OCTOBER 2014

Mediating Transition in Yemen:Achievements and Lessons

STEVEN A. ZYCK

Cover Photo: March for Taiz in Sana’a,

Yemen, May 30, 2011. © Raja Althaibani.

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and not necessarily those of IPI. IPI

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Marie O’Reilly, Associate Editor

Marisa McCrone, Assistant ProductionEditor

Suggested Citation:

Steven A. Zyck, “Mediating Transition in

Yemen: Achievements and Lessons,”

New York: International Peace Institute,

October 2014.

© by International Peace Institute, 2014

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

STEVEN A. ZYCK is Research Fellow with the Humanitarian

Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute and

Editor of Stability: International Journal of Security &

Development.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank Marie O’Reilly and Andrea

Ó Súilleabháin for conducting an extensive interview with

Jamal Benomar in New York. The author is grateful to all of

the international and Yemeni experts and stakeholders who

provided information and analysis for this paper.

IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for their

generous support that makes publications like this one

possible.

CONTENTS

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Historical Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The UN Role in Yemen’s Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

CREATING SPACE FOR DIALOGUE ANDA TRANSITION PLAN

PREPARING FOR THE NATIONAL DIALOGUECONFERENCE

SUPPORTING THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE CONFERENCE

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

BEST PRACTICES

LESSONS LEARNED

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

1

Introduction

Yemen remains the only site of an Arab Springuprising that has ended in a negotiated agreementand a structured, internationally supported transi-tion process. As Jamal Benomar, the UnitedNations Special Adviser to the Secretary-Generalon Yemen, stated, “Yemen was definitely headingtowards a Syria-type scenario” before internationalactors, including the United Nations (UN), helpedto shepherd a complex transition process, whichcontinues at the time of writing.1 Benomar, withsupport from a wide array of stakeholders, helpedavert an escalating conflict in Yemen by stepping into offer the good offices of the UN secretary-general without waiting for the UN SecurityCouncil or the embattled Yemeni regime todemand UN action. Benomar’s interventions—including bringing Yemen’s major political partiestogether amid the uprising—helped ensure that thecountry did not devolve into civil war whenPresident Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down afterthirty-three years in power. That is, the UN openeda space for dialogue where none had previouslybeen considered possible.2

Later, the UN closely participated in designingand implementing a plan for Yemen’s transitionthat involved an inclusive National DialogueConference (NDC), among other steps. Benomarpersonally and successfully championed, withsupport from civil society, embassies, and others,the inclusion of women, youth, and southerners inthe NDC. However, as the UN turned frommanaging a crisis to shepherding a large andcomplex transition, opportunities appear to havebeen missed. The UN, hoping to emphasize theYemeni-led nature of the NDC, maintained alimited role and a small team relative to the size and

complexity of the NDC. UN personnel, particularlythose from the Mediation Support Unit (MSU)within the UN Department of Political Affairs(DPA), provided crucial technical support to theNDC but were unable to keep track of—let alonesupport—the myriad deliberations unfoldingwithin and around the conference.

Many note that, despite Benomar’s credibilityamong many factions, the UN did not respondadequately to ongoing and escalating conflicts inYemen’s North and South. Yet it would not be fairto fully credit or fault the UN or the secretary-general’s special adviser for either progress orproblems. Indeed, Yemen’s formal transitionprocess was initiated by the Gulf CooperationCouncil (GCC), led by the interim government ofYemen, and heavily influenced by a number ofother countries and institutions, particularly theUnited States and Saudi Arabia.3 The transition inYemen is a rather rare example of collaborationamong global, regional, and national actors ratherthan being attributable solely to the UN.

Ultimately, despite some missed opportunities,this study highlights the potential of the UN to pro -actively employ the good offices of the secretary-general to open an impartial space for dialogue anddesign inclusive transition processes.4 Theseconclusions are based on the literature concerningYemen’s transition and, most importantly, oninterviews with several individuals closely familiarwith the UN role in Yemen, including Benomarhimself.5 However, it is important to acknowledgethat the details of sensitive diplomatic processes aregenerally not intended for revelation, and thisstudy cannot comprise a comprehensive record ofthe UN’s multifaceted and still-evolving contribu-tion to Yemen’s transition.

* The content of this paper is based on research, including interviews with relevant stakeholders, in March and April 2014. It is not intended to capture develop-ments in Yemen beyond that point in time. Given the sensitive nature of the transition process and diplomatic engagement, the names and affiliations of intervie-wees, other than Jamal Benomar, are not specified directly or indirectly in this paper. All interviews as part of this project took place on the basis of nonattribution.

1 United Nations Department of Political Affairs, “Yemen: The Middle East’s Only Negotiated Transition,” New York, 2012.2 Chatham House, “Transcript: Friends of Yemen: Aid and Accountability,” Yemen Forum, London, March 6, 2013.3 Charles Schmitz, “Yemen’s National Dialogue,” Middle East Institute Policy Papers Series 2014-1, Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, February 2014.4 For further discussion of the UN’s application of the secretary-general’s good offices, see Anna Magnusson and Morten B. Pedersen, “A Good Office? Twenty

Years of UN Mediation in Myanmar,” New York: International Peace Institute, 2012. 5 The interview with Jamal Benomar was conducted in New York by Marie O’Reilly and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin of the International Peace Institute; it was recorded

and subsequently shared with the author.

2 Steven A. Zyck

Historical Context

Yemen is a complex and dynamic environmentmarked by several ongoing conflicts, entrenchedtribal issues, intersecting political and economicinterests, shifting alliances, and strong regional andinternational involvement.6 Even before the ArabSpring, Yemen was facing a range of intercon-nected humanitarian, political, and securitychallenges. The country remains by far the poorestin the region and has the second lowest level offood security in the world. Amid these social andeconomic challenges, the regime of formerpresident Saleh maintained power for thirty-threeyears—ten of those as the head of North Yemen—by purchasing loyalty from key power-holders andmanipulating tribal and political divisions.7 Such astrategy enabled short-term stability but also meantthat the state achieved more in the way ofobedience than loyalty or legitimacy. The regime’s tenuous balancing act—bolsteredby support from neighboring Saudi Arabia andclose security cooperation with the United States—began to unravel prior to the Arab Spring.President Saleh sought to consolidate power, takingleadership and resources away from allies, as a wayto hand the presidency to his son, Ahmed Ali. Indoing so, the regime lost the goodwill of keybackers such as the powerful al-Ahmar family, whocontrolled a vast network of businesses, a key tribalconfederation, and the largest opposition party.8Hence, the several hundred young activists whobegan demonstrating against the regime in Taizand Sana’a in January 2011 eventually foundthemselves joined by thousands mobilized byformer regime allies and members of Yemen’s“official opposition.”9 For this reason, many in

Yemen now consider their “revolution” to be anengineered rather than bottom-up process. Opposition to President Saleh’s rule grew inintensity after March 18, 2011, when governmentsnipers killed more than fifty peaceful demonstra-tors and wounded nearly 200 more.10 Acknow -ledging the regime had lost key domesticsupporters and the backing of the internationalcommunity, the GCC—with the strong involve-ment of the United States and other Westernpowers—developed the broad strokes of a transi-tional plan, known as the GCC Initiative,11 which itpresented to President Saleh and his party, theGeneral People’s Congress (GPC), in mid-2011.12This one-page agreement offered the president andhis associates immunity if President Saleh wouldstep down.13 It required the formation of an interimgovernment, the transfer of power to the vice-president, the organization of presidential electionswithin sixty days,14 and the formation of acommittee to draft a new constitution (to beratified through a national referendum). Yet President Saleh refused to agree to the GCCInitiative and remained in power despite beinginjured in an attack on the presidential compound inJune 2011 and despite UN Security CouncilResolution 2014 urging his departure.15 He finallyagreed to the GCC Initiative in November 2011 onceit became apparent that his situation was untenableand once the United States and the European Unionthreatened to freeze or confiscate his ill-gottenfortune if he refused to step down.16 While Saleh’srationale for ultimately agreeing to step downremains unknown, analysts suggest that he valuedhis financial position and appeared to have used hislast months in power to ensure he would not lose hisfortune upon stepping down. Hence, the threats of

6 Steven A. Zyck, Conflict Assessment: Republic of Yemen (Sana’a: United Nations, 2013).7 Hugh Naylor, “Social Contracts: Yemen’s Network of Tribes Key in Rebuilding Country,” The National, February 28, 2012, available at

www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/social-contracts-yemens-network-of-tribes-key-in-rebuilding-country . 8 Ginny Hill, “Yemen Unrest: Saleh’s Rivals Enter Elite Power Struggle,” BBC News, May 27, 2011, available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13560514 . 9 Nada Bakri and J. David Goodman, “Thousands in Yemen Protest against the Government,” The New York Times, January 27, 2011, available at

www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/world/middleeast/28yemen.html . 10 Adrian Blomfield, “Yemen Protests: Evidence Snipers Shot To Kill,” The Telegraph, March 19, 2011, available at

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/8392796/Yemen-protests-Evidence-snipers-shot-to-kill.html . 11 Tim O. Petschulat, “Political Change with Pitfalls: An Interim Report on the Yemeni Transition Process,” Sana’a: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 2012.12 The GCC Initiative is also the label often applied to the Implementation Mechanism for the GCC Initiative, which is a longer document developed with extensive

UN support to identify a series of steps that Yemen’s transition would follow.13 “Yemen Transition Agreement 2011,” Al-Bab (blog), available at www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/yemen/yemen_transition_agreement.htm .14 These elections were, from the beginning, intended to be noncompetitive, serving to validate President Hadi’s tenure in compliance with the existing Yemeni

constitution.15 UN Security Council Resolution 2014 (October 21, 2011), UN Doc. S/RES/2014, available at www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014(2011) . 16 The total number killed during the entire revolution is unconfirmed though estimates range from 200, according to Amnesty International, to 2,000, according to

Yemen’s Ministry of Human Rights.

MEDIATING TRANSITION IN YEMEN 3

17 “Profile: Yemen’s Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi,” Al Jazeera, February 25, 2012, available at www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/02/2012219133034774204.html .18 Project on Middle East Political Science, “Arab Uprisings: Yemen’s National Dialogue,” POMEPS Briefings 19, Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, March 21,

2013.19 Raya Barazanji, “Dialoguing for Reconciliation in Yemen,” Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 16, 2014.20 The NDC was initially intended to last six months, though it continued for ten months as a result of slow progress on certain issues. See Stephen W. Day, “The

‘Non-Conclusion’ of Yemen’s National Dialogue,” Foreign Policy, January 27, 2014.21 International Crisis Group, “Yemen’s Southern Question: Avoiding a Breakdown,” Brussels and Sana’a, September 25, 2013.22 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Corporation, 2010).

international financial sanctions proved particularlyeffective in this instance. After President Saleh stepped down, the transi-tion quickly proceeded per the GCC Initiative; thepowers of the presidency were transferred to Vice-President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who wasformally elected president in February 2012.17 Theinterim parliament controversially conferredimmunity on the former president and 500 of hisassociates that same month. Preparations for theNational Dialogue were soon underway. WhileYemen’s transition also includes a constitution-writing process and open presidential elections,many Yemeni and international stakeholdersviewed the NDC as the lynchpin given that it wasintended to restore confidence in the state, proposea new state structure, and address several othercrucial issues.18 These issues were to be tackled inplenary and through nine working groups on theconflicts in the South and North, transitionaljustice, statebuilding, good governance,military/security issues, socioeconomic develop-ment, rights/freedoms, and “special entities.”19

Many felt that the GCC Initiative and, hence, peaceand stability in Yemen, would be undermined if thesix-month NDC was not successful.20

The NDC reflected a Yemeni tradition, exempli-fied in the civil war in the North in the 1960s, ofresolving major disputes via large and inclusivediscussions among multiple parties. Yet, in otherrespects, it was also relatively unique for Yemenand the international community—a single,lengthy conference intended not only to design anew state structure and tackle issues such asdevelopment, transitional justice, and securitysector reform but also to resolve several ongoingconflicts. These included a secessionist movementin southern Yemen led by Al-Hiraak Al-Janoubi(the Southern Movement). Hiraak, whichcomprises several factions, felt that the South ofYemen had been dominated by northern elitessince North and South Yemen united in 1990.21

Likewise, in the far northern provinces, the Houthimovement felt that members of the Zaydi branch ofShia Islam had been increasingly maligned andmarginalized within Yemen; the group fought andsurvived six rounds of conflict with the Yemenimilitary from 2004 to 2010.22 During and since theuprising, the Houthis greatly expanded theterritory under their control, and the movementfound itself increasingly under attack from conser-vative Sunni Salafist groups and others associatedwith the Islamist Islah party. Meanwhile, Yemen was facing additional threatsand myriad factions. These included former regimeelements and members of President Saleh’s party,the GPC, who retained a strong role in Yemen’sgovernment throughout the uprising and transi-tion. The GPC was increasingly being challengedby opposition groups, which were collectivelyreferred to as the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). TheJMP includes the Islamist Islah party, which hasclashed repeatedly with the GPC, the SouthernMovement, and the Houthis as they haveattempted to gain power and supporters in post-Saleh Yemen. The UN was thus entering a highly complexenvironment that posed numerous challenges formediation. The Arab uprisings across the regionappeared to make a strong case for intransigence;instead of proving the benefits of dialogue andmediation, events in Tunisia and Egypt, in partic-ular, seemed to suggest that groups could get theirway simply by holding fast for extended periods oftime (a message not lost on the SouthernMovement). Furthermore, the UN was not the soleor “official” mediator and did not “own” the transi-tion process. Instead, it had entered Yemenwelcome, but uninvited, and eventually signedonto a process initiated by the GCC. And all UNefforts took place alongside many other interna-tional and regional stakeholders’ contributions,including those led by Yemen’s strongest backers,Saudi Arabia and the United States.

4 Steven A. Zyck

The UN Role in Yemen’sTransition

The UN played a key role in facilitating dialogueamong the various stakeholders noted above andmany others. Its engagement was led by Benomarhimself and his team, which this paper refers tocollectively as the Office of the Special Adviser, orOSA. The OSA included a small number of teammembers deployed by the MSU, though itfunctioned as a single office rather than necessarilyhaving a stand-alone MSU contingent. The OSAgenerally had seven to ten international staffmembers, though the numbers fluctuated.However, only three of these were generally inYemen on a nearly full-time basis, with the rest,including Benomar himself, flying in and out ofSana’a as needed. For instance, in his first eighteenmonths as special adviser, Benomar traveled toYemen twenty-four times, according to mediareports.23 These trips each lasted at least two weeks,with several lasting three or four weeks. While afew stakeholders felt that it would have beenbeneficial for the OSA to have had a larger contin-uous presence in Yemen, many diplomats andothers found Benomar’s in-and-out role to beeffective. Yemeni stakeholders were eager to makerapid progress in time for his arrivals and before hewould depart, particularly when he was bound toNew York to brief the UN Security Council; such adegree of urgency may not have applied if thespecial adviser were consistently in Yemen. Benomar and the OSA were involved in Yemen’stransition from the spring of 2011, with their rolebroadly divided among the following three phases:creating space for dialogue and a transition plan,preparing for the NDC, and shepherding the NDC.As further examined in latter sections of this paper,these various phases broadly reflected the key“mediation fundamentals” noted within the UNGuidance for Effective Mediation,24 which include:(a) preparedness, (b) consent, (c) impartiality, (d)inclusivity, (e) national ownership, (f) internationallaw and normative frameworks, (g) coherence,coordination, and complementarity of the media -

tion effort, and (h) quality peace agreements.25

CREATING SPACE FOR DIALOGUE ANDA TRANSITION PLAN

The first and arguably most important contribu-tion of the UN to Yemen’s transition began in April2011, two months after the Arab Spring spread toYemen, with the appointment of Benomar as theSecretary-General’s Special Adviser on Yemen.Despite having a team of only two or three people,Benomar quickly stepped into the fray without anymandate from the UN Security Council or GeneralAssembly. Shortly after being appointed, Benomartraveled to Yemen at Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s request to “find out what was going on”and informally explore whether it might be benefi-cial to extend the secretary-general’s good offices inline with the UN Charter. Benomar not only metwith Yemeni leaders and foreign diplomats but alsospent time speaking with Yemenis demonstratingin squares around Sana’a. When in meetings inYemen, the special adviser is reported to haveexhibited an unusual degree of patience, allowingYemenis to tell their stories in great detail andexpress their frustrations. This “soft intervention,” as Benomar character-ized it, was significant for a number of reasons.Firstly, it represented a more liberal use (andinterpretation) of the UN role in establishing goodoffices than is presently common, and it was highlyproactive in a UN structure that has grown increas-ingly wary of overstepping its mandate or drawingthe ire of the permanent five members of theSecurity Council (P5). Secondly, in the context ofthe Arab Spring, Benomar’s early action wasunique; the UN had been far slower and morecautious to become involved in uprisings in Egyptand Syria, doing little while situations in thosecountries proceeded to deteriorate. Thirdly, fromthe Yemeni perspective, the early involvement ofthe UN created a crucial space for dialogue.Benomar brought all of Yemen’s major politicalparties together for the first time since the uprisingbegan. In doing so, he helped to open lines ofdialogue and begin tangible planning on how tomove Yemen forward—avoiding chaos or a

23 Farea al-Muslimi, “UN Envoy on Yemen Deserves Spotlight,” Al-Monitor, October 23, 2013, available at www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/yemen-un-adviser-benomar-controversy-success.html .

24 United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation, September 2012.25 However, individuals associated with the OSA generally indicated that they had not drawn upon the Guidance document despite being aware of it.

MEDIATING TRANSITION IN YEMEN 5

factional conflict—once Saleh ultimately steppeddown. Lastly, without direct Security Councilinvolvement,26 Benomar was able to emphasize hisand the UN’s independence among Yemeni leadersand the Yemeni public. He was ultimately able tostate and demonstrate that he was not a “fig leaf”for foreign powers but was instead entering Yemenas an honest broker concerned more for Yemen’sfuture than for American or Saudi security interestsor French energy investments. Such an achieve-ment is particularly notable given that, particularlyin the Middle East, the UN is often greeted with astrong degree of mistrust. While playing a crucial role, Benomar and histeam were not directly involved in the design of theGCC Initiative, which Benomar has repeatedly andpublicly criticized for offering broad immunity (inviolation of international law, according to some)to Saleh and his associates.27 Likewise, the UN wasonly marginally involved in Saleh’s crucial decisionto sign the GCC Initiative. Instead, diplomats andanalysts indicate that Saudi and Americanpressure, the loss of Saleh’s key domestic allies, and,perhaps most importantly, credible threats ofinternational financial sanctions proved decisive inpressing the Yemeni president to step down in late2011. However, in the months while the GCC andothers were pushing Saleh to step down, Benomarand his team continued to work with majorYemeni parties in designing the ImplementationMechanism that was to put meat on the bare-bonesGCC Initiative. This process involved pro- andanti-regime elements, both of which personally(and separately) invited Benomar to mediate theirdiscussions. Indeed, this sort of tangible transitionplanning—which had not taken place in Tunisia orEgypt amid the Arab Spring—largely emerged as aresult of Benomar’s soft advocacy. The special

adviser had spent several months trying toconvince key Yemeni stakeholders that astructured agreement was necessary given thatYemen had a history of rudimentary peaceagreements that were vague and that easilycollapsed (e.g., the 1990 unification agreementbetween North and South Yemen or the numerousceasefires agreed between the Houthis and theYemeni military). As negotiations around the transition planbegan, Benomar noted that the pro- and anti-regime sides put forward separate proposals thatwere directly contradictory and that did not showclear areas for compromising. Recognizing animpasse, the two Yemeni sides asked Benomar toput forward an alternative proposal. Anticipatingsuch a moment, the OSA had been working on atransition plan since June or July 2011. This OSAplan, which was reportedly very detailed, ultimatelyserved as the jumping-off point for negotiationsamong Yemeni stakeholders; for instance, this wasthe first document to propose the organization ofthe NDC (discussed later). Ultimately, however,the content of these negotiations is not a matter ofpublic record, and it is not possible to tell howmuch the final Implementation Mechanismresembled the plan that the OSA initially putforward. However, stakeholders involved in thesenegotiations did note that Benomar pushed for thetransition to be inclusive (particularly of womenand youth), to demonstrate general adherence tothe existing Yemeni constitution, and, mostimportantly, to include a clear role for the GPC.28This final element helped reassure the GPC thatthey would not be stripped of power (à la Iraqi de-Baathification) and, thus, helped convince keyfigures in the GPC to also push for Saleh to stepdown.

26 Benomar’s initial visit to Yemen took place without the UN Security Council being aware; however, Security Council member states quickly heard of his missionto Yemen and asked for a briefing upon his return. Following the briefing, the council asked Benomar to remain engaged in Yemen, thus giving his later efforts asort of soft approval or authorization from the council.

27 “Yemenis Protest against Immunity for Saleh,” Al Jazeera, January 22, 2012, available at www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/01/201212210178891840.html . 28 For a key discussion of the normative and instrumental roles of inclusivity in peace processes, see John Packer, “Challenges and Opportunities of Inclusivity in

Peace Processes,” Discussion Paper No. 7, Brussels: Civil Society Dialogue Network, 2013.

6 Steven A. Zyck

Managing International PressuresWhile the OSA was able to maintain its impartiality throughout Yemen’s transition, it had to strategicallygrapple with pressure from a number of UN member states. At times, these proved beneficial and relativelyconsensual. For instance, in October 2011 Benomar and the British government pushed for a UN SecurityCouncil resolution calling for a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Yemen. Despite anticipating resist-ance, the Security Council ultimately agreed and issued Resolution 2014 by consensus. The internationalagreement behind this resolution reportedly strengthened Benomar’s legitimacy and also showedPresident Saleh that the international community was united behind the GCC Initiative. Later, however, the OSA faced more challenging diplomatic pressures. For instance, Benomar at onestage gave President Saleh a preview of his upcoming and very negative briefing to the Security Council onthe situation in Yemen. Saleh asked Benomar to delay his council presentation to allow him to make moretangible progress. While two members of the P5 reportedly opposed any delay, Benomar was able to workwith the then-chair of the council to postpone his briefing before others could stop him in a demonstrationof diplomatic and bureaucratic maneuvering. In another instance, Benomar reportedly faced harsh criticism and pressure after he declined to visit aparticular Western embassy immediately after meeting with key Yemeni leaders. The special adviser feltthat it would be inappropriate—and compromise his perceived impartiality—for him to go directly fromthe president’s office to a Western embassy. To avoid looking as if he were reporting directly to any foreigncountry, Benomar offered to meet with that country’s ambassador the following day. Likewise, the OSA declined to share copies of the Implementation Mechanism for Yemen’s transitionwith foreign diplomats, including the P5, while it was still being negotiated. According to Benomar, the P5and Saudi Arabia received the Implementation Mechanism only once it had been finalized. These sorts ofactions, and those listed above, reportedly caused diplomatic rows and opened the OSA to criticism fromparticular governments. However, Benomar and others noted that, given his seniority, experience, andthick skin, the special adviser was able to weather these minor controversies relatively unscathed. A morejunior or less independent mediator may have given in or been forced out amid similar pressures.

29 As later discussed, the OSA actively pushed the interim government and president’s office to act on the 20 points, but Yemeni government officials generallyresisted these pressures and made very little progress on the 20 points.

30 Christina Murray, “Yemen's National Dialogue Conference,” October 2013, available at www.academia.edu/5925389/Yemens_National_Dialogue_Conference .

PREPARING FOR THE NATIONALDIALOGUE CONFERENCE

As the Implementation Mechanism movedforward, the UN supported the preparatory worksurrounding the NDC. This included an initialperiod of preparations from April to August 2012,during which time Benomar and his team workedwith President Hadi’s office and other Yemenistakeholders to build trust and to ensure that allmajor factions would be willing to be involved inthe NDC. At this point, the UN primarily providedtechnical support on issues such as the restruc-turing of the Yemeni military, confidence-buildinggestures with the Southern Movement (the so-called 20 points29), and the formation of a formalTechnical Committee to chart a course for the

NDC. While providing support on a number ofissues—and encouraging Yemeni leaders to makerapid progress in building trust with the South andother groups—Benomar and his team particularlyworked with stakeholders to promote the inclusionof women, youth, and civil society figures in theTechnical Committee. Ultimately, the Technical Committee, whichoperated from September 2012 to March 2013,included twenty-five individuals from acrossYemen’s largest political parties.30 The committeeaddressed a wide variety of issues, includingfoundational issues such as the number of partici-pants in the NDC, the share of seats to be reservedfor each faction or party, the involvement ofwomen and youth, and the actual agenda. The OSA

MEDIATING TRANSITION IN YEMEN 7

31 Erica Gaston, “Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue,” Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, February 7, 2014.32 Tik Root and Peter Salisbury, “Jamal Benomar and the Fine Art of Making Peace in Yemen,” Atlantic Council, June 17, 2014, available at

www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/jamal-benomar-and-the-fine-art-of-making-peace-in-yemen . See also Murray, “Yemen's National DialogueConference.”

provided technical inputs into these discussionsbased on other countries’ experiences with transi-tion and comparable dialogue processes. This sortof support, which was particularly provided by asmall number of MSU-affiliated experts, waswidely lauded by UN, non-UN, and Yemenistakeholders. In addition, Benomar and his team also helped tobreak logjams as they emerged in and out of theTechnical Committee. When members of theTechnical Committee would reach an impasse, thespecial adviser reportedly put forward middle-ground solutions—for instance, on how many seatseach group would have in the NDC—that theparties were willing to tolerate but could notthemselves propose. In addition, Benomar report-edly used his frequent briefings to the UN SecurityCouncil to press parties to reach a compromise,informing members of the Technical Committee—who were top officials from major politicalfactions—that he needed firm decisions from themto demonstrate tangible progress to the council. These sorts of micro-mediations were bolsteredby Benomar’s popularity within Yemen and therespect he commanded from key factions in thecountry, who were keen to curry the specialadviser’s favor and publicly align themselves withhim. Benomar’s popularity emerged partly fromthe perception that his arrival marked a new degreeof international respect for Yemen, which has oftenchafed at being manipulated by regional orWestern powers. In addition, many Yemenis foundthe presence of a nominally Muslim mediator to beparticularly appropriate, and Benomar, who isfrom Morocco, was reportedly referred to asBrother Benomar, in a sign of religious affinity, byYemenis. Some Yemeni stakeholders felt that beingfrom an Arab country equipped the special adviserwith great patience, which he frequentlydemonstrated as Yemeni officials and factionsoften prolifically reiterated their grievances,frustrations, and positions to him. Such personaltraits also endeared him to the Yemeni media,which Benomar courted and which generallytended to treat him and his work with a somewhatuncommon degree of reverence.

This popularity also allowed Benomar and theOSA to help ensure that the NDC was inclusive.The special adviser made it a personal mission toensure that the NDC included a significant numberof women and youth, a goal shared by severalinternational organizations and foreign embassies.Ultimately the NDC included 30 percent womenand 20 percent youth, most of whom were at leastpartly affiliated with particular parties or factions,among its 565 participants.31 To overcome manyYemeni stakeholders’ misgivings about theinclusion of women, in particular, Benomar report-edly drew upon UN norms and standards—frequently stating that he could not remaininvolved with the process, and that the NDC wouldnot have international backing, if it did not includea significant number of women. In doing so,Benomar and others involved in this process notethat the OSA gradually worked to help Yemenistakeholders understand that it remained impartialbut was not necessarily neutral (i.e., it supportedthe need for change and would not sacrificewomen’s participation and human rights). The special adviser also emphasized the inclusionof Southern Movement and southern participantsgiven that the secession of the South posed atangible and existential threat to the future ofYemen in its current form. Ultimately, half of allseats in the NDC were reserved for individualsoriginating in southern Yemen (including anumber of individuals from the South who hadlived much of their lives in the North or who werenot associated with Hiraak).32 A further eighty seatswere allotted to official representatives of theSouthern Movement. However, Hiraak memberswho agreed to participate in the NDC representedonly one element within the Southern Movementand were not viewed as representative of the Southas a whole. While some analysts have claimed that Benomarand his team failed to secure more broad-basedsouthern (or Hiraaki) participation, this is an areawhere context is crucial. The tenor of the southernsecessionist movement had grown so strong duringthe transition, partly as a result of Yemeni securityforces’ shootings of southern protestors, that many

8 Steven A. Zyck

southern factions were fundamentally opposed tothe NDC and the broader transition, which theyviewed as a northern-led process. Furthermore,President Hadi repeatedly declined to make goodon trust-building measures (the “20 points”)necessary to attain greater Hiraaki participation inthe NDC despite repeated appeals from Benomarfor him to do so. Indeed, this situation highlightsthe fact that, aside from the bully pulpit, the specialadviser wielded little in the way of carrots or sticksto influence Yemeni stakeholders. Lastly, Benomarwas reportedly blocked by the UN Department ofSafety and Security from traveling to southernYemen on at least one occasion, thus blunting hisability to make large personal gestures to buildtrust with the southern people and Hiraaki leaders.While many analysts have rightly criticized thelimited southern buy-in to the NDC, it may not beappropriate to attribute this outcome to Benomarand his office.SUPPORTING THE NATIONALDIALOGUE CONFERENCE

Having spent a great deal of effort on NDCpreparations, Benomar and the OSA wereultimately to play a relatively modest role in theconference itself. In addition to providing day-to-day support to the NDC secretariat and seminarsfor NDC participants on a range of issues, OSA andits team of experts attended some plenary sessionsand issue-specific working groups. One constitu-tional expert and an MSU-deployed legal specialistwere considered by many to be crucial sources ofinformation and practical solutions during theNDC; for instance, they would, when requested,present examples of approaches adopted in othercountries (or in other transition processes) tobetter inform NDC discussions. Yet these expertswere few in number—fewer than half a dozen atany time—compared with the size of the NDC,where even the nine working groups eachcontained more than fifty participants. Each OSAspecialist was generally assigned to at least two orthree NDC working groups, which made it difficultfor them to keep track of the discussions andunderstand whether the participants were makingprogress. The process of monitoring the workinggroups—and engaging comfortably with NDCparticipants—was made more difficult by the factthat very few OSA personnel working on the transi-tion spoke Arabic. High-quality interpreters were

only periodically available, and the OSA reportedlyrelied from time to time on ad hoc assistance withinterpretation, which varied widely in quality. From the early days of the NDC, severaldiplomatic stakeholders in Sana’a expressedsurprise that OSA personnel were present in theNDC only sporadically and were not activelyinvolved in “firefighting,” i.e., helping to settledisputes where they emerged among or withinparticular factions. Many asked whether UNpersonnel should have played a stronger, butsubtle, role in terms of helping mediate disagree-ments among participants or at least helping theworking groups to craft clear agendas and timelinesto ensure that they were likely to stay on track.Without clear external facilitation, some workinggroups reportedly engaged in circular discussionsand proved somewhat directionless. The OSA’s lack of engagement reportedlystemmed from a combination of factors. Theseinclude the special adviser’s desire to maintain aYemeni-led process but also a range of other morepractical factors. Firstly, the OSA team in Sana’ahad little clear instruction or strategic guidance onwhat role they were to play in the NDC; no writtenor unwritten strategy or standard operatingprocedures had been established within Benomar’steam. Without this guidance, and with Benomarbeing frequently hard to reach, it was often difficultto obtain his inputs or go-ahead. Secondly, asalready mentioned, the size of the OSA team wassmall compared to the massive scope of the confer-ence; and a majority of the special adviser’s teamtraveled with Benomar or were only sporadically inSana’a. For instance, MSU specialists working withthe OSA frequently had to juggle several crisissituations around the world and were able todedicate only a portion of their time to Yemen.Thirdly, and as previously noted, the lack of Arabiclinguists on the team—and the inconsistentavailability of interpreters—posed a key challenge;some indicate that Benomar’s team had requestedadditional Arabic-speaking political officers fromthe UN, but that such individuals were short insupply and often unwilling to temporarily relocateto Yemen. Furthermore, Benomar’s office was, aside fromindividual exceptions, not able to draw upon thebroader resources of UN humanitarian anddevelopment agencies in Yemen, which had several

MEDIATING TRANSITION IN YEMEN 9

33 Interviewees frequently noted the reasons for this animosity but indicated that, for institutional reasons, they did not wish to discuss these on the record.34 For a discussion of the contribution of UN humanitarian and development agencies to mediation missions, see Charles T. Call, “UN Mediation and the Politics of

Transition after Constitutional Crises,” New York: International Peace Institute, February 2012.35 Erica Gaston, “Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue.”36 Nasser Arrabyee, “National Dimensions of the Saada Conflict,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 26, 2013. See also Peter

Salisbury, “Yemen's 'Hidden Wars' Threaten Peace Process,” Al Jazeera, December 3, 2013, available at www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/yemen-hidden-wars-threaten-peace-process-2013123898288137.html .

37 United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation, September 2012.

hundred staff members, most of them Arabicspeakers and many with backgrounds related topeacebuilding, governance, socioeconomic deve -lop ment, transitional justice, land reform, andother NDC-relevant topics. Animosity emergedearly between the UN special adviser and seniorUN development figures in Yemen and ultimatelyprevented the OSA from drawing fully upon otherUN agencies in the country.33 Many note that, hadthese frictions not existed, Benomar and his teamcould have involved UN governance and develop-ment specialists in at least monitoring the NDCworking groups, providing more robust andfrequent technical inputs, and providing additionalcapacity building for NDC members.34

The special adviser and his team also played a keyrole outside of the formal confines of the NDC.This includes, for instance, support from Benomarto the so-called “eight-plus-eight” discussions,which formed amid, but partly separate from, thecore NDC working groups once it became apparentthat Yemen’s future state structure would not beresolved within the NDC.35 Benomar was report-edly asked to take a leading role in mediatingbetween the eight northerners and eightsoutherners in the sixteen-person body, alsoknown as the Regions Defining Committee. Thisreportedly included intense negotiations, andBenomar was credited by some with helping partic-ipants approach and conceptualize their positionsand interests in a new way that helped make thedeliberations more fruitful. At the same time, thespecial adviser reportedly also used his leverage andpopularity to push through compromises andconvince groups to abandon immovable positions.Ultimately the eight-plus-eight committee was ableto put forward a plan for a six-part federal statethat, despite controversy, is considered viable(though many questions regarding revenuesharing, the powers allotted to states and thecentral government, and other divisive issues haveyet to be addressed). While Benomar was particularly involved in

resolving the conflict within the eight-plus-eightcommittee, he reportedly did not always engage soproactively to other matters. Several stakeholderspointed to the conflict in northern Yemen,36 whichintensified markedly among the Houthis, Salafistgroups, and others during and since the NDC.Benomar had personally built up a strong degree ofcredibility with the Houthis before the NDC buthad reportedly proven relatively unwilling toleverage this relationship and become significantlyinvolved in the conflict brewing in northernYemen. Yet many in Sana’a felt that the specialadviser’s involvement could have helped to quellthe violence more effectively and could haveyielded a more durable ceasefire between theHouthis and their opponents. According to severalstakeholders, the UN appeared to limit its focus tothe NDC and other steps involved in the GCCInitiative’s Implementation Mechanism while notnecessarily addressing other issues and challengesfacing the country.

Analysis

The narrative above, while identifying somechallenges, is altogether a promising one withsignificant implications for the UN. Despite notreferencing the UN Guidance for EffectiveMediation,37 the OSA’s work reflected many of itscore messages and principles. Benomar and histeam earned the consent of the major stakeholdergroups involved in the transition, and the specialadviser himself was generally seen as impartialdespite having good relations with multiple groups(aside, perhaps, from those closely associated withthe ousted president in the later stages of the transi-tion). The UN also took great pains to ensure theprocess was inclusive and was always led byYemenis and national institutions. The inclusion ofwomen and the special adviser’s critical stance vis-à-vis immunity for the former president and hisassociates also reflected deference to internationallaw and normative frameworks. Indeed, the specialadviser repeatedly informed Yemeni stakeholders

10 Steven A. Zyck

that international norms required the stronginclusion of women in the NDC, leveraging thesenorms and frameworks to strengthen his negoti-ating position. The main deviation from the Guidance and itsprinciples appeared to involve preparedness. Whileindividuals associated with the OSA built up a greatdeal of contextual awareness, new arrivals to theteam often found few materials to help themprepare to engage. As previously noted, no strategyor mission-specific guidelines existed, and recordsof past meetings were rarely maintained. Nor wasthe OSA guided by any structured analysis of thevarious stakeholder groups involved in the transi-tion and their underlying interests. Even regularmedia monitoring was reportedly not undertaken.The OSA reportedly declined to produce thesematerials for a number of reasons. As in manydiplomatic processes, Benomar was at timesconcerned about sensitive documents beingintentionally or accidentally leaked. However,many note that the special adviser’s style, includinga penchant for micro-management, had at timesserved to discourage initiative among those aroundhim. This section now turns to a broader question:what best practices and lessons learned can betaken away from the UN’s mediation or facilitationof Yemen’s transition?BEST PRACTICES

• Early, exploratory engagement can be crucialand should be drawn upon with increasingfrequency.

The UN special adviser’s proactive engagementin Yemen proved crucial in helping to buildrelations among all parties. Benomar and a smallnumber of colleagues in the early days wererelatively free from specific UN Security Councilpressures and were able to engage in a moreexploratory manner, focusing on analyzing thesituation and building relations with keystakeholders rather than achieving any short-term outcomes. Many stakeholders felt that thisproactive form of engagement and liberalapplication of the secretary-general’s good officesshould be viewed as a model meriting replication

in future contexts that appear to be falling deeperinto crisis. However, it is important to note thatthis form of engagement in Yemen is often seenas part and parcel of Benomar’s personal style,which was seen to be well matched to the Yemenicontext, and to his level of seniority, whichallowed him to strategically ignore pressuresfrom particular UN member states keen oninfluencing his work.

• A unified UN Security Council can be a power -ful ally for mediators and can strategicallyemploy resolutions.

Many analyses have recently compared UNinvolvement in Yemen, Syria, and Libya. In thelatter two countries, the council was deeplydivided, a fact that many feel enabled continuedescalation. While such a finding likely passes forcommon sense, the case of Yemen demonstratesthe power of the Security Council when it is inagreement or willing to find common ground.For instance, Security Council Resolutions 2014and 2140, which were coordinated closely withBenomar’s office, were useful in helping toconvince Saleh to step down and in discouraginghim and his allies from attempting to spoilYemen’s transition.38 Furthermore, sinceBenomar was likely to receive a fair and openhearing at the council, the special adviser wasable to use his briefings to push Saleh and othersto make concessions. Such leverage would nothave existed if the council had not trustedBenomar’s briefings or if members of the P5 hadpublicly challenged them.

• The NDC, while problematic at times, demon -strates the potential of large, transformativeevents amid transitions.

The National Dialogue had a number of flaws,but it did provide a historic opportunity forstakeholders to assemble and tackle a wide rangeof challenges. Many felt that it partly validatessuch events, which received a tarnished reputa-tion after they yielded partial or problematicoutcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq. While it is notpossible to say that National Dialogue processesare inherently a good practice, it is clear that theycan be useful in launching a slow process of

38 However, UN Security Council Resolution 2140 also raised concerns that the UN was inappropriately taking sides or collaborating with those eager to see the formerpresident further marginalized; this perception appears to have had implications for Benomar’s perceived neutrality in certain circles. See Nasser Arrabyee, “Howthe U.N. Could Help Yemeni Dialogue,” Yemen Times, March 27, 2014.

negotiation among key stakeholders, buildingtrust among several parties, and turning manystakeholders’ attention away from the battlefieldand toward a major political undertaking.39 Inthis respect, it may comprise a useful first steptoward national elections by modeling peacefulpolitical contestation.

LESSONS LEARNED

• Reconsider the scope of National Dialogueprocesses, moving particular issues to separatevenues.

The NDC addressed an unreasonably broad setof issues, thus making it difficult for the partici-pants to fully understand and engage with thevarious issues at hand. Furthermore, includinghighly sensitive issues related to the structure ofthe Yemeni state and Southern Movement in arelatively public and highly visible venue such asthe NDC undermined the prospects for progress.That is, parties found it difficult to discuss suchissues in the NDC, and it is telling that the statestructure issue was ultimately decided in aclosed-door, sixteen-person forum. That said,dialogue processes would be likely to lose theircredibility if they wholly ignored the largest andmost divisive political issues of the day; hence,there is a careful balance to be struck whensetting the agenda for such processes.

• Recalibrate technical support to dialogues andtransitions, focusing much more on mediationand communication skills among participants.

The OSA in Yemen provided regular support tothe NDC and ran a number of workshops forNDC participants. Yet many felt that, instead oftechnical information on individual issues, theyrequired more in-depth capacity building toallow them to define their agendas, developnegotiating strategies, mediate day-to-daydisputes, and communicate effectively. The sortsof rapid seminars focused on technical issuesrelated to governance, security sector reform,and other somewhat academic topics that the UNprovided were deemed to be valuable thoughvaried widely in quality and relevance; however,many stakeholders noted that NDC participantsinstead needed a broader form of skill building.

Basic planning, negotiation, and communicationskills were deemed particularly crucial inovercoming asymmetries among groups in theNDC. For instance, some groups wererepresented at the NDC by internationally-trained experts, while other delegates wererelatively poorly educated; this means that theyoften faced difficulties negotiating given differ-ences in preparation and communication/negoti-ation styles.

• Strong mediators should have an empoweredand competent manager as second-in-command.

The UN special adviser was frequently so indemand, whether in New York or Sana’a, that hewas not necessarily able to fill the role of day-to-day team manager. Hence, a senior manager orchief of staff role should be incorporated into theOSA and into similar missions in the future. Thismanager should have a diplomatic backgroundand be attuned to the senior UN mediator’sagenda and style and be implicitly trusted byhim; the senior diplomat (e.g., Benomar in thisinstance) should be closely involved in selectingthis individual. Most importantly, the manageror chief of staff should be empowered to overseeroutine team management, manage resources,document progress, and make non-criticaldecisions without the direct involvement of thespecial adviser.

• The skills required for mediation may bedifferent from the skills required for large andcomplex dialogue processes.

Mediators must have a certain skill set that ofteninvolves an ability to build relationships andengage with stakeholders in relatively smallgroup settings. In contrast, dialogue processessuch as Yemen’s 565-person NDC require amanager (or an “orchestra conductor,” as oneindividual termed it) who is comfortable dealingwith information and process management, thedevelopment of technical coordinationmechanisms, and communications strategies.Hence, the UN, specifically DPA and the MSU,may wish to build capacity not only formediation but also for dialogue facilitation andmanagement. In practice, these “conductors”

MEDIATING TRANSITION IN YEMEN 11

39 For a broader discussion of national dialogue processes, including in Yemen, see Katia Papagianni, “National Dialogue Processes in Political Transitions,” DiscussionPaper No. 3, Brussels: Civil Society Dialogue Network, 2014.

would not replace senior mediators once aconflict is resolved; instead, they could serve asempowered deputies capable of leveraging themediator’s credibility and channeling it intopostmediation dialogue processes.

• Consider developing guidance and training forUN mediators and facilitators that enable themto quickly access and draw on cross-contextcomparisons.

As noted earlier, those familiar with the transi-tion and the OSA indicated that many membersof the special adviser’s team were broadly awareof the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, butthat it was not actively drawn on given its breadthand relatively normative perspective. That said,many involved in Yemen’s transition felt thatguidance materials were sorely needed.According to some, these materials—andaccompanying trainings—should equipmediators and facilitators to draw on cross-context comparisons. Many NDC participantsand Yemeni stakeholders were eager to hearexamples from other transition processes, andthe most valued and respected members of theOSA were generally those capable of drawingupon these. While such a broad knowledge baseis often rooted in a lengthy career and first-handexperience, many cross-context comparisons canbe documented and taught to individuals partic-ipating in transition and dialogue processes suchas those unfolding in Yemen.

Conclusion

The UN mediation of Yemen’s transition wasultimately crucial in helping to head off a broaderconflict and build broad consensus regarding thepost-Saleh transition process. The proactive andlow-key use of the secretary-general’s good officesrepresent a promising practice that merits furtherreplication under appropriate conditions in thefuture. That said, it will be important to avoidgeneralizing too broadly from the Yemeni case.Benomar’s ability to proactively engage in Yemenreflected a number of very specific conditions. Theuprising in Yemen was being watched closely byseveral global powers, not least the US and Saudi

governments, but no nation or member of the P5had necessarily taken on responsibility forresponding to it; hence, there was scope for low-key UN involvement. Likewise, Yemenis wereaccustomed to dialogue, negotiation, andmediation, which have a long history in Yemen.Key factions and figures were generally open tomiddle-ground solutions rather than an all-or-nothing mentality; this pragmatism was seenduring the Saleh regime, when several politicalparties, tribes, and others often balanced publicopposition to the state with behind-the-scenescooperation. Beyond the OSA’s success in averting a larger-scale conflict in Yemen, Benomar and his team hadseveral other successes. They proved naysayerswrong by helping to ensure that the NDC andYemen’s transition was far more inclusive in termsof women, youth, and civil society. In the end, theNDC ended with a promising, but daunting, set of1,800 recommendations and—through a somewhatparallel process—a broad roadmap for the futureYemeni state.40 While challenges arose, these didnot necessarily undermine the foundationalsuccess of UN engagement. Now Yemen continues with its transition. Anddespite the NDC, the number of challenges facingthe country has multiplied. As previously noted,conflict in northern Yemen intensified during theNational Dialogue and largely went unaddressedby the OSA. The announcement of a six-partfederal structure was followed by a new round offighting in the South in the Al-Dhale governorate.Yemen is, simply, less stable now than when theNDC began, and it is not necessarily clear that UNdiplomatic engagement in Yemen was responsiveto changing circumstances on the ground acrossYemen. With a constitution-drafting process underway, areferendum to approve a draft constitution, andcoming elections all within the next year, manyanticipate that Yemen will only become less stable.The open dialogue established among key partiesand factions in Yemen will become increasinglyimportant, and the need for Benomar and his officewill only grow. Many analysts and officials are, in

12 Steven A. Zyck

40 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, “Outcomes of Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference: A Step Toward Conflict Resolution and State Building?”Assessment Report, Doha, February 2014.

MEDIATING TRANSITION IN YEMEN 13

particular, hopeful that the OSA will be able tosoften the requirement that Yemen’s draft constitu-tion be approved by a national referendum. Whilethe GCC Initiative established the need for areferendum, many note that Yemen’s politicalsystem would be thrown into disarray if, as manyexpect, the draft constitution were to be rejected nomatter what it contains. Work remains to be done, but the UN hasestablished itself—despite an initial lack of carrotsand sticks—to be an indispensable key player inYemen’s transition. An expanded UN team will bebeneficial in allowing the OSA to fulfill its mandate,

as will improved management arrangementswithin the OSA. Even so, Benomar and his teamwill have an opportunity not only to draw on theirinternal resources but also on the broad networksand key figures that they were able to develop andrefine through the NDC. These include key NDCdelegates as well as Yemeni civil society groups,international NGOs, UN humanitarian anddevelopment agencies, and others who are keen tosupport Yemen’s transition—and who would bewise to do so in an increasingly harmonizedmanner.

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The INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) is an independent,

international not-for-profit think tank with a staff representing

more than twenty nationalities. It has offices facing United Nations

Headquarters in New York and offices in Vienna and Manama. IPI is

dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of conflicts

between and within states by strengthening international peace

and security institutions. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix

of policy research, convening, publishing, and outreach.

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