i”
(therefound
itselfan
individual?)dem
olishesallquestions
ofagencyor
theagent’s
connectionw
ithhis
interest—”w
hogave
himselfout
tobe
thatm
an”(this
pretenseis,
bycontrast,
hisonly
properagency)
“becausehe
carried[trãgt—
thew
ordused
forthe
capitalist’srelationship
tocapital]
theN
apoleonicC
ode,w
hichcom
mands”
that“inquiry
intopaternity
isforbidden.”
While
Marx
her&seem
sto
bew
orkingw
ithina
patriarchalm
etaphorics,one
shouldnote
thetextual
subtletyof
thepassage.
Itis
theL
awof
theF
ather(the
Napoleonic
Code)
thatparadoxically
prohibitsthe
searchfor
thenatural
father.Thus,
itis
accordingto
astrict
observanceofthe
historicalL
awofthe
Father
thatthe
formed
yetunform
edclass’s
faithin
thenatural
fatheris
gainsaid.I
havedw
eltso
longon
thispassage
inM
arxbecause
itspells
outthe
innerdynam
icsof
Vertretung,
orrepresentation
inthe
political.:context.
Representation
inthe
economic
contextis
Darstellung,
thephilo-
;
sophicalconceptofrepresentation
asstaging
or,indeed,
signification,which
relatesto
thedivided
subjectin
anindirect
way.
The
most
obviouspa
isw
ellknow
n:“In
theexchange
relationship[A
ustauschverhaltnis]ofcorn
modities
theirexchange-value
appearedto
ustotally
independentof
theiruse-value.
But
ifwe
subtracttheir
use-valuefrom
theproduct
of
labour,we•
obtaintheir
value,as
itw
asjust
determined
[bestimm
t].T
hecom
mon
ele-..
ment
which
representsitself
[sichdarsteilt]
inthe
exchangerelation,
orthe
exchangevalue
ofthe
comm
odity,is
thusits
valu
e.”2’
According
toM
arx,under
capitalism,
value,as
producedin
nec
essaryand
surpluslabor,
iscom
putedas
therepresentation/sign
ofo
bjc
•tified
labor(w
hichis
rigorouslydistinguished
fromhum
anactivity).
Con
versely,in
theabsence
ofa
theoryof
exploitationas
theextraction
(production),appropriation,
andrealization
of(surplus)
valueas
represen,
to.tionof
laborpow
er,capitalist
exploitationm
ustbe
seenas
avariety
ofdom
ination(the
mechanics
ofpow
eras
such).“T
hethrust
of
Marxism
,”D
eleuzesuggests, “w
asto
determine
theproblem
[thatpower
ism
orediffuse
thanthe
structureof
exploitationand
stateform
ation]essentially
interm
sofinterests
(power
isheld
bya
rulingclass
definedby
itsinterests)”
(FD,
214).O
necannot objectto
thism
inimalist
summ
aryof M
arx’sproject,
justas
onecannot
ignorethat,
inparts
of
theA
nti-Oedipus,
Deleuze
andG
uattari buildtheir
caseon
abrilliant
if“poetic”
graspof
Marx’s
theoryof
them
oneyform
.Y
etw
em
ightconsolidate
ourcritique
inthe
following
way: the
relationshipbetw
eenglobal
capitalism(exploitation
ineconom
ics)and
nation-statealliances
(domination
ingeopolitics)
isso
macrological that
itcannotaccount
forthe
micrological
textureof
power.
To
move
toward
suchan
accountingone
must
move
toward
theoriesof
ideology—of subject
formations
that micrologically
andoften
erraticallyoperate
theinterests
thatcongeal
them
acrologies.Such
theoriescannot
affordto
overlookthe
category
ofrepresentationin
itstw
osenses.
They
must
notehow
thestaging
ofthe
world
inrepresentation—
itsscene
of
writing,
itsD
arstellung—dissim
ulates the
choiceof and
needfor
“heroes,”paternal proxies,agents
ofpower—
Vertretung.M
yview
isthat
radicalpractice
shouldattend
tothis
doublesession
ofrepresentations
ratherthan
reintroducethe
individualsubject
throughtotalizing
conceptsof
power
anddesire.
Itis
alsom
yview
that,in
keepingthe
areaof
classpractice
ona
secondlevel
of
abstraction,M
arxwas
ineffect
keepingopen
the(K
antianand)
Hegeian
critiqueof
thein
dividualsubject
asagent.
22
This
viewdoes
notoblige
me
toignore
that,by
implicitly
definingthe
family
andthe
mother
tongueas
theground
levelw
hereculture
andconvention
seemnature’s
own
way
oforganizing
“her”ow
nsubversion,
Marx
himself rehearses
anancient
sub
terfuge.
23
Inthe
con
textof
poststructuralistclaim
sto
criticalpractice,
thisseem
sm
orerecu
perablethan
theclandestine
restorationo
fsubjective
essentialism.
The
reductionof
Marx
toa
benevolentbut
datedfigure
most
oftenserves
theinterest
oflaunching
anew
theoryof
interpretation.In
theFoucault-D
eleuzeconversation,
theissue
seems
tobe
thatthere
isno
rep
resentation,. nosignifier
(Isit
tobe
presumed
thatthe
signifierhas
already‘i
dispatched?T
hereis,
then,no
sign-structureoperating
experience,and
thusm
ightone
laysem
ioticsto
rest?);theory
isa
relayof
practice(thus
layingproblem
softheoretical
practiceto
rest)and
theoppressed
canknow
andspeak
forthem
selves.T
hisreintroduces
theconstitutive
subjecton
atleast
two
levels:the
Subject
ofdesire
andpow
eras
anirreducible
meth
xlo1ogical presupposition;and
theself-proxim
ate,if
notself-identical,
sub
::1of the
oppressed.F
urther,the
intellectuals,w
hoare
neitherof
theseSI
subjects,becom
etransparent
inthe
relayrace,
forthey
merely
reporton
thenonrepresented
subjectand
analyze(w
ithoutanalyzing)
thew
orkingsof
(theunnam
edS
ubjectirreducibly
presupposedby)
power
anddesire.
The
produced“transparency”
marks
theplace
of
“interest”;it
ism
aintainedby
j
Gay
atriC
hak
ravorty
Sp
ivak
vehementdenegation:“N
owthis
roleofreferee,judge,and
universalwitness
isone
which
Iabsolutely
refuseto
adopt.”O
neresponsibility
ofthe
criticm
ightbe
toread
andw
riteso
thatthe
impossibility
ofsuch
interested‘
individualisticrefusals
ofthe
institutionalprivileges
of power
bestowed
onthe
subjectis
takenseriously.
The
refusalofthe
sign-systemblocks
thew
ay.
toa
developedtheory
ofideology.
Here,
too,thepeculiar
toneofdenegation
isheard.
To
Jacques-Main
Miller’s
suggestionthat
“theinstitution
isitself
discursive,”F
oucaultresponds,“Y
es,ifyoulike,but itdoesn’tm
uchm
atterfor
my
notionof
theapparatus
tobe
ableto
saythat
thisis
discursiveand
thatisn
’t...
giventhat
my
problemisn’t
alinguistic
one”(PK
,198).
Why
thisconflation
oflanguageand
discoursefrom
them
asterofdiscourse
analysis?
Edw
ardW
.Said’s
critiqueof
power
inF
oucaultas
acaptivating
andm
ystifyingcategory
thatallow
shim
“toobliterate
therole
ofclasses,
therole
ofeconomics,the
roleof insurgency
andrebellion,”
ism
ostpertinent,
here
.24
Iadd
toSaid’s
analysisthe
notionof
thesurreptitious
subjectof
power
anddesire
marked
bythe
transparencyof
theintellectual.
Curiously
enough,P
aulB
ovéfaults
Said
forem
phasizingthe
importance
ofthe
in-)
tellectual,whereas
“Foucault’s
project essentiallyis
achallenge
tothe
leadingrole
ofboth
hegemonic
andoppositional
intellectu
als.”25
Ihave
suggestedthat
this“challenge”
isdeceptive
preciselybecause
itignores
what
Saidem
phasizes—the
critic’sinstitutional
responsibility.T
hisS
/subject,curiously
sewn
togetherinto
atransparency
bydenegations,
belongsto
theexploiters’
sideof
theinternational
divisionof
labor.It
isim
possiblefor
contemporary
French
intellectualsto
imagine
thekind
ofP
ower
andD
esirethat
would
inhabitthe
unnamed
subjectof
theO
therofEurope.It is
notonlythateverything
theyread,critical oruncritical,
iscaught
within
thedebate
ofthe
productionof
thatO
ther,supporting
orcritiquing
theconstitution
of
theS
ubjectas
Europe.
Itis
alsothat,
inthe
constitutionof
thatO
therof
Europe,
greatcare
was
takento
obliteratethe
textualingredients
with
which
sucha
subjectcould
cathect,could
occupy(invest?)
itsitinerary—
notonly
byideological
andscientific
production,butalso
bythe
institutionofthe
law.
How
everreductionistic
aneconom
icanal-
.ysis
might
seem,
theF
renchintellectuals
forgetat
theirperil
thatthis
entires.
overdetenninedenterprise
was
inthe
interestof
adynam
iceconom
icsit
uationrequiring
thatinterests,
motives
(desires),andpow
er(ofknow
ledge)be
ruthlesslydislocated.
To
invokethat
dislocationnow
asa
radicaldis
coverythat
shouldm
akeus
diagnosethe
economic
(conditionsofexistence
thatseparate
out“classes”
descriptively)as
apiece
ofdated
analyticm
achinery
may
wellbe
tocontinue
thew
orkofthatdislocation
andunw
ittingly:‘
tohelp
insecuring
“anew
balanceof
hegemonic
relations.”
26
Ishall
returnto
thisargum
entshortly.
Inthe
faceof
thepossibility
thatthe
intellectualis
complicit
inthe
persistentconstitution
ofO
theras
theS
elfsshadow
,a
possibilityof
politicalpractice
forthe
intellectualw
ouldbe
toput
theeco
nomic
“undererasure,”
tosee
theeconom
icfactor
asirreducible
asit
rein-scribes
thesocial
text,even
asit
iserased,
however
imperfectly,
when
itclaim
sto
bethe
finaldeterm
inantor
thetranscendental
signified
.27
IIT
heclearest
availableexam
pleof
suchepistem
icviolence
isthe
remotely
orchestrated,far-flung,and
heterogeneousprojectto
constitutethe
q.
colonialsubject
asO
ther.T
hisproject
isalso
theasym
etricalobliteration
of thetrace
ofth
atO
therin
itsprecarious
Subject-ivity.
Itis
well
known
that Foucault
locatesepistem
icviolence,
acom
pleteoverhaul
ofthe
epis
teme,
inthe
redefinitionof
sanityat
theend
ofthe
European
eighteenthcentury.28
But
what
ifthat
particularredefinition
was
onlya
partof
the.
narrativeof
historyin
Europe
asw
ellas
inthe
colonies?W
hatif
thetw
oprojects
ofepistem
icoverhaul
worked
asdislocated
andunacknow
ledged.
partsof
avast
two-handed
engine?P
erhapsit
isno
more
thanto
askthat
thesubtext
ofthe
palimpsestic
narrativeof
imperialism
berecognized
as“subjugated
knowledge,”
“aw
holeset
of
knowledges
thathave
beendis
qualifiedas
inadequateto
theirtask
orinsufficiently
elaborated:naive
knowledges,
locatedlow
down
onthe
hierarchy,beneath
therequired
level;..
of cognitionor
scientificity”(PK
,82).
This
isnot to
describe“the
way
thingsreally
were”
ortoprivilege
thenarrative
ofhistory
asim
perialismas
thebest
versionof
histo
ry..
29
Itis, rather,
tooffer
anaccount
of howan
explanationand
narrativeof reality
wasestablished
asthe
normative
one.T
oelaborate
onthis,
letus
considerbriefly
theunderpinnings
ofthe
British
codificationof
Hindu
Law
.F
irst,a
fewdisclaim
ers:In
theU
nitedS
tatesthe
third-worldism
currentlyafloat
inhum
anisticdisciplines
isoften
openlyethnic.
Iw
asborn
inIndia
andreceived
my
primary,
secondary,and
universityeducation
there, includingtw
oyears
of graduatew
ork.M
yIndian
example
couldthus
beseen
asa
nostalgicinvestigation
ofthe
lostroots
ofm
yow
nidentity.
Yet
evenas
Iknow
thatone
cannotfreely
enterthe
thicketsof
“motiv
ations,”
Iw
ouldm
aintainthat
my
chief projectis
topoint
outthe
po
sitivist
idealistvariety
ofsuch
nostalgia.I
turnto
Indianm
aterialbecause,
inthe
,absence
ofadvanced
disciplinarytraining,
thataccident
ofbirth
anded
ucation
hasprovided
me
with
asense
ofthe
historicalcanvas,
ahold
onsom
eofthe
pertinent languagesth
at areuseful tools
forabricoleur, especially
when
armed
with
theM
arxistskepticism
of concreteexperience
asthe
finalarbiter and
acritique
of disciplinaryform
ations.Y
etthe
Indiancase
cannotbe
takenas
representativeof
allcountries,
nations,cultures,
andthe
likethat
may
beinvoked
asthe
Other
ofE
uropeas
Self.H
ere,then,
isa
schematic
summ
aryof
theepistem
icviolence
of
thecodification
of Hindu
Law
. If it clarifiesthe
notionof epistem
icviolence,
my
finaldiscussion
ofw
idow-sacrifice
may
gainadded
significance.A
t theend
of theeighteenth
century,H
indulaw
,insofar
asit
canii
be describedas
aunitary
system, operated
interm
sof four texts
that “staged”a four-part epistem
edefined
bythe
subject’suse
of mem
ory:’ sruti (theheard),
smriti (the
remem
bered),sastra
(thelearned-from
-another),and
vyavahara(the
performed-in-exchange).
The
originsof w
hathad
beenheard
andw
hatw
asrem
embered
were
notnecessarily
continuousor
identical.E
veryin
vocationof
srutitechnically
recited(or
reopened)the
eventof
originary:,
“hearing”or
revelation.T
hesecond
two
texts—the
learnedand
theper
formed—
were
seenas
dialecticallycontinuous.
Legal
theoristsand
practi
tionersw
erenot
inany
givencase
certainif
thisstructure
describedthe
bodyof
lawor
fourw
aysof
settlinga
dispute.T
helegitim
ationof
thepolym
orphousstructure
of legal performance, “internally”
noncoherent andopen
atboth
ends,through
abinary
vision,is
thenarrative
ofcodification
I offeras
anexam
pleof
epistemic
violence.
The
narrativeof
thestabilization
andcodification
of
Hindu
lawis
lessw
ellknow
nthan
thestory
of
Indianeducation,
soit
might
bew
ellto
startth
ere
.3°
Consider
theoften-quoted
programm
aticlines
fromM
acaulay’s
infamous
“Minute
onIndian
Education”
(1835):“W
em
ustatpresent
doour
bestto
forma
classw
hom
aybe
interpretersbetw
eenus
andthe
millions
whom
we
govern;a
classof
persons,Indian
inblood
andcolour,
butE
nglishin
taste,in
opinions,in
morals,
andin
intellect.T
othat
classw
em
ayleave
itto
refinethe
vernaculardialects
ofthe
country,to
enrichthose
dialectsw
ithterm
sof
scienceborrow
edfrom
theW
esternnom
enclature,
andto
renderthem
bydegrees
fitvehicles
forconveying
knowledge
tothe
greatm
assof
thepopulatio
n.”
3’T
heeducation
ofcolonial
subjectscom
plements
theirproduction
inlaw
.O
neeffect
ofestablishing
aversion
oftheB
ritishsystem
was
thedevelopm
entofan
uneasyseparation
between
disciplinaryform
ationin
Sanskrit
studiesand
thenative,
nowalternative,
traditionof
Sanskrit
“highculture.”
Within
theform
er,the
culturalexpla
nationsgenerated
byauthoritative
scholarsm
atchedthe
epistemic
violenceof
thelegal
project.I
locatehere
thefounding
ofthe
Asiatic
Societyof
Bengal
in1784,the
IndianInstitute
atOxford
in1883,and
theanalytic
andtaxonom
icw
orkofscholars
likeA
rthurM
acdonnelland
Arthur
Berriedale
Keith,
who
were
bothcolonial
administrators
andorganizers
ofthe
matter
ofSanskrit.
From
theirconfident
utilitarian-hegemonic
plansfor
studentsand
scholarsof
Sanskrit,
itis
impossible
toguess
ateither
theaggressive
repressionof
Sanskrit
inthe
generaleducational
framew
orkor
theincreasing
“feudalization”
ofthe
performative
useof
Sanskrit
inthe
everydaylife
ofB
ralim
anic-hegemonic
India
.3
2A
versionofhistory
was
graduallyestablished
inw
hichthe
Brahm
answ
ereshow
nto
havethe
‘same
intentionsas
(thuspro
vidingthe
legitimation
for)the
codifjingB
ritish:“In
orderto
preserveH
indusociety
intact[the]
successors[of
theoriginal
Brahm
ans]had
toreduce
everythingto
writing
andm
akethem
more
andm
orerigid.
And
thatis
what
haspreserved
Hindu
societyin
spiteof
asuccession
of
politicalupheavals
andforeign
invasio
ns.”
This
isthe
1925verdict
ofM
ahama
hopadhyayaH
araprasadS
hastri,learned
IndianS
anskritist,a
brilliantrep
resentativeof
theindigenous
elitew
ithincolonial
production,w
how
asasked
tow
riteseveral
chaptersof
a“H
istoryof
Bengal”
projectedby
theprivate
secretaryto
thegovernor
generalof
Bengal
in1916.
To
signalthe
asymm
etryin
therelationship
between
authorityand
explanation(depend
ingon
therace-class
oftheauthority),
compare
this1928
remark
byE
dward
Thom
pson,E
nglishintellectual:
“Hinduism
was
what
itseem
edto
beIt
was
ahigher
civilizationthat
won
[againstit],
bothw
ithA
lcbarand
theE
ng
lish.”
35
And
addthis,
froma
letterby
anE
nglishsoldier-scholar
inthe
1890s:“T
hestudy
of
Sanskrit,
‘thelanguage
ofthe
gods’has
affordedm
eintense
enjoyment
duringthe
last25
yearsof
my
life,inIndia,
butit
hasnot,
Iam
thankfulto
say,led
me,
asit
hassom
e,to
giveup
ahearty
beliefin
ourow
ngrand
religio
n.”
36
These
authoritiesare
thevery
bestofthe
sourcesfor
thenonspe
cialistF
renchintellectual’s
entryinto
thecivilization
ofthe
Oth
er.
37
Iam
,how
ever,not
referringto
intellectualsand
scholarsof
postcolonialproduc-
..
tion,like
Shastri,
when
Isay
thatthe
Other
asS
ubjectis
inaccessibleto
Foucault
andD
eleuze.I
amthinking
of
thegeneral
nonspecialist,nonaca
demic
populationacross
theclass
spectrum,
forwhom
theepistem
eoperates•.1.
Gay
atriC
hak
ravo
rtyS
piv
akits
silentprogram
ming
function.W
ithoutconsidering
them
apof
explo
itation,
onw
hatgrid
of
“oppression”w
ouldthey
placethis
motley
crew?
Let
usnow
move
toconsider
them
argins(one
canjust
asw
ellsay
thesilent,
silencedcenter)
ofthe
circuitm
arkedout
bythis
epistemic
violence,m
enand
wom
enam
ongthe
illiteratepeasantry,
thetribals,
thelow
eststrataof the
urbansubproletariat.A
ccordingto
Foucaultand
Deleuze
(inthe
First
World,
underthe
standardizationand
regimentation
ofso
cializedcapital,
thoughthey
donot
seemto
recognizethis)
theoppressed,
if giventhe
chance(the
problemofrepresentation
cannotbebypassed
here),and
onthe
way
tosolidarity,through
alliancepolitics
(aM
arxistthem
aticisat w
orkhere)
canspeak
andknow
theirconditions. We
mustnow
confrontthe
following
question:O
nthe
otherside
ofthe
internationaldivision
oflabor
fromsocialized
capital,inside
andoutside
thecircuit
oftheepistem
icviolence
ofim
perialistlaw
andeducation
supplementing
anearlier
econom
ictext,
canthe
subalternspeak?
Antonio
Gram
sci’sw
orkon
the“subaltern
classes”extends
theclass-position/class-consciousness
argumentisolated
inT
heE
ighteenthB
rum
aire.P
erhapsbecause
Gram
scicriticizes
thevanguardistic
positionofthe
Leninist
intellectual,he
isconcerned
with
theintellectual’s
rolein
thesu
baltern’s
culturalandpoliticalm
ovementinto
thehegem
ony. This
movem
entm
ustbem
adeto
determine
theproduction
ofhistoryas
narrative(oftruth).
Intexts
suchas
“The
Southern
Question,”
Gram
sciconsidersthe
movem
entofhistorical-politicaleconom
yin
Italyw
ithinw
hatcanbe
seenas
anallegory
ofreadingtaken
fromor
prefiguringan
internationaldivision
oflabo
r.3
8Y
etan
accountof
thephased
development
ofthe
subalternis
thrown
outof
jointw
henhis
culturalm
acrologyis
operated,how
everrem
otely,by
theepistem
icinterference
with
legaland
disciplinarydefinitions
accompanying
theim
perialist project.When
Im
ove,at theend
ofthisessay,to
thequestion
of wom
anas
subaltern,I
will
suggestthatthe
possibilityofcollectivity
itselfis
persistentlyforeclosed
throughthe
manipulation
offem
aleagency.
The
firstpart
ofm
yproposition—
thatthe
phaseddevelopm
entofthe
subalternis
complicated
bythe
imperialist
project—is
.confrontedby
a collectiveofintellectuals
who
may
becalled
the“S
ubalternS
tudies”gro
up.
39
Theym
ustask,
Can
thesubaltern
speak?H
erew
eare
within
Foucault’s
own
disciplineof
historyand
with
peoplew
hoacknow
ledgehis
influence.T
heirproject
isto
rethinkIndian
colonialhistoiiography
fromthe
per
spectiveof
thediscontinuous
chainof
peasantinsurgencies
duringthe
co
lonial occupation.This
isindeed
theproblem
of“theperm
issionto
narrate”discussed
byS
aid
.4°
As
Ranajit
Guha
argues,
The
historiographyof
Indiannationalism
hasfor
along
time
beendom
inatedby
elitism—
colonialisteli
tismand
bourgeois-nationalistelitism.
..shar[ing]
theprejudice
thatthe
making
ofthe
Indiannation
andthe
development
ofthe
consciousness—nationalism
—w
hichconfirm
edthis
processw
ereexclusively
orpre
dominantly
eliteachievem
ents.In
thecolonialist
andneo-colonialisthistoriographies
theseachievem
entsare
creditedto
British
colonialrulers,adm
inistrators,p01-
icies,institutions,
andculture;
inthe
nationalistand
Gayatii
Chakra
vorty
PIV
UK
neo-nationalistw
ritings—to
Indianelite
personalities,institutions,
activitiesand
ideas.41
Certain
varietiesof
theIndian
eliteare
atbest
nativeinform
antsfor
first-w
orldintellectuajs
interestedin
thevoice
of the
Other.
Butone
must
nevertheless
insistthat
thecolonized
subalternsubject
isirretrievably
heterogeneous.
V
Against
theindigenous
elitew
em
ayset
what
Guha
calls“the
politicsofthe
people,”both
outside(“this
was
anautonom
ousdom
ain,for
itneither
originatedfrom
elitepolitics
nordid
itsexistence
dependon
thelatter”)
andinside
(“itcontinued
tooperate
vigorouslyin
spiteof
[cob
nialismi,
adjustingitself
tothe
conditionsprevailing
underthe
Raj
andin
many
respectsdeveloping
entirelynew
strainsin
bothform
andcontent”)
thecircuit
ofcolonialpro
ductio
n.
42I
cannotentirely
endorsethis
insistenceon
determinate
vigorand
fullautonom
y,for
practicalhistoriographic
éxigencies
will
notallow
suchendorsem
entsto
privilegesubaltern
consciousness.
Against
thepossible
chargethat
hisapproach
isessentialist,
Guha
VV
;
constructsa
definitionof
thepeople
(theplace
of
thatessence)
thatcan
beonly
anidentity-in-differential.
He
proposesa
dynamic
stratificationgrid
describingcolonial
socialproduction
atlarge.
Even
thethird
groupon
thelist,
thebuffer
group,as
itw
ere,betw
eenthe
peopleand
thegreat
macro-
structuraldom
inantgroups,
isitself
definedas
aplace
of
in-betweenness,
what
Derrida
hasdescribed
asan
“antre
”43
elitefi.
Dom
inantforeign
groups.(2
.D
ominant
indigenousgroups
onthe
all-Indialevel.
3.D
ominant
indigenousgroups
atthe
regionaland
locallevels.
4.T
heterm
s“people”
and“subaltern
classes”have
beenused
assynonym
ousthroughout
thisnote.
The
socialgroups
andelem
entsincl”ded
inthis
categoryrepresent
thedem
ographicdifference
between
thetotal
Indianpopulation
andall
thosew
homw
ehave
de
scribedas
the“elite.”
Consider
thethird
itemon
thislist—
theantre
of
situationalin
determinacy
thesecareful
historianspresuppose
asthey
grapplew
iththe
question,C
anthe
subalternspeak?
“Taken
asa
whole
andin
theabstract
this...
category...
was
heterogeneousin
itscom
positionand
thanksto
theuneven
characterofregionaleconom
icand
socialdevelopments,differed
fromarea
toarea.
The
same
classor
element
which
was
dominant
inone
area...
couldbe
among
thedom
inatedin
another.T
hiscould
anddid
createm
anyam
biguitiesand
contradictionsin
attitudesand
alliances,es
peciallyam
ongthe
loweststrata
oftheruralgentry,
impoverished
landlords,rich
peasantsand
upperm
iddleclass
peasantsall
ofwhom
belonged,ideallyspeaking,
tothe
categoryof
peopleor
subalternclasses.”
“The
taskof
research”projected
hereis
“toinvestigate,
identif’and
measure
thespeq/ic
natureand
degreeofthe
deviationof[the]
elements
[constitutingitem
3]from
theideal
andsituate
ithistorically.”
“Investigate,identifS’,
andm
easurethe
specific”:a
programcould
hardlybe
more
essenr
tialistand
taxonomic.
Yet
acurious
methodological
imperative
isat
work.
Ihave
arguedthat,
inthe
Foucault-D
eleuzeconversation,
apostrepresen
tationalistvocabulary
hidesan
essentialistagenda.
Insubaltern
studies,be
causeof
theviolence
ofim
perialistepistem
ic,social,
anddisciplinary
in
scription,a
projectunderstood
inessentialist
terms
must
trafficin
aradical
textualpractice
ofdifferences.
The
objectof
thegroup’s
investigation,in
thecase
noteven
ofthe
peopleas
suchbut
ofthe
floatingbuffer
zoneof
theregional
elite-subaltern,is
adeviation
froman
ideal—the
peopleor
sub
altern—w
hichis
itselfdefinedas
adifference
fromthe
elite.It
istow
ardthis
structurethat
theresearch
isoriented,
apredicam
entrather
differentfrom
theself-diagnosed
transparencyof
thefirst-w
orldradical
intellectual.W
hat
taxonomy
canfix
sucha
space?W
hetheror
notthey
themselves
perceive
it—in
factG
uhasees
hisdefinition
of
“thepeople”
within
them
aster-slave
dialectic—their
textarticulates
thedifficult
taskof
rewriting
itsow
nco
n
ditionsof
impossibility
asthe
conditionsof
itspossibility.
“Atthe
regional andlocallevels
[thedom
inant indigenousgroups]
if belongingto
socialstrata
hierarchicallyinferior
tothose
of
thedom
inantall-Indian
groupsacted
inthe
interestsof
thelatter
andnot
incon
formity
tointerests
correspondingtruly
totheir
own
socialbeing.”
When
thesew
ritersspeak, in
theiressentializing
language,of a
gapbetw
eeninterest
andaction
inthe
intermediate
group,their
conclusionsare
closerto
Marx
thanto
theself-conscious
naiveteofD
eleuze’spronouncem
enton
theissue.
Guha,
likeM
arx,speaks
ofinterest
interm
sof
thesocial
ratherthan
the
libidinalbeing.
The
Nam
e-of-the-Father
imagery
inT
heE
ighteenthB
ru
maire
canhelp
toem
phasizethat,
onthe
levelof
classor
groupaction,
“truecorrespondence
toow
nbeing”
isas
artificialor
socialas
thepatro
nymic.
Som
uchfor
theinterm
ediategroup
marked
initem
3.F
orthe
“true”subaltern
group,w
hoseidentity
isits
difference,there
isno
unre
presentablesubaltern
subjectthat
canknow
andspeak
itself;the
intellec
tual’ssolution
isnot
toabstain
fromrepresentation.
The
problemis
that
thesubject’s
itineraryhas
notbeentraced
soas
toofferan
objectof seduction
tothe
representingintellectual.
Inthe
slightlydated
languageof
theIndian
group,the
questionbecom
es,H
owcan
we
touchthe
consciousnessof
the
people, evenas
we
investigatetheir
politics?W
ithw
hatvoice-consciousness
canthe
subalternspeak?
Their
project, afterall,is
torew
ritethe
development
ofthe
consciousnessof
theIndian
nation.T
heplanned
discontinuityof
imperialism
rigorouslydistinguishes
thisproject,
however
old-fashionedits
articulation,from
“renderingvisible
them
edicaland
juridicalm
echanisms
thatsurrounded
thestory
[ofP
ierreR
iviere].”F
oucaultis
correctin
sug
gestingthat
“tom
akevisible
theunseen
canalso
mean
achange
of
level,
addressingoneself
toa
layerof
material
which
hadhitherto
hadno
perti
nencefor
historyand
which
hadnot
beenrecognized
ashaving
anym
oral,
aestheticor
historicalvalue.”
Itis
theslippage
fromrendering
visiblethe
mechanism
torendering
‘,rocalthe
individual,both
avoiding“any
kindof
analysisof
[thesubject]
whether
psychological,psychoanalytical
orlin
guis
tic,”that
isconsistently
troublesome
(PK,
49-50).T
hecritique
byA
jitK
.C
haudhury,a
West
Bengali
Marxist,
of
Guha’s
searchfor
thesubaltern
consciousnesscan
beseen
asa
mom
entof
theproduction
processthat
includesthe
subaltern.C
haudhury’sperception
thatthe
Marxist
viewof
thetransform
ationof
consciousnessinvolves
the
Gay
atriC
hak
ravorty
Sp
ivak
knowledge
of
socialrelations
seems
tom
e,in
principle,astute.
Yet
theheritage
of
thepositivist
ideologythat
hasappropriated
orthodoxM
arxismobliges
himto
addthis
rider:“T
hisis
notto
belittlethe
importance
ofunderstanding
peasants’consciousness
orw
orkers’consciousness
inits pure
form.
This
enrichesour
knowledge
ofthe
peasantand
thew
orkerand,
possibly,throw
slight
onhow
aparticular
mode
takeson
differentform
sin
differentregions,w
hichis
considereda
problemofsecond-order
importance
inclassicalM
arxism
.”4
5T
hisvariety
of
“internationalist”M
arxism,
which
believesin
apure,
retrievableform
ofconsciousness
onlyto
dismiss
it,thus
closingoff
what
inM
arxrem
ainm
oments
ofproductive
bafflement,
canat
oncebe
theobject
ofFoucault’s
andD
eleuze’srejection
ofMarxism
andthe
sourceofthe
criticalmotivation
oftheS
ubalternS
tudiesgroup.A
llthreeare
unitedin
theassum
ptionthat
thereis
apure
formofconsciousness.
On
theFrench
scene,there
isa
shufflingof
signifiers:“the
unconscious”or
“thesubject-
in-oppression”clandestinely
fillsthe
spaceof
“thepure
formof
consciousness.”
Inorthodox
“internationalist”intellectual
Marxism
,w
hetherin
theF
irstW
orldor
theT
hird,the
pureform
ofconsciousness
remains
anideal
isticbedrock
which,
dismissed
asa
second-orderproblem
,often
earnsitthe
reputationof
racismand
sexism.
Inthe
Subaltern
Studies
groupit
needsdevelopm
entaccordingto
theunacknow
ledgedterm
sof its
own
articulation.F
orsuch
anarticulation,a
developedtheory
ofideologycan
againbe
most
useful.In
acritique
suchas
Chaudhury’s,
theassociation
of“con
sciousness”w
ith“know
ledge”om
itsthe
crucialm
iddleterm
of“ideological
production”:“C
onsciousness,according
toL
enin,is
associatedw
itha
knowledge
ofthe
interrelationshipsbetw
eendifferent
classesand
groups;i.e.,
aknow
ledgeof
them
aterialsthat
constituteso
ciety....
These
definitions
acquirea
meaning
onlyw
ithinthe
problematic
within
adefinite
knowl
edgeobject—
tounderstand
changein
history,or
specifically,change
fromone
mode
toanother,
keepingthe
questionofthe
spec4fi cityofa
particularm
odeout
of thefo
cus.”
46
Pierre
Macherey
providesthe
following
formula
forthe
interpretation
ofideology:“W
hatis
important
ina
work
isw
hatitdoes
notsay.T
hisis
notthesam
eas
thecareless
notation‘w
hatitrefusesto
say,’although
thatw
ouldin
itselfbe
interesting:a
method
might
bebuilt
onit,
with
thetask
ofm
easuringsilences,
whether
acknowledged
orunacknow
ledged.B
utrather
this,w
hatthe
work
cannotsay
isim
portant,because
therethe
elaboration
ofthe
utteranceis
carriedout,
ina
sortof
journeyto
silence.”47
Macherey’s
ideascan
bedeveloped
indirections
hew
ouldbe
unlikelyto
follow.
Even
ashe
writes,
ostensibly,of
theliterariness
ofthe
literatureof
European
provenance,he
articulatesa
method
applicableto
thesocial
textofim
perialism,
somew
hatagainst
thegrain
ofhisow
nargum
ent.A
lthoughthe
notion“w
hatit
refusesto
say”m
ightbe
carelessfor
aliterary
work,
something
likea
collectiveideological refusalcan
bediagnosed
forthe
codifying
legalpracticeofim
perialism.
This
would
openthe
fieldfor
apolitical-
economic
andm
ultidisciplinaryideological
reinscriptionofthe
terrain.B
ecause
thisis
a“w
orldingof
thew
orld”on
asecond
levelof
abstraction,a
conceptof
refusalbecom
esplausible
here.T
hearchival,
historiographic,disciplinary-critical,
and,inevitably,
interventionistw
orkinvolved
hereis
indeeda
taskof“m
easuringsilences.”
This
canbe
adescription
of“inves-
.-
b1
.
tigating, identifying,and
measuring.
..the
deviation”from
anideal
thatis
irreduciblydifferential.
When
we
come
tothe
concomitant question
ofthe
consciousnessofthe
subaltern, thenotion
ofwhatthe
work
cannotsaybecom
esim
portant.In
thesem
iosesof
thesocial
text,elaborations
ofinsurgency
standin
theplace
of“the
utterance.”T
hesender—
”thepeasant”—
ism
arkedonly
asa
pointerto
anirretrievable
consciousness.A
sfor
thereceiver,
we
must
askw
hois
“thereal
receiver”of
an“insurgency?”
The
historian,transform
ing“insurgency”
into“text
forknow
ledge,”is
onlyone
“receiver”of
anyco
llectively
intendedsocial
act.W
ithno
possibilityof
nostalgiafor
thatlost
origin,the
historianm
ustsuspend
(asfar
aspossible)
theclam
orof
hisor
herow
nconsciousness
(orconsciousness-effect,
asoperated
bydisciplinary
training),so
thatthe
elaborationof
theinsurgency,
packagedw
ithan
insurgent-consciousness,
doesnot
freezeinto
an“object
of investigation,”or,
worse
yet,a
model
forim
itation.“T
hesubject”
implied
bythe
textsof
insurgencycan
onlyserve
asa
counterpossibilityfor
thenarrative
sanctionsgranted
tothe
colonialsubject
inthe
dominant
groups.T
hepostcolonial
intellectualslearn
thattheir
privilegeis
theirloss.
Inthis
theyare
aparadigm
of theintellectuals.
Itis
well
known
thatthe
notionof
thefem
inine(rather
thanthe
subalternof im
perialism)
hasbeen
usedin
asim
ilarw
ayw
ithind
econstru
cfive
criticismand
within
certainvarieties
offem
inistcriticism
.48
Inthe
former case,a
figureof “w
oman”
isatissue, one
whose
minim
alpredication
as indeterminate
isalready
availableto
thephallocentric
tradition. Subaltern
historiographyraises
questionsof
method
thatw
ouldprevent
itfrom
using.
sucha
ruse.F
orthe
“figure”of
wom
an,the
relationshipbetw
eenw
oman
andsilence
canbe
plottedby
wom
enthem
selves;race
andclass
differencesare
subsumed
underthat
charge.S
ubalternhistoriography
must
confrontthe
impossibility
ofsuch
gestures.T
henarrow
epistemic
violenceof
imperialism
givesus
anim
perfectallegory
of
thegeneral
violencethat
isthe
possibilityof
anep
isteme.
49
Within
theeffaced
itineraryofthe
subalternsubject,
thetrack
ofsexual
differenceis
doublyeffaced.
The
questionis
notof
female
partici
pationin
insurgency,or
theground
rulesof
thesexual
divisionof
labor,for both
ofw
hichthere
is“evidence.”
Itis,
rather,that,
bothas
objectof
colonialisthistoriography
andas
subjectofinsurgency,
theideological
con
structionof
genderkeeps
them
aledom
inant.If,
inthe
contextof
colonialproduction, the
subalternhas
nohistory
andcannot
speak,the
subalternas
female
iseven
more
deeplyin
shadow.
The
contemporary
internationaldivision
oflabor
isa
disp
lacem
ent ofthedivided
fieldof
nineteenth-centuryterritorial
imperialism
.P
utsim
ply,a
groupof
countries,generally
first-world,
arein
theposition
ofinvesting
capital;another
group,generally
third-world,
providethe
fieldfor
‘investm
ent, boththrough
thecom
pradorindigenous
capitalistsand
throughtheir ill-protected
andshifting
laborforce.
Inthe
interestof m
aintainingthe
circulationand
growth
of industrialcapital
(andof the
concomitant
taskof
administration
within
ninteenth-centuryterritorial
imperialism
),tran
spo
r‘,law
,and
standardizededucation
systems
were
developed—even
asindustries
were
destroyed,land
distributionw
asrearranged,
andraw
material
was
transferredto
thecolonizing
country.W
ithso-called
deco
lo
F
Gay
atriC
hak
ravo
rtyS
piv
ak
nization,the
growth
of
multinational
capital,and
therelief
of
theadm
inistrative
charge,“developm
ent”does
notnow
involvew
holesalelegislation
andestablishing
educationalsystem
sin
acom
parablew
ay.T
hisim
pedesthe
growth
ofconsum
erismin
thecom
pradorcountries.
With
modern
telecom
munications
andthe
emergence
ofadvanced
capitalisteconom
iesat
thetw
oedges
ofAsia,
maintaining
theinternational
divisionof labor
servesto
keepthe
supplyof
cheaplabor
inthe
comprador
countries.H
uman
laboris
not,of
course,intrinsically
“cheap”or
“expensive.”
An
absenceof labor
laws
(ora
discriminatory
enforcement
ofthem
),a
totalitarianstate
(oftenentailed
bydevelopm
entand
modernization
inthe
periphery),and
minim
alsubsistence
requirements
onthe
partof
thew
orkerw
illensure
it.T
okeep
thiscrucial
itemintact,
theurban
proletariatin
comprador
countriesm
ustnot
besystem
aticallytrained
inthe
ideologyof
consumerism
(paradingas
thephilosophy
ofa
classlesssociety)
that,against
allodds,
preparesthe
groundfor
resistancethrough
thecoalition
politicsF
oucaultm
entions(FD
,216).
This
separationfrom
theideology
ofconsum
erismis
increasinglyexacerbated
bythe
proliferatingphenom
enaof
internationalsubcontracting.
“Under
thisstrategy,
manufacturers
basedin
developedcountries
subcontractthe
most
laborintensive
stagesof
production,
forexam
ple,sew
ingor
assembly,
tothe
Third
World
nationsw
herelabor
ischeap.
Once
assembled,
them
ultinationalre-im
portsthe
goods—undergenerous
tariffexemptions—
tothe
developedcountry
insteadofselling
themto
thelocalm
arket.”H
erethe
linkto
trainingin
consumerism
isalm
ostsnapped.
“While
globalrecessionhas
markedly
slowed
tradeand
investment
worldw
idesince
1979,internationalsubcontractinghas
boomed.
..
. Inthese
cases,m
ultinationalsare
freerto
resistm
ilitantw
orkers,revolutionary
up
heavals,and
eveneconom
icdow
ntu
rns.”
5°C
lassm
obilityis
increasinglylethargic
inthe
comprador
theaters.N
otsurprisingly,
some
mem
bersof
indigenousdom
inantgroups
incorn-•
pradorcountries,
mem
bersof
thelocal
bourgeoisie,find
thelanguage
ofalliance
politicsattractive.
Identifyingw
ithform
sof
resistanceplausible
inadvanced
capitalistcountries
isoften
ofa
piecew
iththat
elitistbent
ofbourgeois
historiographydescribed
byR
anajitG
uha.B
eliefin
theplausibility
ofglobal
alliancepolitics
isprevalent
among
wom
enof
dominant
socialgroups
interestedin
“internationalfem
inism”
inthe
comprador
Countries.A
ttheother
endof the
scale,thosem
ostseparated
fromany
possibilityof
analliance
among
“wom
en,prisoners,
conscriptedsoldiers,
hospitalpatients,
andhom
osexuals”(FD
,216)
arethe
females
oftheurban
subproletariat.In
theircase,the
denialand
withholding
ofconsum
erismand
thestructure
ofexploitation
iscom
poundedby
pa
triarchalsocial
relations.O
nthe
otherside
ofthe
internationaldivision
oflabor,
thesubject
ofexploitationcannot
knowand
speakthe
textoffem
ale.exploitation,
evenifthe
absurdityof the
nonrepresentingintellectualm
aking.space
forher
tospeak
isachieved.
The
wom
anis
doublyin
shadow.
-.
Yet even
thisdoes
notencompass
theheterogeneous
Other.O
ut-side
(thoughnot
completely
so)the
circuitof
theinternationaldivision
oflabor,
thereare
peoplew
hoseconsciousness
we
cannotgrasp
ifwe
closeoff
ourbenevolence
byconstructing
ahom
ogeneousO
therreferring
onlyto
ourow
nplace
inthe
seatof
theS
ame
orthe
Self.H
ereare
subsistencefarm
ers,unorganized
peasantlabor,
thetribals,
andthe
comm
unitiesofzero
workers
onthe
streetor
inthe
countryside.T
oconfront
themis
notto
represent
(vertreten)them
butto
learnto
represent(darstellen)
ourselves.T
hisarg
um
entw
ouldtake
usinto
acritique
ofa
disciplinaryanthropology
andthe
relationshipbetw
eenelem
entarypedagogy
anddisciplinary
formation.
It
would
alsoquestion
theim
plicitdem
and,m
adeby
intellectualsw
hochoose
a“naturally
articulate”subject
of
oppression,that
sucha
subjectcom
e
throughhistory
asa
foreshortenedm
ode-of-productionnarrative.
That
Deleuze
andF
oucaultignore
boththe
epistemic
violence
-.
of imperialism
andthe
internationaldivision
oflabor
would
matter
lessif
theydid
not,in
closing,touch
onthird-w
orldissues.
But
inF
ranceit
is
impossible
toignore
theproblem
ofthe
tiersm
onde,the
inhabitantsof
theerstw
hileF
renchA
fricancolonies.
Deleuze
limits
hisconsideration
of
the
ThirdW
orldto
theseold
localandregional indigenous
elitew
hoare, ideally,
subaltern.Inthis
context, referencesto
them
aintenanceof the
surplusarm
yof labor
fallinto
reverse-ethnicsentim
entality.Since
heis
speakingof
theheritage
of nineteenth-centuryterritorial
imperialism
,his
referenceis
tothe
nation-staterather
thanthe
globalizingcenter:
“French
capitalismneeds
greatlya
floatingsignifier
ofunem
ployment.
Inthis
perspective,w
ebegin
tosee
theunity
of theform
sof repression:
restrictionson
imm
igration, once
itisacknow
ledgedth
at them
ost difficult andthanidess jobs
goto
imm
igrant
workers;
repressionin
thefactories,
becausethe
French
must
reacquirethe
‘taste’forincreasingly
harder work; the
struggleagainst youth
andthe
repres
sionof the
educationalsystem
”(FD
,211-12). T
hisis
anacceptable
analysis.
Yet it
shows
againthat
theT
hirdW
orldcan
enterthe
resistanceprogram
of anaffiance
politicsdirected
againsta
“unifiedrepression”
onlyw
henit
is confinedto
thethird-w
orldgroups
thatare
directlyaccessible
tothe
First
World.5’
This
benevolentfirst-w
orldappropriation
andreinscription
of
the
ThirdW
orldas
anO
theris
thefounding
characteristicof m
uchth
ird-w
orld
ismin
theU
.S.hum
ansciences
today.F
oucaultcontinues
thecritique
of
Marxism
byinvoking
geo
graphicaldiscontinuity.
The
realm
arkof
“geographical(geopolitical)
dis
continuity”is
theinternational division
of labor.
But F
oucault usesthe
term
todistinguish
between
exploitation(extraction
andappropriation
of surplus
value; read,the
fieldofM
arxistanalysis)
anddom
ination(“pow
er”studies)
andto
suggestthe
latter’sgreater
potentialfor
resistancebased
onalliance
politics.H
ecannot
acknowledge
thatsuch
am
omst
andunified
accessto
a conceptionof“pow
er”(m
ethodologicallypresupposing
aSubject-of-pow
er)
ism
adepossible
bya
certainstage
inexploitation,
forhis
visiono
fgeo
graphicaldiscontinuity
isgeopolitically
specifictO
theF
irstW
orld:
This
geographicaldiscontinuity
of
which
youspeak
might m
eanperhaps
thefollow
ing:assoon
asw
estru
ggle
againstexploitation,
theproletariat
not only
leadsthe
strugglebut
alsodefines
itstargets,
itsm
ethods,its
placesand
itsinstrum
ents;and
toally
oneselfwith
theproletariat
isto
consolidatew
ithits
positions,its
ideology,it
isto
takeup
againthe
motives
fortheir
combat.
This
means
totalim
mersion
[inthe
Marxist
project].B
utif
itis
against power
thatone
struggles,then
allthose
who
acknowledge
itas
intolerablecan
beginthe
strugglew
hereverthey
findthem
selvesand
1
:J
interm
sof
theirow
nactivity
(orpassivity).
Inen
gagingin
thisstruggle
thatis
theirow
n,w
hoseobjec
tivesthey
clearlyunderstand
andw
hosem
ethodsthey
candeterm
ine,they
enterinto
therevolutionary
pro
cess.A
sallies
ofthe
proletariat,to
besure,
becausepow
eris
exercisedthe
way
itis
inorder
tom
aintaincapitalistexploitation.
They
genuinelyserve
thecause
ofthe
proletariatbyfighting
inthose
placesw
herethey
findthem
selvesoppressed
Wom
en,prisoners,
con
scriptedsoldiers,
hospitalpatients,
andhom
osexualshave
nowbegun
aspecific
struggleagainst
thepartic
ularform
ofpow
er,the
constraintsand
controls,that
areexercised
overthem
.(FD
,216)
This
isan
admirable
programof
localizedresistance.
Where
possible,this
model
ofresistance
isnot
analternative
to,but
cancom
plement,
macro-
logicalstruggles
along“M
arxist”lines.
Yet
ifits
situationis
universalized,it
accomm
odatesunacknow
ledgedprivileging
ofthesubject.
Without
athe
oryof
ideology,it
canlead
toa
dangerousutopianism
.F
oucaultis
abrilliant
thinkerofpow
er-in-spacing,butthe
aware
nessof
thetopographical
reinscriptionof
imperialism
doesnot
informhis
presuppositions.H
eis
takenin
bythe
restrictedversion
ofthe
West
produced
bythat
reinscriptionand
thushelps
toconsolidate
itseffects.
Notice
theom
issionof
thefact,
inthe
following
passage,that
thenew
mechanism
ofpow
erin
theseventeenth
andeighteenth
centuries(the
extractionof
surplusvalue
without
extraeconomic
coercionis
itsM
arxistdescription)
issecured
bym
eansof
territorialim
perialism—
theE
arthand
itsproducts—
“elsewhere.”
The
representationof
sovereigntyis
crucialin
thosetheaters:
“Inthe
seventeenthand
eighteenthcenturies,
we
havethe
productionofan
important
phenomenon,
theem
ergence,or
ratherthe
invention,of
anew
mechanism
ofpower
possessedofhighly
specificprocedural
techn
iqu
es...w
hichis
also,I
believe,absolutely
incompatible
with
therelations
ofsov
ereignty.T
hisnew
mechanism
ofpow
eris
more
dependentupon
bodiesand
what
theydo
thanthe
Earth
andits
products”(PK
,104).
Because
of
ablind
spotregarding
thefirstw
aveof
“geographicaldiscontinuity,”
Foucault
canrem
ainim
perviousto
itssecond
wave
inthe
middle
decadesofour
own
century,identifying
itsim
ply“w
iththe
collapse:of
Fascism
andthe
declineof
Stalinism
”(PK
,87).
Here
isM
ikeD
avis’salternative
view:
“Itw
asrather
theglobal
logicof
counter-revolutionaryviolence
which
createdconditions
forthe
peacefuleconom
icinterdepend.
enceofa
chastenedA
tlanticim
perialismunder
Am
ericanleadership.
...
Itw
asm
ulti-nationalm
ilitaryintegration
underthe
sloganof
collectivese
curityagainstthe
US
SR
which
precededand
quickenedthe
interpenetrationof
them
ajorcapitalist
economies,
making
possiblethe
newera
ofcom
mercial
liberalismw
hichflow
eredbetw
een1958
and1
97
3.”5
2
Itis
within
theem
ergenceof
this“new
mechanism
ofpow
er”that
we
must
readthe
fixationon
nationalscenes,
theresistance
toeco
nomics,
andthe
emphasis
onconcepts
likepow
erand
desirethat
privilegem
iCrology.
Davis
continues:“T
hisquasi-absolutist
centralizationof
strategic
military
power
bythe
United
States
was
toallow
anenlightened
andflexible
subordinancyfor
itsprincipal
satraps.In
particular,it
provedhighly
Uay
atri
;naravo
rty
pivai
accomm
odatingto
theresidual
imperialist
pretensionsof
theF
renchand
British.
..w
itheach
keepingup
astrident
ideologicalm
obilizationagainst
comm
unismall
thew
hile.”W
hiletaking
precautionsagainst
suchunitary
notionsas
“France,”
itm
ust besaid
thatsuch
unitarynotions
as“the
wo
rk
ers’struggle,”
orsuch
unitarypronouncem
entsas
“likepow
er,resistance
is
multiple
andcan
beintegrated
inglobal
strategies”(PK
,142),
seemin
ter
pretableby
way
of Davis’s
narrative.I
amnot
suggesting, asdoes
Paul
Bové,
that“for
adisplaced
andhom
elesspeople
[theP
alestinians]assaulted
mil
itarilyand
culturally..
.aquestion
[suchas
Foucault’s
‘toengage
inpolitics
isto
tryto
knoww
iththe
greatestpossible
honestyw
hetherthe
revo
lutionis
desirable’]is
afoolish
luxuryof W
esternw
ealth.”
53
Iam
suggesting,
rather,that
tobuy
aself-contained
versionof
theW
estis
toignore
its
productionby
theim
perialistproject.
Som
etimes
itseem
sas
ifthevery
brillianceof F
oucault’sanalysis
of thecenturies
ofE
uropeanim
perialismproduces
am
iniatureversion
of
thatheterogeneous
phenomenon:
managem
entof
space—but
bydoctors;
development
ofadm
inistrations—but
inasylum
s;considerations
ofthe
pe
riphery—but in
terms
ofthe
insane,prisoners,
andchildren.
The
clinic,the
asylum, the
prison, theuniversity—
all seemto
bescreen-allegories
thatfo
re
closea
readingof
thebroader
narrativesof
imperialism
.(O
necould
open
asim
ilardiscussion
ofthe
ferociousm
otif
of“deterritorializatiO
n”in
De
leuzeand
Guattari.)
“One
canperfectly
well
nottalk
aboutsom
ethingb
e
causeone
doesn’tknow
aboutit,”
Foucault
might
murm
ur(PK
,66).
Yet
we
havealready
spokenof
thesanctioned
ignorancethat
everycritic
of
imperialism
must
chart.
IIIO
nthe
generallevel
onw
hichU
.S.academ
icsand
studentstake
“influence”from
France,
oneencounters
thefollow
ingunderstanding:
Fou
cault dealsw
ithreal
history,real
politics,and
realsocial
problems;
Derrida
isinaccessible,
esoteric,and
textualistic.T
hereader
isprobably
well
ac
quaintedw
iththis
receivedidea.
“That
[Derrida’s]
own
work,”
Terry
Eag
letonw
rites,“has
beengrossly
unhistorical,politically
evasiveand
inprac
ticeoblivious
tolanguage
as‘discourse’
[languagein
function]is
notto
be
denied.”54
Eagleton
goeson
torecom
mend
Foucault’s
studyof
“discursive
practices.”P
erryA
ndersonconstructs
arelated
history:“W
ithD
errida,the
self-cancellationof structuralism
latentin
therecourse
tom
usicor
madness
inL
evi-Straussor
Foucault
isconsum
mated.
With
nocom
mitm
entto
ex
plorationof social
realitiesat
all, Derrida
hadlittle
compunction
inundoing
theconstructions
ofthese
two,
convictingthem
bothof
a‘nostalgia
of
origins’_Rousseauesque
or pre-Socratic, respectively—
andasking
what right
eitherhad
toassum
e,on
theirow
nprem
ises,the
validityof
theird
is
courses.”55
This
paperis
comm
ittedto
thenotion
that,w
hetherin
defense
ofD
erridaor
not,a
nostalgiafor
lostorigins
canbe
detrimental
tothe
explorationof social
realitiesw
ithinthe
critiqueof im
perialism.
Indeed,the
brillianceof
Anderson’s
misreading
doesnot
preventhim
fromseeing
pre
ciselythe
problemI
emphasize
inF
oucault:“F
oucaultstruck
thech
arac
teristicallyprophetic
notew
henhe
declaredin
1966:‘M
anis
inthe
process
of perishingas
thebeing
oflanguage
continuesto
shineever
more
brightly
uponour
horizon.’B
utw
hois
the‘w
e’to
perceiveor
possesssuch
aho-
I
Ii
rizon?”A
ndersondoes
notsee
theencroachm
entof
the•unacknowledged
Subject
ofthe
West
inthe
laterF
oucault,a
Subject
thatpresides
bydisa
vowal.
He
seesF
oucault’sattitude
inthe
usualw
ay,as
thedisappearance
of
theknow
ingS
ubjectas
such;and
hefurther
seesin
Derrida
thefinal
development
ofthat
tendency:“In
thehollow
ofthe
pronoun[w
e]lies
theaporia
of
thep
rog
ramm
e.”56
Consider,
finally,Said’s
plangentaphorism
,w
hichbetrays
aprofound
misapprehension
ofthe
notionof
“textuality”:“D
errida’scriticism
moves
usinto
thetext,
Foucault’s
inand
out.”
57
Ihave
triedto
arguethat
thesubstantive
concernfor
thepolitics
ofthe
oppressedw
hichoften
accountsfor
Foucault’s
appealcan
hidea
privilegingof
theintellectual
andof
the“concrete”
subjectof
oppressionthat,
infact,
compounds
theappeal.
Conversely,
thoughit
isnot
my
intention
hereto
counterthe
specificview
ofD
erridaprom
otedby
theseinflu
entialw
riters,I
will
discussa
fewaspects
ofD
errida’sw
orkthat
retaina
long-termusefulness
forpeople
outsidethe
First
World.
This
isnot
anapology.
Derrida
ishard
toread;
hisreal
objectofinvestigation
isclassical
philosophy.Y
ethe
isless
dangerousw
henunderstood
thanthe
first-world
intellectualm
asqueradingas
theabsent
nonrepresenterw
holets
theop
pressedspeak
forthem
selves.I
willconsidera
chapterthatD
erridacom
posedtw
entyyears
ago:“O
fG
ramm
atologyA
sa
Positive
Science”(O
G,
74-93).In
thischapter
Derrida
confrontsthe
issueof
whether
“deconstruction”can
leadto
anadequate
practice,w
hethercritical
orpolitical.
The
questionis
howto
keepthe
ethnocentricS
ubjectfrom
establishingitself
byselectively
definingan
Other.
This
isnot
aprogram
forthe
Subject
assuch;
rather,it
isa
programfor
thebenevolent
Western
intellectual.F
orthose
ofus
who
feelthat
the“subject”
hasa
historyand
thatthe
taskofthe
first-world
subjectofknow
ledge
inour
historicalm
oment
isto
resistand
critique“recognition”
oftheT
hirdW
orldthrough
“assimilation,”
thisspecificity
iscrucial.
Inorder
toadvance
afactual
ratherthan
apathetic
critiqueof
theE
uropeanintellec
tual’sethnocentric
impulse,
Derrida
admits
thathe
cannotask
the“first”
questionsthat
must
beansw
eredto
establishthe
groundsof
hisargum
ent:
He
doesnot
declarethat
gramm
atologycan
“riseabove”
(Frank
Lentric.:chia’s
phrase)m
ereem
piricism;
for,like
empiricism
,it
cannotask
first.
questions.D
erridathus
aligns“gram
matological”
knowledge
with
thesam
eproblem
sas
empirical
investigation.“D
econstruction”is
not,therefore,
anew
word
for“ideological
demystification.”
Like
“empirical
investigation•
.tak[ing]shelter
inthe
fieldofgram
matological
knowledge”
obliges“op
erat[ing]through
‘examples’”
(0G.
75).T
heexam
plesD
erridalays
out—to
showthe
limits
ofgram
ma
tologyas
apositive
science—com
efrom
theappropriate
ideologicalself.
justificationofan
imperialist
project.In
theE
uropeanseventeenth
century,he
writes,
therew
erethree
kindsof
“prejudices”operating
inhistories
ofw
ritingw
hichconstituted
a“sym
ptomofthe
crisisof
European
conscious-ness”
(0G.
75):the
“theologicalprejudice,”
the“C
hineseprejudice,”
andthe
“hieroglyphistprejudice.”
The
firstcan
beindexed
as:G
odw
rote.aprim
itiveor
naturalscript:
Hebrew
orG
reek.T
hesecond:
Chinese
isa
perfectblueprint
forphilosophical
writing,
butit
isonly
ablueprint.
Truephilosophical
writing
is“independen[t]
with
regardto
history”(O
G,
79)and
will
sublateC
hineseinto
aneasy-to-learn
scriptthat
will
supersedeactual
Chinese.
The
third:that
Egyptian
scriptis
toosublim
eto
bedcci
Gay
atriC
hakra
vo
rtysp
ivaic
phered.T
hefirst
preju4icepreserves
the“actuality”
of
Hebrew
orG
reek;the
last two
(“rational”and
“mystical,”
respectively)collude
tosupport
thefirst, w
herethe
centerofthe
logosis
seenas
theJudaeo-C
hristianG
od(the
appropriationofthe
Hellenic
Other
throughassim
ilationis
anearlier
story)—a
“prejudice”still
sustainedin
effortsto
givethe
cartographyof the
Judaeo
[C
hristianm
yththe
statusof
geopoliticalhistory:
The
conceptof
Chinese
writing
thusfunctioned
asa
sortof
European
hallucination....T
hisfunctioning
obeyeda
rigorousn
ecessity....
Itw
asnot
disturbedby
theknow
ledgeof C
hinesescript.
..w
hichw
asthen
available....A
“hieroglyphistprejudice”
hadp
roduced
thesam
eeffect of interested
blindness.F
arfrom
pro
ceedin
g...
fromethnocentric
scorn,the
occu
ltation
takesthe
formof an
hyperbolical admiration.
We
havenot
finisheddem
onstratingthe
necessityof
thispattern.
Our
centuryis
notfree
fromit;
eachtim
ethat
ethnocentrismis
precipitatelyand
ostentatiouslyre
versed,som
eeffort
silentlyhides
behindall
thesp
ectacular
effectsto
consolidatean
insideand
todraw
fromit
some
domestic
benefit.(0G
.80;
Derrida
ital
icizesonly
“hieroglyphistprejudice”)
Derrida
proceedsto
offertw
ocharacteristic
possibilitiesfor
so-•lutions
tothe
problemof
theE
uropeanS
ubject,w
hichseeks
toproduce
an
Other that
would
consolidatean
inside,its
own
subjectstatus.
What
follows
isan
accountof
thecom
plicitybetw
eenw
riting,the
openingof
domestic
andcivil
society,and
thestructures
ofdesire,
power,
andcapitalization.
Derrida
thendiscloses
thevulnerability
of hisow
ndesire
toconserve
som
e
thingthat
is,paradoxically,
bothineffable
andnontranscendental.
Incri
tiquingthe
productionof
thecolonial
subject,this
ineffable,no
ntran
scen
dental(“historical”)
placeis
cathectedby
thesubaltern
subject.D
errda
closesthe
chapterby
showing
againthat
theproject
of
grainmatology
isobliged
todevelop
within
thediscourse
ofpresence.
Itis
notjust
acritique
ofpresence
butan
awareness
ofthe
itineraryof
the
discourseof presence
inone’s
own
critique,a
vigilanceprecisely
againsttoo
great aclaim
fortransparency. T
hew
ord“w
riting”as
thenam
eof the
object
andm
odelof gram
matology
isa
practice“only
within
thehistorical closure,
that isto
sayw
ithinthe
limits
ofscience
andphilosophy”
(0G.
93).D
erridahere
makes
Nietzschean,
philosophical,and
psy
choan
alytic,rather
thanspecifically
political,choices
tosuggest
acritique
ofE
u
ropeanethnocentrism
inthe
constitutionof
theO
ther.A
sa
postcolonialintellectual,
Iam
nottroubled
thathe
doesnot
leadm
e(as
Europeans
inevitablyseem
todo)
tothe
specificpath
thatsuch
acritique
makes
nec
essary.It
ism
oreim
portantto
me
that,as
aE
uropeanphilosopher,
he
articulatesthe
European
Subject’stendency
toconstitute
theO
theras
mar
ginal toethnocentrism
andlocates
thatas
theproblem
with
alllogocentric
andtherefore
alsoall
gramm
atologicalendeavors
(sincethe
main
thesisof
thechapter
isthe
complicity
between
thetw
o).N
ota
generalproblem
,but
aEuropean
problem.
Itis
within
thecontext
ofthis
ethnocentricismthat
hetries
sodesperately
todem
otethe
Subject
of
thinkingor
knowledge
as
[
Gay
atriC
hak
ravorty
Spiv
akto
saythat
“thoughtis
...the
blankpart
of
thetext”
(OG
,93);
thatw
hichis
thoughtis,
ifblank,
stillin
thetext
andm
ustbe
consignedto
theO
therof
history.T
hatinaccessible
blanknesscircum
scribedby
aninterpretable
textisw
hata
postcolonialcritic
ofim
perialismw
ouldlike
tosee
developedw
ithinthe
European
enclosureas
theplace
oftheproduction
of theory.The
postcolonialcritics
andintellectuals
canattem
ptto
displacetheir
own
pro
ductiononly
bypresupposing
thattext-inscribedblankness. T
orenderthought
orthe
thinkingsubject
transparentor
invisibleseem
s,by
contrast,to
hidethe
relentlessrecognition
ofthe
Other
byassim
ilation.It
isin
theinterest
ofsuch
cautionsthat
Derrida
doesnot
invoke“letting
theother(s)
speakfor
himself’
butratherinvokes
an“appeal”
toor
“call”to
the“quite-other”
(tout-autreas
opposedto
aself-consolidating
other),of
“renderingdelirious
thatinterior
voicethat
isthe
voiceof
theother
inus.”
58
Derrida
callsthe
ethnocentrismof the
European
scienceofw
riting
inthe
lateseventeenth
andearly
eighteenthcenturies
asym
ptomofthe
generalcrisis
ofE
uropeanconsciousness.
Itis,
of
course,part
ofa
greatersym
ptom,
orperhaps
thecrisis
itself,the
slowturn
fromfeudalism
tocap
italismvia
thefirst
waves
of
capitalistim
perialism.
The
itineraryof
recognition
throughassim
ilationofthe
Other
canbe
more
interestinglytraced,
itseem
sto
me,
inthe
imperialist
constitutionof
thecolonial
subjectthan
inrepeated
incursionsinto
psychoanalysisor
the“figure”
ofwom
an,thoughthe
importance
ofthesetw
ointerventions
within
deconstructionshould
notbe
minim
ized.D
erridahas
notm
oved(or
perhapscannot
move)
intothat
arena.W
hateverthe
reasonsfor
thisspecific
absence,w
hatI
finduseful
isthe
sustainedand
developingw
orkon
them
echanicsof
theconstitution
ofthe
Other;
we
canuse
itto
much
greateranalytic
andinterventionist
advantagethan
invocationsof
theauthenticity
ofthe
Other.
On
thislevel,
what
remains
usefulin
Foucault
isthe
mechanics
ofdisciplinarization
andinstitutionalization,
theconstitution,
asit
were,
ofthe
colonizer.Foucault
dsesnotrelate
ittoany
version,earlyor
late,proto-or
post-,ofimperialism
.T
heyare
ofgreatusefulness
tointellectuals
concernedw
iththe
decayofthe
West.
Their
seductionfor
them,
andfearfulness
forus,
isthat
theym
ightallow
thecom
plicityof
theinvestigating
subject(m
aleor
female
professional)
todisguise
itselfin
transparency.
IvC
anthe
subalternspeak?
What
must
theelite
doto
watch
outfor
thecontinuing
constructionofthe
subaltern?T
hequestion
of“wom
an”seem
sm
ostproblem
aticin
thiscontext.
Clearly,
ifyouare
poor,black,and
female
yougetitin
threew
ays.If,
however,
thisform
ulationis
moved
fromthe
first-world
contextinto
thepostcolonial
(which
isnot
identicalw
iththe
third-world)
context,the
description“black”
or“o
fcolor”loses
persuasivesignificance.
The
necessarystratification
ofcolonial
subject-constitutionin
thefirst
phaseof
capitalistim
perialismm
akes“color”
uselessas
anem
ancipatory
signifier.C
onfrontedby
theferocious
standardizingbenevolence
ofm
ostU
.S.and
Western
European
human-scientific
radicalism(recogni
tionby
assimilation),
theprogressive
thoughheterogeneous
withdraw
alof
consumerism
inthe
comprador
periphery,and
theexclusion
ofthem
arginsof
eventhe
center-peripheryarticulation
(the“true
anddifferential
subaltern”),
theanalogue
ofclass-consciousness
ratherthan
race-consciousness
inthis
areaseem
shistorically,
disciplinarily,and
practicallyforbidden
byR
ightand
Left
alike.It
isnot
justa
questionof
adouble
displacement,
asit
isnot
simply
theproblem
offinding
apsychoanalytic
allegorythat
canaccom
modate
thethird-w
orldw
oman
with
thefirst.
The
cautionsI
havejust
expressedare
validonly
ifwe
aresp
eaking
ofthe
subalternw
oman’s
consciousness—or,
more
acceptably,subject.
Reporting
on,or
betterstill,
participatingin,
antisexistw
orkam
ongw
omen
of coloror
wom
enin
classoppression
inthe
First
World
orthe
Third
World
isundeniably
onthe
agenda.W
eshould
alsow
elcome
allthe
information
retrieval inthese
silencedareas
thatistaking
placein
anthropology,political
science,history,
andsociology.
Yet
theassum
ptionand
constructionof
aconsciousness
orsubject
sustainssuch
work
andw
ill,inthe
longrun,
coherew
iththe
work
ofim
perialistsubject-constitution,
mingling
epistemic
vio
lencew
iththe
advancement
of learningand
civilization.A
ndthe
subalternw
oman
will
beas
mute
asev
er.
59
Inso
fraughta
field,it
isnot
easyto
askthe
questionof
theconsciousness
ofthe
subalternw
oman;
itis
thusall
them
orenecessary
torem
indpragm
aticradicals
thatsuch
aquestion
isnot
anidealist red
herring.T
houghall
feminist
orantisexist
projectscannot
bereduced
tothis
one,to
ignoreit
isan
unacknowledged
politicalgesture
thathas
along
historyand
collaboratesw
itha
masculine
radicalismthat
rendersthe
placeof
thein
vestigatortransparent.
Inseeking
tolearn
tospeak
to(rather
thanlisten
toor
speakfor)
thehistorically
muted
subjectof
thesubaltern
wom
an,the
postcolonialintellectual
systematically
“unlearns”fem
aleprivilege.
This
systematic
unlearninginvolves
learningto
critiquepostcolonial
discoursew
iththe
besttools
itcan
provideand
notsim
plysubstituting
thelost
figureof the
colonized. Thus,to
questionthe
unquestionedm
utingofthe
subalternw
oman
evenw
ithinthe
anti-imperialist
projectof
subalternstudies
isnot,
asJonathan
Culler
suggests,to
“producedifference
bydiffering”
orto
“ap
peal...
toa
sexualidentity
definedas
essentialand
privilegeexperiences
associatedw
iththat
iden
tity.”
6°C
uller’sversion
ofthe
feminist
projectis
possiblew
ithinw
hatE
lizabethF
ox-Genovese
hascalled
“thecontribution
of thebourgeois-dem
ocraticrevolutions
tothe
socialand
politicalindividualism
ofw
om
en.”
6’M
anyof
usw
ereobliged
tounderstand
thefem
inistproject
asC
ullernow
describesit w
henw
ew
erestill
agitatingas
U.S
.acad
emics.
62
Itwas
certainlyanecessary
stagein
my
own
educationin
“unlearning”and
hasconsolidated
thebelief that
them
ainstreamproject
of
Western
feminism
bothcontinues
anddisplaces
thebattle
overthe
rightto
individualismbetw
eenw
omen
andm
enin
situationsof
upward
classm
obility.O
nesuspects
thatthe
debatebetw
eenU
.S.fem
inismand
European
“theory”(as
theoryis
generallyre
presented
byw
omen
fromthe
United
States
orB
ritain)occupies
asignificant
cornerof thatvery
terrain.I
amgenerally
sympathetic
with
thecall
tom
akeU
.S.fem
inismm
ore“theoretical.”
Itseem
s,how
ever,that
theproblem
ofthe
muted
subjectof
thesubaltern
wom
an,though
notsolved
byan
“essentialist”
searchfor
lostorigins,
cannotbe
servedby
thecall
form
oretheory
inA
nglo-Am
ericaeither.
That
callis
oftengiven
inthe
name
ofacritique
of “positivism,”
which
isseen
hereas
identicalw
ith“essentialism
.”Y
etH
egel,the
modern
.inaugurator
of“the
work
ofthe
negative,”w
asnot
astranger
tothe
notionof essences.
For
Marx,
thecurious
persistenceof
essentialismw
ithinthe
uay
atn
naIu-d
vu.L
y1•W
I%
dialecticw
asa
profoundand
productiveproblem
.Thus,
thestringentbinary
oppositionbetw
eenpositivism
/essentialism(read,
U.S.)
and“theory”
(read,F
renchor
Franco-G
erman
viaA
nglo-Am
erican)m
aybe
spurious.A
part.
fromrepressing
theam
biguouscom
plicitybetw
eenessentialism
anden
tiguesofpositivism
(acknowledged
byD
erridain
“Of
Gram
matology
As
aP
ositiveScience”),
italso
errsby
implying
thatpositivism
isnot
atheory.
This
move
allows
theem
ergenceof
aproper
name,
apositive
essence,T
heory.O
nceagain,
theposition
ofthe
investigatorrem
ainsunquestioned.
And,
ifthis
territorialdebate
turnstow
ardthe
Third
World,
nochange
inthe
questionof
method
isto
bediscerned.
This
debatecannot
takeinto
accountthat,
inthe
caseof
thew
oman
assubaltern,
noingredients
forthe
constitutionof
theitinerary
ofthe
traceof
asexed
subjectcan
begathered
tolocate
thepossibility
ofdissem
ination.Y
etI
remain
generallysym
patheticin
aligningfem
inismw
iththe
critiqueof
positivismand
thedefetishization
oftheconcrete.
Iam
alsofar
fromaverse
tolearning
fromthe
work
ofW
esterntheorists,
thoughI
havelearned
toinsist
onm
arkingtheir
positionalityas
investigatingsub
jects.G
iventhese
conditions,and
asa
literarycritic,
Itactically
confrontedthe
imm
enseproblem
ofthe
consciousnessof
thew
oman
assubaltern.
Ireinvented
theproblem
ina
sentenceand
transformed
itinto
theobject
ofa
simple
semiosis.
What
doesthis
sentencem
ean?T
heanalogy
hereis
between
theideological
victimization
ofa
Freud
andthe
positionalityof
thepostcolonial
intellectualas
investigatingsubject.
As
Sarah
Kofm
anhas
shown,
thedeep
ambiguity
ofFreud’s
useofw
omen
asa
scapegoatisa
reaction-formation
toan
initialand
continuingdesire
togive
thehysteric
avoice,
totransform
herinto
thesubject
ofh
ysteria.
63
The
masculine-im
perialistideologicalformation
thatshaped
thatdesire
into“the
daughter’sseduction”
ispart
ofthe
same
formation
thatconstructs
them
onolithic“third-w
orldw
oman.”
As
apostcolonial
intellectual,
Iam
influencedby
thatform
ationas
well.
Part
ofour
“unlearning”project
isto
articulatethat
ideologicalform
ation—by
measuring
silences,if
necessary—into
theobject
ofinvestigation.T
hus,w
henconfronted
with
thequestions,
Can
thesubaltern
speak?and
Can
thesubaltern
(asw
oman)
speak?,our
effortsto
givethe
subalterna
voicein
historyw
illbe
doublyopen
tothe
dangersrun
byF
reud’sdiscourse.
As
aproduct
ofthese
considerations,
Ihave
puttogether
thesentence
“White
men
aresaving
brown
wom
enfrom
brown
men”
ina
spiritnot
unlikethe
oneto
beencountered
inF
reud’sinvestigations
ofthe
sentence“A
childis
beingbeaten
.”6
4T
heuse
of
Freud
heredoes
notim
plyan
isomorphic
analogybetw
eensubject-form
ationand
thebehavior
ofsocialcollectives,
afrequent
practice,often
accompanied
bya
referenceto
Reich,
inthe
conversationbetw
eenD
eleuzeand
Foucault.
SoI
amnot
suggestingthat
“White
men
aresaving
brown
wom
enfrom
brown
men”
isa
sentenceindicating
acol
lectivefantasy
symptom
aticof
acollective
itineraryof
sadomasochistic
repressionin
acollective
imperialist
enterprise.T
hereis
asatisfying
symm
etryin
suchan
allegory,but
Iw
ouldrather
invitethe
readerto
considerit
aproblem
in“w
ildpsychoanalysis”
thana
clinchingsolution.65
Justas
Freud’s
insistenceon
making
thew
oman
thescapegoat
in“A
childis
beingbeaten”
andelsew
herediscloses
hispolitical
interests,how
everim
perfectly,so
my
insistenceon
imperialist
subject-productionas
theoccasion
forthis
sentencediscloses
my
politics.
Further,
Iam
attempting
toborrow
thegeneral
methodological
auraof
Freud’s
strategytow
ardthe
sentencehe
constructedas
asentence
outof
them
anysim
ilarsubstantive
accountshis
patientsgave
him.
This
doesnot m
eanI
will offer
acase
of transference-in-analysisas
anisom
orphic
model for
thetransaction
between
readerand
text(m
ysentence).
The
anal
‘ogy
between
transferenceand
literarycriticism
orhistoriography
isno
more
thana
productivecatachresis.
To
saythat
thesubject
isa
textdoes
not
authorizethe
conversepronouncem
ent:the
verbaltext
isa
subject.
Iam
fascinated,rather,
byhow
Freud
predicatesa
historyof
repressionthat
producesthe
finalsentence.
Itis
ahistory
with
adouble
origin,one
hiddenin
theam
nesiaof
theinfant,
theother
lodgedin
our
rarchaic
past,assum
ingby
implication
apreoriginary
spacew
herehum
an
andanim
al• were
notyet
differen
tiated.
We
aredriven
toim
posea
ho
rn
ologueof
thisF
reudianstrategy
onthe
Marxist
narrativeto
explainthe
ideologicaldissim
ulationo
fim
perialistpolitical
economy
andoutline
a
historyof
repressionthat
producesa
sentencelike
theone
Ihave
sketched.
This historyalso
hasa
doubleorigin, one
hiddenin
them
aneuveringsbehind
theB
ritishabolition
ofw
idowsacrifice
in1
82
9,
theother
lodgedin
the
classical andV
edicpast
of Hindu
India, theR
g- Veda
andthe
Dharm
asastra.
No
doubtthere
isalso
anundifferentiated
preoriginaryspace
thatsupports
thishistory.T
hesentence
Ihave
constructedis
oneam
ongm
anydisp
lace
ments
describingthe
relationshipbetw
eenbrow
nand
white
men
(sometim
es
brown
andw
hitew
omen
worked
in). Ittakesits
placeam
ongsom
esentences
of “hyperbolicadm
iration”or
ofpious
guiltthat
Derrida
speaksof
inco
n
nectionw
iththe
“hieroglyphistprejudice.”
The
relationshipbetw
eenthe
imperialist
subjectand
thesubject
ofim
perialismis
atleast
ambiguous.
The
Hindu
widow
ascendsthe
pyreof
thedead
husbandand
imm
olatesherself
uponit.
This
isw
idowsacrifice.
(The
conventionaltra
n
scriptionofthe
Sanskrit w
ordfor the
widow
would
besati. T
heearly
colonial
British
transcribedit suttee.)
The
ritew
asnot
practiceduniversally
andw
as
notcaste-
orclass-fixed.
The
abolitionof
thisrite
bythe
British
hasbeen
generallyunderstood
asa
caseof
“White
men
savingbrow
nw
omen
from
brown
men.”
White
wom
en—from
thenineteenth-century
British
Missio
n
aryR
egistersto
Mary
Daly—
havenot
producedan
alternativeu
nderstan
d
ing.A
gainstthis
isthe
Indiannativist
argument,
aparody
of
thenostalgia
forlost
origins:“T
hew
omen
actuallyw
antedto
die.”T
hetw
osentences
goa
longw
ayto
legitimize
eachother.
One
neverencounters
thetestim
onyof
thew
omen’s
voice-consciousness.S
uch
atestim
onyw
ouldnot
beideology-transcendent
or“fully”
subjective,of
course, butit
would
haveconstituted
theingredients
forproducing
aco
un
tersentence. As
onegoes
down
thegrotesquely
mistranscribed
names
of these
wom
en, thesacrificed
widow
s,in
thepolice
reportsincluded
inthe
records
of theE
astIndia
Com
pany,one
cannotput
togethera
“voice.”T
hem
ost
onecan
senseis
theim
mense
heterogeneitybreaking
througheven
sucha
skeletaland
ignorantaccount
(castes,for
example,
areregularly
described
astribes).
Faced
with
thedialectically
interlockingsentences
thatare
con
structibleas
“White
men
aresaving
brown
wom
enfrom
brown
men”
and
“The
wom
enw
antedto
die,”the
postcolonialw
oman
intellectualasks
the
questionof
simple
semiosis—
What
doesthis
mean?—
andbegins
toplot
a
history.
Gayatri
Ch
ak
rav
orty
piv
ak
To
mark
them
oment
when
notonly
acivil
buta
goodsociety
isborn
outof
domestic
confusion,singular
eventsthat
breakthe
letterof
thelaw
toinstill
itsspirit
areoften
invoked.T
heprotection
ofw
omen
bym
enoften
providessuch
anevent.
Ifw
erem
ember
thatthe
British
boastedof
theirabsolute
equitytow
ardand
noninterferencew
ithnative
custom/
law,
aninvocation
ofthissanctioned
transgressionofthe
letterfor
thesake
ofthespiritm
aybe
readin
J. M.
Derrett’s
remark:
“The
veryfirstlegislation
uponH
itiduL
aww
ascarried
throughw
ithouttheassentofa
singleH
indu.”T
helegislation
isnot
named
here.T
henext
sentence,w
herethe
measure
isnam
ed,is
equallyinteresting
ifone
considersthe
implications
ofthe
survivalofa
coloniallyestablished
“good”society
afterdecolonization:“The
recurrenceofsati
inindependent
Indiais
probablyan
obscurantistrevival.
which
cannotlong
surviveeven
ina
verybackw
ardpart
ofthe
cou
ntry
.”6
8W
hetherthis
observationis
corrector
not,w
hatinterests
me
isthat
theprotection
ofw
oman
(todaythe
“third-world
wom
an”)becom
esa
signifierfor
theestablishm
entof
agood
societyw
hichm
ust,at
suchinau
gurativem
oments,
transgressm
erelegality,
orequity
oflegalpolicy.
Inthis
particularcase,
theprocess
alsoallow
edthe
redefinitionas
acrim
eofw
hathad
beentolerated,
known,
oradulated
asritual.
Inother
words,
thisone
itemin
Hindu
lawjum
pedthe
frontierbetw
eenthe
privateand
thepublic
domain.
Although
Foucault’s
historicalnarrative,focusing
solelyon
West-..
emE
urope,sees
merely
atolerance
forthe
criminal
antedatingthe
developm
entofcriminology
inthe
lateeighteenth
century(PK
,41),his
theoreticaldescription
ofthe
“episteme”
ispertinent
here:“T
heepistem
eis
the‘ap
paratus’w
hichm
akespossible
theseparation
notofthe
truefrom
thefalse,
butof
what
may
notbe
characterizedas
scientific”(PK
,197)—
ritualas
opposedto
crime,
theone
fixedby
superstitionthe
otherby
legalscience.
The
leapofsuttee
fromprivate
topublic
hasa
clearand
complex.
relationshipw
iththe
changeoverfrom
am
ercantileand
comm
ercialto
aterritorial
andadm
inistrativeB
ritishpresence;
itcan
befollow
edin
correspondence
among
thepolice
stations,the
lower
andhigher
courts,the
courtsof
directors,the
princeregent’s
court,and
thelike.
(Itis
interestingto
notethat,
fromthe
pointof
viewof
thenative
“colonialsubject,”
alsoem
ergentfrom
thefeudalism
-capitalismtransition,
satiis
asignifier
with
thereverse
socialcharge:
“Groups
renderedpsychologically
marginal
bytheir
exposureto
Western
impact
...
hadcom
eunder
pressureto
demonstrate,
toothers
asw
ellasto
themselves,their
ritualpurityand
allegianceto
traditionalhigh
culture.T
om
anyof
themsati
became
anim
portantproof
oftheir
conformity
toolder
norms
ata
time
when
thesenorm
shad
become
shakyw
ithin
.”69)
Ifthis
isthe
firsthistorical
originof
my
sentence,it
isevidently
lostin
thehistory
ofhumankind
asw
ork,the
storyof capitalist
expansion,the
slowfreeing
oflabor
power
ascom
modity,
thatnarrative
ofthe
modes
ofproduction,thetransition
fromfeudalism
viam
ercantilismto
capitalism.
Yet
theprecarious
normativity
ofthis
narrativeis
sustainedby
theputa
tivelychangeless
stopgapof the
“Asiatic”
mode
ofproduction,
which
stepsin
tosustain
itw
heneverit
mightbecom
eapparent
thatthe
storyofcapital
logicis
thestory
ofthe
West,
thatim
perialismestablishes
theuniversality
ofthe
mode
ofproduction
narrative,that
toignore
thesubaltern
todayis,
willy-nilly,
tocontinue
theim
perialistproject.
The
originof
my
sentence
isthus
lostin
theshuffle
between
other,m
orepow
erfuldiscourses.
Given
that theabolition
of satiw
asin
itself admirable,
isit
still possibleto
wonder
ifaperception
ofthe
originof
my
sentencem
ightcontain
interventionist
possibilities?Imperialism
’sim
ageas
theestablisher
ofthe
goodsociety
is
niarkedby
theespousal
of thew
oman
asobject
of protectionfrom
herow
n
kind.H
owshould
oneexam
inethe
dissimulation
ofpatriarchal
strategy,
which
apparentlygrants
thew
oman
freechoice
assubject?
Inother
words,
howdoes
onem
akethe
move
from“B
ritain”to
“Hinduism
”?E
venthe
attempt
shows
thatim
perialismis
notidentical
with
chromatism
,or
mere
prejudiceagainst
peopleof
color.T
oapproach
thisquestion,
Iw
illtouch
brieflyon
theD
harmasãstra
(thesustaining
scriptures)and
theR
g- Veda
.(Praise
Know
ledge).T
heyrepresent
thearchaic
originin
my
homology
of
Freud.O
fcourse,
my
treatment
isnot
exhaustive.M
yreadings
are,rather,
aninterested
andinexpert
examination,
bya
postcolonialw
oman,
ofthe
fabricationof
repression,a
constructedcounternarrative
ofw
oman’s
con
sciousness,thus
wom
an’sbeing,
thusw
oman’s
beinggood,
thusthe
good
wom
an’sdesire,
thusw
oman’s
desire.P
aradoxically,at
thesam
etim
ew
e
witness
theunfixed
placeof
wom
anas
asignifier
inthe
inscriptionof
the
socialindividual.
The
two
mom
entsin
theD
harmasastra
thatI
aminterested
in
arethe
discourseon
sanctionedsuicides
andthe
natureof
therites
forthe
dead.°F
ramed
inthese
two
discourses,the
self-imm
olationof w
idows
seems
anexception
tothe
rule.T
hegeneral
scripturaldoctrine
isthat
suicideis
reprehensible.R
oomis
made,
however,
forcertain
forms
ofsuicide
which,
asform
ulaicperform
ance,lose
thephenom
enalidentity
ofbeing
suicide.
Thefirst
categoryof
sanctionedsuicides
arisesout
oftatvajnãna,
orthe
knowledge
oftruth.
Here
theknow
ingsubject
comprehends
thein
substan
tialityor
mere
phenomenality
(which
may
bethe
same
thingas
no
nph
en
omenality)
of itsidentity.
At
acertain
pointin
time,
tattva
was
interpreted
as“that
you,”but
evenw
ithoutthat,
tatvais
thatnessor
quiddity.T
hus,
thisenlightened
selftruly
knows
the“that”-ness
ofits
identity.Its
dem
o
litionof
thatidentity
isnot
atmaghata
(akilling
ofthe
self).T
heparadox
ofknow
ingof
thelim
itsof
knowledge
isthat
thestrongest
assertionof
agency,to
negatethe
possibilityof
agency,cannot
bean
example
ofitself.
Curiously
enough,the
self-sacrificeof gods
issanctioned
bynatural
ecology,
usefulfor
thew
orkingof
theeconom
yof
Nature
andthe
Universe,
rather
thanby
self-knowledge.
Inthis
logicallyanterior
stage,inhabited
bygods
ratherthan
human
beings,ofthis
particularchain
of displacements,
suicide
andsacrifice
(atmaghata
andatm
adcna)seem
aslittle
distinctas
an“in
terior”(self-know
ledge)and
an“exterior”
(ecology)sanction.
This
philosophicalspace,
however,
doesnot
accomm
odatethe
self-imm
olatingw
oman.
For
herw
elook
where
roomis
made
tosanction
suicidesthat
cannotclaim
truth-knowledge
asa
statethat
is,at
anyrate,
easilyverifiable
andbelongs
inthe
areaof
sruti(w
hatw
asheard)
rather
thansm
irti(w
hatis
remem
bered).T
hisexception
tothe
generalrule
about
suicideannuls
thephenom
enalidentity
ofself-im
molation
ifperform
edin
certainplaces
ratherthan
ina
certainstate
of enlightenment. T
hus, we
move
froman
interiorsanction
(truth-knowledge)
toan
exteriorone
(placeof
_____:
pilgrimage). It is
possiblefor
aw
oman
toperform
thistype
of(n
on)su
icide.
7’
Uay
atr.L
nak
ravorty
op
lv
Yet
eventhis
isnot
theproper
placefor
thew
oman
toannulthe
propernam
eof
suicidethrough
thedestruction
ofher
properself.
Forher
aloneis
sanctionedself-im
molation
ona
deadspouse’s
pyre.(T
hefew
male
examples
citedin
Hindu
antiquityof
self-imm
olationon
another’spyre,
beingproofs
ofenthusiasmand
devotionto
am
asteror
superior,revealthe
structureof
domination
within
therite).
This
suicidethat
isnot
suicidem
aybe
readas
asim
ulacrumof
bothtruth-know
ledgeand
pietyof
place.Ifthe
former,
itis
asifthe
knowledge
ina
subject ofitsow
ninsubstantiality..
andm
erephenom
enalityis
dramatized
sothat
thedead
husbandbecom
esthe
exteriorizedexam
pleand
placeofthe
extinguishedsubjectand
thew
idowbecom
esthe
(non)agentwho
“actsitout.”
Ifthelatter, itis
asifthe
metonym
forall
sacredplaces
isnow
thatburning
bedofw
ood,constructed
byelab
orateritual,
where
thew
oman’s
subject,legally
displacedfrom
herself,is
beingconsum
ed.It
isin
terms
ofthis
profoundideology
ofthe
displacedplace
ofthefem
alesubject
thatthe
paradoxoffree
choicecom
esinto
play.F
orthe
male
subject,it
isthe
felicityofthe
suicide,a
felicitythat
willannul
ratherthan
establishits
statusas
such,that
isnoted.
For
thefem
alesubject,
asanctioned
self-imm
olation,even
asit
takesaw
aythe
effectof
“fall”(pa.
taka)attached
toan
unsanctionedsuicide;
bringspraise
forthe
actofchoiceon
anotherregister.
By
theinexorable
ideologicalproduction
ofthe
sexedsubject,
sucha
deathcan
beunderstood
bythe
female
subjectas
anexcep
tionalsignifier
ofher
own
desire,exceeding
thegeneral
rulefor
aw
idow’s
conduct.In
certainperiods
andareas
thisexceptional
rulebecam
ethe
generalrule
ina
class-specificw
ay.A
shisN
andyrelates
itsm
arkedpreva
lencein
eighteenth-and
earlyninteenth-century
Bengal
tofactors
rangingfrom
populationcontrol
tocom
munal
miso
gy
ny
.72
Certainly
itsprevalence
therein
theprevious
centuriesw
asbecause
inB
engal,unlike
elsewhere
inIndia,
widow
scould
inheritproperty.
Thus,
what
theB
ritishsee
aspoor
victimized
wom
engoing
tothe
slaughteris
infact
anideological
battleground.A
sP.V
.Kane,the
greathistorianofthe
Dharm
asOstra, has
correctlyobserved:
“InB
engal,[the
factthat]
thew
idowof
asonless
mem
bereven
ina
jointH
indufam
ilyis
entitledto
practicallythe
same
rightsoverjoint
family
propertyw
hichher
deceasedhusband
would
havehad..
.musthave
frequentlyinduced
thesurviving
mem
bersto
getrid
of
thew
idowby
appealing
ata
most
distressinghour
toher
devotionto
andlove
forher
husband”
(HD
11.2,635).
Yet
benevolentand
enlightenedm
alesw
ereand
aresym
patheticw
iththe
“courage”of
thew
oman’s
freechoice
inthe
matter.
They
thusaccept
theproduction
ofthe
sexedsubaltern
subject:“M
odernIndia
doesnot
justif’
thepractice
ofsati,
butit
isa
warped
mentality
thatrebukes
modern
Indiansfor
expressingadm
irationand
reverencefor
thecool
and,
unfalteringcourage
ofIndian
wom
enin
becoming
satisor
performing
thej
jauharforcherishing
theirideals
ofwom
anlyconduct”
(HD
11.2,636).What:
Jean-Francois
Lyotard
hasterm
edthe
“diffErend,”the
inacessibilityof,
oruntranslatability
from,
onem
odeof
discoursein
adispute
toanother,
isvividly
illustratedhere
.7
3A
sthe
discourseof
what
theB
ritishperceive
asheathen
ritualis
sublated(but
not,L
yotardw
ouldargue,
translated)into
what
theB
ritishperceive
ascrim
e,one
diagnosisof
female
freew
illis
substitutedfor
another.
Of
course,the
self-imm
olationof
widow
sw
asnot
invariablerit
ual prescription.If, how
ever, thew
idowdoes
decidethus
toexceed
theletter
of ritual, toturn
backis
atransgression
for which
aparticular type
of penance
isprescrib
ed.
74
With
thelocal
British
policeofficer
supervisingthe
imm
o
,lation,
tobe
dissuadedafter
adecision
was,
bycontrast,
am
arkof real
free
choice, achoice
of freedom. T
heam
biguityofthe
positionofthe
indigenous
colonialelite
isdisclosed
inthe
nationalisticrom
anticizationof the
purity,
strength,and
loveof
theseself-sacrificing
wom
en.T
hetw
oset
piecesare
Rabindranath
Tagore’s
paeanto
the“self-renouncing
paternal grandmothers
of Bengal”
andA
nandaC
oomarasw
amy’s
eulogyofsuttee
as“this
last proof
of theperfect
unityof
bodyand
soul.”
75
•O
bviouslyI
amnot
advocatingthe
killingof
widow
s.I
amsu
g
gestingthat, w
ithinthe
two
contendingversions
of freedom, the
constitution
of thefem
alesubject in
lifeis
theplace
of thedifferend.
Inthe
caseof w
idow
self.imm
olation,ritual
isnot
beingredefined
assuperstition
butas
crime.
:The
gravityof sati
was
thatit
was
ideologicallycathected
as“rew
ard,”ju
st
as thegravity
of imperialism
was
that it was
ideologicallycathected
as“social
mission.”
Thom
pson’sunderstanding
ofsati
as“punishm
ent”is
thusfar
off them
ark:
Itm
ayseem
unjustand
illogicalth
atthe
Moguls,
who
freelyim
paledand
flayedalive, or nationals
ofEurope,
whose
countrieshad
suchferocious
penalcodes
and
hadknow
n,scarcely
acentury
beforesuttee
beganto
shockthe
English
conscience,orgies
ofw
itch-burningand
religiouspersecution,
shouldhave
feltas
theydid
about suttee.B
ut thedifferences
seemed
tothem
this—
thevictim
sof
theircruelties
were
torturedby
alaw
which
consideredthem
offenders,w
hereasthe
victims
of sutteew
erepunished
forno
offensebut the
physicalw
eaknessw
hichhad
placedthem
atm
an’sm
ercy. The
riteseem
edto
provea
depravityand
arrogancesuch
asno
otherhum
anoffense
hadbrought
tolig
ht.
16
All
throughthe
mid-
andlate-eighteenth
century,in
thespirit
of
thecodification
ofthe
law,
theB
ritishin
Indiacollaborated
andconsulted
with
learnedB
rahmans
tojudge
whether
sutteew
aslegal
bytheir
ho
mog
enizedversion
ofH
indulaw
.T
hecollaboration
was
oftenidiosyncratic,
as
inthe
caseof
thesignificance
ofbeing
dissuaded.S
ometim
es,as
inthe
generalSastric
prohibitionagainst
theim
molation
ofw
idows
with
small
children, theB
ritishcollaboration
seems
confu
sed,
77
Inthe
beginningof the
nineteenthcentury,
theB
ritishauthorities,
andespecially
theB
ritishin
England,
repeatedlysuggested
thatcollaboration
made
itappear
asif
the
British
condonedthis
practice.W
henthe
laww
asfinally
written, the
history
of thelong
periodof collaboration
was
effaced,and
thelanguage
celebrated
thenoble
Hindu
who
was
againstthe
badH
indu,the
lattergiven
tosavage
atrocities:
The
practiceof S
uttee.
..is
revoltingto
thefeeling
of
human
natu
re....In
many
instances,acts
ofatrocity
havebeen
perpetrated,w
hichhave
beenshocking
to
Gay
atriL
flalcravo
rtypva.L
theH
indoosth
emselv
es....A
ctuatedby
theseco
nsiderations
theG
overnor-General
inC
ouncil,w
ithoutintending
todepart
fromone
ofthe
firstand
most
important
principlesofthe
systemof
British
Go
vern
ment
inIndia
thatall
classesof
thepeople
besecure
inthe
observanceof
theirreligious
usages,so
longas
thatsystem
canbe
adheredto
without violation
of thep
aramo
un
tdictates
of
justice
and
hum
anity
,has
deemed
itright
toestablish
thefollow
ingru
les....
(HD
11.2,624-25)
That
thisw
asan
alternativeideology
ofthe
gradedsanctioning
ofsuicide
asexception,
ratherthan
itsinscription
assin,
was
ofcourse
notunderstood.
Perhaps
satishould
havebeen
readw
ithm
artyrdom,
with
thedefunct
husbandstanding
infor
thetranscendental
One;
orw
ithw
ar,w
iththe
husbandstanding
infor
sovereignor
state, forw
hosesake
anintoxicating
ideologyof
self-sacrificecan
bem
obilized.In
actuality,it
was
categorizedw
ithm
urder,infanticide,
andthe
lethalexposure
ofthe
veryold.
The
du-‘
biousplace
ofthe
freew
illof
theconstituted
sexedsubject
asfem
alew
assucessfully
effaced.T
hereis
noitinerary
we
canretrace
here.Since
theother
sanctionedsuicides
didnot
involvethe
sceneof
thisconstitution,
theyen
teredneither
theideological battleground
at thearchaic
origin—the
traditionofthe
Dharm
asastra—nor
thescene
of thereinscription
ofritualas
crime—
theB
ritishabolition.
The
onlyrelated
transformation
was
Mahatm
aG
an-:
dhi’sreinscription
ofthe
notionof
satyagraha,or
hungerstrike,
asresist
ance.B
utthis
isnot
theplace
todiscuss
thedetails
ofthat
sea-change.I
would
merely
invitethe
readerto
compare
theauras
of widow
sacrificeand
Gandhian
resistance.T
heroot
inthe
firstpart
ofsatyagraha
andsatE
arethe
same.
Sincethe
beginningof
theP
uranicera
(ca.A
.D.
400),learned
Brahm
ansdebated
thedoctrinal
appropriatenessof
satias
of
sanctionedsuicides
insacred
placesin
general.(T
hisdebate
stillcontinues
inan
academ
icw
ay.)S
ometim
esthe
cast provenanceofthe
practicew
asin
question.T
hegeneral
lawfor
widow
s,that
theyshould
observebrahm
acarya,was,.:
however,
hardlyever
debated.It
isnot
enoughto
translatebrahm
acaiyaas
“celibacy.”It
shouldbe
recognizedthat,
ofthe
fourages
ofbeingin
Hindu
(orB
rahmanical)
regulativepsychobiography,
brahmacarya
isthe
socialpractice
anteriorto
thekinship
inscriptionofm
arriage.T
hem
an—w
idower
orhusband—
graduatesthrough
vanaprastha(forest
life)into
them
aturecelibacy
andrenunciation
ofsam
nyãsa(laying
aside).
78
The
wom
anas
wifb
isindispensable
forgarhasthya,
orhouseholdership,
andm
ayaccom
panyher
husbandinto
forestlife.
Shehas
noaccess
(accordingto
Brahm
anicaIsanction)
tothe
finalcelibacy
ofasceticism
,or
samnyasa.
The
wom
anas
widow
,by
thegeneral
lawof sacred
doctrine,m
ustregress
toan
anteriority.transform
edinto
stasis.T
heinstitutional
evilsattendant
uponthis
laware
well
known;
Iam
consideringits
asymm
etricaleffect
onthe
ideologicalform
ationof
thesexed
subject.It
isthus
ofm
uchgreater
significancethat
therew
asno
debateon
thisnonexceptional
fateof
widow
s—either
among
Hindus
orbetw
eenH
indusand
British—
thanthat
theexceptional prescrip-
tionof
self-imm
olationw
asactively
conten
ded
.79
Here
thepossibility
of
recoveringa
(sexually)subaltern
subjectis
onceagain
lostand
overd
eter
mined.
This
legallyprogram
med
asymm
etryin
thestatus
of thesubject,
which
effectivelydefines
thew
oman
asobject
ofone
husband,obviously
operatesin
theinterest of the
legallysym
metrical
subject-statusofthe
male.
Theself-im
molation
ofthew
idowthereby
becomes
theextrem
ecase
of the
general lawrather
thanan
exceptionto
it.It
isnot
surprising,then,
toread
of heavenlyrew
ardsfor
thesati,
where
thequality
ofbeing
theobject
ofa
uniquepossessor
isem
phasizedby
way
ofrivalry
with
otherfem
ales,those
ecstaticheavenly
dancers, paragonso
f female
beautyand
male
pleasurew
ho
singher
praise:“In
heavenshe,
beingsoley
devotedto
herhusband,
and
praisedby
groupsof
apsarãs[heavenly
dancers],sports
with
herhusband
aslong
asfourteen
Indrasrule”
(HD
11.2,631).
The
profoundirony
inlocating
thew
oman’s
freew
illin
self
imm
olationis
onceagain
revealedin
averse
accompanying
theearlier
pas
sage:“A
slong
asthe
wom
an[as
wife:
stri]does
notburn
herselfin
fireon
thedeath
ofher
husband,she
isnever
released[m
ucyate]from
herfem
ale
body[strisartr—
i.e.,in
thecycle
ofbirths].”
Even
asit
operatesthe
most
subtlegeneral
releasefrom
individualagency,
thesanctioned
suicidepe
culiarto
wom
andraw
sits
ideologicalstrength
byidentifying
individual
agencyw
iththe
supraindividual:kill
yourselfon
yourhusband’s
pyrenow
,
andyou
may
killyour
female
bodyin
theentire
cycleof
birth.
Ina
furthertw
istof
theparadox,
thisem
phasison
freew
illes
tablishesthe
peculiarm
isfortuneof
holdinga
female
body.T
hew
ordfor
theself that
isactually
burnedis
thestandard
word
forspirit
inthe
noblest
sense(atm
an),w
hilethe
verb“release,”
throughthe
rootfor
salvationin
thenoblest
sense(m
uc—
*m
oska)is
inthe
passive(m
ocyate),and
thew
ord
for thatw
hichis
annulledin
thecycle
of birthis
theeveryday
word
forthe
body.T
heideological
message
writes
itselfin
thebenevolent
twentieth-
centurym
alehistorian’s
admiration:
“The
Jauhar[group
self-imm
olation
of aristocraticR
ajputw
ar-widow
sor
imm
inentw
ar-widow
s]practiced
by
theR
ajputladies
ofC
hitorand
otherplaces
forsaving
themselves
from
unspeakableatrocities
atthe
handsof
thevictorious
Moslem
sare
toow
ell
known
toneed
anylengthy
notice”(H
D11.2,
629).A
lthoughjau
har
isnot,
strictlyspeaking,
anact
ofsati,
andal
thoughI
donot
wish
tospeak
forthe
sanctionedsexual
violenceof
con
queringm
alearm
ies,“M
oslem”
orotherw
ise,fem
aleself-im
molation
in
theface
ofit
isa
legitimation
of
rapeas
“natural”and
works,
inthe
long
run,in
theinterest
ofunique
genitalpossession
ofthe
female.
The
group
rapeperpetrated
bythe
conquerorsis
am
etonymic
celebrationof territorial
acquisition.Just
asthe
generallaw
forw
idows
was
unquestioned,so
this
actof
female
heroismpersists
among
thepatriotic
talestold
tochildren,
thusoperating
onthe
crudestlevel
ofideological
reproduction.It
hasalso
playeda
tremendous
role,precisely
asan
overdetermined
signifier,in
acting
out Hindu
comm
unalism.
Sim
ultaneously,the
broaderquestion
of theco
n
stitutionof the
sexedsubject is
hiddenby
foregroundingthe
visibleviolence
ofsati.T
hetask
ofrecovering
a(sexually)
subalternsubject
islost
inan
institutionaltextuality
atthe
archaicorigin.
As
Im
entionedabove,
when
thestatus
ofthe
legalsubject
as
property-holdercould
betem
porarilybestow
edon
the female
relict, theself-
[imm
olationof
widow
sw
asstringently
enforced.R
aghunandana,the
late
Gay
atriC
hak
ravorty
Spiv
akfifteenth-/sixteenth-century
legalistw
hoseinterpretations
aresupposed
tolend
thegreatest
authorityto
suchenforcem
ent,takes
ashis
texta
curiouspassage
fromthe
Rg-V
eda,the
most
ancientof
theH
indusacred
texts,the
firstof
theSrutis.
Indoing
so,he
isfollow
inga
centuries-oldtradition,
comm
emorating
apeculiar
andtransparent
misreading
atthe
veryplace
ofsanction.
Here
isthe
verseoutlining
certainsteps
within
therites
forthe
dead.E
venat
asim
plereading
itis
clearthat
itis
“notaddressed
tow
idows
atall,
butto
ladiesof
thedeceased
man’s
householdw
hosehusbands
were
living.”W
hythen
was
ittakenas
authoritative?T
his,the
unemphatic
trans
positionof
thedead
forthe
livinghusband,
isa
differentorder
ofm
ysteryat
thearchaic
originfrom
theones
we
havebeen
discussing:“L
etthese
whose
husbandsare
worthy
andare
livingenter
thehouse
with
clarifiedbutter
intheireyes. L
etthesew
ivesfirst step
intothe
house, tearless, healthy,and
well
adorned”(H
D11.2,
634).B
utthis
crucialtransposition
isnot
theonly
mistake
here.T
heauthority
islodged
ina
disputedpassage
andan
alternatereading.
Inthe
secondline,
heretranslated
“Let
thesew
ivesfirst
stepinto
thehouse,”
thew
ordfor
firstis
agré.S
ome
haveread
itas
agné“0
fire.”A
sK
anem
akesclear, how
ever, “evenw
ithoutthischange
Apararka
andothers
relyfor
thepractice
ofSati
onthis
verse”(H
DIV
.2,199).
Here
isanother
screenaround
oneorigin
ofthe
historyof
thesubaltern
female
subject.Is
ita
historicaloneirocritique
thatone
shouldperform
ona
statem
ent suchas: “T
hereforeitm
ust beadm
ittedthat eitherthe
MSS
arecorrupt
orR
aghunandanacom
mitted
aninnocent
slip”(H
D11.2,
634)?It
shouldbe
mentioned
thatthe
restof
thepoem
iseither
aboutthat
generallaw
ofbrahm
acarya-in-stasisfor
widow
s,to
which
satiis
anexception,
orabout
niyoga—”appointing
abrother
orany
nearkinsm
anto
raiseup
issueto
adeceased
husbandby
marrying
hisw
ido
w.”
8°IfP.
V.
Kane
isthe
authorityon
thehistory
oftheD
harmasastra,
Mulla’s
Principlesof
Hindu
Law
isthe
practicalguide.
Itis
partof
thehistorical text
ofwhat
Freud
calls“kettle
logic”thatw
eare
unravelinghere,
thatM
ulla’stextbook
adduces, justas
definitively,that
theR
g- Vedic
verseunder
considerationw
asproof
that“rem
arriageofw
idows
anddivorce
arerecognized
insom
eof
theold
texts.”8’
One
cannothelp
butw
onderabout
therole
ofthe
word
yoniIn
context, with
thelocalizing
adverbagré
(infront),the
word
means
“dwelling
place.”B
utthat
doesnot
effaceits
primary
senseof
“genital”(not
yetper
hapsspecifically
female
genital).H
owcan
we
takeas
theauthority
forthe
choiceofa
widow
’sself-im
molation
apassage
celebratingthe
entryofadorned
wives
intoa
dwelling
placeinvoked
onthis
occasionby
itsyonf-nam
e,so
thatthe
extracontextualicon
isalm
ostone
ofentry
intocivic
productionor
birth?P
aradoxically,the
imagic
relationshipof
vaginaand
firelends
akind
ofstrength
tothe
auth
ority
-claim.
82
This
paradoxis
strengthenedby
Raghunandana’s
modification
ofthe
verseso
asto
read,“L
etthem
firstascend
thefluid
abode[or
origin;w
ith,ofcourse,
theyon.nam
e—a
rOhantu
jalayOnim
agne],0
fire[or
offire].”
Why
shouldone
accept thatthis
“probably
mean[s]
‘may
firebe
tothem
ascool
asw
ater’”(H
D11.2,
634)?The
fluidgenital
offire,acorrupt
phrasing,m
ightfigure
asexual indeterm
inancyproviding
asim
ulacrumfor
theintellectual
indeterminacy
oftattvajndna
(truth-knowledge).
Ihave
written
aboveof
aconstructed
counternarrativeofw
orn-an’s
consciousness,thus
wom
an’sbeing,
thusw
oman’s
beinggood, thus
the
goodw
oman’s
desire, thusw
oman’s
desire.T
hisslippage
canbe
seenin
thefracture
inscribedin
thevery
word
sati,the
feminine
formof sat.
Sat
tran
scendsany
gender-specificnotion
ofm
asculinityand
moves
upnot
onlyinto
human
butspiritual
universality.It
isthe
presentparticiple
of theverb
“tobe”
andas
suchm
eansnot
onlybeing
butthe
True,
theG
ood,the
Right.
Inthe
sacredtexts
itis
essence,universal
spirit
Even
asa
prefixit
indicatesappropriate,
felicitous,fit.
Itis
nobleenough
tohave
enteredthe
most
priv
ilegeddiscourse
ofmodern
Western
philosophy:H
eidegger’sm
editationon
Bein
g.
83
Sati,the
feminine
ofthis
word,
simply
means
“goodw
ife.”It
isnow
time
todisclose
thatsati
orsuttee
asthe
propernam
eof
therite
of
widow
self-imm
olationcom
mem
oratesa
gramm
aticalerror
onthe
partof
theB
ritish,quite
asthe
nomenclature
“Am
ericanIndian”
comm
emorates
afactual
erroron
thepart
ofC
olumbus.
The
word
inthe
variousIndian
languagesis
“theburning
ofthesati”
orthe
goodw
ife,w
hothus
escapesthe
regressivestasis
of
thew
idowin
brahmacrya.
This
ex
emplifies
therace-class-gender
overdeterminations
of
thesituation.
Itcan
perhapsbe
caughteven
when
itis
flattenedout:
white
men,
seekingto
savebrow
nw
omen
frombrow
nm
en,im
poseupon
thosew
omen
agreater
ide
ologicalconstriction
byabsolutely
identifying,w
ithindiscursive
practice,good-w
ifehoodw
ithselfim
molation
onthe
husband’spyre.
On
theother
sideofthus
constitutingthe
object,the
abolition(or
removal)
ofw
hichw
illprovide
theoccasion
forestablishing
agood,
asdistinguished
fromm
erelycivil,society, is
theH
indum
anipulationof fem
alesubject-constitution
which
Ihave
triedto
discuss.(Ihave
alreadym
entionedE
dward
Thom
pson’sSuttee, published
in1928.
Icannot
dojustice
hereto
thisperfect
specimen
ofthejustification
ofim
perialismas
acivilizing
mission.
Now
herein
hisbook,
written
bysom
eonew
hoavow
edly“loves
India,”is
thereany
questioningof the
“ben
eficialruthlessness”
of
theB
ritishin
Indiaas
motivated
byterritorial
cx
[pansionism
orm
anagement
ofindustrial
capital.
84
The
problemw
ithhis
bookis,
indeed,a
problemof
representation,the
constructionof
aco
ntin
uousand
homogeneous
“India”in
terms
ofheads
of
stateand
British
ad
ministrators,
fromthe
perspectiveof“a
man
of
goodsense”
who
would
bethe
transparentvoice
ofreasonable
humanity.
“India”can
thenbe
repre
sented,in
theother
sense,by
itsim
perialm
asters.T
hereason
forreferring
tosuttee
hereis
Thom
pson’sfinessing
ofthe
word
satias
“faithful”in
thevery
first sentenceof his
book,aninaccurate
translationw
hichis
nonethelessan
English
permit
forthe
insertionof
thefem
alesubject
intotw
entieth-century
disco
urse.
85)
Consider
Thom
pson’spraise
forG
eneralC
harlesH
ervey’sap
preciationof
theproblem
ofsati:“H
erveyhas
apassage
which
bringsO
ut
thepity
ofa
systemw
hichlooked
onlyfor
prettinessand
constancyin
wom
an. He
obtainedthe
names
ofsatisw
hohad
diedon
thepyres
of Bikanir
,R
ajas; theyw
eresuch
names
as:‘R
ayQ
ueen,S
un-ray,L
ove’sD
elight,G
ar
land,Virtue
Found,
Echo,
SoftE
ye,C
omfort,
Moonbeam
,L
ove-lorn,D
earH
eart,E
ye-play,A
rbour-born,Sm
ile,L
ove-bud,G
ladO
men,
Mist-clad,
orC
loud-sprung—the
lastafavourite
name.’
“Once
again, imposing
theupper-
classV
ictorian’stypical dem
andsupon
“hisw
oman”
(hispreferred
phrase),T
hompson
appropriatesthe
Hindu
wom
anas
histo
saveagainst
the“sy
stern.”
Bikaner
isin
Rajasthan;
andany
discussionof
widow
-burningsof
Gay
atriC
hak
ravorty
pIvaK
Rajasthan,
especiallyw
ithinthe
rulingclass,
was
intimately
linkedto
thepositive
ornegative
constructionof
Hindu
(orA
ryan)com
munalism
.A
lookat
thepathetically
misspelled
names
ofthe
satisof
theartisanal,
peasant,village-priestly,
moneylender,
clerical,and
comparable
socialgroups
inB
engal,w
heresatis
were
most
comm
on,w
ouldnot
have•
yieldedsuch
aharvest
(Thom
pson’spreferred
adjectivefor
Bengalis
is“im
-.
becilic”).O
rperhaps
itw
ould.T
hereis
nom
oredangerous
pastime
thantransposing
propernam
esinto
comm
onnouns,
translatingthem
,and
usingthem
associological
evidence.I
attempted
toreconstruct the
names
onthat
listand
beganto
feelH
ervey-Thom
pson’sarrogance.
What,
forinstance,
might
“Com
fort”have
been?W
asit
“Shanti”?
Readers
arerem
indedofthe
lastline
ofT
.S.
Eliot’s
Waste
Land.
There
thew
ordbears
them
arkofone
kindof
stereotypingof
India—the
grandeurof
theecum
enicalU
panishads.j
Or
was
it“S
wasti”?
Readers
arerem
indedof
thesw
astika,the
Brahm
anicritual
mark
ofdomestic
comfort
(asin
“God
Bless
Our
Hom
e”)stereotyped
intoa
criminal
parodyof
Aryan
hegemony.
Betw
eenthese
two
appropriations,
where
isour
prettyand
constantburntw
idow?
The
auraofthe
names
owes
more
tow
riterslike
Edw
ardF
itzGerald,
the“translator”
ofthe
Ru
bayyato
fOm
arK
hayyamw
hohelped
toconstruct
acertain
pictureofthe
Oriental
wom
anthrough
thesupposed
“objectivity”of
translation,than
to1
sociologicalexactitude.
(Said’sO
rientalism,
1978, remains
theauthoritative
texthere.)B
ythis
sortofreckoning, thetranslated
propernam
esofa
randomi
collectionof
contemporary
French
philosophersor
boardsof
directorsof
.
prestigioussouthern
U.S.
corporationsw
ouldgive
evidenceof
aferocious
:investm
entin
anarchangelic
andhagiocentric
theocracy.Such
sleightsof
pencan
beperpetuated
on“com
mon
nouns”as
well,
butthe
propernam
eis
most
susceptibleto
thetrick.
And
itis
theB
ritishtrick
with
satithat
we
arediscussing.
After
sucha
taming
ofthe
subject,T
hompson
canw
rite,under
theheading
“The
Psychology
ofthe
‘Sati’,”“I
hadintended
totry
toexam
inethis;
butthe
truthis,
ithas
ceasedto
seema
puzzleto
me.”
86
Betw
eenpatriarchy
andim
perialism,
subject-constitutionand
object-formation,
thefigure
ofthe
wom
andisappears,
notinto
apristine
nothingness,but
intoa
violentshuttling
which
isthe
displacedfiguration
ofthe
“third-world
wom
an”caught
between
traditionand
modernization.
These
considerationsw
ouldrevise
everydetail
ofjudgments
thatseem
validfor
ahistory
ofsexuality
inthe
West:
“Such
would
bethe
propertyof
repression,that
which
distinguishesit
fromthe
prohibitionsm
aintainedby
‘
simple
penallaw
:repression
functionsw
ellas
asentence
todisappear,
butalso
asan
injunctionto
silence,affirm
ationof
non-existence;and
consequently
statesthat
of allthisthere
isnothing
tosay,
tosee,to
know
.”8
7T
hecase
ofsutteeas
exemplum
of
thew
oman-in-im
perialismw
ouldchallenge
anddeconstruct
thisopposition
between
subject(law
)and
object-of-knowl
edge(repression)
andm
arkthe
placeof
“disappearance”w
ithsom
ethingother
thansilence
andnonexistence,
aviolent
aporiabetw
eensubject
and.
objectstatus.
Sati
asa
wom
an’sproper
name
isin
fairlyw
idespreaduse
in:
Indiatoday.
Nam
inga
female
infant“a
goodw
ife”has
itsow
nproleptic
irony,and
theirony
isall
thegreater
becausethis
senseof
thecom
mon
nounis
notthe
primary
operatorin
theproper
nam
e.
88
Behind
thenam
ingof
theinfant
isthe
Sati
of
Hindu
mythology,
Durga
inher
manifestation
asa
goodw
ife.8
9In
partof the
story,Sati—
sheis
alreadycalled
that—arrives
ather
father’scourt
uninvited,in
theabsence,
even,of
aninvitation
for
herdivine
husbandSiva.
Her
fatherstarts
toabuse
Siva
andS
atidies
in
pain.S
ivaarrives
ina
furyand
dancesover
theuniverse
with
Sati’scorpse
onhis
shoulder.V
isnudism
embers
herbody
andbits
arestrew
nover
the
earth.A
roundeach
suchrelic
bitis
agreat
placeof
pilgrimage.
Figures
likethe
goddessA
thena—”father’S
daughtersself-pro
fessedlyuncontam
inatedby
thew
omb”—
areuseful for establishing
wom
en’s
;ideological
self-debasement, w
hichis
tobe
distinguishedfrom
adeco
nstru
c
tiveattitude
toward
theessentialist
subject.T
hestory
ofthe
mythic
Sati,
reversingevery
narrateme
of the
rite,perform
sa
similar
function:the
living
husbandavenges
thew
ife’sdeath,
atransaction
between
greatm
alegods
fulfillsthe
destructionof
thefem
alebody
andthus
inscribesthe
earthas
sacredgeography. T
osee
thisas
proof of thefem
inismof classical H
induism
ror
ofIndian
cultureas
goddess-centeredand
thereforefem
inistis
asid
eo
logicallycontam
inatedby
nativismor
reverseethnocentrism
asit
was
im
perialist toerase
theim
ageofthe
luminous
fightingM
otherD
urgaand
invest
theproper
nounS
atiw
ithno
significanceother
thanthe
ritualburning
of
thehelpless
widow
assacrificial
offeringw
hocan
thenbe
saved.T
hereis
nospace
fromw
hichthe
sexedsubaltern
subjectcan
speak.
Ifthe
oppressedunder
socializedcapital
haveno
necessarilyun
mediated
accessto
“correct”resistance,
canthe
ideologyof
sati,com
ing
fromthe
historyof
theperiphery,
besublated
intoany
model
ofin
terven
tionistpractice?
Sincethis
essayoperates
onthe
notionthat
allsuch
clear-
cutnostalgias
forlost
originsare
suspect,especially
asgrounds
forco
un
,terhegem
onicideological
production,I
must
proceedby
way
ofan
exam
ple
.9°
(The
example
Ioffer
hereis
nota
pleafor
some
violentH
indu
sisterhoodof
self-destruction.T
hedefinition
of theB
ritishIndian
asH
indu
inH
indulaw
isone
of them
arksof the
ideological war
of theB
ritishagainst
theIslam
icM
ughalrulers
ofIndia;
asignificant
skirmish
inthat
asyet
unfinishedw
arw
asthe
divisionof the
subcontinent. Moreover,
inm
yview
,
individualexam
plesof
thissort
aretragic
failuresas
models
ofin
terven
tionistpractice,
sinceI
questionthe
productionof
models
assuch.
On
the
otherhand,
asobjects
ofdiscourse
analysisfor
thenon-self-abdicating
in
tellectual,they
canillum
inatea
sectionof
thesocial
text,in
however
hap
hazarda
way.)A
youngw
oman
of sixteenor
seventeen,B
huvaneswari
Bhaduri,
hangedheseif
inher
father’sm
odestapartm
entin
North
Calcutta
in1926.
The
suicidew
asa
puzzlesince,
asB
huvaneswari
was
menstruating
atthe
time,
itw
asclearly
nota
caseof
illicitpregnancy.
Nearly
adecade
later,it
was
discoveredthat
shew
asa
mem
berof
oneof the
many
groupsinvolved
inthe
armed
strugglefor
Indianindependence.
Shehad
finallybeen
en
trustedw
itha
politicalassassination.
Unable
toconfront
thetask
andyet
aware
ofthe
practicalneed
fortrust,
shekilled
herself.B
huvaneswari
hadknow
nthat
herdeath
would
bediagnosed
as
theoutcom
eof
illegitimate
passion.She
hadtherefore
waited
forthe
onset
ofm
enstruation.W
hilew
aiting,B
huvanesari,the
brahmacãrini
who
was
nodoubt
lookingforw
ardto
goodw
ifehood,perhaps
rewrote
thesocial
text
of sati-suicidein
aninterventionist
way.
(One
tentativeexplanation
ofher
inexplicableact had
beena
possiblem
elancholiabrought on
byher
brother-
in-law’s
repeatedtaunts
thatshe
was
tooold
tobe
not-yet-a-wife.)
Sheg
en
10111718
eralizedthe
sanctionedm
otiveforfem
alesuicide
bytaking
imm
ensetrouble
todisplace
(notm
erelydeny),
inthe
physiologicalinscription
of
herbody,
itsim
prisonment
within
legitimate
passionby
asingle
male.
Inthe
imm
ediatecontext,
heract
became
absurd,a
caseof
deliriumrather
thansanity.T
hedisplacing
gesture—w
aitingform
enstruation—is
atfirstareversal
ofthe
interdictagainst
am
enstruatingw
idow’s
rightto
imm
olatehersell
theunclean
widow
must w
ait,publicly,untilthecleansing
bathofthe
fourthday,
when
sheis
nolonger
menstruating,
inorder
toclaim
herdubious
privilege.In
thisreading,
Bhuvanesw
ariB
haduri’ssuicide
isan
unemphatic,
adhoc,
subalternrew
ritingofthe
socialtext
ofsati-suicideas
much
asthe
hegemonic
accountofthe
blazing,fighting,fam
ilialD
urga. The
emer
gentdissentingpossibilities
of thathegemonic
accountofthefighting
mother
arew
elldocumented
andpopularly
well
remem
beredthrough
thediscourse
ofthe
male
leadersand
participantsin
theindependence
movem
ent.The
subalternas
female
cannotbe
heardor
read.I
knowof
Bhuvanesw
an’slife
anddeath
throughfam
ilycon
nections.B
eforeinvestigating
themm
orethoroughly,
Iasked
aB
engaliw
oman,
aphilosopher
andS
anskritistw
hoseearly
intellectualproduction
isalm
ostidentical
tom
ine,to
startthe
process.T
wo
responses:(a)
Why,
when
hertw
osisters,
Saileswari
andR
Asesw
ari,led
suchfull
andw
onderfullives,are
youinterested
inthe
haplessB
huvaneswari?
(b)I
askedher
nieces.It
appearsthat
itw
asa
caseof
illicitlove.
Ihave
attempted
touse
andgo
beyondD
errideandeconstruction,
which
Ido
notcelebrate
asfem
inismas
such.H
owever,
inthe
contextof
theproblem
aticI
haveaddressed,
Ifind
hism
orphologym
uchm
orep
ainstaking
anduseful
thanF
oucault’sand
Deleuze’s
imm
ediate,substantive
involvementw
ithm
ore“political”
issues—the
latter’sinvitation
to“becom
ew
oman”—
which
canm
aketheir
influencem
oredangerous
forthe
U.S.
academ
icas
enthusiasticradical.
Derrida
marks
radicalcritique
with
thedan
gerof
appropriatingthe
otherby
assimilation.
He
readscatachresis
atthe
origin.H
ecalls
fora
rewriting
of
theutopian
structuralim
pulseas
“rendering
deliriousthat
interiorvoice
thatis
thevoice
ofthe
otherin
us.”I
must
hereacknow
ledgea
long-termusefulness
inJacques
Derrida
which
Iseem
nolonger
tofind
inthe
authorsof
The
History
of Sexualityand
Mile
Plateau
x.
9’
The
subalterncannot
speak.T
hereis
novirtue
inglobal
laundrylists
with
“wom
an”as
apious
item.
Representation
hasnot
withered
away.
The
female
intellectualas
intellectualhas
acircum
scribedtask
which
shem
ustnot
disown
with
aflourish.
Gay
atri
GIla
Kra
VO
FtY
IV
K
Itis
important
tonote
thatthe
greatest
‘influence’of
Western
European
intellectualsupon
U.S.
professorsand
studentshappens
throughcollections
ofessays
rather
thanlong
booksin
translationA
nd,in
thosecollections,
itisunderstandably
them
oretopical
piecesthat
gaina
greatercurrency.
(Derrida’s
“Structure,
Sign,and
Play”is
acase
inpoint.)
Fromthe
perspectiveof
theoreticalproduction
andideological
reproductiontherefore,
the
conversation-underconsideration
hasnot
necessarilybeen
superseded.
4T
hereis
anim
plicitreference
hereto
thepost-i
96
8w
aveof
Maoism
inF
rance.S
eeM
ichel
Foucault,
“OnPopular
Justice:A
Discussion
with
Maoists,”
Pow
er/Know
ledge.S
elected
Interviews
andO
therW
ritings1972-77,
trans.C
ohnG
ordonet
al.(N
ewY
ork:P
antheon),
p134
(hereaftercited
asP1<).
Explication
ofthe
referencestrengthens
my
pointby
laying
F.bare
them
echanicsof
appropriation.T
hestatus
ofC
hinain
thisdiscussion
isexem
plary.If
Foucault
persistentlyclears
himself
bysaying
“Iknow
nothingabout
China,”
hisinterlocutors
showtow
ardC
hinaw
hatD
erridacalls
the“C
hineseprejudice.”
5T
hisis
partof
am
uchbroader
symptom
,as
EricW
olfdiscusses
inE
uropeand
theP
eople
without
History
(Berkeley:
University
ofC
aliforniaP
ress,1982).
6W
alterB
enlamin,
Charles
Baudelaire:
ALyric
Poet
inthe
Era
ofH
ighC
apitalism,
trans.H
arry
Zohn
(London:
Verso.
1983).p.
12.
7G
illesD
eleuzeand
FelixG
uattari,A
nti-Oedipus:
Capitalism
andS
chizophrenia, trans.R
ichard
•H
urleyet
al.(N
ewY
ork:V
ikingP
ress.1977),
p.26.
8T
heexchange
with
Jacques-Alain
Miller
inPK
(“The
Confession
ofthe
Flesh”)
isrevealing
inthis
respect.
9A
lthusser.L
eninand
Philosophy,pp.
132-33.
Forone
example
among
many
seePK
,p.
98.
Itis
notsurprising,
then,that
Foucault’s
work,
earlyand
late,is
supportedby
toosim
plea
notionof
repression.H
erethe
antagonistis
Freud,
notM
arx.“I
havethe
impression
that
the
notionof
repression)is
wholly
inadequateto
theanalysis
ofthe
mechanism
sand
effects
ofpow
erthat
itis
sopervasively
usedto
characterizetoday
(PK,
92).”
The
delicacyand
subtletyof
Freud’s
suggestion—that
underrepression
thephenom
enalidentity
ofaffects
is
indeterminate
becausesom
ethingunpleasant
canbe
desiredas
pleasure,thus
radicallyrein-
scribingthe
relationshipbetw
eendesire
and“interest’ ‘—
seems
quitedeflated
here.For
an
elaborationof this
notionof
repression,see
Jacques
Derrida,
Of G
r-amm
atology, trans.G
ayatri
Chakravorty
Spivak(B
altimore:
JohnsH
opkinsU
niversityP
ress,1976),
p.88f.
(hereafter
citedas
06
);and
Derrida,
Lim
itedinc.:
abc,trans.
Sam
uelW
eber,G
lyph2(1
977
),p.
215.
12A
lthusser’sversion
ofthis
particularsituation
may
betoo
schematic,
butit nevertheless
seems
more
carefulin
itsprogram
thanthe
argument
understudy.
“Class
instinct,”A
lthusser writes,
“issubjective
andspontaneous.
Class
positionis
objectiveand
rational. To
arriveat
proletarian
classpositions.
theclass
instinctof
proletariansonly
needsto
beeducated;
theclass
instinct
ofthepetty
bourgeoisie,and
henceof intellectuals,
has,on
thecontrary,
tobe
revolutionized”
(Lenin
andPhilosophy,
p.13).
13F
oucault’ssubsequent
explanation(PK
,145)
ofthis
Deleuzian
statement
comes
closerto
Derrida’s
notionthat
theorycannot
bean
exhaustivetaxonom
yand
isalw
aysform
edby
practice.
i4C
f.the
surprisinglyuncritical
notionsof
representationentertained
inPK
,pp.
141,188.
My
remarks
concludingthis
paragraph,criticizing
intellectuals’representations
ofsubaltern
groups,
shouldbe
rigorouslydistinguished
froma
coalitionpolitics
thattakes
intoaccount
itsfram
ing
within
socializedcapital
andunites
peoplenot
becausethey
areoppressed
butbecause
they
areexploited
This
model w
orksbest
within
aparliam
entarydem
ocracy,w
hererepresentation
isnot
onlynot
banishedbut
elaboratelystaged.
isK
arlM
arx,S
urveysfrom
Exile,trans.
David
Fernbach
(New
York:
Vintage
Books,
1 974),p.
239.
16K
arlM
arx,C
aptial:A
Critique
ofPolitical
Econom
y,vol.
1,trans.
Ben
Fowkes
(New
York.
Vantage
Books;
1977),p.
254.
Marx,
Capital,
I,p.
302.
See
theexcellent
shortdefinition
anddiscussion
ofcom
mon
sensein
ErrolL
awrence,
“Just
PlainC
omm
onS
ense:T
he‘R
oots’of
Racism
,”in
Hazel
V.
Carby
etal.,
The
Em
pireStrikes
Back:
Race
andR
acismin
705B
ritain(L
ondon:H
utchinson,1982).
p.48.
“Use
value”in
Marx
canbe
shown
tobe
a“theoretical
fiction’ ‘—as
much
ofa
potential
oxymoron
as“natural
exchange.”I
haveattem
ptedto
developthis
in“S
catteredS
pecu
lationson
theQ
uestionof
Value,”
am
anuscriptunder
considerationby
Diacritics.
123
Note
s
I amgrateful
toK
hachigT
ololyanfor
apainstaking
firstreading
ofthis
essay.L
ouisA
lthusser,L
eninand
Philosophy
andO
therE
ssays.trans.
Ben
Brew
ster(N
ewY
ork:M
onthlyR
eviewP
ress,1971),
p.66.
Michel
Foucault,L
anguage,C
ounter-Mem
ory,Practice:
Selected
Essays
andInterview
s,trans.
Donald
F.B
ouchardand
SherrySim
on(Ithaca:
Cornell
University
Press.
1977),pp.
205-17(hereafter
citedas
FD).
I havem
odifiedthe
English
versionof
this,as
ofother
English
trans
lations,w
herefaithfulness
tothe
originalseem
edto
demand
it.
Marx.
Capital,
I.p.
128.
Iamaw
arethat
therelationship
between
Marxism
andneo-K
antianismis
apolitically
fraughtone.
Ido
notm
yselfsee
howa
continuousline
canbe
establishedbetw
eenM
arx’sow
ntexts
andthe
Kantian
ethicalm
oment.
Itdoesseem
tom
e,how
ever,that
Marx’s
questioningof
theindividual
asagent
ofhistory
shouldbe
readin
thecontext
ofthe
breakingup
ofthe
individualsubject
inauguratedby
Kant’s
critiqueof
Descartes.
23
KarlM
arx,G
runcir,sse:F
oundarionsofthe
Critique
ofPoliticalEconom
ytrans
Martin
Nicolaus
(New
York:
Viking
Press,
1973),pp.
162-63,
24
Edw
ardW
.Said,
The
World,
theText,
theC
ritic(C
ambridge:
Harvard
University
Press,
1983),p.
243.
25
PaulB
ové,“Intellectuals
atW
ar:M
ichelFoucault
andthe
Analysis
ofP
ower,”
Sub-Stance,3
6/3
7(1983),
p.44.
Carby,
Em
pire,p.
34.
This
argument
isdeveloped
furtherin
Spivak,“S
catteredS
peculations.”O
nceagain,
theA
nti-Oedipus
didnot
ignorethe
economic
text,although
thetreatm
entw
asperhaps
tooallegorical.
Inthis
respect,the
move
fromschizo-
torhyzo-analysis
inM
illeplateaux
(Paris:Seuil,
1980)has
notbeen
salutary.
28
See
Michel
Foucault,M
adnessand
Civilization:
AH
istoryof
Insanityin
theA
geof
Reason,
trans.R
ichardH
oward
(New
York:
Pantheon
Books,
1965),pp.
251,262,
269.29
Although
IconsiderFredric
Jameson’s
PoliticalUnconscious:
Narrative
asa
SociallySym
bolicA
ct(Ithaca:
Cornell
University
Press,
1981)to
bea
textof
greatcritical
weight,
orperhaps
becau
seIdo
so,Iw
ouldlike
my
programhere
tobe
distinguishedfrom
oneof
restoringthe
relicsof
aprivileged
narrative:“It
isin
detectingthe
tracesof
thatuninterrupted
narrative,in
restoringto
thesurface
ofthe
textthe
repressedand
buriedreality
ofthis
fundamental
history,that
thedoctrine
ofa
politicalunconscious
findsits
functionand
itsnecessity”
(p.20).
30
Am
ongm
anyavailable
books,I cite
Bruse
Tiebout
McC
ully,E
nglishE
ducationand
theO
riginsof
IndianN
ationalism(N
ewY
ork:C
olumbia
University
Press,
1940).
Thom
asB
abingtonM
acaulay,S
peechesby
Lord
Macaulay:
With
His
Minute
onIndian
Ed
ucation,ed.
G.
M.
Young
(Oxford:
Oxford
University
Press,
AM
SE
dition,1979),
p.359.
:
Keith,
oneof
thecom
pilersof
theV
edicIndex,
authorof
Sanskrit
Dram
ain
ItsO
rigin,D
evelopm
ent,T
heory,and
Practice,
andthe
learnededitor
ofthe
Krsnayajurveda
forH
arvardU
niversityP
ress,w
asalso
theeditor
offour
volumes
ofS
electedS
peechesand
Docum
entsof
British
ColonialP
olicy(1763to
1937),of
fnternationalAffajrs(1918
to1937),
andof
theB
ritishD
ominions
(19
18
to1931).
He
wrote
bookson
thesovereignty
ofB
ritishdom
iniorisand
onthe
theoryof
statesuccession,
with
specialreference
toE
nglishand
coloniallaw
.
Maham
ahopadhyayaH
araprasadS
hastri,A
Descriptive
Catalogue
ofSanskrit
Manuscripts
inthe
Governm
&ntC
ollectionunder
theC
areofthe
Asiatic
Society
ofBengal(C
alcuttaA
siaticS
ocietyof
Bengal,
1925),vol.
3,p.
viii.
Dinesachandra
Sena,
Brhat
Banga
(Calcutta:
Calcutta
University
Press,
1925),vol
1,p.
6,E
dward
Thom
pson,S
uttee:A
Historical
andP
hilosophicalE
nquiryinto
theH
induR
iteof
Widow
-Burning
(London:
George
Allen
andU
nwin,
1928),pp.
130,47.
36
Holograph
letter(from
G.
A.
Jacobto
anunnam
edcorrespondent)
attachedto
insidefront
coverof
theSterling
Mem
orialL
ibrary(Y
aleU
niversity)copy
ofC
olonelG
.A
.Jacob,
ed, The
Mahanarayana-U
panishadof
theA
tharva-Vecia
with
theD
ipikaof
Narayana
(Bom
bay:C
oyem
ment
Central
Books
Departm
ent,1888);
italicsm
ine.T
hedark
invocationof
thedangers
ofthis
learningby
Way
ofanonym
ousaberrants
consolidatesthe
asymm
etry37
Ihavediscussed
thisissue
ingreater
detailw
ithreference
toJulia
Kristeva’s
About
Chinese
Wom
en,trans.
Anita
Barrow
s(L
ondon:M
arionB
oyars,1977),
in“F
renchFem
inismin
anInternational
Fram
e,”Y
aleF
renchS
tudies,62
(1981).
38
Antonio
Gram
sci,“S
ome
Aspects
ofthe
Southern
Question.”
Selections
fromPoliticalW
riting.
19
21
-19
26
trans.Q
uintinH
oare(N
ewY
ork:International
Publishers,1978).
Iamusing
“allegoryof
reading”in
thesense
developedby
Paulde
Man,
Allegories
ofR
eading:Figur&
Language
inR
ousseau,N
ietzsche,R
ilke,and
Proust
(New
Haven:
Yale
University
Press,1979).
39
Their
publicationsare:
Subaltern
Studies
I:W
ritingon
South
Asian
History
andSociety,
ed,R
anajitG
uha(D
elhi:O
xfordU
niversityP
ress,1982);
Subaltern
Studies
II:W
ritingson
SoothA
sianH
istoryandSociety,
ed.R
anajitGuha
(Delhi:
Oxford
University
Press,
1983);and
Ranajit
Gay
atriC
hak
ravorty
Spiv
akG
uha,E
lementary
Aspects
ofP
easantInsurgency
inC
olonialIndia
(Delhi:
Oxford
University
Press,
1983).
Edw
ardW
.Said,
“Perm
issionto
Narrate,”
London
Review
ofB
ooks(Feb.
16,1984).
Guha,
Studies,
I,p.
1.
Guha,
Studies,
I,p.
4.
Jacques
Derrida,
“The
Double
Session,”
Dissem
ination,trans.
Barbara
Johnson(C
hicago:
University
ofC
hicagoP
ress,1981).
Guha,
Studies,
I,p.
8(all
butthe
firstset
ofitalics
arethe
author’s).
Ajit
K.C
haudhury,‘N
ewW
aveSocial
Science,”
Frontier,16-24
(Jan.28,
1984),p.
10
(italicsare
mine).
Chaudhury,
“New
Wave
SocialS
cience,”p.
10.
PierreM
acherey,A
Theory
ofL
iteraryP
roduction,trans.
Geoffrey
Wall
(London:
Routledge,
1978).p.
87.
I havediscussed
thisissue
in“D
isplacement
andthe
Discourse
ofWom
an,”in
Mark
Krupnick,
ed.,D
isplacement:
Derrida
andA
fter(B
loomington:
IndianaU
niversityP
ress,1983),
andin
“Love
Me,
Love
My
Om
bre,Elle:
Derrida’s
‘Lacarte
postale,’“
Diacritics
14,no.
4(1984),
pp.19-36.
This
violencein
thegeneral
sensethat
isthe
possibilityof
anepistem
eis
what
Derrida
calls
“writing”
inthe
generalsense.
The
relationshipbetw
eenw
ritingin
thegeneral
senseand
writing
inthe
narrowsense
(marks
upona
surface)cannot
becleanly
articulated.T
hetask
ofgram
matology
(deconstruction)is
toprovide
anotation
uponthis
shiftingrelationship.
In
acertain
way,
then,the
critiqueof
imperialism
isdeconstruction
assuch.
“Contracting
Poverty,”
Multinational
Monitor,
4,no.
8(A
ug.1983),
p.8.
This
reportw
as
contributedby
JohnC
avanaghand
JoyH
ackel,w
how
orkon
theInternational
Corporations
Project
atthe
Institutefor
PolicyS
tudies(italics
arem
ine).
The
mechanics
ofthe
inventionof
theT
hirdW
orldas
signifierare
susceptibleto
thetype
of
analysisdirected
atthe
constitutionof
raceas
asignifier
inC
arby,E
mpire.
Mike
Davis,
“The
PoliticalE
conomy
ofL
ate-Imperial A
merica,”
New
Left R
eview.
143(Jan.-
Feb.1984),
p.9.
Bové,
“Intellectuals,”p.
51.
Terry
Eagleton.
Literary
Theory:
An
Introduction(M
inneapolis:U
niversityof
Minnesota
Press,
1983),p.
205.
PerryA
nderson,In
theT
racksof
Historical
Materialism
(London:
Verso,
1983),p.
53.
Anderson,
Inthe
Tracks,
p.52.
Said,T
heW
orld,p.
183.
Jacques
Derrida,
“Of
anA
pocalypticT
oneR
ecentlyA
daptedin
Philosophy,”
trans.John
P.
Leavy,
Jr..in
Semia,
p.71.
Even
insuch
excellenttexts
ofreportage
andanalysis
asG
ailO
mvedt’s
We
Will S
mash
This
Prison!Indian
Wom
enin
Struggle
(London:
led
Press,
1 980),the
assumption
thata
group
ofM
aharashtrianw
omen
inan
urbanproletarian
situation,reacting
toa
radicalw
hitew
oman
who
had“throw
nin
herlot
with
theIndian
destiny,”is
representativeof
“Indianw
omen”
ortouches
thequestion
of“fem
aleconsciousness
inIndia”
isnot
harmless
when
takenup
within
afirst-w
orldsocial
formation
where
theproliferation
ofcom
munication
inan
intern
a
tionallyhegem
oniclanguage
makes
alternativeaccounts
andtestim
oniesinstantly
accessible
evento
undergraduates.N
orma
Chinchilla’s
observation,m
adeat
apanel
on“T
hirdW
orldFem
inisms:
Differences
inForm
andC
ontent”(U
CLA
,M
ar.8,
1983),that
antisexistw
orkin
theIndian
contextis
notgenuinely
antisexistbut
antifeudal,is
anothercase
inpoint.
This
permits
definitionsof
sexismto
emerge
onlyafter
asociety
hasentered
thecapitalist
mode
ofpro
duction,thus
making
capitalismand
patriarchyconveniently
continuous.It
alsoinvokes
the
vexedquestion
ofthe
roleof
the”
‘Asiatic’
mode
ofproduction”
insustaining
theexplanatory
power
ofthe
normative
narrativizationof
historythrough
theaccount of
modes
ofproduction,
inhow
eversophisticated
am
annerhistory
isconstrued.
The
curiousrole
ofthe
propernam
e“A
sia”in
thism
atterdoes
notrem
ain
confinedto
proofor
disproofof
theem
piricalexistence
ofthe
actualm
ode(a
problemthat
became
theobject
ofintense
maneuvering
within
internationalcom
munism
)but
remains
crucialeven
inthe
work
ofsuch
theoreticalsubtlety
andim
portanceas
Barry
Hindess
and
Paul Hirst’s
Pre-C
apitalist Modes
of Production
(London:
Routledge.
1975)and
FredricJa
me
son’sPolitical
Unconscious,
Especially
inJam
eson,w
herethe
morphology
ofm
odesof
productionis
rescuedfrom
allsuspicion
ofhistorical
determinism
andanchored
toa
post-
21
22 20
Derrida’s
“Linguistic
Circle
ofG
eneva,”especially
p.1431.,
canprovide
am
ethodfor
as-sassing
theirreducible
structuralisttheory
ofthe
subject,the
“Asiatic’
mode
ofproduction,
inits
guiseof
‘orientsdespotism
”as
theconcom
itantstate
formation,
stillserves.
Italso
playsa
significantrole
inthe
transmogrilied
mode
ofproduction
narrativein
Deleuze
andG
uattari’sA
nti-Oedipus.
Inthe
Sovietdebate,
ata
farrem
ove,indeed,
fromthese
contemporary
theoreticalprojects,
thedoctrinal
sufficiencyof
the“A
siatic”m
odeof
productionw
asm
ostoften
doubtedby
producingfor
itvarious
versionsand
nomenclatures
offeudal,
slave,and
comm
unalm
odesof
production.(T
hedebate
ispresented
indetail
inS
tephenF.
Dunn,
The
Falland
Rise
ofthe
Asiatic
Mode
ofP
roduction[L
ondon:R
outledge,19821.)
Itwould
beinteresting
torelate
thisto
therepression
ofthe
imperialist
“mom
ent”in
most
debatesover
thetransition
fromfeudalism
tocapitalism
thathave
longexercised
theW
esternLeft.
What
ism
oreim
portanthere
isthatan
observationsuch
asC
hinchilla’srepresents
aw
idespreadhierarchization
within
third-world
feminism
(ratherthanW
esternM
aism),w
hich
Situates
itwithin
thelong-standing
trafficw
iththe
imperialist
concept-metaphor
“Asia.”
Ishouldadd
thatIhave
notyet
readM
adhuK
ishwar
andR
uthV
anita,eds.,
InS
earchof
Answ
ers:Indian
Wom
en’sV
oicesfrom
Manushi
(London:
Zed
Books,
1984).
60
JonathanC
uller,O
nD
econstrucpon:T
heoryand
Criticism
afterS
tructuralism(Ithaca:
Cornell
University
Press,
1982),p.
48.
61E
lizabethF
ox-Genovese,
“PlacingW
oman’s
History
inH
istory,”N
ewL
eftReview
,133
(May.
June1982).
p.21.
62
Ihaveattem
ptedto
developthis
ideain
asom
ewhat
autobiographicalw
ayin
“FindingFem
inist
Readings:
Dante-Y
eats,”in
IraK
onigsberg,ed.,
Am
ericanC
riticismin
theP
oststnjcturalistA
ge(A
nnA
rbor:U
niversityof
Michigan
Press,
1981).
63
Sarah
Kofm
an,L
’enigme
deIa
femm
e:La
femm
edans
lestextes
deF
reud(Paris:
Galilee,
1980).
64
Sigmund
Freud,“
‘AC
hildIs
Being
Beaten’:
AC
ontributionto
theS
tudyof
theO
riginof
SexualP
erversions,”T
heS
tandardE
ditionof
theC
omplete
Psychological
Works
ofSigmund
Freud.trans.
James
Strachey
etal.
(London:
Hogarth
Press,
1955),vol.
17.
Freud.“W
ild’P
sycho-Analysis,”
Standard
Edition,
vol.11
Freud,“A
Child
IsB
eingB
eaten’,”p.
188.
Fora
brilliantaccountofhowthe
“reality”ofw
idow-sacrifice
was
constitutedor
“textualized”during
thecolonial
period,see
Lata
Mani,
“The
Productionof
Colonial
Discourse:
Satiin
EarlyN
ineteenthC
enturyB
engal”(m
astersthesis,
University
ofC
aliforniaat
Santa
Cruz,1983).
Iprofitedfrom
discussionsw
ithM
s.M
aniat
theinception
ofthis
project.
68
J.D
.M
.D
errett,H
induL
awP
astand
Present:
Being
anA
ccountof
theC
ontroversyW
hichP
recededthe
Enactm
entof
theH
induC
ode,and
Text
ofthe
Code
asE
nacted,and
Some
Com
ments
Thereon
(Calcutta:
A.
Mukheqee
andC
o.,1957),
p.46.
69
Ashis
Nandy.
“Sati:
AN
inteenthC
enturyT
aleofW
omen,
Violence
andP
rotest.”R
amm
ohunR
oyandthe
Process
ofModernization
inIndia,
ed.V.
C.Joshi
(Delhi:
Vikas
PublishingH
ouse,1975),
p.68.
70
The
following
accountleans
heavilyon
Pandurang
Vam
anK
ane,H
istoryof
theD
harmasasfra
(Poona:B
handarkarO
rientalR
esearchInstitute,
1963)(hereafter
citedas
HD
,w
ithvolum
e,part,
andpage
numbers).
71U
pendraT
hakur,T
heH
istoryofS
uicidein
India:An
Introduction(D
elhi:M
unshiB
arnM
anoharLal,
1963),p.
9,has
auseful
listofSanskritprim
arysources
onsacred
places.T
hislaboriously
decentbook
betraysall
thesigns
ofthe
schizophreniaof
thecolonial
subject,such
asbour
geoisnationalism
,patriarchal
comm
unalism,
andan
“enlightenedreasonableness.”
Nandy,
“Sati.”
Jean-Francois
Lyotard,
Ledifférend
(Paris:M
inuit,1984).
HO
,11.2,
p.633.
There
aresuggestions
thatthis
“prescribedpenance”
was
farexceeded
bysocial
practice.In
thepassage
below,
publishedin
1938,notice
theH
indupatristic
assumptions
aboutthefreedom
offemale
willat w
orkin
phraseslike
“courage”and
“strengthof
character.”T
heunexam
inedpresuppositions
ofthe
passagem
ightbe
thatthe
complete
objettificationof
thew
idow-concubine
was
justpunishm
entfor
abdicationof
theright
tocourage,
signifyingsubiect
status:“S
ome
widow
s,how
ever,had
notthe
courageto
gothrough
thefiery
ordeal;nor
hadthey
sufficientstrength
ofm
indand
characterto
liveup
tothe
highascetic
idealprescribed
forthem
[brahmacaryaJ.
Itis
sadto
recordthat
theyw
eredriven
tolead
thelife
ofa
concubineor
avaruddastri
[incarceratedw
ife].”A
.S.
Altekar,
ThePosition
ofW
omen
inH
induC
ivilization:From
Prehistoric
Tim
esto
theP
resentD
ay(D
elhi:M
otilalB
anarsidass,1938),
p.156.
Quoted
inS
ena,B
rhat-Banga,
II,pp.
91
3-1
4.
Gay
atri
Ch
akra
vo
rtyS
pvak
Here,
asw
ellas
forthe
Brahm
andebate
oversati,
seeM
ani,“P
roduction,”pp.
71f.
We
arespeaking
hereof
theregulative
norms
ofB
rahmanism
.rather
than“things
asthey
were.”
See
Robert
Lingat,
The
Classical
Law
ofIndia,
trans.J.
0.M
.D
errett(B
erkeley:
University
ofC
aliforniaP
ress,1973),
p.46.
Both
thevestigial
possibilityof
widow
remarriage
inancient
Indiaand
thelegal
institutionof
widow
remarriage
in18
56
aretransactions
among
men.
Widow
remarriage
isvery
much
an
exception,perhaps
becauseit
leftthe
programof
subject-formation
untouched.In
allthe
“lore”of
widow
remarriag
e,it
isthe
fatherand
thehusband
who
areapplauded
forth
eir
reformist
courageand
selflessness.
SirM
onierM
onier-William
s,Sanskrit-E
nglishD
ictionary(O
xford:C
larendonP
ress.1899),
p.552.
Historians
areoften
impatient
ifm
odernistsseem
tobe
attempting
toim
port“fem
in
istic”judgm
entsinto
ancientpatriarchies.
The
realquestion
is,of
course,w
hystru
ctu
res
of
patriarchaldom
inationshould
beunquestioningly
recorded.H
istoricalsanctions
forcollective
actiontow
ardsocialjustice
canonly
bedeveloped
if peopleoutside
ofthe
disciplinequestion
standardsof
“objectivity”preserved
assuch
bythe
hegemonic
tradition.It
doesnot
seem
inappropriateto
noticethat
so“objective”
aninstrum
entas
adictionary
canuse
thedeeply
sexist-partisanexplanatory
expression:“raise
upissue
toa
deceased
husband”!
SunderlalT.
Dessi,
Mulla:
Principlesof
Hindu
Law
(Bom
bay:N
.M
.T
ripathi,1982),
p.184.
Iamgrateful
toP
rofessorA
lisonFinley
ofT
rinityC
ollege(H
artford,C
onn.)for
discussingthe
passag
ew
ithm
e.P
rofessorFinley
isan
experton
theR
g-Veda.
Ihasten
toadd
thatshe
would
findm
yreadings
asirresponsibly
“literary-critical”as
theancient
historianw
ouldfind
it“m
odernist”(see
note80).
Martin
Heidegger,
An
Introductionto
Metaphysics,
trans.R
alphM
anheim(N
ewY
ork:D
ou
bledayA
nchor,1961),
p.58.
Thom
pson,S
uttee,p.
37.
Thom
pson,S
uttee,p:
15.For
thestatus
of theproper
name
as“m
ark,”see
Derrida,
“Taking
Chances.”
Thom
pson,S
uttee,p.
137.
Michel
Foucault,
The
History
ofSexuality,
trans.R
obertH
urley(N
ewY
ork:V
intageB
ooks,
1980),vol.
1.p.
4.
The
factthat
thew
ordw
asalso
usedas
aform
ofad
dress
fora
well-born
wom
an(“lady”)
complicates
matters.
Itshould
berem
embered
thatthis
accountdoes
notexhaust
herm
anym
anifestationsW
ithin
thepantheon.
Aposition
againstnostalgia
asa
basisof
counterhegemonic
ideologicalproduction
doesnot
endorseits
negativeuse.
Within
thecom
plexityof
contemporary
politicaleconom
y,it w
ould,
forexam
ple,be
highlyquestionable
tourge
thatthe
currentlndian
working-class
crime
of
burningbrides
who
bringinsufficient
dowries
andof
subsequentlydisguising
them
urderas
suicideis
eithera
useor
abuseof
thetradition
ofsati-suicide.
The
most
thatcan
beclaim
ed
isthat
itis
adisplacem
enton
achain
ofsem
iosisw
iththe
female
subjectas
signifier,w
hich
would
leadus
backinto
thenarrative
we
havebeen
unraveling.C
learly,one
must
work
to
stopthe
crime
ofbride
burningin
everyw
ay.If,
however,
thatw
orkis
accomplished
by
unexamined
nostalgiaor
itsopposite,
itw
illassist
activelyin
thesubstitution
ofrace/ethnos
orsheer
genitalismas
asignifier
inthe
placeof
thefem
alesubject.
Ihad
notread
Peter
Dew
s,“P
ower
andSubjectivity
inF
oucault,”N
ewL
eftR
eview,
144
(1984),until
Ifinishedthis
essay.Ilook
forward
tohis
bookon
thesam
etopic.
There
are
many
pointsin
comm
onbetw
eenhis
critiqueand
mine.
How
ever,as
faras
Icantell
from
thebrief
essay,he
writes
froma
perspectiveuncritical
ofcritical
theoryand
theintersubjective
normthat
canall
tooeasily
exchange“individual”
for“subject”
inits
situatingof
the“ep
istemic
subject,”D
ews’s
readingof
theconnection
between
“Marxist
tradition”and
the
“autonomous
subject”is
notm
ine.Further,
hisaccount
of“the
impasse
ofthe
second
phaseof
poststructuralismas
aw
hole”is
vitiatedby
hisnonconsideration
ofD
errida.w
ho
hasbeen
againstthe
privilegingof
languagefrom
hisearliest
work,
the“Introduction”
in
Edm
undH
usserl,T
heO
riginof
Geom
etry,trans.
JohnL
eavy(Stony
Brook,
N.Y
.:N
icolas
Hays.
1978).W
hatsets
hisexcellent
analysisquite
apartfrom
