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MEDIATION PRACTICE

Mediation Scoping Missions Reference Guidelines and Lessons Learned

March 2015

mediatEUr in Brussels Avenue des Arts 24, Letterbox 8 Brussels 1000

This document is a compilation of research and work by a number of colleagues currently and

formerly working at mediatEUr, including Juan Diaz, Canan Gündüz, Antje Herrberg, and Miguel

Varela. It is also inspired by our wide network of practitioners. As such this document is not a

definitive, but a living working document that we hope will inform future practice on dialogue —

we are grateful for additional insights from further colleagues and friends.

© European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue e.V. (mediatEUr), 2015

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution.

MediatEUr in Brussels: Avenue des Arts, 24, 10th floor, letter box no.8

B-1000, Brussels, Belgium Phone: + 32 2 230 00 15

E-Mail: [email protected] Web: www.themediateur.eu

Mediation Scoping Missions: Internal Guidance Paper

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Contents

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 5

2. What is a scoping mission? ........................................................................................... 9

2.1. What do others say about mediation scoping? ..................................................... 9

2.2. Scoping missions and the European Institute of Peace .................................... 10

2.3. What are the benefits of scoping missions? ....................................................... 11

3. Conflicts of interest ...................................................................................................... 12

3.1. The donors’ perspective ........................................................................................... 12

3.2. How to address conflicts of interest ...................................................................... 13

3.3. Strengthening transparency ................................................................................... 13

4. Designing a scoping mission ..................................................................................... 14

4.1. The level of scoping and their interlocutors ........................................................ 15

Lessons learned from levels of scoping and generating trust ................................. 16

4.2. Creating a mandate .................................................................................................. 16

4.3. External communication ......................................................................................... 18

4.4. Selecting a team ........................................................................................................ 18

4.5. Scheduling and time management ...................................................................... 20

4.6. Local NGOs as scoping teams and partners ......................................................... 22

Lessons learned in mission preparation ....................................................................... 23

Lessons learned in designing a scoping mission ........................................................ 23

5. The field visit ................................................................................................................. 24

5.1. Impartiality in the field ............................................................................................ 25

5.2. Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 25

5.3. The forgotten logistics ............................................................................................. 26

5.4. Security of information in institutional settings ................................................ 27

6. Re-entry at the headquarters .................................................................................... 27

Lessons learned from re-entry ....................................................................................... 28

7. Outcomes ....................................................................................................................... 28

8. Reflections for the European Institute of Peace .................................................... 29

9. Annex 1. Fact Sheet on Pilot Scoping Missions ..................................................... 30


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1. Introduction

This lessons-learned document on mediation scoping missions is primarily

developed for mediatEUr staff as a follow-up to the scoping missions developed

by the organisation in the context of mediatEUr’s project to support a European

Institute of Peace (EIP). It is aimed at understanding the benefits and challenges

of scoping missions, a tool used to assess the potential for mediation in specific

conflict contexts, the primary focus of the EIP. The guidance paper looks into

some of the key concepts for mediation scoping.

The knowledge collected for this document was accumulated from existing

mediation literature, the past experience of mediatEUr team members, and two

pilot scoping missions (Kosovo and Myanmar) funded by the Swedish Foreign

Ministry in the run up to the founding of the EIP.

The primary purpose of both of these pilot scoping missions was to serve the

overall peace processes in those countries; they were developed together with the

respective EU delegations and had specific objectives and outcomes independent

of this document. The two countries chosen a) had different political dynamics

and b) were places where the EU had a direct interest in the success of the peace

process. The lessons drawn from these pilot missions cannot be generalised to all

scoping missions, but they will inform reflection and stimulate further discussion.

In conjunction with the report “Conducting an Assessment Before Operation

Deployment — A Case Study from Kosovo, 2013”, this document contributes to

mediatEUr’s growing internal knowledge on the development of mediation

scoping missions, and can support the work of organisations like the European

Institute of Peace.

Mediation can be useful for resolving or even transforming conflicts, but the

context or the capacity on the ground may not always be ripe for a mediative

process.


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LESSONS LEARNED FROM SCOPING MISSIONS

Lessons learned from levels of scoping and generating trust

1. Make clear the intention of the organisation in the initial contact toall actors, including whether there is a potential request for funding.

2. Ensure the mandate of the team is clear and narrowly formulated,focused on the envisaged work and the target audience. Providing a“Concept Note” of the scoping mission, which clearly identifies themandate, helps to foster trust and motivates actors to interact.

3. Meetings just to exchange views are less productive when thecounterparts see little benefit; interlocutors should perceive there issomething they can gain from the discussion.

4. Tangible outcomes from the meeting enhance communication –clearly identify why the team is meeting with a particular counterpartand the benefits that may come out for both sides.

Lessons learned in mission preparation 5. While political conditions may necessitate an ad hoc and immediate

scoping mission, most scoping missions can be planned out withenough time for consultation. A minimum of two to three monthshas proven to be useful in the lead up to a field visit with creatingsmall, achievable goals and deadlines.

6. Where an organisation is likely to be called upon for short-notice,quick deployments, it may be useful to develop upfront templatesfor quick planning, methodology and implementation (e.g. contactdatabases, standard concept and letter templates, methodology andquestionnaire templates).

7. Preparation can be divided into three phases: design, outreach andmeeting setup.

8. The schedule of the field visit should not be packed before arrival asneeds and availability will be determined during the trip. Specificallysome actors may need a follow up meeting.

9. It is helpful to have people on the preparation team who bring indifferent perspectives, such as business, politics, security,peacebuilding, rule of law etc.


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10. Brainstorming sessions built into the trip schedule help to ensure that theteam takes time out to process information during the field visit.

Lessons learned in designing a scoping mission

11. When designing a scoping mission it is important to have a counterpartin-country who can discuss needs and interest of possible interlocutorsand how they themselves may have needs beyond the scoping mission.

12. Explaining the level of confidentiality, the source of the mandate, andhow information will be used helps parties determine how muchinformation they wish to provide. Sometimes, parties will use a firstmeeting to assess the scoping team and call for a second meeting todeepen the exchange.

13. Meetings with actors follow need and function. It is important to buildinto the design different types of meetings, such as informationexchange, consulting, capacity-building, brainstorming, attending animportant conference that is going on at the time of the scoping mission,etc.

14. Deploying with a diverse team with different expertise helps to bring indifferent perspectives during the field visit and allows the team toprovide ad hoc services not foreseen in the mission.

15. Designing secondary ‘capacity-building’ components into a scopingmission, such as short seminars or coaching on mediation and peaceprocess support helps leave tangible, immediate benefits for interlocutorsthat makes the process less ‘extractive’ and helps building relationships.Secondary capacity building components should not overshadow thepurpose of the mission and should only be undertaken if there is arequest from a local actor or a specific added value.

16. Scoping teams should bear in mind the short nature of capacity-buildingevents. Due to time limitations, such events may remain at a superficiallevel and may not capture the complexities of the local situation.


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17. Scoping missions provide value to conflict actors mainly by givingthem an opportunity to share their knowledge and produce newideas, more so than by the knowledge that the scoping team bringsin. In a way, scoping missions act as a sort of catalyst. Bringing thisperspective in mind will give the scoping team opportunities tocrystallise and clarify local knowledge and share their own.

Lessons learned from re-entry

18. Pre-plan official debriefing during the mission and ensure thatresults are captured in some document form.

19. Regular updates during scoping mission to the home base and viceversa are helpful for keeping close organisational contact.

20. Having the staff backstopping the mission document daily outcomeshelps ensure institutional memory.


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2. What is a scoping mission?

There is no common definition for a ‘scoping mission’ in the professional

mediation literature. At its essence, a scoping mission is primarily considered a

planning tool of first resorts that allows practitioners to assess if an organisation

should dedicate resources to a given project or objective. In its purest form, it is

nothing more than a needs assessment.

The concept of scoping missions originates in the environmental and social

impact assessment fields, where a scoping is an effort “to clarify key issues and to

promote dialogue with consultees and other stakeholders concerning key

ecological issues and proposed methods for survey, evaluation and assessment. It

also ensures that the proponent is aware of the likely issues and has an

understanding of the expected costs”.1 Applying this definition to mediation, one

can understand mediation as an ongoing assessment of a conflict situation,

usually through monitoring and discussion, to evaluate the state of and potential

for a mediation or mediation support engagement.

2.1. What do others say about mediation scoping?

Despite the limited literature on the topic, several actors in the fields of mediation

and peacebuilding have referred to mediation scoping and its use. The UN, the

Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), the EU, or the European External Action

Service (EEAS), among others, provide definitions for the concept of scoping

missions:

Business definition of scoping:

“Ongoing assessment of a situation, usually through monitoring and discussion”


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UN “[A mediation scoping is] a process of data gathering and analysis to

inform decision-making”.2

EU “[A mediation scoping refers to] the identification of possible future

mediation needs into its policy analysis and planning processes.3

EEAS “[Scoping missions aim to] assess the role of the EU as a value-driven

actor [in mediation]”4

CMI “[Mediation scopings are] informal consultations and talks with parties

[to] give indispensable and timely insights into the parties’ internal

dynamics and their interest vis-à-vis the conflict.”5

2.2. Scoping missions and the European Institute of Peace

Scoping Missions have the primary task of evaluating the cost of potential

engagement relative to possible outcomes. In the case of the European Institute

of Peace, scoping missions should be a key part in the aim set out by the

Institute’s concept paper, namely to “contribute to and complement the global

peace agenda of the European Union, primarily through mediation and

informal dialogue”, as its mission statement reads.6

The EIP may be called upon by the EU or member states to make an assessment

of the feasibility of an international mediation process led by the EU. While the

EU may have the competencies to undertake a scoping mission for its own

institutions, such as the EEAS, it may not always have the capacity readily

deployable with necessary security clearances or information-sharing approval.

The autonomous and unique character of the EIP would allow it to reflect on

whether EU engagement is appropriate.


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2.3. What are the benefits of scoping missions?

Scoping missions help identifying new areas of possible engagement and

generating innovative approaches to mediation and dialogue through

consultation.

In addition to its most immediate results, sending experts into the field to

conduct an assessment may also carry unexpected, positive results. For example,

peacebuilding issues that have been unresolved, (e.g. communication, mistrust,

local development conflict etc.) may be discussed in the interviews held during a

scoping mission — through such discussions, new ideas, formats and ultimately

solutions may be jointly developed. How to capture these outcomes and make

them sustainable, while avoiding losing track of the aim of the mission, remains a

challenge for scoping teams.

Scoping missions can have other benefits:

ü Providing ad hoc or one-time interventions, such as coaching or capacity-building.

ü Building confidence of local practitioners through exposure to international experiences.

ü Forming important local contacts for future work and being a catalyst for indigenous networking.

ü Motivating others to reflect on “if” and “how” mediation can be integrated into their own work.

ü By identifying potential interlocutors, a nascent network of mediation-related actors may be formed.

ü An existing, developing, indigenous network of mediation-related actors may be discovered.

In Myanmar, for example, contrary to the belief of many counterparts the

scoping mission identified that there are several actors working on mediative

initiatives already or would like to begin with this type of work.

In Kosovo, for instance, a half-day seminar on provided insight into the

potential for transformative mediation


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3. Conflicts of interest

The European Union defines a conflict of interest as “a situation where the

impartiality and objectivity of a decision, opinion or recommendation of an

Agency is or might be perceived as being compromised.”7

In the context of mediation, a conflict of interest is understood as a situation

where an organisation and/or its members have motivations that antagonise or

jeopardise the aim of the mission, and which results in the impossibility for the

organisation to perform in an impartial manner. Conflicts of interest are an

important aspect for the practice of professional mediation — if a mediation

organisation is perceived as having a conflict of interest and is, as a result, being

viewed as partial, actors in the field will be reluctant to interact with it and to give

it honest information, endangering the validity of the mission.

3.1. The donors’ perspective

A mediation initiative can be costly in relation to its tangible and immediate

outcomes.8 Despite an increase in international funding for mediation, donors

have grappled with how to show concrete outcomes from mediation

engagements. While mediators seek to ensure the sustainability of their work

and take on a long-term perspective, experience suggests that donors lean on

funding short-term success stories, typically missions with immediately visible

results — this is not the aim with a scoping mission.

Instead, the nature of a scoping mission is to determine whether an organisation

should provide its services in a particular context, or whether the situation is ripe

– or not – for a mediation engagement. If the recommendation is made that

mediation or mediation support do not fit the situation on the ground, donors

may perceive the mission as a failure, as there is no clear follow-up process. This

mismatch between mediation’s nature and funders’ expectations may result in an

important conflict of interest for the scoping team.

This is why it is important that scoping teams may come under pressure to justify

their work. The ties between donors and scoping teams, and the way they

cooperate, play an important role in the perception of the team and potential

conflicts of interest, as scoping missions include an assessment of potential


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sponsors or donors. To avoid assumptions over personal interests during the

mission, a scoping mission may be developed by an organistion knowing they

will not be involved in any follow-up project that may result from it.

3.2. How to address conflicts of interest

Managing the perception of the scoping team plays a role in avoiding

assumptions over conflicts of interest. Following the principles of impartiality,

inclusivity and transparency can go lengths in building a good image of the team

on the ground, and thus calming any suspicions. In addition, maintaining a

professional distance from the donor and the host can help ensure the

independence of the scoping, and thus improve the image of the team and the

trust interlocutors deposit on them.

3.3. Strengthening transparency

When undertaking a scoping mission, the team should ensure a sufficient level of

transparency in terms of mandate, purpose and intended outcomes. Circulating

an information sheet about the organisation and its work as well as a concept

note on the mission to all interlocutors in advance will prove helpful in alleviating

concerns from stakeholders.

As the team reflects on conflicts of interest it can build mechanisms to ensure

maximum transparency — for example, setting out both the focus of the mission

and the intentions of the organisation, and sharing them openly with requisite

interlocutors in order to alleviate any concerns.

ü An internal concept note may be shared with the ‘client’ to outline the focus, objectives, and detailed plans including timelines, deliverables and finances.

The question of personal interests of the members of scoping missions was a

repeated theme with interlocutors in the Kosovo and Myanmar missions, one that

needed to be clarified at the beginning of meetings. Once counterparts

understood the nature of the scoping mission and the outcomes, issues related to

conflict of interest were also mitigated.


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ü An external briefing note may be shared with all interlocutors and stakeholders in advance, in order to demonstrate transparency and give interlocutors the opportunity to prepare for the meetings adequately.

ü Letters of introduction should be shared with every meeting request, laying out the background, institutional affiliation, purpose and financing of the scoping mission, and introducing the team.

4. Designing a scoping mission

Designing and developing a scoping mission can be challenging due to its

evolving character and its many potential outcomes. While common logic dictates

that one should set the mandate of the scoping mission (its aim and objectives)

early on, in practice the design of a scoping mission is rather an evolving process

of defining and refining hypotheses, objectives and deliverables.

Mission design will require several creative meetings to brainstorm the level of

scoping, the mandate, the goal and possible outcomes — the ‘building blocs’ of

the mission. Who will be met and in what order will be determined by these

building blocs. At an early stage the team should focus less on the “who (they

should meet)” and more on the “what (they want to achieve)”. The clearer the

reason for scoping and the intended outcomes, the easier it will be to identify

who needs to be involved. Below is an example of a useful matrix to assist the

brainstorming in this process.


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Blank Matrix for a Scoping Mission

Purpose

Objectives and

Expected outcomes

Level of Conflict

Phase of Scoping

Limitations/Risk

Primary Beneficiary

Locations

Languages

Team Expertise

Local contacts?

Cultural issues?

Gender issues?

Relevant

Documentation

4.1. The level of scoping and their interlocutors

Mediation initiatives can — and should — be conducted at many different levels

depending on the actors they engage. Typically, mediators and people working in

international relations refer to Tracks I, II and III when addressing the different

levels at which they interact with stakeholders — these levels refer to how close

or how far they are from the political arena, with Track I being central political

leaders, Track II local political actors and civil society, and Track III being

community actors. Each of these levels includes different types of actors, such as

governments, donors, practitioners, experts or academics, all of which may be

part of more than one category. Actors within the two tracks perceive mediation

scoping teams differently.

International Track I actors tend to be more concerned with mandates, funding

and sustainability questions. They are also often the most suspicious over the

intentions of the assessment team. By contrast, NGOs show less concern about

scoping missions and are often more focused on the type of work that is foreseen


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in the future, how the resulting initiatives would interact with them, and how

they might affect their own activities or potential for future projects. As a result,

communication with Track II actors tends to be more informal, quicker and more

informative, while actors on track I will be more formal and less committal.

Lessons learned from levels of scoping and generating trust

1. Make clear the intention of the organisation in the initial contact to allactors, including whether there is a potential funding issue.

2. Ensure the mandate of the team is clear and narrowly formulated, focusedon the envisaged work and the target audience. Providing a “ConceptNote” of the scoping mission, which clearly identifies the mandate, helpsto foster trust and motivates actors to interact.

3. Meetings just to exchange views are less productive when thecounterparts see little benefit; interlocutors should perceive there issomething they can gain from the discussion.

4. Tangible outcomes from the meeting enhance communication – clearlyidentify why the team is meeting with a particular counterpart and thebenefits that may come out for both sides.

4.2. Creating a mandate

The word “mandate” implies an official command or order to undertake a specific

action. It is a judicial term that is most often used by military and government

representatives in the peacebuilding world. NGOs, consultants and activists often

work with terms such as “project”, “mission” or “contract”, some of which may be

formally mandated by an external actor or an internal authoritative body.

Consideration of a scoping mission may begin by a simple request from an actor

to look into a matter or the possibility of a mission — an actor in the field, an

interested third party such as the UN, the OSCE or the EU, or a funding authority

may initiate this request. It may be motivated by the expertise within the

organisation, joint participation in an event, or simply through the mandate of

the organisation calling for action in a particular field. Upon a request for scoping,

the organisation should follow a formal process of consideration of the risks

involved in developing the mission.


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Typically the construction of the mandate for a scoping mission will be the result

of a discussion between the scoping team, the host and the donor, and will

reflect their needs, interests and capacities. While a mandate will not provide all

the ingredients that are required for good practice in mediation (i.e. transparency,

inclusivity, and others that will largely depend on the team’s mediation craft), it

should provide enough terms and conditions to guarantee the independence of

the team.

In the case of a European Institute of Peace, for example, mandates could be

given by a variety of actors such as the EEAS, European Commission or European

Parliament (external) or the Board of Governors and Advisory Council (internal).

Further afield the EIP may consider requests from governments, international

actors, and even the private sector. Requests become mandates having gone

through an internal approval process.

Goals of scoping for a European Institute of Peace

An organisation like the EIP may find scoping missions relevant in three types

of situations:

1. Where the EIP wants to assess its own potential for direct intervention andcontribution to a particular mediation or peace process situation, with thepotential for a future project or intervention design led by the EIP itself.

2. Where another third party or conflict party requests the EIP to assess itspotential options in a situation and make recommendations at the end,without any follow-up engagement of the EIP in the situation.

3. A hybrid of the two, where a third party requests an EIP scoping mission toassess a limited type of ‘support engagement’ from the EIP to existingefforts, for example in advising in an ongoing process, or providing trainingand coaching support.


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4.3. External communication

The way the team communicates with stakeholders will greatly impact the

interaction and ultimately affect the results of the mission. While the mandate

provides the team with a conceptual framework and a set of objectives, actors in

the field may understand the mission differently depending on their needs and

expectations. To prevent misunderstandings and achieve maximum impact, the

scoping team will have to make an effort to communicate its mandate and goals

effectively. Participants will be interested on how the information given to the

team will be used (which relates ethics) and on who will have access to this

knowledge (which relates to confidentiality).

4.4. Selecting a team

The success of the scoping mission team lies in its diversity and the unique added

value of each team member. Having different experiences and expertise

generates complementary and expands the horizon of the scoping mission,

deciding on the focus of the field visits, potential interlocutors, and giving an

initial sense for the priority of meetings. Sometimes team members may be

narrowly focused on scoping from a perspective with which they feel most

comfortable, such as their own expertise. Leaving a comfort zone and trying

something new is not always easy or desired, but it may prove useful for a

scoping mission. Often the best critical thinking comes from having individuals on

the team with different backgrounds and a common purpose.

In Kosovo, mediatEUr’s team was formed by a lead mediator, a second mediator

with expertise in the region, and a research assistant.


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As a general guide, an assessment team may need to contain the following

personnel to meet its objectives:

1) Assessor and Team Leader: ultimately responsible for the methodology, thedevelopment of the mission, and its final result (including the last draft report).While he or she will not take on a direct mediative task at this stage, his or herskills in mediation, conflict transformation and conflict analysis are key for anadequate assessment. The lead assessor may also be wholly or partly responsiblefor appointing the rest of the assessment team. The assessor engages inexploratory discussions with the host, produces initial conflict mapping and,ultimately, agrees a mandate with the host.

2) Advisor: with good background knowledge of the conflicted situation, the advisoris able to provide solid contextual analysis and insight, including the politicalcontext and local culture. The advisor can be based outside the region, althoughusing a local expert reduces the logistic costs of the mission. When consideringthe appointment of an indigenous person as a team member, the lead assessormust take care to ensure that one or other conflict parties will not view them asbiased or partisan.

3) Project Officer: acts as liaison person between the assessment team and the hostorganisation; attends to logistics, administration and scheduling. The projectofficer also collates briefing materials and undertakes research. He or she is alsoresponsible for note-taking and drafting reports.

As a general guide, it will be important for the project officer to undertake anadvance field visit. Apart from establishing a working relationship with staff ofthe host organisation, the key purpose will be to organise the broad itinerary ofthe assessment visit. In situations where costs are problematic, it may bepreferable to recruit a local person as project officer. However, this may be afalse economy since a project officer should, ideally, understand the operationalmodalities of the assessor organisation.

4) Fieldworker: assists the team with translation/interpretation and logisticalsupport on the ground. Her or his role is key for the mission. The fieldworkeraccompanies the preparation phase as well, 1 and assists the researcher during apreliminary information visit. In some situations, where society is riven withdivision along tribal or sectarian lines, it may be necessary to engage twofieldworkers so that the team reflects sufficient breadth to reassure respectivesides.


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The figure below depicts the composition of the optimum mediation assessment team, outlining its members and their shared and unique capacities. While resources and circumstances may dictate for a smaller team, it is important that the capacities are present.

4.5. Scheduling and time management

One issue often underestimated in scoping missions is the time needed for

preparation and implementation. Funding for this type of mission is often

unrealistic and may not cover institutional costs. The result can be that

preparation is limited to the bare essentials and the length of field trips needs to

be shortened. Future missions need to be conscious of the need for sufficient

time for preparation, and try to secure enough funding for it.

Specifically challenging for the scoping mission is the setting up of meetings.

Contrary to setting up meetings for fully funded projects to discuss cooperation,

scoping missions suffer from the scepticism surrounding their often unclear

outcome. Stories abound of the multitude of international actors who “come and

go” in conflict zones. Moreover, local actors may be inundated with meetings that


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lead to little visible outcomes. A request for a meeting in such a context may be

perceived more as a nuisance and might only be read in-between an array of

other demands and requests. The following are several recommendations to

overcome these challenges:

ü Ensure that the request is concise and complete with an explanation of the purpose.

ü Make reference to what the added value of the meeting is for the interlocutors.

ü Have other reputable actors introduce your mission.

ü Be precise about the team’s availability and flexibility.

ü If you are willing to meet with other person in the same organisation, make this known.

ü Do not ask people to meet together unless there is a clear purpose.

While NGO structures typically allow for more flexible and informal interaction,

working with EU and state-based actors tends to be more formal and time-

consuming, partly due to the need for approval for information exchange and

cooperation. In practice, however, this may not always be the case: once track one

actors have given approval for a meeting, information exchange and cooperation

will flow smoothly; NGOs, on the other hand tend to be quicker to set up

meetings but more hesitant to release information that can be detrimental to

their own future project acquisition. Ensuring enough time to allow for proper

communication during the visit with both actors, and where necessary, providing

introductions through other third parties and shared contacts should be a priority

in the design of the mission.


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Timeframe for a Scoping Mission Preparation

3 Months 2 Months 1 Month 2 weeks

Mandate Concept Note Outreach to potential Track II interlocutors

Finalise meetings set up

Local partnerships

Outreach to potential Track I interlocutors

Travel Arrangements

Security Assessment

Information Gathering

General Conflict Analysis

Qualitative Interviews Structure

Logistics for capacity-building components

Team

Identification

Team Role

distribution

Materials for

Distribution

4.6. Local NGOs as scoping teams and partners

Local NGOs may be considered when selecting a scoping team, especially as a

way to reduce costs and enhance outcomes, but collaborating solely with them

also poses challenges. The problem with a local NGO undertaking a scoping

mission for an international organisation is that it may neither have knowledge of

the institution nor be able to assess the internal capacities of the organisation.

Moreover, there may be a direct conflict of interest (see above). On the other

hand the NGO’s expert knowledge of the conflict and the local language give it an

advantage when researching specific questions related to the scoping mission.

One might consider a hybrid model in which a local NGO researches, consults

independently and reports to the scoping team.

Specifically helpful in both scoping missions was having two in-country partners

for logistics. In both countries the teams relied heavily on the support from the

EU Delegation and an existing NGO who guided the teams towards track two

and three actors who had direct or indirect experience with the research topic.


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Lessons learned in mission preparation

1. While political conditions may necessitate an ad hoc and immediatescoping mission, most scoping missions can be planned out with enoughtime for consultation. A minimum of two to three months has proven tobe useful in the lead up to a field visit with creating small, achievablegoals and deadlines.

2. Where an organisation is likely to be called upon for short-notice, quickdeployments, it may be useful to develop upfront templates for quickplanning, methodology and implementation (e.g. contact databases,standard concept and letter templates, methodology and questionnairetemplates).

3. Preparation can be divided into three phases: design, outreach andmeeting setup.

4. The schedule of the field visit should not be packed before arrival as needsand availability will be determined during the trip. Specifically some actorsmay need a follow up meeting.

5. It is very helpful to have people on the preparation team who bring indifferent perspectives, such as business, politics, security, peacebuilding,rule of law etc.

6. Brainstorming sessions built into the trip schedule help to ensure that theteam takes time out to process information during the field visit.

Lessons learned in designing a scoping mission

1. When designing a scoping mission it is important to have an in-countrycounterpart who can discuss needs and interest of possible interlocutorsand how they themselves may have needs beyond the scoping mission.

2. Explaining the level of confidentiality, the source of the mandate, and howinformation will be used helps parties determine how much informationthey wish to provide. Sometimes, parties will use a first meeting to assessthe scoping team and call for a second meeting to deepen the exchange.

3. Meetings with actors follow need and function. It is important to build intothe design different types of meetings, such as information exchange,consulting, capacity-building, brainstorming, attending an importantconference that is going on at the time of the scoping mission, etc.


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4. Deploying with a diverse team with different expertise helps to bring indifferent perspectives during the field visit and allows the team to providead hoc services not foreseen in the mission.

5. Designing secondary ‘capacity-building’ components into a scopingmission, such as short seminars or coaching on mediation and peaceprocess support helps leave tangible, immediate benefits for interlocutorsthat makes the process less ‘extractive’ and helps building relationships.Secondary capacity building components should not overshadow thepurpose of the mission and should only be undertaken if there is a requestfrom a local actor or a specific added value.

6. Scoping teams should bear in mind the short nature of capacity-buildingevents. Due to time limitations, such events may remain at a superficiallevel and may not capture the complexities of the local situation.

7. Scoping missions provide value to conflict actors mainly by giving them anopportunity to share their knowledge and produce new ideas, more sothan by the knowledge that the scoping team brings in. In a way, scopingmissions act as a sort of catalyst. Bringing this perspective in mind will givethe scoping team opportunities to crystallise and clarify local knowledgeand share their own.

5. The field visit

Once the team leaves the headquarters, an independent dynamic is created by

changing factors on the ground and conflict dynamics. Teamwork in the field

should be inspired by three concepts: flexibility, adaptably and impartiality. The

objective of the team is to gather enough information to make an informed and

analytical report on the feasibility of mediation and dialogue. Therefore, the team

must be ready to adapt to changing circumstances on the ground. No matter how

much preparation one has done, the people at the headquarters will not know

more than the people in the field; the former has second hand information, while

the latter works in real time. The task for the team is to check the assumptions

being made by both and to assess the information received.


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5.1. Impartiality in the field

Impartiality refers to the equal treatment of all actors without taking sides — it is

part of a great debate in the conflict management literature. Different experts

have their own understanding of what the concept means, but its importance

cannot be neglected. The team’s ability to remain impartial will be key to the

correct development of the mission. While all sources of information are useful

and necessary for a scoping mission (at least as long as they have relevance for

the analysis), the information they provide must be carefully analysed and filtered

for bias.

Impartiality is also connected to credibility. Interlocutors may engage the team

and ask for advice regarding their own situation. Advice given should be based on

concrete experience. Concrete examples of where a particular recommendation

has worked add to the credibility of the team.

A third aspect of impartiality is how information is handled. In this regard,

confidentiality should be seen as a hallmark for impartiality. Mediators are

trusted with sensitive information and under no circumstance should

confidentiality be broken without prior consent of the parties, even when one

thinks it serves a higher purpose. A written report needs to be labelled clearly

with the appropriate level of confidentiality, which should be established with

the mandating authority/actor and communicated appropriately.

5.2. Analysis

While the team may conduct analysis throughout the mission as they receive the

information from interlocutors (in “real time”), a central phase of the scoping is

the final analysis. This phase should be divided into three main questions:

1. The need — is there a need for a mediation engagement?

2. The ability — is there a local or international capacity that could fulfil thisneed? ?

3. The suitability — is our organisation the most appropriate to develop sucha mediation engagement?


26

5.3. The forgotten logistics

1. Time management is essential in the cost-benefit analysis. It is worthwhileto employ local staff for the duration of the field visit who can assist in theprovision of local transportation, organise meetings, rearrange schedulesand sort out problems while in the field. Such a move reduces dependencyon the headquarters and unnecessary logistical problems.

2. Weather, seasons, and religious holidays are major factors that canfacilitate or hinder a mission. Experience has shows that monsoon seasons,Ramadan, or summer holiday season may reduce productivity.

3. First-time meetings often take longer than expected due to introductoryand confidence-building aspects. It is important to ensure there is enoughtime between meetings in case meetings go over the expected time.

4. Local translation adds expense to the budget but also enriches the pool ofpotential actors. In this regard it is essential to ensure the quality ofinterpretation is sufficient for the mission, and to factor interpretation timeinto the design of any events.

5. Interlocutors are interested in background information. Having materialsabout the mission or organisation in local languages facilitates trust-building and common understanding.

6. EU delegation staff are generally open to supporting missions but havetime and resource constraints.

Need • Have the parties

exhausted allbilateralpossibilities?

• What help dothey need?

Ability • Do leaders have

support andauthority?

• Is the interveneraccepted by both/all sides?

Suitability • Do the parties want

help?• Are you the right

person /organization tohelp ?


27

5.4. Security of information in institutional settings

EU and other institutional are not allowed to provide information that is

classified, even to well-known colleagues. They may however, share personal

thoughts or information readily available to the public. It is important to clarify

with the delegation what was intended as information for public consumption

and what was confidential.

6. Re-entry at the headquarters

Internal to one’s own organisation there may be a disconnection between the

team sent into the field and the headquarters upon return. A team sent into the

field experiences many impressions, ideas and events. They have lived in a very

short time through an intense socialisation process; they may form bonds with

people in the field and may even be encouraged to develop major plans for

intervention. This intense experience can be related to what is called boundary

roles in organisational behaviour.9 At the same time, the home team has been on

a parallel and different track, especially if they have not been backstopping, i.e.

supporting, the scoping mission. The re-entry of the field team to the home base

needs to be properly managed in order to gain the most out of the mission. Some

activities include debriefing, following up on new contacts, tracing new ideas,

exploring potential, and storytelling and sharing in larger team meetings.

In both of mediatEUr’s missions, the final report and the recommendations of the

team were discussed with the EUHoM prior to a final report being issued. The

sharing of recommendations was helpful in clarifying misunderstandings or any

outstanding issues.


28

Lessons learned from re-entry

1. Pre-plan official debriefing and ensure that results are captured in somedocument form.

2. Regular updates during scoping mission to the home base and vice versaare helpful in keeping close organisational contact.

3. Having the staff backstop the mission and document daily outcomes helpsensure institutional memory.

7. Outcomes

Mediation scoping missions are important to inform future mediation processes,

as they assess the adequacy of mediation in a particular context and the existing

capacities on the ground, and draw on that knowledge to design suitable follow-

up activities. Achieving a successful mediation scoping — one that generates

enough knowledge and information to design a solid mediation process —

however, does not guarantee a wider follow-up process. While they are

fundamental in increasing the chance of a successful mediation, scoping missions

still struggle to generate follow-up work, as their contribution to the resolution of

conflict is not immediately visible and funding remains a challenge. Guaranteeing

funds for follow-up activities remains a systemic problem for peace mediation

scoping missions.

In order to support or strengthen the outcome component of the scoping

missions, the organisation should agree in advance with the mandating authority

on the specific deliverables. It should further separate official outcomes from

unofficial outcomes, the latter being ad hoc commitments that may have been

made, and document any ad hoc consulting, coaching or capacity-building

provided while in the field. Once the team is back at the headquarters they may

wish to follow up with all interlocutors on any “to dos”.

When the team is in the field, it is helpful for them to get a short update of the

latest news in the organisation. This way their return is not as intense.


29

8. Reflections for the European Institute of Peace

Scoping missions are useful in assessing the situation on the ground and gaining

information. There is a danger that institutional priorities pre-determine whether

mediation is needed and fast-forward to determining the scope of the activities.

The assumption that mediation is needed in every conflict sets up any mediation

activity for failure. Given that the EIP is newly established, there will be a series of

scoping missions in the first year, more so than in already established institutions.

The Institute will also seek to build its credibility and reputation. Therefore, its

choice of intervention will be crucial to its success. Too many scoping missions

without outcomes may generate a negative image.

The first few scoping missions of the EIP may have several objectives, including

assessing the potential for mediation, building networks, and building credibility.

In this regard, it is suggested that a scoping mission be undertaken with an

existing actor already working in the field, such as an NGO or multilateral

organisation. This supports trust and network building at an early stage during

the scoping mission and reduces the need to hand over projects from the scoping

mission to lead process managers. Such a construction would allow the EIP to

hire ad hoc experts with regional or thematic knowledge who can be deployed

from short to medium-term. Such cooperation supports the hub-mentality

foreseen in the EIP founding documents.

Lastly, it would be advisable for the EIP to have strong institutional mandates

from relevant actors, such as the EU. Cooperation with EU Delegations has proven

in the past to be invaluable and very productive. mediatEUr’s pilot scoping

missions proved beyond a doubt that there is added value in an international

organisation being supportive and providing complementary services to the EU.

However, this is only possible if the EU is willing to such support, and if EU actors

in the field trust the scoping team. Therefore, it is advisable to have a longer lead

up and trust building phase with the delegations in-country and to ensure that

the scoping mission team is working closely with the delegations to meet its

mediation and dialogue needs.


30

9. Annex 1. Fact Sheet on Pilot Scoping Missions

MISSION 1: SCOPING MISSION TO KOSOVO, MARCH 2013

Country: Kosovo

Donor: Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Field visit duration: 5 days

Aim: to support the European Union’s efforts to develop its use of mediation as a

contribution to peace and stability in Kosovo.

Objectives:

1. To undertake an initial assessment of relevant mediation initiatives inKosovo regarding their implications for the EU’s work for peace andstability there.

2. To advise the EUSR on strategic options regarding development of the EU’suse of mediation.

3. To gather learning on mediation scoping approaches that can be used inthe context of EU peace mediation efforts in the future.

Outcome: Report to the EUSR on mediation options for Kosovo and the role of the

EUSR’s office in supporting the development of mediation capacity

MISSION 2: SCOPING MISSION TO MYANMAR, JUNE 2014

Country: Myanmar

Field Visit Duration: 10 days

Donor: Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Aim: To identify options and risks for promoting dialogue and mediation as part

of wider peace efforts in Myanmar, and to identify what role, if any, the EU can

play in this regard.

Objectives:

1. To undertake an assessment mission to identify gaps and capacities indialogue and mediation that are of relevance to the EU.

2. To explore what roles, if any, the EU can play in promoting dialogue andmediation approaches as part of wider peace efforts in Myanmar, and todevelop a set of recommendations in that regard.

3. To learn lessons from innovative peace support practices beingimplemented in Myanmar for similar efforts in other parts of the world.

Outcome: Report to the EU HoD on the role of the EU Delegation in supporting

mediation and peace-process efforts.

Mediation Scoping Missions: Guidance Paper

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NOTES

1 Chartered Institute of Ecology and Environmental Management, Screening and Scoping. Section 2.6. Available online at http://www.cieem.net/screening-and-scoping (retrieved 15 September at 16:14) 2 United Nations (N/D) Planning Toolkit. United Nations: New York. Available online at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/Planning%20Toolkit_Web%20Version.pdf (retrieved 12 September 2014 at 11:56) 3 Council of the European Union and European Commission (2009), “Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities”. Available online at http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/concept_strengthening_eu_med_en.pdf (retrieved 12 September 2014 at 11 :59) 4 EEAS (2012) Strengthening national capacities for mediation and dialogue: National dialogue platforms and infrastructure for peace. European External Action Service: Brussels. Available online at

http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/2013_eeas_mediation_support_factsheet_peace_infrastructures_en.pdf (retrieved 12 September 2014 at 12:00) 5 Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) (2013) Lessons Learned from Mediation Processes. Crisis Management Initiative: Helsinki. Available online at:

http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LessonsLearnedPreTalksToNegotiations_CMI_2013.pdf (retrieved 12 September 2014 at 12:01)

6 European Institute of Peace (2014), About Us: Mission. Online at http://www.eip.org/en/about-us/mission 7 European Commission (2013) Guidelines on the prevention and management of conflicts of interest in EU decentralised agencies. P.4 European Commission: Brussels. 8 On relative cost see for example, Fischer, D. (2006). “Relative cost of mediation and intervention”. The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2. And Greig, J.M. and PM. Regan. (2006). “When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, 31 August – 3 September; Schirch, L. Lund, M.S. (2009) Statement to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities. US Congress; and Brown, M.E. and R.N. Rosecrance. Eds. (1999). The Cost of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 9 See for example Jonsson, C. (1986). “Interorganization Theory and International Organization” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 30, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 39-57.

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