Web view · 2016-09-23M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair & Anr. v. State of Kerala & Ors ... (b)....

5TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

TARKA SASTRA, 2015

IN THE HON’BLE

SUPREME COURT OF GOD’S ISLAND

IN THE MATTER OF

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SLP NO. ___ OF 2015

MRIGA APPELLANT

V. STATE OF LEOLAND RESPONDENT NO. 1

AND

WRIT JURISDICTION

W.P. (CIVIL) NO. ___ OF 2015

PUBLIC INTEREST BODIES & RELIGIOUS BODIES PETITIONER

V.

UNION OF GOD’S ISLAND RESPONDENT NO. 2

PETITIONS U/ARTS. 136 & 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF GOD’S ISLAND, 1950

ii5TH NATIONAL TARKA SASTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENT P.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS v

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES vii

I. CASE LAW vii

II. LEGISLATIONS ix

III. JOURNALS ix

IV. COMMENTARIES ix

V. LEXICONS x

VI. WEBSITES x

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ISSUES RAISED

3

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 4

WRITTEN PLEADINGS 6

I. WHETHER THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE COLONIAL

GOVERNMENT OF THE DARK ISLES AND MRIGA, IN 1898, IS BINDING

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENTS

iii5TH NATIONAL TARKA SASTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015

UPON THE UNION OF GOD’S ISLAND. 6

[1.1] REPUDIATION OF THE AGREEMENT: AGREEMENT CEASES TO BE

IN FORCE 7

[1.2] BAR TO INTERFERENCE: ART. 363 IS APPLICABLE 8

II. WHETHER THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION

OF GOD’S ISLAND, 1950 IS VALID. 9

[2.1] PROCEDURAL CONFORMITY: PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY ART. 368

HAS BEEN STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH 10

[2.2] DOCTRINE OF BASIC STRUCTURE: AMENDMENT HAS NOT

DESTROYED OR DAMAGED THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE

CONSTITUTION

11

[2.3] RETROSPECTIVITY: RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE AMENDMENT

IS VALID 12

III. WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATION OF LEOLAND CONCERNING THE

TAKEOVER AND COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE DEER TEMPLE

ESTABLISHMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 13

[3.1] LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE: STATE LEGISLATURE HAS THE POWER TO

ENACT 14

[3.2] FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: NO VIOLATION OF PART III

16

[3.3] PUBLIC INTEREST: LEGISLATION IS IN CONSONANCE WITH


iv5TH NATIONAL TARKA SASTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015

CONSTITUTIONAL IDEALS 18

IV. WHETHER THE DEER TEMPLE PROPERTY CAN BE USED TO REDRESS

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS CAUSED BY THE LEOLAND LIQUOR CORPORATION. 18

[4.1] INADMISSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION OF NEW ISSUES AT APPEAL STAGE

IS NOT PERMISSIBLE 19

[4.2] ESSENTIALS OF RELIGION: PROHIBITION OF LIQUOR IS NOT AN

ESSENTIAL PART OF THE RELIGION IN QUESTION 19

[4.3] HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION: BALANCE HAS BEEN STRUCK

BETWEEN PARTS III & IV 20

V. WHETHER THE OFFICIALS IN THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF LEOLAND

CAN BE HELD GUILTY OF COMMITTING ANY OFFENCE UNDER THE

GOD’S ISLAND PENAL CODE, 1860 FOR THE RESTRUCTURING OF

PROPERTY AND THE CONVERSION OF IDOLS. 21

[5.1] JURISDICTION: LACK OF JURISDICTION TO TRY A CRIMINAL OFFENCE 22

[5.2] PROCEDURAL CONFORMITY: REQUISITE PROCEDURE HAS NOT BEEN

COMPLIED WITH 23

[5.3] NO CRIME COMMITTED: RESTRUCTURING OF PROPERTY & CONVERSION

OF IDOLS IS NOT A PENAL OFFENCE 24

[5.4] GENERAL EXCEPTIONS: GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE IMMUNE FROM

PUNISHMENT 25

PRAYER 26


v5TH NATIONAL TARKA SASTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

§. Section

§§. Sections

¶ Paragraph Number

¶¶ Paragraphs Numbers

& And

AIR All India Reporter

All Allahabad High Court

Anr. Another

Art. Article

Arts. Articles

GPC, 1860 The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860

The Constitution The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950

Co. Company

Cr.P.C., 1973 The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

ed. Edition


vi5TH NATIONAL TARKA SASTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015

etc. Etcetera

HC High Court

Hon’ble Honourable

H.R.E./H.R. & E. Dept. Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Department

i.e. id est (Latin)

LLC Leoland Liquor Corporation

Ltd. Limited

M/s. Messrs.

No. Number

Ors. Others

P&H Punjab & Haryana High Court

p. Page Number

Pat Patna High Court

pp. Page Numbers

r/w. Read With

S/d Signed

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

S. No. Serial Number

U/§. Under Section

U/§§. Under Sections

U/Art. Under Article

U/Arts. Under Articles

v. Versus

Vol. Volume

Vols. Volumes


vii5TH NATIONAL TARKA SASTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

I. CASE LAW

S. NO. CASE TITLE CITATION PP.

1. Amalgamated Electricity Co. v. Municipal Committee AIR 1969 SC 227 (234) 15

2. Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1 16

3. Bachan Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898 18

4. Balraj v. State of Punjab AIR 1989 P&H 273 (¶ 13) 15

5. Brahmachari v. State of West Bengal AIR 1995 SC 2089 16

6. Commissioner of H.R.E. v. Sri Lakshmindra Ajmer Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt AIR 1954 SC 282 (288) 15

7. Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta & Anr. AIR 1984 SC 512 20

8. Dharam Dutt & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 2004 SC 1295 14

9. Durgah Committee v. Syed Hussain Ali AIR 1961 SC 1402 20

10. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643 13


viii5TH NATIONAL TARKA SASTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015

11. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299 (¶¶ 680, 682) 11

12. Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni & Ors. v. The State of Madras & Ors. AIR 1960 SC 1080 17

13. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 11, 12

14. Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 2517 23

15. Kunwar Sri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 1946 8

16. M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair & Anr. v. State of Kerala & Ors. AIR 2005 SC 3053 12

17. M/s. Punjab Tin Supply Co. v. The Central Government & Ors. AIR 1984 SC 87 13, 17

18. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India AIR 2015 SC 1517 10

19. Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 953 7

20. Mangtulal v. Radha Shyam AIR 1953 Pat 14 (20) 16

21. Minerva Mills v. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789 (¶ 31) 11, 20

22. Motilal v. State AIR 1952 All 963 (964) 7

23.Municipal Corporation of the City of

Ahmedabad & Ors. v. Jan Mohammed Usmanbhai & Anr.

AIR 1986 SC 1205 18

24. N.K. Bajpai v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 2012 SC 1210 (¶ 14) 16

25. Narendra Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 1995 SC 519 21

26. Public Service Tribunal Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2003 SC 1115 14

27. Raghunath Rao v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 1267 10

28. S.I. Corporation v. Board of Revenue AIR 1964 SC 207 (215) 7

29. S.P. Mittal v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 1 (¶ 37) 17

30. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1918 12

31. Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1965 SC 845 13

32. Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India AIR 1951 SC 458 13


ix5TH NATIONAL TARKA SASTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015

33. Smt. Chander Kali Bail v. Jagdish Singh Thakur AIR 1977 SC 2262 19

34. Sri Kanyaka P.A.S. Committee v. Commissioner H.R. & E. Dept. AIR 1999 SC 3567 16

35. State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Venugopal AIR 1964 SC 33 25

36. State of Bijar v. Kameshwar Singh AIR 1952 SC 252 18

37. State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch and Co. AIR 1966 SC 365 16

38. State of Seraikella v. Union of India AIR 1951 SC 253 (258) 8

39. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1990 SC 1927 14

40. Union of India v. Prince Muffakam Jah & Ors. AIR 1995 SC 227 8

41. Waman Rao v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 271 (¶ 15) 11

II. LEGISLATIONS

S. NO. TITLE OF LEGISLATION PP.

1. The Constitution of India, 1950 Passim

2. The General Clauses Act, 1897 6, 21

3. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 21-25

4. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 21-25

5. The Indian Independence Act, 1947 7

III. JOURNALS

S. NO. TITLE OF JOURNAL PP.

1. All India Reporter (AIR) Passim

2. Supreme Court Cases (SCC) Passim


x5TH NATIONAL TARKA SASTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015

IV. COMMENTARIES

S. NO. AUTHOR TITLE EDITION PP.

1. M.V. Pylee Constitutional Amendments in India

3rd ed. 2010 10

2. Arvind P. Datar

Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol. II

22nd ed. reprint 2010

10

3. Durga Das Basu Shorter Constitution of India

13th ed. reprint 2006

Passim

4. Durga Das Basu

Case Book on Indian Constitutional Law

2nd ed. 2007 Passim

5. Durga Das Basu

Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol. II

8th ed. 2007 Passim

6. Durga Das Basu

Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol. VIII 8th ed. 2011 Passim

7. Durga Das Basu

Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol. X

8th ed. 2012 Passim

8. V.N. Shukla Constitution of India 12th ed. 2013 Passim

9. P.S.A. Pillai Criminal Law 12th ed. 2014 Passim

10. Hari Singh Gour

The Penal Law of India 11th

ed.1998 24

11. Peter Murphy Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2003 25

V. LEXICONS

S. NO. AUTHOR TITLE EDITION PP.

1. Henry Campbell Black Black’s Law Dictionary 4th ed. revised 1968 Passim

2. P. Ramanatha Aiyar Concise Law Dictionary 3rd ed. reprint 2007 15

VI. W EBSITES

S. NO. WEBSITE LINK PP.

1. w ww.scconline.in Passim


http://www.scconline.in/

xi5TH NATIONAL TARKA SASTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015

2. www.manupatra.com Passim

3. www.judis.nic.in Passim

4. www.indiankanoon.org Passim

5. www.legalserviceindia.com Passim

6. www.thelawdictionary.org Passim

7. www.oxforddictionaries.com Passim


http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/

http://www.thelawdictionary.org/

http://www.legalserviceindia.com/

http://www.indiankanoon.org/

http://www.judis.nic.in/

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Appellants herein have approached the Supreme Court of God’s Island through:

1. Appellant: A Special Leave Petition U/Art. 136 of The Constitution of God’s Island,

1950.

2. Petitioner: A Writ Petition U/Art. 32 of The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950.

The petitions have been clubbed together and the Supreme Court has admitted the petitions as

maintainable. The Respondent humbly submits to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.

This Memorandum sets forth the facts, laws and the corresponding arguments on which

the claims are based in the instant case. The Respondents affirm that they shall accept any

Judgement of this Hon’ble Court as final and binding upon itself and shall execute it in its

entirety and in good faith.

[Each of the parties to the pending dispute before this Hon’ble Court may be referred to

individually as either ‘Appellant’, ‘Petitioner’, ‘Respondent No. 1’ or ‘Respondent No. 2’ as the

case may be. For the sake of convenience, they may be collectively referred to as ‘the

Appellants’ (representing the Appellant & the Petitioner) or ‘the Respondents’ (representing

Respondent No. 1 & Respondent No. 2).]


STATEMENT OF FACTS

For the sake of brevity, the material facts are placed herewith in the

chronological order:

1. God’s Island, now an independent and secular country, was conquered

by the Dark Islanders in 1700 A.D. Deer’s Cave, belonging to a

religious denominational sect named Mriga, situated in the State of

Leoland, contained a hoard of antique material riches. Unsuccessful attempts to take

over the property by the Colonial Rulers resulted in an Agreement with Mriga to

safeguard Mriga’s rights over the Deer Temple.

2. In 2011, God’s Island faced a huge financial crisis caused by the Leoland Liquor

Corporation. Several people employed in charitable institutions run by the Corporation

lost their livelihood. Subsequently, based on a re-discovery by the National Bureau of

Ancient Antiquities the State Legislature of Leoland enacted a Legislation to enable

complete control and takeover of the Deer Temple establishment.

3. A writ petition filed by Mriga before the High Court of Leoland challenging the

Legislation was dismissed. Simultaneously, the High Court remanded to trial a certain

issue regarding the criminality of actions of the Government Officials. Aggrieved by the

dismissal, Mriga appealed to the Supreme Court of God’s Island.

4. During the time when the judgement was being considered by the Supreme Court, the

Union of God’s Island passed an Amendment to Art. 26 of The Constitution.

Consequently, various other religious denominations and public interest bodies also filed

petitions challenging the Amendment.


5. The petitions were clubbed to be heard together. The matter was posted for final hearing

before a Constitutional Bench on the 20th of September, 2015.

ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE [I]

WHETHER THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT OF THE

DARK ISLES AND MRIGA, IN 1898, IS BINDING UPON THE UNION OF GOD’S ISLAND.

ISSUE [II]

WHETHER THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF GOD’S ISLAND, 1950 IS

VALID.

ISSUE [III]

WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATION OF LEOLAND CONCERNING THE TAKEOVER AND

COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE DEER TEMPLE ESTABLISHMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

ISSUE [IV]

WHETHER THE DEER TEMPLE PROPERTY CAN BE USED TO REDRESS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

CAUSED BY THE LEOLAND LIQUOR CORPORATION.

ISSUE [V]


WHETHER THE OFFICIALS IN THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF LEOLAND CAN BE HELD GUILTY OF

COMMITTING ANY OFFENCE UNDER THE GOD’S ISLAND PENAL CODE, 1860 FOR THE

RESTRUCTURING OF PROPERTY AND THE CONVERSION OF IDOLS.

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

______________________________________________________________________________

[I] WHETHER THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT

OF THE DARK ISLES AND MRIGA, IN 1898, IS BINDING UPON THE UNION OF GOD’S ISLAND.

______________________________________________________________________________

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Agreement continues in validity after

the commencement of The Constitution by the joint application of §.7 of the God’s Island

Independence Act, 1947 and Art. 372 of The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950. Furthermore,

the application of Art. 363 is not attracted owing to the nature of the parties to the Agreement.

______________________________________________________________________________

[II] WHETHER THE AMENDMENT TO ART. 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF GOD’S ISLAND,

1950 IS VALID.

______________________________________________________________________________

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Amendment to Art. 26 of The

Constitution of God’s Island, 1950 is valid in law. The procedural compliance U/Art. 368 has

been strictly adhered to and the Amendment passes the test of Basic Structure which is the

touchstone of validity of a Constitutional Amendment. Furthermore, there is no bar to the

retrospective application of the Amendment.

______________________________________________________________________________


[III] WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATION OF LEOLAND CONCERNING THE TAKEOVER AND


______________________________________________________________________________

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the State legislation of Leoland concerning

the takeover and complete control of the Deer Temple establishment is constitutional. Legislative

competence of the State Legislature to enact in the subject-matter of the Legislation is enshrined

in the List III to the Seventh Schedule of The Constitution. Furthermore, there has been no

violation of Part III or any other provision of the The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950.

______________________________________________________________________________

[IV] WHETHER THE DEER TEMPLE PROPERTY CAN BE USED TO REDRESS THE FINANCIAL

CRISIS CAUSED BY THE LEOLAND LIQUOR CORPORATION.

______________________________________________________________________________

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Deer Temple property can be used to

cure the financial crisis of the Leoland Liquor Corporation as the prohibition of liquor is not an

‘essential’ part of the religion in question and the principle of Harmonious Construction has been

employed in striking a balance between Parts III & IV of The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950.

______________________________________________________________________________

[V] WHETHER THE OFFICIALS IN THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF LEOLAND CAN BE HELD

GUILTY OF COMMITTING ANY OFFENCE UNDER THE GOD’S ISLAND PENAL CODE, 1860

FOR THE RESTRUCTURING OF PROPERTY AND THE CONVERSION OF IDOLS.

______________________________________________________________________________

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Officials in the State Government

cannot be held guilty of committing any penal offence under The God’s Island Penal Code,


1860. The reasoning follows that this Hon’ble Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain

the issue relating to the penal offence and also that the requisite procedure under The Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 has not been complied with.

WRITTEN PLEADINGS

______________________________________________________________________________

[I] WHETHER THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT

OF THE DARK ISLES AND MRIGA, IN 1898, IS BINDING UPON THE UNION OF GOD’S ISLAND.

______________________________________________________________________________

It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the Agreement entered into between the

Colonial Government of the Dark Isles (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Colonial Rulers’)1 and

Mriga, the Denominational Sect (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Appellant’)2 on 17.08.18983

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Agreement’) is not binding upon the Union of God’s Island

(hereinafter referred to as ‘Respondent No. 2’)4 and therefore not binding on the State of Leoland

(hereinafter referred to as ‘Respondent No. 1’)5.

In order to prove that the Agreement is not binding, the following must be considered:

i. that the Agreement ceases to be binding owing to repudiation by the appropriate

authority; and [1.1]

1 Moot Proposition, p. 2, ¶ 22 Memorandum For The Respondents, p. i, Cause Title3 Moot Proposition, p. 3, ¶ 64 Memorandum For The Respondents, p. i, Cause Title5 Memorandum For The Respondents, p. i, Cause Title


ii. that the present case attracts Art. 363 of The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950

(hereinafter referred to as ‘The Constitution’6).7 [1.2]

[1.1] REPUDIATION OF THE AGREEMENT : AGREEMENT CEASES TO BE IN FORCE

The Respondents most respectfully submit that the Agreement is not valid at the present

date as it has been repudiated or revoked by the appropriate authority. Repudiation is required to

make the Agreement cease in its application by virtue of the following:

a. that the Agreement is not valid by virtue of §. 7(b) of the God’s Island Independence

Act, 1947 enacted by the Colonial Rulers; and 8 [1.1.1]

b. that the Agreement is not valid under Art. 372(1) of The Constitution.9 [1.1.2]

1.1.1: AGREEMENT IS NOT VALID BY VIRTUE OF §. 7(B)

The Agreement is not valid by virtue of §. 7(b). This clause prescribes that the

suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties,

agreements, obligations, powers, rights etc. in force at the date of the passing of this Act

between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, also lapses. Thus, the Agreement in

the present case has been lapsed and is not valid now.

1.1.2: AGREEMENT IS NOT VALID UNDER ART. 372(1)

The object of Art. 372(1) is to sanction the continuance of the existing laws until

they are repealed or amended by a competent authority under the new Constitution.10 At

the outset, an agreement does not come under the definition of ‘law’ provided in Art.

13(3)(a). An agreement rests solely on the consent of the parties; it is entirely contractual

6 §. 3(15). “Constitution’. The General Clauses act, 18977 Art. 363. “Bar to interference by courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements, etc .” The Constitution of God’s Island, 19508 §. 7. “Consequences of the setting up of the new Dominions”. God’s Island Independence Act, 19479 Art. 372. “Continuance in force of existing laws and their adaptation”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 195010 S.I. Corporation v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1964 SC 207 (215); See also Motilal v. State, AIR 1952 All 963 (964)


in nature and is not law, because it has none of the characteristics of law.11 Therefore the

above provision does not apply in the present case.

[1.2] BAR TO INTERFERENCE : ART. 363 IS APPLICABLE

It is most respectfully submitted that Art. 363 bars the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

and all other courts to entertain a dispute arising out of any treaty, agreement, etc. which was

entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution between the Rulers of

Indian State and the Government of India.

In order that the bar under Art. 363(1) is to apply, there are three conditions to be

fulfilled:12

i. That such instrument should have been executed before The Constitution came into

force, [1.2.1]

ii. That such instrument is in operation after The Constitution came into force, [1.2.2]

iii. That the dispute which is the subject-matter of the litigation may arise before or after.

[1.2.3]

1.2.1: THE AGREEMENT WAS EXECUTED PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE

CONSTITUTION

The alien rulers entered into an Agreement with the Appellant on 17.08.1898 which

mandated legal recognition and respect for the tradition and lineal rights and relating to the

management and daily administration of the temple and its properties13 and the same was

11 Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 95312 State of Seraikella v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 253 (258); See also Union of India v. Prince Muffakam Jah and others interveners, AIR 1995 SC 227; Kunwar Sri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 194613 Moot Proposition, p. 3, ¶ 6


recognised by the King of the Dark Isles in 1901.14 Therefore, it is clear that the Agreement

was entered into and recognized before the commencement of The Constitution.

1.2.2: AGREEMENT CONTINUES IN OPERATION AFTER COMMENCEMENT

The Agreement which was entered into prior to the commencement of The Constitution

has continued in operation after such commencement, owing to the continuous possession of

the temple property by the Appellant.

1.2.3: DISPUTE AROSE AFTER COMMENCEMENT

Art. 363 also provides that the dispute concerning the Agreement may arise before or

after the commencement of The Constitution. In the present case, the dispute having arisen

after the commencement, it is valid.

____________________________________________________________________________

[II] WHETHER THE AMENDMENT TO ART. 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1950 IS VALID.

______________________________________________________________________________

It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the Amendment to Art. 2615 of The

Constitution is valid in law. In the present instance, the Amendment to Art. 26 is in conformity

with the ideals of The Constitution and upholds the principle of Secularism.16

14 Moot Proposition, p. 3, ¶ 715 Art. 26. “Freedom to manage religious affairs”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 195016 “SECULAR”, inserted by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. Preamble to the Constitution of God’s Island, 1950


The power of the Parliament to amend The Constitution is derived from Arts. 245,17 24618 &

24819 r/w. item 97 in List I, i.e. the Union List.20 The residuary power of the Parliament can

certainly take in the power to amend The Constitution.21 Art. 36822 is the principal provision that

confers upon the Parliament the wide power of Amendment.

To examine the validity of the Amendment, the Court should not concern itself with the

wisdom behind or the propriety of the Constitutional Amendment but rather with the compliance

of the following rules: 23

i. that the procedure prescribed by Art. 368 of The Constitution has been strictly complied

with; and [2.1]

ii. that the amendment has not destroyed or damaged the basic structure or the essential

features of The Constitution.24 [2.2]

It is also important to establish that there is no bar to the retrospective effect given to the

Amendment [2.3].

[2.1] PROCEDURAL CONFORMITY : THE PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY ART. 368 HAS BEEN

STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH

17 Art. 245. “Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 195018 Art. 246. “Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and the Legislatures of States”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 195019 Art. 248. “Residuary powers of Legislation”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 195020 Schedule VII, List I - Union List. Entry 97. “Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including fees taken in any court”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 195021 M.V. Pylee, Constitutional Amendments in India, 3rd ed. 201022 Art. 368. “Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure thereof”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 195023 Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 151724 Raghunath Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1267; See also Arvind P. Datar, Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol. II (2nd ed. reprint 2010)


It is most respectfully submitted that the procedure prescribed by Art. 368 has been strictly

complied with. For the purposes of an Amendment U/Art. 368, the provisions of The

Constitution fall under two categories:

(i) Art. 368(2) prescribes that an amendment can be effected by a special majority, i.e., a

majority of the total membership of each House of Parliament as well as by a majority of

not less than 2/3rds of the members of that House present and voting.

(ii) The proviso to Art. 368(2) prescribes a condition for five types of amendment wherein a

ratification of not less than one half of the State Legislatures is required.

In the present case, though the Amendment to Art. 26 is one that falls under the former

category and not the latter, the ratification of the Amendment by all the State Legislatures is in

furtherance of their approval of the Amendment to The Constitution.25 Therefore, no doubt can

be raised as to the validity of the Amendment where the additional procedural step of ratification

has been followed.

[2.2] DOCTRINE OF BASIC STRUCTURE : THE AMENDMENT HAS NOT DESTROYED OR

DAMAGED THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTION

It is most respectfully submitted that there has been no violation of the Doctrine of Basic

Structure in the present case. The Basic Structure or Features of The Constitution constitute the

unalterable part of The Constitution. In the present context, the scope of the Doctrine of Basic

Structure under Part III26 is to be examined. The present position as to the amenability of

Fundamental Rights is that:

(i) Fundamental Rights, as a class, are not immune from amendment.27

25 Moot Proposition, p. 5, ¶ 19 26 Part III. Fundamental Rights. The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950.27 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461


(ii) But the principle of equality in Art. 1428 as well as the ‘essence’ of other fundamental

rights in Part III cannot be amended because these form part of the basic structure of The

Constitution.29

In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,30 it was held that the Parliament may amend the

Fundamental Rights provided the basic foundation and structure of The Constitution remains

unaltered.

In the present case, Art. 26, a fundamental right, prior to the Amendment only provided

rights to the religious denominations with respect to managing its own affairs and administering

its property. Though reasonable restrictions were placed on these rights through the words

“public order, morality and health”, there was lack of an express provision providing for a

Government action to remedy the situation of violation of the reasonable restriction. Therefore,

such an Amendment does not affect the basic structure but merely effects changes by adding the

necessary detail of Government action in case of violation of reasonable restriction.

God’s Island is a secular country. Secularism has been inserted in the Preamble by reason of

The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976. The object of inserting the said word

was to expressly spell out the high ideas of secularism and the integrity of the nation on the

ground that these institutions are subjected to considerable stresses and strains and vested

interests have been trying to promote their selfish ends to the great detriment of the public

good.31

28 Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299 (¶¶. 680, 682); See also Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789 (¶ 31)29 Waman Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 271 (¶ 15)30 AIR 1973 SC 1461 (769)31 M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair & Anr. v. State of Kerala & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 3053; See also S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918


[2.3] RETROSPECTIVITY : THE RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE AMENDMENT IS

VALID

It is most respectfully submitted that the retrospective application of the Amendment to

the State Legislation is valid. Parliament has given retrospective effect to the working of the

Amendment to Art. 26 in order to clarify certain details regarding the rights and obligations of

the Respondents and the Appellants respectively, while upholding the State Legislation that

permitted the takeover and control of the Deer Temple property. Since the constituent power is

plenary (subject to the Doctrine of Basic Structure) and there is no provision barring

retrospective amendment of The Constitution, an amendment of The Constitution can be given

retrospective effect.32

The retrospective effect may be given where there are express words or where the

language used necessarily implies that such retrospective operation is intended. Hence the

question of whether a statutory provision has retrospective effect or not depends primarily on the

language in which it is couched.33 In the present case, this requirement has also been complied

with which can be understood by virtue of the wording of the Amendment, which clearly states:

“... shall be deemed to have always possessed every right and means to pass a law...”34

In light of the above, it is humbly submitted that in the instant matter, the Respondents

have followed the requisite procedure for the amendment and have not violated the Basic

Structure of The Constitution and the retrospective application of the amendment is valid.

______________________________________________________________________________

32 Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458; See also Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845; Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 164333 M/S Punjab Tin Supply Co. v. The Central Government & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 8734 Moot Proposition, p. 5, ¶ 18


[III] WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATION OF LEOLAND CONCERNING THE TAKEOVER AND


______________________________________________________________________________

It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the State Legislation of Leoland

(hereinafter referred to as ‘State Legislation’) concerning the takeover and complete control of

the Deer Temple establishment is constitutional.

It is a well-settled rule that while dealing with a challenge to the Constitutional validity of

any legislation, the Court should prima facie lean in favour of Constitutionality and should

support the legislation and it is the party who attacks the validity of the legislation to place all

materials before the Court to make out a case for invalidating it.35

In order to determine the validity of the State Legislation, on the subject of the takeover and

control of the Deer Shrine property, it is important to consider the following:

i. the legislative competence as defined and specified in Part XI, Chapter I of The

Constitution,36 [3.1] and

ii. the effect of the legislation on fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III and any other

constitutional provision.37 [3.2]

It is also relevant to note that the reasoning for the enactment of the legislation is in

consonance with the Constitutional ideals of promoting public interest. [3.3]

[3.1] LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE : STATE LEGISLATURE DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER TO

ENACT

35 Dharam Dutt & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 129536 Part XI. “Relations between the Union and the States”, Chapter I. “Legislatives Relations”, The Constitution of God’s Island, 195037 Public Service Tribunal Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2003 SC 1115


Respondent No. 1 most humbly submits that in order for a legislation to survive the test

of Constitutionality, the enacting body which in the present case is the State Legislature, must

have the required legislative competency to enact such legislation. The word ‘sovereign’ means

that the State has power to legislate on any subject in conformity with Constitutional

limitations.38 Art. 246 of The Constitution deals with the distribution of legislative powers as

between the Union and the State Legislatures. The Article gives concurrent power to the Union

and State with respect to the Entries enumerated in List III, 39 [3.1.1] and a law enacted by the

State with respect to List III shall be valid unless it is repugnant to a law made by the Union. 40

[3.1.2].

3.1.1: CONCURRENT POWER TO THE UNION AND STATE WITH RESPECT TO THE

ENTRIES ENUMERATED IN LIST III

Art. 246(2) warrants the State Legislature to enact legislations with respect to the

entries listed under List III, along with the Union Legislature. Entry 42 of the List, which

reads ‘Acquisition and Requisition of Property’, entitles the State to pass a law with

respect to that field. The Supreme Court, holding that the word ‘property’ should be

given a wide and liberal connotation, extended it to all kinds of property.41 No implied

restriction such as the existence of a public purpose or an obligation to pay compensation

can be read into this entry, which is a mere legislative head.42 Therefore enacting

legislation for the takeover and complete control relating to the temple establishment

would fall well within the ambit of Entry 42. 43

38 Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 192739 Concurrent List, Seventh Schedule, The Constitution of God’s Island, 195040 Amalgamated Electricity Co. v. Municipal Committee, Ajmer, AIR 1969 SC 227 (234)41 Commissioner of H.R.E. v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282 (288)42 Balraj v. State of Punjab, AIR 1989 P&H 273 (¶ 13)43 Moot Proposition, p. 3, ¶ 10


3.1.2: A LAW ENACTED BY THE STATE WITH RESPECT TO LIST III SHALL NOT BE

VOID UNLESS IT IS REPUGNANT TO A LAW MADE BY THE UNION

Repugnant means inconsistent, contradictory or incompatible with.44 Repugnancy

arises when two enactments both within the competence of the two Legislatures collide

and when The Constitution expressly provides that the enactment of one Legislature has

superiority over the other.45 There is must actual inconsistency between such law and a

Union legislation.46 In the present instance, it is pertinent to note that there is absence of

any Union legislation under Entry 42 of List III which is repugnant to the provisions of

the State legislation. Hence, such legislation cannot be held to be void on the ground of

repugnancy.

[3.2] FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS : NO VIOLATION OF PART III

Respondent No. 1 most humbly submits that to examine the validity of the State

legislation and to comprehend its effect on the constitutional provisions, it is important to

understand that Art. 26 cannot be attracted in the case of Appellant, [3.2.1] the fundamental

rights are not absolute and are designed to suffer reasonable restriction47 [3.2.2] and the

retrospective effect given to Art. 26 validates the State Legislation. [3.2.3]

3.2.1: ART. 26 CANNOT BE ATTRACTED IN THE CASE OF THE APPELLANT

Among the religious institutions, denominational institutions stand on a different footing

and enjoy special protection under Art. 26.48 However in order to constitute a religious

denomination, the three conditions must be satisfied:49

44 P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Concise Law Dictionary, 1011 (3rd ed. reprint 2007)45 State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch and Co., AIR 1966 SC 36546 Mangtulal v. Radha Shyam, AIR 1953 Pat 14 (20)47 Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1; See also N.K. Bajpai v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 2012 SC 1210 (¶ 14)48 Sri Kanyaka P.A.S. Committee v. Commr. H.R. & E. Dept., AIR 1999 SC 356749 Brahmachari v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1995 SC 2089


a. It must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines

which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, i.e., a common faith.

b. A common organization.

c. Designation by a distinctive name.

Though the Appellant has a common name, Mriga, they do not possess a common faith,

which is considered to be more important than the other features.50 This is clear from the fact

that the Appellant’s religious doctrine and belief system is based on an abstract philosophical

ideology. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Mittal v. Union of India51 very

clearly stated that a belief system based on a philosophy does not give a class or community

the identity of religious denomination.

3.2.2: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ARE SUBJECT TO REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS

The State is expected to bring about a Welfare State within the framework of The

Constitution, for it is authorised to impose reasonable restrictions, in the interests of the

general public, on the fundamental rights.52 The reasonable restrictions attached to the

fundamental rights warrants the State to act accordingly when the fundamental right is being

exploited or used in a deceitful manner. In the present instance, the misappropriation of the

devotees contribution and treasures of the temple53 on the part of the Appellant and the

sufferings caused to a large number of employees and beneficiaries, justifies the action of the

State Legislature in passing the legislation.

3.2.3: THE RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT GIVEN TO ART. 26 VALIDATES THE STATE

LEGISLATION

50 S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1 (¶ 37)51 AIR 1983 SC 152 Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni & Ors. v. The State of Madras & Ors., AIR 1960 SC 108053 Moot Proposition, p. 2, ¶ 4


The Amendment to Art. 26, which has been given retrospective effect through its implied

language54 endorses the State Legislature’s act of passing the impugned legislation. It is

humbly submitted that as the retrospective effect has been made essentially in the interest of

the temple and also of the charitable bodies run by Leoland Liquor Corporation (hereinafter

referred to as ‘LLC’), the State legislation cannot be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary and

thus does not violate fundamental rights of The Constitution.

[3.3] PUBLIC INTEREST : LEGISLATION IS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL

IDEALS

The Respondent No. 1 most humbly submits that ‘public interest’ means those interests

which concern the public at large; some interest that affects the legal rights and liabilities of a

community.55 It is of wide import, comprehending public order, public health, public security,

morals, economic welfare of the community and the objects mentioned in Part IV of The

Constitution56 and consequently the right of the individual has to be sublimated to the larger

interest of the general public57.

Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the State Legislature’s

act of passing the legislation befit the circumstances of the case as the interest of the community

of employees affected by the closure of LLC constitute the larger public interest.

______________________________________________________________________________

[IV] WHETHER THE DEER TEMPLE PROPERTY CAN BE USED TO REDRESS THE FINANCIAL

CRISIS CAUSED BY THE LEOLAND LIQUOR CORPORATION.

______________________________________________________________________________

54 Punjab Tin Supply Company v. Central Government, AIR 1984 SC 8755 State of Bijar v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 25256 Bachan Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 89857 Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad & Ors. v. Jan Mohammed Usmanbhai & Anr., AIR 1986 SC 1205


It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the Deer Temple assets can be used to cure

the financial crisis of the LLC. At the outset it is important to establish that this Hon’ble Court

cannot take up the additional issue of whether liquor prohibition is an essential part of the

religion in question, which was not brought to light before the Hon’ble High Court. [5.1]

Furthermore, the question to be clarified in the present case is not whether the taking over

and complete control of the assets by the State Government of Leoland is permissible, but

whether the assets can be used to clear the debt-riddled condition of God’s Island.

In the present case, establishing the following will undoubtedly point in the direction of the

validity of the act of using the assets to pay the debt of the LLC:

i. that the prohibition of liquor is not an ‘essential’ part of the religion in question; [5.2]

ii. that the principle of Harmonious Construction has been employed in striking a balance

between the Directive Principles of State Policy and the Fundamental Rights. [5.3]

[5.1] INADMISSIBILITY : INTRODUCTION OF NEW ISSUE AT APPEAL STAGE IS NOT

PERMISSIBLE

The Respondents most respectfully submit that the new issue regarding the prohibition of

liquor as an essential ingredient of the religion cannot be brought to light by the Appellant in this

stage. It has to be noted that a new question of fact can only be entertained in the initial stage and

not at the appellate stage.58

[5.2] ESSENTIALS OF RELIGION : THE PROHIBITION OF LIQUOR IS NOT AN ‘ESSENTIAL’

PART OF THE RELIGION IN QUESTION

The Respondents most respectfully submit that Art. 26 of The Constitution allow

religious denominations to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. The protection under

this Article must however be confined to such religious practices which are essential and an

58 Smt. Chander Kali Bail v. Jagdish Singh Thakur, AIR 1977 SC 2262


integral part of it59, whereby, without it, there would be a significant or fundamental change in

the nature of the religion. Essential or integral part has to be determined with reference to the

doctrines, practices, tenets, historical background, etc. of the religion.60 However, it is pertinent

to note that there is no clear indication as to necessity for the prohibition of liquor from the

Appellant’s practices, tenets or historical background.

[5.3] HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION : BALANCE HAS BEEN STRUCK BETWEEN DIRECTIVE

PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The Respondents most respectfully submit that The Constitution is founded on the bed

rock of the balance between Part III61 and Part IV62. To give absolute primacy over the other is to

disturb the harmony of The Constitution. This harmony and balance between Fundamental

Rights and Directive Principles is an essential feature of the Basic Structure of The

Constitution.63 The rights under Art. 26 are subject to reasonable restrictions which are expressed

through the usage of words such as ‘public order, morality and health’ and ‘administer such

property in accordance with law’. Beeping in mind the misappropriation on the part of the

Appellant, it was unerring on the part of the Respondent No. 1 to acquire the property.

Furthermore, such an acquisition was executed by Respondent No. 1 in furtherance of the

principles laid down in Parts III & IV of The Constitution. Thousands of employees of LLC and

its allied charitable institutions such as public hospitals, primary and secondary schools,

environment protection societies, medical research faculties and old age homes64 and the

beneficiaries of such charitable institutions lost their livelihood due to the financial crisis. It is

the duty of the State to incorporate within its policies the Directive Principles of State Policy, 59 Durgah Committee v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR 1961 SC 140260 Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and Anr., AIR 1984 SC 51261 Part III. Fundamental Rights. The Constitution of God’s Island, 195062 Part IV. Directive Principles of State Policy. The Constitution of God’s Island, 195063 Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789 (1806)64 Moot Proposition, p. 4, ¶ 12


one of it being the right to adequate means of livelihood65, an integral facet of the right to life66

which should be protected by the State by all means. The State is also obligated to protect the

material riches of antique nature67 which are of historical and national importance.68

Hence, the State through the acquisition, intended to give effect to the fundamental right

enunciated U/Art. 21 and the Directive Principles U/Arts. 38(1)69, 39(a), (b) & (f), 4170, 48A71

and 49 of The Constitution.

______________________________________________________________________________

[V] WHETHER THE OFFICIALS IN THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF LEOLAND CAN BE HELD

GUILTY OF COMMITTING ANY OFFENCE UNDER THE GOD’S ISLAND PENAL CODE, 1860

FOR THE RESTRUCTURING OF PROPERTY AND THE CONVERSION OF IDOLS.

______________________________________________________________________________

It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the Officials in the State Government

(hereinafter referred to as ‘Government Officials’) cannot be held guilty of committing any

offence72 under the God’s Island Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter to be referred to as the ‘GPC,

1860’) for the restructuring of property and the conversion of idols belonging to The Deer

Temple. The Government Officials are being implicated in the present case as it involves

criminal jurisprudence.

65 Art. 39. “Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State, The Constitution of God’s Island”, 195066 Narendra Kumar v. State of Haryana JT, AIR 1995 SC 51967 Moot proposition, p. 2, ¶ 368 Art. 49. “Protection of monuments and places and objects of national importance”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 195069 Art. 38. “State to secure social order for promotion of welfare of the people”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 195070 Art. 41. “Right to work, to education and to public assistance in certain cases”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 195071 Art. 48A. “Protection and Improvement of Environment and safeguarding the forest and wildlife”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 195072 §. 3(38). “Offence”. The General Clauses Act, 1897


In the present case, it is relevant to establish the following to determine that the current case

cannot be heard before this Hon’ble Court and also to prove that the Government Officials are

not guilty of committing any penal offence under the GPC, 1860:

i. that this Hon’ble Court does not have the jurisdiction to hear the issue relating to the

penal offence; [5.1]

ii. that the requisite procedure under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to

be referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C., 1973’) has not been complied with; [5.2]

iii. that the acts of the Government Officials do not amount to any ‘offence’ under the GPC,

1860; and [5.3]

iv. that the Government Officials can avail of the General Exception U/§.7973 of the GPC,

1860. [5.4]

[5.1] JURISDICTION : LACK OF JURISDICTION TO TRY A CRIMINAL OFFENCE

The Respondents most respectfully submits that this Hon’ble Court does not have the

jurisdiction to try the commission of alleged penal offences in the present case. This is owing to

the reason that the Supreme Court of God’s Island is not a Trial Court [5.1.1] and that an issue

which has not been raised before the lower Court, i.e. the High Court, cannot be introduced at the

stage of appeal before this Hon’ble Court [5.1.2].

5.1.1: THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT OF TRIAL

The Supreme Court is not a court of trial i.e., the collection of evidence and

investigation cannot be conducted by the Supreme Court. It is the duty of the Appellants

73 §. 79. “Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing himself justified, by law”. The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860


to establish the case in the lower court. And only by getting aggrieved to such order can

they appeal to the Appellate Court. Therefore, in the absence of any judgement by the

Magistrate, the Government Officials cannot be held guilty for any penal offence by this

Hon’ble Court.

5.1.2: AN ISSUE THAT HAS NOT BEEN RAISED BEFORE THE HIGH COURT CANNOT

BE INTRODUCED AT THE SUPREME COURT

It has been held in a catena of cases that, no new point shall be allowed to be

raised at an appellate stage.74 In the present case, this issue of the presence of mens rea

over the Government Officials which has been introduced only before this Hon’ble

Supreme Court cannot be appreciated. Therefore, it is proved that this Hon’ble Court

does not have any jurisdiction to take up this issue at this point of appeal.

[5.2] PROCEDURAL CONFORMITY : THE REQUISITE PROCEDURE HAS NOT BEEN COMPLIED

WITH

The Respondents most respectfully submits that in the present case the requisite

procedure under the Cr.P.C., 1973 and The Constitution have not been complied with. This is

relevant as §.475 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 mandates the trial of all offences under the GPC, 1860 to

be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C., 1973.

5.2.1: THE MAGISTRATE HAS NOT TAKEN COGNISANCE

Upon the High Court remanding the present case to trial, the Magistrate has the

power to take cognisance of the offence U/§.190(1)(c)76 of the Cr.P.C., 1973. But in the

present instance, there is no evidence to show that Magistrate has exercised such power

74 Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 251775 §. 4. “Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws”. The God’s Island Penal Code, 186076 §. 190. “Cognizance of offences by Magistrate”. The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860


and taken cognisance of the matter or whether, the Magistrate has ordered for the

investigation of the matter. Therefore, due to the lack of evidence on the above, it can be

proved that the requisite procedure has not been complied with.

[5.3] NO CRIME COMMITTED : RESTRUCTURING OF PROPERTY & CONVERSION OF IDOLS IS

NOT A PENAL OFFENCE

The Respondent most respectfully submits that in order to commit a crime, the

Respondents shall have either knowledge of the particular act; [5.3.1] or intention to do such an

act.77 [5.3.2].

5.3.1: NO KNOWLEDGE OF LIKELIHOOD TO HURT RELIGIOUS FEELINGS

The Respondents did not have the knowledge that the restructuring of the Deer

Temple would lead to hurting the religious feelings of the Appellant. Moreover the

Government Officials have been given the power to takeover and acquire complete

control of the property by both the Legislation78 and Amendment79. Thus, by acting to the

orders of an authority does not make the Officials guilty of any penal offence.

5.3.2: NO INTENTION TO HURT RELIGIOUS FEELINGS

The lack of evidence by the Appellant in order to prove the Respondents guilty

itself points out that the Government Officials did not contain any mens rea or guilty

intention to hurt the religious feelings of the Appellant.

77 Hari Singh Gour, The Penal Law of India, pp. 2377, 2378 (11th ed. 1998)78 Moot Proposition, p. 3, ¶ 1079 Moot Proposition, p. 5, ¶ 18


[5.4] GENERAL EXCEPTIONS : THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE IMMUNE FROM

PUNISHMENT

The Respondents most respectfully submits that in the present case, the Government

Officials can avail of the General Defences or Exceptions which will have the effect of limiting

and overriding offences and penal provisions of the Code.80 §. 79 protects acts which are justified

by law or are bona fide believed, by mistake of fact, to be justified by law.81 In the present

instance, the acts of the Government Officials are justified under the State Legislation82 and the

Amendment to Art. 2683. They were merely acting under the authority and instructions of the

Government to execute the takeover and complete control of the Deer Temple property and thus

cannot be held liable for any offence under the GPC, 1860.

In light of the above, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the present

matter, the Officials of the State Government of Leoland cannot be held guilty of any penal

offence under the provisions of the GPC, 1860.

80 Peter Murphy, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice, 34 (2003)81 State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Venugopal, AIR 1964 SC 3382 Moot Proposition, p. 3, ¶ 1083 Moot Proposition, p. 5, ¶ 18


PRAYER

WHEREFORE, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is

humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Court to:

DISMISS the petition for being devoid of any merit and UPHOLD the order of the High Court

of Leoland and be pleased to declare that,

The Officials in the State Government of Leoland are not guilty of committing any

offence under The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860 for the restructuring of property and

the conversion of idols that belonged to the Deer Temple;

AND/OR pass any other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the

circumstances of the case and in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

Place: ________, God’s Island S/d_____________

Date: 9th September, 2015 COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS


Date post:	29-Jan-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	dangkhuong
View:	214 times
Download:	0 times

Web view · 2016-09-23M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair & Anr. v. State of Kerala & Ors ... (b)....

Documents