Material Objects in Design Process

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The Role of Material Objects n theDesignProcess: A Comparison f TwoDesignCultures nd HowThey ContendwithAutomation

Kathryn HendersonTexas A&M University

This article compares two cultures of engineering design, one flexible and interactive,the other rigid and hierarchical. It examines the practices of design engineers who usea mixture of paper documents and computer graphics systems and contrasts these withthe practices of workers reengineering their own work process and its technologicalsupport ystem, using predesigned oftware. Based on the idea rom actor network heorythat objects participate in the shaping of new technologies and the networks hat buildthem, the study reveals that (1) design cultures are intrinsically ied to the way in whichtheir

representationsre constructed because such

representations-sketches, drawings,prototypes-are the heart of design work; (2) such design tools can engage or restrictparticipation n the design process; (3) politics in the orm of management prerogativescan be built nto a design tool, influencing he range of creativity allowed and innovationaccomplished n a given sociotechnological setting.

This article compares wo cultures of engineering design, one flexible andinteractive, the other rigid and hierarchical. It examines the practices ofdesign engineers who use a mixture of paper documents and computergraphics systems and contrasts hese with the practices of workers reengi-neering their own work process and its technological support system, usingpredesigned software. Design cultures or styles are intrinsically ied to theway in which each constructs representations of their ideas. Such repre-sentations-sketches, drawings, prototypes-are the heart of design workand constitute he space in which ideas are defined, refined, and negotiated.Comparison of the manner n which different design tools both engage andrestrict participation n diverse settings reveals the importance not only of the

tools, but also of the culture hey help build. The study also shows that politicsin the form of management prerogatives can be built into a design tool,

Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 23 No. 2, Spring 1998 139-174? 1998 Sage Publications nc.

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140 Science, Technology, & Human Values

influencing he range of creativity and nnovation n a given sociotechnologi-

cal setting.Actor network theory (Callon 1986a, 1986b; Latour 1987; Law 1987a,1987b) lets us treat design documents-sketches, drawings, diagrams-asparticipants n the interactions hat construct new technologies. Such docu-ments are actants enlisted into and constructed by a heterogeneous networkof people and things which jointly contribute o the construction of a newtechnology. Visual representations re also the holding ground for collec-tively negotiated design ideas. They serve as recruiting evices and gatekeep-ers. As I have shown elsewhere, visual representations, ncluding prototypes,used in the design of new technologies are conscription devices, objects thatboth enlist and constrain participation n design. Anyone who wants toparticipate n the design process must do so by interacting with them. Becausethey represent a design group's negotiated deas, and hence its distributedcognition, they also structure how work gets done in groups (Henderson1991, 1995a). Consequently, their form and format affect the nature ofinteractions and the culture of the designing group. Art historian Alpers(1983) has shown that how members of a given culture see the world is

reciprocally nfluenced by the way they render his world. In his discussionof visualization and cognition, Latour 1986, 9-10) refers to this relationshipas "defining both what it is to see and what there is to see." I have shown,similarly, hat engineering drafting conventions and their context help con-struct he visual culture of engineers, hat in turn nfluences the conventionsof rendering hat world (Henderson 1995b). Clearly, he implementation fnew representational ools (such as computer graphics ystems) changes thisculture, while the existing conventions nfluence how the new tool may beused (Henderson 1993, 1994, 1995b). Because visual representations anfacilitate or restrict group nteraction, hey are primary players in the socialconstruction of the design culture or design style of the designing group,whether ts members are period artists, mechanical or other design engineers,reengineering workers, or any other types of designers.

This study adopts the STS perspective that views technology and itsdesign as both socially constructed and society shaping. This perspective scompatible with design studies that compare differences and similarities nvarious design cultures. Whereas he role of visual renderings n design hasbeen often acknowledged, science and technology studies have been

payingattention o the role of visual representations ot only in design but also inlaboratory work1 and in the heterogeneous engineering of technology (Fer-guson 1976, 1992; Hindle 1981; Mukerji 1984; Latour 1986,1992; Fyfe andLaw 1988; Bowker 1988; Henderson 1991, 1995a, 1995b; Turnbull 1993;Gorman and Carlson 1993). Historical (Vincenti 1990) and ethnographic


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Henderson Role of Material Objects 141

studies by engineers hemselves (Bucciarelli 1994) also document he impor-

tance of visual documents n technology design development. Observationsof engineering practice (Ullman, Stauffer, and Dietterich 1987; Bly 1988;Tang and Leifer 1988; Henderson 1991, 1995a) have pointed out that moreis going on in sketching and drawing han he working out of a single design.From the psychological perspective, Arnheim, who has long recognized theimportance of visual thinking (1969), has more recently (1993) pointed outthe dialectic nature of sketches for the individual working out design ideas.From the sociological perspective adopted here, such a dialectic is manifestat the group evel when engineers and designers use interactive ketches anddrawings on white boards and paper to work out and negotiate variousperspectives and to draw in, literally and figuratively, a wealth of tacitknowledge (Henderson 1991, 1995a, 1998).

The new perspectives n design studies are somewhat analogous to thosein science and technology studies. Sociological perspectives on science nolonger accept the myth of linear scientific progress nor embrace he myth ofscientific objectivity and detachment n research methods. Similarly, designstudies are moving away from positivist and functionalist iews that prescribe

the one right way to do design (such as form follows function deology). Theytend to advocate examination of the variety of design processes and acknowl-edge no preferred ight way to do design and no single correct meaning ofthe designed object in a pluralistic society (Margolin 1989; Margolin andBuchanan 1995; Buchanan and Margolin 1995). According to Margolin, nthe continuing debate over the definition of design, more positivist viewssuch as those of Herbert Simon, who defined design as the science of theartificial, compete with ideas such as those of the civil engineer Petroski(1985), who described design as the disassembling and reassembling of the

parts of nature, and with the perspectives of those who suggest that design isa new form of practical art or communication Margolin 1989). Most relevantto this study are the ideas of Italian designer Vitta, who sees a design cultureas embracing "the totality of disciplines, phenomena, knowledge, analyticalinstruments nd philosophies that the design of useful objects must take intoaccount, nasmuch as those objects are produced, distributed, nd used in thecontext of economic and social models that are even more complicated andelusive" (Vitta 1989, 31). Vitta's inclusion of such heterogeneous elementsmoves his position closer to the perspective of actor network heory, althoughhe emphasizes the consumption rather han production ide of the network.The overall theme that design is an activity defined by the social milieu inwhich it occurs s compatible with the perspective aken here and agrees withthose in science studies who argue that neither design nor science andtechnology are value free.


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The contingencies of automation n work worlds that had been tradition-

ally dependent on paper-based practices have also drawn cross-disciplinaryattention. Researchers ave shown that n many work settings, practices usingpaper are so integral o the way work s done and knowledge s generated hatthey cannot simply be replaced by automated ystems (Harper, Hughes, andShapiro 1991; Luff, Heath, and Greatbatch 992). Despite nationalistic U.S.hope and hype, implementation of computer graphics in all types of engi-neering design-from civil to mechanical to electronic-has not led to asmoother transition rom design to manufacturing Downey 1992a, 1992b,1995). It has also not led to a paperless world, but rather o a world of mixedpractices hat combine the assets of both the paper and the electronic worlds.Initial ideas are often captured on paper, whereas analysis and problemsolving are often accomplished individually and/or collaboratively usingcomputer-generated ard copies (Henderson, 1993, 1994, 1998).2Hence theflexibility of collaborative practices around visual documents is crucial,whether the representations are hand-drawn ketches on paper and whiteboards, or computer-generated ard copies, redlined by hand. More mportantthan the difference between electronic representational ormats s the differ-

ence between flexible and negotiable visual representations and the situatedinteractions around hem) and the rigid and reified formats. Both the work-place context and the particular epresentational mode used are relevant.

The article begins with an overview of my findings from ethnographicresearch conducted n industrial ngineering design settings and focusing onthe crucial role of visual representations n the collaboratively hared knowl-edge of team design work. I then describe the participation ction research ata national call center and present the situated practice of one of the jobsto be integrated hrough reengineering. Finally, I compare my observations

of the reengineers' practices using printouts rom their company-providedsoftware with my earlier findings regarding design engineers' interactivepractices on, around, and through visual documents. The contextual ele-ments, including the way automation s handled, are analyzed alongside thechoices of the mode of visual representation.

Visual Documents and SituatedPractice in Design Engineering

The visual culture of design engineering that has been built arounddrafting conventions constructs the manner in which engineers see theirworld. My earlier research revealed the crucial role visual documents(sketches, drawings, schematics) play not only in the construction of new


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technologies but also in the construction of shared and individual work

practices and knowledge (Henderson 1991, 1995a, 1995b). For instance, acase study at a site that builds turbine ngines revealed hat visual documentswere used individually and collectively as thinking and note-taking ools. Theimportance of sketches as individual hinking ools is illustrated by a drafterwho had moved through he ranks o become a design engineer still possiblein some old-line, heavy industries). When she was promoted o engineer heytook away her drafting board, but she asked for it back, stating "I can't thinkwithout my drafting board." She described he way drawing helps her think:

When you do drafting by hand, a lot of the thought process comes when you'redrawing t out. So it's like you can't think.... You can't sit there and wait untilyou' ve got it up here, because t comes through drawing t. And as soon as youstartdrawing t, you have deas and changes. You're rasing t and mproving t.

You're ust getting a feeling for it. You know, you're ust trying o get a size,trying o understand t-to get an understanding f the system, almost buildingup your self-confidence so you know the task you've been assigned.

Then, as soon as you have something, you can take it to someone else andsay, "Look, this is what I have, how can I improve on it?" or "Did you have aproblem n this area too?" Without he drawing, you know, it's just talk. But

when you start aying it out, that's where, you know, 80% of the problems comeout, when you start drawing it and you start realizing what you'vegot. . . you've always got something n hand. (Henderson 1991, 159-60)

Thus, as individual hinking ools, sketches help to capture concepts in atangible and communicable orm which then facilitates ndividual and com-munal critical analysis. Pairs and groups use sketches as an interactivecommunication ool for further efining of ideas. Collaboration ver sketchesis one of the best methods for accessing and sharing tacit knowledge. On

several occasions at the same site I observed seasoned design engineersengaged in collaborative sketching conversations. One engineer describedsuch activity:

I don't think you ever get two designers who just sit down and just talk. It's"give me a pencil, and I'll explain." Everybody draws sketches to each other;[it's] "You know, this is what I'm trying to do here, let me show you." ... Theysay that he best designers start drawing right rom the beginning. That's wherethey make all their mistakes.... They're drawing t out there. They're lookingat it. They're visually checking it and improving upon it. (Henderson 1991,460-61 )

During a study at a high-precision medical optics firm I observed even moresynchronous collaboration-two engineers designing a new surgical nstru-ment were so engaged n shared visual thought hat hey were ointly drawing


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a sketch with one implement, each alternatively aking the pen from the hand

of the other as they drew and talked simultaneously.Moreover, hroughout my observations found, as have others (Ullman,Stauffer, and Dietterich 1987; Bucciarelli 1994), that designers do not actu-ally follow design school protocols that dictate working rom overall designto finer and finer detail in a linear fashion, developing one area at a time. Inpractice, designers work back and forth rom general ayout to specific detail.Nor do they concentrate on one area alone and develop it. They work ondifferent portions of the design, all over the drawing, both serially andsimultaneously, eveloping t as a whole while they collaborate with others-a nonlinear practice hat takes advantage of multiple resources and perspec-tives by negotiating distributed ognition.

Productive mechanical engineering designers often take early sketches tothe shop floor and show them to machinists and welders. The combinationof the visual representation nd the interaction regarding t serves both toelicit information hat improves the design and to make explicit informationthat might be ambiguous in the drawing. As objects serving to facilitateshared cognition, sketches capture pertinent knowledge from many sources.

Cap, the senior designer on the turbine package project, pointed out thecrucial role that sketches and drawings play not only in collaboration etweendesign engineers but in eliciting tacit knowledge in consultation with thosein the production ycle. He described his methods:

When you're doing the mechanical design work you have to be very aware ofall the people that are nterfacing and need to work with your design problems.You've gotta leave room for the electrical people to put their stuff, you haveto know how to put a package together so it... can be built in the cheapest,most inexpensive way that you can possibly do it. An' to do that you are incontact a good portion of the time with other departments especially, eh,structures, which actually weld the thing together.

I usually take my layouts right after I' ve started, fter I do my initial ayouts,before they' re ever dimensioned or, you know, ust be a frame ayout, then I'llgo over and I'll sit and talk with them and say, "Look, eh, here's what I wannado and here's the types of material I wanna use, here's what I've gotta havecut out." . . . And it's just a matter of: "is this the best possible way to do thisparticular hing?" And usually it's peripheral, ut a lot of times they'll say, ah,"Well, gee, if you did this, over here, this would save one weld." (Henderson1991,460)

Because he knows from experience that drawings can be misinterpretedon the shop floor, this engineer s out on the production loor during he firstassembly of his designs. This way he can provide additional visual informa-


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Henderson Roleof Material bjects 145

tion when needed. Referring to the plan, profile, and section drawings from

which the initial assembly workers must build the first prototype, Capacknowledges:

They still may not make as much sense in one area, so you circle a line on itand make a little hand sketch off to one side there o clarify the thing. [Pointingto a vague area n a layout] For instance, ike where its black here in this area,they see a dotted line coming down and say "what's really going on there?"I' m liable to just go off with the pencil and go an'just make a little hand sketchoff to one side just to make t clearer o the guys doing it at the time. (Henderson1991,461)

Latour (1986) points out that such cascades of sketches cumulatively buildup knowledge for the ultimate transformation from paper to machine atcenters of calculation that are necessarily centers of power. My observationsethnographically document the larger complexity of this process as informa-tion is accumulated in a continual progression back and forth from paper tomachine to paper until all the myriad design details reach closure throughnegotiation of the multiple heterogeneous social and technical elements andplayers. For instance, at the medical optics site prototypes played an impor-tant role in the development of the new surgical tool. They were interspersedbetween the iterations in the cascade of drawings that transformed the designidea into a producible product. As the project engineer put it:

It [a drawing] helps in terms of, "Oh t looks pretty" r "How does this [work],"or "I think my finger could work really well on this." But until you actuallyget your hands on it, it's still not even close. There's a big, big difference indrawing t and making t. That's where the main change comes over, when youget the prototype.... I would say you cannot make anything unless you make

prototypes, rn,and understand t and worry ut thebugs. Henderson, 995a,283)

Prototypes were especially useful for soliciting tacit knowledge, which wasthen incorporated back into new iterations of the drawings. This eliciting oftacit knowledge was seen as very useful play by the engineers involved:

I'm basically the person who comes in and says, "Ah, this isn't working right"and then I say, "Let's change this and see if this will fit and get rid of thatproblem." .. Or I bring them into my office and play with the instruments.

That's when things get accomplished... when I' m grinding at the bit and that'sjust the next thing on the list-one of the critical things to know is that if youkeep working on the thing all the time it doesn't get any better .... You canwork super hard on it. But it just doesn't improve. Going every time with a


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fresh approach, with a fresh look and not being afraid to change it is just asimportant. Henderson 1995a, 286)

Such play with the prototype was greatly advanced by the engagement ofothers, especially new members of the project eam who joined the designers'meetings when the new tool neared production. The research and devel-opment team's strategy of handing a prototype of their nstrument, esignedfor physicians' use, to newcomers myself included) and soliciting feedbackabout the appropriateness f its size, shape, smoothness, and comfort offunction served not only to garner tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1958, 1967;

Collins 1974). Politically, t also worked to facilitate support or the design-ers' "technological rame" n Bijker's terms (1995), "jumping on the band-wagon" in Fujimura's erms (1988), or "buying into the project" in thecommercial terms of my corporate nformants. Hence prototypes served asdevices for eliciting and capturing-conscripting-tacit knowledge andas devices for conscripting support networks. They share the capacity ofpaper documents to be read on several levels at once, as boundary objects(Star 1989; Star and Griesemer 1989).3 But this capacity too has politicalpossibilities because multiple readings can both facilitate collaborative workand contribute o conflict among collaborators. As Bucciarelli (1994) pointsout, the shared use of visual representations an help participants negotiatedifferences, given their different experiential backgrounds nd expectationsfor the design. Negotiation can also be facilitated when participating ngi-neers read the design drawings rom the perspectives of their specializations(for example, from the perspective of fluids flows, electrical, or structuralengineering). However, diverse orientations can also potentially lead toout-and-out onflict when readings are based not only on different specialty

orientations and background xperience, but also on departmental oliticsand distrust between research and development and manufacturing. My datafrom the practice of design engineers show that because of the potential forsuch conflict, visual documents play a gatekeeping ole as agents controllingwho is permitted o have input into the new design. Designers at more thanone site told me that they did not show early iterations o superiors, so thatcertain decisions were already closed by the time management nput wasgiven. The way in which designers had to contend with management preroga-tives in the reengineering project was very different and much more difficultto circumvent. Before discussing the work of the designers n that project, twill be necessary to understand he context of the reengineers' contrastingdesign culture.


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Reengineering a Call Center

The site of this study was one of several call centers hat provides suppliesand service for a multinational ompany that makes copy machines.41 was amember of a team of sociologists engaged in action research o participatealong with workers in reengineering heir work. The project plan was tointegrate hree pecialty reas-service, supplies, ndbilling nquiry all-taking-into one more generalist call-taking ob. Initially, calls for service came in onseparate 800 toll-free ines to telephone representatives n the three respectiveareas. Under he reengineering nitiative, such calls would come in on a single800 line, requiring he TeleRep o become knowledgeable n the multitude ofpolicies and practices for all three areas. New software would facilitate theintegrated unctions. In the first phase of the research our team documentedexisting practice so that the reengineered omputer ools and work processeswould be grounded n actual ways of doing work.

This phase of our research paid close attention o the total context of theTeleRep's nteractions with people, work setting, and machines. Our obser-vations focused on the interdependence f conversation tructure, he use of

paper documents, he dictates of the technology, he role of tacit knowledge,and the physical involvement of the TeleRep's body. We found the drivingforces for interaction and the locus of the knowledge to be multiple, shifting,and mutating. Knowledge was not singularly constructed nto the "smart"system that supported he work alone, nor only into the heads of TeleReps,singly or collectively. Nor was it located in the posted documents alone, noronly in the TeleRep's fingertips or visual memory; t was in all these places,elicited interactively and in consort, sometimes orchestrated imultaneouslyand other times sequentially Whalen, Henderson, and Whalen 1995). Thishas been called distributed cognition by Hutchins (1991). Hutchins nowterms it cultural cognition (1995). Suchman 1987) and Lave (1988) call itsituated practice; it is knowledge in practice. The important points are that(1) the knowledge that TeleReps command was complex and distributedthroughout heir tacit, technical, and physical work environment, ncludingcollaboration with peers; and that (2) the menu-driven graphic methods thecompany provided for representing and redesigning he work, coupled witha structured, management-driven uality assurance process, worked against

capturinghis

complexityin a manner hat would allow creative nnovation.

In all three areas of specialization service, sales, billing inquiries) to becombined by reengineering, he TeleRep, almost cyborglike, sits suspendedbetween one machine-the telephone-and another-the computer system.


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Headphones connect her or him to the computerized telephone system,

fingers hovering at-the-ready over the keyboard, and eyes set to scan thecomputer creen. Also within at-a-glance angeare numerous aperdocumentsand pad and pencil. On the surface he work looks simple: answer he phone,place the request n the system. However, the job is made more complex bythe myriad variations n types of service, purchase, and lease contracts, timezones, priority codes, supplies used by various models of copiers, quantitydiscounts, availability, and special offers, to name ust a few details that theTeleRep must maneuver. To keep track of much of this information alongwith its constant updates and the coding for the various screens of thedatabase of an aging system, TeleReps, especially new ones, paper theirspace with posted and bound documents. I mention them here only as partof the context; he details of their use is an article n itself. To understand ullythe complexity and knowledge involved in actually doing this work, Iparticipated n the standard raining lasses in service and supplies sales givento new employees. I spent wo weeks taking ive calls in the Customer ServiceCall Center. Because that ob was generally regarded as the simplest of thethree to be integrated, will draw on that area to illustrate he attention to

detail and tacit knowledge nvolved in the work of the TeleReps at its locallyperceived minimum.The Customer Service Call Center segment of the converted warehouse

in which the national call center resided was broken up by clusters oftwo-person work spaces, separated y cubicle walls rising about a foot abovethe work surface. Higher walls compartmented ork areas oward he rear ofthe large space, making t quieter han the ongoing call-taking chatter of themain floor. Sets of clocks on three walls of the central space displayed timezones across the continental United States, while red LED screens abovethem reported he number of callers waiting on hold and how long they hadbeen waiting. A light on the telephone console on each desk also indicatedurgency, urning rom green to yellow to red as the caller queue lengthened.The console's standard elephone keypad was amplified with additionallarger nodes that it to indicate whether he TeleRep was on an 800-line call,an internal, company line, or an outside line; and in "wrap-up," ready," r"idle."

The telephone system is computer controlled, but a human monitorsurveys the display, showing who is off the system, or, if on, which type ofline they are using. All of this is recorded and checked against statisticalnorms and expected on hours. The results are posted monthly, a form ofemployee monitoring and discipline. This is another xample of the politicsbuilt into artifacts (Winner 1985, 1995). Even though management hasrecently nformed employees that these statistics are less important han the


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quality of service they give customers, TeleReps tend not to believe this

rhetoric, because the monitoring devices are built into the technology andhave not been removed. My own experience supports the TeleReps' percep-tions, as shown in this account from my field notes while I was taking calls:

Mara, my trainer and the floor facilitator omes by and asks that I sign off thetelephone system when I am taking notes and asking questions because I amstaying in wrap-up mode on the phone too long, causing the computer moni-toring system to highlight the designation for my telephone line connection,upsetting their process. Once signed on to the phone, TeleReps are reallyhooked in like part of the machine, every action monitored. ask a neighborTeleRep f I would have been reprimanded or this, were I a regular employeeand she says, "Yes."5

Although the work of taking and recording service calls can eventuallybecome monotonous, learning the tacit knowledge required both to use thetechnology and to manage the callers takes time and experience, as illustratedby this excerpt from my first day on the phones:

I plug my head set into the phone console in my assigned cubicle, next to Sandy,an experienced TeleRep. She helps me log on, but a screen message indicatesa PC problem o she reboots he machine. We choose the appropriate rogramsfrom the program manager, Rhumba and FWSS. I type in "logon impf," hitenter, then the ctlc22 button twice, as I have been instructed, but the screentells me: "your logon is already n use." We have to call the trainer back. Itturns out someone else has been given this number ince I used it yesterday.get a new number and we do it all over again. Finally I am ready to take calls.

I punch the ready button on the phone console. A recorded voice tells me"incoming call." I respond as I have been taught, "[company name] customerservice, this is Kathryn, How may I help you?" The customer dentifies himselfand his company, saying he wants to place a service call. I say, "May I haveyour serial number, please?" He is used to the protocol, has his serial numberhandy and rattles t off so fast I have to ask him to repeat t so I can type it. Imake a couple of typos and the number turns red. Finally when I have thecorrect number t turns green and the data screen finally comes up. I verify thecaller's and his company's name and address but Sandy has to remind me toverify the telephone number. Its field is buried in the middle of the screenamong many others and I missed it in my visual scan. The customer tells mehe has lines and streaks on his copies so I enter "poor copy quality" n theproblem field. Sandy tells me later I could have just entered "cq." I tell the

customer I will place the call and he hangs up. I hit the enter button o registerthe service order. The purchase order field turns red and I have to enter N for"no purchase order required" before the system will let me enter the order. Ihit enter again and the screen for solving machine problems comes up. Sandyhas to help me get out of it. I should have hit the return key, located right nextto the enter key. I also forgot to verify the customer hours, important or theservice technician o know, Sandy reminds me. This field is in the uppermost


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right comer of the screen, which I also missed in my visual scan as I read downthe page, vertically, o verify the name and address. Sandy also tells me not touse the hyphen in telephone numbers because it sometimes messes up pagercalls-a glimpse of TeleRep acit knowledge.

I take two more simple requests or service calls but keep forgetting o askthe caller for the condition of the machine: totally down, partially down, orroutine service check, for which I should enter a 0, 1, or 2 in the appropriatefield. A new call comes in, but when I ask for the serial number he caller saysthey are placing me on hold and will transfer o their copy room. Too much timepasses,but now I cannot etoutof hold,on the phone ystem. try pressing hehelpbutton and get a recording stating that all my calls are on hold, and to call asupervisor. Her ine is busy and so is Sandy, so I sit feeling dumb and frustrated,afraid to punch any more buttons that might make matters worse. Finally,Sandy is free and tells me to press the blinking button of the several lit up onthe phone console. This is my first piece of information hat the buttons areactive not static, more tacit knowledge absorbed.

The opening protocol for any service call requires eliciting the machineserial number rom the caller to access the database records. The databasewas designed in the 1970s. Some but not all TeleReps have personal com-puters with a Windows nterface hrough which to access the database. Manyterminals, however, have the old green-on-black isplay, and all informationin the database, even with new PC color choices, appears in old style,squarish, difficult-to-read omputer print. Whatever he customer may wishto convey about a nonworking copier, no information can be recorded forpotential action until the machine serial number s recited and entered ntothe system. If the entered serial number is valid, the computer systemproceeds to the next screen. The information ields on this screen are so densethey fill the entire page, often leaving only one- and two-digit spaces to befilled in. The visual field is so crowded that it is

easyfor a novice to miss

details. Only after the TeleRep verifies the name, address, and telephonenumber of the corporate ustomer, along with the name of the client contactperson and company hours of operation, s the customer o be asked what theTeleRep can do for them. Whatever a caller replies about their machine, onlya two-line problem ield is available or the description, o the TeleRep mustusually reword and shorten he description. f a tiny field at the bottom of thescreen s marked MC for maintenance ontract, he call is entered by simplypressing he appropriate ey, and the TeleRep nforms he customer hat heir

call has been placed. If the field is marked TM for time-and-materials, heTeleRep must inform the customer hat they will be billed a certain amountfor the first half hour and another amount or each subsequent quarter hour,depending on the size and complexity of their particular opier and whetherthe customer wants the service call during or after regular business hours.


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The most current billing rates are posted on paper nearby so that TeleReps

can verify that they are quoting the most recent price updates. But not all callsare so straightforward, as these examples from my field notes show:

The next call is a legitimate ENOF [equipment not on file]. The serial numberthe customer has provided urns red when I attempt o enter it. I have doublechecked for typos on my part and had the customer go back to their machineto check the number they gave me against that on the copier's silver serialnumber plate. This in itself is an ordeal. Many times customers do not knowtheir serial number and must go look for it. It is not in the same place on everymachine. Each TeleRep has a small but thick reference volume with a line

drawing of each model of the company's copier, typewriter, nd fax machinesand their accessories. An arrow points to the location of the serial number,which is sometimes inside the machine. Sandy can tell customers where it ison the most common models without looking it up; she has worked for thecompany for twelve years. I write down the company and caller's name,address, telephone and serial numbers on a pad of paper. Sandy says to waituntil we come back from lunch to handle this because we will have to make aphone call and have someone get back to us so we can tell the customer whetherthe call is billable or covered on a service contract.

The data screen for the next caller has "XFS in conversion, customer said

was converting from time and materials o ser.cont." n the billing field. Wenever discussed anything ike this in training o I ask Sandy what I should do.She says to put the service call through because it was already changed at thetop of the screen and was internal anyway. I am learning hat the literal ruleswe were taught n training as the one-and-only-way-things-are-done re ndeedmore open to interpretation, ven in an automated ystem.

One of the forms of tacit knowledge I had to develop as a TeleRep waslearning to see the data screen. I had to discipline my visual scan to includethe small two-digit fields pertinent to what I was doing at the time whileglancing over other fields not relevant to the customer on the line. This meanttraining my gaze to include the far upper-right corner of the screen where theclients' hours were posted instead of reading down the screen, vertically, asif it were a list. Learning to scan all the relevant fields took some practice:

I get call from an elementary chool that has "do not service, no renewal PC,"an 800 number, and a name to call, so I tell the woman that there is someproblem on the account and she needs to call the 800 number. I have nowtrained my visual scan to notice the billing field at the bottom of the screen as

well as those things I have to verify. Sandy tells me a lot of schools haveproblems getting service because of billing problems because they often havereally old equipment without service contracts or have to get purchase ordersfrom their district or state.

I get several calls that I handle OK, then one from he State of MassachusettsDepartment f Motor Vehicles on which I missed the "PC [purchase ontract]


15/37


required" ntil after they hung up. Sandy says to just put "if billable " in thatfield. I get a call from Carmella Eastin at Investment Bankers of America whosaid she had called yesterday but received no ETA [estimated ime of arrival]and felt she should have by now, Sandy tells me that [reading he screen betterthan I] the service technician has already been out there.

A bit after 2:00 p.m. [CST] Sandy reminds me to ask customers on EasternStandard Time whether they want to pay for after-hours alls. This involvesnot only noticing where and in what time zone the customer s located andwhether they have a service contract, but also if the service contract coversafter-hours alls.

Although I had been through training,I felt

very dependenton

my papercheat sheets, which listed the various computer codes to move through thedatabase or protocols for exceptional, but common, breaks from simple calls,like the one below.

I do my first CCE [customer ourtesy escalation], he process for impatient orirate customers. The caller was irritated hat the technician had not yet come.I designate t a "+1" rather han a"+2" because the tone of the customer's voiceis not out-and-out anger, but mild irritation. must send two messages fromthe screen, one to the area service technician supervisor and one to thedesignated technician. With my cheat sheets near-by I feel confident that Iknow the process but then get confused about how to designate the serviceteam number because the example used in training was unclear. Working withthe data screen rather han my memory and he cheat sheet, I realize hat houghwe have to enter the same message twice, it is the second box on the messagescreen that actually sends the message to the technician via employee numberwhen I put "CCE + team and section number" nto the CCP [customer ourtesyprocess] screen. I make the usual mistake of using the enter button o end thiswhich means the technician got paged twice. Sandy reminds me I shouldhave used the pflO key, adding, "Then she would not have been paged twice."

The service area was local so Sandy knew who the technician was by theemployee number.

My second day on the phones, paper cheat sheets at hand, I felt moreself-assured and resolved to try to use the on-line system (CCA; customercall assistance) designed to help customers fix simple problems with theircopy machines themselves without having to place a service call. I had heardSandy give instructions to customers from memory. I would be dependent onthe system. After a delay because the whole system went down, forcing us to

scurry around getting paper documents to record calls, I finally had a chanceto try out the technology-assisted helper role:

I take a call from an Army Base in their Career Resource Mgt. Center. Thecaller says their machine is "jamming n the output area" and give[s] me acomplicated set of hours, different or each day of the week. In addition o the


16/37


PO [purchase order] number he caller wants to give me a very long "BPA"number. write all the hours and the BPA number down on my tablet and askthe caller, "Are you willing to try some things that might fix the problem?" hesays, "Yes." type "paper ams" in the "problem" ield and the right numberin the CCA field but nothing happens. So I look up the code for paper ams onmy CCA paper cheat sheet. I finally get into CCA by using the right alpha-numeric code for paper ams. I scan the list of questions that appears on thescreen and ask the caller the first one: "How many copies have you been doingat a time?" since the instructions ay twenty-five is the limit. The caller sayspeople are only allowed to do five at a time since the machine s for public use.I read off a suggestion for adjusting he feed tray and the next one which asksif the paper could be damp. The caller responds, saying they have had verydamp weather, and I tell her to try a new ream of paper and recall that I haveoften heard Sandy mention this to customers. There is another suggestion onthe list, but this seems like a good one, so I do not read the final suggestion. Ido read something about pressing he start button wice to the customer, but itwas not worded clearly and neither of us is quite sure of the step-by-stepprocess. Keeping the conversation natural-sounding while wording the "Dothis, do that" ommands n a way that does not sound condescending s difficult.I tried to word my instructions as I had heard other TeleReps do, in an "ofcourse you've done this" tone of voice, because the CCA instructions comefrom customer manuals and are mostly common knowledge for anyone who

has worked regularly with copiers or electronic equipment. After telling thecaller to try changing the paper I tell her to call back and cancel the serviceorder f that works and thank her for trying he steps as I have heard Sandy do.

When I return rom lunch, the small screen on my phone console says, "4calls waiting." The overhead LED screen which shows number of customerswaiting and their average time of wait had displayed all O's earlier. Now it islit up with numbers which keep escalating. A bell rings and everyone dropswhatever they are doing to get on the phones and bring the numbers down.Everyone, including me, ignores CCA, turning all calls as much as possibleinto vanilla service calls to get the backlog down as fast as possible.

The numbers are not so severenow, my peak

had been 14waiting, ust

afterI got on, now it shows only 6. I take two more calls but neither wants to tryCCA. A third doesn't even know what area her jam is in: input, output,whatever, so I try nothing. Customers do not want to try things to fix theirmachine very often. They would rather ust call the technician o fix it, evenwhen just changing he paper or turning he machine on and off might get themback up and running. Getting people to attempt o fix their own copier s anotherlevel of TeleRep knowledge. The TeleRep has to read the customer's mood,probe tor contextual clues, such as whether he copier is nearby and carefullyword the suggestions so that the customer does not feel that they are having todo what their service contract hould provide.

During my two weeks on the phones, I remained dependent on my posteddocuments for less frequently used codes but did acquire some tacit knowl-edge. Doing the work myself, but dependent on the expertise of my experi-enced neighbor, Sandy, I became particularly aware of her level of tacit


17/37


knowledge, ncluding not ust the mechanics of taking service calls, including

work-arounds, ut also her extensive knowledge of all the various models ofcopiers and how to fix them over the phone. Some of this knowledge wasgained from her husband, who was a service technician, some from experi-ence; but none of it was included n company training programs.

By the end of the two weeks I had several suggestions for the reengineer-ing design team about how to improve training. I also had suggestions forchanges to the antiquated ystem which would make the work practice moreefficient, as the three obs became ntegrated nto one. However, sharing whatI learned with the reengineering design team during our regular designmeetings was not to be. The structure f the design meetings focused on thework at an abstract evel and used a menu-driven rocess that would not allowthe discussion of work details to take place. At the beginning, it certainlyappeared o our team of sociologists, concerned with knowledge situated npractice, hat having the workers who actually did the work design the newintegrated work process and its supporting technology was an excellentinsight on the part of management. ndeed, he worker-reengineers new thework in depth and in detail. However, whether management ntended so or

not, the design practice itself and the documents for capturing it werehampered by management-driven mperatives or following a rigid process.This ultimately ook the form of a piece of software n which everything waspreordained, nd the designers only filled in the blanks-another example ofbuilding politics into artifacts. This, of course, worked against the flexibilitycrucial to innovative design work. Significantly, the introduction of thissoftware and the translation of the project into prespecified terminologyoccurred when it lost its autonomy as a singular nitiative and was put, bymanagement, under a corporate-wide eengineering nitiative. At that point,which happened o coincide with the arrival of our team of sociologists, thewhole project was rewritten n the larger nitiative's anguage, he company'sversion of total quality control (TQC).

The "Quality Process": Quality or Control?

In contrast o the engineering design world of negotiation, collaboration,and/or

potential conflict, negotiationover the documents or the

redesignof

the actual work hardly ever occurred t the reengineering ite. The exceptionsoccurred when our research team raised questions about details of workpractice, although we were often silenced for being "at the wrong level."6The design process was constrained both by the design documents and theformat of the meetings. Management perspectives ntervened n the process,


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not by their presence per se, but by the dictated format of design meetings

and design documents. Management-directed orporate ulture dictated andconstrained nteraction hrough ts TQC conventions. These included man-dated step-by-step prescribed process for running meetings, documentingwhat took place, and what action would follow. A menu-driven processformula dictated staying at a high level of abstraction efore details of workpractice could be considered. The formalism was compounded by the soft-ware templates used to create visual documents. Such documents weresupposed orepresent work process and were constantly mployed as a meansof shorthand ommunication n meetings.

Anyone making a presentation n the corporate setting uses overheadslides composed of boxes and bullets and pictograms. This computer-gener-ated format has become the correct medium of corporate alk; one is notprofessional if one cannot reduce the message to sound bites, icons, andbullets.7 The requisite executive summary s intended or managers who donot have time to address details. Concrete examples of work practice thatsupport summary statements are left out. This detail is what broader gener-alizations should be built on, so acceptance of the broader abstractions s

dependent on trust that the person making these generalizations has paidattention to the detail. However, all too often the abstractions ome downfrom management's general impressions rather than being built up fromconcrete data because the details of work practice are associated with low-status workers. A reengineering team must pay attention to the level ofpractical detail that cannot be easily reduced o abstractions. The work has tobe thoroughly understood before it can be redesigned. However, so muchtime was spent on documents at the high level (their erm) of abstraction myaddition) hat when attention inally turned o detail, ittle or no time was leftbecause it had been eaten up in numerous two-day meetings devoted tohigh-level discussions around high-level documents.

The structured nteraction was the result of the application of manage-ment's interpretation of the so-called total quality process introduced byW. Edwards Deming via Japanese market success.8 This concept of qualityis based on the idea that business must anticipate he needs of its customers,transform hese needs into a useful and dependable product that meets orexceeds customer expectations, and in so doing create a process that canproduce heproduct at the lowest

possiblecost so that

qualityand

profitabilitybecome synonymous. Deming recommended a cyclical perspective promot-ing ongoing change and improvement, not only of the product produced, butalso of the structure and processes of the firm. Cooperation among alldepartments was intended to facilitate redefinition of the customer's needsin a changing environment. Although corporate adaptations of Deming's


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ideas vary, any good idea can always be reified and formula-ized as it moves

from originator o management-mandated pplications. Deming also advo-cated commitment to long-term strategies; elimination of numerical goalsand quotas that focus management attention on ends rather than means;driving out fear so that people can work effectively; leadership hat guidesrather han polices; collaboration with suppliers rather han contracts basedonly on lowest price; employee duties that are meaningful, accompanied byprograms or education and self-improvement; limination of mass inspec-tion, emphasis on teamwork nstead of individualism ndcompetition amongemployees, including on-the-job raining n which managers participate; ndelimination of the individual merit system and the numeric measurement fjob productivity. Deming maintained hat if a system is functioning withquality processes in place, it will not generate waste or faulty products. Healso advocated the eradication of slogans and exhortations because theyimply that reform ies with the employees rather han n a functioning ystem.According to Deming, change must be holistic, encompassing every aspectof the organization. The structure o facilitate such transformation must comefrom top management Townsend and Gebhardt 1992).

Deming's TQC process recommendations may or may not have been theprimary easons for Japanese ascendance n a competitive market. Americanbusiness has incorporated Deming's perspective in many different ways,some more successful than others. In many cases, management has takensome ideas and not others, abstracting, einterpreting, nd reifying them,using some of the very perspectives and processes of which Deming wascritical. Too often, management-mandated orkshops hroughout orporateAmerica have institutionalized logans, acronyms, and various process for-mulas and checklists promoting quality processes and attempts o measurequality. Contrary o Taylor's original ideas, just as scientific managementcame to dictate to labor the one right way that work should be done, so alsomanagement has all too often selected some, but not all, of Deming's ideasand applied them piecemeal from a top-down perspective that missed theholistic character f the nonhierarchical eamwork Deming advocated.

This was the case in the company where my research was conducted. TheTQC process, initiated in the early 1980s, was conceived as a top-downcorporate ulture change. Each level of management was supposed o master

an abstracted nd truncated ersion of Deming's ideas, "cascading tdown-

ward" n company jargon. TQC was handed down the management chain,starting ach time with managers and their staff, who then taught t to the nextlevel, downward, and eventually to employees. Pace and Argona (1991)report he conflict between this top-down perspective and a joint union andmanagement project o improve he quality of work life (QWL) in the same


20/37

Henderson Roleof Material bjects 157

company. They also point out, to the company's credit, that it allowed QWL

representatives o modify the TQC curriculum nddeliver t to the workforce.In the past decade, further modifications of Deming's concepts have takenplace.9The company has won national quality awards and has implementedDeming's ideas such as employee self-improvement programs and an em-phasis on teamwork. And yet it maintains practices antithetical o Deming'sTQC. The company still uses quantitative measures for everything fromnumber of minutes spent per customer elephone call to the setting of salesgoals. It still maintains ndividually based merit evaluation and a proliferationof empty slogans that promote the idea that delivering quality is the soleresponsibility of the worker. The following analysis traces this company'sversion of its TQC formula in the structure and language of the designdocuments provided o the reengineers n software emplates.

Our eam oined the National Design Program Team after ts members hadcompleted the initial conceptual stage of the reengineering project. Thedesign meetings we attended began with large stacks of paper documentsbeing passed out to all present. Sometimes hese were black and white copiesof multicolored lides. Other imes they were sets of paper documents alone.

The person who was responsible or the TQC action item for a subject areawould present the document by reading through t. Others, whose specialtyarea was the same, would respond. There was no sense of innovation orcreativity. There was no playing with the designed object as described by theengineers who designed the surgical instrument. There was no room toexplore related areas. The contents of the document set the agenda fordiscussion, and little deviation was made from it. The documents served asa checklist for things already known. Representations f work stayed at avery abstract evel. No unrepresented acit knowledge was elicited. If moreconcrete suggestions or observations were made, the speaker was often toldthey were at the wrong level. The team was said to be working at a very highlevel, but that meant a very low level of understanding f the actual work. Asparticipants ngaged in documenting he work practice hat was being reen-gineered, our team members attempted to make comments about actualpractice. But we also were told that we were at the wrong level. In otherwords, our input was too concrete in a discussion where things were to bekept very general and abstract. After being repeatedly reprimanded, all

participants, ncludingour research

eam,earned not to mention such details.

We awaited the appropriate ime to raise detailed work practice ssues.As time passed, the National Design Program Team worked from high

into medium levels. When flowcharts were finally brought out to discussprocess, it appeared we were finally at a level to address work practice. Butthe company's and hence the design team's definition of process was not the


21/37


same as practice. Process was formalized and prescribed o that even here it

was hard to introduce attention o detail. Time was short, the pilot initiationdeadline was approaching, ndmany other opics had to be covered. So muchtime had been spent on documents at a high level that when the time came toaddress he details of practice, here was very little time left to do so.

The "Design Documents"

A series of documents illustrates the company's and the design programteam's notion of moving from a very high level to a detail level. Therepresentation f the business profile of the overall ob integration-plan s agood example of a very high level document (see Figure 1) composed forbroad dissemination at the management evel with figures expressed inmillions and billions.i?

The second example (Figure 2) is a working document used by theprogram design team. It presents he component parts of the new integratedjob, divided nto blocks that represent ctual ob descriptions. This is a design

process document, a detailed representation f the actual processes to beincorporated nto the new integrated ob, designated by numbers hat indexofficial written ob descriptions. At the next level down (Figure 3), eachprocess is further detailed. A designated specialist who had actually per-formed the job being analyzed worked on the document to be sure that itincluded all the pertinent nformation nd then presented t back to the designteam for further review. Feedback generally came from those on the teamwho had the same job expertise.

The third document (Figure 3) shows how one of the business subproc-esses of technical service management 9.0), the so-called service call man-agement 9.3), can be broken down further nto two subsubprocesses: ervicecall handling (9.3.1.1) and service dispatch 9.3.1.2). Although the number-ing system seems to imply that we are moving into a very detailed area, thejob practices are abstracted nto the preformulated argon of the company'sdictated process abstractions: objective, process owner, inputs, outputs,documents. To make sense of this language use, one must know the com-pany's specialized codes and have some experience with the job itself. In this

respect, thedocument resembles the

designdocuments n mechanical

engi-neering that are intended for specialty engineers. The electrical engineercontributes one set of codes to a particular egment of the design documentswhile the fluids engineer and he structural ngineer construct other segmentsusing their particular ets of symbols. Despite the fact that the reengineeringdocument uses English, its language is neither universal nor transparent. n


22/37

|Integrated Customer Servic

BUSINESS PROFILE |

|BUSINESS | | CUSTOMER CARE, PROBLEM RESOLUTION, TELEMARKETING, SUPPPROCESS | CUSTOMER SERVICE

r SUPPLY ^ r TELE- ? r CUSTOMER 'SUB- MARKETING MARKETING SERVICEPROCESS l l SUPPORT

-$ ORDERS S N REVENUE CALLS FROM- ^WERS. ~AND ROWING 'UBUD^^^^^H ~- LEADS CLST

f l GENERATED CUSTOMSET

- CALIJMAIL W11

CONTACTSWITH \^T ^CUSTOMERST -

I- CUSTOMER - CUSTOMERCNAT CONTACTS

KEY MESSAGE:* There are million customer contacts done by today's functionally oriented personnel,

processes and technologies.

* Each of these customer contacts represents a 'Moment of Truth' to satisfy customers aof Business Priorities.

Figure 1


23/37

Figure 2

Process

Sub-Process


24/37

USCO BUSINESSAREA:TECHNICAL ERVICEMANAKEYBUSINESSPROCESS: SERVICE ALLMANAG

KEYWORKPROCESS: SERVICE ELIVERY9

&|k SERVICE CALLHANDLING .3.1.1 . E SERVICE DISP

Provide ront.end product support to customers throughaccurate rvice entlement Identification, problem Ensure timely dispatch and hand

Objectve: Identiflca Remon Call Ashtance, and prompt analystfservice engineer.ecalation to *nelylthwrvlce engineer.

Process Worldwide Customer ServicesO w n er ustomer Services Support Support

*Service Requests *Pending Ser ice Callsmpins. *Outbound SeviCe Alerts *Pending Software Calls

*Hardwace ertice Call need Identified*Softwne, Service Call need Identified *.Hrdware Service Call dispatc

Outputs: *Co atlon Call scheduled *Soltwar Service Call handed*Account Profile updatd*Remote Call Assistance successfully completed

*Service CaJlRecord *Service Call Record

.*Sofware Call Record *Software Call RecordDocuments Remot Call A$$1stlnce Solve Record *Remote Call Assistance Solve

*Account profile updates *Account profile updates

Figure 3


25/37

Provide Front-end product support to customers through accurate serviceObjective: entitlement Identification, problem identification, Remote Call Assistance, andprompt escalation to analystlservice engineer.

Process Owner: Customer Services Support

Inputs* Service RequestsOutbound Service Alerts

Key Process Steps: >^ \

Confimatio cheduld t proflemoteC aDttermloe *ny i^^^^ Csil AsiistaBce\

\, reuiirmenti sSBQS\ Dispstch procesi

Oupt: Hardware Service call need idenftifed, Software call need Ideneified,pUS Confirmnation caSI cheduled, Account profile update, Remote aill

Assistance successfully completed

C ustomer , Field Technicians, Analysts

Service Call Record, Software Call Record,Documents: Remote Call A.istance Solve Record, AccountProfile updates

Benefits:

QualityCost - Reduced on4ite service callsDel'verv - Customer downtime reduced


WORK PROCESS: SERVICE CALL HANDLING 9.3.1.1

Figure 4

this document, the representation of the detail is constrained by the inflexi-bility of the company's formalized interpretation of process components.

This interpretation dictates what can be expressed and prohibits descriptionsof actual practice.

The next level document (Figure 4) represents the redesigned job, but itdoes not take us much closer to practice either. Three quarters of it is identicalto the document in Figure 3. What has been added are the customer, benefits,


26/37


and a visual representation f key process steps. A practice-oriented ction

researcher rying to participate n this design process inevitably experiencesfrustration. Every time my colleagues and I tried to clarify practice orcontribute nformation on knowledge in practice, we were told we were atthe wrong level. This document can be read as an actual picture of ourfrustration: Each circle in the key process steps identifies the sequence ofevents the TeleRep goes through n taking and placing a service call request.However, he circles literally circumscribe he space available or the descrip-tion of steps, making t very clear that his is still the wrong evel for capturingactual practice. Further proof of how little design manipulation occurred atthese levels is provided by the comparison of the original document rom 25January 1995 (Figure 4) with ones from 8 February 1995 (Figure 5) and 16February 1995 (Figure 6). The only difference between the first two of thesedocuments is that process owner has been changed, the quality line underbenefits has been filled in, and the border ines have been removed. In thenext iteration, he only change is computer-generated esthetics, the docu-ment has been moved to landscape configuration, and the background had-ing has been removed.

But I still hoped that, at the most detailed level, the process flow chart(Figure 7) representing the job as redesigned would finally address thecontingencies of the work itself. Time was running out. Plans for the pilotwere being made and design team members were being called away to otherresponsibilities. On the day when we finally discussed things at the level ofwork practices, only some of the National Design Program Team memberswere present and the project manager was not there. The flowchart hat waspassed around, dated 7 February, was no different rom its predecessor rom25 January. Fortunately, hose present did include area experts with service-call experience. When I started asking questions about he actual work, theylistened and responded. Our interactions generated hanges to the chart hatare handwritten n Figure 8. At least some of the messiness and ambiguity ofthe work got discussed, although even there, little was captured in thedocuments. The whole sequence of events that occurred when a TeleRep usedremote call assistance (RCA),11 hat required knowledge of how to coax thecaller to turn their machine off and on or run some copies, as well asfamiliarity with machine types and common problems, has been reduced toa flowchart decision. Although the flowchart could be used as a centeringdevice for discussion of the details of this work that could be improved n theredesign, time and energy for examination of how the work really got donehad run out. Had our research team not interrupted he structured designsequence earlier, with our own workshop, our suggestions relevant to thedetails of the work would hardly have been discussed.


27/37

Harowarc service call need Idenfified, Software call need identified,Confirmation cell scheduled, Account profilc updated. Remote CallAssistance successfully completed

Customer, Field Technicians, Analysts


XVORKPROCESS: SERVICE CALL HANDLING 9.3.1.1

Provide Front-end product support to customers through accuraet serviceObjective: entitlement identification, problem identification, Remote Call Assistance, and

prompt escalation to analyst/service engineer.

Process Owner: 8ervice CallHandling rocess Owner

Inputs: ServiceRequestsOutbound Service Alerts

Key Process Steps:k,Cutomer\ t

| Account nd 5h|_& PrblemB8iB_sai Inormtbn A t _SS rob

01 ianoseProble

4.Perform Remote'Detennine.ny CallAsi,stnce

follow-up ~fl (exit oService\ requlremenU % Dlispatchrocess

/ fedd

Outputs:

Customer:

nArnm-4o Service Call Record, 8offwarn Call Record,Remote Call Assistance Solve Record, AccountProfile uDdates

Benefits:QualityCostDellewv

,Accuracy of Information given to customer (.e., Cuebase Info.)-Cost per telephone Call- Response to customer phone call

Figure 5

Because of this change of communication format, some innovations basedon attention to practice were made in the pilot. Among these were (1)

awareness of the importance of at-a-glance support documents so that somepaper documents, already in use, were captured and expanded; (2) awarenessof the significance of TeleRep interaction and sharing of information and,hence, the importance of cubicle wall height for both easy communicationbetween work groups and some level of sound buffer, also applied in the pilot;


28/37

Obii* i | Provide Front-end product support to customers through accurate servic| Ujec ve: | problem dentification, Remote Call Assistance, and prompt escalation to

Process Owner: t&ece c.ll andllng ProcOwnj

Inputs' 11~IerviceRequests|npu8: I1 Outbound Service Alerts

KeyProcess Steps: , !y Obt.l Cu tomer.

^ -'^l Account nd )

f Verify ustomer ~sUtisfctloni d lose ]\^ nicrvcall y \

> \\ f PerformDetetme ny 1 f Aufist%o.ljw-up / . Selric

'^ reqnlrement p^ sjroces

IOutputs: I Hardware ervice call need identified, Software call need identified, ConfiI * t Account profile updated, Remote Call Assistance successfully completed

| Customer: | ^ustomer, Field Technicians, Analysts

se* Ince Call Record, Software Call Record, Remote CallI)ocumenc. | Assistance Solve Record, Account Profile updates

Benefits:QuarAy - Accuracy of information iven to customer (i.e., Casebase info.)Cost - Cost per telephone CallDelivery :Response to customer phone call

Figure 6

WORK PROCESS: SERVICE CALL HANDLING .3.1.1


29/37

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168 Science,Technology, HumanValues

(3) awareness hat he"smart ystem" or solving machine problems over the

phone was not being used in practice as it was designed to be, which wasaddressed n existing practice by soliciting more eedback from users and bya company-sponsored, month-long competition among users for the highestnumber of solves (solutions). The updated ystem was used in the pilot.

Issues that were not addressed n design meetings because the discussionof actual practice was put off for so long included he omission of knowledgein practice residing n the sequence of customer-TeleRep nteractions duringthe use of RCA. In the flowchart model of customer-TeleRep nteraction, hejuncture at which the TeleRep nitiated solving the machine problem on thephone is shown as a simple yes/no decision tree. However, in practice, muchskill in handling the customer was necessary to get them even to try to fixtheir own machine; n fact, many refused. Successful skills involved usingthe right language and tone along with holding out the potential that thecustomer's copier could be back up and running right away. Another tech-nique, useful if the caller's telephone was remote from the copier, wasinforming the customer hat the service call was being placed, as usual, andasking them to call back and cancel if the recommended steps solved the

problem. In all cases, judgment of the customer's mood, their kind ofbusiness, along with the level of difficulty of the problem required as muchskill and knowledge as knowing the various machine models, their typicalproblems, and the right recommendations for solving those problems,whether ound in the database and read from the screen in a manner o keepconversation lowing or recited from the TeleRep's memory. Such skills andknowledge were neither acknowledged by management nor taught n train-ing. The assumption was that TeleReps knew little and were dependent onthe smart system to accomplish such solves.12 Discussion of how TeleRepsactually solve machine problems over the phone would have revealed themistaken nature of such assumptions and would have shown the shortcom-ings of the smart system. Had this taken place early in the design process,less emphasis could have been put into trying to make the ill-suited, case-based smart ystem work, and more emphasis could have been put on trainingTeleReps in machine-problem-solving kills. Our IRL team's participationin the design and construction of training curriculum brought emphasis onlearning hrough practice with expert peers as tutors, facilitating some tacitknowledge transfer. However, the mind-set that credited the technologyrather han the worker did not change. It might have at least been challengedhad such practice-oriented iscussion taken place in the design meetings.

Another example of the results of ignoring practice was the destruction ofuseful resources because they were put on-line with no awareness of theiruse in practice. The inclination o have technicians simply put paper docu-


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ments on-line without understanding ow they are actually used in practice

is a common pitfall in the use of computer ystems. The particular xamplehere applies to supplies sales rather han service calls. Indiscriminate digi-talization of existing paper resources had resulted n the destruction of usefuldocuments such as the one used for floor (lowest allowed) prices in suppliessales. As a paper document, referred o as the hible, it had been individuallycustomized with highlighting and book-marking or often-used sections, andhandwritten margin notes for special cases and updates. Although nteractivetechnology was capable of incorporating uch functions, the document wasput on-line in a form that made it impossible for people to customize to theiruse, and it became a dead document. As a compilation of unused data, t wasa waste of technology and of a previously valuable resource. We were ableto address his issue in memos from the IRL eam during he pilot period, butit would have been preferable, however, if the importance of designingon-line documents o emulate their use in practice were discussed earlier nthe process with the whole team of designer-users. Although some attentionwas given later to which documents should be put on-line, when the techni-cians responsible for this task requested that our team give them a list of

documents to be digitalized, they expected that we would provide a yes/notype of list rather than an answer demonstrating awareness that how theinformation ontained n the paper document was used in practice matteredfor the format in which it should be made available electronically. Whenearlier use practice s not emulated, he assets of the original-such as speedof access facilitated by at-a-glance structure and location, and its custo-mizable flexibility-are lost.

Conclusion

The comparison of the two design cultures-industrial design engineeringpractice and this particular reengineering practice-reveals a contrast interms of flexibility and innovation.

The mechanical design engineers sketched o one another on scrap paperand in the margins of official drawings o convey meaning. The reengineerswere bound by predefined emplates and icons in their computer program.

Industrial design engineers did not followdesign

schoolprotocols

inpractice, preferring o work on different evels and different segments of thedesign simultaneously. The reengineers had to work using dictated steps,controlled by management-mandated tructure f the TQC process, deviationfrom which was quickly pointed out. The work was a lock-step hierarchicalprocess that stayed at a high level of abstraction o the extent that little time


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was left for the crucial details of work practice that could make or break the

project's effectiveness.The industrial design engineers used mixed electronic world and paper

world practices to create visual representations, choosing the format mostappropriate for a given context. The reengineers used only the computersoftware templates and, given the conventions of presentation and the de-mands of management, had no other choices.

Corporate management has created a myth that it is handing over crucialdecisions to empowered work groups, stepping aside so that workers canredesign their own work practice and its technical support. However, corpo-rate programs to ensure quality through uniformity of practice also ensurethat little innovation takes place. To its credit, this is not what managementis trying to do. It is trying to give guidance and structure. However, just likeTaylor's ideas that have come down to us through scientific management,what might have been a good idea to start with in one particular application,when reified and made into a formula, results in the loss of the creativeflexibility and of the innovative informal processes that are the cornerstonesof doing things well. The real dangers are less the software packages that

create concepts and visual representations of work than the assumptions thatone idea will work for every application and that the formalization of goodideas will produce standardized good work. Such reifications cause the lossof the necessary messy, informal detail and patched-together character of realwork and knowledge in practice that made them fit the situation in the firstplace. Streamlined and abstracted knowledge in executive summaries andprepackaged formats may serve the purposes of review for busy executives,but such standardization can result in slippage and misfit between plans,appropriate action, and anticipated outcomes.

Notes

1.See,for nstance, udwick 1976,1992),Mukerji 1984),Lynch 1985a,1985b,1988),Latour nd Woolgar 1979),Lynch ndWoolgar 1988a,1988b),Amann nd Knorr Cetina(1988),andKnorrCetina 1990).

2.SeeAllwood ndKalen 1994) orareview fthe iterature n he imitations fcomputerassisted esign CAD).

3. Star ndGriesemer 1989,393)defineboundary bjects s"objects hat rebothplasticenough oadapt o localneedsand onstraints f the several arties mploying hem, etrobustenough omaintain common dentity cross ites."

4. This was a team project n action esearch ponsored hrough heInstitute orResearchon Learning IRL) and funded by the unnamed orporation t whose site the study wasconducted.

5.All individual ndcompany ames re pseudonyms.


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6. Once the members of our team realized we would not be able to convey the crucialinformation we needed to get across to the design team because of the structure of the designmeeting format, we introduced a different nteractional tructure n the form of a workshop topresent our findings. However, this was an exception introduced by our presence, and was notpart of the usual process.

7. The use of slick corporate presentation lides is similar to the art history example ofAlberti (1404-1472), who had to present his arguments egarding he importance f perspectivein painting n Ciceronian hetoric, egardless of its inappropriateness or the subject, o be takenseriously by the Medici court, because such rhetoric was the respected mode of discourse of theday. Overhead slides presenting material n boxes, icons, and bullets is the Ciceronian rhetoricof today's corporate ulture.

8. Quality became the corporate fetish of the 1980s and 1990s, another by-product ofshrinking single company market shares due to increased nternational ompetition. In manysectors, the focus has been deemed the new battleground or corporate urvival and prosperity.Deming, originator f the concept and a U.S. citizen, found a receptive audience for his qualityphilosophy n the desperate economy of postwar Japan, his ideas having been rejected by thethen-booming U.S. business community. Declines in U.S. market shares due to Japanesecompetition n the 1970s brought renewed attention o Deming's ideas.

9. Marcia Porterfield, "The Quality Philosophy and One Corporation's nterpretation"(unpublished manuscript, n.d.).

10. This representation lso includes telemarketing hat was to be incorporated, lthough heNational Design Program Team was working on integration of supply marketing, customer

service support, and customer administration.11.This is an updated erm o include new support ystems to help customers ix their copiers

with database-supported dvice from TeleReps. CCA, the older system, is discussed earlier nthe field notes.

12. How such solves were actually accomplished s discussed in Vinkhuyzen and Whalen(1996) and Whalen and Henderson 1996).

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Kathryn Henderson earned her Ph.D. in sociology and M. EA. in art criticism at

University of California, San Diego. She is currently an assistant profe.vssorn sociologyat Texas A&M University College Station, TX 77843-4351). Her latest book is On Lineand on Paper: Visual Representations, isual Culture, and Computer Graphics n DesignEngineering MIT ress, 1998). She is currently writing about he use ofpaper documentsin computer-supported work and researching the actor networks of the grassrootssustainable building movement.

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