EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner -versus-

HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, FELIPINO

TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR , respondents.

FACTS:

- A three- way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, MARILAO , BULACAN, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and

driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by

respondent Filipino ,Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya

- two separate Information’s for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and

Freddie Montoya with the CFI of BULACAN.

The case against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz

The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the

Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00

Petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left going towards the

poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before the impact, Salazar had

jumped from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya.

Petitioner's version of the accident was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the other hand, tried

to show that, after overtaking the truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left towards the

poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop

position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which then

swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was coming from the opposite direction.

CFI:o Montoya guiltyo Salazar acquitted He was absolved in view of its findings that the collision

between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the

truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-

driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar- On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal

cases, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the CFI of Manila

against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck

driven by Montoya for identification of damages

- Timbol filed a MTD on the grounds that the complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal case. This was granted

since there was no reservation to file a separate civil case by the petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only.

Thus, petitioner sought a review before this court to which we gave due course

- Upon motion of Salazar, respondent judge also dismissed the case

o Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of

the Civil Code could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New

Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made in

the criminal action; otherwise, the same would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111

ISSUES

Whether or not the lower court is right in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against private respondents

ISSUES

Whether or not the damages ensued to the vehicle of petitioner shall be the liability of the driver of the jeep or of the truck.

ISSUES

Whether or not the truck’s owner may be held liable for damages caused by his employee.

Case Filed against ..

R. Salazar (jeep owner)SM-228- Reckless imprudence causing damage to propertyCost of damage to the petitioner (MB car)

Php. 8,890.00

F. Montoya (truck driver)SM-227- Reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property Cost of damage to R. Salazar (jeep owner)

Php. 1604.00

Reckless imprudence

Reckless imprudence vis-à-vis simple negligence. -   

Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides that defines “reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place”.

The same article provides that “simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest”.

Penalty for Reckless imprudence. –

Art. 365 of the Rev. Penal Code (“Imprudence and negligence”) provides that “any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed

On 07-31-1970

The court of first instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria finds the accused F. Montoya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence on case SM227 and sentenced to pay Php. 927.50 andto indefmnify R. Salazar in the same amount of Php. 927.50 as actual damage damages, w/ subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine and indemnity, with costs.

Accused R. Salazar is ACQUITTED from the offense charged in crime. Case no. SM228 with cost de oficio, and his bond is ordered canceled.

Quasi - Delicts

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Section 2. — Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shau proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Art. 31-34

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(1)  Freedom of religion; (2)  Freedom of speech; (3)  Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical

publication; (4)  Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; (5)  Freedom of suffrage; (6)  The right against deprivation of property without due process of

law; (7)  The right to a just compensation when private property is taken

for public use; (8)  The right to the equal protection of the laws; (9)  The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and

effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; (10)  The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11)  The privacy of communication and correspondence; (12)  The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law; (13)  The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress of

grievances; (14)  The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form; (15)  The right of the accused against excessive bail; (16)  The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature

and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

(17)  Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18)  Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19)  Freedom of access to the courts. In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission

constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission

constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

Art. 2177

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant

Art. 29

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.  Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

APPLICATIONS

Article 31 of the CivilCode provides that,

“When the civil action is based on an

obligation not arising from the actor

omission complained of as a felony, such

civil action may proceed independently of

thecriminal proceedings and regardless of

the result of the latter.”

Petitioner’s cause of action against Timbol is clearly based on quasi-delict since while petitioner was driving his car

along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his

(petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either by the

negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii

the same direction as Salazar's jeep

Moreover, inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the

civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case.

Timbol’s submission thatpetitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action, as required under:

section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, bars the

institution of such separate civil action is

untenable. For inasmuch as Article 31 (in relation to

Articles 2176 and 2177) of the Civil Code creates a

civil liability distinct and different from the civil

action arising from the offense of negligence under

the Revised Penal Code, no reservation is required

to be made in the criminal case.

And so, to reiterate, the civil case filed

against Timbol is not barred by the fact

that petitioner failed to reserve, in the

criminalaction, his right to file

an independent civil action based on

quasi-delict.

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been

proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.

Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence

And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would

be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon

reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted (Art. 29).