Energy

Symposium on International Safeguards Linking Strategy, Implementation and People

IAEA CN-220, 20-24 October 2014

Material Balance Evaluation

Solid, transparent and scientifically sound practice

in the European Union

R.Bencardino, O.Alique, W.Kilb, P.Klumpp, W.Köhne, L.Persson, S.Vaccaro

Euratom Safeguards Directorate - European Commission

Raffaele.Bencardino@ec.europa.eu

Outline

Euratom Safeguards

MBE

Legal

Framework

Integrated

Management

System

Nuclear

Inspection

Activities

MBE

Practice

MBE

Audit

elements

ReviewConsultation

Conclusion

- 4 legal dimensions- Control of Nuclear Material

- Conformityassessment

- Compliancewith standards

- Flow Inspections

- InventoryInspections

- MBE

- Facility specific, σMUF provided?- Use of uncertainty in BTC & ITV

- Verification resultstransmission

- Bilateral- Trilateral- Member States

- Operator declarations- Inspector validation- Inspector verification

Euratom Safeguards

MBE

Legal

Framework

Integrated

Management

System

Nuclear

Inspection

Activities

MBE

Practice

MBE

Audit

elements

ReviewConsultation

Conclusion

- 4 legal dimensions- Control of Nuclear Material

Four Legal Dimensions

Supranational relation with

Member States

International relation with

third countries

Cooperation relation with

IAEA

Supervision relation with

nuclear operators

European Commission

Bilateral EURATOMAgreements

Art. 77b

MultilateralAgreements

Art. 77b

INFCIRC/193ADD Protocol

INFCIRC/263-UKINFCIRC/290-FR

Control ofNuclear Materials

Art. 77a, 81, 83

SupranationalCooperation

Art. 81, 82, 192

EURATOM Control of Nuclear Materials

Secondary LawPrimary

Law

EURATOM

Treaty

Commission

Regulation

(Euratom)

302/2005

Particular Safeguards Provisions

(Commission Decisions)

Commission Recommendations

(soft Law)

Guidelines for the application of

302/2005

Implementation of NMAC system

IAEA:Facility Attachments

Euratom Safeguards

MBE

Legal

Framework

Integrated

Management

System

Nuclear

Inspection

Activities

MBE

Practice

MBE

Audit

elements

ReviewConsultation

Conclusion

- Conformityassessment

- Compliancewith standards

Integrated Management System

•ISO/IEC 17020:2012 – Requirements for the operation of various types of bodies performing inspection

INSPECTION

•ISO/IEC 17025:2005 – General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories

MEASUREMENT

•ISO/IEC 17021:2011 – Requirements for bodies providing audit and certification of management systems

AUDIT

Established concrete measures

• Perform Conformity Assessment

• Integrate EC Internal Control Standards

• International Standards forming the basis of our IMS

Euratom Safeguards

MBE

Legal

Framework

Integrated

Management

System

Nuclear

Inspection

Activities

MBE

Practice

MBE

Audit

elements

ReviewConsultation

Conclusion

- Flow Inspections

- InventoryInspections

- MBE

IAEA: Design Information

Nuclear Inspection Activities

First Layer Assessments

• Verification of BTCBasic Technical Characteristics declared by Nuclear Operator

• Check Nuclear Material DeclarationsAccountancy declarations are correct, consistent and 302/2005 compliant

• Check Imports/Exports & Transit MatchingShipper Receiver Difference Analysis

• Verification of RecordsConsistency between Accountancy declarations, declared accounting records

and Operating Records

• Verification of Measurement SystemAssessment of Operator measurement system compliancy to LIS

Physical Verification of Nuclear Material

• Verification of FlowsConsistency between declared operating records and EURATOM measurement results

• Inventory VerificationsConsistency between declared NM at PIT and EURATOM PIV

MBE

PhysicalVerification

First

Layer

Nuclear Inspection Activities

Justified by legitimate measurement uncertainties?

Justified by legitimate

measurement uncertainties?

TW, TE, GA,

LA, NM

correlated to MUF or duly justified?

Not justified MUF trend?

MUF/σMUF

assessment

CUMUF

assessment

SRD evaluation

Special IC codes

MBE

PhysicalVerification

First

Layer

Euratom Safeguards

MBE

Legal

Framework

Integrated

Management

System

Nuclear

Inspection

Activities

MBE

Practice

MBE

Audit

elements

ReviewConsultation

Conclusion

- Facility specific, σMUF provided?- Use of uncertainty in BTC & ITV

EURATOM Safeguards MBE

MBE responsibility

• Lies with inspection units, HoS and Facility Officers

• Harmonised by dedicated MBE working group

Focus on facility-specific aspects

• Profound knowledge of BTC info & main NM flows

• Close examination of all potential contributors to the uncertainty budget

Development of VARO (Verification of Accountancy Records of Operators)

• Powerful IT tool for NMAC assessment

• Implement and harmonise the MBE practice consistently over all inspected installations

MBE practice – facility specific

Verify inventories (Ii, If) by Inventory Inspections

Verify flows in (R) and out (S) by Flow Inspectionsregard to measurements established in another MBA

Apply acceptance criteria to declared MUF = PE–BA = If + S – R – Ii

if(σMUF provided) {

Compare σMUF with σIMUF obtained by BTC & ITV;

Test H0 = MUF = 0 against σMUF }else if{

if (Detailed BTC) {

Obtain σIMUF by BTC;

}else{

Obtain σIMUF by ITV;

}

Test H0 = MUF = 0 against σIMUF

}

Euratom Safeguards

MBE

Legal

Framework

Integrated

Management

System

Nuclear

Inspection

Activities

MBE

Practice

MBE

Audit

elements

ReviewConsultation

Conclusion

- Operator declarations- Inspector validation- Inspector verification

MBE Audit Criteria

• Regulation 302/2005, Nuclear Operators

• Obligation to record and report measurements & uncertainties for accountancy purposes

• Recommendation 2009/120/Euratom on

Implementation of NMAC System

• Further requirements for a high quality NMAC

• Nuclear Operators shall perform Material Balance Tests using MUF and σMUF

• No guidance on how to perform MBT

MBE by Audit elements

NM Flow

Operator vs. Inspector measurements

Paired results

Grouped pairs

UncertaintyEstimators

σMUF

Validated results

Validated methods

Uncertainty budget

Audit elements:

Validation of NO measurement systemand uncertainties

Identification of lowlevel contributions

Bottom-up propagation

Top-downapproach

Euratom Safeguards

MBE

Legal

Framework

Integrated

Management

System

Nuclear

Inspection

Activities

MBE

Practice

MBE

Audit

elements

ReviewConsultation

Conclusion

- Verification resultstransmission

- Bilateral- Trilateral- Member States

Review, consultation, SG conclusion

• PIV preliminary results discussed with NO• Closing meeting

• Flow and inventory verification results • Integrated and communicated in writing to NO and MS

• Evaluate and comment IAEA conclusion

• Large sites, multiple MBAs• Annual safeguards performance feedback event

Review, consultation, SG conclusion

• Bilateral meetings• State-specific safeguards measures discussed with NO

• Best safeguards practices outlined

• Trilateral meetings• EC-IAEA cooperation during SG implementation

• Logistics and communication

• Member States representatives meetings• High level discussion of SG evolutions and projects

• Encourage best practice for harmonizing MBE

Conclusions

• EC and IAEA continuously promote MBE cooperation

• Involving Nuclear Operators and Scientific Community

• Series of workshops and technical meetings

• Harmonized approach to the expression of uncertainty in measurement (CN-220 S15)

• EC and IAEA apply similar MBE decisional processes

• Harmonizing or complementing uncertainty propagation processes

• EURATOM has the potential to apply bottom-up to MBE

• Assessing the quality of NO measurement system

• Close cooperation inspector-operator

• Thank you

• Acknowledgments

•

Antonio Medeiros

Yves Lahogue

Oscar Alique

Yetunde Aregbe

Jean Coadou

Dario Lodi

Wolfgang Kilb

Cedric De Walsche

Alexandre Isebaert

Maria Incerti-Lahogue

Stefano Ciccarello

Peter Schwalbach

Jolanta Svedkauskaite

extras

Installation Types by MBE practice

Operator

• Provides σMUF

Inspectors

• audit MUF and σMUF calculation method

• Compare σMUF with σI

MUF obtained by BTC & ITV

1

Operator

• Provides σMUF

• But does not allow Audit

Inspectors

• Compare σMUF with σI

MUF obtained by BTC & ITV

2

Operator

• Does not provide σMUF

Inspectors

• Obtain σIMUF using

BTC & ITV

3