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Implementing retrospective episode-based payments in a multi-payer environment
May 23, 2014 Presentation Document
CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY Any use of this material without specific permission of McKinsey & Company is strictly prohibited
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Introduction to McKinsey and our experience
Introduction to McKinsey
Experience in payment innovation
▪ World’s leading management consulting firm, with >9,000 professionals in 102 offices worldwide
▪ Serve clients from strategy through implementation
▪ Not political organization in any way
▪ Serve six states directly and have had discussions and workshops in ~10 additional states to design and launch new payment models including episode based payment, Patient Centered Medical Homes, Accountable Care Organizations, Health Homes
▪ Experience designing and launching new payment models in private sector as well
▪ Significant direct investment in proprietary
capabilities including data management, advanced analytics, clinical (e.g., 150+ clinicians), statistics, actuarial, Medicaid member research, etc.
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Contents
▪ Refresher on the mechanics of retrospective episodes
▪ The case for retrospective episodes
▪ Select lessons learned
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The episode model is designed to reward coordinated, team-based, high-quality care for specific conditions or procedures
A provider “quarterback”, the Principal Accountable Provider (PAP), is designated as accountable for all pre-specified services across the episode (PAP is provider in best position to influence quality and cost of care)
Accountability
Coordinated, team-based care for all services related to a specific condition, procedure, or disability (e.g., pregnancy episode includes delivery as well as pre- and post-natal care for the mother)
The goal
High-quality, cost-efficient care is rewarded beyond current reimbursement, based on the PAP’s average cost and total quality of care across each episode
Incentives
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What is an episode? Hip & Knee Example. Services included
in the episode
Self-referral
Initial assess-ment by surgeon ▪Necessity of
procedure ▪Physical exam ▪Diagnostic
imaging
Referral by PCP
Preadmission work ▪Pre-work (e.g.,
blood, ECG) ▪Consultation
as necessary
Surgery (inpatient) ▪Procedure ▪ Implant ▪Post-op stay
IP recovery/ rehab ▪SNF/ IP rehab
No IP rehab ▪Physical
therapy ▪Home health
Readmission/ avoidable complication ▪DVT/ PEs ▪Revisions ▪ Infections ▪Hemorrhages
Surgery (outpatient) ▪Procedure ▪ Implant
Referral by other orthopod
0-90 days before surgery 30 -180 days after surgery Procedure
Sources of value
Ensure optimal recovery / rehab treatment
D
Minimize readmissions and complications
E
Tertiary sources of value: ▪ Reduce implant costs ▪ Optimize inpatient
length of stay
C
Reduce unnecessary or duplicate imaging/services
A
Use more cost efficient facilities
B
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Patients seek care and select providers as they do today
Providers submit claims as they do today
Payers reimburse for all services as they do today
1 2 3 Patients and providers continue to deliver care as they do today
Retrospective episode model mechanics for patients & providers
Calculate incentive payments based on outcomes after close of 12 month performance period
▪ PAPs may: ▪ Share savings: if
average costs below commendable levels and quality targets are met
▪ Pay part of excess cost: if average costs are above acceptable level
▪ See no change in pay: if average costs are between commendable and acceptable levels
Review claims from the performance period to identify a ‘Principal Accountable Provider’ (PAP) for each episode
4 5 6 Payers calculate average cost per episode for each PAP
Compare average costs to predetermined ‘commendable’ and ‘acceptable’ levels
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Each payer assesses historic provider average costs for each episode
Provider cost distribution Average episode cost per provider1
Average cost/episode $
Principal Accountable Provider
ILLUSTRATIVE
1 Each vertical bar represents the average cost for a provider, sorted from highest to lowest average cost
Cost per episode
Individual episodes for a single provider
Providers are sorted from highest to lowest average cost
Avg. cost per episode
Individual episodes for a single provider
Cost per episode
Avg. cost per episode
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Retrospective threshold model rewards providers for delivering cost-efficient, high-quality care
1 Each vertical bar represents the average cost for a provider, sorted from highest to lowest average cost
7 Provider cost distribution Average episode cost per provider1
Acceptable
Gain sharing limit
Commendable
Principal Accountable Provider
Average cost/episode $
Risk sharing Gain sharing Eligible for gain sharing based on cost, didn’t pass quality metrics
No change
Pay portion of excess costs
_ + No change in payment to providers
Eligible for incentive payment
Gain sharing Risk sharing
ILLUSTRATIVE
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Transparency and feedback is crucial to making payment reform work
Providers will receive several reports from payers:
▪ Summary – Overview: Total number of episodes
(included and excluded) – Risk adjusted average cost of care
compared to other providers – Quality and utilization metrics summary – Risk adjustment summary – Gain sharing and risk sharing eligibility
▪ Performance summary – Individual PAP cost distribution – Inputs to gain/risk sharing calculation
▪ Quality detail – Detailed benchmarks for quality metrics
across all providers ▪ Cost detail
– Breakdown of episode cost by care category
▪ Episode detail – Cost detail by care category for each
included episode – List of excluded episodes
Sample provider report
ILLUSTRATIVE
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Contents
▪ Refresher on the mechanics of retrospective episodes
▪ The case for retrospective episodes
▪ Select lessons learned
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Case for Retrospective Episode Based Payment
▪ Directly targets large, clear sources of value around unjustified variation in provider performance
▪ Potentially applicable to as much as 50-70% of healthcare spending
▪ Growing evidence it can be implemented at scale quickly at reasonable investment for payors and providers
▪ Potential to offer true win-win for payor and accountable provider
▪ Evidence it can and does motivate provider behavior change, potentially more quickly than other payment models
▪ Growing competitive requirement, but with opportunity for competitive advantage
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Potential for improvement: Sources of value
Primary prevention and early detection
Choice of tests, treatment, and setting of care
Efficient and effective delivery of each clinical encounter
Care coordination and treatment adherence
▪Behavioral health risks (e.g., smoking, poor diet, sedentary lifestyle, etc.) ▪Delayed detection
contributing to increased severity and preventable complications
▪Overuse or misuse of diagnostics ▪Use of medically
unnecessary care ▪Use of higher-cost
setting of care where not indicated
▪Medical errors ▪Clinicians practicing
below top of license ▪High fixed costs due
to excess capacity ▪High fixed costs due
to sub-scale ▪Use of branded
drugs instead of generic equivalents ▪Use of medical
devices ill-matched to patient needs
▪Poor treatment compliance ▪Missed follow-up
care leading to preventable complications ▪ Ineffective
transitions of care ▪Misaligned treatment
guidance among providers
Root causes of inefficiency, poor clinical outcomes and patient experiences
Pop’n based approaches Episodes and
pop’n based approaches
Addressed by payment model :
Episodes
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189% 192% 368%
Difference in cost between the 10th and 90th percentile providers
Average cost per episode varies significantly across providers
Distribution in average total cost per episode, by provider
Each bar represents the average total cost per episode for 3-5 providers with similar costs (performing surgeons for a cholecystectomy, delivering providers for a birth, and facilities for an acute asthma exacerbation). Total costs include all relevant professional, facility, and other inpatient and outpatient claims. Patients with meaningful co-morbidities or risk factors are excluded or risk-adjusted. Outlier (high cost) episodes were also removed.
Cholecystectomy Gallbladder removal plus 90 days
U.S. State A
Pregnancy/delivery Prenatal care through 2 mo. post birth
U.S. State B
Acute asthma exacerbation Hospital visit plus 1 mo. post discharge
U.S. State C
▪ % of cases done in inpatient setting varies from 0% to 20%
▪ >400% variation in hospital length of stay
▪ >500% variation in imaging and diagnostic costs
▪ C-section rate varies from 20% to 70%
▪ Rate of admission from the ER varies from 0% to 100%
▪ >400% variation in rate of repeat visit to ER or hospital (within 30 days of discharge)
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Perinatal care, practice pattern variation PRELIMINARY
SOURCE: TennCare, trigger dates during 2012
1 Excludes unknown providers (3914 episodes) 2 Excludes 139 episodes with over 20 ultrasounds an episode 3 No other exclusions applied (except unknown providers (3914 episodes) were removed) 4 Ultrasounds claims were counted if they were performed on different days
Average C-section rate per quarterback – Quarterback C-section rate distribution: Perinatal
n = 33,606 episodes, 488 quarterbacks1
High-volume quarterback Low-volume quarterback
Distribution of ultrasounds – Variation in ultrasounds per episode: Perinatal
n = 33,467 episodes2, 488 quarterbacks3
4747871101281692443183815165457429151,3321,9192,776
4,2435,757
6,692
4,681
1,818
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
# of ultrasounds/episode Count
Count of episodes4
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
020406080
100
Quarterbacks
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Contents
▪ Refresher on the mechanics of retrospective episodes
▪ The case for retrospective episodes
▪ Select lessons learned
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New payment models must meet 8 requirements to drive cost-reducing innovations
Significant
Supportive
Sustainable
Striving but practical
Synch with consumers
re-Set expectations and align payment
at Scale
Stable
Champion innovation with information, insights, and infrastructure
Ensure that providers that adapt thrive financially
Design the new approach so that it is effective in current regulatory, legal, and industry structures
Clarify long-term vision and make a long-term commitment to providers
Align payment with benefits, network design, and consumer engagement
Maximize the proportion of provider revenue and earnings that are subject to outcomes-based payment
Ensure that a critical mass of providers transition to outcomes-based reimbursement
Create clear roles for Component Providers, Healers, and Partners; pay through a mix of enhanced fee-for-service, episode-based, and population-based payments
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Ingredients for state-led large-scale improvements to healthcare systems
Clear and repeated “case for change” ▪ Healthcare cost growth and “waste” hurt economic growth ▪ Stakeholders, irrespective of all politics or role, increasingly
agree that “paying for outcomes” is positive and required ▪ States have opportunity to lead the innovation
1
Executive leadership ▪ Power of inevitability (i.e., not debating “if”, but “how”) ▪ State as “convener” and “leader” vs. “prescriber” ▪ Active leadership/involvement of Governor, Medicaid Director,
agency heads, and ultimately CEOs of large stakeholders
2
Stakeholder engagement ▪ Appreciation for sensitivity around payment models ▪ Everyone needs potential to benefit ▪ Power of objective facts and open dialogue ▪ Seeking and incorporating stakeholder feedback
3
▪ Several states have made significant progress in last 3-5 years
▪ Dozens of private sector initiatives
▪ Multiple global examples
▪ Many more failures than successes
Evidence
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Payment Innovation showing positive impact in Medicaid
Provider engagement and growing acceptance
Changes in provider behavior
Performance improvement
▪ Thousands of clinicians and administrators engaged in design process
▪ Provider assessment of performance - both cost and quality
▪ Growing support/acceptance from many (but not all) larger hospitals/health systems and special needs providers
▪ Examples of “at scale” contracting and/or enrollment in programs
▪ Deeper understanding of economic implications of clinical decisions within control
▪ Explicit acknowledgement of changes in treatment patterns
▪ Investments in care coordination and infrastructure
▪ Greater openness to sharing performance risk
▪ Improvements quality (e.g., reduction in antibiotic use, alignment with guidelines)
▪ Reduction in episode specific costs
▪ Mitigation of overall trend
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Early signs of success from Arkansas episodes
Taking the Payment Improvement Initiative to heart (Apr 2014) Cardiologist David Rutlen and UAMS team make changes in the best way to care for their patient “The approach was to see "what exactly do we need to know to take care of the patient?" Rutlen said. The result was a "sea change," impacting not just its Medicaid patients but all heart patients seen at the medical center.” Better health care, lower cost. (Apr 2014) Arkansas's Payment Improvement Initiative shows it can be done “…since the PII began to provide doctors with information on their peers' costs and outcomes in the treatment of upper respiratory infection, the prescribing of antibiotics to treat a common cold has fallen more than 10 percent. The number of doctors that prescribed two courses of antibiotics has fallen by 40 to 50 percent, Golden said.”
SOURCE: http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/taking-the-payment-improvement-initiative-to-heart/Content?oid=3257813 http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/better-health-care-lower-cost/Content?oid=3257807