Medina MMAS Chapters 1-3 14 Dec 05

7/28/2019 Medina MMAS Chapters 1-3 14 Dec 05

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OPERATIONALIZING THE INTERAGENCY COORDINATIONMECHANISMS BETWEEN STATE AND DOD FOR

STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION

OPERATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

Strategy

by

Elizabeth Anne Medina, MAJ, USA

BS, University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point, WI, 1991

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas2006

Distribution statement

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Elizabeth Anne Medina

Thesis Title:

Operationalizing the Coordination Mechanisms Between State and DoD for Stability andReconstruction Operations

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee ChairMr. Robert D. Walz, MA

, Member

Dr. Judith Jones, PhD

, MemberLTC Marcus Fielding (middle initial and highest degree?)

, MemberMr. Michael R. Czaja, MS

Accepted this 16th day of June 2006 by:

, Director, Graduate Degree Programs

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not

necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College orany other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing

statement.)

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ACRONYMS

ACT Advanced Civilian Teams

CA Civil Affairs

COCOM Regional or Functional Combatant Commander as identified in the US

Unified Command Plan

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CRSG Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Groups

DoD US Department of Defense

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

HSRT Humanitarian Stability and Reconstruction Team

IA Interagency

ITPT Interagency Transition Planning Team

JFCOM Joint Forces Command

JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group

JOC Joint Operations Concept

LFA Lead Federal Agency

NDU National Defense University

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

NSS National Security Strategy

ORHA Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

PCC Policy Coordination Committee

PDD Presidential Defense Directive

S/CRS Department of States Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

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SJFHQ Standing Joint Force Headquarters of a Combatant Command

State US Department of State

SRO Stability and Reconstruction Operations

UJTL Unified Joint Task List

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees

USAID United States Agency for International Development

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Stage-Setter Epigraph

The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national

security policy as it affects the United States - domestic, foreign, military,intelligence, and economics (in conjunction with the National Economic

Council (NEC)). The National Security Council system is a process to

coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective

development and implementation of those national security policiesTheNSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) will continue to be the senior

interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national

security, as it has since 1989The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC)will also continue to serve as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for

consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC

can prescribe and review the work of the NSC interagency groupsdiscussed later in this directiveManagement of the development and

implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the

United States Government shall usually be accomplished by the NSC

Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall bethe main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security

policy... Six NSC/PCCs are hereby established forregionsEleven

NSC/PCCs are hereby also established forfunctional topicsTheexisting system of Interagency Working Groups is abolishedExcept for

those established by statute, other existing NSC interagency groups, ad

hoc bodies, and executive committees are also abolished as of March 1,2001, unless they are specifically reestablished as subordinate working

groups within the new NSC system as of that date.

[signed: George W. Bush]

President Bush,National Security Presidential Directive-1, 2001

Achieving full spectrum dominance requires full coordination with

interagency and multinational partners. Achieving the desired end-state

and strategic objectives necessitates an integrated, networked Joint Force,as well as interoperability with interagency and multinational partners.

Secretary of Defense Rumsfield, Joint Operations Concepts, November 2003

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Background

In the past decade, looking at post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization in

Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military has conducted complex

operations, transitioning responsibility and tasks from and back to Department of State

(State) responsibility. By referring to figures 1-2 which were published in Transforming

for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations1, one sees that in the current world, as

the duration of major combat operations has decreased, a gap between combat and the

expectation or need for the institutional civilian response for nation-building has grown.

In the past decade, DoD has filled the post-conflict gap on an ad hoc basis based on

military presence in the conflict area.

Figure 1 Past Model of Combat Operations transition to Reconstruction (must

get approval to include)

Figure 2 Current Model of transition from Combat to Reconstruction (must get

approval to include)

For operations in Iraq, the Secretary of Defense created an organization called

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to be responsible for the

occupation of Iraq, replaced within four months by the Coalition Provisional Authority

(CPA) which then transitioned to sovereignty of the Iraqi people. In Afghanistan,

supporting the Afghani Transitional Authority, the Secretary of Defense created an

organization called the Afghanistan Reachback Office in concert with Provincial

Reconstruction Teams to assist and advise on the stabilization and reconstruction. In

April 2004, to preclude filling this gap on an ad hoc basis, and to address this new model

1 Binnendijk and Johnson. Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. 2004.

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deliberately, President Bush and his National Security Council (NSC) approved the

concept of a deployable civilian diplomatic corps that could institutionalize the US

civilian reconstruction and stabilization efforts under State: States Coordinator for

Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Despite the Lead Federal Agency (LFA)

responsibility given to S/CRS, for post-conflict environments or failing/failed states, the

military will continue to be required for stability and reconstruction operations pre- and

during-conflict as well as to support post-conflict operations as directed. In order for the

US to effectively prepare for and address the next complex contingency mission,

interagency coordination mechanisms between S/CRS and the DoD must be defined in

detail, particularly regarding transition of tasks and responsibilities.

US policy in the interagency coordination area stems from the Goldwater-Nichols

Act, which simply directed a joint military environment in the late 1980s. Following

operations in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as Somalia during the late 1990s and early

2000s, we received Presidential Defense Directive (PDD) 56 and the Interagency

Handbook for Complex Contingencies that mandated, coordination beyond joint military

coordination: interagency coordination. However, there was no follow-through on the

planning and execution so we continued to see the existence of critical gaps through the

spectrum of operations and up and down the levels of implementation. Only a handful of

times in the past eight years have we published the Political Implementation Plans, or

Pol-Mil plans as required by PDD56, and fewer times have we ever put them into action.

There were plans for Kosovo, Bosnia, Central Africa and Iraq. However, they were

complex and couldnt be fit easily into the militarys newly adopted capabilities or effects

based operations. Although they were supposed to include US policy and interests with

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well developed transition points, the format was a guide with no ease of use or

connection to the military operations on the ground. There was no way to

operationalize these plans. Weve recently received recommendations from Congress,

our professional military community, national institutes and defense corporations that the

US integrate all national elements of power through interagency planning and

coordination, like was achieved for the joint forces by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Problem

To reach the level of interagency interoperability required to keep failing or failed

states from impacting on US interests, the primary question is whether the US

government can provide the institutionalized level of coordination between S/CRS and

DoD required to operationalize reconstruction and stabilization operations down to the

tactical level. Although S/CRS focuses on post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization

operations, there should be no caveat to when these operations might be conducted,

whether in pre-, during or post-conflict.

To answer this central question, many other questions must be asked and

answered. First, it will be important to determine whether there will be an

institutionalized process or system for published interagency plans, whether those plans

will integrate all elements of power, whether S/CRS and DoD plans and planning will be

compatible and synchronized, whether they will include reconstruction and stabilization

operations along the conflict spectrum, and finally whether the plans will include a

greater community of agencies or even integrate current military concepts such as the

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) or national level Civil Military

Operations Centers (CMOCs). We will also need to answer whether the plans will

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specifically include the transition operations between government agencies and the

metrics required to know when to transition.

Next it will be important to determine whether the coordination mechanisms will

build the familiarity, proximity and relationships required to execute the plans. We must

find out whether each agency will have positions that are filled with qualified candidates

that can be assigned as elements of or liaisons to partner agencies, whether agency

locations are conducive to the coordination required, and whether training and exercises

are planned and conducted that require agencies to test plans and mechanisms.

Lastly it will be important to clarify whether the agencies will be physically

interoperable. We must further answer whether there is enough individual and common

funding for each agency to conduct coordination, planning, exercising and operations;

whether agency terminology, methodology, equipment, particularly communication

equipment, is common between the interagency group; and whether each agency has

qualified staff in positions that can deploy to conduct transitions and stability and

reconstruction operations as required.

Assumptions

There are a number of assumptions to make: 1) that State will retain the mission

of Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for US civilian reconstruction and stabilization efforts

despite any party change in the White House or despite Ambassador Pascuals departure

to the Brookings Institute, 2) the establishment of the S/CRS will become policy and/or

law during the next year, with the provision of the first crisis response funds as a line

item in the budget, 3) the majority of personnel and funding resources will continue to

come from DoD, 4) DoD will continue to coordinate with civilian agencies for all other

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types of operations, and 5) the US National Security Strategy (NSS) will continue to state

the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) requirements to protect our citizens through

preventative means which leads to the importance of planning for failing and failed

states. The underlying assumption to this last item is that the context for US stabilization

and reconstruction operations is in support US national interests and objectives as

conveyed in our current strategy, to address the conditions that allow terrorists and

terrorism to flourish.

Definition of Terms

The term operationalize in this paper will mean to establish the capability-

generation-elements of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Materiel,

Personnel, and Facilities (DOTLMPF), in addition to the planning and execution

elements that will translate strategic goals into tactical action.

There are many terms in use today for Stability Operations: Stability and Support

Operations (SASO), Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO) and Reconstruction

and Stabilization Operations as used by the SCRS. There is also the phrase Stability,

Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations which has been used by DoD

as a synonym for Stability Operations and may be the term used in a forthcoming Joint

Operations Concept.

In this paper the term Stability and Reconstruction Operations or the acronym

SRO will be used synonymously for all of these terms to mean the potential critical

missions of the US military in stabilization and reconstruction under the core mission of

Stability Operations in combination with the other two core missions of the US when

abroad: Defense Operations and Offense Operations.

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Limitations

Almost all of the SCRS documentation talks about post-conflict reconstruction

and stabilization. Since the military has responsibilities for, and the SCRS will be

planning for the full spectrum, this paper will attempt to address all reconstruction and

stabilization coordination requirements and mechanisms. Not only is the discussion

limited by terms at times, its also very timely. There have been and are many scheduled

conferences, studies and seminars at the strategic level to discuss the very issue of this

paper. In that respect, there is and will continue to be a large amount of pending

documentation, recommendations and policy. The most significant pending documents

from the DoDs perspective are the Quadrennial Defense Review and the updated Joint

Operations Concept that address interagency and stability operations at length.

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Delimitations

This paper will focus on whether or not the US government will be able to

conduct deliberate and successful Stability and Reconstruction Operations in the next

complex contingency by the addition of the new State structure as a complement to DoD

in the near term. The near term is within the same administration, with the same SCRS

Director, and the same Secretary of Defense and NSC. Because so much policy and

doctrine is noted as pending update, the long-term capability assessments will need to be

made in subsequent studies or papers. Facets of the issue that will not be covered are:

changes to the national oversight structure as defined in the NSPD-1, any requirements

for a new US grand strategy, involvement or engagement of the Standing Joint Force

Headquarters (SJFHQ), completion of the planning by the interagency body, or definition

of the missions the interagency body should be coordinating beyond reconstruction and

stabilization.

Significance of Study

At best, this study will provide a baseline or snapshot of the currently planned

interagency connectivity and institutionalization, identify any possible gaps, and provide

a view as to whether or not the US will be able to translate practically the national policy

into tactical action with the structures and mechanisms. At a minimum, this paper will

serve as an update to operational level planners and operators who are mostly unaware of

the magnitude of activities occurring at the national level by NSC, State and DoD. And,

finally this study can serve as feedback from the operational level planner to the

strategists involved in providing the solutions.

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Summary

The US has moved forward from the Presidential Decision Directive of 1997,

PDD56, and Pol-Mil planning to a time when the current President, Congress, State and

DoD realize we need a Lead Federal Agency, and legislation to create an institutionalized

capability to conduct coordinated interagency support to the next Stabilization and

Reconstruction Operations. Beginning in the next chapter, this paper will look at the

recent publications, doctrine and recommendations to determine what the contemporary

requirements are, what the systems are that are being built to meet those requirements,

and whether through the S/CRS and its support from DoD weve developed the specific

capability the US needs to plan and execute Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.

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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Background

Relevant literature is largely from the past five years that the Bush administration

has been in the White House since with the event of September 11th, 2001, the policies

and strategies have changed significantly from previous versions and administrations.

Because of these recent US policy changes, both military and civilian official

publications have been re-published to define and relate to this subject. As well, recent

independent professional and academic studies and reviews of these policies and

publications are also abundantly available.

The review of literature in this chapter is to determine whether through S/CRS

and DoD planned coordination, the US government is building a new capability for

interagency interoperability with a capacity to plan and execute Stabilization and

Reconstruction Operations for the next complex contingency. This chapter will lay out

what written requirements, doctrine and mandates exist for both S/CRS and the military

for conducting Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. Next, the literature review

will show what is currently being improved within DoD and what is being built from

scratch within S/CRS. Comparing the requirements to what exists or is planned will

show what is a gap or has yet to be built. Then, this chapter will present how well the

new capability, made up of organizations and processes, may work in the new and

contemporary operational environment in addressing the noted tasks associated with

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.

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National Strategy Documents

Beginning at the national level, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-

1 laid out the structure for policy and decision-making with regard to interagency

coordination. According to NSPD-1, as in the excerpt in Chapter 1, the NSC and the

PCC are the policy- and decision-makers for interagency operations. There are

interagency working groups that are established as needed for identified topics to provide

information and recommendations to the PCC which is to be an early warning

organization to the NSC.

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), published September 2002, set a new

course for our country after 9/11. This strategy was the first to outline prevention or

preemption of terrorists and terrorism which requires a concerted offensive from all

elements of power, to include a military that deters and dissuades to diplomats serving on

front lines.

Our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, published in February of 2003,

describes the need for all US elements of power to integrate in order to help nations

reduce the terrorist threat down to a criminal level that can be controlled by them within

their own borders as a subset of carrying for their own people.

In the last session of Congress, Senators Biden, Hagel and Lugar introduced the

Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 (SARCMA S2127,

108th Congress). It has been endorsed by the Senate Foreign Relations committee and

discussed by congress twice but is still not passed into law. This bill requests the

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establishment by the NSC of a Directorate for Stabilization and Reconstruction, as well

as a standing committee in order to synchronize interagency, interdepartmental plans.

Within the State Department, in translating national strategy for their

organization, their Strategic Plan for FY 2004-2009 states that both USAID and the

diplomatic corps must focus on preventing troubled states from becoming failed states.

The S/CRS itself has published multiple concept papers itself, most of which are posted

on the State webpage. Given the mission from NSC principles in April 2004, to lead,

coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare

for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition

from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy

and a market economy, it has established divisions and hired directors. The Office of

Early Warning and Prevention division identifies the states at risk. The Office of

Planning brings all elements of the US government together to plan for an intervention.

The Office of Best Practices and Sectoral Coordination is responsible for monitoring,

evaluation and lessons learned. The Office of Response Strategy and Resource

Management is responsible for developing and deploying US resources to Stabilization

and Reconstruction Operations. The current staff of 50 has been hired or received from

other agencies so that it is by origin interagency and joint. S/CRS has published a

DRAFT Post-Conflict Task List, a training, exercising and evaluation plan for the

organization and a timeline. The S/CRS organization chart identifies Humanitarian

Stabilization and Reconstruction Teams (HSRTs) that deploy to work at the COCOM

level and Advanced Civilian Teams (ACTs) at the Division, Brigade and Battalion level.

It has also drafted a task list that mirrors the military UJTL. S/CRS is currently soliciting

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candidates for their cadre positions as well as exercising with some of the COCOMs on

standard contingency plan (CONPLAN) and functional plan (FUNCPLAN) exercises.

However, it is in the future that these tasks and positions will become official against

which they can assign work and hire quality candidates. Most recently, SCRS has

provided recommendations to the PCC, at a session on 30 Nov 2005, for operational

models of the CRSG, HRST, ACT as well as an overall Action Plan and a Military

Exercise Participation schedule.

Military Publications

From the Department of Defense, we have the National Defense Strategy of the

United States published in March of 2005. While reiterating the requirements of the

military to dissuade, deter and defeat, this strategy identifies the need to build on our

global and regional security cooperation efforts. In specific, one of the capabilities we

must have to increase the contributions of our domestic and international partners led to

the creation of the S/CRS. DoD is cooperating with S/CRS so that non-military

stabilization and reconstruction tasks wont fall to the military by default and will allow

us to focus on long-term security.

A DoD Directive dated 28 November 2005 is written on the subject of Military

Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR). This

directive provides guidance that will become updated joint operating concepts and

mission sets, and establishes policy for planning, training and preparing to support or

conduct stability operations in order to establish order that advances US interests and

values. Immediate goals are often to provide security, restore essential services, and meet

humanitarian needs of the local populace. Long-term goals are to develop a nations

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capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic

institutions, and a robust civil society. Although many of the tasks in stability operations

must be performed by indigenous, foreign, or US civilian professionals, the US military

must be prepared to perform them as necessary when the conditions preclude others from

doing them.

Published in November 2003, the Joint Operations Concept and Capstone

Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) require a capabilities-based approach to defeat a

broad array of capabilities in an adversary. To shorten the planning timelines and get

joint responses from origin this approach defines ideas and concepts for future joint

military operations. Stated often, in order to achieve Full Spectrum Dominance, we must

accomplish all we do in an interagency and multinational context. The end-state can and

strategic objectives can only be achieved through integrated, networked, interoperable

joint, interagency and multinational force.

The more specific Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept from September

2004 spells out the requirements of the joint force across the full spectrum of conflict.

Pre-conflict we must conduct Stability and Reconstruction Operations to prevent the

conflict and achieve national objectives and preserve national interests. During conflict

there will be major combat operations and simultaneously the military will continue to

conduct security, transition and reconstruction operations. At the point in time where the

situation becomes post-conflict, we will transition operations to S/CRS and becoming a

supporting force.

The Joint Staff has published multiple joint publications, such as JP 1-0, Joint

Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, of 14 November 2000, that although it

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introduced interagency operations early on and has chapter about the interagency

environment, it mentions very little about how and why the military would conduct

coordination. It doesnt identify anything specific that would be required during the late

or post-conflict phases of operation which are now known as Stability and Reconstruction

Operations. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, dated 10 September 2001, discusses the national

elements of power but doesnt draw the connections during the discussion of the strategic

estimate, the campaign plan although it could easily and should, particularly in the

discussion of the Military Operations Other Than War. The two volumes of JP 3-08,

Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations are extremely dated, published in

1996, and while they have good descriptions of various organizations, only hold models

that may be used for coordination that use dotted lines between agencies. The updated

August 2005 version of the Unified Joint Task List (UJTL) does do a better job of

identifying the types of tasks involved in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations as

defined in a contemporary context.

JFCOM has published a substantial amount of material in the past five years

regarding the SJFHQ and the prototype interagency coordination group called the JIACG.

Recently, all of the COCOMs have established JIACGS, but each with different foci.

This paper will discuss the general benefits and limitations of the current JIACG as

covering only one or two of the sectors of coordination, law enforcement/lethal and

intelligence but not the diplomatic/humanitarian/non-lethal sector. Joint Forces

Command (JFCOM) has drafted pamphlets for the COCOMs to recommend linkages,

coordination to the S/CRS, TBD.

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The National Defense University (NDU) has been chartered to be the training

center for interagency coordination and continues to host interagency conferences as well

as offer training in interagency management of complex crisis operations, with a

handbook that describes the Pol-Mil planning that takes place under the new NSPD-1

structure of the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC). NDU supports the JIACG

concept with an additional recommendation that there be a national interagency

contingency coordination center or NIACG.

US Civil Affairs (CA) doctrine is in final draft with the focus to engage the civil

component of the operational environment by assessing, monitoring, protecting,

reinforcing, establishing, and transitioningboth actively and passivelypolitical,

economic, and information (social and cultural) institutions and capabilities to achieve

U.S. national goals and objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of

operation both abroad and at home. Civil Affairs soldiers are to be employed to provide

the primary interface with all civilian agencies and organizations (indigenous, U.S.

government [USG], non-government, and international) in the AO; establish and

maintain a CMOC to manage, coordinate and synchronize key CAO/CMO

functions/activities; analyze the civil component of the AO for CASCOPE to determine

the impact of the civil environment on military operations, as well as, the impact of

military operations on the civil environment; monitor operations to minimize the negative

impacts of both sides, to identify requirements for follow-on CA operations and CMO,

and to identify when MOEs have been achieved; assist commanders at all levels to fulfill

their responsibilities inherent in CMO directly (by conducting CA activities/operations)

and indirectly (in an advisory role for all CMO); and facilitate transition of operations

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from military to civilian control built on the premise that interagency coordination and

planning is key to national success.

Looking across the globe to one of our best allies we see the new United

Kingdom doctrine regarding a Comprehensive Approach similar to our effects based

approach, it is the means by which military and non-military organisations, agencies and

individuals can collaborate in complex situations, especially during crisis and in unusual

circumstances. Indeed, it has long been recognised that sophisticated joined-up

government and cross-discipline working are needed to deal effectively with the diverse

challenges of the modern world, both at home and in relation to national responses to

crisis and conflict.

National Studies and Effectiveness Reviews

Over the past five years, studies on interagency coordination, planning and

execution have proliferated among the DoD supported think tanks, the national security

organizations, governmental organizations and the professional academic institutions as

we all look for the answers we have yet to find. What we do find is that critical gaps

remain: an identified lead agency, infrastructure and processes for interagency

coordination, and relationships that will produce the kind of operational planning and

execution that is required to address post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization.

As part of the Princeton Project on National Security, former general William

Nash and Ciara Knudsen wroteReform and Innovation in Stabilization, Reconstruction

and Development. This report summarizes a couple of related issues are at the fore-front

of any solution: getting a deployable force of Foreign Service officers, getting legislation

to support the interagency coordination requirements, and getting an organization that can

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actually lead, synchronize, plan and execute operations as necessary including a more

broad group of participants from other countries as well.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has published phase I

and II reports on Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BG-N): US Government and Defense

Reform for a New Strategic Era. Recommendations made were 1) a Quadrennial

National Security Review to develop US national security strategy and determine

capabilities required to implement the strategy, 2) creation of a National Security

Planning Guidance signed by the President, 3) eliminate interagency barriers by

codifying terminology, concepts of operations, roles and responsibilities in a series of

NSPDs, 4) the budget reflects national security priorities by having NSC/OMB review, 5)

establish a national security career path for interagency experience, education and

training, and finally 6) a common template for dividing the globe into regions with

interagency regional summits to de-conflict efforts and prevent crisis.

During a conference held in April 2004, Michele Flournoy of CSIS outlined

Historical Lessons, Learned and Unlearned, SAIS Nation Building: Beyond Afghanistan

and Iraq. Her lessons were 1) strategies for successful nation building must integrate all

the elements of power, similar to what PDD 56 attempted, 2) LFA and C2 relationships

must be clear up front, 3) the US and international public must also understand the US

interests, 4) military forces must be continually tailored for the specific missions of

stabilization and reconstruction, 5) supervision of tactical actions according to strategy

must be continuous, 6) planning and executing smooth transitions can win or lose the

battle. Ms Flournoy recommends creating a greater integration role for the NSC, and an

interagency training center.

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From the Center for Technology and National Security Policy under NDU, Mr.s

Binnendijk and Johnson wrote Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction

Operations.This extensive report on stabilization and reconstruction reviews historical

cases to propose an organizational model of two joint headquarters with two modular

divisions made up of MP, CA, Engineers, Medical and PO supported by tactical combat

forces for US stabilization and reconstruction operations. Technologies that support the

mission and forces would be unclassified, wireless, interoperable packages. To develop

more efficient interagency aspects of these missions they recommend the establishment

of a National Interagency Contingency Coordination Group or NIACCG under the NSC,

and the creation of JIACGs at the COCOMs as J-10 directorates. Lastly, they encourage

our identification of international capabilities and encouraging NATO to develop a

parallel force.

State versus the Pentagon TBP

In an article published in the Washington Post on 13 October 2005, called

Pentagon Plans to Beef Up Domestic Rapid Response Forces, Paul McHale, Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense sees, in catastrophic events, the military

providing a rapid, early response and then quickly transferring responsibilities to civilian

authorities. This leads to the question as to whether the interagency will need to plan for

stabilization and reconstruction operations even here at home in the US.

The US Army War College (USAWC) has been the impetus of many professional

studies and seminars. Their Peace Keeping Institute hosted a seminar in July 2001 with

findings published as CSL Issue Papers Volume 7-02, An Interagency Approach Toward

Complex Contingencies: Narrowing the Gaps Between Planning and Action. In this

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seminar, attended by representatives of the interagency body, they identified

requirements for a better system of 1) written implementation plans, 2) an identified

accountable authority for planning, 3) more effective and combined training, 4) PCC

drafting top level guidance for the NSC to publish, and 6) a basic common planning

format such as a modified Pol-Mil plan. In June of 2005, the USAWC again hosted a

seminar with findings published as Volume 11-05, Aligning the Interagency Process for

the War on Terrorism. The recommendations made were 1) creating a State counterpart

to the COCOM, 2) better tasking of specific responsibilities, 3) fix the lack of power in

the NSC to coordination interagency operations, and 4) maintain centralized focus or

strategy and build decentralized action, or in the words of this paper operationalize the

strategy into tactical action.

A USAWC student, LTC Margan, wrote a research paper titled Planning for

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations without a Grand Strategy in March of 2005.

His conclusion was that there are no coordination mechanisms or structures that will be

successful until there is a new US Grand Strategy that better defines our national interests

and goals with regard to stabilization and reconstruction.

Another USAWC student wrote a research paper in May 2005 called Lesson

Relearned: the Urgent Need to Replace Post-Conflict Improvisation with Policy. His

conclusion was that the executive and legislative branches of US government need to

provide policy synchronization, similar to President Clintons PDD 56, of the elements of

power to achieve our interests. Specific recommendations he made beyond policy were

1) put an agency in charge, 2) give the agencies the infrastructure and funding necessary

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to build the appropriate organization, and 3) build national level or NSC doctrine for

dealing with post-conflict operations.

Michael Donley of Hicks & Associates Inc has written two papers entitled

Rethinking the Interagency System which are best suited as a baseline for my research.

In these two papers Donley identifies specific shortcomings and alternatives to the

current system, or lack of a system. His noted key problems are: the lack of horizontal

and vertical integration efforts [and interoperability]; the legitimacy of decision-makers

below the President; the weakness of operational level planning, coordination and

execution; and the lack of institutional development and support for interagency

coordination.

Assassins Gate TBD

Tom Barnett has published a book called the New Pentagon Map in which he

describes the need for two military forces to provide the response to the nations that

cannot integrate themselves into the globalized world. To cover the non-integrating gap

of nations, Mr. Barnett proposes a military that deals with conflict and a separate and

larger military that deals with stabilization and reconstruction like tasks that help nations

build free-market economies and trade.

Pending Documents

Besides the bill in the Senate Foreign Relations committee for review called the

Civilian Management Response Act of 2004, there is another one in the House

Committee on International Relations for review to establish a legal basis for the S/CRS.

Lastly, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will also address the

shortcomings of the current interagency coordination mechanisms. According to Major

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General Keith Dayton, the US Armys Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, there is

great debate within the QDR on how best to conduct Stability Operations, particularly in

the near time, the next five to ten years.

Schools of Thought

Within this academic or professional literature, most can be categorized into four

schools of thought for the solution to institutionalizing interagency coordination: 1) those

within S/CRS and DoD who are actively working the solution set within the processes

established and in support of the current national strategies to be able to act now like

Amb Pascuale, congress, former general Nash, the CSIS and PKI/PKSOI seminar

findings; 2) those that recommend a new national security structure and/or new US grand

strategy like many of the student research papers; 3) those that are on a peripheral

platform who raise anecdotal issues outside the current system or process, and 4) those

who have recommendations that deal with outlying or related issues that must be

integrated in the central concept like JFCOM, NDU and the Civil Affairs community. Of

these schools of thought the first is the most informative for looking at the near-term

solutions that might allow mechanisms for the next contingency. The second school is

the most conceptual on looking at long-term solutions. The third and fourth schools are

audiences and customers that must understand the efforts and end-state to be able to

operationalize the result.

Summary

By conducting a thorough review of the existing and pending literature on

the subject of interagency interoperability with regard to conducting Stability and

Reconstruction Operations, there remains a gap in policy and legislation of exactly who

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assigns and conducts what tasks, how this will translate into tactical action to achieve

strategic objectives and exactly what role JFCOM is playing with its introduction and

proponency of both the SJFHQ and the JIACG, neither of which appear to be reflected in

most of the publications. Only by taking the requirements noted in the literature and the

currently planned systems and organizations as a stepping off point for validation and

clarification can we determine whether a new US capability for interagency

interoperability has been established that will be able to operationalize US strategy.

The next chapter will present the research methodology used to compare the

literature to what exists and what is being planned to what is needed in order to conduct a

validation of the capabilitiy.

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To determine whether the US Government will have a true capability to conduct

Stability and Reconstruction operations through SCRS and DoD coordination, this paper

will follow a number of steps to provide a comparison and contrast of what is required

versus what the US has now, and what the US will have in the near future to

operationalize interagency coordination.

(1) Step one of the research will be to identify the current non-disputed

requirements, roles and responsibilities for interagency coordination mechanisms at the

tactical, operational and strategic levels stated in relevant NSC publications, the military

pubs, State pubs, S/CRS documents, Congressional Record and budget authorizations

married up with the documents and multiple studies that provide additional

recommendations and insight to what is required in the near future.

(2) The next step will be to identify all of the current efforts or recommendations

by S/CRS, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), JFCOM, the COCOMs, Special

Operations Command (SOCOM), and Department of the Army (DA) to build or improve

the required doctrine, organization, training, leader development, materiel, personnel and

facilities (DOTLMPF) elements. This paper will specifically include what planning and

execution processes are being built or improved as well.

(3) The third step will be to determine what is not being developed but is needed

as far as DOTLMPF and planning and execution processes, to which this paper will refer

to as +PE from here forward.

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(4) The fourth step will be to diagram the existing or planned organizational and

planning linkages with a specific identification of responsibilities, a by-task capabilities

assessment and associated deliverables at each level and for each entity, noting any gaps

or ambiguities.

(5) The fifth step will be to conduct quantitative and qualitative surveys and

personal interviews of those individuals currently in planning and executing roles along

the strategic-operational-tactical continuum to see whether they recognize and can

acknowledge the level of successful coordination for their organization conducting

stabilization and reconstruction operations.

(6) And lastly, this paper will apply possible solutions to the situation and make

recommendations necessary according to the DOTLMPF+PE analysis to be able to

operationalize national reconstruction and stabilization strategy.

(7)Because of the level of work ongoing regarding this topic, among each of these

steps, it will be necessary to collect newly published information and documents to apply

to the paper

(8)Specific criteria to evaluate the success of the coordination measures.

(a) Doctrine & Organization. There is a broad effort to update the doctrine

both in DoD and in State to fit the evolution of S/CRS but this study must show what has

been institutionalized. It is important how many other agencies have begun the updating

or integrating of doctrine or organization, specifically the Country Teams, Military

Attaches and MILGRPs linkage through this process. There is not yet a corresponding

publication by either JFCOM, or NDU that accomodates these updates but it is expected

that during the period of research there will be movement on that front.

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(b) Training. State and DoD are making efforts to be more inclusive of

S/CRSs HSRTs and ACTs in COCOM exercises, but is there any inclusion at the lower

operational or tactical levels yet, such as in the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). It will

be important to identify what agencies are involved in the JIACGs at each COCOM, how

they are participating, down to what level and in which sectors they are working,

planning and executing. This study will identify how much interagency training

continues to be provided and for whom by both JFCOM, NDU or other agencies.

(c) Leadership. The leaders of each of the entities, S/CRS, the COCOMs,

JFCOM, NDU, the ASOC and CAPOC Commanders must know and have roles,

responsibilities and decision-making legitimacy. This study will consider their leadership

visions as well as their leadership development philosophies for their subordinates to

make sure that this paper addresses how goals and intent are conveyed to the operational

and tactical level capabilities.

(d) Material. Whether the organizations are working resources and funding

that are interoperable and able to relate to each other no matter what the circumstances:

peacetime through wartime, will be important for success. This paper will look at what

the Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) unclassified collaboration software is evolving

into, as well as what the classified software sharing capabilities are in the intelligence and

law enforcement agencies. This information linkage will be the back bone for both

horizontal and vertical integration and interoperability. All levels must be able to plan

and execute off of the same operational picture.

(e) Personnel. Analysis will be made of the recruiting, retention and

deployability of each of the interagency coordinating sections for each agency. This

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paper will look at whether the right people can be placed in interagency planning

elements throughout the spectrum that can create and deploy the horizontal and vertical

relationships that will establish the initial institutional linkages.

(f) Facilities. Proximity and access will be considered, when both planning or

deployed, looking back to the informational back bone to identify whether the

geographical or positional locations suit the relationships and familiarity that must be

developed between the layers and staffs and agencies.

(g) Planning and execution. This paper will analyze the actual planning products,

whether a type of Pol-Mil plan, a Mission Performance Plan, a Bureau Performance Plan,

a CONPLAN or FUNCLAN, identifed as a responsibility of each element, each level and

determine whether the information required can be fed through the system so that the

strategic guidance is clear and understood, translated into operational guidance that can

be measured by effects, and used to write plans and orders at the tactical level no matter

what the level of hostilities. The execution of such planning will need to be conducted on

a spectrum from State led operations through the Country Team and MILGRP, to DoD

led operations through the COCOM, JTF and Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).

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GLOSSARY

Military Support to SSTR (DoD Directive).

Stability Operations (DoD Directive).

Stabilization (State).

Reconstruction (State).

Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (DoD Directive)

Stability and Reconstruction Operations. (JP 3-0?) Multiagency operations that involve

all instruments of national and multinational action, including the internationalhumanitarian and reconstruction community to support major conventional

combat operations if necessary; establish security; facilitate reconciliation amonglocal or regional adversaries; establish the political, social, and economic

architecture; and facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance. Stabilityoperations establish a safe and secure environment; provide essential social

services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief in order

to facilitate the transition to legitimate, local civil governance. The objective isclearly to establish governance that enables a country or regime to provide for its

own security, rule of law, social services, and economic activity and eliminate as

many of the root causes of the crisis as feasible to reduce the likelihood of thereemergence of another crisis.

Joint Operating Concept. (JOC?) The JOpsC is an overarching description of how thejoint force will operate 10-20 years in the future in all domains across the range ofmilitary operations within a multi-lateral environment in collaboration with

interagency and multinational partners. It guides the development of future joint

concepts and joint force capabilities. The JOpsC establishes the unifyingframework for the family of joint concepts, the attributes and broad strategic and

operational tasks for the future joint force, a campaign framework for future

operations, the long-range focus for joint experimentation, and the conceptualfoundation for unified action towards implementing the military aspects of

national strategy.

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APPENDIX A

SURVEY OF ACKNOWLEDGED INTERAGENCY STRUCTURE

AND SUCCESS

Name:

Position:

Organization:Time in position/organization:

Length of service to interagency community:

Do you think the following organization has the elements it needs to complete its stability

and reconstruction mission: (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5

= strongly agree)

SCRS DoD Your Organization1. Doctrine 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Top reason why:

2. Organization 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Top reason why:

3. Leadership 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Top reason why:

4. Training 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Top reason why:

5. Material 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Top reason why:

6. Facilities 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Top reason why:

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7. Planning 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Top reason why:

8. Execution 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Top reason why:

Do you understand the organization and linkages between SCRS and DoD for the

planning and executing of the Stability and Reconstruction mission?

(Insert S/CRS org chart-CA chart for drawing linkages)

Do you understand the S/CRS DoD planning templates and linkages for the translationof strategy into tactical action?

(Insert S/CRS planning chart DoD planning continuum/joint planning system)

Have you participated in SCRS DoD Conferences, Seminars or Planning Sessions? Ifyes, which ones?

What were your observations?

Will you be participating in one of the planned S/CRS-DoD exercises? If yes, which

one?

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APPENDIX B

STATE AND DOD (CIVIL AFFAIRS) LASH UP CONCEPT

CMO

STAFF

Civil Affairs and Proposed DoS C/RS

Capabilities Lash-up

RCC

Army

XXXX

XXX

DIVISION

XX

BRIGADE

X

CACOM

CABattalion

CA Det

CABrigade

CORPS

RCCCAPT

CMOC/

C2

TSOC

Unit ofEmployment Y

CMO

STAFF CAPT

Unit ofEmployment X

CMO

FUNCTION

CMOC/

C2

BrigadeUnit of Action

CATx5

CMO STAFF

CMOC/

C2

CA Co

CABattalion

CACOM

CLT

CMOC/

C2

DRAFT / PRE-DECISIONAL

DRAFT / PRE-DECISIONAL AS of 07JUN05

REF:

CA Forces FDU 05-1 subm itted to TRADOC for Staffing FEB05

DRAFT Stabilization and Reconstruction Conce pts PaperO ffice of the Coordinator for

Reconstructi on and Stabilizati on

Dtd 21MAR05

DoSHRST

DoSACT

DoSACT

DoSACT

CLT

CABrigade

CAPT

CLT

DoSCRSG

DoD

J-StaffHQDA

Comments/Thoughts- RCC-level the CMOC functions as a working groupand/or element of JIACG (CMOC may be renamed atthis level BUT functions as primary cell to coordinate IAfor CMO ISO S&R O)***At the Strategic level the JIACG is the focal point forIA planning, coordination, and exe cution

- UEy/UEx-level the CMOC directly supports inter-agency CMO (primary element of S&RO) coordinationelemen t for CDR***At the Operational to Tactical levels the CMOC isthe focal point for IA planning, coordination, andexecution

- At BCT level the CMOC is primary inter-agency CMOcoordination element for CDR

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REFERENCE LIST

Birmingham, Guillermo, Barndt, Luann, and Salo, Thomas,Achieving Unit of Effort: A

Call for Legislation to Improve the Interagency Process and Continue Enhancing

Interservice Interoperability So All May Labor as One. Joint Forces StaffCollege, Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Intermediate, 18 September

2003

Bogdanos, Matthew F. Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step. Joing Force

Quarterly, Spring 2005, Issue 37, p10-18. March 2005.

Briem, Christopher. Joint is Dead: What is Next? Proceedings of the United States

Naval Institute, Vol 130, Issue 1, p56-59. January 2004.

Buss, John C. USAWC Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper: the State

Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and Its Interaction withthe Department of Defense, July 2005, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. Beyond Goldwater Nichols Phase II

Report, June 2005, Washington DC.

Clays, Michelle M., The Interagency Process and Americas Second Front in the Global

War on Terrorism. April 2003, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination

During Peace Operations; October 1996, Washington DC.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, 2002, Washington DC.

Clinton, William. Presidential Decision Directive 56: Managing Complex ContingencyOperations; 1999, Washington DC.

Donley, Michael. Occasional Paper #05-01: Rethinking the Interagency System. Hicks& Associates Incorporated. March 2005. McLean, VA.

Donley, Michael. Occasional Paper #05-01: Rethinking the Interagency System, Part 2.

Hicks & Associates Incorporated. May 2005. McLean, VA.

Drechsler, Donald R. Reconstructing the Interagency Process after Iraq. Journal of

Strategic Studies, Volume 28, Issue 1, p3-30. March 2005.

Krasner, Stephen D & Pascuale, Carlos. Addressing State Failure. Foreign Affairs, Vol

84, Issue 4, p153-163. July/August 2005.

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NAIC. The Failed States Index. Foreign Policy, Issue 149, p56-65. July/August 2005.

National Defense University. The Interagency Management of Complex Crisis

Operations Handbook. January 2003. Washington DC.

National Intelligence Council. The National Intelligence Councils 2020 Project

Piscal, Richard. USAWC Strategy Research Project: A No Policy Policy for Nation-Building. March 2005. Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Lugar, Biden, Hagel. S.R. 600.Establishment of the S/CRS. Congressional Record.

January 2005. Washington DC

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. SCRS Post-Conflict

Reconstruction Essential Tasks. April 2005. Washington DC.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Joint Task List. August 2005.

Washington DC.

United States Joint Forces Command. The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine

Series, Pamphlet 4: Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment(ONA). February 2004. Norfolk, VA.

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