McDonald - Walbank 1937 the Origins of the Second Macedonian War

7/28/2019 McDonald - Walbank 1937 the Origins of the Second Macedonian War

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The Origins of the Second Macedonian War

Author(s): A. H. McDonald and F. W. WalbankSource: The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 27, Part 2 (1937), pp. 180-207Published by: Society for the Promotion of Roman StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/296365 .

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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WARBy A. H. McDONALD AND F. W. WALBANK1

There is little need now to emphasise the importance of thedeclaration of war against Philip V of Macedon in the history ofRoman imperialism, or to formulate the problem of the causes of theRoman decision to intervene in the East. The work of M. Holleauxhas defined the problem and indicated its historical implications,and subsequent research has kept the issue clear. We have ratherto justify a paper upon this subject which returns to details of re-construction already fully treated. Yet the reconstruction of eventshas not received its final exposition, and a better understandingof the details is essential for the historical interpretation of the politicalsituation in 200 B.C.It was the achievement of Holleaux to establish the place of Polybiusas the primary authority for the period, to give a working reconstruc-tion of the Polybian tradition, and to show that- the Roman policy in200 B.C. was determined, not by an Athenian appeal under the termsof the Peace of Phoenice, but by fear of Antiochus the Great inalliance with Philip of Macedon.2 Holleaux, however, left two majordifficulties first, the relative insignificance of Philip as compared withAntiochus in the Roman calculations, and, secondly, the question of anAthenian appeal to Rome, even if it did not affect the case for war.The first point has been cleared up by G. T. Griffith, who hasshown that the Roman decision to intervene in Greece was influencedby the appearance of Philip, with his newly created fleet, as thevictor of Lade and Chios, and that the Senate took Philip's navalpolicy into account in considering the strategic position in Greecein 200 B.C.3

The second point has been less convincingly treated. Theannalistic- tradition in Livy included Athens in the Peace ofPhoenice on the Roman side and made the casus belli in 200 B.C.the Macedonian aggression against Athens. Holleaux assertedthat Philip would not have attacked Athens if Rome had beeninvolvred through treaty relations, and showed that the Romanultimatum contained no reference to Athens: the annalistic traditionof an Athenian appeal to Rome, he concluded, must therefore be1 Part I, Part II, I and 3, and Part III, i.e. thehistorical reconstruction, are by A. H. McDonald;

Part II, z, the constitutional section, by F. W.Walbank. These represent two papers, at firstwritten independently, which it has been foundpossible with full agreement to combine into a

comprehensive treatment of the evidence.2 Rome [la Grece et les nionarchiesbellinistiques]

(Paris, I92I); C[ambridge] A[ncient] H[istory] viii,ch. 6 (with bibliography).3 CambridgeHistorical Journal v, I (I935), I f.


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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR I8Irejected. 4 Subsequent work has taken the line either ofdefending the Livian account or of modifying it less drasticallythan Holleaux.As defenders of Livy we may mention G. De Sanctis,5 whosecriticisms of detail do not, however, invalidate Holle'aux' mainthesis, and T. Walek-Czernecki,6 whose methods in arguing againstPolybius from annalistic data have been refuted by Holleaux himself. 7E. Bickermann argues for the assumption that the Peace ofPhoenice was a xoLvveip'vw including Athens.8 To meet thoseobjections of Holleaux which remain unanswered, he has alteredcertain points in the reconstruction of the Polybian tradition, and inparticular has suggested that the Roman embassy in 200 B.C. wassent, not to deliver a formal ultimatum, but to intimidate Philip andfulfil Rome's obligations under the treaty of Phoenice without war.We shall consider Bickermann's arguments in the course of this paper,and examine the constitutional character of the Roman embassy in aspecial sectlon.Of those who accept the thesis of Holleaux but propose modifica-tions, we may mention A. Passerini9 and J. A. 0. Larsen.10 Bothcritics rightly place the Athenian appeal after the Roman declarationof war, but they explain its circumstances differently, and neitherbrings it into full relation with the Polybian tradition.The problem of the relation of Athens to Rome, then, has becomean issue upon which Holleaux' view of the Roman policy at this ,timemay be accepted or rejected, and in dealing with it we shall raise thewhole question of the origins of the Second Macedonian War. Ouropening point must be the Peace of Phoenice, and here we shall takeHolleaux' general criticisms of the Livian record as our basis.11But the real answer to the problem of the treaty is to be found in thestudy of the events leading up to the outbreak of war between Romeand Macedon in 200 B.C. We shall attempt to reconstruct thesituation in the light of the evidence, including the recently discovereddecree in honour of Cephisodorus.12 By proposing slight modifica-tions in Holleaux' exposition of details, we hope to end by setting outmore clearly his thesis that Rome did not formulate an Eastern policyuntil the report in 201 of a secret Syro-Macedonian pact.The paper falls into three parts: first, the Eastern situation205-I B.C.; secondly, the Athenian declaration of war, the Roman

4 Livy (A[nnalist]) xxix, I2, I4; XXXi, 1-9,Holleaux, Rome, 265-271.6 Storia dei Romani iv, I, 32, n. 65; /f. iii,

2, 438- Riv- fil- (NS) XiV (1936), I96 ff.6 Rev. phil. xlix (I925), 28 if.; Eos xxxi (1928),369 ff.7 Rev. phil. 1 (I926), 194 ff-8 Rev. phil. lxi (I935), 59 ff-, i6I ff.9 Athenaeum ix (1931), 260 if., 542 ff.

1I Class.Phil. xxxii, I (I937), I5 ff., in reply toBickermann's paper.11 Rome, 58-7I ; CAHviii, 135-6; cf. Taubler,Imperium Romanunci, 214-8. Against De Sanctis,op. cit., iii, 2, 436 ff. ; cl. Larsen, Class. Phil. xxx(I935), 210-12 ; xxxii, I (I937) 5 ff.12 Published with commentary by B. D. Merittin Hesperia v, 3 (I936), 419-28. Mr. McDonaldhas had the privilege of reading the decree withProf. Meritt, who refers to this paper for thediscussion of the historical implications of the decree.


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182 A. H. MCDONALD AND F. W. WALBANKembassy,and the Athenian appeal to Rome in 200 B.C.; thirdly,the Roman declaration of war and the policy of the Senate.

I. THE EASTERN SITUATION 205-I B.C.13After the Peace of Phoenice, Philip proceeded with a navalpolicy in the Aegean. The twenty ships under Dicaearchus show hisprogress by 204, just as the activities of Dicaearchus indicate hisdesigns on the Cyclades and the Hellespont, and the intrigues inthe ' Cretan War' (with, perhaps, the alleged attempt of Heracleideson the Rhodian fleet) betray his desire to break the influence ofRhodes and re-establish Macedonian ascendancy. 14Developments in the Aegean would also affect Egyptian andSyrian interests. Egypt in these last years of Ptolemy Philopator'sreign had declined in strength, through weak rule and native troubles,and was now threatened by Syria; for Antiochus, after the triumphof his ' Anabasis,' was in 204 planning to regain Coele-Syria.Antiochus' ambitions also to recover his hereditary possessions inAsia Minor and Thrace would in the end clash with the aims ofMacedonian expansion in the Aegean. This was the position,15with the Syrian policy of aggression clear but the Macedonian policynot yet defined, when Ptolemy Philopator died (c. Aug.-Sept. 204),leaving the infant Ptolemy Epiphanes as his heir.' 6 Sosibius andAgathocles concealed this critical change in the rule of Egypt, andat the end of 204 or early in 203 made overtures for an alliance withPhilip, which should be sealed by the marriageof the young Epiphaneswith one of Philip's daughters. On the announcement of Philopator'sdeath and the accession of Ptolemy Epiphanes (c. Aug.-Sept.- 203),Agathocles immediately sent Ptolemy, ;he son of Sosibius, to concludethe negotiations for an alliance against Syria.1 7 Antiochus saw thatit would be necessary to come to an agreement with Philip, andtowards the end of 203 he proposed a pact defining their spheres ofexpansion. Philip accepted the offer, and a secret Syro-Macedonianpact was drawn up.According to Polybius, the agreement involved the partition ofthe Egyptian empire, Philip taking the Ptolemaic possessions in theAegean, Caria and Samos, Antiochus those in Coele-Syria andPhoenicia ;18 and, as Zeuxis was apparently bound to help Philipaccording to the treaty, 1 9 there were presumably pledges of mutualassistance. Polybius also seems to have envisaged an attack on Egypt

13 On the earlier relations of Rome with the East,see Holleaux, Rome, chs. I-6.14 Polyb. xiii, 4-5, xviii, 54, 8; Diod. xxviii, I iPolyaenus v, 17, 2. C/. Holleaux, Klio xiii (I913),I37 ff., Rev. EG xxx (19I7), 88 ff., xxxiii (I92o),223 ff. ; De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, 3 and notes 7, 8,g; M. Segre, Riv. fil. (Ns) xi (1933), 365 f.-;Griffith, op. cit., 7-8.

15 Holleaux, Rome, 281-3.

16 For a full reconsideration of the demotic andGreek evidence for the problem of the date ofPhilopator's death and the accession of Epiphanes,see F. W. Walbank, 7[ournal on]E[gyptian] A[rch-c0ology] xii (I 936), I, 20-34-

17 Polyb. xv, 25, I3. Holleaux, Rome, 77-80.18 Polyb. iii, 2, 8; xv, 20.

9 Polyb. xvi, I, 8-9.


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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 183itself, for he condemns the coalition as directed against the veryexistence of the child Ptolemy, 20 and strongly criticises Philip fornot sailing against Alexandria after the battle of Lade. Yet notonly did the strategic situation make this impossible, 23 but a study ofthe position at the time shows that Philip's policy was limited to theestablishment of Macedonian power in the Aegean. Polybius, then,appears to have misrepresented the Macedonian policy in regard toEgypt itself, and he may have exaggerated the aims of the pact in thesamerespect.2 3The agreement between Antiochus and Philip was not, as Polybiusjudged, 24 due merely to some brute instinct to devour the weaker:it was forced upon Antiochus by the danger of an alliance betweenMacedon and Egypt, and was accepted by Philip because it gave hima free hand in the Aegean. Its basis lay in the mutual recognitionof the right to expand at the expense of Egypt in the spheres in whicheach power had hereditary claims, Antiochus in Coele-Syria, Philipin the Aegean. Both powers were pursuing an independent policy ofaggression, and even if they had been in a position to invade Egypt, itis doubtful whether either would have been willing to support theother in the conquest of a country which could not be partitioned andwhich might prove an acquisition of decisive weight in the balance ofthe Hellenistic political system. We may believe that neitherAntiochus nor Philip would have allowed the other to set foot inAlexandria. Indeed, it would be surprising if Antiochus gave Philipentire freedom in the Aegean, considering the Syrian interests there.Certainly he may have been ready to make concessions in order toavoid embarrassment in Coele-Syria and to obtain treaty limitation ofMacedonian expansion in Asia Minor; but we may assume that hereceived a promise from Philip that Macedonian ascendancy in theAegean would respect the interests of Syria. Otherwise he wouldscarcely have agreed to terms of mutual assistance by which Philiprather than himself would benefit. And he may have been strictlywithin his rights when he reconciled certain Cretan cities withRhodes.25 The compact, however, must be considered a diplomaticsuccess for Philip, and he exploited his advantage in the Aegean to thefull. When the pact at last stood revealed, it had become an emptyform. Antiochus had been estranged by Philip's unscrupulous policyat his expense: his reconciliation of the Cretan cities with Rhodesdeprived Philip of valuable auxiliaries, and Zeuxis was no doubtacting under orders when he neglected to give Philip the full assistancestipulated in the treaty. 26 But this would hardly appear in the

2 0 Polyb. XV, 20, 2.21 Polyb. XVi, IO.22 De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, IO-I I.23 Appian (Maced. 4, I), preserving the Polybiantradition through an annalist (Schwartz, P-W s.v.' Appianus ' col. 2I9), states that, according toreport, Philip was to help Antiochus against Egypt

and Cyprus, and Antiochus to help Philip againstCyrene, the Cyclades and Ionia.24 Polyb. XV, 20, 3-25 Holleaux, Klio xiii (I9I3), I48 ff-26 Polyb. xvi, I, 9; 24, 6. Holleaux, Rome,290 n. I ; CAHviii, I55.


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I84 A. H. MCDONALD AND F. W. WALBANKrevelationof the pact. The mere fact of a treaty between the greatpowers of Syria ancdMacedon would cause a serious political crisisin the East.27For the moment, however,the pactwas secret, and Philip, playinga double game, maintained riendly relationswith Egypt.28 In Romean Egyptian embassy had announced the accession of PtolemyEpiphanesand had doubtless appealed or mediationwith Antiochus;but there was little hope at this time that Rome would take actionover Coele-Syria.2 9Thiswas he position t the endof 203. In 202 the effect, houghnot the fact, of the coalition became clear. Antiochus invadedCoele-Syria. Philip, his fleet now forty strongin additionto a largenumber of lembi, openly seized control of the Hellespont. Heoccupied the strategicallymportantcities of Lysimacheia,Chalcedonand Perinthus,and as the ally of Prusias ook Cius: on his return hegained possessionof Thasos. Lysimacheia,Chalcedon and Cius hadbeen dependent allies of the Aetolian League, and Perinthus adependency of Byzantium: Cius was sacked n the face of Rhodianintercession,and Thasos was enslavedwithout justification.30 Thecampaign provokedthe open hostility of Aetolia, Byzantium andRhodes, and shockedthe Greek world. It also probably irritatedAntiochus, who must have resented Philip's co-operation withPrusias,a naturalopponentof the Seleucids,and above all his occupa-tion of Lysimacheia,o whichhe himselfhadclaims,31The Greek states, although ignorant of the pact, could not beblind to Philip's deliberate policy of aggression. The Macedoniancontrol of the Hellespontthreatenedthe Bosporan rade of Rhodes,Delos and Athens, and would endanger the economic stability ofthe Aegean: Cephisodorus'public service as TOIoCtX Tcv GLTCVLXCdV(203-2) in Athens may well have been worthy of record.32 And thepoliticalascendancy o which Philip'seffortsappeared o be directedmight well menace the establishedautonomy in Greece.33 As aresult of Philip's campaign,Rhodes with Byzantiumand her otherallies declaredwar on Macedon,34and Aetolia attempted to renewfriendlyrelationswith Rome (autumn202).3 5The Greeksstates, then, were in open hostility to Philip. Egypt,whose possessionson the Thracian coast he had respected and whostill hoped for his help against Antiochus, remained acquiescent.Rome was indifferent. The Senate harshly rejected the Aetolian

2 7 For this interpretation of the Polybian account,compare the similar lines of the brief exposition ofHolleaux, CAH viii, 15o.28 Polyb. XVi, 22, 3-5. Holleaux, Rome, 2go n. I,3I7-8; CAHviii, I50-i, I53, I55.2 9 Polyb. xv, z5, 14. Holleaux, Rome,8S, 82.On the earlier relations of Rome with Egypt, seeHolleaux, ibid., 6o-83, 93-4.3 ? Polyb. XV, 22-4; cf. XViii, 3, I 1-12; 4, 5-7;5, 4; Livy (P[olybius]) xxxi, 3', 4. Holleaux, Rome,

29i, notes I, z; CAH viii, I5I ; De Sanctis,op. cit., iv, I, 6-8.31 Polyb. xviii, 5I, 4-6. Holleaux, Rome,290, n. I.32 Meritt, Op.cit., 426; Heichelheim, Aegyptus

XVii (1937), 6i ff.33 We may note Philip's severe rule in his ownkingdom: Holleaux, CAH viii, 144-5.34 Polyb. xvi, 9, 3-4-3 aAppian, Maced. 4, 2; Livy (P) xxxi, 29, 4.


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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 185appeal. Livy, reproducing Polybius, gives their reply 'QQuidadnos venitis, Aetoli, sine quorum auctoritate pacem cum Philippofecistis ? ' 36It is the manner, not the fact, of this refusal that is significant.The Senate in 202 might well have declined to intervene in the East,but with any anticipation of military action in Greece the careful,calculating Roman diplomacy will scarcely have administered such acruel rebuff to a powerful ally. In 200, when war against Macedonhad been decided upon, and in 200-i99, after the arrival of SulpiciusGalba in Greece, Rome made most urgent attempts to repair thebreach with the Aetolians.37 The Senate cannot have under-estimated the strategic importance of Aetolian support in case of war.Yet the rebuff was crushing. Its effect is seen in the collapseof Aetolian policy. The Aetolians did not respond to the appeal ofAttalus to invade Macedonia during Philip's absence in 20I, andremained inactive despite his further appeal in 200. Even after theappearance of the Roman army in Greece, Amynander was equallyunsuccessful, and at the Panaetolica in I99 there was no reply to theRoman envoy: the Aetolians came in only at the end of the year,when the Roman superiority became certain.38 This may beattributed to the Senate's harsh dismissal of the Aetolian embassy:it was a result easily foreseen, and the implication is that at the end of202 Rome did not contemplate any Eastern policy that would involvemilitary action in Greece. 9In 20o the Eastern situation developed further. Antiochuscontinued his operations in Coele-Syria, taking Gaza after a longsiege; but the delay had enabled Scopas to gather an army, and in thlewinter of 20I-200 he reconquered Palestine up to the sources of theJordan.40 Philip, having established an ascencdancy n the NorthAegean, confirmed his control of the Cyclades and extended hisaggression to the East Aegean, with the object of securing a stategicposition in Caria. He was still sparing Egyptian possessions, andalthough Samos, a Ptolemaic dependency, refused him entrance and hewas forced to reduce the city, this was due to the action of the Samiansthemselves, and he did not let it affect his relations with Egypt:

36 Livy (P) XXXi 29, 4, in a close adaptation ofPolybius, cf. Polyb. xviii, 38, 8. Nissen, Krit.Unters. iiber die Quellen der 4 und 5 Dekade desLivius, 126.37 Polyb. xvi, 27, 4 (zoo). Livy (P) xxxi, 28, 3;29, I ; 31, 20 (2OO-199).38 Livy (P) xxxi, 46, 4 (ZOI); 15, 9 (Zoo);28, 3 (200-I99); 32, 2-5 (I99).3a9 See Holleaux, Rome, 293-7, and Griffith,op. cit., 3-5. It will appear even more clearly fromthe present reconstruction of events that theembassy would never have been rebuffed after thePergamene and Rhodian appeal in zoi, whereAppian places it. Bickermann (op. cit., I6z n. 4)

surprisingly accepts Appian's dating on the groundsthat " rien ne prouve que le Senat voulut la guerred6ja en ilhiver zoI-o.' Yet the appeal in zoI was thecause of the war: the Senate must have graspedits implications immediately. The election ofSulpicius Galba as consul for zoo shows the anti-Macedonian policy in Rome at the beginning of thewinter zOI-o (cf. De Sanctis, Riv. fil. (NS) xiV(I936), zoo against Bickermann, op. cit., I67 n. z).The date of Zama, it may be noted, does not affectthe implications of the rebuff to the Aetolians,for we may not assume that the Punic War made theSenate blind to the situation in Greece.4 ?Polyb. xvi, 22a; 39. Holleaux, Klio viii(i908), 267 ff


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i 86 A. H. MCDONALD AND F. W. WALBANKSamos remained Egyptian, and an Egyptian squadron lying in theharbour reinforced his fleet. 41 Clearly the pact with Antiochus wasstill unsuspected.The Rhodians were forced by the appearance of Philip in theirwaters to offer direct assistance in spite of their inferior numbers.They brought the Macedonian fleet to action at Lade, but weredefeated and had to retire, while Miletus, nominally an ally of Egypt,gave Philip a triumphal reception.42 The victory secured theMacedonian ascendancy in the Aegean, and the Greek statesrecognised this with hatred and fear.43But the threat of Macedonian domination in Asia Minor rousedAttalus of Pergamum, whose ambitious policy did not conduce tofriendly relations with Rhodes and who had so far held back from thesupport of Rhodes, to join in combined action against the commondanger. After a declaration of war, he appealed to his allies theAetolians for a diversion in Greece, and proceeded without delay tomilitary measures.44 Philip turned on Pergamum. He subduedTeos, a Pergamene dependency,45 and after an unsuccessful attemptto surprise Pergamum, plundered the temples outside the city.46Then he moved against Chios, a city with Rhodian connections.47Here the combined Pergamene and Rhodian fleets brought him tobattle. In the engagement the Macedonian fleet won a strategicvictory; but Philip's losses were the heavier, and Attalus and theRhodians together would in future have a superiority at sea.48 Theallies meanwhile separated, and Philip was able to invade Caria and,in spite of failing at Cnidus, seize the Rhodian Peraea and establish a

41 Appian, Maced. 4, I; Polyb. xvi, 2, 4, 9 ; 7, 6(reading A1yuv7ri&nvor MS. v7revavrtwv) Livy (P)xxxi, 31, 4. G. Klaffenbach, Ath. Mitt. li (ig26),28-33. Holleaux, Klio ix (Io99),454-8 ; Rev. EA xxii(1920), 237 ff., xxiii (192I), i8i ff.; Rome, 290n. I, 3i8 n.z; CAH viii, i53 ; De Sanctis, op. cit.,iv, I, 8 n. zz. Samos does not appear in the negotia-tions of i98 (Polyb. xviii, z) or in the settlement ofI96 (Polyb. xviii. 44), and is definitely among thecivitates sociae Ptolomaei in 197 (Livy (P) xxxiii,20, Ii-iz) : the explanation must be that Samoshad remained juridically Egyptian in zoi. Onoccupying the city Philip will have made clear hisfriendship with Ptolemy, the strategic necessity forhis action, and the fact that it was not intendedto injure Egyptian sovereignty.

42 Polyb. xvi, 14-15. The priority of the battleof Lade is established by the comment of Polybius(xvi, IO) I): Ae&a 7O6 vreXe-Ovat 7ijv 7replTj71v Ad&0XPVUa%CLX'CLV Ka' TOVSAev 'Po&ovseK7roUbv yev&tOac, rOv o' `A-rraXov pA 7rwo7vtuke J'Evat, 6Xov WS e?Jv Te reXetv -rC41?tX17r r 'ov e ts -rv 'AXe4dv6ptctav 7rwXov.Polybius will have recognised the move againstAlexandria as a major campaign to be undertakenonly with unchallenged mastery in the Aegean.It could not be carried out after the alliance betweenAttalus and the Rhodians, in any interval in thesummer in which the allies might happen to be

temporarily separated: in the reference to AttalusPolybius must have meant that the king had not yetjoined in the war. Thus Lade will come beforethe combined action at Chios. In any event, afterthe Macedonian losses at Chios, with Attalusoperating in the Aegean, no victory over theRhodians would have made Polybius criticisePhilip for not sailing to Alexandria: we mayconclude that he recorded the battle of Lade as thefirst engagement, with Philip at the height of hispower and before Attalus entered the war (cf.De Sanctis, op. cit., iv. i, io n. 27; Griffith, op. cit.,8; against Holleaux, Rev. EA xxii (I920),244 ff.; CAH viii, 153-4).43 Cl. Polybius (Polyb. xvi, io and supra, n. 42),and Alcaeus of Messene (Anth. Pal. ix, 5I8). DeSanctis,op.cit., iv, I, 9 n. z6.4 4 Polyb. xvi, 9, 4; Livy (P) xxxi, 46, 4.

45 Holleaux, Klio xiii (I913), 144; CAH viii,153 n. 2.

46 Polyb. xvi, i; xviii, 2z 2; 6, 4; Diod.xxviii, 5; Appian, Maced. 4, I. Holleaux, Rev. EAxxiii (I9zI), i96 if.4I Holleaux, Rome, 35, 87 n. 2, 9i, againstBeloch, Gr. Gesch. iv, 2, 345, followed by DeSanctis, op. cit., iv, I) I2 n. 32, who hold it to benominally Ptolemaic.

48 Polyb. xvi, 2-9. Holleaux, Klio ix (I909),450 f.; De Sanctis,op. cit., iv, Ix I2-14.


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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR I87Macedonian province.49 Yet his mastery of the Aegean had dis-appeared. He could still carryout effective maritime operations, butit must havebeenclearthat wheneverAttalus andthe Rhodianschoseto unite their fleets they could forcehim to act on the defensive.50This was the position in the summer of 20i. Yet it was at thismoment that Attalus and the Rhodians sent an embassyto beg theintervention of Rome.51 Why ? Surely, in spite of his cordialrelations with Rome, Attalus must have preferred to pursue hisambitions without the embarrassmentof a dominant ally. Andthe Rhodianshad been consistentlyopposedto Roman interventionin the East. Why shouldAttalus weakenand the Rhodians reversetheir policy at the moment when they appeared o have the Aegeansituation n hand ? The reasonmust have been great and compelling.There must have arisen in the political situation a factor of suchoverwhelming importance that the small Aegean powers couldbalance t only by calling n Rome. The implicationof the appealtoRome is clear Syria stood revealed to the Greek world behindMacedon. The Syro-Macedonian acthad been discovered.This will be independentlyestablished romthe historyof Athensin this year,on the basisof the followingreconstructionof the courseof events in Greece in 20I-200 B.C.II. THE ATHENIAN DECLARATION OF WAR, THE ROMAN EMBASSY, AND

THE ATHENIAN APPEAL TO ROME IN 200 B.C.IIn the autumn of 20I Philip lay blockaded n Bargyliaby the com-bined Pergameneand Rhodian fleets. As the winter came on, theallies tightened up the blockadeuntil escape became impracticable,and, in spite of his anxiety for affairsat home, Philipwas forced toremain. Suppliesgave out, and he had to relyon whathe could get

from Zeuxis or the neighbouringtowns of Mylasa, Alabanda andMagnesia: it was the life of awolf, saysPolybius. Finallyhe attemptedto seize Mylasa,and ravagedthe territory of Alabanda.52 This isthe picture of a full winter under famine conditions, and we mayconclude that Philip didcnot effect his escape, by the stratagemrecorded n Polyaenus iv, I8, 2), until the springof 200. Only thendid he return to Greece, closely pursued by Attalus and theRhodians.5 3In Greecethere had been strainedrelationsbetween the Atheniansand the Acarnanians inceAugust zoi, when the Athenianshad put49 Polyb. xvi, I I-I2; XViii, 2, 3; 6, 3; 8, 9.Holleaux, Rev. EA xxii (1920), 237 ff., xxiii

(1921), I9I ff., xxv (I923), 330 if.; CAH viiiI54-5. De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, II 15.6 0Polyb. xvi, 8; ct. xvi, 28; Livy (P) xxxi,

15, I0.

51 Appian, Maced. 4, 2; Polyb. xvi, 24, 2-3;Justinus xxx, 3, 5; cf. Livy (A) xxxi, z, i.5 Polyb. xvi, 24. Holleaux,Rev.EA xxii (I920),249-50, Xxv (I923), 353-5.

63 Livy (P) xxxi, I4, II . Holleaux, Rev. EA.xxv (I923), 353-9; De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, i6,n. 44. Seeinfra p. 19I, n. 70.


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I88 A. H1. MCDONALD AND F. W. WALBANKto death two Acarnanian youths who had violated the Eleusinianmysteries. 5 4 The Athenians had refused redress, and the Acarnaniansplanned a punitive expedition ; but as allies of Philip they waited forhis support. On his return Philip was informed, and immediatelysent Macedonian auxiliaries to join the Acarnanians. The combinedforce devastated Attica, and the Acarnanians returned with theirbooty. This is the Polybian tradition in the adaptation of Livy;but it has been abbreviated. In particular, there is no reference to theco-operation of Macedonian ships, which, we shall see, accompanied theoperations by land. 5 5 The account may be supplemented from thedescription of Attalus' visit to Athens.56

According to Polybius (xvi, 25, i), the Athenians sent envoysto Attalus in Aegina 'to thank him for what had been done(suXocplcatnaovta4 odo1 ysyovoaLv) and to invite him to Athens toconfer on the present situation.' Now this expression of thankscannot be dismissed as an empty compliment or referred to theoperations in the East Aegean, which only indirectly concernedAthens. The natural sense of the words is that Attalus had renderedthe Athenians some direct service, presumably after his arrival inGreek waters. This impression is strengthened by the account ofhis reception, when some days later he crossed to the Peiraeus inorder to meet the Roman envoys despatched in reply to his and theRhodians' appeal in 20I. The archons met him and escorted him withgreat ceremony up to the city. The temples were prepared forsacrifice, and in the ecclesia the people voted him honours such asthey had never voted to previous benefactors without long considera-tion: they created the new tribe of Attalis, and added his name to theroll of eponymous heroes. But what had Attalus done to receivethanks, to be called a benefactor, and to have the welcome and thehonours due to a saviourof the cityv-and all this by a sudden decision ?The nature of his service will appear from a consideration of theRhodians' activities at this time. Their leaders did not cross fromAegina with Attalus, but they are present in the ecclesia and receivethe honour of a a poe'vo &pLaG-LcLvnd the vote of Zgonom-c'La.According to Polybius, this was because ' apart from the otherthings (zop' tCov &`Xcov)they had returned the captured shipswith their crews ' ; and Livy preserves from the lost Polybianchapters the information that the ships were four in number and hadrecently been captured by the Macedonians and retaken from them.The fact that the crews were still on board shows that the Rhodianshad appeared during the engagement and had rescued the Athenian54 Bickermann, op. cit., I64 n. 3.

55 Livy (P) xxxi, I4, 6-io; iS, S; Polyb. xvi, z6,9. In adapting Polybius, Livy has limited himself topresenting separately, first the outbreak of hostilitybetween Philip and the Athenians, then the formaldeclaration of war: the intervening account ofevents by sea has been omitted.

56 Polyb. xvi, 25-6, cf. Livy (P) xxxi, 14,11-15, 7. The Polybian fragment has not beenabridged: the undefined allusions refer back tothe previous chapters (cf. Holleaux, Rev. EA xxv,19Z3), 356 n. 6).


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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR I 89ships before the Macedonians could reach port with them. We mayconnect the thanks to Attalus 'for what had been done ' with thereference to 'the other things ' of the Rhodians, and see here anallusion to some action by Attalus and the Rhodians on behalf ofAthens against Macedonian naval operations. It would seem thatPhilip not only sent auxiliaries to reinforce the Acarnanians: he alsodespatched ships from Chalcis to co-operate in raiding on the Atticcoast. The land force no doubt devastated Attica almost to the wallsof Athens. The naval force threatened the Attic ports and may haveappeared o$fthe Peiraeus ; and the four Athenian ships were captured.In helpless anger the Athenians had to watch the destruction of theirpeaceful land and the loss of their small protection by sea. At thismoment, we may suppose, Attalus and the Rhodians appeared onthe scene, presumably from their base at Aegina. The raiders fled,with the Rhodians in pursuit to recover the Athenian vessels. TheAcarnanians, their purpose fulfilled, retired. And the Atheniansmay well have felt that their safety had been secured by the opportunearrivalof Attalus. 7It was for this reason, then, that, when the Rhodians arrivedwiththe recaptured ships and they saw Attalus put back into Aegina,the Athenians sent envoys to thank the king and invite him to thecity. This was the reason for the magnificent reception and thealmost divine honours voted to Attalus, and the award for valour andgrant of isopolity to the Rhodians. And, we should note, the swift-ness of the relief will have anticipated any wide-spread appeal forhelp such as that recorded by Pausanias concerning Cephisodorus,which is generally, but, on the above interpretation of the Polybianevidence, falsely, dated to this time. 58In Rome the Pergamene and Rhodian embassies had won over theSenate to a policy of intervention in Greece: the decision is reflectedin the election of P. Sulpicius Galba, who had been general in theFirst Macedonian War, to the consulship for 200 (c. Nov. 20I). 59In spring 200 the Roman envoys, C. Claudius Nero, P. SemproniusTuditanus and M. Aemilius Lepidus, crossed to Greece to deliver anultimatum to Philip and to proceed to the East to offer mediationbetween Antiochus and Ptolemy Epiphanes. The ultimatumdemanded that Philip should not make war on any Greek state andshould submit Attalus' claims for reparations to arbitration.61- Theenvoys visited Epirus, Athamania, Aetolia and Achaea, publishingthis measure for the protection of Greek autonomy and solicitingsupport in the event of its rejection ; and in due course, as we have

57 Cf. Ferguson, Hell. Athens, 268 ; De Sanctis,Op. cit. iV, I, 20 n. 52; andHolleaux,Rev.EA xxv(1923), 356-9.58 Paus. I, 36, 5-6; cl. Ferguson, op. cit., 269;De Sanctis, Op. Cit., iV, I, 21 ; Holleaux,Rev.EA xxii (Ig20), 84 n. 3; CAH viii, I6I.

59 Supra p. I 85, n. 39,60 Polyb. XVi, 27; 34, I-7; Livy (A) xxxi, 2, 3-4;Justinus xxx, 3, 3-5 ; xxxi, I, 2. Holleaux, Rev. EAxv (1913), 4, XXV (1923), 359; Rome, 50; CAHviii, i6I ; De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, 23 n. 57.61 Polyb. XVi, 27, 2.


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190 A. H. MCDONALD AND F. W. WALBANKseen, they arrived at the Peiraeus. Their reception and their sub-sequent conduct in Athens show that their visit here was no differentfrom their earlier halts on the way. There is no sign of any politicalrelations or previous commitments of Rome to Athens. If it had notbeen for the presence of Attalus, the envoys would no doubt once morehave repeated their proclamation, and have merely asked for thepromise of Athenian co-operation in the event of war with Macedon.62But Attalus' position in Athenian regard offered a more effectivecourse of action. For who could now better solicit Athenian supportthan the king himself ? And so, after reporting the decision of theSenate to Attalus, the Roman envoys remained in the background andleft the handling of the situation to him. 63The appeal of Attalus, already in a state of war with Philip,produced a result that the Roman envoys would not have attempted,one beyond the scope of their mission, since the ultimatum had notyet been presented and Rome was still at peace with Macedon. Inalliance with Attalus and the Rhodians, the Athenians openly de-clared war on Macedon. This clearly lay outside the competenceof the Roman embassy, and they took no part in the declaration ofwar. Further, it would seem that, although war was practicallycertain and Attalus might well invite the Athenians to join theRhodians, the Romans, and himself in hostility to Macedon, 64 yet theRoman envoys at this point had not the power to enter into relationsof alliance with Athens, as they did later with Rhodes. For, whileRome was already acting on behalf of Pergamene interests and theRhodian case appears in the final demands, after the establishmentof relations of alliance, the Athenians came into no relations withRome. Their case will not appear in the Roman demands, and, aswe shall see, when they were finally forced to appeal to Rome, itwas only as a last resort after the failure of their allies.Apparently the competence of the Roman embassy at this pointwas limited. This will appear also from a study65 of the procedurefollowed in the presentation of the formal ultimatum and declara-tion of war at Abydus. We shall find that the embassy did not atfirst have the authority of the Roman People, and this is to beexplained by the fact, recorded in the annalistic tradition, that theCenturies had refused to pass the proposal for war against Macedonat the beginning of 200.66The course of Athenian policy leading up to the declaration ofwar, then, has developed continuously from the incident at the

62 Taiubler, op. cit., 2i6-7; Holleaux, Rev. EAxxii (I920), 77; Ronme,267-70; CAH viii, i6in. 2.63 Livy omits all mention of the envoys in hisadaptation of Polybius, not because after a criticalsurvey he felt it inconsistent with his annalisticaccount of the causes of the war (as Holleaux,Rev. EA xxii (ig20), 9I-2; CAH viii, i6i, n. z)

nor in order to preserve the dignity of Rome(as De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, sv 32, n. 65), but ratherbecause he had stated that they went direct toAlexandria (Livy (A) xxxi, 2, 3): this would appearfrom his addition in xxxi, i8, r; cf. Polyb. xvi, 34.64 Polyb. xvi, 26, 6.65 See infra p. i92 ff.66 Livy (A) xxxi, 6, 3-4 ; cf. Passerini, op. cit., z8I.


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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR I9IEleusinian mysteries in August 20I ; yet this case of sacrilege appearsin itself too slight an occasion for such drastic action. We maysuppose some already existing political tension, which found issue inthis way. 67 In the evidence for the abolition of the 'Macedonian 'tribes, Antigonis and Demetrias, we have the means to determine moreprecisely the position in Athens at this time. These tribes, createdin 307-668 were abolished in the Attic year 20I-200, long enoughbefore the creation of Attalis in the spring of 200 for a redistributionof demes into eleven tribes :6 9 thus, as Attalis was created immediatelyafter the Acarnanian raid, we must search for a motive earlier.7 0The abolition could have accompanied the incident at the Eleusinianmysteries ; but it was even less likely to have been caused by a mereact of sacrilege. We must assume in Athens at this time a state ofhostility to Macedon so strong that not only are Macedonian alliesunreasonably put to death, but the two tribes created in honour ofMacedon a century earlier, which had survived the revolt in 289-8,the Chremonidean War in 266, the secession in 229 and the alliancewith Egypt in 224, are suddenly abolished. Certainly Athens willhave suffered from the economic disturbance of Philip's control of theHellespont, and with the rest of the Greek world will have detestedhis brutal treatment of free cities and feared the aims of his deliberateaggression; yet for nearly thirty years the Athenians had maintaineda strict neutrality. There must have been some overwhelming reasonfor this open break with Macedon: we may see it in the discovery ofthe Syro-Macedonian pact, directed against the great power whichfor over twenty years had stood behind the Athenian policy ofneutrality.The creation of the tribe Ptolemais, 71 the Egyptian orientationof the whole foreign policy of Eurycleides and Micion,72 its con-tinuation under Cephisodorus, the appeal to Egypt in 200-these arethe signs of the close Athenian friendship with Egypt ; and it canhardly be a coincidence that the new Tribal Cycle in 20I began withPtolemais.73 At the same time that the Pergamene and Rhodianembassies left for Rome, in the summer of 20I, Athens proclaimed herEgyptian sympathies in the face of the coalition of Syria and Macedon.And we can now appreciate something of the feeling that found

67 Niese, Gesch. der griech. und niaked. Staatenii, 589.68 Ferguson, Hell. Athens, 96, n. 2; AthenianTribal Cycles, 5, n. i.69 IG2 iiI 236z. Ferguson, Ath. Tr. Cycles,14I, n. I.7 Ferguson (Ath. Tr. Cycles, I4I, n. i) has placedthe Acarnanian raid in autumn zoi, before the returnof Philip, in order to explain the abolition ofAntigonis and Demetrias; but the evidence givenabove (p. I87 ff.) dates the raid to spring 2oo, andour explanation, we submit, provides satisfactorilyfor the abolition of the tribes. Bickermann (op. cit.,

i64, n. 3), without detailed treatment, places theEleusis incident in August 2oi, the Acarnanianinvasion some weeks later in autumn 2oi, and theAthenian embassy to Rome in winter 2oi-o. Thepresent reconstruction (see also infra, p. I97 ff.) maybe held to dispose of this view.71 224-3 or 223-2. Ferguson, Ath. Tr. Cycles, 92.

72 Polyb. v, io6, 6-8. Niese, op.cit., ii, 463-5;Ferguson, Hell. Athens, 24I ff.; Ath. Tr. Cycles,143-4; De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, i, i6 ff.; Holleaux,Rome, i i8.

7 3 Ferguson, Ath. Tr. Cycles, 142.


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I92 A. H. MCDONALD AND F. W. WALBANKexpression in the reception of Attalus and the Rhodians, and in theAthenian declaration of war. 2

From Athens Attalus returned to Aegina and the Rhodians leftto bring over the Cyclades.74 The Roman envoys remained, and whenNicanor, one of Philip's generals, no doubt informed of the Atheniandeclaration of war, ravaged Attica up to the Academy, they sent aherald and delivered the ultimatum. Nicanor retired to transmitit to Philip, and the Romans left for Rhodes. 7 Here they waited fora report of Philip's reception of the ultimatum, which they mightsend back to the Senate; but when this took the form of a secondattack on Attica, this time by Philocles, 76 they unexpectedly made nofurther move, but allowed Philip to proceed unhindered to a rapidcampaign of conquest in Thrace and the Thracian Chersonese,77culminating in the siege of Abydus. To Abydus the Roman envoysdespatched M. Aemilius Lepidus, their youngest member, to delivera second ultimatum to Philip in person.78 This has generally beentaken as the indictio belli leading up to the Second Macedonian War. 7 9Certain criticisms of this view by Bickermann, however, make itadvisable, before proceeding to a consideration of the Roman policy,to discuss the character and competence of the embassy, and the realnature of the two ultimatums delivered at Athens and Abydus.By the end of the third century B.C. the forms observed in thedeclaration of war had diverged considerably from those laid down inthe iusfetiale, as described in Livy. 8 0The original procedure had contained three stages. First, thepater patratuswas sent, with others of the fetiales, ad res repetendas. 1Next, after an interval of thirty-three days, if the demands were notsatisfied, this envoy delivered the testatio or denuntiatio82 in theseterms: he swore by the gods that his cause was a just one, andstated that ' de istis rebus in patria maiores natu consulemus, quo

74 Livy (P) xxxi, I5, 8-Ia; Polyb. xvi, 26, 10, cf.xvi. z8.75 Polyb. xvi, 27; Livy (P) xxxi, i6, I-z. Livyomits the incident of Nicanor and records only thedespatch of Philocles ; but there was not merely oneepisode, with Livy giving Philocles in confusion forNicanor (as Ferguson, Hell. A4thens, 273, n. i) orPolybius giving the subordinate Nicanor and Livythe commander Philocles (Niese, op. cit., ii, 592,n. 7; De Sanctis, 35, n. 67). Livy omitted theNicanor incident because it introduced the Roman

envoys he did not wish to mention (see suprap. i90, n. 63) ; and the despatch of Philocles pre-supposes a knowledge of the Roman ultimatumwhich must have come through Nicanor'Philippus . . . ne Romano quidem quod imminebatbello territus, Philocle . misso,' etc. (ci. Polyb.xvi, 29, I)-7 6 Livy (P) xxxi, i6, 2.

77 Livy (P) xxxi, i6, 3-I7, II. See infra, p. I99.7 8 Polyb. xvi, 34, I-7 , Livy (P) xxxi, I 8, I-4 ;Diod. xxviii, 6; Appian, Maced. 4, 2.79Cf. Holleaux, Rome, 267-8; CAH viii, I64;De Sanctis op. cit., iv, I, 35; Niese, op. cit., ii, 595.80 Livy i, 3z, 5; cl. vii, 6, 7; 32, I; x, 45, 7Dionys. Ant. Roen. ii, 72, 6. Lange, RomischeAltertiimeri3, 322 ff.81 Theoretically, 'of course, the Roman Peoplehas always suffered injury from its adversary; andit is reparation for this injury that is sought by thepater patratus. The rerumrepetitio is also called theclarigatio, cf. Servius, ad Aen. ix, 52; Arnobius ii,67; and Wissowa, Religion und Kultus der Rimer2,

553.82 Testatio-Livy i, 32, 9, 'ego vos testorpopulum illum iniustum esse': denuntiatio-Livy x, I 2; Cic. de re pub. ii, I7.


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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR I93facto ius nostrum adipiscamur.' The Senate then met and solemnlydecided on war, the war was authorised by the people,83 and amessenger was sent to the frontier to carry out the symbolical ceremonyof casting a spear into the enemy's land. It was to this ceremony thatthe term indictio belli was originally applied. 84 Thus in the originalform of the ius fetiale the order of procedure was res repetuntur,senatus censet, populus iubet, bellum indicitur.'The first change in this procedure came as early as the time ofPyrrhus. Servius (Danielis) relates how, in the case of an overseasenemy, difficulty was experienced in finding a suitable place for thecasting of the ceremonial spear.85 Accordingly, a prisoner of war,captured from Pyrrhus, was made to purchase a piece of land near thetemple of Bellona, boundary stones were set up, and into this strip ofpermanently ' hostile soil ' the spear of war was henceforth cast !8 6Thus from the time of Pyrrhus, it cannot be assumed that the old-fashioned indictio belli necessarily took place on any particularoccasion.With the growth of the Senate's power during the second half ofthe third century, a still more important modification took place,this time with reference to the clarigatio or rerum repetitio. In theinterests of centralised control, the duties of the fetiales were nowtransferred to senatorial legati. 87 And as the Senate came intocontact with non-Italian peoples, who had no ius fetiale, it was thissenatorial legatio which, in practice, presented the ultimatum anddeclared war. The modification was scarcely avoidable. Whenenvoys had to be sent to Carthage, Syria or Macedon, it was no longerpracticable for them to deliver their message, bring the refusal backto Rome, there wait until the question had gone before the Senateand People, and then, finally, return to the enemy to deliver theformal indictio belli.The new procedure can best be seen in the preliminaries to theSecond Punic War. In 2i8, after long deliberations, the Senatedecided on war with Carthage ; the necessary military preparationswere made; ' latum inde ad populum, vellent iuberent populoCarthaginiensi bellum indici; eiusque belli causa supplicatio perurbem habita atque adorati dei, ut bene ac feliciter eveniret quodbellum populus Romanus iussisset.'88 This sounds like an unqualified

83 Livy vii, 6, 7, the term used being iubere;this step is omitted in the account of i, 32, 5.84 Livy x, 45, 7 where the letiales are sentad res repetendas; ' quibus non redditis exauctoritate patrum iussu populi bellum Faliscis

indictum; ' Cic. loc. cit.; Lange, op. cit., i3, 328.In two places in Livy (i, 32, 5; vii, 32, i-z) theexpression indictio belli is used to describe thedenuntiatio; the reason for this curious error will beconsidered below (p. I94, n. 9I).85 Serv. Dan. ad Aen. ix, 52: 'cum . . . necinvenirent locum ubi hanc sollemnitatem perfetiales indicendi belli celebrarent.'

86 Serv. Dan. ibid.; Ovid, Fasti vi, 205 ff. Thisfiction was preserved into imperial times; cl. Suet.Claud. 25; Amm. Marc. xix, 2, 6.87 Wissowa, op. cit., 554; P-W., s.v. Fetiales'(Samter); Weiss in Daremberg-Saglio, Dict. des

antiquites, ii, I Ioo (inaccurately paged zooo);Mommsen, Romisches Staatsrecht, ii3, 675; cf.Varro, de 1. 1. v, 86 (fetiales) '. . . ex his mitte-bantur . . . qui res repeterent, et per hos etiamnunc fit foedus.'88 Livy xxi, I7, 4; the passage derives ultimatelyfrom a contemporary annalistic tradition: ct.De Sanctis, op. cit., iii, 2, 185.


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I94 A. H. MCDONALD AND F. W. WALBANKwar-vote; but the account goes on to explain how, ' ut omnia iustaante bellum fierent,' the Senate despatched five legati to ask certainquestions at Carthage about the siege of Saguntum and ' sifaterentur ac defenderent publico consilio factum, ut indicerentpopulo Carthaginiensi bellam.' 8 9 Then there occurred the famousincident when the Roman envoy, making a fold in his toga, exclaimed'hic vobis bellum et pacem portamus: utrum placet, sumite.' 90In short, notwithstanding the authorisation of the Senate andPeople, the toga still held both peace and war; thus the order ofprocedure now ran: ' senatus censet, popialus iubet, res repetuntur,bellum indicitur.' Hence, the People and the Senate now decidedon war conditionally; the legati were authorised to convey thedecision of war, if they received a certain reply. 91It is an indictio belli of this kind which most historians have seenin the visit of Aemilius Lepidus to Abydus. Bickermann, however,claims that the assent of the Roman people to the war was not givenuntil after this meeting, which was therefore not the indictio belli; 92and he has put forward two main objections to the usual view. 93First, the annalistic account in Livy 94 states that after thepeople had been persuaded to vote for the war, the consul Sulpiciusasked the fetiales whether the declaration must be made to Philipin person, or if an announcement at the nearest frontier station wouldbe sufficient : this question, Bickermann claims, would be superfluous

89 Livy (A) xxi, i8, 2; Polyb. iii, 20, 6-7 givestwo similar alternatives.90 Livy xxi, i 8, 13 (Polybius through an annalist,cf. De Sanctis, op. cit., iii, z, 176); Polyb. iii, 33, 2.91 The reason for the error in Livy (see supra,p. I93, n. 84) is now clear: under the later procedure,the new senatorial legati deliver the indictio belliimmediately before departing-in short, at thepoint where formerly the fetiales had delivered thedenuntiatio. The spear-throwing ceremony is amere rite, to be carried out at Rome or on theenemy's frontier, as convenience allows: the realindictio belli is the parting word of the legati.

92 op. cit., I72 ff. Apart fromthe difficultyofexplaining the allotment of Macedonia as a provinceto Sulpicius at the beginning of the year (supra,p. i85, n. 39), the chronology of Bickermann'sthesis is hard to accept. Sulpicius landed in Epirusautumno fere exacto (Livy (P) xxxi, 22, 4), i.e. inmid-September (cf. Ilolleaux, BCH, lvi, I932,531 f.), and Philip learnt of this on the way fromAbydus to Macedon (Livy (P) xxxi, I8, 9). Nowif Lepidus' meeting at Abydus preceded the war-vote in the Comitia, time is needed for Philip'sreply to reach Rome, for the two votes on the war-motion, for all the preparations and formalities,and for the army to get from Rome to Epirus beforePhilip left Abydus. Bickermann allows (op. cit.,174, n. 3) twenty days for the journey from Abydusto Rome, three days for the supplicatio, ten daysfor military preparations and other formalities andnine days for the journey from Rome to Epirus-in all about six weeks. Therefore, assuming that

Philip left Abydus about the time that Sulpiciuslanded in Epirus (asseems likely, since the news metPhilip en route for Macedon), Philip must havestayed six weeks at Abydus after it fell. But Livy'swords ( .(P) xxxi, I8, 9) are simply: 'Philippusimposito Abydi praesidio in regnum rediit.' It isdifficult to limit the whole of the Roman prepara-tions to ten days and equiallyso to prolong Philip'sstay at Abydus to six weeks (particularly after thevisit of Lepidus). Yet Bickermann's figures arehere a maximum and a minimum respectively:neither can be modified except at the expense of theother.

93 Op. cit., I83. Bickermann's other criticismsare easily disposed of. His first-that if theultimatum at Abydus was the indictio belli, that toNicanor must have been the clarigatio-rests on amisunderstanding not only of the procedure at thistime, but indeed of the ius /etiale of the earlyrepublic. For the original indictio belli was, as wesaw (supra, p. I93, n. 84), a mere ritual of spear-throwing; hence it can never have possessed 'lameme ampleur' as the clarigatio. Secondly,Bickermann argues, Lepidus was sent to Abyduson the instructions of the embassy, whereas anyquestion of an ultimatum must have been manageddirect from Rome. But that the envoys didhave direct instructions from Rome is clear fromPol. xvi, 34, 2: 3sA6iuevoc 7rpobsav'srb' TO-VC'lX7r7rov 7ro?osrcW Lt TObS \6' OVS KacT Ta'5E'ToVds.

94 xxxi, 8, 3-4.


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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 195if AemiliusLepiduswasto besent. Now, onthe analogyof the SecondPunic War, 5the war-vote(whichwasonly a conditional declarationof war9 6) should have been followed by the sending of legati to Philipad res repetendas. But on this occasion legati were already in Greeceand had delivered what was in effect a rerumrepetitio to Nicanor atAthens; and Philip, disdaining to reply, had merely continued hisaggression in the north-east. Therefore, Sulpicius, authorised con-ditionally by the People to make war, asked the fetiales whether infact the ultimatum (that is, the combined clarigatio and indictiobelli) need be delivered to Philip in person, 97 or if the old spear-throwing ceremony would be sufficient. 98 And the fetiales repliedthat either would be in order.So long as the validity of the ultimatum presented to Nicanor,before and without the authorisation of the Centuries, was in question,Sulpicius' appeal to the fetiales, far from being superfluous, wasalmost the only course ; and the reply of the priests shows that theywere aware of the difficulty and were determined to evade it. 'Lareponse des pr6tres fut positive ' writes Bickermann: 99 positiveit was, but only in informing the Senate that whichever course theyadopted would be correct. This failure on the part of the fetialesto offer a reliable interpretation of the ius fetiale under the morecomplicated conditions of the early second century was to bearfruit eight years later, when, at the outset of the war with Antiochusin I92, the consul, confused by the precedent of 2oo, again askedthesame question-only to be referred back to that precedent, i.e. thathe should please himself.1 00 But the fact that the reply in zoo wasevasive is not evidence that the question was superfluous.Bickermann's second objection concerns the sending ofM. Aemilius Lepidus to Abydus, after the Senate, according to theannalistic tradition, had instructed the consul to send ' quem videreturex eis qui extra senatum essent . . . ad bellum indicendum.' 1 o1 Lepidus,he claims, was already a senator; hence the meeting at Abydus wasnot the indictio belli. The answer is that there is no proof thatLepidus was a senator in 200 B.C.; it is doubtful, indeed, if he hadeven held the quaestorship in 204, when the last censors had been in

96 The similarity of language in which the twodecisions and the subsequent religious ceremonies aredescribed shows the two situations to be parallel:if Livy (A) xxi, 17, 4 (quoted supra, p. 193) and xxxi,8, i-z (A): ' supplicatio inde in triduum exsenatus consulto indicta est, obsecratique circaomnia pulvinaria dei, ut quod bellum cum Philippopopulus iussisset, id bene ac feliciter eveniret.'96 See sUpra, pp. I93-4-

9 7 Livy (A) xxxi, 8, 3: ' bellum, quod indicereturregi Philippo, utrum ipsi utique nuntiariiuberent .98 ibid. an satis esset, in finibus regni, quodproximum praesidium esset, eo nuntiari.'-99 Op-. Cit., 17z.

100 Livy (A) xxxvi, 3, 7 ff. A similar evasivenessmay appear also in the record of the priests' replyto the consul's second question-whether a separatedeclaration of war must be made against theAetolians and whether friendly relations must firstbe broken off; for the statement that Aetoliahad already broken off her relations with Rome byher refusal to give satisfaction legatis totiens (res)repetentibus (Livy (A) xxxvi, 3, io) grossly mis-represents the negotiations of Flamininus with theAetolians in I92 at the spring League meeting(Plut. Tit. i5; Livy (P) xxxv, 33) and at Aegiumin November (Livy (P) xxxv, 47 sq.; Plut. Philop.I5; Tit. 17; Comparison,2).101 Livy (A) xxxi, 8, 4-


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I96 A. H. MCDONALD AND F. W. WALBANKoffice. 10 2 And, in any case, all that is known of the quaestorship inthis respect is that by I50 B.C. anyone holding the office could reason-ably expect to be enrolled in the Senate at the next census 1 03and that in the time of Sulla this enrolment became automatic. 1 04But in the year 200 B.C. admission to the Senate could only be ob-tained in one of two ways. First, the censors filled up the ranks everyfive yearsfrom those citizens who, in addition to certain other qualifi-cations, were over the age of forty-six. 10 5 Secondly, upon holdingcertain magistracies, a Roman became qualified to sit in the Senate andenjoy the rights of a senator without actually holding the rank; thesemagistracies were, in the year 2i6,106 those of consul, praetor andcurule aedile. The formal distinction between the two grades isseen in the phrase " senatores et quibus in senatu sententiam dicerelicet."1 07 Now it is improbable that Lepidus had in 200 beenadmitted into the Senate by the second method; and, as his youthautomatically precludes the first, we may assume that he was not atthis date a member of the Senate.10 8What then, if we accept the annalistic record, will have been theSenate's motive in instructing the consul to deliver the ultimatum toPhilip by a non-senator ? In the first place, that it was delivered atall is proof that in spite of the reply of the fetiales the Senate consideredit better to regularise the position with a full rerum repetitio-utomnia iusta ante bellumfierent.109 But why was it to be delivered bya single legatus and a non-senator ?1 1 0 The answer is, we believe,that the Senate were compromising between religious legality-thatstrict pietas to which Bickermann refers"'1-and their dignity as abody. Since the ultimatum delivered to Nicanor was, whatever thefetiales might say, not fully valid according to the ius fetiale,they would deliver a further indictio; but, as Philip's only replyto the first ultimatum had been intensified aggression, lest theyshould appear to be giving him excessive consideration this time

1 02 Livy (A) xxix, 37, i. Bickermann followsMunzer (Romische Adelsparteien, I7I) in the viewthat the quaestorship at this time brought automaticentry to the Senate; but neither adduces anyevidence in its support.103 Val. Max. ii, Z, I. Q. Fabius communicatedthe war-decision against Carthage to Crassus'memor eum triennio ante quaestorem factum,ignarus nondum a censoribus in ordinem senatorumadlectum, quo uno modo etiam iis qui iam honoresgesserant aditus in curiam dabatur.' The laststatement requires modification, at least as regardsconsuls, praetors and curule aediles (see infra, n. Io6).10 Mommsen,op. cit., iii 3, 863.105 Monimsen, op. cit., iii3, 874; Daremberg-Saglio, op. cit., iv, I185, ' Senatus' (Lecrivain):according to the latter the age of entrance to theSenate was probably reduced by the Lex Villia of

18o to twenty-seven.106 Livy (A) xxiii, 23-

107 Aul. Gell. iii, I8, 7; cf. also Festus, p. 339,M: ' qui post lustrum conditum ex iunioribusmagistratum ceperunt, et in senatu sententiamdicunt, et non vocantur senatores ante quam insenioribus sunt censi.' The seniores are presumablythose of forty-six and over.1 08 Even if it could be proved that Lepidus wasa member of the Senate in zoo, there is still thepossibility that the words qui extra senatum essentare merely the annalistic or Livian transcription ofan original qui nondumsenatores essent or the like.The distinction between senatores and quibus insenatu sententiam dicere licet was blurred as early asthe S.C. ' de Bacchanalibus ' of I86; cf. Mommsen,op. cit., iji3 859, n. I.1 09 Livy (A) xxi, I8, z referring to the legatiof zi8. See supra, p. I 94.110 Cl. Mommsen, op. cit., ii3, 685 'Einzel-gesandte finden sich auch, aber sehr selten.'111 Op. cit., I70, quoting Flor. ii, 6, z, ' summafoederum Romanis religio est.'


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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 197they would sendonly a singleenvoy, and him a non-senator.Accord-ingly, not all three legati, but onlythe youngest, 12 presentedhimselfat Abydusto deliverthe ultimatum.This journeythus fulfilled the same function as that of Q. Fabiusand his four colleaguesto Carthagein zi8. And indeed the twointerviews ran a parallel course; at both the Romans began bydelivering their ultimatum, 13 whereupontheir opponents first ofall contested the demands made, 14 but then, realisingfrom theRoman answer that the Senate was determined on war in anyevent,115 they accepted the ultimatum as a true declaration ofwar. 116

To sum up: the Romanembassywhich deliveredthe ultimatumto Nicanor was limited in competence,and the ultimatum had notthe full validity of an indictiobelli: this we may attribute to thefact, recordedby the annalistic tradition, that the first attempt toget the war-motionthroughthe Centurieshad failedand the embassythus lacked the authority of the Roman People. When the newsthat the war-vote had at last been passed by the People reachedRhodes, it was accompanied by instructions that a final indictioshould be deliveredto Philip in person; but that in order to avoidcompromising he dignity of the Senate, only the youngest of thethree envoys,the non-senator,M. Aemilius Lepidus,should be sent.It was this formal declarationof war which was to be delivered atAbydus. 3Philip's reply to the Senate'sultimatum had been to despatchPhilocleswith z,ooo infantryand200 cavalryo devastateAttica. 17There are no details of the opening of Philocles'operations,but itseems that he wasto carryout a continuousand systematicblockadeof Athens. Fromthe fact that towardsthe end of the yearhe came

from Euboeawith 2,000 Thraciansand Macedonianso ravageAttica,118it would appearthat he had been in command there andoperating againstAthens for the whole summer. Some idea of hismethods may be gainedfrom the account of the conditionin whichthe Atheniansfound themselvesbeforetheir reliefby ClaudiusCentoin the autumn.19 They had been suffering rom regular ncursions112 Polyb. xvi, 34, I: 6 vecbraToe; 34, 6: ve0 Kac

wpaty/54TOV &7repos; cf. Livy (P) xxxi, i8, i.113 Carthage: Polyb. iii, ZO, 7; Livy (A) xxi,i8, 3. Abydus: Polyb. xvi, 34, 3; cf. Livy (P)

xxxi, i8, i. (On the source of Livy xxi, I8 seesupra, p. 193, n. 88.)114 Carthage: Polyb. iii, zo, io sq.; Livy (A)xxi, I8, 4. Abydus: Polyb. xvi, 34, 5; cf. Livy

(P) XXXi, I 8, 2.115 Carthage: Polyb. iii, 33, i-z; Livy (A) xxi,I8, I3. Abydus: Pol. xvi, 34, 5; cf. Livy (P.)xxxi, I8, z-3.

116 Carthage: Polyb. iii, 33, 4; Livy (A) xxi,I8, 14. Abydus: Polyb. xvi, 34, 7; cf. Livy (P)xxxi, I8, 4.

117 Livy (P) xxxi, I6, z. See supra, p. I92.118 Livy (P) xxxi, z6, I.119 Livy (P) xxxi, I4, 3; 22, 5-7. Zonaras ix, I5.Appian, Maced. 4, I, is misdated to zoI: therecord represented by the phrase ETepqp/le'peto-rparoOmay originally have applied to the simultane-ous operations of Philip in Thrace and Philocles inAttica in the summer of zoo.


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198 A. H. MCDONALD AND F. W. WALBANKof Macedonian troops from Corinth, and privateers from Chalcis hadnot only made the sea unsafe for shipping, but were a constantmenace to the coastal districts of Attica. How long this had beengoing on is not stated; but the regularity of the depredations and theutter despair of the Athenians point to a considerable period, and wemay conclude that the desperate situation in the autumn was the resultof Philocles' strategy throughout the summer.The question immediately arises: what help did the Atheniansreceive from their allies ? There is a reference to the presence ofthree Rhodian quadriremes at the time of Cento's arrival, and to thepart played by a Pergamene detachment in the defence of the cityagainst Philip. 12 0 We do not know when these reinforcements cameon the scene, but in all probability they were sent in response to anAthenian appeal soon after Philocles had opened his operations, justas Abydus later received reinforcements of 300 Pergamene troops andone Rhodian quadrireme. 121 The safety of Athens was thus secured;but apparently no measures were taken to protect Attica fromdevastation, and it is clear that neither Attalus nor the Rhodians feltable to spare the necessary forces. In these circumstances theAthenians would certainly extend their appeals to every possiblequarter. They would immediately approach their other allies;then, if aid was late in coming and the strict blockade continued,they might well, even without having official relations, send envoysto Rome and appeal to the Senate to hasten the military interventionin Greece.It is to this point that we may attribute the embassy ofCephisodorus, which Pausanias, in describing his monument, cele-brated as the outstanding achievement of his career.122 Cephisodorus,says Pausanias, led the Athenians in an anti-Macedonian policy(,uol Ipo&v(o Dod c-Jccpc A-%qup'ouMocx8'ov P aLe6o0vL G CXLSa-o ZVocVTL&&V-T4).He procuredasalliesof Athensthe kingsAttalusand Ptolemy Epiphanes, of the autonomous peoples the Aetolians,and of the islanders the Rhodians and Cretans (au61Xouq 8?&MYeTO Kiyp=66&poq 'AO-svm'mq yev aOmL a6sZx?G ptv 'Attocovbov Muabv xoc l HltoXsecZov t6v A'yL&7rLov, e'Ovj 8 otuovoAlAXoq xod'L naLrmtv TPoaou XoL Kpstocq.) Then, whenAttalus, Ptolemy and the Cretans for the most part failed tosend help, and the Rhodian ships were of little use against theMacedonian hoplites, he sailed with other envoys to Rome to beg forprotection ((OU octZ Alyi'rn-ouoctMua'ocX OC T&v Kpvti0v tok 7roXX&ua6tpL40v oct PoWeLOCL,TP&OL U P6VOCVqVOCU6V LayUOVte4 7ZpO4 07WrLt4 to6Mocax6vaq oi) iueyokXocceXouv, &vtoMi5oc KypLa608cpo4 e' 'Jtowcv a"V &\xxoL'AO-voukov -nXe6aoc 'xz&uev 4tivaL 'PcPtoaouq). This record may betaken to represent the laudatory decree inscribed upon Cephisodorus'

120 Livy (P) XXXi, 22, 8; 24, 10.121 Polyb. xvi, 30, 7; 31, 3. Livy (P) xxxi, i6, 7.122 Paus. i, 36, 5-6.


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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR I99monument. 123 Pausanias' inaccuracy in the context does not affectthis detailed passage,124 which clearly stands by itself and may betaken as a special reproduction. It even preserves the diplomaticphraseology in the distinction between 3ocaLXe4, Ovn ocC6ovo,uacand vnatoCL& just as these classes appear in contemporary in-scriptions. 1 2 5The statements are in striking agreement with our reconstructionof the situation that will have arisen in Athens during Philocles'operations. The auxLpCYoct re military agreements againstMacedon. 126 The Rhodian ships are the three quadriremes; thequalification & -toXXOcn regard to the lack of assistance from Attalus,Ptolemy and the Cretans appears appropriately in deference to thesmall Pergamene detachment; and the suggestion of inadequacy indefence points to a period of regular incursions before the appeal toRome. Egypt no doubt maintained the old relations of alliance withAthens, but in spite of promises was not in a position to send help.In Crete there were towns hostile to Philip and friendly towardsAthens, e.g. Cnossus, Polyrrhenium, Rhaucus, Cydonia, Hierapytna,Gortyn, which may have promised assistance.127 The Aetolians,who were on friendly terms with Athens,128 may have given theirformal support to the Athenian side, but probably from the firstdeclared themselves unable to promise immediate military actionthis will account for the absence of reference to them in the secondpart of the Pausanian record; and we may compare their similarinaction in connection with the appeal of Attaluasat the same time. 12 9Taking the definite evidence of Pausanias' record with the indicationsof the Polybian reconstruction, therefore, we may accept the traditionof an Athenian appeal to Rome and date it to late in the summer of200.13 0After the despatch of Philocles, Philip had taken immediatesteps to secure Thrace and the Hellespont and keep control of theStraits. 131 It was only now that he appeared in open action againstEgypt. He reduced the Ptolemaic possessions on the Thracian coast,completed the conquest of the Thracian Chersonese, and began thesiege of Abydus. Attalus and the Rhodians made no attempt tohinder him, and although they sent 300 men and a quadrireme toAbydus, they did not move to the relief of the city. 13 2The Roman envoys at Rhodes will have reported to the Senate

123 Niese, op. cit., ii, 590, n. I ; Taubler,op. cit., i, zI6 ; Ferguson, Hell. Athens., 269,n. I ; De Sanctis, op. cit. iv, I, zi, n. 53.124 As Holleaux, Rev. EA xxii (I920), 84(cf. Nissen, op. cit. Izz note).125 Cf. for ao-tXeds, 96vq air76voga: Ditt.ii3, 557, 31 ff-; 590, I2, 3I; 6I3 A. 3-4; for theAetolians as an t6vos: i, 532, 6; ii, 554 7;

598, D. 6; for v37odtiras: i, 390, I3, I9,24; ii, 58z, 6 if.126 Ferguson, Op.cit., 270, n. 5.

127 Holleaux, Klio Xiii (I9I3), I46-8 ; Seltman,Greek Coins, z6i.128 Holleaux, Rome, z66, n. 3.129 Livy (P) xxxi, I5, 9-IO. See supra, p. I85.13 0 Cf. Passerini, op. cit., z8z-6.131 Polyb. xvi, 29, i ; Livy (P) xxxi, i5, I i.De Sanctis op. cit., iv, I, 34; Holleaux, CAH viii,I63 ; Passerini, op. cit., 287-8.132 Polyb. xvi, 29-34; cf. Livy (P) xxxi, i6,3-I8, 8.


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200 A. H. MCDONALD AND F. W. WALBANK

the rejectionof the ultimatum shown in Philocles'opening operationsin Attica, andthe beginningof Philip'scampaign n Thrace, includingthe threatto the Egyptian possessions. The despatcharrived n mid-summer,and the Senateagain presentedthe proposal or war to thepeople, on the grounds of Philip's aggression against Attalus, thefriend and ally of Rome. When the measurewas voted, the Senatesent instructions to the envoys, who were still at Rhodes, to com-municate the formal Roman rerumrepetitio and indictio belli toPhilip in person. Philipshouldnot makewar on any Greek state ortouch Egyptian possessions,and he must submit to arbitration thequestionof reparationsnot only to Attalus but to the Rhodians.1 3The reference o Egypt at this late point will be due to the fact thatPhilip was only now openly threatening Egyptian possessionsn theAegean. The addition of Rhodes would seem to accompany theestablishmentof relationsof alliance. Athens as yet clearly had noformalrelationswith Rome which would permit her appearancen theRomandemands.But soon after the despatch of instructionsfor the delivery ofthe indictio belli, the Athenian embassy under Cephisodoruswillhave arrived, and doubtless the Senate entered into relations ofalliance. 34 This was the climax of Cephisodorus'diplomacy; andwe may here attempt a surveyof it in connection with the decreepassed n hishonour n the springof I95, when the proclamation f the' Freedomof Greece' by Flamininusat the Isthmian Gamesin I96seemed to have set the seal of success upon his policy. 135 Thepreamble s cast in studiouslyvagueterms,but the references n theirorder are clearlyto Cephisodorus' pecial servicesto the State: theallusionsmust have been intelligible to the Athenians, who knewthe details of his career, and we have now sufficient evidence todefinethem moreclosely.Cephisodorus eganhis politicalcareersoonafter 225, and carriedout the usualliturgies.13 He did not becomeprominent until afterthe deaths of Eurycleidesand Micion,137 when in the archonshipof Apollodorus (204-3) he served as rocpJocqr&vacp -rtconxvand inthe archonship of Proxenides (203-2) as -roclqO -wv av(VL&x&V.In the latter capacity he will no doubt have had to face the economicdifficulties caused by Philip's campaign in the Hellespont in the spring

13 3 Polyb. xvi, 34, I-4.134 This embassy, it may be noted, should not beconfused with the Athenian envoys who metSulpicius Galba on his arrival in Greece in the

autumn and requested the immediate despatchof a squadron to the relief of Athens (Livy (P)Xxxi, I4, 3): against Larsen, Class. Phil. xxxii,I (I937), 22 f$-1 3 5Meritt, Hesperia v (I 936), 3, 424-5, 427.13 6 11 7-jZ: ibid., 425-6.137 According to Pausanias (ii, 9, 4) Eurycleidesand Micion, like Aratus, were poisoned by Philip.

Eurvcleides' death occurred after the archonship ofArchelaus (zIz-I or 209-8: Ferguson, Ath. Tr.Cycles, 36, n. 7), and before the archonship ofDionysius, which, with the preceding archonship ofNicophon, may now (since we have Apollodorus204-3 and Proxenides 03-2) be placedbeforethearchonship of Callistratus 2o6-5. It may thus bedated as early as IsI or as late as 207, and the laterdate is preferable in view of the effect of theirpolicy, which would imply influence in the lastdecade of the century, and in the light of the tradi-tion of Philip's hostility.


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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 20Iof 202, and we may associate with this the legislation for civic unity(Vopuq au5 yepovroc I '(Po'40[0o0L 7t&VrCOV AONvocU&w)nd the recom-mendation of measures for raising money (7o6pouqXpn,uocrvLaourXOct aLctoVq au tppouXeuxd). The record thus throwslight upontheeffect in Athens of Philip's policy of aggression in the north Aegeanin ZOZ.138The next reference is to a proposal of Cephisodorus to considerthe means of maintaining old alliances and obtaining new ones(eLG-NY? 8?M0 axo'L o?i Tp6'ouIoVt re 6'v'aq yXou O?o 05Lq?POC'LOUq ?V T'EZ 7da[L] EVOVTMGxao ETSpOUq 7porx carL). This wasa move due to his foresight in regard to foreign (i.e. Macedonian)plots (xocl r YLVOk?LVgoc 7LM3OUX?'& 1J7b'?T'CiV 96)O?V 7rpO&)p0qLSV0 ),and he was appointed to consider measures of resistance (xoclocVnLas'VOC[L] tp[oa0 1oCy?voq). He made recommendations foralliances (xocl aU[LVoxMLMo uV.PPU?SUX&q Xax xot [aVV eVnVO|7?LCg'cU)L a,[L6L). We have here the record of a definite proposalby Cephisodorus that Athens should formulate a policy againstaggression in anticipation of an open threat to Athenianinterests, of his official appointment to consider ways and meansof carrying it out, and of his recommendations for alliances. Thesemeasures are to be dated to a point at which the Macedoniandanger to Athens could be felt but the full aims of Philip's policyhad not yet been revealed, so that Cephisodorus' proposal could bepraised as foresight. The date will clearly be earlier than the dis-covery of the Syro-Macedonian pact in the summer of 20I, butpresumably later than the economic measures of 202. We may seethe occasion in Philip's appearance in the Cyclades in the spring of20I, which may now have seemed to Cephisodorus almost as threaten-ing as the operations in the East Aegean were to appear to Attalus. 139Our reconstruction of the course of Athenian policy may thus betaken a stage further back. As early as the spring of 20I the Atheniansfelt obliged to take steps to meet the possibility of Macedonianaggression. The report of the Syro-Macedonian pact convinced themthat the danger was not only direct and imminent, but even moreserious than they had imagined. And so the break with Macedonfollowed immediately in the abolition of the ' Macedonian' tribes,and we see the tension in the attack on the Acarnanians. The strainof the winter 20I-O may be imagined, and the effect of the Acarnanianand Macedonian raid is shown by the reception of Attalus as a saviourhero. The formal declaration of war on Macedon followed as anatural con'sequence.Then, with the operations of Philocles, the Athenians foundthemselves again in desperate straits, and it would scarcely be possibleto exaggerate the urgency of the appeals to Attalus, Ptolemy

138 11. I2-17. Meritt, op. cit., 426: cl. Heichel-heim, loc. cit. (see supra, p. I84, n. 32). 13 11. 17-ZZ: ibid.,426.


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202 A. H. MCDONALD AND F. W. WALBANKEpiphanes, the Aetolians, -the Rhodians and the Cretans, andultimately to Rome. These appeals are the subject of the nextrecord of special commissions undertaken by Cephisodorus: hecarried out importantembassies or the security of the Attic townsand territory (xocl 7tp?ar3LMoc 7?p?r3?Ux6 7rsnp [-TW&V]1y'aLCTCV?L a @ ov 'ocLo t6? OXoO ' L Xc)poL). The reference to the 7hXetLandto the Zc6pocndicates that Athens itself was not threatened,but that the coastal towns and the Attic countrysidewere in dangerof falling entirely into Macedonian hands, and we have seen thatPhilocles' strategy was to blockadeAthens by the devastation ofAtticaandby navaloperationsalongthe coast. The terrible ef3ectofthe blockade s reflected n the recordof Cephisodorus' ifts of money,corn and other-things at this time (xocl Zp+jLocvrocZj xodt ev'ov xoclWacqcops?k OV'X OXELzCq).14 0The rest of the preambleconcernsthe SecondMacedonianWar.We have mention of decrees proposed by Cephisodorus (elavNVoq8? aocL |


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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 203the Roman action. Rome definitely laid down the principle ofGreek autonomy as her justification for intervention in Greece,andas the basisfor her diplomacy in the Second MacedonianWar, andthe supportof the Greekstates was given to her expresslyand solelyin her characteras the defender of freedom. This was the extent ofCephisodorus' ro-Romanpolicy: it rested upon the needsof Athensandupon the declaredpolicy of Rome ; and in I95, after the Isthmianproclamation f Flamininus n I96, a decree n honourof the Athenianstatesman might justifiably claim that his aims had been achieved.III. THE ROMAN DECLARATION OF WAR AND THE POLICY OF THE SENATE

From our study of events in Athens, then, it would appearthatRome was not involved by treaty relations in the protection ofAthenian interests. We may not accept the record of Athens' partin the Peace of Phoenice even as a xoLv' 46n. 1But,while theAthenian case did not legally affect the Roman declaration of war,the embassyof Cephisodorus,arriving mmediatelyafterwardswithits reportof Macedonianviolence,must have created a profoundim-pression and it is not hard to understandhow the Athenian appealcame to occupy an unduly significant place in the Roman traditionof the outbreakof the war, andfinally, n the chronological onfusionandtendentious compositionof the annalists,afterRome and Athenshad entered nto close relations,wasacceptedasthe decidingcause.1 4To return to the reconstructionof events: late in the summer,besidesthe Athenian embassy,Egyptian envoys may have appearednRome. By mid summerAntiochushad won the battle of Panion 45and Scopas lay besieged in Sidon; an Athenian embassyled byCephisodorushad appeared n Alexandria o beg for help; and newswill have come of the Senate'sultimatum, and of Philip'sthreat tothe Ptolemaic possessionsin Thrace. Now there had been littlehope that Rome would move on behalf of Coele-Syria; but theposition in Thrace wasdifferent,for Rome had shownher intentionto block Philip's expansion,and she could easily afford protectionto the Egyptian cities there. Thus, when the annalistictraditionrecordsan Egyptian embassy o Rome after the war-votein 200, thismaywell be true. 46 The envoyswould havereportedthe Athenianappealas proofof the seriousness f the situation,and have requestedhelp for their Thracian possessions. They would, of course, have

'44 Livy (A) xxxi, I, I0; 5, 5-6; xl, zz, 6.Appian, Maced., 4, 2. On other annalistic falsifica-tions, see De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, 2I, n. 55.14-5 On the dating of the battle the evidence ofJosephus (Ant. lud. Xii, I35) for its appearance inPolybius Bk.x vi (ob., I44, 3, 4 = ZOZ-ZOO) ay beaccepted and the year taken as 200 (cf. Niese,op. cit., ii, 578, n. 6; Holleaux, Klio Viii (i908),Z70; against the date of I98 upheld by De Sanctis,op. cit., iv, I, ii8, n. 8).

146 Livy (A) xxxi, 9, I--5. This notice is intypical annalistic style, with its anachronistic modeof reference to the relations between Rome and heramici at this time; but allowance must be made forthis characteristic elaboration in all treatment ofannalistic data: it does not necessarily meancomplete invention (as Niese, op. cit., ii, 580, n. 3;HIolleaux, Rome, 64, n, 4). The basic record underthe elaboration may be sound (cf. De Sanctis, op. cit.,iv, I, 2z, n. 56).


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204 A. H. MCDONALD AND F. W. WALBANKfoundtheir reply in the Romanultimatum. If the questionof Coele-Syriawas raised, t would have been referred o the Romanembassy.The formal ultimatum and declarationof war was delivered, aswe have seen, by M. Aemilius Lepidus at Abydus. 47 Romedemanded that the king should not makewar on any Greek stateor touch Egyptianpossessions,and that he shouldsubmit to arbitra-tion the question of reparations to Attalus and the Rhodians.The Rhodians,we may note, are now addedin view of the establish-ment of relations of alliance with Rome, for which the embassyreceivedfull authority after the war-vote.148 Philip raisedthe legalquestion of the right of Rome to intervene againstMacedon. Heclaimed that the Rhodianswere technicallythe aggressors, nd that,in joining them and Attalus, Rome would violate the Peace ofPhoenice. 49 It must be clear from this appeal to the treaty ofPhoenice that Philip had not committed aggression against anysignatory: in the case of Attalus he makesthe counter-chargeofaggression. Lepidus ignoredthe legal argument,and maintained heRoman claim to be acting in defence of Greek autonomy. Philip,he stated,wasconvictedof aggressionagainstfree Greek statesby histreatment of Athens, Cius and Abydus. These instances have noconnection with the Peace of Phoenice, and there is no question oftreaty obligationson the partof Rome: 150 they are quoted togetheras the most flagrant examples of the Macedonian threat to theautonomy of Greece. The Roman and the Macedoniancaseswereirreconcilable. Philip held to his point that he had not violated thetreaty with Rome, and rejected the demands. Rome was left todeclarewarin the name of Greekautonomy.The Romanembassy hen left for Syriaon its further missionofmediationbetween Antiochus and Ptolemy Epiphanes. The victoryof Panionmarkeda decisivestep in the conquest of Coele-Syria,andthe Romans found as an almost accomplishedfact what they canscarcelyhave intended to hinder: the duty of interveningfor Egyptin Coele-Syriacould be given up as impracticable. The real pointat issue lay nearer home. Antiochusmust have been askedhow farthe Syro-Macedonianpact committed him to the supportof Philipin a warwith Rome. His replyseemsto havegiven completesatisfac-tion, and argumentswere made for a Syrianembassy o visit Rometoopen diplomaticrelationswith the Senate. 51It has been urgedthat on the Romansidethis cordialitywasonlyapparent. The Romans, t is said,wereuneasyat the threat of Syriansupport for Macedon and wished at any cost to secure Antiochus'neutrality; so they feigned goodwill in the hope that he might be

147 See supra, p. i92 ff.148 Cf. Holleaux, Rome, 3o-46; Carcopino,L'imperialisme romain, 48, n. 2; against DeSanctis,Riv. fil. (NS) Xiii (I935),6-314 9 Cf. Polyb. xviii, 6, z.

150 As De Sanctis, op. cit., iv, I, 32, n. 65 andBickermann, op. cit., 75: see Holleaux, Rome,z68, and Passerini, op. cit., 289.151 Cf. Livy (P) xxxiii, zo, 8. Holleaux, Rev. EAXv (I9I3), I-4.


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THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 205

sufficiently occupied with Egypt to withhold help from Philip.152Yet a study of the situation appears to indicate that the Romancordiality was due not so much to anxiety for Syrian neutrality as tothe welcome discovery that this was certain. The Syro-Macedonianpact had broken down. The unrestrained aggression of theMacedonian policy, as we have seen, had roused uneasiness in Syria,and Antiochus had practically withdrawn his support from Philip inthe Aegean. He would scarcely undertake a great war with Romemerely to save Philip. The only thing that might have moved himwas fear of Roman imperialism in the East. But here the Romanenvoys could assure him that their policy in Greece was based uponthe principle of autonomy, and that it would secure full respect forSyrian interests in the Aegean. The tacit acceptance of the conquestof Coele-Syria and the fact that Antiochus had no immediate designsupon Egypt itself, resolved any difficulties arising from the relationsof Rome with Egypt. Thus Antiochus could promise Syrianneutralityin the war with Macedon, and the embassy could cordially invite himto enter into diplomatic relations with Rome.The Roman envoys then proceeded to Egypt. Here, wherein any case there was little hope of effective Roman action overCoele-Syria, they probably pleaded the necessity of accepting thesituation, and pointed to the measures in defence of the Ptolemaicpossessions in the Aegean as the true indication of Rome's practicalsupport. The Egyptian government will have entertained theembassy in royal fashion, and it was then that M. Aemilius Lepidusbegan his connections of friendship with the Ptolemaic dynasty.153On returning to Rome the envoys could report that the situationin the East had resolved itself. The Syro-Macedonian pact hadbroken down: Syria would acquiesce in the Roman interventionagainst Macedon. The problem of Coele-Syria no longer existed:Egypt would not demand Roman action against the Syrian conquest.Thus with the friendly neutrality of Syria and in alliance with Egypt,Rome could make war on Macedon in the name of Greek autonomy.The diplomatic preparations were complete.We thus reach the conclusion of our study of the events leadingup to the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War. But we may notstop at this point, for it is not unduly cynical to believe that there wasmore in the Roman policy than philhellenism.The real motive has been seen in the rising Roman imperialism,hitherto engaged in the West, which now turned to the East as soonas the Carthaginian danger disappeared and the Aegean situationgave a favourable opportunity for intervention. The Senate wasmilitaristic in spirit, and Scipio Africanus inspired a programme of

lg2 Niese, op. cit., ii, 637-8 ; Holleaux,Rev. EAXv (I9I3), 4; Rome, 58-9; CAH viii, I65-6.

153 For a full treatment of this matter, see Otto,Zur Geschichte der Zeit des 6. Ptolemders, 27-9;Mattingly, Roman Coins, 76.


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206 A. H. MCDONALD AND F. W. WALBANKimperialistic aggression.154 Yet our survey of the evidence raisesdifficulties in this conception of Roman policy. In 205, with the Peaceof Phoenice, Rome withdrew from Greece. In' 202, with the rebuffto the Aetolians, the Senate did no

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McDonald - Walbank 1937 the Origins of the Second Macedonian War

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