Mearsheimer. The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe

8/7/2019 Mearsheimer. The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe

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John J.MearsheimerJohn J.Mearsheimer

A Strategic Misstep:A Strategic Misstep:The Maritime Strategy andThe Maritime Strategy andDeterrence in Europe.Deterrence in Europe.


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Useful definitionsUseful definitions

Deterrence stability:Deterrence stability: the stability caused bythe stability caused by

your ability to threaten your adversary with ayour ability to threaten your adversary with aformidable military posture so that he recognizesformidable military posture so that he recognizesthat he cannot use force to upset the statusthat he cannot use force to upset the statusquo.quo.

Crisis stability:Crisis stability: it is applied in cases whereit is applied in cases whereneither side is firmly committed to aggressionneither side is firmly committed to aggressionand is a function of the structure of the rivaland is a function of the structure of the rivaldeterrent postures. It depends of each sidesdeterrent postures. It depends of each sides

perceptions of the others aggressiveness, theperceptions of the others aggressiveness, thedegree of military advantage accruing to thedegree of military advantage accruing to theside striking first and the tendency of peacetimeside striking first and the tendency of peacetimemilitary operation to activate the opponentsmilitary operation to activate the opponents

ROE.ROE.


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What NATO was afraid of;What NATO was afraid of;

Soviet Unions attempt to sever theSoviet Unions attempt to sever theAtlantic SLOC by using SSN.Atlantic SLOC by using SSN. Early deployment of Soviet SSBN.Early deployment of Soviet SSBN. Soviet blitzkrieg in the Central FrontSoviet blitzkrieg in the Central Front

(Europe)(Europe)How can the Navy solve these problems;How can the Navy solve these problems;

Direct Naval Impact.Direct Naval Impact. Horizontal Escalation.Horizontal Escalation. Sea Control.Sea Control. Counterforce Coercion.Counterforce Coercion.


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Area of OperationsArea of Operations


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Direct Naval Impact StrategyDirect Naval Impact Strategy

US Navy strike Soviet targets and lessenUS Navy strike Soviet targets and lessenSoviet prospects of winning a conventionalSoviet prospects of winning a conventionalwar in Europe.war in Europe.

The requirements are powerful Navy withThe requirements are powerful Navy with

substantial carrier battle group componentsubstantial carrier battle group componentand a truly robust amphibious capability.and a truly robust amphibious capability.

Critical time constrains are involved.Critical time constrains are involved.

There are three principal scenarios forThere are three principal scenarios forusing the Navy.using the Navy.


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11stst ScenarioScenario

A major landing operation at the coast of either theA major landing operation at the coast of either the

Baltic or Black Sea.Baltic or Black Sea.ProblemsProblems

The element of tactical surprise is missing.The element of tactical surprise is missing.

It is difficult to gain air and sea control of theIt is difficult to gain air and sea control of thelanding area.landing area. US has a limited amphibious lift capability.US has a limited amphibious lift capability. Even if you overcome all of the above, it is difficultEven if you overcome all of the above, it is difficult

to maintain lines of communication with your forces.to maintain lines of communication with your forces.


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22ndnd ScenarioScenario

Participation of the Navys carrierParticipation of the Navys carrier--based aircraft intobased aircraft into

the air war on the Central front.the air war on the Central front.ProblemsProblems

Its not in NATO plans.Its not in NATO plans.

It is very expensive.It is very expensive.


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33rdrd ScenarioScenario

Naval offensive against the Kola Peninsula wouldNaval offensive against the Kola Peninsula would

force the Soviets to postpone a blitzkrieg operation inforce the Soviets to postpone a blitzkrieg operation inEurope because they will have to transfer muchEurope because they will have to transfer muchneeded air units from Europe to the Kola Peninsula.needed air units from Europe to the Kola Peninsula.

ProblemsProblems

Lack of credibility. It is not clear that the NavyLack of credibility. It is not clear that the Navywould achieve a major success.would achieve a major success. Soviets can send air units not involved withSoviets can send air units not involved withoperations at the Central front.operations at the Central front.

Soviets time frame for executing a successfulSoviets time frame for executing a successfulblitzkrieg would be short enough that events on theblitzkrieg would be short enough that events on theNorthern Flank would not upset it in any way.Northern Flank would not upset it in any way.

Central Europe is where a major conventional warCentral Europe is where a major conventional war

would be settled.would be settled.


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Horizontal Escalation StrategyHorizontal Escalation Strategy

Similar to the Direct Naval Impact Strategy thisSimilar to the Direct Naval Impact Strategy this

strategy does little to enhance deterrence. The moststrategy does little to enhance deterrence. The mostdifficult part is to find an appropriate target.difficult part is to find an appropriate target.

ProblemsProblems

The Soviets could afford to absorb a hit in the farThe Soviets could afford to absorb a hit in the farEast while they were rolling up NATOs forces inEast while they were rolling up NATOs forces inCentral Europe.Central Europe.

Again it is not clear that the Navy could inflict aAgain it is not clear that the Navy could inflict a

significant defeat on Soviet forces.significant defeat on Soviet forces. There is no evidence that NATO could improve theThere is no evidence that NATO could improve theforce ratio in Europe by pursuing this strategy.force ratio in Europe by pursuing this strategy.


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ConclusionsConclusions

Advocates of both strategies tend towards a MahanianAdvocates of both strategies tend towards a Mahanian

view of military power. They believe that control ofview of military power. They believe that control ofthe sea is the key ingredient for great power status.the sea is the key ingredient for great power status.However this is not an accurate assessment of theHowever this is not an accurate assessment of thepresent superpower rivalry. The only suitable militarypresent superpower rivalry. The only suitable military

lever that can bring pressure against a continentallever that can bring pressure against a continentalpower (Soviet Union) is a strong army supported bypower (Soviet Union) is a strong army supported bytactical air forces. The neotactical air forces. The neo Mahanian threats ofMahanian threats ofhorizontal escalation and direct military impact simplyhorizontal escalation and direct military impact simply

do not provide a satisfactory posture for deterring ado not provide a satisfactory posture for deterring aformidable land power like the Soviet Union.formidable land power like the Soviet Union.


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Sea control StrategySea control Strategy

Defensive Sea ControlDefensive Sea Control

1.1. Sealing off the SovietSealing off the SovietSSN with a barrier inSSN with a barrier inGIN gap.GIN gap.

2.2. Open ocean ASW belowOpen ocean ASW below

the GIN gap iotthe GIN gap iotneutralize SSN thatneutralize SSN thatpenetrate the barrier.penetrate the barrier.

3.3. Neutralize BackfireNeutralize Backfire

threat with aircraftthreat with aircraftstationed in UK,stationed in UK,Iceland, Norway,Iceland, Norway,Greenland.Greenland.

Offensive Sea ControlOffensive Sea Control

1.1. Rollback campaign.Rollback campaign.US SSN would destroyUS SSN would destroySoviet SSN in theSoviet SSN in theNorwegian andNorwegian and

Barents Sea.Barents Sea.2.2. Carrier battle groupsCarrier battle groupslaunch air strikes andlaunch air strikes andcruise missiles strikescruise missiles strikesagainst Kola Peninsulaagainst Kola Peninsulaiot eliminate the airiot eliminate the airthreat to NATO sthreat to NATO sSLOCs.SLOCs.


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Why offensive sea control isnt anWhy offensive sea control isnt anappropriate deterrent strategy;appropriate deterrent strategy;

Even a 600 ship Navy would have difficulties inEven a 600 ship Navy would have difficulties inrolling back the Soviets Northern Fleet and thenrolling back the Soviets Northern Fleet and thenlaunching attacks against the Kola Peninsula.launching attacks against the Kola Peninsula.

Soviets had an enormous array of assets at the KolaSoviets had an enormous array of assets at the Kola

Peninsula besides the Northern Fleet.Peninsula besides the Northern Fleet. US Navy didnt have adequate number of attackingUS Navy didnt have adequate number of attackingaircraft and carriers for an efficient attack.aircraft and carriers for an efficient attack.

Impossible to inflict a knock out blow against theImpossible to inflict a knock out blow against theSoviet Air Forces.Soviet Air Forces.

US Navy cant fight a protracted air war on NATOsUS Navy cant fight a protracted air war on NATOsNorthern flank.Northern flank.


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The threat of nuclear escalation.The threat of nuclear escalation. Soviets SSNs primary mission is to protectSoviets SSNs primary mission is to protect

SSBNs and not to attack NATOs SLOCs.SSBNs and not to attack NATOs SLOCs.

However if Soviet Union attacks NATOsHowever if Soviet Union attacks NATOsSLOCs the defensive sea control strategy isSLOCs the defensive sea control strategy isstill the most appropriate. Why;;;still the most appropriate. Why;;;

Soviet SSNs would also confront the not-insignificant Navies of US allies.

NATO would have turned the GIN gap into astrong defensive barrier.

NATOs dependence on reinforcements by sea inthe early stage of a conflict wouldnt be great.


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Much easier to destroy Backfires in the areaMuch easier to destroy Backfires in the areaaround GIN gap.around GIN gap.

Variety of ASW assets against Soviet SSNs at theVariety of ASW assets against Soviet SSNs at theGIN gap.GIN gap.

ConclusionConclusion

The Soviets could not be confident of winning theThe Soviets could not be confident of winning theSLOC war, much less winning it in a reasonablySLOC war, much less winning it in a reasonablyshort period of time, if NATO pursued a defensiveshort period of time, if NATO pursued a defensive

sea control posture.sea control posture.


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Counterforce coercionCounterforce coercion

Use of US SSNs to eliminate significant numbers ofUse of US SSNs to eliminate significant numbers of

Soviet SSBNs. This strategy requires a large scaleSoviet SSBNs. This strategy requires a large scaleinsertion operation as well as a rollback operation. Itinsertion operation as well as a rollback operation. Itwill enhance deterrence in two ways:will enhance deterrence in two ways:

Sink enough SSBNs to shift the strategic balanceSink enough SSBNs to shift the strategic balance

against the Soviets.against the Soviets. Produce deterrence simply by generating the risk ofProduce deterrence simply by generating the risk ofnuclear war, even if it didnt necessarily change thenuclear war, even if it didnt necessarily change thestrategic balance.strategic balance.

ProblemsProblems

Risky strategy because of the threat of nuclearRisky strategy because of the threat of nuclearescalation.escalation.


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Mearsheimers viewMearsheimers view

This strategy could be quite destabilizing in a crisis

because it provides very little deterrence stability andpromotes crisis instability.

ProblemsProblems

If US SSNs position themselves into the BarentsIf US SSNs position themselves into the BarentsSea, Soviets would certainly make worst caseSea, Soviets would certainly make worst caseassumptions about US intentions.assumptions about US intentions.

Soviet Union will deploy SSNs and a deadly game ofSoviet Union will deploy SSNs and a deadly game ofcat and mouse would ensue with unpredicted results.cat and mouse would ensue with unpredicted results.

Also it is possible that some US SSNs would be lostAlso it is possible that some US SSNs would be lostbecause of mines forcing the US to respond.because of mines forcing the US to respond.

An American antiAn American anti--SSBN campaign would generateSSBN campaign would generate

risk too early and with less credibility.risk too early and with less credibility.


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Mearsheimers Final conclusionsMearsheimers Final conclusions

A defensive sea control strategy would satisfy

NATOs needs in protecting the SLOCs. The force structure demands of defensive seacontrol are more modest than those of offensive seacontrol.

More resources for the ground and air forces on theCentral Front, which represent the core of NATOsdeterrent.

By building a large Navy and not increasing theground and air forces in Europe, Reaganadministration missed an excellent opportunity toimprove NATO s deterrent posture.


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My own conclusionsMy own conclusions

I am sure that Mearsheimer wasnt voting for

Reagan. He is a huge fun of the Navy. As a neutral reader I believe that his arguments arevery convincing.

I am happy that we didnt have the chance to testhis arguments.


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Questions;;;;Questions;;;;

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Mearsheimer. The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe

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