Mental Functioning and the Ontology of Language
Barry SmithGraz, July 21, 2012http://x.co/mGgu
http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/austrian_philosophy/
Brentano and his students
Brentano
Meinong Ehrenfels Husserl Twardowski
Meinong Alley, Graz
Investigations in Ontology and
Psychology
with support from the Imperial-Royal Minister of Culture and Education in
Vienna, 1904
from 1874 to 1914 Brentano controls Austrian philosophy
BrentanoVienna
MeinongGraz
EhrenfelsPrague
TwardowskiLemberg
Husserl Proßnitz
Brentano revolutionizes psychology
Brentanopublished Psychology
from an Empirical Standpoint, 1874
Meinong Ehrenfelsfounder of Gestalt psychology, 1890
Husserl Twardowski
Wundt first laboratory of
experimental psychology, 1879
Brentanists revolutionize ontology
Brentano
MeinongOn the Theory
of Objects, 1904
EhrenfelsHusserl
first formal mereology, 1902
______
first use of ‘formal ontology’
~1905;
Twardowski
Leśniewskilogical
formalization of mereology,
1916
Brentanists revolutionize our understanding of the relations between psychology and
ontology
Brentano introduces in 1874 the idea of intentional directedness
(aboutness)
Meinong Ehrenfels Husserl Twardowski
how can we think about what does not exist?
Brentanists revolutionize our understanding of the relations between psychology and
ontology
Brentano introduces in 1874 the idea of intentional directedness
(aboutness)
Meinong Ehrenfels Husserl Twardowski
Stefan Schulz famous contributor to
zoology of unicorns
15
the arrow of intentionality
Brentanists introduce the problem of understanding the relation between intentionality and language
Brentano
Meinong Ehrenfels Husserlcategorial
grammar, 1901
Twardowski
Leśniewskifounder of
formal mereology
Tarski invents formal
semantics
“From Intentionality to Formal Semantics”Brentano
Husserl Twardowski
Leśniewskiformal
mereology
Tarski formal
semantics
Joseph Woodger Axiomatic Method in
BiologyPatrick Hayes
“Ontology of Liquids”…
Description Logics, OWL …
The Logicians: Leśniewski, Tarski, Łukasiewicz, Twardowski Main Library of the University of Warsaw
Brentanists revolutionize our understanding of the relations between psychology and language
Brentano
Meinong EhrenfelsHusserl
two kinds of aboutness: relational
Twardowski
MFO Draft
MFO Draft
simple object-presenting acts vs. judgments, evaluations, …
mental process content (putative) target
presenting actcontent of presentation
“apple”object of presentation
judging act
judgment-content
“the apple over there is ripe”
state of affairsObjektive
evaluating actemotional act
appraisal…
“it is good that the apple over there is ripe”
?
mental process content (putative) target
presenting act content of presentation
“apple”object of presentation
targetpresent
targetabsent
• target present = you are in physical contact with target• successful intentionality• with evidence, without evidence
Successful intentionality
mental process content (putative) target
presenting act content of presentation
“apple”object of presentation
object exists
object does not exist
targetpresent
targetabsent
Veridical intentionality
ordinary perception
mental process content (putative) target
presenting act content of presentation
“apple”object of presentation
object exists
object does not exist
targetpresent
targetabsent
Veridical intentionality
veridical thinking about
mental process content (putative) target
presenting act content of presentation
“apple”
object of presentation
targetpresent
targetabsent
object exists
object does not exist
Non-veridical intentionality
non-veridical thinking about (error, hallucination, imagination, …)
mental process content (putative) target
presenting act content of presentation
“apple”object of presentation
object exists
object does not exist
targetpresent
targetabsent
Non-veridical intentionality
error, hallucination = the presenting act is dependent on an underlying false belief
mental process content (putative) target
presenting act content of presentation
“apple”object of presentation
object exists
object does not exist
targetpresent
targetabsent
Non-veridical intentionality
thinking about Macbeth = the presenting act is not dependent on an underlying false belief
mental process content (putative) target
presenting act content of presentation
“apple”object of presentation
object exists
object does not exist
targetpresent
targetabsent
An excluded case
this combination is impossible
mental process content (putative) target
presenting act content of presentation
“apple”object of presentation
object exists
object does not exist
targetpresent
targetabsent
Veridical intentionality
ordinary perceptionevolutionarily most basic case
content matches
“food”
content mismatches
“poison”
39
the primacy of language (Frege, Tarski …):
mental experiences are about objects because words have semantics
meaning
40
the primacy of the intentional (Brentano, Husserl, …): linguistic expressions have meanings because there are mental experiences which
have aboutness
content mismatches
“poison”
dimension of content / belief prior to dimension of language