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れもみるむの＊◇,めも.″ ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇

Merleau-Ponty and

Naïve Realism

Keith AllenUniversity of York

© ＠＆＊◇ KeithAllenThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives §.＆ License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/＆＊◇＆＆＠/>

ABSTRACT: Thispaperhas twoaims.Theがrst is tousecontempo-

rarydiscussionsofnaïverealisttheoriesofperceptiontooＨeranin-

terpretationofMerleau-Ponty]stheoryofperception.ThesecondistouseconsiderationofMerleau-Ponty]stheoryofperceptiontooutlineadistinctiveversionofanaïverealisttheoryofperception.InaMerleau-Pontianspirit,thesetwoaimsareinter-dependent.

M erleau-Ponty]saiminthePhenomenology of Perceptionistoarguethatweareembodiedsubjects,embeddedintheworld.Thisaccountofbeings-in-the-worldisintendedto

overcometwopervasivedistinctions:betweenEmpiricismandIntel-lectualismontheonehand,andbetweenSubjectandObjectontheother.

Merleau-Ponty]saccountofembodied subjectivity attemptstosteeramiddlewaybetweentheextremesofEmpiricismandIntellectualism.Empiricists, likepsychologistsandphilosophicalnaturalists,attemptto explain subjects and subjectivity in purely causal terms. Intellec-

tualists,bycontrast,treatsubjectseitherasnon-physicalentitiesthatco-existwithpurelyphysicalobjects(asDescartesandCartesianssug-

gest),orelseasacosmictranscendentalEgos or,asMerleau-Pontyoften refers to them, 〉constituting consciousnesses《 that exist out-side of physical space and time (as Kant and post-Kantian Idealistssuggest).

Merleau-Ponty]s account of embodied subjects as essentially em-

bedded,meanwhile,attemptstodissolvethesharpdistinctionbetweenconscious subjects and physical objects. From an ontological pointof view, perceiving subjects are not immaterial, and objects are notmerely physical; rather,perceiving subjects are bodily subjects, andthethingsthatappeartous inperceptualexperienceare〉burdenedwithanthropologicalpredicates《(PP§§☆).Fromaphenomenologicalpointofview,self-awarenessthroughthe〉bodyschema《alreadyim-

pliesawarenessofourenvironment.Wearenotawareofourselvesin merely 〉positional《 spatial terms: that is, as one object amongstotherslocatedinobjectivespace.Ratherourawarenessofourselves

まのへりふなみみのめ Merleau-Ponty and Naïve Realism

やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＠′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

thosethingsintheperceiver]senvironmentthattheyareexperiencesof.Second,therelationalnatureofperceptualexperiencecannotbeexplained in terms of perceptual experiences having representational contentthatisveridicalifthethingsinthesubject]senvironmentareastheyarerepresentedasbeingandnon-veridicalotherwise.Third,theclaimthatperceptualexperiencesareessentiallyrelationalarticulatesthedistinctivephenomenologicalcharacterofperceptualexperience,or〉whatitislike《forasubjecttohaveanexperience.Fourth,giventhat veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational, theydiＨerinkindtonon-veridicalexperiencessuchashallucinations.Fifth,perceptual experiences are relations to speciがcally mind-independent objects,properties,andrelations:thingswhosenatureandexistenceareconstitutivelyindependentofthepsychologicalresponsesofper-

ceivingsubjects.The following sections consider these claims in turn. In §§＊′☆, I

arguethatMerleau-Pontycanbeunderstoodasendorsinginterestingversionsof theがrst fourclaimsassociatedwithcontemporarynaïverealism,and to thisextentheaccepts something likeanaïve realisttheory of perception. In §★, I argue that the comparison with naïverealismbreaksdowninsofarasMerleau-Ponty]stheoryofperception,at least inthePhenomenology of Perception,appearstobebroadly ide-

alisticinawaythatcontemporaryformsofnaïverealismtendnottobe.Iconcludebyhighlightingafurthermeta-philosophicaldiＨerencebetweenMerleau-Ponty]sapproachandthatofcontemporarynaïvere-

alists,whichpointstothepossibilityofaviewthatIcalltranscendental

naïve realism.

1. Relationality

Accordingtothenaïverealist,perceptualexperiencesareessentiallyrelational.Theessentialrelationalityofexperienceistobeunderstoodinaparticularlystrongsense:onthisview,perceptualexperiencesareconstituted, at least in part, by the things objects, properties, rela-

tions ina subject]senvironment that theyareexperiencesof.Theclaimthatperceptualexperiencesareessentiallyrelationalinthisway

involvesakindof〉situationalspatiality《.Weareawareofourselvesasbody-subjects throughbeingawareof the〉milieu《 inwhichwesitu-

ated,andthepossibilitiesforactionthatthismilieuaＨords(PP＊＆＠);assuch,Merleau-Pontyarguesthat〉the[bodyschema]is,intheend,amannerofexpressingthatmybodyisinandtowardtheworld《(PP

＊＆§).Thisaccountofournatureasembodied,embeddedsubjectsinturngroundsMerleau-Ponty]stheoryofperception:ashesaysintheIntroductiontoPartIIofPhenomenology of Perception,havingoutlinedhisaccountofthebodyinPartI,〉Thetheoryofthebodyisalreadyatheoryofperception《(PP＠＆◇).

A number of recent discussions of Merleau-Ponty in the Anglo-

phone tradition have drawn comparisons to contemporary debatesabout enactive theories of perception (e.g. Noë ＠＆＆○), whether thecontent of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (e.g. Kelly ＠＆＆＊,Carman＠＆＆◎:＠＠＆′§),andthekindofdisjunctivisttheoryofpercep-

tiondefendedbyMcDowell(e.g.Jensen＠＆＊§,Berendzen＠＆＊§).Thispaper explores a diＨerent comparison: that between Merleau-Pon-

ty]s theory of perception and contemporary naïve realist theories ofperception.≠

Whereas Merleau-Ponty]s philosophical project is, in part, a reac-

tion toKantianandpost-Kantian Idealismas itmanifested itselfpri-marily in France and Germany, contemporary naïve realist theoriesofperceptionhavetheirrootsintheresponseofOxfordRealistslikeCook Wilson, Pritchard, and Austin to predominantly British mani-festations of post-Kantian Idealism in the later nineteenth century(cf. Kalderon and Travis ＠＆＊§). Contemporary naïve realist theoriesof perception are philosophical theories of perception, and as suchembody substantive philosophical claims. Naïve realist theories ofperceptionarenotanaturalkind,andcomeinavarietyofdiＨerentforms;however,theycommonlyembodyacommitmenttosomeorallof the following theoreticalclaims:First,perceptualexperiencesareessentiallyrelational, inthesensethattheyareconstitutedinpartby

＊. See,forinstance,Martin(＠＆＆＠,＠＆＆☆,＠＆＆○),Campbell(＠＆＆＠),Travis(＠＆＆☆),Fish(＠＆＆◇),Brewer(＠＆＊＊),Logue(＠＆＊＠),andSoteriou(＠＆＊§).


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′§′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

call〉successwords《.AsMerleau-Pontyputs it, 〉If Iseeanashtray in

the full sense of the word [see],thentheremustbeanashtrayoverthere《(PP§◇§).

Itispossibletoacceptthat[see](〉inthefullsenseoftheword《)isasuccessterm,butneverthelessdenythatperceptualexperiencesareessentiallyrelational:forinstance,if [see]and[perceive]canbetrulyappliedonlyincaseswherethereisapsychologicaleventthatiscom-

montothe〉good《caseofveridicalperceptionandthe〉bad《casesofillusionandhallucination,andwherethispsychologicaleventmeetsfurthernon-psychologicalconditions,suchasbeingcausedintheap-

propriateway.ButthisisnotMerleau-Ponty]sview.The context of this remark is a discussion (and rejection) of the

Cartesianclaimthatthemindisbetterknownthanthebody.ForDes-

cartes,evenifadoubtcanberaisedaboutthenatureandexistenceoftheexternalworldthataperceptualexperienceisanexperienceof,wecanatleastbecertainofthenatureandoccurrenceoftheexperienceitselfquamentalphenomenon.AsDescartesputsit:

Iamnowseeinglight,hearinganoise,feelingheat.ButIamasleep,soallthisisfalse.YetIcertainlyseemtosee,tohear,andtobewarmed.Thiscannotbefalse;whatiscalled 〉having a sensory perception《 is strictly just this(＊○☆＠:＊◇).

Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, insists that 〉[p]erception and the per-

ceivednecessarilyhavethesameexistentialmodality《(PP§◇§);thisis tosay that if Iamperceiving, thennecessarilywhat Iamperceiv-

ingexists.ForMerleau-Ponty,thereisnopsychologicaleventof〉hav-

ingasensoryperception《 that is independentof theway thingsareinthesubject]senvironment,andsowhichiscommontothe〉good《and〉bad《cases.Tosupposeotherwise,hethinks,wouldbetothinkofvision〉asthecontemplationofadriftingandanchorlessquale《,ratherthananawarenessofqualitiesofparticularobjects,wherethisaware-

nessofqualitiesofparticularobjects〉presupposesouropeningontoa

hasmodalconsequences:aparticularexperiencecouldnothaveoc-

curred if the subject had not been perceptually related to preciselythoseelementsoftheenvironment.Itfollowsthatifthereisnothingoftheappropriatekindinthesubject]senvironmentthatthesubjectisrelatedto,thenthereisnoperceptualexperience evenifitseemstothesubjectthatthereis.

Naïve realist theories of perception contrast in this respect withtheoriesofperceptionaccordingtowhichperceptualexperiencesareessentially relational, but according to which they involve standinginarelationtosomethingotherthanthingsinthesubject]senviron-

ment as,forinstance,onsense-datumtheoriesofperception,whereperceptualexperiencesinvolve〉direct《awarenessofsense-data(e.g.Price＊◇§＠).＜Naïverealisttheoriesofperceptionalsocontrastinthisrespectwiththeoriesofperceptionaccordingtowhichperceptualex-

periencesarenotessentiallyrelational:forinstance,adverbialisttheo-

riesofperception,accordingtowhichperceptualexperiencesare〉ad-

verbialmodiがcations《ofconscioussubjects(e.g.Ducasse＊◇☆＠);andstandardformsofintentionalism(orrepresentationalism),accordingtowhichperceptualexperiencesrepresentthingsinthesubject]sen-

vironment as being a certain way, and are veridical if the things inthesubject]senvironmentarethewaythattheyarerepresentedasbe-

ing,andnon-veridicalotherwise(seee.g.Crane＠＆＆◇).Onalloftheseviews,howthingsarewiththesubjectisconstitutivelyindependent(at leastonaparticularoccasion)ofhowthingsare in thesubject]senvironment: it ispossible for thesubject tohaveexactly thesamekindofexperiencewhetherornottheenvironmentisasitisperceivedtobe.

Merleau-Pontyaccepts thatperceptualexperience isrelational inthestrongsenseacceptedbynaïverealists.AccordingtoMerleau-Pon-

ty,[see] and[perceive]moregenerally arewhatRyle(＊◇☆◇)would

＠. Some sense-datum theorists sought to argue that sense-data 〉belong to《things in the environment; however, even so understood, sense-data arenecessarily distinct from material objects, to allow that veridical and non-veridicalexperiencesformacommonkind.


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′☆′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

Catholicism holds that God is really present in the bread and wineduringcommunion atleasttothosewhoseareappropriatelyrecep-

tive(PP＠＊◇).TheEucharisticanalogyisnotmeanttosuggestthatsensingsub-

jects take on the attributes of the sensible; they do not themselvesbecome, inanysense, colouredor shaped.This isnota formofad-

verbialism,accordingtowhichperceptualexperiencesareconsciousmodiがcationsofperceivingsubjectsthatcanbediＨerentlyadverbiallymodiがed:itisnot,forexample,thatinthepresenceofaredsquare,asubjectwillperceiveredlyandsquarely.AdverbialismassumesastrictseparationofsensingsubjectsandsensibleobjectsthatMerleau-Pon-

tyisatpainstodeny.ForMerleau-Ponty,therelationshipbetweensensingandsensible

ismuchcloser:thereisanintertwiningofthesensingandthesensibleinperception.＞Thesensibleprovidesa〉vaguesolicitation《that〉posestomybodya sortof confusedproblem《 (PP＠＠＠).Thesensiblecanthenbeexploredbymy〉gaze《:the〉mechanism《whichmediatesbe-

tweenappearancesandbodilybehaviour,andsowhichallowsustorespondourenvironment]ssolicitations〉giventheirsense《(PP§＠§).ButIamabletoexplorethesensibleenvironment〉only】inresponsetoitssolicitation《(PP＠＠＠).Allthisismadepossiblebymyopennesstotheworldthroughthesenses,whichobtainsinvirtueofmyembod-

iedexistence:

TosaythatIhaveavisualがeldmeansthatIhaveanac-

cessandanopeningtoasystemofvisiblebeingsthroughmyposition,andthattheyareavailabletomygazeinvir-

tueofakindofprimordialcontractandbyagiftofnature,withoutanyeＨortonmypart. Inotherwords, itmeansthatvisionispre-personal(PP＠＠☆).

§. However,Merleau-Pontyemphasisesthatthisco-existencewithobjectsdoesnotamounttoaperfectcoincidenceofsubjectandobjectinperception:per-

ceptionisperspectival,andweneverfullygrasptheobjectthatwecommunewith(e.g.PP○◇′●☆,＠＠☆).

realorontoaworld《(PP§◇§).Ifthereisnoobjectoftheappropriatekindinthesubject]senvironment,thereissimplynoperception:

ifIraiseadoubtastothepresenceofthething,thisdoubtbears upon vision itself; if there is no red or blue overthere,thenIsaythatIhavenotreally seenthem(PP§◇§;seefurther§☆below).

TherelationalnatureofMerleau-Ponty]saccountofperceptualex-

perienceisreきectedinhisaccountoftherelationshipbetweensens-

ingsubjectsandsensibleobjects.ForMerleau-Ponty,thesensingandthesensibleare:

not opposite each other like two external terms, andsensation does not consist of the sensible invading thesensingbeing.】In thisexchangebetween thesubjectofsensationandthesensible,itcannotbesaidthatoneactswhiletheothersuＨerstheaction,northatonegivessensetotheother(PP＠＠＊′＠).

Tosaythatthesensingandthesensibleare〉notoppositeeachotherliketwoexternalterms《istosaythattheyarenotradicallydiＨerenttypesofentitythatareonlycontingentlyrelated,forinstance,viaef-がcientcausalrelations.Objectsdonotcausesensationsinperceivingsubjects,asonEmpiricistviews.Norisitthecasethatconscioussub-

jects〉constitute《sensibleobjects,astranscendentalidealistformsofIntellectualismmaintain.Rather,〉sensationis,literally,acommunion《(PP＠＊◇)or〉coexistence《(PP＠＠＊)betweensensingandsensible.Thatis,sensoryexperiencedoesnotmerely〉symbolize《,orrepresent,sen-

sibleobjects,asonProtestantinterpretationsofcommunioninwhichthebreadandwinemerelysymbolizethebodyandbloodofChrist(PP

＠＊◇).Rather,sensingbodies〉takeup《sensibleobjectsinexperience;thereis,whenwearesuitably〉gearedinto《theworld,a〉couplingofourbodywiththethings《(PP§§☆).Assuch,sensibleobjectsbecomepresenttosensingsubjectsinsomethinglikethewaythatorthodox


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′★′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

standardintentionalisttheoriesofperception,perceptualexperiencesarerepresentationaleventsorstatesthatareindividuated,atleastinpart,bytheirintentionalorrepresentationalcontent.Thiscontentisitself determined by accuracy or correctness conditions: conditionsthat specify how things must be in the subject]s environment if theexperienceisveridical.

The claim that perceptual experiences are essentially relationaldoesnotsuＩce todistinguishnaïverealismfromall formsof inten-

tionalism. Some intentionalists insist that there is a sense in whichperceptualexperienceisessentiallyrelational,becauseperceptualex-

perienceessentiallyinvolvesrepresentationalcontentthatneedstoberelationally individuated: for instance,because it involvesobject-de-

pendentdemonstrativecontentsuchasthis isF(e.g.McDowell＊◇◇☆),or it involvespotentiallygappyrepresentationalcontentsconsistingofde re modesofpresentationofparticularobjectsandproperties(e.g.Schellenberg＠＆＊＊).WhilstitcanbecomediＩculttoseeexactlywhatisatstakebetweennaïverealistsandintentionalistsofthiskind,thedebatecanbeunderstoodasadisagreementaboutwhatexplainstherelational nature of perception. Intentionalists of this kind will typi-cally seek to explain the obtaining of a relation between perceiversandtheirenvironmentintermsofthewaytheirenvironmentisrepre-

sentedasbeing;indeed,theywilltypicallyinsistthattheobtainingoftheperceptualrelationsimplyconsists inexperiencerepresentingtheworldintheparticularwayitdoes.AsMcDowell,forinstance,putsit:

itispreciselybyvirtueofhavingcontentastheydothatperceptualexperiencesputusinsuchrelationstothings(＠＆＊§:＊☆☆).

IntentionalistswhoindividuatethecontentofexperiencerelationallydiＨer in this respect from naïve realists. According to naïve realists,theobtainingoftheperceptualrelationisdistinctfrom,andstandard-

lymorebasicthan,theintentionalattitudesthatwecanadopttowards

As the analogy with communion suggests, Merleau-Ponty thinksthat there is something mysterious, even miraculous, about percep-

tualexperience:〉Onecansay,ifyoulike,thattherelationofthethingperceivedtoperception】isamagicalrelationinnaïveconsciousness《(SB＊◎◇).Tothisextent,Merleau-Ponty]saccountof therelationshipbetweensensingandsensibleisreminiscentofRussell]s(disparaging)descriptionofhis(earlier)conceptionofknowledgebyacquaintanceas involving 〉something like a mystic union of knower and known《(＊◇＠＊:＠§☆).

2. Representational Content

Proponentsofnaïverealisttheoriesofperceptioncanbedescribedasacceptingaformof〉austererelationalism《totheextentthattheyholdthatperceptualexperiencesconsistmostfundamentallyintheobtain-

ingofacertainkindofrelationbetweensubjectsandobjects arela-

tionthatissomethinglikeRussell]s(＊◇＊＆)non-propositionalrelationofacquaintance.Onthisview,perceptualexperiencesarenotessen-

tiallyrepresentational:thereisnoessential,non-derivative,senseinwhichourperceptualexperiencesrepresenttheenvironmentasbeinga certain way. Rather, the attitudes typically judgments that per-

ceivers adopt towards what is presented in perception are constitu-

tively distinct from perceptual experiences themselves; at best, per-

ceptualexperienceshaverepresentationalcontentonlyderivativelyornon-essentially, invirtueof thecontentofdistinctattitudestowardswhatthesubjectisacquaintedwithinexperience.This,forinstance,istheimportofTravis]sclaimsthatthesensesare〉silent《:

ratherthanrepresentinganythingasso,oursensesmerelybringoursurroundingsintoview;aＨordussomesortofawarenessofthem.Itisthenforustomakeofwhatisinourviewwhatwecan,ordo(Travis＠＆＆☆:○☆).

Austererelationalistformsofnaïverealismcontrastwithstandardintentionalist theories of perception in this respect. According to


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′○′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

anintentionalisttheoryofperceptionaccordingtowhichthecontentofperceptualexperienceisnon-conceptual.Butthismayalsobetooquick.AsMerleau-Pontynotes,althoughintentionalityisoftencitedas〉theprincipaldiscovery《ofthephenomenologicalmovement,thebasicclaimthat〉allconsciousnessisconsciousnessofsomething《iswidely accepted (PP lxxxiii). It was accepted, for instance, by Kant,albeit in an overly intellectualist form. In a diＨerent way, it is alsosomethingacceptedbynaïverealists,forwhomtheintentionality,or

〉aboutness《,ofperceptualexperienceistobeexplainedbythefactthatperceptualexperiencesconsistintheobtainingofaconsciousrelationofacquaintancetothingsinourenvironment.Forthenaïverealist,ourperceptualexperiencesare〉about《(〉of《,or〉directedat《)thosethingsinourenvironment thatweareconsciouslyacquaintedwith.Giventhe relationalnature ofacquaintance, there canbenoconscious ac-

quaintance without anobject of acquaintance,andhence thenaïverealisttoocanacceptthat〉allconsciousnessisconsciousnessofsome-

thing《.We thereforecannotconcludesimply from the fact thatMer-

leau-Ponty thinks that perceptual experiences are intentional in thesenseofexhibiting〉aboutness《 that〉allconsciousnessisconscious-

nessof something《 that theyare intentional in thesenseofbeingfundamentallyrepresentationalstatesoreventsthatareindividuatedbytheirrepresentationalcontent,non-conceptualorotherwise.≦

An alternative way of interpreting Merleau-Ponty is as claim-

ing that perceptual experience consists essentially but not exclusively

in theobtainingofarelationofacquaintancebetweensubjectsandobjects.Merleau-Pontyagreeswiththerelationalistthatopennesstothe world is necessary for perceptual experience: as Merleau-Pontysays,theworldofobjectsis〉availabletomygazeinvirtueofakind

☆. Seee.g.Siewert(＠＆＊○)fordiＨerentwaysofunderstanding〉intentionality《:forinstance,being〉about《(〉of《or〉directedat《)anobject;beingabout(of,or directed at) a possibly non-existent object; having accuracy conditions(orconditionsof satisfactionmoregenerally);andhaving representationalcontent.AlthoughthesediＨerentwaysofunderstanding〉intentionality《areoftenruntogether,tosaythatexperiencesareintentionalinonesenseneednotbetosaythattheyareintentionalinanother.

that which we are perceptually related to. As Soteriou, for instance,remarks:

theclaimthattherelevantpsychologicalrelationisnon-representational should be understood in terms of theideathattheobtainingoftherelationisnotsimplydeter-

minedbytheobtainingofamentalstatethathasanin-

tentionalcontentwithveridicalityconditions irrespec-

tiveofwhether thementalstate inquestion isa factiveone,andirrespectiveofwhetherthecontentofthestateisobject-involving(＠＆＊§:＊＆●;seealsoBrewer＠＆＊＊:＊§＊).

One way of interpreting Merleau-Ponty the 〉overcomer of dis-

tinctions《 is as suggesting a middle way between the extremes ofaustererelationalismandintentionalism.Merleau-Pontyishostiletoviewsaccordingtowhichperceptioninvolves〉representation《.Ashesays while considering the perception of three-dimensional objectsfromaparticularpointofview,forexample:

Shouldwesay,aspsychologistsoftenhavedone, that Irepresent to myself the sides of this lamp which are notseen?IfIsaythesesidesarerepresentations,Iimplythattheyarenotgraspedasactuallyexisting;becausewhatisrepresented isnotherebeforeus, Idonotactuallyper-

ceiveit(PrP＊§;seealsoPPlxxiii′lxxiv,SB＠＠☆).

Of itself, this doesn]t necessarily mean that he rejects an inten-

tionalisttheoryofperception.Merleau-Pontytypicallymeansby〉rep-

resentation《 something intellectual, that is voluntary and involvesthe application of concepts: what Husserl calls 〉act intentionality《(PP lxxxii; cf. e.g. PP ＠☆●). By contrast, Merleau-Ponty emphasisesthat there is a distinct kind of 〉operative intentionality《 that under-

lies thoughtand judgment;asheputs it in 〉ThePrimacyofPercep-

tion《,perceptualexperienceis〉anoriginalmodalityofconsciousness《(PrP＊＠).Thismight inturnbethoughttosuggestacommitmentto


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′●′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

Perceptual experience so understood is not a two-stage process.Norareouropennesstotheworldandourabilitytoexploreitviathegazeandtherebytakeittobeacertainwaydistinctaspectsofexpe-

rience thatcanbeunderstood independentlyofeachother.WecanthinkofthisasprovidingatwistononeinterpretationoftheKantianthesisthat〉intuitionswithoutconceptsareblind《.Onthisinterpreta-

tion,intuitionisakindofnon-propositionalrelationofacquaintance,andthe twist is that thisacquaintancerelation isblind,notwithoutconcepts, but without bodily understanding.≧ This is not simply aformofintentionalismaccordingtowhichthecontentofexperienceisnon-conceptual,becausetheobtainingoftheacquaintancerelationinperceptionisnotitselftobeexplainedintermsofthewaythattheenvironmentistaken(inabodilyway)tobe;rather,opennesstotheworld,andexplorationofitviathegaze,iswhatmakespossibletak-

ingtheenvironmenttobeacertainway.Inthisrespect,Merleau-Pontyacceptsacorecommitmentofcontemporarynaïverealism.Butnoristhis simply an austerely relationalist form of naïve realism, becausetheopennesstotheworldisnotitselfmorefundamentalthanourabil-itytotakeittobeacertainway:tobeopentotheworldisfortheworldtobeavailableforexplorationbythegaze,andsoavailabletobetakenacertainway;andwecannotunderstandwhatitistobeopentotheworldsuchthatitisnotopentoexplorationbythegazeandnotavail-abletobetakenupbyus.InacharacteristicallyMerleau-Pontianfash-

ion,thesetwoaspectsofperceptualexperienceareinter-dependent.∞

★. ForinterpretationsofKantianintuitionasaformofacquaintance,seeAllais(＠＆＊★),McLear(＠＆＊○),andGomes(＠＆＊●).

○. If a corecommitmentofnaïve realism is thedenial thatperceptualexperi-enceshaverepresentationalcontentessentially,thenMerleau-Ponty]shybridpositionisnotaformofnaïverealism;itisatbesta〉naïverealist-like《theory.Assumingsomeきexibilityinwhatthecorecommitmentsofnaïverealismare,however,Merleau-Ponty]spositioncountsasaformofnaïverealisminsofarasheacceptsthattheintentionalcontentofexperienceisnotexplanatorilymorebasicthanitsrelationality.ForslightlydiＨerentformsofhybridtheory,seee.g.Soteriou(＠＆＊§)andLogue(＠＆＊☆).

of primordial contract and by a gift of nature, without any eＨort re-

quiredonmypart《(PP＠＠☆).However,acquaintancewiththeworldofobjectsisnotofitselfsuＩcientforperceptualexperience.Perceptualexperienceitselfalso essentiallyinvolvestakingthingstobeacertainway thatis,italsoinvolvesakindofrepresentationalcontent.Andthis,inturn,involvestheoperationofthegaze,themechanismthatallows us to explore and interrogate our environment. Mere open-

nesstotheworldwithouttheoperationofthegazeisnotsuＩcientforperception.AccordingtoMerleau-Ponty,forinstance,thedimensionof〉[d]epthisbornbeforemygazebecausemygazeattemptstoseesomething《(PP＠●☆),andso〉passivevisionwithnogaze,suchasthecaseofadazzlinglight】doesnotdisplayanobjectivespacebeforeus《(PP§＠◇).Assuch,vision〉isonlyinwardlypreparedforbymypri-mordial opening to a がeld of transcendences《 but 〉is accomplishedand fulがlled in the thing seen《 (PP §◇★). Given that we cannot per-

ceivewithouttheoperationofthegaze,andthatitisbymeansofthegazethatwetaketheworldtobeacertainway,perceptualexperienceessentiallyinvolvestakingtheworldtobeacertainway thatis,ites-

sentiallyinvolvesacertainkindofcontent.InkeepingwithMerleau-Ponty]s anti-Intellectualism, the additional 〉taking《 that is partiallyconstitutiveofperceptualexperienceisnotanintellectualjudgment,butratheraformof〉bodilyunderstanding《:

athingisnotactuallygiven inperception, it is inwardlytakenupbyus,reconstitutedandlivedbyusinsofarasitislinkedtoaworldwhosefundamentalstructureswecarrywithinourselvesandofwhichthisthingisjustoneofseveralpossibleconcretions(PP§☆＊).

Merleau-Ponty]sviewthereforepotentiallydiＨersfromthatofaustererelationaliststwiceover:がrst,inclaimingthatperceptualexperienceconsistsessentiallybutnotexclusivelyintheobtainingofarelationofacquaintance;andsecond,inclaimingthattheattitudesthatweadopttowardstheworldarenotprimarilybelief-likepropositionalattitudes,butconsistinsteadinakindofbodilyunderstanding.


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′◎′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

Onthepositiveside,Merleau-Pontyinsiststhatweperceivebothob-

jectsandtheirproperties.So,forinstance:

WhenIperceiveathingsuchasaがreplace,itisnottheconcordanceofitsvariousappearancesthatleadsmetobelieveintheexistenceoftheがreplaceasthegeometri-calplanandcommonsigniがcationofalloftheseperspec-

tives.Onthecontrary,Iperceivethethinginitsownclar-

ity(PP＊◇＊).

Just as we perceive objects, and not merely their appearances, Mer-

leau-Pontyinsiststhatweperceivetheconstantpropertiesofobjects,too: we perceive their size, form, colour, sound, temperature, andweight,andnotmerelytheappearancestheypresentfromparticularperspectives(PP§＊＠′◎).Indeed,forMerleau-Ponty,weperceivetheconstantpropertiesofthingsbecause weperceivetheobjectsthattheyarepropertiesof,andweperceivebothbecause,morefundamentally,weareopentothe world:

Theconstancyofcolourismerelyanabstractmomentoftheconstancyofthings,andtheconstancyofthingsises-

tablishedupontheprimordialconsciousnessoftheworldasthehorizonofallourexperiences(PP§＠○).

Onthenegativeside,Merleau-Pontyinsiststhatwearenotawareofanymentalobjectsorqualitativepropertiesofexperience.AshesaysinhisearlierworkThe Structure of Behaviour,wearenotperceptu-

allyawareofanymentalobjectsdistinctfromthethingsthemselves:

it is thething itselfwhichnaïveconsciousness thinks itisreaching,andnotsomeinnerdouble,somesubjectivereproduction. Itdoesnot imagine that thebodyor thatmental〉representations《functionasascreenbetweenit-selfandreality(SB＊◎○).

3. Phenomenology

I have argued so far that Merleau-Ponty agrees with the naïve real-istthatperceptualexperiencesareessentiallyrelational,andthattherelationalityofexperiencecannotbeexplainedexclusively in termsof our experience representing the environment as being a certainway although I have suggested that he oＨers a distinctive, hybrid,accountoftherelationshipbetweenacquaintanceand(bodily)repre-

sentationalcontentthatdiＨersfromthatstandardlyprovidedbynaïverealists,byinsistingthatperceptualexperiencesareessentiallybutnotexclusivelyrelational.Butwhyshouldweacceptthatperceptualexpe-

rienceisessentiallyrelational?Acommonlineofargumentforcontemporarynaïverealisttheories

ofperceptionisthattheybestexplainandarticulatethephenomeno-

logicalcharacterofveridicalperceptualexperience,or,inlesstechni-calterms,〉whatitislike《tobeasubjectofexperience.MyaiminthissectionistoshowthatMerleau-Pontypresentsadistinctiveversionofthislineofargument.

Onewidelydiscussedaspectofthephenomenologyofperceptualexperienceisthe〉transparencyofexperience《.AsG.E.Moorefamous-

lyremarks:

Whenwe try to introspect thesensationofblue,allwecanseeistheblue:theotherelementisasif itweredi-aphanous(＊◇＆§:☆★＆).

Theclaimthatperceptualexperienceistransparentcanbeunderstoodastheconjunctionofapositiveandanegativeclaim(cf.Martin＠＆＆＠).Thepositiveclaimisthatwhenwereきectonperceptualexperience,weareawareofenvironmentalobjects,properties,andrelations.Thenegativeclaimisthatwhenwereきectonexperience,wearenotawareofanymentalobjects(suchassense-dataorimages)oranyqualitativepropertiesoftheexperienceitself(sensationsorqualia).

Merleau-Pontyacceptsboththepositiveandthenegativeclaims.


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′◇′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

Figure ＠: IshiharaColourPlate.Source:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ishihara_◇.png

ThereisasenseinwhichMerleau-Pontydoesnotthinkthatpercep-

tualexperienceisentirelytransparent.Heis,forexample,preparedtoallowthatphenomenologicalreきection,viathephenomenologicalre-

ductions andinparticulartheepoché,or〉puttingtheworldinbrack-

ets《〉loosenstheintentionalthreadsthatconnectustotheworldinordertomakethemappear《(PPlxxvii).Thisreveals,amongstotherthings,essentialstructuralpropertiesofperceptualexperience,suchasitsbasicがgure-groundconがguration,orthewaythatexperiencesofthebackgroundbecomeindeterminatewhenwefocusourattentiononaがgure.

But thesearenotpropertiesofexperience thatareanything likesensations, properties of a subjective visual がeld, or qualia. Rather,they are essential properties of experience that determine, or struc-

ture,thewaythatobjectsthatareindependentofourexperiencesarepresented.∴ Reきective awareness of experience as such is therefore

●. CompareMartin]s (＊◇◇＠)accountof thevisualがeldas thatwhichdelimits,orsetsboundariesto,aregionofphysicalspace(seealsoRichardson＠＆＊＆).Ingeneral,itisconsistentwithnaïverealismtoallowthatthephenomenal

Carryingonthisspirit,thePhenomenology of Perceptionbeginsbydecon-

structingthe〉classicalprejudice《ofmuchphilosophyandpsychologythatperceptualexperienceinvolvesthehavingofsensations,whereasensationisunderstoodasan〉undiＨerentiated,instantaneous,andpunctual [jolt]《 (PP§).Thechoiceofcoverdesign for theonce-stan-

dardEnglishtranslationofPhenomenology of PerceptionbyColinSmith(Figure＊)isunfortunateinthisrespect.ThecovershowsadetailfromanIshiharaColourTestplate,whichissuggestiveofpreciselythekindofatomistictheoryofperceptionthatMerleau-Pontyisatpainstore-

ject. Indeed, seen in its entirety, an Ishihara plate in which diＨer-

entlycolouredcirclescoalescetopresentdiＨerentnumberstopeoplewith〉normal《colourvisionandthosewhoare〉colour-blind《(Figure＠) illustratesperfectlyoneofthekeyprinciplesofMerleau-Ponty]stheoryofperception:that〉aがgureagainstabackgroundisthemostbasicsensiblegivenwecanhave《(PP☆).

Figure ＊: Cover,Phenomenology of PerceptiontranslatedbyColinSmith(London:Routledge,＠＆＆＠).


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＊＆′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

caldatumonthegroundsthatperceptualexperiencesarerelationaleventsthatareinpartconstitutedbythethingsintheperceiver]sen-

vironmentthattheyareexperiencesof(＠＆＆＠:§◇◇).Theintentionalist,bycontrast,explains the transparencyofexperience in termsof thewaytheenvironmentisrepresentedinexperience(＠＆＆＠:§◎＆′★).Un-

likeothertypesofrepresentationalstate forinstance,imaginingorhoping perceptualexperiencesarenotneutralwith respect to theexistenceoftheobjectsrepresented;assuch,perceptualexperienceshaveacertainkindofauthorityoverbelief,inthatwetendtobelievethingsareastheyseem.Theintentionalistcanexplainthisfeatureofperceptualexperienceontheassumptionthatperceptualexperienceisadistinctivetypeofrepresentationalstatethatinvolvesanassorticattitudetowardstheexperience]sintentionalcontent(＠＆＆＠:§◎○′◇＠).This, in turn, provides the intentionalist with a way of capturing atleastsomeofthesenseoftheintuitionsthatperceptualexperiencesare〉immediate《and〉direct《.

Martinhimselfisscepticalabouttheprospectsofadjudicatingthedispute between naïve realists and intentionalists based directly onhowexperienceseemstous,becausehethinksthephenomenologi-cal data will underdetermine the choice between naïve realism andintentionalism:

WhenwecometostatethediＨerencesbetweenthetwopositions,weがndourselvestalkingintermsofnotionsofmodalityandconstitution.Onemightbescepticalwheth-

eritcouldreallybepartofanycommonsenseviewthatobjectswereorwerenotconstituentsofourexperiencesofthem(＠＆＆＠:§◇◎).

If this is right, one option for the naïve realist would be to look totheepistemicconsequencesofthetwoviewstoprovideawayofdif-ferentiating them(indiＨerentways, seee.g.Campbell＠＆＆＠,Logue＠＆＊＠).Martinhimself thinks thatbecause thenaïve realist claims tobe 〉doing justice to some common sense or naïve intuition《 abouthowexperienceappears, thenthereshouldbesomewayofsettling

necessarily incomplete, because our experiences are essentially ex-

periencesoftheworldthatisindependentofus.Merleau-Ponty]sex-

ecution of the phenomenological project diＨers importantly in thisrespectfromHusserl]s,atleastatthetimeoftheCartesian Meditations.Husserlattemptstousethephenomenologicalreductionsultimatelyasameanstouncoverthe〉innerman《,ortranscendentalEgo:

thebeingofthepureegoandhiscogitationes,asabeingthatispriorinitself,isantecedenttothenaturalbeingoftheworld】.Thefundamentalphenomenologicalmeth-

od of transcendental epoché 】 leads back to this realm(＊◇§＊:§◎).

ForMerleau-Ponty,bycontrast,〉Themostimportantlessonofthere-

ductionistheimpossibilityofacompletereduction《(PPlxxvii).Thenecessaryfailureoftheattempttocarrythroughtheepoché,anduncov-

erapurelyinnerrealmofsubjectiveexperience,showsthatthereisno〉innerman《,butthatwearemostfundamentallybeings-in-the-world.♂

Itiscontroversialtowhatextentthe(putative)phenomenologicaldatum that perceptual experience is transparent supports the naïverealist]sclaimthatperceptualexperienceisessentiallyrelational.♀Ontheonehand,itispossibletoholdthatalthoughexperienceappears transparent,theappearancesaremisleadinginthisrespect;thismightbeacostofa theoryofperception,butperhaps it isonethat isulti-matelyacceptablegivenothertheoreticalbeneがts.Ontheotherhand,as Martin (＠＆＆＠) argues, the transparency of experience may seemtobeequallywellexplainedbybothnaïverealistand intentionalisttheoriesofperception.Thenaïverealistexplainsthephenomenologi-

characterofexperienceisdetermined,atleastinpart,bythespeciがcwaythatweareacquaintedwiththingsinourenvironment.Fordiscussion,seee.g.Logue(＠＆＊＠),French(＠＆＊☆).

◎. FordiscussionofMerleau-Ponty]sattitudetowardsthephenomenologicalre-

duction,seeSmith(＠＆＆★).

◇. Indeed,itiscontroversialevenwhetheritisaphenomenologicaldatum.Forsomerelevantdiscussion,seee.g.Crane(＠＆＆＆),althoughIwillnotconsiderthisissuefurtherhere.


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＊＊′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

Thereareat least twoaspects to thisdescriptionof thephenom-

enologicalcharacterofvisualexperience,andtheyarenicelycapturedbyC.D.Broad]sclaimthatvisualexperienceappearstobeboth〉salta-

tory《and〉prehensive《(＊◇★＠:★).≠≠Ontheonehand,visualexperienceis〉saltatory《inthatit〉seemstoleapthespatialgapbetweentheper-

cipient]sbodyanda remote regionof space《 or,asMerleau-Pontyputsit,thegaze〉reaches[objects]fromadistance《.Ontheotherhand,visualexperience is 〉prehensiveof the surfacesofdistantbodiesascolouredandextended《inthesensethatitseemstoputusintoakindofcontactwithobjects or,asMerleau-Pontyputsit,ourgazeseemstobe〉posedon《objects.Thisisoneofanumberoftactilemetaphorsthat Merleau-Ponty uses to describe perception: in perception we

〉gearinto《theworld(e.g.PP＠○＊)liketheteethintwocogsmeshingtogether,≠＜〉coupleourbodywith the things《(e.g.PP§§☆), 〉takeup《thesensible(e.g.PP＠＊◇),geta〉grip《or〉hold《onthings(e.g.PP＠●§),orinvestigateobjectswith〉apalpationofthelook《(e.g.VI＊§＊).ButwhereasBroad,asense-datumtheorist,thinksthattheseappearancesare ultimately misleading, Merleau-Ponty develops a philosophicaltheoryofperceptionthatattemptstoexplainandarticulatethisaspectofhowlivedexperienceappears.

Theseclaimsaboutthenatureofperceptualexperiencegobeyondthe minimal claim that perceptual experience is transparent. Thetransparencyclaimisprimarilyaclaimaboutwhat weareandarenotawareofinperceptualexperience:weareawareofthingsinouren-

vironmentandnotanymentalobjectsorsensations.Theclaimthatperceptualexperience isostensivelysaltatoryandprehensive, likeabeamoflightthatrevealsobjectsintheenvironment,bycontrast,isa

abackgroundthatis,ultimately,theworld《(PP＠★＊).HenceitisnotsomuchthatMerleau-Pontyisresistingtheviewthatperceptionislikeabeamoflight,butthatthelightisrevealingobjectsthatareotherwiseindarkness.

＊＊. SeealsoFish(＠＆＆◇:§′☆)andKalderon(＠＆＊＊b:＠＠§;＠＆＊●)forfurtherdiscus-

sionofBroad]sdescription.

＊＠. AsLandesnotes(PP☆◇○,n.☆●),engener (〉togearinto《)alsohasthesenseof〉toadjustto《,suggestingthattheintermeshingofbodyandworldisn]trigidlydeterminedinadvance,inthewaythatthemeshingofcogsis.

the dispute between the naïve realist and the intentionalist that re-

latesto〉anaccountofperceptualappearances《(＠＆＆＠:§◇◎);hiswayofarguingfornaïverealismappealstodiＨerencesbetweenperceptionandsensoryimaginationthatheclaimsthenaïverealistisinabetterpositiontoexplain.Whateverthemeritsofthesealternativewaysofmotivatingnaïverealism,whatIwanttosuggestintheremainderofthesectionisthatthematerialsforamoredirectadjudicationofthedisputebetweenthenaïverealistandtheintentionalistmaybefoundinMerleau-Ponty.

IntheがnalchapterofThe Structure of Behaviour,Merleau-Pontydis-

tinguishescommonsensedescriptionsofperceptionfrom〉livedper-

ception《.AccordingtoMerleau-Ponty,commonsensedescriptionsofperceptiontreatperceptualexperiencesascausal impressions(〉tran-

sitive《eＨects)ofdistinctexistences.Thisview,whichMerleau-Pontyassociateswiththeterm[naïverealism](seealsoPP★＊＆n.○＆;PrP§◎),isaproductofwhathewouldlaterdescribeas〉ObjectiveThought《:thetendencyincommonsenseandscientiがcthinkingtoabstractfromlivedexperienceandthinkoftheworldindeterminate,causal,terms(cf.PP●§′☆).Fromthelivedperspective,Merleau-Pontythinksthatthethingsweperceivedonotseemtobethecausesofourexperiences:

Itseemstomeratherthatmyperceptionislikeabeamof light which reveals the objects there where they areandmanifeststheirpresence,latentuntilthen.WhetherImyselfperceiveorconsideranothersubjectperceiving,it seems to me that the gaze 〉is posed《 on objects andreaches them from a distance as is well expressed bytheuseoftheLatin luminafordesignatingthegaze(SB

＊◎★).≠＝

＊＆. ThisisqualiがedslightlyinthePhenomenology,whenMerleau-Pontyasks(rhe-

torically), 〉Shall we say that perception reveals objects as the lamp illumi-natesthematnight?Mustweembracetherealismthat,asMalebranchesaid,imaginesthesoulgoingoutthroughtheeyesandvisitingtheobjectsintheworld?《(PP＠★＊′＠).Butatleastinpart,theemphasishereisonresistingIntel-lectualistviewsthatattempttodissociateperceptualexperiencesfromtheircontext:〉sensationcannomorethananyotherperceptionbeseparatedfrom


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＊＠′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

necessarilyrelyonthe(typicallyassumed)judgmentsof〉themanonthe Clapham omnibus《, since the mythical 〉common man《 will nor-

mallybeinthethroesof〉ObjectiveThought《.Oneoption,followingasuggestionbyFish(＠＆＆◇:＊◎′＠＆),would

be toappeal to the judgmentofexperts inphenomenologicalstudy.Thisstrategyfacesanumberofchallenges.Aninitialchallengeistoidentifythephenomenologicalexpertsinadvanceofknowingwhichjudgmentsaboutthenatureofexperiencearecorrect.Relatedtothis,there is the challenge of identifying the correct method for deter-

miningthephenomenologicalcharacterofexperienceinadvanceofknowing what experience is really like. These two concerns are ex-

acerbatedbythefactthatamongsttheclassofpeoplewhomitmightbenaturaltodescribeas〉experts《,theremaybedisagreement,bothabout the methods to be adopted and about the results that thesemethods deliver. Still, it is at least striking that Merleau-Ponty]s de-

scriptionofthephenomenologicalcharacterofexperienceissimilartotheindependentdescriptionprovidedbyBroad,whowasnotonlyworking in a diＨerent philosophical tradition to Merleau-Ponty, butwhodescribedvisualperceptionasseemingly〉saltatory《and〉prehen-

sive《despite beingundertheinきuenceofObjectiveThought,andsowhoultimatelytooktheappearancestobemisleadinginthisrespect.Thisconvergenceinjudgmentprovidessomecorroborationfortheirdescriptions.≠≦

However,ratherthanpursuethisapproachfurtherhere,IwanttoconsideradiＨerent,butcomplementary,wayofarguingforthephe-

nomenologicaldatumsuggestedbyMerleau-Ponty.Insteadofappeal-ingtothejudgmentsofphenomenologicalexperts,analternativeistotrytoelicitdescriptionsofexperiencethatareuntaintedbyObjectiveThought.Childrenareapotentiallypromisingsourceinthisrespect.In considering the child]s experience of the inter-subjective world,

＊☆. For a more detailed defence of phenomenological method, see Zahavi]s(＠＆＆●)responsetoDennett.SeealsoSiewert(＠＆＆●)fortheclaimthatwecanresolvephenomenologicaldisputesbyphilosophicallyenrichedがrst-personreきection.

claimaboutthewaythatweareawareofobjectsinexperience.Thesearedistinctclaims,sincetheremaybeotherwaysthatwecanbeawareoftheverysamethings:forinstance,perhapssensoryimaginationorthoughtprovidediＨerentwaysofbeingawareof things.Thisclaimabout theway that thingsarepresented inexperience is suggestiveofthenaïverealist]sclaimthatperceptualexperiencesarerelationaleventsthatarepartlyconstitutedbyobjectsinourenvironment.Theclaim that perceptual experiences are partly constituted by externalobjectsprovidesastraightforwardexplanationofthesensethatper-

ceptualexperienceputsusintoakindofcontactwithspatiallydistantobjects:visualexperienceostensivelyleapsoutto,andgrasps,objectsinvirtueofthefactthatthoseobjectsareliterallyconstituentsoftheexperience.≠＞

Thislineofargumentfornaïverealismraisestwoquestions.First,shouldweacceptthedescriptionofthephenomenologicalcharacterofexperiencesuggestedbyBroadandMerleau-Ponty?Second,doesthisprovideareasonbasedonthewayexperienceappearstoprefernaïverealismtointentionalism?Iwillconsiderthesequestionsinturn.

Providingadescriptionofperceptualappearancesonwhichevery-

oneagreesisnotoriouslydiＩcult.Justastheputativephenomenologi-caldatumthatvisualexperienceistransparent issometimesdenied,the claim thatvisual experience is ostensively saltatory andprehen-

sivemightalsoberesisted.Sohowmightweargueforthisclaim?IfMerleau-Pontyisright,thencommonsensedescriptionsofexpe-

rienceareliabletomisrepresentthephenomena;wethereforecannot

＊§. Thisthoughtmightbeatleastnascentinthetransparencyintuition,depend-

ingonexactlyhow〉awareness《ofthingsinourenvironmentisunderstood:if it is understood in a strong, object-involving way, then the contact intu-

itionmightjustbeonewayoffurtherdescribingthetransparencyintuition.ItisworthnotingthatthereisaslightlydiＨerentintuitionthatissometimesappealed to indiscussionsofphenomenal character: that thephenomenalcharacterofexperienceis〉inheritedfrom《thatwhichitisanexperienceof(thephrasecomesfromCampbell＊◇◇§;seealsoShoemaker＠＆＆§,Kalderon＠＆＊＊a).Theinheritanceintuitionisarguablystrongerthanthetransparencyintuition(Allen＠＆＊○:＊§′☆),butweakerthanthecontactclaim,sinceitdoesn]tfurtherspecifythewayinwhichthephenomenalcharacterisinherited.


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＊§′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

immunetotrainingbecausetheyreきectthephenomenologicalchar-

acterofvisualexperience:〉Visionisgenerallythoughtofasdirectedoutward,awayfromtheself,towardspeciがcobjects《(＠＆＆＠:☆＠§).

These results provide at least indirect support for the claim thatvisualexperienceisostensivelysaltatoryandprehensive,andassuchappearstobeconstitutedinpartbyitsobjects.Theseresultswouldnotnaturallybetakenasevidenceofaconstitutiveviewofperceptualexperienceiftheoutputfromtheeyeinvolvedsomethinglikeanef-がcient causal process; this would be more naturally suggestive of avariationontheviewthatMerleau-Pontyascribestocommonsense,according to which perceptual experiences are distinct existencesfrom that which they are experiences of, but on which the eＩcientcausalprocessthatresults inaperceptualexperiencerequiressomeadditionalinputfromthesubject.However,therearereasonstoresistthisinterpretationoftheがndings.Inthecaseofchildren,forinstance,anearlierresearchernotes:

For children the movement that goes from the eyes tothe object remains abstract. It is thus clearly diＨerenti-atedfromthe〉visualがre《ofearlytheories,fromthe〉きuid《emittedbytheeyesofwitchesinfairytalesorfromtheredraysthatarebeamedfromSuperman]seyes.Onlytheideathatthesubjectisattheoriginofaprocess,insteadofbeingatthereceivingend,iscommontothesevariouswaysofportrayingsight(Guesne＊◇◎★:＠○).

Besides,thinkingofthatwhichisdirectedoutwardsinvisionasbeingpartofaneＩcientcausalprocessisn]tobviouslyconsistentwiththemosthighly favouredextramissionist responses,according towhichthereisasimultaneousinputandoutput,orviewsaccordingtowhichthereisaninputfollowedbyanoutput.

Assuming that the visual experience is ostensively saltatory andprehensive,thesecondquestioniswhetherthisprovidesareasontoprefer the claim that perceptual experiences are essentially relation-

al. According to non-relationalist views, perceptual experiences are

Merleau-PontyappealstoがndingsbyPiagetwhichsuggestadescrip-

tionofthephenomenologicalcharacterofexperiencethatissimilartothatwhichhegivesinThe Structure of Behaviour:

Thechildlivesinaworldthathebelievesisimmediatelyaccessibletoeveryonearoundhim.】Forthechild,oth-

ersaresomanygazesinspectingthings,theyhaveanal-mostmaterialexistence,tothepointthatonechildwon-

dershowthesegazesarenotbrokenwhentheymeet(PP

§●＊).

Theviewofperception that this suggestshas similarities toancientextramissionist theories of perception, associated with Plato, Euclid,Ptolemy,andAl-Kindi,andaccordingtowhichvisioninvolvessomekindofoutputfromtheeye.Subsequentstudieshavesinceconがrmedtheexistenceofwidespreadbroadlyextramissionistintuitionsaboutvisioninchildren(e.g.WinerandCottrell＊◇◇○).Perhapsmorestrik-

ingly,theyhavealsofoundthatextramissionistintuitionscantypicallybe elicited in around ★＆% of adults including university studentswhohavejusttakenanintroductorycourseonvisionscience(Wineret al. ＠＆＆＠).

Onewayoftestingthisinvolvesaskingsubjectswhichofaseriesof representations (typically on a computer monitor) best describeswhatoccurswhenpeoplesee.Subjectsarepresentedwithdiagramsoftheproがleofafaceononesideofascreenandagreenrectangleontheother,andがvepossiblerelationshipsbetweenthetwo.Dotsareseentomoveeitherfromtherectangletotheeye,fromtheeyetotherectangle,fromtherectangletotheeyeandback,fromtheeyetotherectangleandback,orsimultaneouslytoandfromtheeye.Typicallyaround★＆%ofparticipants eventhosewhohavejusttakenthein-

troductorycourseonvisionscience preferoneoftheextramissionistresponses,inwhichdotsmovefromtheeyetotheobject.Themosthighlyfavouredarethosethatinvolvesimultaneousinputandoutput,andthoseinwhichinputtotheeyeisfollowedbyoutputtotheobject.Wineret al.suggestthatthesebeliefsarebothwidespreadandlargely


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＊☆′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

intuitionandBroadhimselfthoughtthatperceptualexperienceisn]treallysaltatoryandprehensive.Butinsodoing,thiswouldinvolveacommitment to a theory of nature of perceptual experience accord-

ingtowhichourbestjudgmentsaboutthenatureofexperiencearemistaken.

4. Hallucination

Accountingforthephenomenologyofperceptualexperienceisonlyoneofthedimensionsalongwhichphilosophicaltheoriesofpercep-

tion are evaluated. As Martin (＠＆＆＠) argues, representationalist ap-

pealstothetransparencyofexperiencecanbeunderstoodasdepend-

ingfortheirforceonthethoughtthattheyarebestabletoexplainthephenomenologicalcharacterofexperienceinawaythatisconsistentwiththepossibilityofillusionandhallucination:casesinwhichsome-

thingintheenvironmentlooksotherthanitis,andcasesinwhichitseemstothesubjectasifthereissomethingintheirenvironmentthatisn]tthereatall.Evenifitisconcededthatthenaïverealistprovidesabetterexplanationofthephenomenologicalcharacterofexperiencethantheintentionalist,itmightstillbearguedthatintentionalismis,onbalance,abettertheoryoverall,becauseitgivesabetteraccountofillusionandhallucination.

A common naïve realist strategy for accounting for illusion and(particularly)hallucinationistocombineanaïverealisttheoryofper-

ceptionwithaformofdisjunctivism.Accordingtostandardformsofdisjunctivism, perception (on the one hand) and illusion and hallu-

cination(ontheother)areessentially,ormostfundamentally,diＨer-

ent kinds of mental event: either S perceives, or it is merely as if Sperceives.≠≧Muchofthecontemporaryliteratureonnaïverealisttheo-

riesofperceptionhasbeenconcernedwiththenaïverealist]scommit-menttoaformofdisjunctivism,focusinginparticularondisjunctiv-

istaccountsofhallucination;thisisbecausehallucinationsareoften

＊★. NotalldisjunctiviststreatillusionandhallucinationasfundamentallydiＨer-

ent;somesubsumeillusionsunderthe〉good《disjunct.SeeByrneandLogue(＠＆＆◎)forfurtherdiscussion.

distinct from, and merely causally responsive to, mind-independentobjects.Itmaybepossiblefornon-relationaliststoexplainwhyexpe-

riencesarenon-neutralwithrespecttotheexistenceofobjectsintheenvironment.AsMartin(＠＆＆＠)notes,forinstance,intentionalistscanexplainthenon-neutralityofperceptualexperienceswithrespect totheexistenceoftheobjectstheyrepresentintermsofthetypeofrep-

resentationalstatetheyare:experienceshave〉authorityoverbeliefs《becausetheyrepresentthingsintheenvironmentasbeingacertainway. But it is far from clear that this captures the distinctive way inwhichobjectsarepresented inexperience: thatnon-neutrally repre-

sentingtheexistenceofobjectsintheenvironmentissuＩcienttoex-

plain the sense of contact with them that extramissionist intuitionspointto.

Itmightbesuggestedthattheextramissionistintuitionsarebroad-

lyconsistentwithanintentionalisttheoryofperceptionaccordingtowhichexperiencesaredistinctfrom,andcausedby,externalobjects,butwheretheoutputfromtheeyeissomethinglikearepresentationalorreferentialrelation.Thiswouldがtmostneatlywiththescenarioinwhichaninputtotheeyeisfollowedbyoutputtotheobject.However,itisdiＩculttoseehowitisconsistentwiththeviewthatinputandoutputaresimultaneous,orwiththepureextramissionistresponses.Bycontrast,thenaïverealisttheoryofperceptionがtsneatlywithboththepureextramissionistresponseandthesimultaneousinput-outputresponse. It is also consistent with the input-followed-by-output re-

sponse,ifitisassumed(asnaïverealiststypicallydo)thatcausalpro-

cessesinvolvinglightandvisualprocessingmechanismsareenablingconditions of perceptual experiences that constitutively depend ontheir objects. The naïve realist theory of perception can thereforeclaimtobetterexplainandarticulatethephenomenologicalcharacterofexperiencethantheintentionalist:itcanexplainalltheresponsesthattheintentionalistcan,plussomethattheintentionalistcannot.

Ofcourse,therepresentationalistmightseektoexplainawaythisaspectofthephenomenologicalcharacterofexperience,inmuchthesamewaythatthesense-datumtheoristexplainsawaythetransparency


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＊★′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

handasaguineapigimmediatelynoticesthatagenuinepighasbeenplacedintheotherhand《(PP§★＆).≠∴

AccordingtoMerleau-Ponty,wearetypicallyabletotellwhenweareperceivingbecausehallucinatedobjectslackthe〉markofreality《(PP§★◇)characteristicofobjectsthatareveridicallyperceived.Itisasifhallucinatedobjectsare〉superimposed《ontotheperceivedworld(PP§★★).Whereas〉[t]hereallendsitselftoaninがniteexploration,itisinexhaustible《(PP§§◎) thatis,wecaninvestigaterealobjectsfromdiＨerent perspectives and in diＨerent conditions the hallucinatedworld〉lackstheplenitudeandtheinternalarticulationthatmakesitthecasethattherealthingremains[initself],oractsandexistsbyitself《(PP§★★).

Ofcourse,althoughitisoftenpossibletotellthatyouareperceiving(andnothallucinating)whenyouareperceiving,animportantpartofthephenomenathatneedsaccountingforisthatitisneverthelesspos-

sibletobedeceivedbyhallucinationswhenyouarehavingthem.Mer-

leau-Pontyarguesthateventhoughhallucinationsmaylackthemarkofreality,theycanneverthelesshave[〉the value of reality《 (PP§★◎):theycan〉supplant《perceptions,giverisetoaＨectiveresponses,andmoti-vatedistinctivekindsofbehaviour.Thereasonforthis,accordingtoMerleau-Ponty,isthatthereisasharedbasistobothperceptionandhallucination. In particular, both are modalities of a 〉single primor-

dialfunctionbywhichwearrangearoundourselvesamilieuwithadeがnitestructure《,anditisbecauseofthissharedbasisthatwecanbedeceivedwhenwearehallucinating:〉this がction can only count as reality because reality itself is reached for the normal subject in an analogous opera-

tion《(PP§★◎).ThesharedbasisiswhatMerleau-Pontycalls〉faith《,or〉primordial《or〉originaryopinion《:〉themovementthatcarriesusbe-

yondsubjectivity,thatplacesusintheworldpriortoeveryscienceandeveryveriがcation】orthat,onthecontrary,becomesboggeddowninourprivateappearances《(PP§★◇).Thissharedbasistoperceptionand

＊●. Merleau-Ponty]sfocusonactualcasesofhallucinationissomethingstressedbyRomdehn-Romluc(＠＆＆◇).

considered to be the more diＩcult case for the naïve realist. Again,Merleau-Pontyprovidesaninterestinganddistinctiveperspectiveonthisdebate.

Merleau-Pontyacceptsaformofdisjunctivism(cf.Berezden＠＆＊§).For Merleau-Ponty, perceptual experiences 〉in the full sense of theterm《 are essentially relational (§＊). Hallucinations diＨer fundamen-

tallyfromveridicalperceptualexperiencesinthisrespect:thereisan〉essentialdiＨerence《betweenperceptionandhallucination(PP§★＠),suchthatsomeonewhoishallucinating〉doesnotseeanddoesnothear inthenormalsense《(PP§★●).Speciがcally,whereasperceptioninvolves communion or communication 〉with an insurmountableplenitude《(PP§§●,§★☆),hallucinations〉playoutonadiＨerentstage《(PP§★★).≠∞

Much of the recent debate about disjunctivism focuses on hallu-

cinationsthatareinprinciplesubjectivelyindistinguishablefromve-

ridicalperceptualexperiences.Merleau-Ponty]saccountofhallucina-

tion,however,startsfromtheobservationthatasamatterofempiri-calfact,manyactualhallucinationsaresubjectivelydiscriminablefromveridicalperceptualexperiences oratany rate, it isoftenpossibleto tell thatyouareperceivingwhenyouareperceiving,even if it isnot always possible to tell that you are hallucinating when you arehallucinating. Merleau-Ponty presents a number of examples fromthepsychopathologicalliteraturetoillustratethepoint.Forinstance,aschizophrenicpatientwhoclaimstoseesomeoneatacertainlocationinthegardenis〉astonishedwhensomeoneisactuallyplacedinthegarden,atthespotindicated,inthesameoutがt,andstandingwiththesameposture《.Similarly,analcoholicsubject〉whoseesthedoctor]s

＊○. Merleau-Ponty makes similar remarks about illusions. For instance, of thepatchofsunlightonthepaththatheseesasastone,hesays,〉IcannotsaythatIeverseetheきatstoneinthesenseinwhichIwillseethepatchofsun-

lightwhilemovingcloser《(PP§＊＆);thisisbecausewedonot〉gearinto《illu-

sions.However,Iwillsetillusionsasidehere,andremainneutralonwhetherMerleau-Ponty]s account of hallucinations can be extended to account forillusions.


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＊○′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

thistoleranceofthepre-predicativeworldaswellasourvertiginousproximitytoallbeinginsyncreticexperience(PP§★◇).

Theviewthathallucinationis,oris like,aformofsensoryimagi-nation typically,aformofsensoryimaginationoverwhichsubjectslack direct voluntary control is popular in the psychopathologicalliterature(e.g.Bentall＊◇◇＆;cf.Allen＠＆＊★).Atleastinpartthisisbe-

causeitprovidesacompellingaccountofabroadrangeofempiricalcases,likethoseMerleau-Pontyconsiders,inwhichthephenomenalcharacterofhallucination ismore like thatofanepisodeofsensoryimaginingthanaperceptualexperience,andsowhicharesubjectivelydiscriminablefromveridicalperceptualexperiences.

Thegeneralviewthathallucinationis,orislike,aformofsensoryimaginationdoesnotof itselfentailadisjunctivist theoryofpercep-

tion.Itispossible,forinstance,toholdthatthereisacommonelementtoperceptionandimagination thehavingofanimage,orthetoken-

ing of a representational content and that the diＨerence betweenthetwoissolelyadiＨerenceintheextrinsiccausalrelationsthatthiscommonelementstands in.ThiswouldbeanEmpiricistaccountofhallucinationthatMerleau-Pontywoulddismissonthegroundsthatitcannotaccountforthesubjectivediscriminability ofactualhallucina-

tions;attendingtotheempiricaldetails,Merleau-Pontythinks,showsthat〉hallucinationisnotasensorycontent《(PP§★＆).

Buteveniftheviewthathallucinationis,orislike,aformofsen-

soryimaginationdoesnotentailadisjunctivisttheoryofperception,it represents a promising account of hallucination from the disjunc-

tivist perspective.≠♀ Contemporary disjunctivists often give negative,relationalcharacterisationsofhallucination,asmentaleventsthataresubjectively indiscriminable from veridical perceptual experiences.AccordingtoMartin(＠＆＆☆),forinstance,thereisnothingmoretothe

＊◇. SeeAllen(＠＆＊★)forfurtherdiscussionanddefence.Fortheclaimthathalluci-nationisadistinctivemodeofconsciousness(andsowhichatleasthasaＩni-tiestotheviewthathallucinationislikesensoryimagination),seeCampbell(＠＆＊☆:◇＆′☆)andIvanov(ms.).

hallucinationisgroundedinthefact thatweareembodiedsubjectswithsensoryがeldsthatgiveusaccesstoatranscendentworld.

OnMerleau-Ponty]saccount,hallucinationis oratleastislike aformofsensoryimagination:thetypeofperception-likementaleventthatinvolvesthinkingabouthowthingslook,sound,taste,orsmell,aswhenwevisualiseanappleor〉picturewiththemind]sear《thepealofchurchbells.Whereasperceptioninvolves〉gearinginto《theworldviathebody,wedonot〉gearinto《theworldinimagination.Whenwesensorily imagine something, the world does not provide the samekindoffrictionorresistancethatitprovideswhenweperceive:〉Imag-

inationiswithoutdepth;itdoesnotrespondtoourattemptstovaryourpointsofview;itdoesnotlenditselftoourobservation《(PP§§◎).≠♂

Hallucination is like imagination in this respect. Someone who hal-lucinates isnot 〉geared into《 theworld,but instead 〉fabricate[s] forhimself,withthedebrisofthisworld,anartiがcialmilieuconformingtothetotalintentionofhisbeing《(PP§★●).Hallucinatedobjectsarenotpartoftheinter-subjectivelyaccessibleworld,andassuchlackthe

〉depth《thatischaracteristicofrealobjects:〉Thehallucinatorythingisnotliketherealthing,packedwithlittleperceptionsthatsustainitinexistence《,anditisforthisreasonthatitisasif〉Thehallucinationisnotintheworld,butrather[infrontof]it《(PP§★★).Bothimaginationandhallucinationneverthelesspresupposeourbeing-in-the-world.Itis only because we are bodily subjects with sensory がelds who areembedded within the world that hallucination and imagination arepossible:

Theworldremainsthevagueplaceofallourexperiences.It accommodates, pell-mell, true objects as well as indi-vidualandきeetingfantasies becauseitisanindividualthatencompasseseverythingandnotacollectionofob-

jects linked together through causal relations. To havehallucinations and, in general, to imagine is to exploit

＊◎. Merleau-Pontydoesnotdiscussimaginationinmuchdetail,thoughitisclearfromwhathedoessay thathisviewof the imagination isat leastbroadlysimilartotheviewthatSartrepresentsinmoredetailinThe Imaginary(＊◇☆＆).


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＊●′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

The underlying problem with Intellectualist accounts of hallucina-

tion aproblemwhichIntellectualistaccountssharewithEmpiricistaccounts, because both are expressions of 〉Objective Thought《 isthattheyfailtoappreciatethehallucination]s〉ownmodeofcertaintyanditsimmanentsense《(PP§★＊).Thatis,theyfailtoaccountforthedistinctivephenomenalcharacterofactualhallucinations.

It might be suggested that Merleau-Ponty]s account of hallucina-

tionfacesaversionof the〉screeningoＨ《objectionthat isoften lev-

eled against contemporary forms of disjunctivism (cf. Martin ＠＆＆☆).Accordingtothe〉screeningoＨ《objection,ifwhateveroccurswhenwehallucinate also occurs when we veridically perceive, then the com-

monelementtohallucinationandperceptionthreatensto〉screenoＨ《fromtheexplanationofthephenomenalcharacterofveridicalpercep-

tualexperiencewhateverisuniquetothegoodcase;inparticular,itthreatenstorenderirrelevanttotheexplanationofthephenomenalcharacter of experience the subject]s relationship to mind-indepen-

dent objects, properties, and relations in the world. Assuming thatthereisacommonelementtohallucinationandperceptionthatissuf-がcient toaccount for thephenomenalcharacterofexperience, thenthis would establish the 〉common kind assumption《: that hallucina-

tionandperceptionarefundamentallythesamekindofmentalevent,contrarytoclaimofthedisjunctivist.ApplyingthislineofreasoninginMerleau-Ponty]scase,eventhoughperception(〉inthefullsense《)andhallucinationdiＨeressentially,botharetheresultofthe〉singleprimordialfunction《byvirtueofwhichwearrangearoundourselvesamilieu.Itmightbesuggestedthatthiscommonfunction〉screensoＨ《opennesstotheworldintheexplanationofthephenomenalcharacterofveridicalperceptualexperience.

Butitisnotclearthatthecommonfunctionunderlyingperceptionandhallucinationisbestthoughtofasacommonelementtopercep-

tionandhallucination.Instead,itcanbethoughtof consistentwithMerleau-Ponty]sclaimthatperceptionandhallucinationdiＨeressen-

tially asanenabling conditionforperceptionandhallucination.Itisinvirtueofthisprimordialfunctionthatperceptionandhallucination

phenomenalcharacterofanhallucinationthanitsbeingsubjectivelyindiscriminable from a veridical perceptual experience. AccordingtoFish (＠＆＆◇),hallucinations lackphenomenalcharacteraltogether,andhallucinatingsubjectsmerelyformmistakenhigher-orderbeliefsabout thephenomenalcharacterofhallucinations. (MartinandFishfocusprimarilyon〉causallymatching《hallucinationsthatareinprin-

cipleindistinguishable;moreonthesebelow.)Butnegative,relationalcharacterisationsofhallucinationareliabletoseemdissatisfying;itistemptingtoagreewithDancy(＊◇◇★)thatamoredirectcharacterisa-

tionofhallucinationinmentaltermsoughttobepossible.Theviewthathallucinationis,orislike,aformofimaginationprovidesawayforthedisjunctivisttogiveapositiveaccountofthenegativedisjunct,andtherebysatisfythisdesireforfurtherexplanation.

By identifying hallucinations with episodes of sensory imagin-

ing perception-like episodes with phenomenal character the dis-

junctivistcanprovideanaccountofwhyhallucinationsarenotdistin-

guishedfromveridicalperceptualexperienceincases inwhichtheyare not, without seemingly taking subjective indiscriminability forgranted(compareSiegel]s＠＆＆◎objectiontoMartin＠＆＆☆).Nordoesthisformofdisjunctivismreducehallucinationtofalsejudgment(likeFish＠＆＆◇).FromMerleau-Ponty]sperspective,thiskindofIntellectual-istaccountofhallucinationalsofalsiがesthephenomena.Peoplewhohallucinate do not, Merleau-Ponty claims, typically believe or judgethattheyareperceiving:

madmen do not believe they see or, so long as they arequestioned,theycorrecttheirdeclarationsonthispoint.Thehallucinationisnotarashjudgmentorbeliefforthesame reasons that prevent it from being a sensory con-

tent:judgmentorbeliefcouldonlyconsistinpositingthehallucination as true, and this is precisely what the pa-

tientsdonotdo.Onthelevelofjudgment,patientsdistin-

guishbetweenhallucinationandperception(PP§★＆′＊).


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＊◎′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

in principle indistinguishable from veridical perceptual experiences,becausetheirproximatecausesinthebrainareidenticaltothoseofcorrespondingveridicalperceptualexperiences.Suppose,forinstance,thatadevicecouldbeがttedtotheopticnervethatexactlyreproducesthesignalthatwouldbereceivedfromtheretinaiftheworldwereacertainwaythatitisnot.Wouldtheexperiencescausedbythisdevicebe of the same fundamental kind as those the subject would enjoyweretheycausedbythesceneinfrontofthem?Or,totakeamoreex-

tremecase,ifitwerepossibletostimulateanenvattedbrainintheap-

propriateways,wouldtheyhaveexperiencesofthesamefundamentalkindasanormalembodiedsubjectembeddedwithintheworld?

These purely hypothetical cases of 〉causally matching《 hallucina-

tionarecentraltopresentationsofthecausalargumentfromhalluci-nation in contemporary Anglophone philosophy of perception. TheargumentstartsfromtheclaimthattheproximatecausalconditionsinthebrainaresuＩcientfor(orがxthechancesof)theoccurrenceofaveridicalperceptualexperience,evenifthecandidateobjectofper-

ceptionisnotpresent.Giventheprinciplesame proximate cause, same immediate eＨect,itfollowsthatwhateverwouldhappenwhenwehallu-

cinateinthesecircumstanceswouldalsohappenwhenweveridicallyperceive.Assuming,inturn,thatthiscommoneＨectwould〉screenoＨ《whateveristruejustofthecaseinwhichweveridicallyperceive,thenasubject]sopennesstotheworldisrenderedirrelevanttotheexplana-

tionofthephenomenalcharacteroftheirexperience;andthiswouldestablishthecommonkindassumption.

ThisstrengthenedversionofthecausalargumentattemptstoblocktheMerleau-Pontianaccountbyenvisagingasituationinwhichtheproximate causes of perceptual experience in the brain generate ex-

periences that are indistinguishable in every respect from a veridi-calperceptualexperience.Theenvisagedsituation,however, isonewhose possibility Merleau-Ponty would deny. The causal argumentfromhallucinationdependsontheprinciplethatMartincalls〉Experi-entialNaturalism《:thatperceptualexperiencesare〉themselvespartofthenaturalcausalorder,subjecttobroadlyphysicalandpsychological

arepossible,butof itself thisprimordial functionisnotsuＩcienttoexplain the phenomenal character of a veridical perceptual experi-ence.Thesingleprimordialfunctionpartlydeterminesthenatureoftheworldthatisavailabletothesubject.AsMerleau-Pontysaysinex-

plaininghishesitationtodescribewhatheearliercallsthe〉intentionalarc《underpinningconsciouslifeintermsofasearchlight:

thecomparisontoasearchlightisnotagoodone,sinceit takes for granted the given objects upon which intel-ligence projects its light, whereas the core function weare speaking of here prior to making us see or knowobjects がrst more secretly brings them into existenceforus(PP＊§●).

ButtheoperationofthisprimordialfunctionisnotofitselfsuＩcienttodeterminethephenomenalcharacterofaparticularveridicalpercep-

tualexperience.Thisisdetermined,atleastinpart,bytheoperationofthegaze;andthis,inturn,dependsonwhethertheworldaＨordsexplorationbythegaze.

A second version of the 〉screening oＨ《 objection is that if hallu-

cinationalsoinvolvestakingtheworldtobeacertainway,thenthisrepresents a common element to perception and hallucination thatthreatens to 〉screen oＨ《 whatever else is uniquely true of veridicalperceptualexperience.Butthisdoesnotprovideacommonelementtoperceptionandhallucination that is suＩcient toexplain thephe-

nomenal characterofexperience,either.ForMerleau-Ponty there isalwaysaphenomenallydiscerniblediＨerencebetweenhallucinationand perception, and this is because perception involves 〉commercewithaharsh,resistant,andintractableworld《(PP§★◎)inawaythathallucinationdoesnot.Opennesstoatranscendentworldisnecessaryforthedistinctivekindofcontactorcommunionwithaninsurmount-ableplenitudethatveridicalperceptualexperienceinvolves.

A thirdobjection, followingon fromthis, is thatMerleau-Ponty]saccountdoesn]taddressthetypesofhallucinationsthataremostcom-

monlydiscussedinthephilosophicalliterature:hallucinationsthatare


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＊◇′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

Naturalismwarrantsfurtherdiscussion,butIwillsetthisasidehere.＜＝

ForthosenaïverealistswhowouldnotwanttofollowMerleau-PontyinrejectingExperientialNaturalism,itisworthnotingthattherejec-

tion of Experiential Naturalism is independent of Merleau-Ponty]sclaimthatphysicalactivityinthebrainandcentralnervoussystemisanenablingconditionofveridicalperceptualexperience.Itispossibletoacceptboth ExperientialNaturalismand theclaimthatprocessinginthebrainandcentralnervoussystemisanenablingconditionofve-

ridicalperceptualexperience,ifperceptualprocessingisanenablingconditionofanessentiallyrelationalexperiencethatiscausedbytheworldlystateofaＨairsthatpartlyconstitutesit(e.g.Kalderon＠＆＊＊a).Moreover,ExperientialNaturalismcanbeacceptedconsistentlywiththeviewthathallucinationisaformofsensoryimaginationif, inre-

sponsetothecausalargumentfromhallucination,theprinciplesame

proximate cause, same immediate eＨect does not hold where there areadditional conditions necessary for the occurrence of certain kindsofmentalevents: in thecaseofperception, thepresenceofamind-independentobject;andinthecaseofimaginationandhallucination,theabsenceofamind-independentobject(forfurtherdiscussion,seeAllen＠＆＊★).

5. Realism and Transcendental Naïve Realism

I have argued so far that Merleau-Ponty accepts interesting and dis-

tinctiveversionsofanumberofthekeytheoreticalcommitmentsofcontemporarynaïverealisttheoriesofperception.IwanttoconcludebypointingtoonewayinwhichMerleau-Ponty]stheoryofperceptionmaydiＨerimportantlyfromthenaïverealist]s,andbyhighlightingafurtherpossiblemeta-philosophicaldiＨerencebetweenMerleau-Pon-

ty]sapproachandthatofcontemporarynaïverealiststhatopensupanavenueforfurtherexploration.

＠＆.ExperientialNaturalismisoftenrejectedbyopponentsoftheCausalTheoryofPerceptionwithWittgensteiniansympathies(e.g.White＊◇○＊).Itisreject-edinadiＨerentwaybyStoneham(＠＆＆◎),whodeniesthatthereareexperi-encesatall.Forfurtherdiscussion,seeAllen(＠＆＊○:Chapter★).

causes《(Martin＠＆＆○:§★●).ThisprincipleisonethatMerleau-Pontyexplicitlyrejects;ashesaysincriticisingEmpiricistviewsofhallucina-

tion,forinstance,wecannotassumethat〉throughtheeＨectofcertainphysiologicalcauses,suchastheirritationofthenervouscentres,sen-

siblegivenswouldappearastheyappearinperception,throughtheactionofphysicalstimuliuponthesamenervouscentres《(PP§★＊).ForMerleau-Ponty,perceptualexperiencesdonotsupervenelocallyonasubject]sbrainstate,oreventhestateoftheircentralnervoussystemmore generally. The character of perceptual experience depends in-

steadonthenatureofthesubject]sentirebodyandtheenvironmentinwhichtheyareembedded.Thephysicalevents that takeplace inthebrainandcentralnervoussystemareatbestenablingconditionsofperceptualexperience;theymakeperceptualexperienceofthesub-

ject]s environment possible, without determining the nature of thatexperience. As Merleau-Ponty says in the Structure of Behaviour, wecannotunderstandthe〉sumofthenerveeventswhichareproducedineachpointof thecortex《as thecauseofexperience,since〉[t]hiswholecanbeonlythecondition of existenceofsuchandsuchasensiblescene; itaccounts for the fact that Iperceivebutnot for that which Iperceive《(SB＠＆○).Thatis,activityinthebrainandcentralnervoussystemcanexplaintheoccurrenceofperceptualexperiences,butweneedtoadvert tothings inthesubject]senvironmenttounderstandwhatthoseexperiencesareexperiencesof.

Merleau-Ponty]s rejection of Experiential Naturalism may be amanifestationofamorebroadlyidealisticoutlook;Iwillreturntothisbelow(see§★).ManycontemporarynaïverealistswouldbereluctanttofollowMerleau-Pontyinthisdirection.AsMartinexplains,Experi-entialNaturalismisawidelyaccepted〉methodologicalorregulativeassumption of both empirical work on sense experience and philo-

sophicaldiscussionof it《 (Martin＠＆＆○:n.◎); itdoesnotof itself in-

volveacommitmenttoanyformofreductivephysicalism,justtothemuchmoreminimalclaim thatexperiencesdonotstandoutsideofthe causal order. Whether naïve realists should accept Experiential


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＠＆′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

heappearstoretainsomethingofKant]sidealismabouttheperceivedworld.＜≠

Merleau-Pontyinsiststhatthingsintheworldtranscendparticularexperiencesofthem.Givenitsembodiedbasis,perceptualexperiencenecessarilyprovidesuswithonlyaperspectival, indeterminate,andambiguousholdonan 〉inexhaustible《world that lends itself 〉toaninがnite exploration《 (PP §§◎).＜＜ Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty thinksthatwecannotmakesenseofthingsindependentofall possibleexpe-

rienceofthem.ForMerleau-Ponty,theworldistranscendent,butnotwhatmightbecalledstronglymind-independent.This,forinstance,isthegrainoftruththatMerleau-PontythinksiscontainedwithinBerke-

ley]s〉MasterArgument《for(subjective)idealism:

The thing can never be separated from someone whoperceivesit;norcaniteveractuallybeinitselfbecauseitsarticulationsare theveryonesofourexistence,andbecauseitispositedattheendofagazeorattheconclu-

sionofasensoryexplorationthatinvestsitwithhuman-

ity(PP§§☆).

Itisnotjustthattheperceivedworldisprimaryintheepistemologicalsense thatourknowledgeof it comes, in theがrst instance, throughperception.Merleau-Pontyseemstosuggest,moreover, that theper-

ceivedworldenjoysakindofmetaphysicalprimacy:

To return to the things themselves is to return to thisworldpriortoknowledge,thisworldofwhichknowledgealwaysspeaks,andthisworldwithregardtowhichevery

＠＊. For furtherdiscussionofsimilaritiesbetweenMerleau-PontyandKant,seee.g.Gardner(＠＆＊★)andMatherne(＠＆＊○).

＠＠. Compare Merleau-Ponty]s discussion of his experience of his neighbour]shouse, which tries to steer a course between thinking of the house as be-

ing〉thehouseseenfromnowhere《andthefactthatperceptionisperspec-

tival.AsMerleau-Pontysays,foreshadowinghissubsequentdevelopmentofthispoint,thechallengeis〉tounderstandhowvisioncancomeaboutfromsomewherewithouttherebybeinglockedwithinitsperspective《(PP○◇).Forinsightfuldiscussion,seeMatherne(＠＆＊●).

Merleau-Ponty]s denial of Experiential Naturalism may be symp-

tomaticofabroadercontrastbetweenhisapproachandthatofmanycontemporary naïve realists: Merleau-Ponty]s approach, at least inPhenomenology of Perception,appearstobebroadlyidealistic inawaycontemporaryformsofnaïverealismtendnottobe.Thismayinturnberelated,atleastcontingently,totheparticularmeta-philosophicalattitudethatMerleau-Pontyadoptstowardshistheoryofperception:totheextentthatheacceptsanaïverealisttheoryofperception,Mer-

leau-Ponty]sviewcanbedescribedasacceptingaformoftranscenden-

tal naïve realism.Merleau-Ponty is working in the post-Kantian tradition, and like

Husserlbeforehim,heseesphenomenologyasaformoftranscenden-

talenquiry.This involves,ataminimum, identifying transcendentalconditions that provide 〉how possible《 explanations of phenomenalikeourexperienceoftheworld;asMerleau-PontysaysontheveryがrstpageofthePrefacetoPhenomenology,phenomenologyis〉atran-

scendentalphilosophy that suspends theaＩrmationsof thenaturalattitudeinordertounderstandthem《(PPlxx).ForMerleau-Ponty,thelived-bodyrepresentsa transcendentalconditionofperception; thisiswhyhesays intheIntroductiontoPartTwoofthePhenomenology of Perception that〉[t]hetheoryofthebodyisalreadyatheoryofper-

ception《(PP＠＆◇).Thelived-bodyplaysaroleroughlyanalogoustoKant]stranscendentalEgo.ForKant,theobjectivecharacterofpercep-

tion thefactthatitisexperienceofanindependentworld ispossi-bleinvirtueoftheunityofthetranscendentalsubjectanditscapacitytoorderrepresentationsusinga prioriconceptsoftheunderstanding.ForMerleau-Ponty,thelived-bodyplaysabroadlysimilarexplanatoryrole:thebody〉isintheworldjustastheheartisintheorganism:itcontinuouslybreathes life intothevisiblespectacle,animates itandnourishes it fromwithin,and formsasystemwith it《 (PP＠＆◇),andperceptionofanindependentworldispossiblebecausetheunityoftheobjectisexperiencedas〉thecorrelateoftheunityofourbody《(PP

＠＊＆).Merleau-PontyrejectstheexistenceofKant]stranscendentalEgo,andcorrespondingly theKantianworldof things-in-themselves;but


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＠＊′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

cerebrallesions,likethatsuＨeredbySchneider candramaticallyaf-fectthe〉phenomenal《bodyanditsrelationtotheworld.AccordingtoMerleau-Ponty,thisproblemissymptomaticofthefactthatinthePhenomenology hestartsfromthe〉consciousness《-〉object《distinction,renderingtheproblemsheconsidersthere〉insoluble《(July＊◇★◇,VI ＠＆＆).BecausethedistinctionissoheavilyembeddedwithinthePhe-

nomenology¨initsstructure,argument,andlanguage¨Merleau-Pontyisultimatelyunabletoescapethedualisticframeworkthatheattemptstoovercome(cf.Barbaras＠＆＆☆:§�＊◇).Hetriestoaddressthisprobleminhislaterworkthroughtheintroductionofthe〉きesh《,the〉element《or〉incarnateprinciple《ofwhicheverythingpartakes(VI ＊§◇),andbyreconceivingofthephenomenalandtheobjectivenotastwo〉sides《,

〉leaves《,or〉layers《,butasintertwined,liketheobverseandreverse,orliketwosegmentsofacircle(VI＊§●�◎).

WhetherMerleau-Ponty]sattemptstoovercometheproblemsthatariseforthePhenomenologyaresuccessfulisnotsomethingIwillcon-

siderhere;norwillIconsidertherelatedquestionoftowhatextentMerleau-Ponty]slaterworkdiＨerssubstantivelyfromhisearlierwork.＜≧

Instead,Iwanttoclosebybrieきyhighlightinganavenueforfurtherexploration that the consideration of Merleau-Ponty]s theory of per-

ceptionhelps todisclose: thepossibilityofunderstandingthenaïverealisttheoryofperceptionasatranscendentaltheoryofperception.

Contemporary naïve realist theories of perception are often pre-

sentedasonephilosophicaltheoryofperceptionamongstothers,tobedefendedbyinferencetothebestexplanation,andtobeassessedonthebasisofacost-beneがtanalysisthatweighsperformancealonganumberofdiＨerentdimensions:forinstance,がdelitytoappearances,simplicity,systematicity,がtwithscientiがctheories,andsoon.Onthisview,naïverealismisaphilosophicaltheoryofthesamebasickindas,andindirectcompetitionwith, intentionalistandsense-datumtheo-

ries.Comparedtothesealternatives,naïverealismisgenerallyconsid-

eredtobethephilosophicaltheoryofperceptionthatbestarticulates

＠★. Seee.g.Dillon＊◇◇●:◎★(andfollowing)forsomediscussion.

scientiがcdeterminationisabstract,signitive,anddepen-

dent(PPlxxii).＜＞

ThisisnottosaythatforMerleau-Pontytherearetwoworlds,thephe-

nomenalandtheobjective,suchthatthelatterdependsmetaphysical-lyupontheformer.NorisMerleau-Pontybestunderstoodasclaimingthatthe〉objectiveworld《isunreal(cf.PrP§★).Butheatleastseemstothinkthatscientiがcdescriptionsoftheworldareabstractionsfromlivedexperiencethatnecessarilydistortitslivedcharacter(cf.Dillon＊◇◇●:◎○′◇§).

To the extent that Merleau-Ponty]s view in the Phenomenology isa form of idealism, Merleau-Ponty cannot naturally be described asacceptinganaïverealist theoryofperception;atbesthemaybesaidtosharesomeof thenaïverealist]scoretheoreticalcommitments. Itis controversial, however, whether Merleau-Ponty]s view in the Phe-

nomenologyreallyis oratanyrate,oughttobe aformofidealism.＜≦

CommentingonthePhenomenology, Beaufret,forexample,claimsthatMerleau-Ponty]s main problem is that he has not been 〉suＩcientlyradical《, because (following Husserl) his phenomenological descrip-

tions〉retainthevocabularyofidealism《,evenifphenomenologyitself,whenfullydeveloped,mayrequire〉theabandonmentofsubjectivityandthevocabularyofsubjectiveidealism《(PrP☆＊′＠).Certainlythein-

timationofidealisminthePhenomenology seemstobesomethingthatMerleau-Pontyhimselfbecamedissatisがedwith.Ashesaysinwork-

ingnotesforthelater(posthumouslypublished)workThe Visible and

the Invisible,ifweaccepttheviewoftherelationshipbetweenthephe-

nomenalandtheobjectivesuggestedinthePhenomenology,thenwecannotunderstandhowfactsaboutthe〉objective《body forinstance,

＠§. SeealsoMerleau-Ponty]sclaimthat〉thebody asachemicalstructureoracollectionoftissues isformedthroughaprocessofimpoverishmentbegin-

ningfromaprimordialphenomenonofthebody-for-us《(PP§○●).

＠☆. AndinsofarasMerleau-Pontyisanidealist,itisalsocontroversialwhetherthis is necessarily problematic. Compare, for example, Pihlström]s descrip-

tionofthe〉idealistobjection《totheuseoftranscendentalargumentsasanoxymoron(＠＆＆☆:§＊＆,n.＊＠).


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＠＠′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

Merleau-Ponty]sdiscussionofperceptionsuggestsoneformthatatranscendentalnaïverealisttheoryofperceptioncantake.Ratherthanseeingthenaïverealisttheoryofperceptionasthatwhichprovidesthebestexplanationofthephenomenologicalcharacterofexperience,forexample,a transcendentalnaïve realist canuse thephenomenologi-calcharacterofexperienceasapremissinatranscendentalargumentfornaïverealism:perceptualexperienceputsusintocontactwithourenvironment,anditisaconditionofthepossibilityofperceptualex-

perienceputtingusintocontactwithourenvironmentthatperceptualexperienceisessentiallyrelational.Itisnotjustthatthisaspectofthephenomenologicalcharacterofexperienceisbestexplainedbythena-

ïverealisttheoryofperception;itwouldnotbepossibleifnaïvereal-ismwerefalse.＜♂

Inturn,atranscendentalnaïverealistcanfollowMerleau-Pontyinarguingthatthepossibilityofperceptualexperiencebeingessential-lyrelationalisitselfgroundedinthedistinctivenatureofperceivingsubjects:thatit isaconditionofthepossibilityofbeingconsciouslyacquaintedwithobjectsinourenvironmentthatweareourselvesem-

bodiedsubjects,embeddedintheworld.Werewenotbodilysubjects

Merleau-Pontyhimselfdivergesfrom or,asheseesit,developstoitslogicalconclusion theKantianviewthattranscendentalphilosophyinvolvesiden-

tifyinga prioritranscendentalconditionsinsofarashethinksitisnecessarytoreinterpretthetraditionalnotionofthea priori.ForMerleau-Ponty,thereisnodistinctioninkindbetweenthea prioriandthea posteriori:theyare〉truthsonthesamelevel《,anddiＨertotheextentthat〉[t]hea priori is thefactasunderstood,madeexplicit,andfollowedthroughintoalloftheconsequencesofitstacitlogic;thea posterioriistheisolatedandimplicitfact《(PP＠§＆).NordoestranscendentalphilosophyforMerleau-Pontyinvolveidentifyingneces-

saryconditionsasthesearenormallyunderstood,either:〉Humanexistencewillleadustorevisitourusualnotionofnecessityandcontingency,becausehumanexistenceisthechangeofcontingencyintonecessitythroughtheactoftakingup《(PP＊●☆).

＠◎.Otherarguments fornaïverealismcanalsobecastas transcendentalargu-

ments:forinstance,perhapsconsciousacquaintancewithourenvironmentisaconditionofthepossibilityofdemonstrativereferencetoobjects(cf.Camp-

bell＠＆＆＠),knowledgeofwhatobjectsarelike(cf.Logue＠＆＊＠),or(combin-

inganaïverealisttheoryofperceptionwithanaïverealisttheoryofcolour)the qualitative character of conscious experience (cf. Fish ＠＆＆◇, Kalderon＠＆＊＊a,Allen＠＆＊○).

thephenomenologicalcharacterofexperience.Butoneofthepressingchallengesforthenaïverealistatthispointistoexplainwhyがdelitytotheappearancesshouldbeaccordedanyparticularprivilegeindecid-

ingbetweencompetingphilosophicaltheoriesofperception.Atbest,itmightbesuggestedthatrespectingtheappearancesisoneconsider-

ationamongstmany,whichprovidesadefeasiblereasonforacceptingaphilosophicaltheoryofperception,butwhichcanbeoutweighedbytheoreticalcostsorbeneがtselsewhere;atworstitmightbesuggestedthatrespectingtheappearancesisnotarelevantconsiderationatall,anymorethanitwouldbe ifweweretryingtoexplainwhypeoplebelieveinghosts.＜∞

Whenviewedfromatranscendentalperspective,however,thena-

ïverealisttheoryofperceptiontakesonadiＨerentcast.Likenaïvereal-ism,transcendentalnaïverealismisaphilosophicaltheoryofpercep-

tion:thetranscendentalattitudeisnotsupposedtobeanattitudethatweordinarilyornaïvelyadopt,butisadistinctivemeta-philosophicalattitudethatwecanadopttowardsaphilosophicaltheorylikenaïverealism.Broadlyspeaking,thetranscendentalnaïverealistwillnotseenaïverealismsimplyasonephilosophicaltheoryofperceptionamongothers.Rathertheywillseeitashavingaspecialstatusamongstphilo-

sophicaltheoriesofperception;indeedtheyarelikelytoseeitasbe-

ing,insomesense,immunetofalsiがcation.Viewedfromthetranscen-

dentalperspective,naïverealismispartofthetranscendentalprojectofexplaininghowitispossible thatperceptualexperiencehasthedis-

tinctivecharacteristicsthatitdoes.AlthoughtherearediＨerentwaysofunderstandingexactlywhatthisinvolves,itislikelytoinvolvesome,orall,of the following:using transcendentalarguments, identifyingtranscendentalconditionsforthepossibilityofperceptualexperiencehavingthedistinctivecharacteristicsthatitdoes,andaccordinganes-

sentialroletosubjectsandsubjectivity.＜∴

＠○.Foraversionofthiskindofobjection,seee.g.HawthorneandKovakovich(＠＆＆○:＊◎＆).

＠●. For further discussion of what, if anything, is common to all manifesta-

tions of transcendental philosophy, see e.g. Pihlström (＠＆＆☆). Note that


やふへみもらもやふのよら]へむやよへめり ′＠§′ れもみ.＊◇,めも.＠(ほなめるなよん＠＆＊◇)

Bibliography

The works of Merleau-Ponty are referred to using the followingabbreviations:

PP Phenomenology of Perception,＊◇☆☆.TranslatedbyD.Landes.London:Routledge,＠＆＊§.

PrPThe Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences,＊◇☆●.InJ.Edie(ed.)andW.Cobb(trans.),The Primacy of Perception.Evanston,IL:NorthwesternUniversityPress,＊◇○☆.

SNS Sense and Non-sense, ＊◇☆◎. Translated by H.L. Dreyfus and P.A.Dreyfus.Evanston,IL:NorthwesternUniversityPress,＊◇◇＠.

SoBThe Structure of Behaviour,＊◇☆＠.TranslatedbyA.L.Fisher.Boston:BeaconPress,＊◇○§.

VI The Visible and the Invisible,＊◇○☆.TranslatedbyA.Lingis.Evanston,IL:NorthwesternUniversityPress,＊◇○◎.

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