Metaphysics, Theological Language, and the … Theological Language, and the Postmodern Turn A...

Metaphysics,TheologicalLanguage,andthePostmodernTurn

AthesissubmittedtoCharlesSturtUniversityfortheDegreeofMTh(Hons)

by

RobertAnderson

BTh,MTh

December2016

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Abstract:Jean-LucMarion’sGodwithoutBeingandKevinHector’sTheology

withoutMetaphysicsarebothconcernedwiththeproblemsofthemetaphysical

traditionconcerninglanguage,knowledge,transcendence,anddifference.Their

proposedsolutionstotheproblemsofmetaphysicspresupposetheirown

traditions,CatholicandProtestantrespectively.Marionattainsavantagepoint

independentofmetaphysically-determinedrealitybyinterpretingtheEucharist

asaportalbetweentranscendentrealityandtheworldofdifference.Hectorsees

conceptsasauthorisedbythepracticesoftheChristiancommunity.Iarguethat

thesetwoapproachesdonotsolvetheproblemsofmetaphysicsbutonlyconceal

thembehindthelanguageofreligioustradition.

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TableofContents

Introduction.....................................................................................................................................4

Chapter1TheologicalLanguageandthePostmodernTurn......................................8

Chapter2Jean-LucMarionandaCatholicPostmodernTheory...........................32

Chapter3KevinHectorandaProtestantTherapeuticTheory.............................94

Conclusion...................................................................................................................................150

Bibliography...............................................................................................................................152

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bycolleagueswithwhomIhaveworkedatCharlesSturtUniversityorelsewhere

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Introduction

IhavechosentwonarrativessituatedwithintheChristianmeta-narrativeaskey

examplestosupportmythesis.ThefirstisthatofMarion’sGodwithoutBeingand

Hector’sTheologywithoutMetaphysics;thesewritersarebothconcernedwith

humanity’sabilitytocommunicatewithGod,giventheviolenceofourlanguage,

yettheirsuggestedsolutionsdisplaytheirownpersuasions,Catholicand

Protestantrespectively.

Marion’spolemicisbasedonthepropositionthatGodconsidershumanlanguage

asidolatrous.YetatbottomMarion’sconcernemergesfromHeidegger’s

discourseonthecritiqueofmetaphysicswhichhe(Heidegger)deconstructsto

noteonlytwotrajectories,ontologicalandtheological,andwhichhewentonto

callonto-theology.Onto-theologyhoweverhaditsinceptioninthesingular

philosophicalcategoryof“thebeingofbeings”.InhisworkMarionwillinstitute

PseudoDionysius’critiqueofidolsfromtheChristianmysticaltraditionto

mirrorHeidegger’scritiqueandletitreflectbackontotheologyproper.The

resultisthatHeidegger’sphilosophicalcategoryofthe“thebeingofbeings”

becomessublatedintoamoretheologicallydeterminedterminthatoftheidol.

YetMarion’sstyleandlanguageremainsuniquelyphenomenologicalsincehe

utilizesittotranslateanddescribethereligiousconceptsofidolandicon.

AlthoughPseudoDionysius’negativetheologycanbeinterpretedto

counterbalanceaffirmativetheology,Marion’simplementationofitistoinitiatea

wayoutofidolatrywhichhewillattempttoachievethroughtheChristian

Eucharisticevent.Thiseventthenbecomestheonlywayoutofthisidolatry,the

onlyiconicspaceforproper(non-idolatrous-affirmative)theology,andtheonly

spaceforanyauthenticexperience(non-idolatrousmysticaltheology)withthe

trueChristianGod.

Hector’sworkrevealsanacceptanceofMarion’scritiquethatlanguageis

inherentlyviolentbuthistrajectorycomesfromaslightlydifferentdirection.The

Westernmetaphysicaltraditionunderstandslanguageinawaywhichwas

carriedoverintoPatristicChristianityfromitsneo-PlatonicoriginsbyAugustine

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ofHippo.Thiswayofunderstandingseeslanguageashavinganinnerword

whichiscontainedinspokenandwrittenwords.ThiscanbeseeninHector’s

understandingofthetermmetaphysicswhichhegoesontodescribeashaving

twomainfeatures.

Oneofthesefeaturesisthatofessentialism(innerword)whereitgivesapicture

accordingtowhichanobject’sultimaterealityisidentifiedwithareal,idea-like

essence,andyetstandsataremovefromordinaryexperience.Thelatermay

cometoseeminferior.Sincemetaphysicsunderstandsthatfundamentalreality

(innerword)isthusthoughttostandapartfromexperience(externalwords),

accordingtoHectoratleastitmustfollowthathumanknowersareseveredfrom

thisfundamentalreality.Hectorgoesontoclaimthatoncethesefeatureshave

beenmadeexplicititiseasytoseewhyonewouldwanttoavoidmetaphysics

sinceitseemsalienating,violent,andidolatrous.

Theotherfeatureiscorrespondentismwhichistheideautilizedtobridgeagap

thatsupposedlyopensupbetweenaninnerwordanditstransferintoexternal

words.Theonlywaytobridgethisgap,Hectorthinks,istoacceptthatourideas

andwordsareacorrespondenceofsuchrealityyettoallowourideas(inner

word)tobesmoothedout(receivetherapy)tobetterreflectareligious

community’sdesignatedusage(externalwords)ofthem.

Thisthesiswillimplementthepostmodernmethodofdifferencetodestabilize

Marion’sinterpretationofHeidegger’sintentionalaiminhiscritiqueof

metaphysics.SincethiscritiqueisdeflectedontoPseudoDionysius’negative

theologyinhiscritiqueofidolsthisalsowillbedestabilizedintheprocess.The

finalresultwillseeMarion’sonlyfoundationdestabilizedsinceitisonethathas

aGod’seyeviewofhumanlanguageasbeingidolatrous.Mythesiswill

demonstratethatthereisnoGod’seyeviewonlanguage.Itwilldisclosea

postmodernperspectiveofshowinguptheprincipleofdifference.Howeverin

keepingwiththepostmodernmethoditwillnotdeterminewhetherMarion’sor

Hector’sviewsarecorrectorincorrectbutwillonlydirectlyandindirectly

supportapostmodernperspectiveofdifference.

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Mostoftheresearch,fromwhichMarion’sandHector’spositionsareconsidered,

willbepresentedinchapter1.Myaccountwillalsoresemblesomeapproaches

employedbycontinentalthinkers(Kearney1984).Abriefanalysisoftheterm

postmodernismwillalsoberequiredfollowedupbyashorthistoryand

discussionofthosemovementsthatareconsideredpostmodern,andthiswill

produceaprincipleuponwhichmostpostmoderninterpretationsarethoughtto

rest.Aninterpreter’sacceptanceofthisprinciplewillautomaticallycreatea

furtherprocesswhichwillparadoxicallyattachitselftoitsunderbelly.Theco-

regencyofthisprincipleideaanditsprocesswillcontinuallycirculateto

produce,maintain,andstrengtheneachoftheother’sfooting.

Aninterpreter’scontinuedpracticeofcirculationfromprincipletoprocessand

processtoprinciplewillbuildupasentimentthatcanbeconsidered

postmodern.Thisattitudewillalsooutworkitselfininterpretationsthatwillbe

consideredpostmodern.Suchanattitudewillexpressitselfwiththeword

“perhaps”.Thisopen-stanceattitudewillnotresistorapprovephilosophicalor

theologicaltextsortheirpropositionalstatementsbutitsaimisonlyto

disseminate2.Discussionsofstructuralism,metaphysics,Christendom,

philosophicalandtheologicalrelations,andapproachestothebiblicaltextwill

furtherdemonstratethispostmodernprincipleofshowingdifferenceyetitwill

alsorecognizethatanysuchmethodisultimatelydecideduponbyaninterpreter

(Caputo2006,49).Itwillthereforedemonstratethatthepostmodern

fundamentalconceptofdifferenceisanauthenticwaytodestabilizeMarion’s

andHector’sstanceinregardtolanguagebeinginherentlyviolentandthus

idolatrous.

2StevenShakespeare,DerridaandTheology(London:T&TInternational,2009),119.Caputo’sprincipleofdisseminationcanbetracedbacktoDerridawhodiscoversthisprincipleofdisseminationinhisinterpretationofthe“confusionoflanguages”inthestoryoftheTowerofBabel.“Onthesurface,thisnarrative,inwhichthesovereignGodpunisheshiscreaturesfortheirprideintryingtoreachuptotheheavensandknockhimoffhisthrone.Bydispersinghumanityandmultiplyingtheirtongues,God’sownpropernamehasbeendividedanddisseminated:Andthefirstwarthathedeclareshasfirstragedwithinhisname:divided,bifid,ambivalent,polysemic:Goddeconstructing.TheGodofthetextstillbearswithinhisnameapaganplurality(Letusdescend...)andtheeffectofscatteringhumanityisalsotomakethetranslationofGod’snameandnatureunavoidable”.

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Chapter1:

TheologicalLanguageandthePostmodernTurn

Postmodernism

Caputotracesthedevelopmentsthathaveledtoa“postmodernturn”(Caputo

2006,48).HecommenceswithHeidegger’shermeneuticalturn,theviewthat

“wecannevergetoutofourskinsandlookdownuponourselvesfromabove”

andso“shouldrealizethatweareintruthshapedbythepresuppositionswe

inherit”(Caputo2006,49).Itishavingsuchpresuppositionsthatdetermineour

perspectiveontheworldasitpresentsitselftousinthe“hereandnow”

(Shakespeare2009,27).

NextCaputoidentifiesWittgenstein’slinguisticturn,theviewthatthereisno

suchthing“asapure,private,pre-linguisticsphere”(Caputo2006,45).Lastlyhe

identifiesKuhnasinstrumentalina“revolutionaryturn”citinghis(Kuhn’s)

perspectiveonthematter;“scientiststrustandworkunderoverarching

frameworks”or“paradigms”(quotedinCaputo2006,47).AccordingtoCaputo,

Kuhnwascoming“againsttheEnlightenmentcamp”whothoughtthatobjectivity

“wassomesortofeternalknowledge”(Caputo2006,47).Thehermeneutical

turn,thelinguisticturn,andtherevolutionaryturncanbedescribed,Caputo

argues,as“thecollectiveideathathumanthinkingturnsontheabilitytomove

amongshiftingperspectives,vocabularies,andparadigms”(Caputo2006,48).

Theresultingpostmodernturnisanattempttomovebeyondtheperceived

problemsofEnlightenmentreductionism.TheresultiswhatLyotarddescribed

as“incredulitytowardsmeta-narratives”(Lyotard1984,1).LaterinhisbookThe

PostmodernConditionheextendedthisdefinitionto“therejectionofanymeta-

narrative,3anygrandtheoryofGodortheAbsolute,Eternalforms,Universal

history,orBeinginitselfwhichissupposedtobetrueforalltimesandfrom

everyperspective”(Lyotard1984,344).

3Jean-FrancoisLyotard,ThePostmodernCondition(1984)Minnesota,MinnesotaUniversityPress,29.“Thisisanarrativeaboutnarrativesofhistoricalmeaning,experienceorknowledge,whichoffersasocietylegitimationthroughtheanticipatedcompletionofa(asyetrealized)masteridea.”

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Therejectionofmeta-narrativescanbeseenintheology.DavidFordarguesthat

thishasledtoa“renewedattitudetowardmysteryintheChristianfaith,”linked

toconceptslike“gift”,“otherness”,“theimpossible”,and“messianity”(D.F.Ford

2007,345).Thetheologicallandscapehaschangedtodisplayavarietyof

complexpostmodernideas.Thisofferstheologians,aswellasphilosophers,a

“varietyofpolyvalentapproachestowhathasbeencalledthepolyphonyin

Christianrevelation”(Kristiansen2013,5).

Post-StructuralismandDeconstruction4

Jensen,inrecountingthehermeneuticaltradition,retracesdeconstruction’s

beginningsbackthroughpost-structuralismtostructuralismandultimatelyto

eachoftheirunderstandingsoflanguage.Hesituateshisoverviewindiscussions

thatinvolvethedefinitionsofopenandclosedsigns.Henotesthatthesehad

emergedfromaclosedsignsystem(asinstructuralism)butheassociatesthem

withanopensignsystemandnotesthatthedistinctionbetweenthetwocan

producesomeverydifferentperspectives.HebeginswithitsfounderFerdinard

deSaussure(1857–1913)whoinfluencedmanyFrenchthinkersduringandafter

theSecondWorldWaruntilthe1970s.Thissystemwassubsequentlyreplaced

bypost-structualistanddeconstructionistideas.Althoughhedoesnotpinpoint

anexacttimeinhistoryforsuchatransitionfromstructuralismto

postmodernismheidentifiesrepresentativepostmodernthinkerssuchasRoland

Barthes(1915–80),JacquesDerrida(1930–2004),andMichelFoucault(1926–

84).

Thefollowingwillnotbeare-tellingofJensen’sentireaccountbutwillreferto

pointsthroughouthisaccountthatwillservetoshowhisunderstandingofsuch

opensignsystemsinclusiveofexamplesandcriticisms.Itwillserveasawayof

understandingthemainideasthatledtoapostmodernunderstandingof4StevenShakespeare,DerridaandTheology(NewYork:T&TClarkeInc.2009),24.“DerridaoriginallycoinedthetermasatranslationofHeidegger’sAbbau(quarrying,dismantlingordecomposing),asynonymforDestruktionwhichHeideggerlaterhyphenatedandemployedinordertoemphasizethatDestruktionisnotmerelyanegativeact,aZerstorung,butrathermustbeunderstoodstrictlyasde-struere[theLatinstrueremeanstolay,pile,orbuild],ab-abauen[quiteliterally,un-buildingorde-construction]”.

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language.Astructualist’sforemostintentionwastostudythelanguageinandfor

itself.YetJensenstatesthat“conventionallylanguagewasoriginallystudiedin

ordertofinditsresultantreferent”(Jensen2007,237),whichinadditionmay

“possiblyliebehind,within,orinfrontofthetext”(McKenzie1999,55).

InanycaseitwasSaussurewhopositedthatthebestapproachtostudylanguage

wasasaself-containedsystem.Therewasreallynoneedtomountasearchfor

anyextrareferentthatmayexistoutsidethelanguagesystemitself,sincehehad

adducedthatmeaningwhichisproducedbyitsreference/sdoesnotlayoutside

itselfbutisultimatelyproducedbydifferencesthatonlylaywithinit.Thisisin

contrasttoBarth’s“wordofGod”whichcanbeseenasreferringtosomething

outsidethesystem;suchanunderstandingalsoalignsitselfwiththeWestern

hermeneuticaltraditionwhichseesthe“referentoftheinnerwordoutsidethe

textyetthatitwasencapsulatedintheexternalvisualwordsofthetext”

(Hegstad2004,21).

Thisearlystructualistsystemisanabstractformalsystemoflanguageonwhich

thespeakerdrawsinordertospeak.Forthemtomakesenseofitwillrequire

notingthedifferencebetweenonegivensigntothatofitsopposite,ortothatof

itsneighboringone,ortobothatthesametime.Forexamplethecolororangeis

notdefinedbyitsorange-nessbutinitsoppositiontoredandyellow.Againthe

signmothercanonlybedeterminedwhenitisshowntobeinoppositionto

anothersignsuchasfatherand/orchild.Itisthesystemthenthatbecomesthe

onlydeterminantthatcandecideonanyofthespecificmeaningsreferredtoby

anyofitsinternalsigns(Jensen2007,236-240).

Thisledtoanassumptionthatlanguage(theexternalword)istheonly

mechanismthatwillproducementalconceptsofthought(theinnerword).Since

conceptscanonlybeconceivedfromlanguage,itistheyalonethatwill

determinethewayinwhichweperceivetheexternalworld.Onewouldthink

thatlanguagemustconstructanddevelopallitsownstructuralscaffoldswithin

thehumanmindaswellasallitsassociatedmeanings,andthatitisthesethat

direct,store,andcategorizeallfurtherpossibilities.Fromablankslatethenthe

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infanthumanpsycheisdevelopedthroughtheconstructoflanguage.Hencethe

saying,“languagewasnotmadeformanbutmanforlanguage”(Labron2009,

278).

Incontrasttothisparadigm,previoushermeneuticalperspectivessuchasthose

ofSchleiermacher,HeideggerandGadamerhadacceptedthesubjectivepremise

thataneternalinnerwordexistsinexternalwords(Jensen2007,16).Whatsuch

hermeneuticalthinkerssawastheirtaskwastorecovertheinnerword(Hector

2011,34)andtherebytogainitspureeternalmeaning.Theirdecisiontoaccept

thisviewoflanguagebroughtwithitmanyothercommitments,notleastthe

understandingthatalossoccursinthetransferoftheinnerwordtoexternal

speechandwriting,resultingin“theseexternalwrittenwords”beingseen“only

asinferiorcontainersthathousedasuperioressenceorspirit”(Jensen2007,62-

63).Writtenwordscontainthetruereferent,aninnerword(logos),inmuchthe

samewaythatthehumanbodycontainsitsspirit.Yetitwasthisinternalessence

thatwasconsideredthesuperiorofthetwo.Anditisfromsuchaviewof

languagethatanentiretraditionemerged.Themetaphysicaltraditionpresents

itsunderstandingoflanguageasontological(Walsh1966,24-25),anexternal

encasementcontaininganinternalandeternallivingessence.

ThisontologicalunderstandingoriginatesinthephilosophicalideasofPlato.It

washewhoproposedthatthemindhousedaneternalparadigmofformsand

thatthesehadlefttheirreflectiononourempiricalworld.Thisparadigmisthe

trueformofrealityandnotaninferiorempiricalcopy.Thisunderstandingis

beautifullypresentedbyPlato’scaveallegory(Plato2011,54-56).Jenseninhis

accountnodsinagreementtotheimportancethatAugustineplacedonthe

humanmemorywhich,Augustinebelieved,storedall“ourperceptionsand

emotionswhichwehadhadinourlife”.Thisunderstandinghadalsobeen

includedinhisChristiansystemwhichJensenclaimshadbeen“importedfrom

theneo-Platonicsystem”(Jensen2007,17).Suchanunderstandingalsosees

memoryasacontainer,butherememorycontainsperceptionsandemotions

insteadofPlato’sforms.Yetitstillfollowsthatsincetheseidealperceptionsand

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emotionsaredispersedintotheexternalworldtheymustbeconsideredsuperior

totheirinferiorlanguagecontainers.Itmustalsofollowthatthepuremeaningof

ourperceptionsandemotionslosesomeoftheirforceinthisdispersion.Suchan

understandingoflanguagewillgoontoplayanimportantpartindetermining

themovementofunderstandingasitreferstoasign’sexternalreferent.

Forthemoment,though,theimportantpointisthatthehermeneuticaltradition

andthestructualistsystemseemtoagreethat“thewayinwhichweinterpretthe

worldisusuallydeterminedbythewayinwhichweunderstandlanguage”

(Jensen2007,59).Thehermeneuticaltraditionpresupposeslanguagesignsas

containerswhosetaskistorecoveraneternalinnerwordalongwithits

meaning,whereasthestructualistismore“interestedinlanguageasasystem

withoutnecessarilyconsideringanyexternalreference/meaning(Jensen2007,

237).Laterthinkersconsideredthatlanguagehadthepriorityindeterminingall

themind’sstructuresandmentalconcepts;inthiswaytheydifferedfromthe

hermeneutictradition’sunderstandingwhichsawmemoryasastorehouseof

alreadygiveneternalforms,oremotionsandperceptions,fromwhichspoken

andwrittenlanguagearederived.

JensennotesthatSaussure’sstructualistsystemwasappliedtothreedifferent

disciplines.ThisbeganwithLevi-Strausswhoinitiallyimplementeditto

understandearlyhumantribalmythsandcustoms,yetwhenhefoundthatthese

gaveupsomeoftheunderlyingandfundamentalelementstotheirstructurehe

wentontousethesetohelpdeviseauniversal“mythologicalvocabulary”

(Jensen2007,239).Hedeterminedavocabularybyarticulatingfourcategories

usingtheOedipusmythashistestcase,anditwasfromherethatherigorously

devisedhismythicalvocabulary.Thisvocabularywasthenimplementedasa

paradigmtointerpretallmythologicaltexts.Yetwhathediscoveredwasthat

mythsrespondbettertoadeeperlevelofinterpretationthantheliteral.

Levi-Straussfurtherutilizedthestructuralistparadigmtointerpretearly

“customs,kingshipsystems,andfoodlaws”(Jensen2007,240).Hisaimwasto

unearththedeepstructuresinthesepracticesandfoundthattheydisclosedeven

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deeperstructuresinthehumanmind.Itisfromthestrategyofdredgingthathe

identifiedtheirpurposesinthedevelopmentofhumancommunities,even

concludingthatwithoutsuchstructures“humansocietywouldnothavebeenat

allpossible”(Jensen2007,242).Thetwostructuralelementshehighlighted

werethoseof“contradictionandopposition”(Jensen2007,242)andhebelieved

thatitwastheseelementsthatreallylaydeepbeneaththebasicstructureofour

worldseeninthe“tellingofmyths,establishingkinshipstructures,andtothe

makingoftotems”(Jensen2007,242).

InDerrida’sinterpretation,Levi-Strauss“wantstoovercometheolddivision

betweennatureandculture.Thekeyfactaroundwhichhedisputesthevalidity

ofthedistinctionistheincestprohibitionwhichseemstobebothuniversaltoall

societiesandthereforenaturalbutatthesametimeisstillaprohibitionorlaw

andthereforecultural”(Shakespeare2009,52).Atthebottomofthisdebate

then,accordingtoDerrida,isacontradiction.Thetellingofmyths,the

establishingofkinshipstructuresandthemakingoftotemsprovedtobevery

helpfultoourearlypredecessorsincomingtotermswiththevarious

contradictionsandoppositionswhichwerealreadyapartoftheirdailylives.

AligningJensen’sdefinitionofanopensignsystemwithLevi-Strauss’discovery

meansthattextsonlyreflectwhattheirwritershadalreadyexperiencedoftheir

world:inLevi-Strauss’view,oppositionsandcontradictions.Yetanystrict

externalreferencecanonlybeadequatelydeterminedbywhatitmeanstothose

whoexperiencethemintheirowncontext(Caputo,1993,34-45).Itmustfollow

accordingtothisconclusionthatLevi-Strauss’positionreflectedhisowninterest

andpreference.ThisistheargumentofDerridawhowrotethatLevi-Strauss

longedfora“nostalgiclostcentre,originorfoundation”whichhethoughtmight

exist“closertothepristinefountsofmyth”(Shakespeare2009,55).Perhaps,

then,itisLevi-Strauss’ownsubjectivepreferencethatcanbeseenasthetrue

referentofhissystem.

JacquesLacanalsoincorporatedstructuralisminhispsychoanalyticalapproach.

SinceheacceptedJung’spremisethatthe“unconscioushasalanguageofits

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own”(Edinger1972,37),hewentontosurmisethatitistheunconsciouswhich

actuallyspeaksby“producingpsychologicalsymptoms”(Jensen2007,244).

Thesesymptomscaninturnbeinterpretedinmuchthesamewaythatspeechis

interpreted.Thatis,injustthesamewaythatasymbolormetaphorsignifies

somethingbeyonditself,“compulsivebehavior”canalsorefertosomethingelse

beyonditselfsuchas“asuppresseddesire”(Jensen2007,244).Yetsucha

signifiedishardtointerpret.Itmustbeleftuptotheanalysttodiscernand

clarifyitsexactsignification.Althoughaconsciousutteranceoractionisthe

psychoanalyst’sreferencepoint,eachconcludinganalysismustbeachievedvia

theinterpretiveparadigmoftheunconscious(archetypes).Thisunderstanding,

accordingtoJensen(Jensen2007,245),givestheillusionthatitisthe

unconsciousthatisincontroloftheconscious.YetinLacan’sview,human

controlisindeterminatewhenitcomestotheunconsciousandconscious:“the

consciousandtheunconsciousareinvolvedinabattlewhichlastsalifetime”

(Jung1976,44).

Althoughitwasuptothepsychoanalysttodiscerntheconsciousactionor

utterancewhilstatthesametimeconsideringitinaccordwithother

unconscioussignifieds,thiswasultimatelydeterminedbytheanalystwhowould

stoptheprocessifneedbesothatitwouldnotcontinueintoaninfiniteregress–

intotheindeterminate“nowhere”(Jensen2007,247).Thelogichereiswhatled

thepost-structualisttosurmisethatthisinterruptionofregresswassubjectively

determinedbythepsychoanalyst.Thiswouldimplythattheearlystructualist’s

premiseiswrong:thesubject,andnotthetextitself,decideswhatasignifier

signifiesinatext.Theimplicationsofthisconclusionhavebeenexploredinmany

disciplines,fromliterarycriticismtopsychologyandsociology(Jensen2007,

248).

RolandBartheshasdevelopedthesepostmodernimplicationsfully.Ifthesubject

determinesitsownreferenttheneveryreferentismerelyasubjectiveone.

Barthes,whoarmshimselfwiththis“relative”(Putnam1981,121)structualist

idea,becomesveryplayfulandindeterminate.Heapplieshisviewtoawide

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varietyofobjectsandculturalproductions.HedubsallFrenchculturalpractices,

suchasdrinkingwineandgoingtostripteaseclubs,asa“functiontolegitimize

bourgeoissocietyandmakeitoperatebetter”(Jensen2007,249).Heclaimsthat

mythshidenothing:“theyjustdistort”(Jensen2007,249).Whatmythsactually

doistotransformaparticularhistoryintoahumanuniversalcharacteristic“by

pretendingthatasocialconstructissomethingnatural”(Jensen2007,250).

Bourgeoisinterests,then,cannowbeseenasaninherentuniversalcharacteristic

ofeveryhumanbeing,ortouseDerrida’sexampleandstillmakethesamepoint,

the“Europeanwaysofthinkinghaveakindofuniversalculturalvalidity”

(Shakespeare2009,52).

Barthessawtheuniverseasamultitudeofsignsloadedwithunlimitedmeaning.

Anditwashewhoultimatelydeterminedtheirmeaningsfromhisownsubjective

standpoint.Everysignpointspotentially“toeveryothersign”(Jensen2007,

250).Bartheshadeliminatedtheauthorandsotheauthorityofinterpretation.

Anysentenceinatextdoesnothouse“asingletheologicalmeaning”,butit

exposesa“multidimensionalspace”whereanunlimitedamountofothertexts,

“noneofthemoriginal,”converge(Jensen2007,251).Whatauthorsdoisweave

thethoughtsofotherwritersintotheirowncloakofmanycolors(Shakespeare

2009,46-68).

Thereaderisnowcalledintothismultidimensionalspace“toplay”(Shakespeare

2009,54).Heorsheisdesignatedasaco-produceroftexts.Thereaderisnow

the“onewhoholdstogetherinasinglefieldallthetracesbywhichthewritten

textisconstituted”(Ricoeur1976,87).Barthes,wholikensthereaderto“a

musicianwhoplaysascore”(Jensen2007,254),alsoconsideredthatwritersare

involvedintheproductionofmeaning.Theyre-produceitinmuchthesameway

thatIamre-describingJensen’sdescriptiveaccountofBarthes’repetitionof

previouswrittentexts.Theyalsorepeatthoughtsfromvariousotherand

previoustextsorspokencommunications(Shakespeare2009,46-68).Inthe

samewaythatamusicalscoreisnotjustdecipheredtoremainanun-played

pieceoftheory,butisappropriatedbythemusicianinthepracticeandthe

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pleasureofplaying,soalsowithpost-modernswhowill“disseminate”texts

(Derrida1978,276).

Sincetextsareonlyassessedfromareader’sownexperienceoftheworld

(Caputo1993,38-55)thelifeforceinatextwillmanifestitselfinfrontofthetext.

Thiscollusion,wherethereaderinjectstheirlifeformintothetextandwherethe

textmutatesit,canbelikenedtomakingcoffee:thetextchangesthereader’s

originallifeformintoanothernewlifeformanddispersesitinfrontofthetext.

Andfinallyinmuchthesamewaythatapersondrinksthecoffeepresentedin

thecup,thereaderimbibesthenewlifeformpresentedtotheminfrontofthe

text.Itisinthismeetingof“twohorizons”(Thiselton1980,56)thata

transformationhappensandanothersynergizedhorizoniscreated.Nowfrom

thisnew-createdhorizonthereaderbeginsagaintointerprettheworldaround

theminawaythatisinclusiveofthetextstheyhaveread.

Consideredasacloakofmanycolors,textshaveanunlimitednumberof

possibilities.Justasthereareasmanysignifiedstoseekinatext,sothereare

manysubjectivehorizonsinwhichtofindthem.Hermeneuticallyspeaking,then,

humanbeingsandtextsareinseparablyunitedtoeachotherinaneternal

marriage:“livingisexpressedintexts”(Kearney1984,127).

Deconstruction

Thedeconstructiveperspectivedifferseversoslightlyfromthatofthepost-

structualist,notonlybecauseitcomesfromacritiqueofthephenomenological

philosophyofHeidegger(Derrida2003,40-67),butmorespecificallybecausethe

deconstructionistunderstandingoflanguagediffersfromthatofHeidegger.

Heideggerclaimedthatlanguageisthatwhichgrantshumanbeingsthings.He

describedthisprocessasadisclosureof“themeaningfulrelationshipsbywhich

anindividualthingisrelatedtotheworldandtheworldtothething”(Caputo

1993,32).Language’sendowmentgivestheworldits“meaningfulwhole”

(Shakespeare2009,13).Itnotonlymakesthingsempiricallypresentbutalso

bringsthingsthatareabsentintoexistence“bydisclosingthemeaningful

17

relationships…inwhichthethingdwells”(Marion1998,52).ForHeidegger

languageisthelogos;itisthatwhichgiveseachthingmeaningbycommunicating

toeachitsinter-relationshiptoallotherbeingsintheworld(Thomson2000,

320-26).

Derrida“vehemently”disagreeswithHeidegger’s“logocentrism”byinsistingthat

languagedoesnothavethecapacitytomakepresentoreventogiveeverything

meaning(Shakespeare2009,66).Derridawillonlyattributetolanguagea

signifyingcapability,muchlikethepost-structualist’stheorywhichseessignsas

onlysignifyingothersignifiers...adinfinitum.Followingfromthis,Derridasees

deconstructionasthatwhichonlyidentifiestheoppositesofbinarycoupletsand

thensubvertsthem(Jensen2007,259).Yetdeconstructiondoesnot,likepost-

structuralism,acknowledgeanyreduciblereferentaspresent;thereisonly

difference.

Itfollowsthen,fordeconstruction,thatplayisunderstoodasthedisruptionof

presence.Derridadeniesany“timeless,absoluteoriginoftruth”(Shakespeare

2009,50)andhethereforeinstitutestheconceptofplayashisonlytheoryof

origin.Playcomesfirstandgeneratespresenceandabsence.Playisanorigin.

Play,ordifference,doesnotresolveanythingbutit“keepsdecisionmaking,

politicsandfaithalive”(Shakespeare2009,50).Differencerefusestoarbitrateby

“comingdownononesideortheother”(Shakespeare2009,50).Thisisavery

differentconclusiontothatofthehistoryofmetaphysicsintheWestwhich“has

alwaysdependedontheideaofstructuredknowledgeandwhichisgivenorder

andunitybyacentre,apointofpresence,afixedorigin”(Derrida1978,278).

Metaphysics

ThishistorywilldrawonArmstrong’sandThompson’saccountsofGreek

metaphysicalbeginnings5althoughitcanonlybeimaginedhowthestoryof

5JacquesDerrida,WritingandDifference(London:Routledge,1978.),246.“Forthereisnoword,noringeneralasign,whichisnotconstitutedbythepossibilityofrepeatingitself.Asignwhichdoesnotrepeatitself,whichisnotalreadydividedbyrepetitioninitsfirsttime,isnotasign.Thesignifyingreferralthereforemustbeideal–andidealityisbuttheassuredpowerofrepetition–inorderto

18

metaphysicsreallybegan.Itwouldhaveinvolvedaspecificsceneinvolvinga

masterstorytellerandhisdisciple.Thalessatuponarock,hisbeloveddisciple

Anaximanderbeforehim.Itcouldbeimaginedhowhesuddenlyliftedhiseyes

andlockedthemuponthoseofhisstudentandhowhehadslowlylickedhislips

whichwouldhavebecometaintedwithhissalivabeforeliftinghishandtohis

mouthandputtinghisforefingerinit.Hewouldhavemostlikelycontemplated

themoistfeelinganditstextureuponhislips.Hemayhaveslowlyrubbedit

betweenhisforefingerandthumb.Itwouldnotbesodifficulttoimaginethe

consistencyofitsmoistureandhowthismayhaveinvadedhisthoughtsand

puzzledhismind.Onecouldimaginethathisfacemayhavebeencreasedwith

puzzlementandhismouthagapebeforeheblurtedouttohisbeloveddisciple

Anaximander:“thefirstprincipletolifeis‘themoist(Gk.tohugron)”anditis

fromthissubstancethat“alloflifewasdevelopedspontaneously”(Armstrong

1981,3).

OnecouldonlyguessatAnaximander’sresponsehowhemayhavebeen

unconvincedbyhisteacher’sstatement.Hemayhavebeennervouslyfidgeting

withabladeofgrass.Onecouldonlyguessthathemayhavemusteredupallhis

couragewhilsttakinginadeepbreathbeforehealsostoodbutonlytopointinto

theskyandexhaleandwhisper:“theairisdivinebreath(Gk.toapeiron)”and

“theworldresemblesaman’sbody”thusitisthe“divineairthathasmadethe

humansoul”(Armstrong1981,5).

PerhapsfollowingThales’discoverythatalllifewasspontaneouslydeveloped

fromandencompassedthemoistontologyhavingbeeninspiredbythis

speculativenotionsearchedforthemostgeneralgroundofbeings.Ittriedto

determinetheessencethatallbeingshadincommon.Throughthissearchit

producedapictureofanexemplarybeingandelectedits“Being’–asakindof

being”thatithadproposedthat“allotherbeingsmayshare”(Armstrong1981,

refertothesamethingeachtime.”TherearemanyreinterpretationsofGreekmetaphysicalbeginningsand,baseduponthepresuppositionthatnotoneretellingcanbeheldoverthatofanother,IhavedecidedtousetheframeworkofnarrativetoimagineArmstrong’sversion.

19

6).Consequentlyalllifeformswerecreditedtothis“Being”andfromthis“Being”

“allotherbeingsarethusunifiedorcomposed”(Armstrong1981,6).

Also,onecouldimaginethatinthesamewaythatAnaximanderhadbelievedthat

alloflifewasdevelopedfromthedivineairordivinebreaththeologyhaving

beeninspiredbythisspeculativenotionsearchedforagrounduponwhichit

couldplaceallotherlifeforms.The“HighestorSupremeBeingwhichthey

alreadyconceivedofasGod”becametheirgroundforallbeings(Armstrong

1981,6).

Moreoveritisthefundamentalmetaphysicalaimbothontologicallyand

theologicallytostriveforanultimateground.Whenthisgroundhadbeen

determineditwouldproceedtodiscoverprinciplesfromwhichitcouldaccount

fortheexistenceofeverythingelse.Thissearchforafoundationalclaimseemsto

beinitiatedfromtwodifferentandopposingdirectionsfrom“atopdown,

highestbeing/theologicalfounding”aswellasfrom“abottomup,basic

being/ontologicalground-giving,orestablishing”(Thomson2000,302).One

couldsurmisethatuponthisgroundofgroundingsasuperstructureofclaims,

ideas,beliefs,andprincipleswasdevelopedanditsubsequentlybecamethe

groundingstosubstantiateallfurtherclaims(Thomson2000,302).

Thisisperhapsthestoryaboutthedevelopmentofmetaphysicaltheoriesbut

perhapsitlackscharacterorindeedcharacters.Forthemetaphysicalaim

involvingontologyandtheologydonotappeartobecharacterswithmotivesor

intentions,althoughtheyareoftenportrayedthisway.Inanycasethesame

themecanbeappliedtothestoryofaman.

ThismancanbethefamousorinfamousmetaphysicianDescartes.Descartes’

narrative,hissearchforagroundingprinciple,iselucidatedinhisworks

DiscoursesonMethodsandMediationsonFirstPhilosophy(Decartes1998,2-10).

Throughhistumultuousmeditationsinwhichhedeniedallrealityhediscovered

anontologicalfoundation“athinkingthing”,andthisiswhatheacceptedashis

ultimateground(Decartes1998,2-10)andfromwhichhedeclaredall

20

subsequentclaims.Hissecondspeculativeclaimpulleddownanotherbeinginto

itselfyetitappearsaccordingtoNietzsche,atleast,thatthis“Being”that

presenteditselfbeforehimwasmerelyhisownpresupposedGodofChristianity

(Nietzsche1908,134).

Christendom

WhocanforgetTertullian’sstatement,“WhathasAthenshavetodowith

Jerusalem”(McGrath2011,10),orwhathadthemetaphysicaltraditiontodo

withtheChristiantradition?AsalsonotedaboveAugustine’sunderstandingof

thememoryhadaconnectionwithneo-Platonicthoughtwhichhebroughtinto

Christianthinkingandwhichthehermeneuticaltraditionalsotookoninits

understandingoflanguage.Yetitisthepostmodernattempttorefusetogather

traditions,schoolsofthoughtorgroupsintoonemonolithicentitybuttofind

waystodestabilizesuchunrealisticandtotalizingventures.Althoughphilosophy

andtheologyinvolvemanyindividualthinkersitissometimesnecessarytogo

alongwithsomeofthesegroup’sthinkerswhototalizeinordertoengagewith

theirwork.Caputoisnoexception.

ItisCaputo’sbeliefthatpostmoderntheoryhasseenarenewedrelationship

betweentheologyandphilosophy.Aspartofthefinaldevelopmentinhis

argumentinPhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)hewillmaintainthat

theanimosityexperiencedduringtheseearlierperiodsbetweenpre-modernity

andmodernitywasmainlyduetotheother’sabuseofpoliticalpower,noting

wrylythat“howeveroneworksitout,whoevergetsthepower-inourcase,

whetheritbethephilosophersortheologians-theotherone,wholacksthe

power,isintrouble”(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)

2006,12).Thushebeginshisoverviewduringthepre-modernperiodoften

referredtoastheageoffaith.TheageoffaithisunderstoodbyCaputoto“stretch

fromthetimeofAugustinetothetimeofthehighMiddleAges”(Caputo,

PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)2006,13)andwasanera

wheretherelationshipbetweentheologyandphilosophyforthemostpart

resembledarelationshiptothatofakingandhisinterpreteroradvisor.Itwas

21

alsoatimewhen(apparently)everyonehadfaith.Inordertoshowthegeneral

relationsbetweenphilosophyandtheologythroughthisperiodandto

summariseCaputo’sextendedversionofthehistoryconnectedwithitIhave

takenthelibertytodrawthefollowingcomparisons.

ItwasfromSocrates’storythathisstudentPlatorevisedhisfriend’steachingsto

suithisownhierarchicalideasofuniversalsandtheirinferiorempiricalcopies.

Healsowroteaboutthepowerfulintegrityofhisteacher’sresolvetomaintain

hisdignityandprincipleswhichhehadwitnessedfirsthandduringhisfinaldays.

Inspiredbythis,Platoinauguratedaschooltocarryonhismaster’slegacyto

searchfor“thingsundertheearthandabovetheheavens”andnotonlydidhe

teachaboutuniversalsbuthewas“asmuchinfluencedbywhathesaw(whatis)

asbywhathethought(whyitis)”(Plato2011,2).

ThenatalatertimethegreatchurchfatherAugustinewhose“longshadow

stretchesoverthehistoryoftheologyandphilosophytothisday”(Caputo,

PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)2006,13)”“satdowntotable

withthewisdomoftheworld”andthroughthisongoingdialoguethere“came

pouringintoChristianityandintoWesterncultureastreamofphilosophical

assumptions”(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)2006,

13).Augustine’steachingswereinmanyrespectsasyncretismofPlatonicideas

andearlyCatholicChristianbeliefs(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(Horizons

inTheology)2006,13).

Thecontinuationoftheseideascanbeidentifiedinthewritingsofthe“fatherof

thescholastics”Anselm(Ables2010,245)whohadworkedfroman“Augustinian

direction(topdown)”andcarriedthroughAugustine’sunderliningPlatonic

meaningthat“thetrueworldisabove”and“thissensibleworldhereisonlya

copy”(Plato2011,323).Theseideals/ideascanalsobediscernedinhiswritten

worksonmeditationandcontemplationwhichhewroteforthemonksatBec,

theMonologionandProslogionrespectively(Canterbury2012,1-3).Anselmhad

concludedthatthesearchforGodisaboveorbeyondbutthereisnoneedto

searchforhim“bygoingoutside(whatis)sincethatsearchforhimmustbegin

22

bygoingwithin(whyitisorbeyondwhatis)”(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology

(HorizonsinTheology)2006,13,15).

Aristotlehadre-formulatedPlato’steachings,asPlatohaddonebeforehim,and

soinsteadofpromotinghisbelovedteacher’sinstructionsAristotlechallenged

andrevisedthem.SothatinsteadofbeginningwithPlato’sfoundationalbeliefin

perfectuniversalsorformsoutsidetheempiricalsphereheadoptedonethat

broughttheperfectcategoriesofformstotheearthandintothemindsof

humanity,sincehethoughtthatthiswasamoreauthenticunderstandingtowhat

hehadexperiencedoftheworld.Heinsistedthatanysearchfortruthand

meaning(whyitis)must“alwaysstartwiththesensibleworldunderyournose

(whatis)”ratherthantryingtofirstlookheavenwardandspeculativeabout

unseenuniversalsorconjureuptheirfirstcause(whyisit)(Caputo,Philosophy

andTheology(HorizonsinTheology)2006,14).

ThegreatDominicanfriarThomasAquinasalsohappenedto“sitdowntotable

withthewisdomoftheworld”(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(Horizonsin

Theology)2006,15).The“dumbox”ashewasaffectionatelyreferredtoisseen

tohavecarriedforthapartofAristotle’steachings,especiallyhisfoundational

empiricalbelief(Walker1997,324).Hetaughtthateverythingontheplanethad

beenstampedwithin-builtlawsfromGodandthatifhumanitydesireditthese

lawswereabletobediscovered.God“createsnatureandnaturehasbeengiven

itslaws”(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)2006,16)so

itisuptothe“naturalsciencestotelluspreciselywhatinparticularthose

naturallawsare”(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)

2006,16)andthat“whateverisgoodscienceisipsofactogoodfromGod’spoint

ofview”.

Ashasbeenmentionedthechurchhadthepowerandthereforeitwasfaithin

theirstoriesthatwasdeterminedanddeemedtobewhatwasreasonable

(Deanesly1969,325-326).Itwasduringthistimetherelationshipbetween

theologyandphilosophy“wasdeemedalotbetter...beforemodernscienceand

modernpoliticaltendencieschangedtheatmosphere”(Caputo,Philosophyand

23

Theology(HorizonsinTheology)2006,22).Yetatthesametimethisalliance

wasclearlydrivenbythedemandsofpowerasCaputoremindsusitis“an

unbrokenprincipleinhumannature”that“whoeverhasthepowerabusesitand

ifsomeonehasabsolutepowerheorsheabusesitabsolutely”(Caputo,

PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)2006,23).Andthishad

certainlybeenthecasewiththepopesduringthetimeofthepre-modernera

(Frend1976,322-356).Withtheir“deephierarchicaltop-downorderinscribed

inalllife;theheavensandGodaboveandearthandusbelow,withkingsand

queensaboveandeverydayordinarypeoplebelow,priestsup,laypeopledown,

menup,womendownandfinallytheologyaboveandphilosophybelow,asa

handmaidentothequeen”(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(Horizonsin

Theology)2006,11),alloflifewashemmedinandundercontrolandiftherewas

anythreattothisperfectsystemtheleadersandauthoritieswereabletoquell

thesethreats(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)2006,

11).

IfanyonechallengedtheCatholicChurch’sinterpretiveauthoritywhichwas

determinedbytheircreeds,traditionsandtheirscripturalstoriestheywere

unmercifullyandseverelypunished(Frend1976,345-47).Thismeantthatany

neworrevolutionaryinterpretationswereviewedwiththeutmostsuspicion

(antitheticaltotherevolutionaryturnposedbyKuhn).Howevertheseemingly

indomitableruleoftheCatholicChurchfinallyended.Astothetimeoftheir

demisethereismuchconjecturebutaccordingtoCaputoitwasinthetimeof

“theverymodernman,Descartes”(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(Horizons

inTheology)2006,23).

Inthelightofsuchcorruptiveuse/abuseofpowerCaputocontendsthat

modernitywasanecessarycorrectivethatthe“Enlightenmentormodernityera

isanecessaryphase,andanessentialcoursecorrection,inworkingouta

satisfactoryreconciliationofthecompetingclaimsoffaithandreason”(Caputo,

PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)2006,30).Atthesametimehe

clearlymaintainsthatphilosophyisindispensabletotheologyandthat

24

“everythingdependsuponunderstandingthefaiththatisinyou,thinkingit

throughandout,indialoguewithothers,andwitheverythingelsethatGodhas

givenus.Thatiswhyiftheologyproceedswithoutphilosophyitisatgreat

personalrisktoitself”(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)

2006,35).

Everythingdependsuponunderstandingthefaiththatisinyou.Thepostmodern

viewisperhapsbestexpressedbyavariationofviewsandCaputo’sstatement

herecertainlyexpresseshisownopenstanceandhispostmoderntheory.Yethis

statementisalsoreminiscentofAugustine’semphasison“faithseeking

understanding”(Migliore2004,2).Thenagainitcouldverywellbeinspiredby

Nietzsche’sviewthatbeliefswherevertheyoriginatearethebelievingsubject’s

owndecisionsandshouldbeviewed“asjustthat;one’sowndecisions”regarding

whatonewillbelieve(Nietzsche1908,28).WhetherCaputohastheconviction

behindthisstatementofbeliefisamootpointforhecanstandonbothsidesof

the“existenceofGod”fencewithAugustineorwithNietzscheandstillberight

withhis“perhaps”(Shakespeare2009,82).

Caputo’ssuggestionthat“iftheologyproceedswithoutphilosophyitisatgreat

personalrisktoitself”(Hector2011,38)butIfailtoseehowthiscanbethecase

sincetheologyhasalwaysandwillalwaysproceedcarryingphilosophyalong

withit,andnoamountofeffortcandissolvethisunion6despitemanyattempts

todoso.MarionalsoseesthisasthecasewherehereferstoCatholicteachingas

“Theiology”,acompositeoftheologyandphilosophy(J.-L.Marion,Godwithout

Being1991,65).

Onceagainithascomebacktoafirstprinciplethatmanythinkershave

concluded(SeediscussionCahoone1996,18-38)thatitisthehumanmindthat

istheultimatefilterthroughwhichwedetermineallotherphenomena(Cahoone

1996,18).AndsoitwasthecasewithDescartes,theCatholic,whothroughthe6D.StephenLong,“OpposingorIgnoringMetaphysics?ReflectionsonKevinHector’sTheologywithoutMetaphysics”JournalofAnalyticTheologyVol.1Issue1,May2013,pp92-107.“The‘re-hellenization’ofChristianityinnotmonolithic.ItaffirmsChristianity’scatholicity,andfindsthealreadyHellenisedJudaismofthefirstcentury,andinscripture,asintegraltotheChristianfaith.”

25

filterofhisminddeemedhis“Other”(Levinas1969,16)bydesignatinghimthe

ChristianGod.ItwasalsothroughthefilterofthemindofDescartes,the

philosopher,thathisontologywouldprecedehistheology.Andarmedwithsuch

anunderstandingonlyfurthersupportsthetheorythatWesternmetaphysics

makesitsclaimsupontwometaphysicalfoundations,ontologyandtheology,or

onwhatanotherhascalledthegroundof“onto-theology”(Seediscussion

Thomson2000,297-320).7Itisuponthesetwofoundationsthathugeand

impressivesuperstructuralsystemswerebuiltasmonumentstotheultimate

truth.

YetthereisnoproofthataGoddefinedbyonto-theologyactuallyexists.Onthis

basisbothChristianity’stheologicalclaimsandphilosophy’stheologicalclaims

canbeheldinabeyancealongwithallothermetaphysicaltheories(J.-L.Marion,

GodwithoutBeing1991,145).Andaddtothisthecomplexityofhumannature

whichmakesitimpossibletodeterminewhetherhumanbeingsevenhavesouls

(Armstrong1981,6)orthattheycanbeontologicallygrounded,absolutely,as

Descartes’thinkingthing(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(Horizonsin

Theology)2006,45).Itmustbefurtherconcludedthatanyonto-theological

absolutesconcerningthemakeupofthehumancorearealsounfounded(Renaut

1997,65-87).Thisputsaquestionmarkupontheology’sandontology’sabsolute

claims.

Coulditbethatfromthesegrandstructuresandtheseseeminglyimpenetrable

foundationsweareleftwithmerespeculations?Theseonto-theological

foundationshavebeenpromotedasiftheywere“indisputablegivens”(Harrison-

Barbet2001,25-67).Anotherdiscoursecanbetracedbackbeforeonto-theology.

Thomsonwritesthatbefore“Being”cametobeinterpretedintermsofthe

permanentpresenceof“substance(ousia)”,itwasfirstthoughtofandnamed

underthedualtermsof“emergenceanddisclosure(physisandaletheia”7IainThomson“Ontotheology?UnderstandingHeidegger’sDestruktionofMetaphysics,”InternationalJournalofPhilosophicalStudiesVol.8(3),(2000),297-327;“Metaphysicalsystemsmakefoundationalclaimsbestunderstoodasonto-theological.Metaphysicsestablishestheconceptualparametersofintelligibilitybyontologicallygroundingandtheologicallylegitimatingourchanginghistoricalsenseofwhatis.”

26

(Thomson2000,318).Thesetwoconceptssafeguarded“Being”withtwo“pre-

metaphysicalaspects”.Itsunderstandingcouldnotbereducedtosingleconcepts,

allowingamirrorlikethatofonto-theology.Heideggerchosetocallthis

understanding“theinceptiveessenceofBeing”(Thomson2000,318).This

earliertraditionispreservedinthepre-Socratictextualruins.WhatHeidegger’s

deconstructionofmetaphysicsuncoversisnotonlywhatcomestostandoutas

thesinglemonolithiconto-theologicalbeginningeffectedbyThalesand

Anaximander,butalsoahistoricallyinterveningyet“soonforgottenalternative:

themulti-aspectualself-showingofBeingpreservedinthewritingsof

ParmenidesandHeraclitus”(Thomson2000,316).

WhatthismeansisthatBeingcanbeexpressednotonlythroughmetaphysics

butalsoin“pre-metaphysical,temporallydynamic,non-foundationalterms”

(Thomson2000,317).Howeveritonlytooktwogenerationsbeforethisearlier

traditionforgottenandreplacedbymetaphysics,oronto-theology.Inanycase

thebeginningofWesternmetaphysicsestablishedbyonto-theologyis

destabilizedbytherevelationofanalternativediscourse.ThediscourseofThales

andAnaximanderhadarivalintheonedescribedbyHeraclitusandParmenides,

yetitwasonethatisnon-metaphysical(onto-logicallyconstituted)andnot

reducibleto“Being”showingup,anddidnotresultinthe“freezing”ofBeinginto

“apreconceivedpermanentpresence”(Thomson2000,317).

Seeingas

Caputo’sdiscussionofthedistinctionbetweenphilosophy’sseeingclearlyand

theology’sseeinginpartcanfurthersupportapostmodernviewofdifference.

Hissuggestionisthatwhenthepostmodernturnisaccepteditshowshowboth

disciplinesareabletoseethefaceoflanguageandlifemorefully.Thiswillin

turnmaketheirdistinctionsshowupwhileeachremainsporoustotheother.

Philosophical“seeing”,heargues,looksmuchliketheological“believing”,since

botharebasedontrust(Caputo2006,56).Ontheonehandthenthisweakens

theideaof“pureseeing”whichisdefendedbyEnlightenmentreason,yetonthe

otherhanditstrengthenstheideaofseeing“as”,bygivingfaithalargerroleto

27

playinwhatwasuntilnowcalledreason.Thereforeanynotionsofa“faith-free

seeingorapresuppositionlessunderstanding”arenegatedandreformulatedin

orderto“findtherightpresuppositions,therightassumptions,therighttake,

andtherightvocabulary”(Caputo2006,57).Whatthismeansisthatthe

distinctionbetweenphilosophyandtheologyisadistinctionbetween“two

faiths”,notbetweenareasonthatseesandafaiththatdoesnotsee(Caputo

2006,57).

AlthoughCaputoimplementsthisargumenttounitetheologyandphilosophy,

actuallyheexposesadifferenceintheirfoundations.Bothdisciplineslookto

somepurestoppingfromwhichtobuildtheirsubsequentclaimstoultimate

reality.Asnotedabove,earlystructuralismwithitsturntolanguagethoughtit

couldbreakawayfromthisfoundationalism,butitwasultimatelyfacedwiththe

frustrationofafoundationalismthatithadactuallyneverleft.The

metaphysicallyconstitutedaimasnotedabove“dependsontheideaof

structuredknowledge,whichisgivenorderandunitybyacentre,apointof

presence,afixedorigin”(Derrida1978,278).Likephilosophyandtheologythen,

earlystructuralismhadtoconcedethatithadfailedtodeliverauniversal

paradigm.Thesaviourlanguagehadnotdeliveredtoitthefoundationitso

desperatelysought.Yetitwasnotlanguage’sfaultpersesinceitcanbeargued

thatitactuallydidcontainearlystructuralism’selusivephilosopher’sstone.The

problemthatearlystructuralismhadfailedtorecognisewasplainlyvisibleon

language’sface.Ithadjustfailedtomakethepostmodernturntoseeand

interpretlanguagefromafiniteperspectiveinsteadoffromaninfiniteone.Early

structuralismhadstillsoughtinlanguageatimelessanduniversalparadigmto

accountforeverything,theneedfora“necessarystoppingpointforanyattempt

toaccountforthechangingandtemporalworldofcreation”(Shakespeare2009,

19).Butwhatwasseenplainlyetchedonthefaceoflanguagewasstubbornly

ignored,andanotherstructuralistmaskwasplacedoverit.Whatthe

metaphysicaltraditionhadaimedatthroughonto-theologywascarriedoverand

intotheaimofthehermeneutictradition.Yetallthatearlystructuralismneeded

wasatriptoanoptometristforaneyecheckandareplacementlens.

28

Earlystructuralismandonto-theologydreamtofgatheringallthingsintounity,

backtothesecurityoftheorigin.Buttheprincipleofdifferencecannotbeso

easilycaptured.Anyactualinstanceofunityisalwaysdependentupon

differences;itisalwaysdependentoncontingencies,alwaysquestionable,and

alwayssubjecttoafutureitcannotfullypredict,muchlesscontrol.These

differencesareapartandparcelofthestructureofourworldandareexpressed

inallourtexts.

Sowhilepre-modernandmodernthinkersaimedtoaccountforallofrealityby

gathering8andunifyingrealityintoonesingularsystemorfoundation,the

postmodernperspectiveseesthatthereisnoonesuchsystemorfoundationthat

canaccountforallofrealitybutonlyonethatrevealstheprincipleofdifference.

Apostmodernperspectiveseesalltextsmadeupofbitsandpiecesoftruthand

untruth(notTruthandun-Truth)yetthesearetakenfromothercurrentand

previousfoundationalsystems(Shakespeare2009,57).Itacceptsthatthereare

noparticularmeta-narratives(Lyotard1984,56)thatcanclaimanultimateand

unbiased“God’seyepointofview”(Putnam1981,34)todetermine“whyreality

is”the“wayitis”and“thesowhatofit”(Armstrong1981,99).Thispostmodern

understandingisacknowledgeddespitethedifferencesinstartingpoints

(Caputo,Cahoone,Kane,Lyotard,Putnam,Derrida,Foucault,Barthes,Labron,

Armstrong,Westphal),whethertheinterpreterhasreasonedfromrealityand

thenformedtheirideasandtheoriesfromitor,alternatively,hasstartedfrom

theoriesandthentriedtofitthesetoreality(Hector2011,2).Anyinterpreter’s

knowledgeofrealityi.e.,anyindividual,group,orschoolofthought,islockedin

andrestrictedbytheirown“conceptualscheme,”“linguisticframework,”

“languagegame,”or“formoflife”(Labron2009,233).Thus,anyone’sclaimstoa

“neutral”or“absolute”groundfromwhichtomakeassertionsabout“theTruth,

theReal,ortheGood”(Labron2009,234)areintheendunfounded.8ChristopherNorris,TheDeconstructiveTurn(NewYork:Methuen&Co.Ltd,1983),7.”Thescandalofdeconstruction,simplyput,isitshabitofuncoveringadisjunctrelationshipbetweenlogicandlanguage,theorderofconceptsandorderofsignification.Thiscanseemnothingshortofscandaloustophilosophersandtheologiansalikewhoseprimarybusinessisthestraighteningoutofourconceptualendeavoursthroughacloseandrigorousattentiontotheworkingsoflanguage.Yetitcomesupagainsttheproblemsimplicitinitsownstatusaswrittenortextualdiscourse.”

29

Inter-textuality

Injustthesamewaythatthereisnoprocessofdiscoveringtheoriginofthe

individualfragmentsthatconstituteknowledge,sothereisnowaytodetermine

theoriginalsourcesthathavebeenincorporatedintothemakeupofany

individualtext.AsWoldehasexpressedinmetaphor,“itisnotthewriterwho

determineswherethedropendsandtheriverbegins,butthereaderwho

distinguishesparticulardropswithintheunfathomablequantityofwater”

(Wolde1994,168),anditisculturethatinevitabledetermines“everythingand

formstheuniversal,trans-subjectiveorcollectivetext”(Wolde1994,169).Itis

onlythereaderwhoislefttodistinguishbetweenthingsanditisthereaderonly

whocangivethemtheirconcretemeanings.

Disseminationisthehabitofuncoveringadistinctrelationshipbetweenlogic

andlanguageandtheorderofconceptsandsignification.Thiscanseemnothing

shortofscandaloustophilosophersandtheologiansalikewhoseprimary

businessisthestraighteningoutofourconceptualendeavorsthroughaclose

andrigorousattentiontotheworkingsoflanguage.Yetitisherepreciselythat

philosophyandtheologycomeupagainsttheproblemsimplicitintheirown

statusaswrittenortextualdiscourses.Suchproblemsareequallyapparentin

textslikethoseofMarionandHector,whichprogrammaticallyworktoexclude

ormarginalizewhattheyseeasirrelevant.

Disseminationworksoffthepremisethatatextalwaysdisplaysdifferencesand

contradictions(Shakespeare2009,49),andsuchoppositionsusuallysuppressor

elevateoneofthepartnersofthesedifferences.Inordertoachieveitsaimit

findsthesebinarycouplets,inthetextandthroughananalysis,andthentriesto

determinewhichpartnerisbeingsuppressedandwhichisbeingelevated.Once

animbalancehasbeenidentifiedinabinarycouplet,itmeansthatthetextisa

possiblecandidateforpostmoderndiscussion(Derrida1972,54-56).This

promptstheinterpretertogoinsearchofitsbaseofoperationsinorderto

accomplishitsdestabilization.Thiscriticalexposurealsoopensupthetexttoa

varietyof“playfulorridiculousreadings”(Caputo1987,44).Ultimatelythenall

30

readingsarejustifiable.Thereisjustnowaytolimitthenumberofsignstowhich

asignifiercanrefer,andthesesignsinvariablyspilloutofthetextintowider

worldsofdiscourse.Seenpositively,suchreadingaimstoretrievelanguagefrom

oppressivecontrol.

Caputo,asanadvocateofthispostmodernview,writestoexhorttheologiansand

philosopherstoacceptthattheirmetaphysicalclaimsarespeculativeand

contingent.Thepostmodernabsolutegroundofnoabsolutessuffersfromcertain

contradictions,ascriticshavenoted(seeShakespeare2009,2;Westphal2001,

xviii).Firstly,thepositionthattherearenogroundingabsolutesisitselfan

absolute,yetitistheportrayaloftheonlylegitimatefoundationorstartingpoint

fromwhichtobuildanyother“conceptualscheme”(Taylor1984,115).Secondly,

thefactthateventhisantitheticalpositionhasanabsolutegroundcannot

presupposethatitsownassertionisbasedonaneutralpointofviewbecauseit

issupposedthateverypositionisbiasedbyitsownstartingpoint(Pabst2012,

37).Thirdly,ifthereisnoabsolutegroundingthenhowcanitpresentitsown

positionasifitweregrounded?

Theclaimofanon-absolutestancedoesnotinvalidateanyone’spositionsinceat

bottomitinsiststhatone’sparticularpositioncannotanddoesnotcontainallthe

truth.Nietzschespeculatedthatallnarratives,metaphysicalornot,are“driven

bytheirwriters’ownintendedaims”(Nietzsche1908,234).Heclaimedthat“our

beliefsabouttheworld”areactually“irreduciblyourownideasandourown

values”.Yethealsoencouragedwritersto“takeresponsibility”fortheirideasby

admittingtothemselvesthatthesewereafterallonlytheirownspeculations

aboutlife(Nietzsche1908,212).

InthenextchapterIre-interpretMarion’sGodwithoutBeing.Accordingto

Hector’sinterpretation(Hector2011,22),Marion’sGodisatranscendentGod

whocannotaccepttheverbalcommunicationsofmankind.ButMarionwantsto

findanangletoestablishanadequatemediumforhisGodtocommunicatewith

humanity.MarionseestherelationshipbetweenhumanityandGodassimilarto

theperspectiveofanOldTestamentprophet.Isaiahbestdescribesthis

31

relationshipbetweentheOldTestamentGodandtheHebrewprophetwhenhe

cries:“IamamanwithuncleanlipsandIliveamongapeoplewithuncleanlips”

(Isa.6:5).ForMarion,humankindcannotdwellinthesamespherewithGodbut

istobeseparateandremainseparatefromGod.Humanlanguageisidolatrous

(unholy),whichseemstoimplythathumanityissomehowunholy.Accordingto

MarionhumanlanguagemakesGodanobjectofitsownconcepts/imagesand

thusmakesHimintoanidol.Marion’smetaphysicalnarrative,Iwillargue,could

beviewedasaniconicpictureofmysticalredemptionwhichseekstospeakand

hearGod’svoiceandwhichfindsawayofrelatingwithGodthroughan

encounterwithanevent.

32

Chapter2

Jean-LucMarionandaCatholicPostmodernTheory

Christiantheologysynergizeditselfwithphilosophicaltheologyandadoptedits

conceptualmetaphysicalGod.ThisledtoHeideggertoconsiderboththeology

andphilosophyasone,bothcategorizedunderthetermonto-theology.This

onto-theologicalGodisexactlytheGodthatJean-LucMarionidentifiesas

wantingtodowithout.Hisprojectisasearchforthemoredivinegodthatwillbe

releasedfrommetaphysicsandthusfromHeidegger’scritique.Subsequently,

MarionwillpresentthismoredivinegodasthetraditionalCatholicChristian

“crossedout”God.

Initially,implementingaphenomenologicalperspective,13Marionunderstands

thattheconceptualGodonlyappearsbecauseoftheintentioninthegazeofthe

seeker.ThisintentionalgazepresentsahumanconceptualGod,whichMarion

callsanidol.MarionseesthemetaphysicaltraditionasinducingtheSupreme

Beingfromthefinitecategoryofthebeingofbeings.TheSupremeBeing,inhis

view,hasultimatelybeenderivedfromthemindsoffinitebeingsthroughonto-

theology.Thegaze,Marionthinks,hassetitselfupasamirror,sothathuman

intentionswillbereflectedbacktotheobserver.Yetthissuper-human

conceptualGodhasdeterminedourworld,astheworldofdifference,sothatall

subsequentsearchersforGodareunabletopenetratebeyondthedualistic

representationofmetaphysics.Thepowerofonto-theologyextendstoall

communicationviathelanguageofsigns.Thesesignsarealreadytheoryladen,

investedwithmetaphysicalmeaning.Therefore,Marionmustpresentagapthat

liesbeyondourworldofdifference.Hepresentsanotherworldthatisbeyond

thisworld,envisagedasagapontheothersideofalldifference.Thisother

world,heasserts,iswherethemoredivineGodresides–betweentheworldof13GabriellaFartina,(2014)“SomereflectionsonthePhenomenologicalMethod”DialoguesinPhilosophy,MentalNeuroSciencesVol.7(2):50-62,December2014,50.“Auniqueandfinaldefinitionofphenomenologyisdangerousandperhapsevenparadoxicalasitlacksathematicfocus.Infact,itisnotadoctrine,noraphilosophicalschool,butratherastyleofthought,amethod,anopenandever-renewedexperiencehavingdifferentresultsandthismaydisorientanyonewishingtodefinethemeaningofphenomenology”.

33

differenceandtheworldofthemoredivineGod.Thisgapopensupanother

viewpointtothesearcher,anotherperspective.Thisbecomesanentrypointinto

thisin-betweenworld.Itwillonlybecomevisible,though,whenasearcherhasa

gazethatisdeterminedbyindifferencetotheworldofdifference.

Theprocessbeginswhenthesearcherexperiencesboredomwiththeworldof

difference.Todescribethisexperience,MarionintroducesSolomon’sgazeof

boredom,writtenaboutinthewisdomliteratureoftheBible.Whenthesearcher

looksattheworldofdifferencewiththisSolomonicgaze,itallowsaportalto

openuptorevealthegapbetweenbothworlds,allowingtheworldof

indifferencetocomeintoview,andtobecontrastedwiththeworldofdifference.

Inaninstanttheworldofindifferenceswallowsupthesearcher’slook,and

allowshimorhertolookback,withindifference,ontheworldofdifference.

MarionenlistsSaintPaul’stheology,inRomans8:20,tocallthisgapworldthe

worldofcreation,subjectedtovanityormeaninglessness.Marionwillnowplace

theCatholicEucharisticeventintothissystemasaportal,anditwillstand

betweentheworldsofdifferenceandthatofindifference,soastodistinguish

betweenthetwo.Thesearcher,asheorsheparticipatesintheEucharisticritual,

isusheredintothisgaptostandsilent,stunned,andsuspended.

Marioninsiststhatadivineidoloperatesonlyintheworldofdifference.

Therefore,histermsfor“idol”,theworldofdifference,andthebeingofbeings

aremerelydifferentconceptsforviewingthesamething.Yethismainpointis

thatthesearcherhasinterestonlyinthesensibleworld,whereastheworldof

creationisopposedto,andagainst,thisworldofdifference,andsoforthisworld

heusestheterm“icon”.Thisautomaticallymeansthattheworldofindifference,

andcreation,aremerelydifferenttermsimplementedforviewingthesame

thing.Buthismainpointisthat,here,thesearcherhasanon-interestinthe

sensibleworld.Itisinthisgapthattheyexperience“suspension”.

TheEucharisticeventstandsasthespherefortheiconoficons.Itisthespace

whichfunctionstoallowtheinvisibleGodtoinvestitwithhisgaze,anditisthis

invisiblegazewhichsubsequentlyholdsitsobserver.Whiletheevent-iconholds

34

itssearchersgaze,andasthepresidingpriestreadsthetextsoftheritual,itis

onlythebishopwhoisimbuedwiththepresenceofJesus.Heisthesuperlative

icon.ItishewhobecomestheWordincarnate.Thebishop’swords,then,become

theWordofGod.HeistheonlyonewhocanultimatelyinhabitMarion’s

phenomenologicalsite.TheEucharisticsiteistheonlypropersitefromwhich

thebishopcanbecomeunchainedfromtheidolatroushumanconceptualgazeon

thedivine.Hebecomesthetheologianparexcellence,anditishewhobecomes

theonlyauthorisedonetointerpretthebiblicaltexts,whicharepresentedinthis

event.Ideally,theinvisibleGodcomestoinhabitthebishop,theiconoftheicons,

anditisinhimthatGodviewstheassembly,yetfromadivinedistance.

Therefore,itisonlytheCatholicbishopwhodoespropernon-idolatrous

theology.HeistheonlyonethatisauthorisedtospeakforMarion’sChristian

“crossedout”God.

TheParadoxofTheologicalWriting:theJoyandtheSin

Marionfindsgreatenjoymentintheactoftheologicalwriting,butthisenjoyment

isdeeperthanthepleasureofdealingonlywiththetopicinwrittenterms.His

pleasureinvolvesthesearchforan“Other”(Levinas1969,13)whoissomehow

encompassedinthewrittenword,14yetatthesametimestandsatadistance

fromthetext.Itisinthisexerciseplayedatadistance,“fromwordstoWord”,

thatresultsin“unitingandseparating”thewriterwith“theWordathand–the

Christ”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,1).Marionclaimsthatitis

theologicalwriting,asopposedtoanyothersortofwriting,thatgivestheauthor

themostpleasure,becauseit“alwaysstartsfromanotherthanitself”,inother

words,thispleasureisalwaysimplicitlyreceivedinlocatingthe“Other”coming

outofandwithinthewrittentext(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,1).

Giventhispositiveportrayalofthetheologicaltask,thesearchfor,recoveryof,

the“Other”(Levinas1969,221-222),wemayalsoassumethatitisalso,only,an

honourableundertaking,yetthisisnothowMarionunderstandit.The

14Marionunderstandslanguageasmanyoftheotherthinkersconnectedwiththehermeneutictraditionasmentionedinthediscussionsofchap.1(pp35-36).

35

theologicalauthorisnothonourable,buthypocritical,becausehepretendsto

speakaboutHolythings,thewritermakeshim-self“unholy,unworthy,impure–

inaword,vile”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,2).Thetheologian,

however,shouldnotviewthisstateofaffairsasaltogethernegative.Thereisa

counterbalance,apositiveaffectforthebeneficiary;theirweaknessand

unworthiness,isrevealed,andthis,atleast,makesthemlesserdeceivedthan

theiropposingnon-theologicalwriter,andbetter“thananyaccuser”(J.-L.

Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,2).

Marionelaboratesonhisnegativeviewoftheologicalwriting,ashypocritical,by

enlistinganextremerealistperspective.Fromthisperspective,considered

authenticity,itconsistsinspeakingforoneselfandinsayingonlythatforwhich

onecananswer.Incontrast,thetheologianclaimstospeakforanother,theother,

whoisaboveall,furthermore,thisotherclaimednottospeakforHimself,butfor

HisFather.Inthefinalanalysis,then,everytheologiandoesnotspeakforhimself,

butmustspeaktheanswersofanother,whoiswhollydistinctfromhimself.

Marionseemstobelabourthispoint,thattheologicalwritingisanexpressionof

extremehypocrisyandisindicativeofsin.15Theremedyheprescribes,toanyso

calledtheologian,sothattheymayberelievedoftheirguilt,isthatevery

theologicalwriter“mustobtainforgivenessforeveryessayintheology”(J.-L.


SettingGodFreefromBeing

Marionintroduceshisstory,GodwithoutBeing,withadisclaimeronthetitle.He

writesthatthistitledoesnot“insinuatethatGodisnotor,thatGodisnottruly

God”rather,hewillattempttofreethetermGodfromeveryhumancategory,

especiallythosewhichpertain“tohisownexistence”(J.-L.Marion,Godwithout

Being1991).Akeyinthisendeavouristoexposetheproblemwiththemajor

metaphysicaltenet,that“Godhastobebeforeallelse”(J.-L.Marion,Godwithout

Being1991,2).AsMarionwillgoontoelaborate,thisisacomplexproblem.Yet,

15Surelyheisnotsosillyastothinkthatheisnotindictedaswellinthisstatement,sincewhatheisdoingistheologicalwriting.

36

putsimply,itistheproblemoftheconceptbeing;ifGodispositedasbeing

beforeallotherbeings,itmustfollowthatHeisbeforeeveryinitiativeandthat

ultimatelyhemusttakethequalitativeandquantitativeapriorimetaphysical

categoryofBeing.16

Marionquestionsthisaxiomaticdetermination;“WhatcanGodactuallygain

fromthiscategoryofbeing?”“CanBeing–whichwhateveris,providedthatitis,

manifest–evenaccommodateany(thingof)God?”(J.-L.Marion,Godwithout

Being1991,2).Inhisreplyhewillapproachthecategoryofbeingbyintroducing

anaspectofthephenomenologicalframeworkthattreats“Being”asstarting

fromthatinstancewhichprovokesallbedazzlementsandmakesthemappear

insurmountable,theidol.Thiswilleffectivelybeanexposéoftheidol,andits

alternative,orantagonisticother,theicon.Usingthisapproachhewillbe

perfectlypositionedtochallengetheassumptionsregardingthegroundofall

beings–“thenameofGodthatintheologyisassumedtobefirst,justasitisin

philosophyasthefirstbeing”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,3),andwho,

supposedly,suppliesallotherbeingswiththeirbeing(existenceandessence).

Thismeansthathewillendeavourtomakethisfirstbeingconceivableand

audibleasanidol.Thisendeavourisbasedontherationalethatwhenthis

conceptualidolbecomesthinkable,“oneshouldautomaticallyand

understandablebereleasedfromthisallencompassingmetaphysicalcategoryof

being”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,11).

MarionIntroducesIdolandtheIcon

Inapproachingthecategoryofbeing,itisusuallyacceptedthatthetermidol

invariablycarrieswithittheantagonistictermicon.YetMarionclaimsthatthis

contrastingpairofconceptshasarisenoutoftwoseparateandrivalperiodsin

history.Thetermidolhasanunderstandingthatispresupposedinthepriority

thattheGreeksallocatedtotheobservable,anditisduringtheirepochthatthe16AlexanderJensen,SCMCoreTextTheologicalHermeneutics(London:SCMPress,2007),32.Kaufmanmaintains,therefore,“thatGodmuststandatadistancefromcreaturelyexperience–hethinkstheveryideaofexperienceofGodisacategorymistake–becausehethinksthatsomethingwithincreaturelyexperiencecouldnotbeGod.”

37

idolwasunderstoodasmanifestingvariousexpressionsofthedivine.Onthe

otherhand,theiconoriginatedwiththeHebrewsand,havingbeenrenewedby

theNewTestamentwriters,latercapturedtheimaginationsofthePatristic

Fathers(Louth2007,65)andthoseintheByzantinePeriod.Itwasdepictedas

thebrillianceofthevisiblebutwhichwasfurtherdevelopedtorepresentthat

whichdwellsona“solefigure”named“TheOnlyOne”(Armstrong1981,56).

Marionclaimsthatthisdistinctionbetweenidolandiconisnotsimplytheresult

ofaconflictbetweenpaganartandChristianart;thereisadistinctioninmodes,

awayofbeing,whichismorefullyexpressedasaconflictbetween“two

phenomenologies”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,9).Thisdistinctionis

derivedfromanunderstandingthatbothconceptsindicateor“describea

mannerofbeingforbeings,notaparticularbeingorevenaclassofbeings”(J.-L.

Marion,IdolandDistance2002,26).ForMarion,therefore,thedistinction

betweenidolandiconisnotbasedonrigidcategorisationbecausesuchconcepts

canactuallypassfromoneranktoanother.Inthisrespect,classificationshould

notbeexpressedasthedualistic,beingsagainstotherbeings,butisdetermined

byachangeinmodesofbeingforbeings.Specifically,thisdeterminationofmode

oftendependsuponanagewhichgivescredencetoacertainmonumentasbeing

“theauthenticallydivinedignityofthatwhichoffersitselfforveneration”(J.-L.

Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,16).Marionseemstoanticipate,thatsome

readersmayobjecttothepropositionthatbeingscanchangestatus,fromanidol

toanicon,andviceversa,sohedefendshispositionbysuggestingthatnotevery

beingisabletodoso,inreality“notjustanybeingcangiveriseto,stillless

demand,veneration”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,16).Having

establishedthebaserelationshipbetweeniconandidol,Marionwillnow

elaborateontheCatholictermof“signa”in-as-farasitdeterminesand

distinguishesthe“common”andthe“minimal”featuresthatareemittedbythe

idol/icon(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991).

Thoseworksofartthataredeemedtobeicons,oridols,areworksthathave

beensoworked,soastonolongerrestricttheirvisibilityonlytothemselves,but

38

theyalsohavethemeanstosignalindissolublybyidentifyinganothersalient,yet

undeterminedterm.Anacceptedunderstandingofasignumdoesnotauthorize

anyotherunderstandingexcept,thatwhichtheworkofartitselfconstitutes.Any

otherunderstandingsofitsconstitutionwouldtryto“usurpovertheworkfrom

theoutside”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,17),andthereby,givethis

signumanotherentirelydifferentsymbolicvalue.17Itisonlyonitsownvisible

recommendationthatwillconstituteitasamostessentialworkofdignity.

Therefore,aninvestigationoftheworkofartwouldentailascertainingits

signallingability,butmorespecifically,thisassessmentwouldconcerntheway

inwhichitsignalledthissupposedsalientandundeterminedterm.Thus,theidol

andtheiconareonlydistinguishedfromeachotherinthewayeachmakesuseof

theirvisibilityintheirownway.Itisthisassesseddeterminationofappearing

thatwillultimatelysettleeverythingbetweentheidolandtheicon.

Foranypieceofarttoaccedetothestatusofsigna,theymust,andthiswith

muchdifficulty,notsignalareferentotherthanthedivineitself,besidesitself,

andthedivineitselfinturnmustsupportthevisibilityofthesignum.Visibility,

therefore,“havingtodowiththedivine”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,

17),willtakeonavarietyofwaysbywhichtomanifestit-self.But,itisinthe

mannerofseeing,whichdecideswhatcanbeseen,orwhatmaynotbeperceived,

ofthedivine.Itisnotjustonemodeofvisibilitythatwouldnecessarilysuitany

figureofthedivine,foritiswhatcanbeseenthatdeterminesitsapprehension,

andsoitisdependentuponarigorousandundoubtedlyconstitutiverelation.

Thisinvolvesacloserelationshipbetweenthemodeofvisibilityandthefigureof

thedivineitproduces.Thismeansthatinordertoapprehendthedivine,soasto

allowittocomeintoview,requiresonetospecifyitstwomodesofvisibility:of

“apprehensionandreception”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,33)

17AlexanderS.Jensen,TheologicalHermeneutics(London:SCMPress,2007),58-77.AlexanderseesMarionasoperatingundertheinnerwordexternalwordtheoryproposedbyAugustine.

39

TheMaterialIdoldemandstobeFirstVisible

Mariondescribestheidolasthatobjectwhichdemandstobeseenandtobe

knownbytheobserver.Theidolmanifestsitspowerpriortotheobserver’sgaze

“inorderthatitsrepresentation,andhenceitsknowledge,canseizeholdofany

observer’spassingandidleglance”(J.-L.Marion,IdolandDistance2002,27).

Thus,itisessentialthatitiserectedanddisplayedinthemostprominentand

strategicpositionavailable,soastopresentthebestofitselfopenly.Theidol

desirestoreignastheonlycentrepieceinthesphereofanobserver’sgaze,and

theinstanceofobserver’ssleightglancemustbeinstantaneouslysatisfied.Itisin

theidolthatthisglanceissubsequentlyseized,andwhich,ultimatelygivesthe

idolitsdignifiedposition.

Marionseems,again,toanticipatethereader’sobjection,thiscanbeseeninhis

responsebelow,thatthisconceptofanidoldefiescontemporarylogic.Itis

ludicroustoproposethatanycontemporaryobserverwouldbecapableof

stoopingtosuchapositionofmakingpetitions,requests,orevergivinganysuch

devotiontoahumanfabrication.Marionthinksthattheidolonlybecomesanidol

ofagod,orotherwise,whenanobserver’sglancefallsuponit,andsubsequently

givesitaprivilegedfixedpoint.Therefore,hebeginshisresponsebystressing

thatthepoweroftheidolmostconcertedlyresidesinanobserver’sindividual

gaze,andalthoughboththegazeandthethingarereciprocallyexhaustedineach

other,theheldgazeoftheobserveristhecrucialelementtotheidol’sentire

power.

Thus,Marioncontends,themaker’smotivationistoduplicateadazzlinggaze

andisthecrucialelementinthefabricationofhis/heridol.Thisdazzlinggaze

mustbetheinspirationcontrollingtheircreation,directingtheireverymove,and

itmustimbibeeveryvisiblestrandofitsbanalmaterial.Inotherwords,hisor

herfirstvisiblemustbeabletoinstantlydazzleanypasser-byandcapturetheir

slightestglance.Thismeansthattheartistmustcontemplatethefirstvisiblethat

capturedhisorherownattentioninthefirstplace,theymustbeabletoreplicate

thisfirstvisible.Similarly,thisfirstvisiblemustcontinuetogrowasanobserver

40

considersandcontemplatesit.Fortheidoltobecomeanidoltheobserver’sgaze

mustfirstbebe-dazzled.Butheorsheisdazzledonlyinproportiontohisorher

ownidolatrousconsiderationofthisfirstvisible.Itisthereplicationofthefirst

visiblethatalonefunctionstostoptheglance,yetitis“afirmimprintedgazethat

ultimatelybringstomaterialformadazzlinggod”(J.-L.Marion,Godwithout

Being1991,36).

AsMarionhasalreadyintimated,itistheobserverthatdeterminestheiridol

accordingtotheirownintentionality.Oncethefirstvisiblehasstoppedthe

observer,itisinthegazeofthissameobserverthatimbibestheir

intentionality.18Itiseveryobserver’sintentionalgazethatcomestoconsidera

multiplicityofphenomenaasitsidols,andwhichdesiresnothingmore,other

thantosee.Itisanobserver’sfirstintentionalaimthatinvariablypavestheway

tosighttheiridol.Theirfirstglancereflectsanintentionalaimthatwantsonlyto

bedazzled,butbeforeitsobserverhasbecomeawareofitsinfluence,andinthe

momentthatthisfirstintentionalaimisbeingsatisfied,thisglancehasnow

intensifiedintoagaze,andithasfurthercapturedtheminitsbedazzlement.Plus,

inthesamewaythatthisfirstglanceintensifiedintoafirmgaze,thefirst

intentionalaimalsointensified,butnowitssoleandfiercedesireistoseethe

divine.Therefore,thisgazewillstraintoitsupmosttobringthedivineintofocus,

andtherebyfindasuitablecontainerinwhichtosecureitsownconceptionsof

thedivine.Usually,itwillbethemostconvenienttohandwhichwillcapture

theirglanceandthisisthefirstvisible.Yet,itisthepowerofthisintentionalaim

thatinfusesand,subsequently,producestheidol.

Thelifespanoftheidolisdependentonitsabilitytodazzletheglanceofits

observers’ineveryage.Thoseidolsthatare“richer,moreextensive,andmore

sumptuous”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,39),willmoreoftenthannot,

bethosewhichwillcontinuetocaptureourglances.

18Jean-LucMarion,ReductionandGivenness:InvestigationofHusserl(Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1998),34.“Theintentionalityaccordingtowhichconsciousnessisalwaysconsciousnessofsomethingdoesnotexcludetheobjectivedimension,butwecantalkofobjectivityonlywithinthelimitsofourexperience”.

41

AspicturedbyMarion,itistheobserverslonginggaze,whichstrainstoseethe

divine,oratleasttheirconceptionsofit,thatensnaresthemintheidol’strap.

Thefirstinstanceofentrapmentiswhenthegazehasstopped,inthisinstance,

thegazerestsupontheidolanditcannolongerpassbeyond.Andoncestopped,

thegazewillnotovershootorpenetrateit-self.Itwillbeunabletotrans-pierce

itselfandexperienceothervisiblethingsastransparent,butwillbeweighed

downwithitsowngloryandlight,soastofinallypresentitselfonlyastheever

recurringfirstvisibleglance.Itisthisfirstglancethatwillproduceanintentional

“gaze’slandingplace”,anditwilloffertoitsobservertheiridol“injustthesame

measureofitsscope”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,37).Thestageis

nowsettoaccommodatethefirst“gaze’slandingplace–intheidol–andthen,by

facingbacktoitsobserverthatwhichitfirstsawas‘aspectacletorespect’”(J.-L.

Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,38).Thegazestrainstosee,butissubsequently

filled,whenitletsitselfseewithoutbeingoutflankedbytheinvisible,andthus,it

isunabletocauseitselftoseenothingwhich,ironically,completesitscapture.

Thegazeisnowimprisoned,caughtinthebedazzlementofitsownintentional

firstvisible.Theidolwillimpressontheobserver’sfirstglancegradually

intensifyingtheirgazeonitsfirstvisible“whateveritmaybe:thing,man,woman,

idea,orgod”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,42).Yet,itisthis

bedazzlementofthefirstvisiblewhichactsasaninvisiblemirror,anditisthis

thatconcealstheirintentionalgaze,onlyto,inturn,reflectitbacktotheirsight.

Thismirror,nowincorporatedintotheessentialnatureoftheidol,canbe

equatedwithaninvisiblemirror.Itsendsbackanimage,ofanobserver’s

intentionalgaze,theirownimageofthedivine,ormorerightlytheimageofits

aimandthescopeofthataim.Yet,allthewhile,thismirrorcontinuestoremain

invisibletoitsobserver.Marionclaimsthat“theidolaterneverbecomesaware

thatheorsheisbeingdeceived,andnordoesheorshefindhimselforherself

deceived:heorsheonlyremainsravishedbytheirownreflection”(J.-L.Marion,

GodwithoutBeing1991,47).Thisinvisiblemirrorreflectsbacktotheobserver

onlyitsownravishingandfabricatedidol.

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Thereisreciprocationinthisprocess–gazeofobserverandbedazzlementof

idol–butultimatelytheidol’ssuccessisinfulfillingtheintentionalaimofthe

observer.Itisthegazethatmakestheidol,anditistheidolthatbedazzlesan

observer’sglance,becausetheidolrepresentsnothingmorethanthatwhichthe

humangazehasexperiencedofthedivine.

Marionstressesthattheidoldoesnotreproduceanyparticulargod.Theartist’s

intentionalreligiousaimhadbeenstopped,beingdazzledbyhisorhergodandit

wasthiswhichinvariablyheldtheirgaze.Consequentlytheidolofferstheonly

materiallyvisibleoriginalofitsreligiousmaker’soriginalfirstvisible.Anditis

thisintentionalreligiousaim,whichtheartistwantsto“consignandfixinstone,

gold,wood,orwhateverelse”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,31).Aslong

asanobserverlooksupontheidolwithanattitudeofthereligiousheorshe“will

continuallyfindinthatmaterialidolthebrillianceoftheartist’sfirstvisible”(J.-L.

Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,45).Allidolsareessentiallythematerial

replicationsofthefirstvisibleoftheiroriginalmakers.Butitisthesesameidols

thathaveproducedthevariousanddifferentintentionalbrillianceswhichhave

beenverifiedthroughoutourwrittenmonumentalhistory.Anditisthesewhich

haveproducedallouridolatrousgodsaswellas“thememoryofthemthatmen

doordonotkeep”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,43).

ConceptsPretendingnottobeIdols

TosummariseMarion’stheorysofar,theidolisdeterminedbytheobserver’s

firstvisible,basedontheintentionalaim/willoftheirgaze.Thistheoryofthe

idollendsitselftoawiderapplicationthanthematerialrepresentations.

Therefore,Marionhaspositionedhimselftocountertheanticipatedobjectionof

themodernreader,thatidolworshipisanancientactofsuperstition.Whilehis

contemporarymightobjecttothepracticeofgivingdevotiontoablockofwood,

thisdoesnotdiscountthemfromthepracticeofidol-worship.AsMarion

elaborates;ourcontemporaryidolshaveonlybecome“moresophisticatedby

beingcontainedinphilosophicalandtheologicalconcepts”(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,59),andincontrasttoourprimitiveancestors,whoseidols

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werefabricatedoutofbanalandnaturalmaterials.Itistruethatwemodernsare

certainlygiftedwiththecompletionofmetaphysicswhichrendersusunableto

graspthematerialidol,becausewedonothavethevisualmeanstodoso.

However,itisnowtheconceptthatdispatchestoasign,thefirstvisibleofthe

mind.Likethematerialidol,whichisabletodazzleitsprimitiveobserver,the

conceptproducesitsownabstractionorpictureofthedivinetodazzleits

modernobserver.Itthereforehasthesamepotencyasthematerialidol,tohold

thedivineinitsgrasp,withsuchintent,thatwhenaphilosophicalortheological

notioncomestotheminditwillonlyexpressitselfwithincertainconceptual

categories.Thisinvokesaconceptualpicturewhichsubsequentlyinscribesall

otherassociatedattributes,ofthedivine,intoitspreconceivedcontours.Thetitle

Godisaffixedtothetopofthispicture:arepresentationofthedivinewhichwill

functioninthesamewayasanaestheticidol.Anymentionofthedivine,or

associatedterms,willinstantaneouslypresentthispresupposedpicturebefore

themind,ofitsmaker,dazzlingit.

Thisconceptualpicture/idolhasclearlytakenonthesameattributesasthe

materialidol,asMarionfurtherelaborates.Itletsitselfbeseenwiththeeyesof

themind.Itisapicturethat,simultaneously,dazzlestheobserverand

establishesit-selfasaninvisiblemirrorintheobserver’smind.Aswerecall,of

thephysicalidol(above),itreflectsbacktheobserver’sownintentionality,their

owngod,asitwere.Atthesametime,thismirrorworkstoconcealandblockany

otherpotentialaimsofpenetratingbeyondit.Likethematerialidol,thefirst

visiblestopstheobserverinmindglance,whichisenoughtosecurelyholdthe

observer’sintentionalgaze,whilsttheinvisibleconceptualmirrorisinstalledso

astofreezethedivineinitshumanobserver’sconceptualimage.Itisan

individual’sidolatrousconceptualbounds,ortempleprecincts,whichareusedas

themeasurementforthedivine.

TheMetaphysicalgod/Idol

Mariondiscussesthedevelopmentoftheseconceptualidols,byenlisting

Heidegger’spresentationonmetaphysics.Metaphysicalidols,astheyare

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assessedbyHeideggerinhisDestruktionofMetaphysics,werederivedfromthe

notionsoftheGreekphilosophers,andafterfurtherdevelopment,culminatedin

thedivineconceptualfigureof“thecausasui”.Thisconceptcanbeunderstoodas

theforemostidolofmetaphysics,in-as-muchas,ithassucceededincapturingthe

imageofthedivine.Havingestablishedthisimage,ithasdrawninmanyother

associatedimages/gods,whichareseeninthetrajectoriesofonto-theology,and

which,also,taketheirreferencefromthisfirstvisibleofthedivine.Heidegger

recordsthemetaphysicalhistory,ofthefirstvisible“causasui”andvarioussub-

sequentialbrilliances,asMarionexpressesit,thathavebeengeneratedinthe

mindsofthosemeta-doctorsthatfollowed.Moreover,theconcept“causasui”had

actuallysprungfromitsfirstvisible,thecategory,the“Being”ofbeings.Itwas

fromthisancientconceptthatthemetaphysicalgodmarchedonwardand

upward,eventuallyevenoutflankingtheconceptoftheChristiangod;butitwas

theassociategod,morality,thatcapturedtheChristiangod,bindingitinits

moralcontainer;yet,godsof“Being”allofthem.

AsMarionpresentsit,Kant’sintentionalaim19establishedthelimitsofthe

Christiangod’slife-form.Theseboundariesweresetbyhis(own)

presuppositionsaboutmorality.20Kant’sownintentionalaimhadproducedhis

pictureofthisconceptualidol.Thisconceptual“Being”ofallotherbeings,the

moralauthoroftheworld,assumeditsthronetodiminishallthelesser“Beings”

oftheirbeing,andtoseizealloftheircurrentpower.Thismeantthatallthe

previousintentionalaims,includingthoseofhiscontemporaries,containedin

theirownacceptedpre-modernconcepts,werefoundwantingbyapopular19Jean-LucMarion,ReductionandGivenness:InvestigationofHusserl(Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1998),34.ThisisimplicitinMarion’sunderstandingofHusserl’sconceptofintentionality.“Theintentionalityaccordingtowhichconsciousnessisalwaysconsciousnessofsomethingdoesnotexcludetheobjectivedimension,butwecantalkofobjectivityonlywithinthelimitsofourexperience”.20JohnCaputo,PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)(Nashville:AbingdonPress,2006),31.Kantfoundnotonlynature’sGodbutalsothemoralGod,“wheretheideaofGodcomesattachedtotheideaofduty.Weareallvisitedbyanunconditionalcommandtodoourduty.Whetherwelikeornot,andwhetheritmakesushappyornot,the‘thoushalt’ofmoraldutyringsunconditionally,uncompromisingly,non-negotiably,inourears.AreligiouspersonissomeonewhounderstandsthatimperativecommandofGod,aGodwhoseestoitthatintheenddoingyourdutyandhappiness,whichinandofthemselvesrunonseparatetracks;endupatthesamestation.Religionisethics;itisyourdutywherethevoiceofdutyorconscienceistakenasthevoiceofGod”.

45

consensusintheKantianconceptualgodofmorality.Leibniz,workingonfrom

Kant,transformedthetraditionalconceptof“Being”ofbeingsintohisown

conceptualequivalence–ofwillandforce–whichultimatelyculminatedin

Nietzsche’swilltopower(Caputo,DemythologizingHeidegger1993,27-28).

Nietzsche,followingonfromLeibniz,developedatheoryleadingtothe

dethronementand“deathofthemoralreigningKantiangod”(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,32).Hisunderstandingoftheconcept“willtopower”

accentuatedman’sself-determinationandeventuallygainedpopularconsensus.

Nietzscheassertedthat“everythingismerely–human–alltoohuman”,andthat

thehumanworldiscontinually“embracingendsforthem-selves”(Nietzsche

1908,28).Therefore,theirconceptsofthedivinearepurelythefabricationsof

theirownidolatrousmaking,ratherthananythingprovable.Indeed,the“Being”

ofallotherbeingsisdependentonanunprovablepre-modernpresupposition,

thataSupremeBeinghadalreadyexisted.Therefore,whethertheseconcepts

originateinmindspromoting“theismorthatofatheism”(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,35),theydonotoriginatefromanyprovabletruth,suchas

theexistenceoftheSupremeBeing.

Marionnotesthatalltheorists,priortoNietzsche,simplydidnotstoptoconsider

thatalloftheseconceptsofthedivinewereinvokedfromtheirown

preconceivedideasofthedivine.Heisperhapsstatingtheobvious,butitgives

himachancetore-statethematteraccordingtohisowntheory.These

preconceivedideasare,morecorrectly,theintentionalwillofanindividual’s

gaze,anditisthisgaze,thefirstvisibleoftheconceptualcategoryof“Beingof

beings”,whichhesingle’soutasbeingthedecisiveinfluenceforalltheothers

thathavefollowed.MarionusesastatementbyFeuerbachtosummarisethereal

natureofmetaphysics,withallofits(human)conceptsofthedivine,thatitis

merely“aman’screationdevisedfromhisownoriginalmodelofhisidol(god)”

(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,38).

46

EntertheIconoftheInvisible

NowthattheimageofaSupremeBeinghasbeeneclipsedbythe“blacksunof

nihilism”Marioniswell-positionedtobringouthisowndivineimage,whichhe

hopeswillshinebrighteragainst“theblacknessofthissun”(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,39).Morespecifically,though,againstthedarkimageofthe

idolhewillpresenttheicon.Marionclaims“thattheicondoesnotactuallycome

fromavision,butitprovokesone”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,17).

Unliketheidol,theiconappears,ormoreoriginally‘seems’,or‘lookslike’”.

Mariongoesontogiveanexample,andtoclarifywhathemeansbytheseterms

“appears”,“seems”,or“lookslike”todescribetheicon(J.-L.Marion,Godwithout

Being1991,17).

HeturnstothewritingsofHomerandtothecharacterreferredtoinPriam’s

stupefieddescriptionofAchilles:“Achillesisnotcountedamongthegods,buthe

‘seems’likeagod,likethe‘semblance’ofagod”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing

1991,24).MariondirectsthereadertoappreciatetheimplicationsofPriam’s

response.Accordingtothegeneralconsensus,regardingthoseentitiesaccepted

asgods,Achilleswasnotconsideredagod.Priam’sstupefactionisnotsimplyto

dowithhersurprisethatAchillesmayhavesomeofthequalitiesusually

attributedtothegods,rather;shewasmomentarilystruckbyherownnotion

thatgraspedAchillesandcategorisedhimunderthetitleofthegods.Marion

surmisesthat,inPriam’sunderstanding,theseinvisiblegodlyattributionshad

somehowtakenonvisibilityinAchilleshumanform.Thereby,inherviewhis

humanstatuswaselevatedtothatofthegods,andshesawhimasagod.

Marionclarifiesthisunderstandingforthereader,byexplicatingthat“something

characteristicofthegodsrisestovisibility(inAchilles),thoughpreciselynogod

isfixedinthevisible(semblanceofAchilles)”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing

1991,17).Asfurtherexplanation,hecomparesthiseffectoficonwiththatofthe

idol.Theidolisonlyconceivedfromthegazeofthatwhichaimsatit,andthe

invisibleisblocked.Theiconcomesaboutby“summoningsightinlettingthe

47

visible(Achilles)besaturated21littlebylittlewithaninvisibleessence”(J.-L.

Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,21).Thisessencehappenedtobepossessedby

theunperceivedgods.Therefore,itisthroughtheiconthattheinvisibleseems,

orappearsinasemblance,but,accordingtoMarion,“theiconwillneverreduce

theinvisible(godqualityseeninAchilles)entirelytothevisiblephysical(image

ofAchilles)”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,24).

Furthermore,thevisibledoesnotgoinsearchoftheinvisible,likethegazethat

isdirectedtothefixedidolandtriestoflushouttheinvisible,aswellassubjectit

tothisvisiblegaze.Theiconactsinreverse,asMarionexplains;“onewould

rathersaythatitistheinvisiblethatproceedsupintothevisible,thisisprecisely

becauseitisthevisiblethatwouldproceedfromtheinvisible”(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,23).And,ashefurtherclarifies;“itisnotthevisible

discerningbetweenitselfandtheinvisible,hemminginandreducingit,but

rather,itistheinvisiblebestowingthevisible,inordertodeducethevisiblefrom

it-selfandallowit-selftoappearthere”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,

24).WithrespecttoAchillestherefore,itwastheinvisiblegodqualitywhich

allowedit-selftobeseenasdistinctfromAchilles’normalhumanvisible

qualities.

Marionpresentsasupremeexampleoftheicon,asitisexpressedinPaul’s

formula,andwhichheappliedtoChrist;the“iconoftheinvisibleGod”(Col.1:15).

ChrististhetrueiconofGod,inthattheinvisiblequalitiesoftheinvisibleGod

areseentobededucedinthevisibleresemblanceoftheChrist.Therefore,every

iconneedstobeunderstoodinthissense,aspresentingthe“invisibleicon”,and

notonlyavisibleicon.22Effectivelythismeansthat,whiletheiconispresentedit

21RobynHorner,Jean-LucMarion:ATheo-logicalIntroduction(Surrey:Ashgate,2005),67-77.ThisideaisdevelopedbyMarionresultinginhisfullyfledgedconceptofthesaturationofcertainphenomena.22StevenShakespeare,DerridaandTheology(London:T&TClark,2009),66.ThisiswhatDerridavehementlydislikedwithlogocentrism–inthatthereisnocentreorstoppingpointtoareferent.AlexanderJensen,SCMCoreTextTheologicalHermeneutics(London:SCMPress,2007),10-18.ThisisagoodexampleofwhatJensen’swasreferringtowhenheoutlinedhowthehermeneuticaltraditionunderstandslanguage,thatitwasderivedfromPlatonicunderstandings,yetcanalsobeenseenin

48

stillallowstheinvisibleGodtoremaininvisible.Itisnotunseenbecauseitis

omittedbytheaim,butitisunseenbecauseitisdistinguishedfromthe

intentionalaimand“renderedvisiblethisinvisible(God)assuch–

unenvisageable”.Thus,whetherthis“invisible(god)remainsinvisibleorthatit

(god)shouldbecomevisibleamountstothesamething”(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,18).

Marion,buildingonthisideaoftheunenvisageable,makesuseofthecontrast

betweenvisableandinvisabletodistinguishbetweentheidolandtheicon,and

intheireffect.Itisthepurposeoftheidoltodistinguishthevisiblefromthatof

theinvisible,yetremainsunabletodoso,becauseitconsignstheinvisible(god)

tothatofbeing“invisable”–thatwhichcannotbeaimedat.Whereas,itisthe

icon’sfunctiontoattempttorendertheinvisible(God)visable–thatwhichcan

indeedbeaimedat.Therefore,theiconpermitsthevisibletoremainvisible,but

paradoxically,italsoallowstheinvisible(god)toremainbothinvisibleand

visibleassuch.Again,theiconinvariablyshowsnothing,butitteachesthegaze

toreturntothevisibletimeandagain–allthewayintoinfinityandbackagain,

tothisinfinity–whilealwaysfindingsomethingnewintheexercise.

InMarion’snarrative,theiconisalwaysservingtheinvisible.Theiconbeckons

andencouragesthegazetoextenditselfpastitself,yetitisneverabletofreeze

uponit-self,asitsooftendoesintheidol,“sincethevisibleonlypresentsitselfin

viewoftheinvisible”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,18).Finally,this

meansthatthegaze,whenitlooksupontheicon,isnotpermittedtosettle.Since,

itiscontinuallysentbackupthe“infinitystream”23tofocusupontheinvisible,it

Stoicthinking,betweentheinnerword(logos)andthespokenword(logosprophorikos/virbumexternum).SeealsoChapter1,sectiononEarlyStructuralism,pp12-16.23StevenShakespeare,DerridaandTheology(London:T&TClark,2009),62.InsimilaritytoDerrida’s“trace”Marion’s“infinitystream”returnstonooriginorsettlingpoint.“Thevisibleonlypresentsitselfinviewoftheinvisible”andviceversa.Derridawrites“Thetraceisinfacttheabsoluteoriginofsenseingeneral.Whichamountstosayingonceagainthatthereisnoabsoluteoriginofsenseingeneral.Thetraceisthedifferencewhichopensappearanceandsignification.Articulatingthelivinguponthenonlivingingeneral,originofallrepetition,originofideality,thetraceisnotmoreidealthanreal,notmoreintelligiblethansensible,notmoreatransparentsignificationthananopaqueenergyandnoconceptofmetaphysicscandescribeit”.

49

furtherenablesthegazetoriseupandmountthis“infinitegaze”(J.-L.Marion,

GodwithoutBeing1991,18).

TheFacethatEnvisages

Marionnowturnstotheproblemofterms,specifically,thetraditional

terminologyusedfortheinvisible.Whentheinvisibleassuchismadevisible

underthereignofthemetaphysicalterm“ousia,”onlythenthe“divinityofthe

godsorofGod”willbecome“visible(sensible,intelligible)”(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,19).Itdoesthisbysettinguptheboundariesofwhatcanbe

visible,ofthesesubstancesand,inparticular,whatcanbevisibleinregardto

theirinvisibility.Itwillthereforebetheumbrellatermthatwilldeterminethe

aspectsandconceptsconcerningthedivine.Marionnotesthatthetermousia24is

nottheonlytermthathasbeenutilizedtodeterminetheaspectualand

conceptualboundsofthevisibilityandinvisibilityofthedivine.Atthesametime

itisclearthathewantstoprovidewhathebelievesisamoresuitabletermin

lightofhisownnarrative.

Swervingtotakeanotherpath,Marionappealstotheterm“hupostasis”anditis

thisterm,anditsunderstanding,thatwillultimatelydeterminethestatusofthe

icon.Asifreceivingapprovalforthisstatus,hequotesHeinrichJoseph

DominicusDenzinger(1819-1883)aCatholicscholar(J.-L.Marion,Godwithout

Being1991,202),whogivesthetraditionalCatholicunderstandingoftheicon,in

that;“Hewhoveneratestheiconveneratesinitthehypostasisoftheonewhois

inscribedinit”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,19).ThisledtotheLatin

Fatherstranslatingthisword,icon,foritsequivalentandmorecorrectword

persona.Throughenlistingthisnewterm,itwastheirintentiontorepelany

24IainThomson,“Ontotheology?UnderstandingHeidegger’sDestrucktionofMetaphysics,”InternationalJournalofPhilosophicalStudies,Vol8(3),318.Heidegger’snewbeginning,insteadofinonto-theology,inphenomenologicaltermsas“selfopening(physis)”and“thehistoricalclearingofconceptualtruth(aletheia),”havingbeingforgotten“ossifiedintothepermanentpresenceof(ousia)andswallowedupintothemetaphysicsofsubstance”.Theinceptionof“Being,”understoodas“showingup,and“Theinceptionofitshistory,‘Being’clearsitselfasemerging(physis)anddisclosure(aletheia).Fromthereitacquiresthecastofpresenceandpermanenceinthesenseofenduring(ousia).Thusbeginsmetaphysicsproper”.

50

transferofmeaningunderstoodinthenatureofthesubstantialpresence.This

newterm“persona”wouldreflectanideathatwas“morecorrect”(J.-L.Marion,

GodwithoutBeing1991,19).Thistermwouldharmonizemorewithanicon’s

hypostaticpresencebyonlypresentingthatwhichmostlyandproperly

characterizedit.Moresignificantly,forMarion,theterm(terms)servesto

underpintheimportanceoftheicon,whichhegoesontoelaborate.

Itisthesourceanddirectionofthe(intentional)aim,anditsgaze,thatisall-

importantwhendistinguishingbetweeniconandidol;itmeansthedifference

betweenagazethatmerelylandsonthefirstvisibleandonethatispenetrating;

a“trans-piercinggaze”thatsupersedesit.Usingthetwotermsintroducedabove;

hypostasisandpersona;Marionsetsouttoillustratethispointmore

dramatically.Hefirststatesthat,whencomparingtheintentionalaimofthis

gaze,withregardtoidolandicon;oneisaperfectinversionofitsantagonistic

other.Asfarasthegazeisconcerned,withregardtheidol,itisreferencedtothat

oftheobserverwhoaimsatthefirstvisible,yetthegazeoftheicondoesnot

belongtotheobserverbuttothatoftheiconit-self.Intheicontheinvisibleonly

becomesvisiblebytheintentionoftheinvisible;inotherwords,thisaimis

actuallyanintentionalaimwithintheicon,andnotonethatisdictatedbyany

observer.Whenanobserverlooksatthematerialidolitishisintentionalaim

thatultimatelyresultsinrenderingtheidolpossible.Whenthissameobserver

contemplatestheiconitistheinvisibleinperson(hypostasis)whoisactuallythe

onethatlooksbackattheobserver.

Theinvisiblelooksbackatthemwithitsownintentionalaimbycontinually

contemplatingthemwithinitsowninvisiblegaze.Since,itisanawarenessofthis

invisibleaimthatultimatelyresultsinmakingtheiconbyallowingitsobservers

tovisiblyviewtheintentionoftheinvisible.Whenanobserverseesthematerial

icon,hisorhergazeenvisagestheblindsideofthefirstvisible,theyinturnsee

theinvisibleintentionintheface,oftheicon,wholooksbackatthem.Itstares

backatthem,fromtheeyesoftheicon,displayinganinvisiblequality;unlikethe

gazethathitsupagainsttheinvisiblemirror,intheidol,whichonlyreturnsthis

51

intentionalaimbacktoitsobserver.Itisthegazeoftheiconthatgazesuponthe

observer,withouttheobserver’sownaimsettingupaninvisiblemirror,before

them,andactingasobstacle.Theicon’sinvisiblegazebringstheobserveralong

aninfinitestreamtobeenthralledinitsinfinitedepths.

Marionmakestheprofoundclaimthatitisonlytheiconthatisabletoshowits

observersaface.Indeed,everyhumanfacemustbeconsideredandprofferedup

asaniconoftheinvisibleGod.Itisthe“openface25ofaniconnotsmiling,asthis

closesupthefacewithamaskwhichwillneedtobeunfastenedinit-selftotake

inthe‘visible’”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,19).Thissmilingfaceis

thatwhichtakesupthisinvisibility.Itmustgoontoopenupandrevealthe

invisibleperson.Itmustofferupitselftobecontravenedbeyondsightitself,and

thenbeveneratedasbeingbeyondsightassuch.Thisprocesscanbeunderstood

asajourneyfromthevisibleperson(visibleicon)totheinvisibleperson

(invisibleicon).Thevisiblefirstbeckonstheobservertotravelthroughthedoor,

oftheinvisiblemirror,andthenpasttheboundsofanyoftheirintentionalaims.

Oncethisinvisiblemirroristrans-pierced(penetrated),itwillthenopentheir

eyesoutontotheinvisibleface,consistingofaninfinitespace.Itcapturesthe

observerwithinthevisibleeyesofitsvisibleicon.Yetthesevisibleeyeshave

suddenlybeenintegratedintoinvisibleeyes,sothatnow,bothsetsofeyesstare

backintothoseoftheobserver.Finally,theobserverarrivestotakeinthe

invisibleGod,byastrangepropertyandprocess,displayedouttowardthemin

thefaceofthevisibleicon.

Marionlikensthecallofthevisibleicon,tothecalloftheebbandflowofan

incomingtide,whichseemstobeckontheobservertocomeforthandbath,inthe

sameway,theinfinitedepths,asseenintheeyesoftheicon,alsocalloverand

overagaintoitsobserver,tocomeforthandbath.But,unlikethewarmfeelings

ofasaltyembracethattheseaofferstoitswatchers,theinfinitedepths,canonly25EmmanuelLevinas,TotalityandInfinity:AnEssayonExteriority(Pittsburgh:DuquesneUniversityPress,1969),194.“Thefaceispresentinitsrefusaltobecontained.Inthissenseitcannotbecomprehended,thatis,encompassed.Itisneitherseennortouched–forinvisualortactilesensationtheidentityof‘theface’envelopsthealterityoftheobject,whichbecomespreciselyapartofitscontent”.

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profferitsobserversfeelingsofmeaninglesswhicharecaughtinaseaof

incomprehensiblevastness.

VisibleMirroroftheInvisible

Usingtheinterplaybetweeninvisibleandvisible,Marionfurtherelaborateson

thedistinctionbetweenidolandicon.Intheidol,theinvisibleismadevisible

throughtheintentionalaimofitsobserver.Thisaimisreflectedbackoffits

mirroranditsexactcopyissentbacktoitsoriginator.Theaiminthegazeis

unabletopenetratethismirror.Ifitwerepenetrateditwouldrevealanexcessto

anyobserver’sintentionalaim.Butthismirroronlydistinguishestheinvisible

fromthevisibleandtherebyrenderstheinvisiblevisible,inaccordancewiththe

intentionalaimoftheobserver.Intheicon,asMarionhasexpressed,thisaimof

thegazedoesnotcomefromanobserver.Thisallowstheicontobringtogether

theinvisibleandthevisibletocoexistinitseyes.Theseconceptsofvisibleand

invisiblearetherebynotopposedtoeachother,sinceanygazeonlyconsistsof

anintention.

Marionelaboratesonhowthisintentiondrawstheapparentdualismstogether.

Theinvisiblegazewithintheiconinvolvesthisintentionintheeyesandface,so

thatanyincreaseinthevisibilityofthefacewillonlyallow“moreoftheinvisible

intentionandwhosegazeenvisagesustobecomemorevisible”(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,21).Anditisinthedepthofthefaceandeyesthatopensout

toenvisagetheobserver.Itwillpermittheicontounitebothitsvisibleand

invisiblequalities.Itisthisresultantdepththatwillenjoinitselftorevealthe

intentionoftheinvisible.Itisthisenjoinmentthatusherstheintentionfrom

infinity.Itpenetratestheicontorevealthisinfinitedepth.Theaimoftheidolis

fixedtoareflex,whichoriginatesfromapredeterminedpoint.Thisreflexcan

onlyreturntothatoriginalpoint.Theaimoftheicon,however,isnotfixedtoa

predeterminedpoint.Whenitreflexes,itisareflexthatcontinuallyreturnsan

invisiblegazewithintheinfinitedepthsofnothingness.Itonlyreceivesthedeep

unfathomabledepthfromitsreflex.Thisreceiveddepthenhancesthefaceofthe

iconwithaneverrecurringinfinitedepth.Itisthelookofthesearchingobserver

53

upontheiconthatwillonlyresultinexponentiallyintensifyingthisdepth.Andit

isduetotheintensityofthisdeepstarethatwilleventuallycausethemtoavert

theirgaze.

Theicondoesnotlenditselftoself-importance.AsMarionmaintains,“itisonly

theidolthatdesirestobeapprehendedandnottheicon!”(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,23).Thisshouldbeagoodenoughreasontowithdrawthe

iconfromallaestheticaims,suchasart.Itistheidolalonethatrequiresthe

humangazeandpre-supposesanaestheticaim.Itisthehumanintentionalaim

thatmeasurestheidol.Itimposesitslookontoitandreturnstheirownreflection

backtothemagain.Whereas,theiconisunmeasurable,becausewhatitreturns

ismerelyacontinuouslossforanyaimofthehumangaze.Thehumangazewill

eventuallytireandgiveway,yettheinvisibledepthintheiconwillnevertire.

Theiconregistersnoothergauge,butonlyitsownandinfiniteexcessiveness.

Withregardtothedivine,theidolsculptsitsgod/sinaccordwiththepattern

givenit.Thispatterncomesviatheintentionalaimwithinanobserver’sgaze.Yet

theicondoesnotreflectbacktheintentionalaimoftheobserver,inregardtothe

divine,sincetheintentionalaimresidesinthefaceoftheicon.Anditisthis

invisiblegazethatobservestheobserverandreflectsbackonly“arevelationof

anabyssthattheeyesofmenneverfinishprobing”(J.-L.Marion,Godwithout

Being1991,22).

AsMarionhasalreadynoted,idolcanbecomeiconthroughthepassageoftime.

Yet,itisalsothecasethat,fromitsconception,idolisdistinguishedfromicon.

Theidolhasoriginatedfromtheintentionalaimoftheartist’sgaze,whichhas

beencapturedinmaterialform.Therefore,theintentionalaimhasbeenreflected

backtoitsmaker.Or,asMarionfurtherexpressesit,theidolcomesfromthe

brillianceofthefirstvisibleanditisthisbrilliancethathasconsequently

determinedcertainpartsofitsnature;theseareaspectsofitsmaker’sown

conceptionofthedivine.Moreover,thesourceofthesecertainperceivedparts–

reflectedintheidol–musthavecomefromaplacewherethesumtotalofthat

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natureresides.Andsowehavecomefullcircle;forthisfullanddivinenature

comesfromtheintentionalaimofthemaker.

Theicon,ofcourse,hasadifferentstartingpointtothatoftheidol.WhileMarion

doesnotdenythattheiconwasfabricatedbythehandsofmen,atthesametime

heclaimsthattheiconcomesfromelsewhere;itsorigindoesnotcomefromany

intentionalaimresidingintheartist.Itssourceisfromaninvisibleaimanditis

thebrillianceofthisaimthatmakesitselfvisibleinthefaceoftheicon.

Furthermore,thesourceofthisinvisibledepthpartofitsvisiblecharacteristic,

whichisreflectedinthefaceoftheicon,hascomefromasumtotalofthat

invisibledepth.ThiscouldbeunderstoodinmuchthesamewaythatPlato

understoodthegood,sincehealsoclaimedthatapartoftheessenceofthegood

wasintheworld.Thisallowedhimtospeculateupontheideathatithadcome

fromsomeoriginalsourcewhichhetitledthe“perfectGood”(Plato2011,80).

Consequently,thisintentionthatenvisagescomestotheobserverfrom

elsewhere.Partofitssource-banknatureisdisclosedinthefaceandeyesofthe

icon,theseareitsorificesintothevisibleworld.Theobservercontemplatesthe

iconandthiscontemplationconsistsincrossingthedepththatfloatsupinthe

visibilityoftheface.Thus,theobserverrespondstotherevelationatthepoint

wheretheinvisibleismadevisible,yetthisrequirestheobservertogainan

interpretationallens.Itisthislensthatallowstheobserverto“readinthevisible

theintentionoftheinvisible”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,23).Inthis

processtheobserverexchangestheirgazeforthegazethaticonistically

envisagesthem.Invariablytheiconturnstheobserver’sgazeupsidedownwitha

confoundingphenomenologicalexactnesssothatthecrucialmomentsofthegaze

towardtheidolaresubsided.

Therefore,inthisprocessofgainingadifferentinterpretationallens,the

observerundergoesadramaticreversalandMarionuses1Cor.13:18inorderto

explainthisreversal.Theobserver’saim,intheirgazeattheicon,doesnot

chooseitsfirstvisiblesincethisvisibleisunabletobegrasped.Yetitdoessubmit

itselftoanapocalypticexposureforitisthiswhichactuallybecomesvisiblefor

55

theobserver.Whereasintheidol,aninvisiblemirrorissetuptoreflectbackthe

observer’sownaiminthegaze,inthiscase;theobserver’sgazebecomesan

opticalmirror.Thus,ratherthanexperiencingagazethatreflectsbackoneself,

theobserversuddenlyrealisesthatheorsheisbeinglookedatbyanother,but

withamoreradicallyintenselook.Itistheobserverthatnow“becomesthe

mirrorofaninvisiblegazethatsubvertsthemtothemeasureofitsglory”(J.-L.


Marionsumsupthisreversalintheobserver’sgaze,whentheyare

contemplatingiconratherthanidol.Itisthegazeintheiconthat“summonsus,

facetoface,persontoperson”(1Cor.13:12)anditisthroughthepainted

visibilityofitsincarnation,aswellasthefactualvisibilityofourfleshthatisno

longerthevisibleidol,astheinvisiblemirrorofourgaze,butnowourfaceis

actuallythevisiblemirroroftheinvisible”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,

46).

TheConceptthatisaChannelfortheIcon

Boththeidolandtheiconpresentamediumthroughwhichtomobilisetheir

respectiveresults.Theidolcanimplementitsmeasureofthedivinebyreflecting

backtoitsobservertheirownaim,butnowbytheconcept.Marionencourages

thereadertoacceptthattheicon,thoughitcanproceedconceptually,cannotbe

conceivedbyimplementinghumanconceptsofthedivine.Thispointturnsonthe

questionofauthority;humanconceptsmustbesubmittedtotheauthorityofthe

invisible.Marionclaimsthatitisonlywhenconceptsaresubmittedtothe

invisiblemeasurecanthey“correctlyserveasanintelligiblemediumforthe

icon”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,25).Whateverconceptis

implementeditmustbeable,responsible,andauthenticinspeakingforthis

infinitedepth.Leavingnothingtochance,Mariongoesontostatewhatconcepts

fitthismeasurement.Firstly,theonlyvalidhumanconceptofthedivineis

distance.Thisconceptisappropriatebecauseitrepresentstheformaldefinition

ofanotherunderliningandacceptedconceptualterm;infinity.Thissecondterm

trulydefinesthescopeofanyhumanconceptsofthedivine,becauseitmostfully

56

expressestheideathatdivine“cannotbegraspedatall”(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,195).Therefore,theterminfinityisanappropriateand

thoughtfuldefinitionofthedivine,aswellasbeing“indeterminablebyconcept”


Marionreiteratesthatcorrectconceptuseisnotabouttryingtodecideoncertain

conceptstodeterminethedivinewhichwouldonlyreverttoidolatry.Rather,the

emphasisshouldbeonsomeone’suseofaconcepttoestablishanintention,

becauseitisintentionthatisable,visibly,todistinguishthevisiblefromthe

invisible.Itdoesthisbymakingtheinvisiblevisibleintheveryfaceoftheicon.

Therefore,anyconceptthatisadoptedmustservetoreinforcethedistinction

betweenthevisibleandtheinvisibleyetandmoreimportantly,itmustalso

maintaintheirunion.Anyapprovedconceptmustenhancenotonlytheiconall

themore,butitmustalsohighlightandenhancetheinfinitewithinit.Anysuch

conceptprohibitingthisdistinctioninunionwillcertainlyviolatethisdefined

scopeoftheinvisibleconceptofthevisibleiconanditwillfallbackintothe

domainoftheabsolutistidol.Hebelievesthatanyiconthatcanmaintainthis

union,whileatthesametime,increasingthemeasureofthedistinctionshould

enhancebothitsvisibleandinvisibleaspectsequally.Accordingly,theconcept

distance;thatMarionauthorisesasalreadyresidingintheicon;nodoubthelps

tomaintainthisunion.

ComingOutofBeing

Havingsuggestedalternativeconcepts,Marionnowquestionstheuseofbeingin

asfarasithascometoprominence,especiallyinphilosophyandspecifically,

phenomenology.Also,withrespecttothesubjectmatterofGod,thisinvariably

impactsontheology.HebeginswithHeidegger’s(Thomson2000,316-318)

contention,thattheanteriorityof“Being”isjustifiedinthephenomenological

sense,morespecifically,itisjustifiedbythehumanbeingintheworld,termed

Dasein.ItistheprivilegeandanessentialcharacteristicofthisDaseinto

comprehenditsbeingandtocomprehendsomethinglike“Being”.Marion

concludesthat,onthisbasis,anycomprehensionorinvestigationofallbeings

57

andovereveryregionalonticinvestigationmustbeginfromthispeculiar

neutralityofDaseinandthisprivilegedpositionofDaseintendstoperpetuatean

extremeindividualism,even“radicalatheism”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing

1991,57).Moreover,Marionclaimsthatphilosophicalresearchisatheistic;yet,

thispeculiarneutralityinDaseinleadstoapositionofsuspensionratherthana

directnegationoftheexistenceofGod.

Marionisclearlyconcernedaboutthedominantinfluenceofthispositionandits

negativeeffects.Takingthispositionrealizesthateveryotheronticpositionmust

besuspendedwithit.Theterm,Dasein,beingintheworld,controlsallother

terms.Thismeansthatnotermcanappearunlessaimedatandseenbyit.He

understandsthatbeingintheworld(howeverunderstood)certainlyprecedes

thequestionofGod.Thisincludesthemetaphysical“Being”asitdeterminesthe

existenceofthegods,thedivine,theholy,God,hislifeandhisdeathaswellas

anysimilardeterminations,invariably;alloftheseideas/beliefsmustsubmitto

thephenomenologicalconditionofsuspension.Thefinalnegativeoutcome,and

concernforMarion,isthatalloftheseconceptsof“Being”aresubjecttoa

possibilityofidolatry,or,expressedintermsofMarion’sowntheory:“anidol

determinesthe‘god’onthebasisoftheaim,henceananteriorgaze”(J.-L.Marion,


Marion’sexampleisnotonlyintendedtorevealthepotentialforidolatryinthe

understandingofDasein,beingintheworld,buttheproblemoftheconceptof

“Being”fullstop.Whenonethinksof“Being”assuch,Marioncontends,onemust

not,norcannotthinkanythingotherthanofonticbeings.Therefore,onehas

alreadyconsideredGodasabeinginadvance.Itisthispre-comprehensionwhich

hasalreadyexhaustedinadvanceGod’sexistenceasaquestion.Underthe

categoryof“Being”andthoughttheologically,Godisalreadyconsideredasan

onticbeing.Anyquestionsconcerninghisexistencestandprotectedbehindthis

categorymask.SinceGodjusthastobe.ThistermGodcomestofirstvisibilityas

abeingwhichin-turnsetsupaninvisiblemirror.Thisfirstvisibilitywillonly

reflectbackthispre-comprehensiveaimfromitselftoallitsenquirers.Marion

58

believesthisaim,Godisabeing,isitselfanidol“becauseitonlyreturnstheaim

thatinadvancedecidesthateverypossible‘God,’presentorabsent,inoneway

oranotherhastobe”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,47).

Thus,Marionchallengesthecategory“Being”andquestionswhetheritisa

necessaryprerequisiteforGodtobe,inordertogivehimselfasGod.Helikens

thecategoryof“Being”toatemplethatallowseverymanifestationofGod,past

orcurrent,asafehaveninwhichtorest.Thisprotectsthesegodsfromany

criticism,astotheirexistence,sincetheexistenceofthetempleitselfis

sanctionedfromeverypossiblecriticism,asregardstoitsownexistence.The

templebecomestheidolinwhichallotheridolscantaketheirrefuge.Henow

turnstodiscusshowonecansearchfor“amoredivinegod”(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,72).Butthismustbedoneoutsidethetempleprecinctsof

metaphysics(Godinviewofabeing)andtothinkGodwithoutpretendingto

inscribehimortodescribehimasalreadyexistingasanonticbeing.

Marionischallengingalong-heldmetaphysicalunderstandingofGodasexistent

“Being”,whichalsoringstrueaccordingtoourownnature.Hehasalready

acknowledgedthatitisimpossibletoconceiveofGodanydifferently.Never-the-

less,Marionnowseekstochangethereader’sview.Hefirstcomesalongside,by

outliningthedifficultyofthinkingGodbeyondonto-theologyandoutsidethe

ontologicaldifference.ThiscertainlymeansthatonemustnolongerviewGodas

abeing,butwhichcanendinaplacewhereonecannolongerthinkatall.Yet,

MarionbelievesthatnotbeingabletothinkGodshouldbeviewedasastepinthe

rightdirection,26towardamoredivinegod,ratherthanthepathtoabsurdity.

Moreover,forthismoredivinegodtobethought,ifhemustbethoughtatall,26AndrewLouth,Deny’stheAreopagite(London:Continuum,2001),142.AsfarasDeny’swasconcernedheidentifiedtwotypesofidolatry;“thosewhothinkthatbytheirownintellectualresourcestheycanhavedirectknowledgeofhimwhohasmadetheshadowshishidingplace.AndthosewhodescribethetranscendentCauseofallthingsintermsderivedfromthelowestordersofbeing”.Mary-JaneRubenstein,“UnknowThyself:Apophaticism,Deconstruction,andTheologyafterOntotheology”ModernTheology19(3)July2003,387-417.TheMysticalTheologydistinctionisthedegreeofprolixitytheauthorwillexerciseinhiswriting‘atakeflightupward’themoreourwordsareconfinedtotheideaswearecapableofformingsothatnowweplungeintothatdarknesswhichisbeyondintellect,weshallfindourselvesnotsimplyrunningshortofwordsbutactuallyspeechlessandunknown”,p.389.

59

thesethoughtsofhim“mustsurpass,detour,anddistractallrepresentational

andnon-representationalthoughts”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,75).

Asfarasthemoredivinegodisconcerned,andindefiningordecidinganything

aboutit,anyofthesepreviouslymentionedmeanscannotprovideatheoretical

spacetohismeasure.Itmustbehismeasurethatexertsitselfinoureyes.Itis

onlythisabodeofexcessivenesswhichwilleasilycontrastanyofthoseother

limitinghumanabodes,suchas,theontologicaldifferenceitselfandhencebeing.

ItisthesethatonlypretendtoprofferadimensionwhereGodwouldbe

thinkable.MarionfurthersupportshispositionfromtheJewishbiblical

revelation(Exod.3:14),sinceitreflectsthatanyhumanidentitypertainingto

Godisarepugnance.Thisstatement,“IamtheonethatIwanttobe”,from

biblicalrevelationsaysnothingdeterminateaboutGodbutonlythatthisGod

doesnotrejecthisexistenceor“Beingassuch”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing

1991,78).

OnewouldthinkthatMarionhassuccessfullyputuparoadblockagainsthimself.

Thematterisconcluded.Hecannotspeak,noreventhinkofthismoredivine

God,becauseeventocontemplatethinkingoutsidethemeasuresofthe

ontologicaldifferenceisanimpossibletask.Ashehimselfwouldagree,itis

almostindispensabletoallthought!(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(Horizons

inTheology)2006,62).ThisistheconclusionthatAnselmcametowhenhe

contemplatednamingGodasthatthanwhichagreatercannotbethought.He

decidedtoabandonthisenterprisebecauseitledtoacontradiction;God’sname

wouldbecomethatthanwhichagreatercanbethought,sincetheprior

statementwouldactuallystillbeathought(Hopkins1976,76).

YetMarionisnotdistractedfromhisownproject,whoseultimateaimisto

profferawayoutofthisbind.Accordingly,theontologicalproblemnowbecomes

aneducationaltoolthatMarionusestowardshispurpose.Morespecifically,the

ontologicaldifferencecanbeviewedasanegativeeducationalconceptofthe

unthinkablethoughtofGod.Whenbeingusedtoproposeadeterminationabout

God,itcanbemostdangerousbecauseitproducesidolatrousconcepts,however,

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itcanalsobeusedasthemosteducationalandprofitabletoolwhen

contemplatingagodoutsideofthisdifference,becauseitcanbepresentedasan

correction.27Ithasnoprovisionalornegativeacceptationfromwhichto

determinetheunthinkableasafigure.Itactuallyexceedsasmuchaswhatwe

cannotthinkaswhatwecanthink.

AsifechoingAnselm,Marionstatesthat“thinkingtheun-think-abilityofGodis

usstillthinkingthoughts”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,89).However,

healsoassertsthatthisun-think-abilityservestoaccentuatethegapbetweenus,

inouridolatrousconcepts,andGod.Inthisway,theunthinkabletakenassuch

doeseventuallybringforththemoredivinegodhimselfandcharacterizeshis

trueappearanceandarrival.AsMarionelaborates,itistheunthinkablethat

agreeswith“hisdefinitiveindeterminatenessforacreatedandfinitethought”.

Theconcept“unthinkable”forges“thegap”between“Godandtheidol”,a

continuousburdenseenas“Godandthepretentionofallpossibleidolatry”(J.-L.


Followingthislineofunderstanding,Marionpositsasymbolthatisreminiscent

oftheJewishtetra-grammaton.Marionsuggeststhatweshouldtakeawaythe

quotationmarksencapsulatingtheword“God”andinstituteacross,ortheletter

“X”,overtheletter“o”inthisword.ThisappearanceofthewordGod,nolonger

withinquotationmarks,definesGodasthe“unthinkable”andtheletter“X”over

the“o”inthewordGodwillhighlightanddemonstratethelimitofthe

temptationtoblasphemetheunthinkableasanidol.Thisdoesnotmeanthat

“God”woulddisappearasaconcept.Yetitdoesmeanthattheconceptof

unthinkablewillnowenterintoourthoughts.Thehopeisthatitwillrender27AndrewLouth,TheOriginoftheChristianMysticalTraditionfromPlatotoDenys(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),243.“TheinterdependenceoftheMysticalTheologyandtheDivineNamesshowsthedialecticalpulsationbetweenaffirmationsandnegationsthatcharacterisestheenterpriseofChristiannegativetheologyasawhole.Herenegationisnotfreestanding,butsecuresthetheologicalcharacteroftheaffirmativespeechpatternsinaddresstoGodorinspeechaboutGod.Beingcancelledinthiswaytheyareshownnottobeordinarylanguageuseatall,butspeechburdenedtothepointofexcess:asexhaustedasitisfull.”Whileitmaybeindispensible,itcanneverdomorethanqualify,albeitinacriticalmanner,kataphaticGod-talk.Itfunctionsasaguardianagainstabuseofaffirmativelanguage,especiallyprobablyagainstitsunivocalapplicationinmattersofthedivine”.

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“itselfunthinkabletherebyexcess”.ThecrossedoutGodunderstoodasthe

unthinkablewillnowbeabletoenterintoourdeliberations,aboutthemore

divinegod,andalsobeabletocritiquethesethoughts.Furthermore,itwillshow

usthat“hisunthinkablenessactuallysaturatesourthought–rightfromthe

beginning,andforever”.Thisunderstanding,claimsMarion,impressesuponus

toconsiderthecrossedoutGod“outsidethequestionofBeing,outsidethe

ontologicaldifference,unthinkable,butimpassable”(J.-L.Marion,Godwithout

Being1991,90-96).

Marionnowcontemplatesaname,aconceptorasign,whichwillenablehimto

proceedtowherethecrossedoutGodcanpenetratepasttheidolatrous

constraints;banishedoftheconditionsofpossibility,thatis,bythoughtssuchas

Being,ifGodisabeing,thedivineabode,ifGoddependsonthedivineand,

throughthisdeliverance,totakeupsomeplacethatisworthyofhim.The

crossedoutGod,contendsMarion,surelydoesnothavetobeinordertolove!He

askstherhetoricalquestion;inthecrucifixionofChristisHedeterminedbyour

owndefinitionorratherdoeshesurpriseusbyhisowndetermination?The

Christianwillpredictablyanswer,byhisowndetermination,towhichMarion

promptlyresponds;yetwhenherevealshimselfwepromptlyturnthisintoan

idol.

Marionhasnowestablishedhisjustificationfortheuseofatleastone(non-

idolatrous)concept,onthegroundsofGod’sinitiative;heneedonlyspellthisout

indefiniteterms.Thushestates;“bydefinition,thereisnoconditionwhichcan

continuetorestricthisinitiative,amplitude,andecstasy”(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,101).Andthisinitiativecanbeexpressedaslove;Love

simplylovessinceGodislove(1John4:8).Goddoesnotneedanyconditionsand

soHeloveswithoutanylimitorrestriction.Lovegivesitselfwithoutany

welcomeanditdoesnotrequiretheleastconsideration.Humanitydoesnotneed

topretendtobuildanabodetohousethisgiftofsimplelove–“butpurelyand

simplytoacceptit”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,102).Lovejustis,and

62

theweaknessofmankindisnotenoughtodisqualifyitsinventivenessorits

achievement.

Atlast,itseems,theunbridgeablegapbetweenusandGodcanbebridged,but

surelythisrequiressomeresponsefromus.EvenGod’sfreegiftoftheChrist

commandedaresponse.Andindeed,inthiscase,thereisaresponsetobemade.

Marionstatesthat,“inordertoaccomplishtheresponsetoloveitisnecessary

andsufficienttowillit”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,104).Thewillis

capableofrefusingorreceivingthisalreadygivengiftoflove.Yet,itmustalsobe

affirmedthathumanitycannotimposeanyofitsconditions,evennegativeones,

onthisinitiativeofthecrossedoutGod.Itiscertainlynottheaimthatultimately

decidesontheidolatrouspossibilityorimpossibilityofcontacttoandfromGod.

Thesymbol,thecrossedoutGodjoinedwiththeconceptoflove,seemtoactasa

deterrentwhenitcomestoidolatry.AsMarioninterpretsit;tothinkthecrossed

outGodaslove“prohibitseverfixingtheaiminthefirstvisibleandfreezingiton

aninvisiblemirror”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,105).Thiscontrasts

theeffectofaconceptthatapprehendsbygatheringtoitselfahuman

comprehensionandthereforecomestoresultinanidol.Lovedoesnotgathera

humancomprehension,duetotheexcessivenessofitsgivingnatureand“sinceit

doesnotmeanatalltotake,itpostulatesitsowngiving,givingwherethegiver

strictlycoincideswiththegift,withoutanyrestriction,reservation,ormastery”

(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,105).Lovegivesitselfceaselesslythereby

abandoningitselfbypenetratingthroughitsownlimits“totransplantitself

outsideofitself”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,106).

Love,asMarionportraysit,seemstofloodeveryfacetofidolatry.Theessenceof

loveconsumeseverydiscrimination,depiction,orexistentialinitsfluctuation.

Loveincludestheidol,onlytosubvertitinitsafterswell;theidolcanbe

surpassed,onlybylettingthecrossedoutGodbethought,beginningfromhis

singleanduntainteddemand.Inthisrespect,loveactsasdemand,bygoing

beyondthelimitoftheconcept–everyconditionwhatsoever–eventhatof

“Being”conceivedinontologicaldifference.Thelovethatispuredemandisalso

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puregift;thecrossedoutGodcanonlybethoughtwithoutidolatrybeginning

fromhisowninitiativetogivehimselftobethoughtofaslove,henceasgift.Agift

canonlybethoughtfromathoughtofloveandthereforethisthoughtoflove

givesitselftothegifttobethought.Onlyathoughtoflovethatgivesitselfcan

dedicateitselftoagiftforthought.Godas“lovegiveshimselftobethoughtofas

agift”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,110).

Thoughloveseemstoconquerall,includingidolatry,thehumandilemmamakes

itmorecomplicated.ThisiswhatMariongoesontoelaborate.Takinghislead

fromHeidegger,Mariondiscussesthecrossingof“Being”,simplyput,themeans

bywhichwebreakthestrongholdof“Being”.Fromtheoutset,hestatesthatthe

word“Beingisanuntheologicalword,becauseitisnotcompatiblewithChristian

Revelation.ItisthisR/revelationthatdeterminesthewayofitsmanifestness

andtherefore,theologydoesnothavetoproveorinterpret“Being”.Moreover,

theologyshouldnothavetoshielditselfbeforephilosophy,becausephilosophy

andtheologyarefoolishnesstoeachother(SeediscussiononwisdomofGod86-

95on1Cor1:22,24;Rom.4:17J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991).Similarly

itisfoolishnessfortheologytoaskfor“Being”inordertosecureitselfanew

ground.Thisislikeacceptingthesortofillogicexpressedinanoxymoron;“a

squarecircleorawoodeniron”(Derrida,SemiologicetGrammatologie1972,45-

46).Moreover,itisnothinglessthanimprudencethatseparatestheologyfrom

“Being”.Hehasalreadypointedout;”Being”isaphilosophicaltermandtherefore,

foolishtotheology(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,89).

Itisalmostclichétomakethepointthattheologyisinundatedwithphilosophical

ideasthathavebeensourcedoutof“Being”.Therefore,ifMarionisseekingto

untanglethisrelationshipsimplybypointingoutasupposedtheological

disposition,thenonewouldthinkthatheisexpectingtoomuch.However,thisis

nottheapproachthatMarionistaking.Rather,itishisbeliefthatthis

relationshipoftheologytowardphilosophyandviceversa28actuallydoes

28JohnCaputo,PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)(Nashville:AbingdonPress,2006),3-8.SeeCaputo’sdiscussionontherelationshipoftheologywithphilosophyandviceversa.

64

nothingtoliberatethemoredivinegod,crossedoutornot,fromthequestionof

“Being”.Infact,itsubvertshisactualplantofoundtruetheologyintheCatholic

Eucharist.29

Thereasonwhytheology’srecapdoesnotrenderitimmunefromthequestionof

“Being”isbecause“theproblem”,asMarionseesit(J.-L.Marion,Godwithout

Being1991,86),isbiggerthantheologyperse,yet,byimplication,stillimpacts

ontheology.Thereisthepossibilityofanon-Christiantheologicaldiscourse,

whichmayalsoinvolvethecrossedoutGodandsuchadiscoursemustnotsolely

betheconcernofChristiantheology.Thediscoursemustextenditselfwiderto

includenotionsconcerning“Theiology(philosophy’sdiscourseoftheology)”,

becausethesethoughtscertainlyincludetheknowledgeofaSupremeBeingor

Godpar-excellence.Furthermore,thedoubledimensionof“beingsingeneral”

(ontologicaldirection)andofthe“Beingpar-excellence”(theologicaldirection)

canbecomeinitsessencethedisciplineof“beingsassuch”(Dasein:beinginthe

world))andthereforecouldbeconsideredundertherangeinitselfasonto-

theological,byimplication,thesubjectoftheology.

Marionthenclaimsthat,intheirendeavourtoconstructaprooffortheexistence

ofGod,thebestthatTheiologycanofferis“ablasphemy”(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,36).Thisblasphemyconsistsinthedeterminationthatifa

godneedsproofsinthefirstplaceforitsexistence,thenitisaveryungodlygod.

29JeanLuc-Marion,GodwithoutBeing(Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,1991.),153.“IftheEucharistofferstheonlycorrecthermeneuticsitewheretheWordcanbesaidinpersonintheblessing,iffinallyonlythecelebrantreceivesauthoritytogobeyondthewordsasfarastheWord(revelation),becausehealonefindshimselfinvestedbythepersonaChristi,thenonemustconcludethatonlythebishopmerits,inthefullsense,thetitleoftheologian”.StevenShakespeare,DerridaandTheology(NewYork:T&TClarkInternational,2009.),118.ThiscertainlystandsincontrasttoDerrida’sandtheunderstandingofKarlBarthtorevelation;“Ontheonehand,he(Derrida)upholdstheunpredictabilityofthefutureandofevent.Nothingcantrulyhappenwithoutopennesstowhatistocomethatexceedsanysetofconditions,anylaworprogramme.Ontheotherhand,ifwearetrulyopentowhatistocomethenwecannotconfineitwithinthelimitsofoneinstitutionallydefinedsetofdogmasaboutthecontentofrevelation.Thereissomethingintheeventofrevelationthatescapessuchconstriction,openingittootherinterpretationsandvoices”.

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TheEntrytoLoveviatheReverseofVanity

Inhisprocessofsolvingtheproblemof(conceptual)idolatry,Marionhas

broughtusbacktothewiderconsiderations:thecrossedoutGod,outsideof

“Being”,willcontinuetoexceedandescapeusfromtwopointsofview.Fromthe

perspectiveofTheiology,whereweholduptheimportanceofbeings,the

categoryofSupremeBeingisthatwhichgovernsthemoredivinegod.Theiology

admitsandrecognisesusonlyinthesiteofbeingintheworldanditisfromthis

sitewhichtheontologicaldifferencethoroughlyandmostintimatelydetermines.

Itistheplacewherewefindourselveswhollycollapsedinbytheconceptual

categoryofthebeingofbeings.FromthepointofviewofChristiantheology,we

acknowledgeoursinfulnessandthisplacesusataninfinitedistancefromagape.

Therefore,MarionconcludesthatbothTheiologyandtheologymustbeexcluded

fromhismoredivinegodorcrossedoutGod.

Whetherweconsiderourselvessimplyashuman(Dasein)orspecifically,sinful

humanity,itisapparentthattheconceptoflove,byitself,willnothelpus.Rather,

ourrealisationthatwearefinite,governedby“Being”andthestatusofthe

sinner,actuallyforbidsusaccesstoagape.Therefore,withthecrossingof

“Being”,consideredradicallyastheunthinkableisincapabletobreakthebounds

inscribedinthe“Being”ofbeings.Theunthinkableonlybringsasilencewhose

veryemptinessremainshorrendoustous.30Theunthinkablethoughtmerelysets

upanotherinvisiblemirrorbeforeus,thistimerepellingbackouraimas

unthinkable.ItdoesnotbringusanyclosertothecrossedoutGod,sincethis

unthinkablemirrordeniesusaccesstotheiconofagape.ThecrossedoutGod,as

30StevenShakespeare,DerridaandTheology(NewYork:T&TClarkInternational,2009.),110,134.ThisishorrendoustoMarionatleastsinceitcomesclosetoatheism.Derridaexpressesthiswell.“Thissourceofnothingisalmostnothing.Itwouldbeexperienced,ifitwereexperienced,asexcessofeverythingthatcanberelatedtoit.Arelationofnothingtonothingthisrelationshipisbarelyarelationship.ImaginetheGodofnegativetheologyattemptingbyhim-selftodescribehimself,tocatchhimselfinthegridofadeterminingdiscourse:hewillalmostannihilatehimself”.Furthermore,“This‘unthinkable’underminestheintegrityofhumanity’sresponsetoGod.Unlessweareableinsomewaytorecogniserevelationwhenitcomestous,weareunabletoreceiveandrespondtothatevent”.

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agape,willcontinuetoremainbehindthisscreenastheunthinkableandwewill

remaincutoffbyit.

Marionwillattempttosetupaninter-spacewhichwillopenupbetweentheidol

andtheiconorbetweenoursituationoffinitudeandthecrossingof“Being”as

agape.

Thisinter-space,explainsMarion,needstobeanindeterminabletypeofspace.It

mustneitherbelongtothespaceoftheidolandneithertotheplaceoftheicon.

Thisspacewillinscribeanattitudethatisdistinguishedeitherbytheidolatrous

gazeorbyaniconicface.Thismediummustservetochallengetheunperceived

screenofthecategoryof“Being”.Ironically,itachievesthisbylendingusitsown

screenofidolatrysoastosidetracktheontologicaldifferencesetupbythe

screenof“Being”.Itmustnotreachthespaceoftheiconfortheicononlybegins

tocomeintoplayatthemomentthatagapeenvisagesourgaze.Marionreminds

usthatitisnotourgazethatdeterminestheicon“itisonlyenvisagedbythe

distancethatagapedispensesandtraverses”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing

1991,101).Therefore,inthesearchforanattitudeweshouldbelookingfora

gazethatwouldseenothingoftheidolyetatthesametimeagazethat“would

notdiscoveritselfseen–agazethatseesnothing,butthatnothingloves,with

neitheridolnoragape”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,106).

TheInter-SpaceofBoredom

Marionidentifiessuchagazeasboredom.Heusesthreeantitheticalideasto

describethisattitude.Firstly,heinsiststhatitmustnotbe“confusedwith

annihilation;thisboredgazedoes“notannihilate,destroy,orevendeny”(J.-L.

Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,118).Sinceitdoesnothaveanyinterestandis

thereforeindifferenttoanynegativeorpositiveinterestwhatsoever.Itisagaze

thatmerelyturnsawayanddeniesanythingdignified.Yetitneverdestroys,but

placesthisdignityfarfromitsspectacle.Itonlybringsanarrowhaloofinverted

gloryaroundanysuchvisible.Itdoesnotevenpayattentionwhenitgazesupon

thevisible.Suchisthisgazethatdivertsthevisibleandrefusestonoticeit.This

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refusalde-stabilisesitspowertoerectitselfasafirstvisible(idol)andannulsit,

yetwithouthavingtoannihilateit.

Secondly,onemustnotconfusethisgazeofboredomwithanattitudeofnihilism.

Marionassertsthat,indevaluingeventhehighestvalues,nihilismproceedsfrom

therealisationthateveryvalueonlyreceivesandlosesitsdignityasreferenced

fromsomeforeignevaluation.Value,then,isdependentuponaperson’sown

personalpreferenceanddecision.Nihilism,inthisrespect,doesnotescapebeing,

butonly“assignstoeverybeinganewwayofBeing–anevaluationbysomeone’s

willtopower”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,85).However,Marion

claims,thisisnotthecaseinthegazedeterminedbyboredom,itdoesnot“found

beings”,itdoes“notevendispute”.Itcertainlydoesnotdecideinfavourofits

ownfoundation,sinceitisnotinterestedinitsfavourordisfavour.Suchagaze

doesnot“establishitselfasanultimateidol”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing

1991,123).Thisgazeofboredomdoesnotintheleastconcernnihilism;

similarly,itdoesnotgoinsearchforanaffirmationlikewilltopower.Boredom

willneitherhateandnordoesitlove.Alliteverdoesistoabandonitselfinan

attitudeofpureindifference.Sincethereisnothingofvalueinthescopeof

boredom,unlikethetaskofnihilism,itdoesseekanyactivepurposebut

abandoningitselfofanypurpose.

Thirdly,onemustnotconfusethisboredomwithanxiety;specifically,an

understandingofanxietyas“thefundamentalmood”giventoitinthestatusof

being.Thisstatusofanxietyistheresultofthediminutionoftheoverallcategory

ofbeingandisbroughtaboutbyaphenomenologicaloperation,whichallowsit

tooperateasathreateningobsessioninandaroundDasein.Daseinnowgoverns

beingasrepulsionandgestureitbecomestheshepherdof“Being”andanxietyis

thecategorythatguardstheconceptofnothingness/nothing.Anxietyis

experiencedandholdsaplacein“Being”onthepartofreductionof

nothing/nothingness.Anxietyandboredomsharetheresponseofafrightened

retreat,atthesametime,neithermoodsleadtoanonticannihilationofbeings.

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Yet,theirfundamentalresponsetonothingnessisthepointofdeparture,

accordingtoMarion’sportrayal.

Anxiety,continually,criesoutinthedesert,bringing“Being”tosilentlyutter

anxiously.Yetboredomdoesnotevenhearnothing/nothingness,itisdeaftoany

call,lockingout“Being”nowcontrolledbyDasein.Itsonlynatureistosuspend

anyclaims,especiallythoseof“Being”.Boredomlendsnointeresttoanygiven

beinganditthereforereleasesitselffromeveryconstraint,limit,ortie.Itonly

manifestsitselfasuninterested.Thegazeofboredom,withtheattitudeof

indifferencetotheontologicaldifference,willdistractanypotentialgazebeing

fixedonanybeingofinterest.Itmovesthegazepastthevisibleidolandit“stops

itshortofeveryiconwhereagapecouldenvisageit”(J.-L.Marion,Godwithout

Being1991,126).Undertheattitudeofboredomthegazesees“allandnothing”


MeaninglessnessRulestheGap

Boredom’sgazeleadstoindifference,anattitudewhich,predictablyso,cares

littleabouttheonticdifferencebetweenbeingandnon-being.Theontological

differencefirstcameaboutundertheaegisthatabeingexists.Thecharacteristic

ofboredom’sgazesucceedsinripping“Being’s”spectacleawayfromit.This

rippingisfacilitatedbythemeaningofthewordmeaninglessness.

Meaninglessnessstandsparadingitsboredattitudebeforethethroneof“Being”,

whilstunfetteringit-selffromitsboundssetupintheontologicaldifference.The

resultisthatmeaninglessness,underthegazeofboredom,rulesinthegap

betweentheidolandtheicon.

Byenlistingthetermmeaninglessness,Marionisclosetoaccomplishingthe

deathblowtotheverynameof“Being”.Heispositingawayoutofthe

ontologicaldifferenceandthereforeoutofidolatry,yet,hemustfirstjustifyhis

applicationofthisterm.Hebeginsbyreferencingvanity(meaninglessness)in

theOldTestamentbookofEcclesiastes.AsMarioninterpretsit,vanityor

meaninglessnessimpactsonallaspectsofaperson’slife,orbeing;thisis

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summedupinthephrase“vanityofvanities,”whichmeans;“Allisvanity”

(Eccles.1:2-3).Thesignificanceisthatmeaninglessnesscoversandaffects

everythingintheonticworldandnothingescapesitsoutlook.Marionnotesthe

rareconstructionofanotherphrase“nothingnewunderthesun”thishe

interpretstoread“nothingnewinallthenew.”Thereisnothingnewinspace

andtimewhenitisseenfromtheperspectiveofmeaninglessness.

Meaninglessnessalwaysstrikesintheabsolutewithoutlimitorreserve.

However,ithasnotyetbeenestablishedthatthisisameaninglessnessthat

encompassesallbeings,whichisclearlyMarion’saim.Althoughboredombrings

withitanattitudeofmeaninglessnessonthetotality,itcannotbeconfusedwith

thetotalityofbeing.ThetextofEcclesiastesdoesnot“usethecopula‘is’”inthe

phrase“all(is)vanity”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,126),andbesides,

Hebrewdoesnotevenofferastrictequivalentoftheverb‘tobe’.Marion

concedesthattherelationshipwithwhichboredomstrikeswithvanitycannotbe

expressedasawayofbeing.Also,becausethetextofEcclesiastesdefinitelydoes

notexpresssuchtotalitiesaslife,death,knowledge,love,power,andevilswith

thewordbeing,itmustfollowthatvanityalsomustnotbeencompassedina

totalityofbeing.Althoughthereisnodenyingthatthetotalityisexpressedas

vain,yetitcannotbecertainthatthisreferstothetotalityofbeing.However,

Marionmitigates,thisworldappearsascreationandsototalitycouldbe

expressedastotalcreation.MarionnowdrawsonPaul’stheologytosupporthis

clarificationoftotalityascreation.Creation,Paulwrites,first“appearsbeing

subjectedtovanity”(Rom.8:20).Itiscreation,then,thatis“disengagedasan

absolutewhole”andnot“asatotalbeing,butqualifiedas‘created”(J.-L.Marion,


ThisleadsMariontoposittwototalities(ortotalisations).Inotherwords,there

aretwoviewpointsoftheworldandtheyareincompetitionwitheachother.One

interpretstheworldfromtheperspectiveofbeinginitsdifferencefrom“Being”.

Theotherinterpretstheworldasvaininitsstatusofcreatedindifference.This

doesnotmeanthatcreationcoincidesexactlywithvanitybut,whenseenwith

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theviewpointofboredom,itallowscreationtoonlybeseenwithindifference.

Thedifferenceintheworld“seemstoloomlargebetweenlivingandnolonger

living,enjoyingandsuffering,havingandnothaving,knowinganderring,even

beingandnotbeing,therefore;thisdifferencedoesnotindeedseemtobean

appearance,butthereality”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,131).

Marionhasdevelopedtheideaoftwoalternativeviews.Hehasalsopresented

oneoftheseviewsasthetruerealityortheacceptedview.Heisnowina

positiontopresentthealternativeview;thefoolishviewwhichistheview

openedupbythetermmeaninglessness.

Meaninglessnessmarksthisrealitywithindifferenceandthereforesuspendsthis

realitywiththelookofindifference.Itistheonlypointofviewthatsustainsan

outlookthatismadorexteriortotherealworldofdifference.Itisanexterior

thatcanbesummedupasfoolishness.Itisanexteriorworldthatismarkedby

thetwoconcepts;creationandvanity.Itisthelookofmeaninglessthatshinesits

brillianceupontheworldofdifferenceandbringsforththerealisationthat

anotherexistsoutsideofit.Thedarkflameofvanitylightsupafireoutsidethe

fireplaceoftheworldofdifference.

Thisoutsideworldascreation,andnotasbeing,ismarkedwithindifference.The

worldofbeingismarkedwithdifferenceandhasnoadvantagetothemaninall

thelabourbywhichhelaboursunderthesun.Againstthebackdropofvanity,

nothingistobegainedintheworldofdifference;nothingmatters,aman’s

interminablelabouringisnowpointless.Yet,hisworldofdifferencepresupposed

aviewthathasaninterest.Thisisnotthecaseintheworldofcreation.Creation’s

meaninglessviewpoint,broughtonbythegazeofboredom,“couldn’tcareless

withanything”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,132).Itlooksonthese

sameworthwhilethingsintheworldofdifferenceasbeingempty.

Marionnowoutlinestheprocessofthoughtthathappensinbringingabouta

viewpointofmeaninglessness.First,toestablishabasicoutlineofthisprocess,

hereturnstoEcclesiastes(1:2-3).Therehenotesthefundamentalmoodof

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boredomthatsuspendstheinterestbyindifference(1:3),thenhenotesthat

boredomtrainsitselfontotalitythatisnon-ontic,butonlyinthestateofcreation

(1:2)andfinally,hepointsoutthatvanity’ssuperlativeredoubling(vanityof

vanities)extendspastthedomainanddimensionsofthesensualworld(1:2).

Marionendsbyposingaquestion:“whenvanitystrikes,whatdoesitaccomplish,

infact?”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,134).

MarionappliesthisoutlinetoJerome’sanalogyofthelanternandthesunwhich

servestoexplainvanity’saccomplishment,inchangingaperson’sviewpointina

specificsituation.Anoccupantmayappreciatethelightfromalanterntolightup

theirroomatnight,butwhenthesuncomesupinthemorningitslight

disappearsyetwithoutbeingdestroyed.Itisnotextinguishedbythebrilliant

lightofthesun.Yetthislightfromthelanternsuffersavanity.Sointhesameway

thatthesunrendersthelightfromthelanterninvisible,itisthegazeofboredom

thatallowsdistancetobringanothergazefromelsewhere,onethatrisesover

theworldrenderingtheworldofdifferencemeaningless.

Thisindifferentgazecanbedescribedasthegazeofastrangerbecausethisgaze

renderstheworldofdifferenceodd,unhinged,andaforeignertoitself.This

worldofdifferenceislookeduponbyexcessandthislookistakenupfrom

anotherpoleoutsideofit.Meaninglessnesshappenswhentheworldfindsitself

takenintoviewbyanotherview,onetakenoutsideofitsownviewpointof

difference.SowhenthewriterofEcclesiastesseestheworldstruckby

meaninglessness,thisviewpointcomesfromwithinthegapsetupbythegazeof

boredom.Itisfromthisstandpoint,betweentheworldofdifferenceandthe

crossedoutGod,thatthisworldisviewed.Yetthisisnot“asthecrossedoutGod

seesit,butasseenbythecrossedoutGod”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,

137).ItislikeseeingtheworldfromtheplanetMarsitisseen“indistance”(J.-L.


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TheEucharistthePropersiteforTheology

Marionapplieshisstorytoboththeologyandtheecclesiasticalsituation.

AuthentictheologymustclaimtospeakforthecrossedoutGod,whocrossesout

everydivineidol,sensibleandconceptual.Iftheologyclaimstohaveasan

integralobjective;discoursesourcedfromGod;thensurelyitshouldseriously

considerthatitisonlyGodwhocanspeakwellofGod.Yet,ifthisinconceivable

Godisspeaking,andhasspoken,bygivinghimselfastheWord,evenasthesilent

Wordwhichisgiveninabandonedflesh,thenthissortoftheologyshouldreveal

itsGodwithinit.Byimplication,itseemsthatGodcanspeakforhimselfand

establishhisWord,andMarion’sconceptofthecrossedoutGodwillleadtothis

conclusion.

ChristiantheologyspeakswordsofChrist,oraboutChrist.Itisonlythistheology

thatcallsChristtheWord.Yet,Marionclaims,thisChristdoesnotyetspeak

wordsinspired“bythecrossedoutGodconcerningthecrossedoutGod,”buthe

doesbringtoanend“inhimselfthegapbetweenthespeakerwhostates

(prophetorscribe)andthesign(speechortext)”thatconcernsthiscrossedout

God.Since,notonlydoeshe“abolishthisgapbuthealsoabolishesanother“more

fundamental”one.Thissecondgapis“inus,humanity”.TheWordneedonly

speakhimself“theWord”andallisdone.Itisonlyinhimthat“thesign,the

locator,andthereferent”can“commune”withoutanymisunderstanding,

dispute,orconfusion.Thus,thisWordcameand“pitchedHistabernacle(tent)

amongus(orinourworld)”(John1:14).Itisonlyatourplacewheretheactual

experienceoflanguageirremediablydivorcesitselfanditisherewherehewill

meritthesesenselessstutteringofours,bymerelysayingHimself(J.-L.Marion,


MarionstatesthatChrist’sincarnationisredoubledbecauseitisourlanguage

thatmoreresolutelyconstitutesusthanourfleshandbone.Heincarnates

himselfinourwordsyetmencannotrendertohimanyhomagesincetheWord

isnotsaidinanyofourtonguesandaccordingtoourmannerofspeaking.Sohe

profferedhimselfinourwordsbyrevealinghimselfinthem.He,therefore,

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presentshimselfincarnatetousbeforeourwords.InourwordstheWord

accomplishesamysteriousun-speakablenessitisanincarnationthatmoves

beforeourwordsandwhichallowshimtospeakastheun-speakablenessand

whichalsoheletsspeakhim.Heletsusspeakhiminourwordsbygivinghimself

inthemtobespoken.

TheWordletshimselfbespokenbytheFatherashisWordhethereforespeaks

fortheFatherastheincarnatedWorddwellinginourworldandhepresents

beforeusHimselfastheincarnateappearingasthe“unspeakableSaid”inour

words.This“transference”oftheWordfromtheFathertotheincarnateSonto

theanteriorofourwordsdesignatestheSpirit.TheWord“profferedbythe

breathofthepaternalvoice,breath,Spirit”wherebywhichtheFatherandthe

Son“expirethesamebreath”thatistheSpirit,oneinhalingwhilsttheother

exhalingandanimatingtheTriuneGodwho“respiresamongus”(J.-L.Marion,


AnytrueChristiantheologicaldiscourse,therefore,mustbe“asaidoftheSaid,a

wordoftheWord,logosoftheLogos”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,

143).Any“doctrineoflanguage,theoryofdiscourseorscientificepistemology”

needstobeorderedby“theevent”demonstratedinthe“redoubledcapital”(e.g.

“S”inasaidoftheSaid)(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,143).Any

theologieswhichclaimtodoatheologyoftheWordmustnotprecede“theWord,

theSaidortheWord”.Itisnotamatterof“hermeneutics,linguistics,ormethods

ofthehumansciences”orconceding“tocertainconditions”inlightofthe“Christ

event”whichgoesthrough“afewmodifications,evenexceptions”(J.-L.Marion,

GodwithoutBeing1991,143).Sinceallmethodsfallshortof“theWord”andare

thereforeaninterpretativewordof“theWord”andnotstrictly“theauthentic

Word”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,143).Moreemphatically;“ifalogos

pretendstoprecedetheLogos,thislogosblasphemestheWord(of)thecrossed

ofGod”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,143)Thetheologianmustallow

himselftobespokenbythecrossedoutWordofGodwherebyhemustabandon

everylinguisticinitiativeandonlythenwillhebeabletospeaktheWordofthe

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crossedofGod.Sinceitisonly“tothedegreethatthecrossedoutGodwillspeak

ourlanguageandteachusintheendtospeakitashespeaksit–divinely,which

meanstosayinallabandon”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,144).

ItisontheeventofthedeathandresurrectionofJesusthattheWordactually

makeshisappearanceinthetextandit“isspokenbyaman,fidesexauditu

(madeaudiblebyfaith)”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,145).Andthis

mantransmitsthisWordinatextoftheoriginal“kerygma”bystatingitorby

allusion,orelsebydeployingitsdimensionsfollowingthecompleteNew

Testament.Yettheeventmakesuseofthetextandnotthereverse.TheWord

announcestheeventviatextswhichbecomeanoccurrence,asarevelation,ina

manwhohasabandonedhisownhermeneutic;onewholetstheWordspeakhis

words,orratheronewholetstheWordlethimspeakhumanlanguageintheway

thatthecrossedoutGodspeaksitinhisWord.

TheChristeventdoesnotproperlymatchthetextbutatbestitdeliverstoitthe

tracesofit.Mariongivestwoanalogiestofurtherilluminatehowthis

correspondenceofconsignmenthappensbetweentheeventandthetext.He

likensthisrelationshiptothewayinwhich“theveilofVeronicaretainsthe

featuresofChrist”,orbetter,formeatleast,tothewayinwhich“anuclear

explosionleavesburnsandshadowsonthewalls:anunbearableradiation”.Itis

these“shadows”thatcorrespondtotheevangelicaltexts,anditisthe“nuclear

explosion”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,145),whichisthecauseof

theseshadows.ThisnuclearexplosionisthereforetheoriginalChristevent,and

theeffectsleftbythiseventisthetext.Thevisible“evangelicaltextsfixliterally

theeffectsofmeaningandmemoryofthewitnesses”buttheseareincapableof

determininganyhistoricalmeaning“ofanunimaginable,unheardof,

unforeseeable,andinasenseinvisibleirruption”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing

1991,146).Thismeansthatthebestthesetextscanprofferitsreaderisasimple

encounterwiththisevent.Butwhatinevitablyhappensisthatthereaderis

continuallytemptedtomasterthesetextswiththeirownhermeneuticscience,

whichtherebyprohibitsallutteranceoftheevent,oftheSaid.Marionclaimsthat

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“nohumanhermeneuticcouldeveropenoureyestoseetheexegeteofthe

Father”(John1:18)untilweacceptthatthistrueexegeteisChristhimself(J.-L.


Accordingly,Marionbelievesthatcontactwiththetrueexegetecanonlybe

accomplishedinthetheologicalsiteoftheEucharist.Herefersthereadertothe

accountofLuke24toaddsupporttothisbelief.Thisaccountactuallydescribes

Jesuscarryingoutanexegesisof“MosesandalltheProphets”.InLuke24,some

ofhisdisciples,whowerestrugglingwiththedisappointmentofhisdeath,are

departingJerusalemontheirwaytoavillagenamedEmmaus.Theyaresuddenly

joinedontheirjourneybyJesushimself,buttheyareunawarethatitishim.Yet

atthattimetheywerediscussinganinfamousmannamed“JesusofNazareth”

andall“thethings”thathadhappenedtohim.Theyrecountthesethingstothis

supposedstranger,whoisJesus.TheyrecallhowGodandtheIsraelitepeople

hadconsideredJesustobeamanwhowas“powerfulinwordanddeed”andyet

hewasbetrayedby“theirrulersandchiefPriests”whenthey“handedhimover

tobesentencedtodeath”.Moreover,itwasafterhissubsequentdeath,which

camebyway“crucifixion”,andhisentombmentthatsomeofhisfollowers

testifiedtoseeinghim“alive”(Luke24:19-24).

Afterlisteningtothesethings,then,thestrangerarticulatesanexegesisforthem

ofcertainundisclosedpericopaeintheOldTestamentScriptures.Althoughhe

doesnotdisclosewhichpassagestheywere,hisexegesisofthesepassageswas

enoughforthemtobelievethatthese“things”thattheyhadrecountedtohim

werealreadypredestinedtohappentohim(Luke24:27).Marion’s

interpretationrevealsthatthetextdisclosestwodifferenthermeneuticallenses.

JesususedtheOldTestamentScripturesasalenstointerpretthose“things”the

disciplesrecounted.Incontrast,thedisciplesusedtheirownassumptionsto

interpretthesethings,inthat,“theyhadhopedthathewastheonewhowas

goingtoredeemIsrael”(Luke24:21).Fromthisvantagepointthese“things”(his

wordsanddeeds,hisbetrayal,hisdeath,burial,andresurrection),astheywere

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interpretedbythetrueexegeteJesus,willtaketheprideofplaceindetermining

anyauthenticinterpretationsoftheScriptures.

Marionclaimsthatthisaccountdescribesonlyonecontinuouseventandnottwo

independentones,ahermeneuticone(Luke24:13-27)andEucharisticone(Luke

24:28-35).ItisintheeventofcelebratingtheEucharistwheretruehermeneutics

andpropertheologyhappen!Heexplainsthat,“theWordintervenesinperson”,31

ashedidontheroadtoEmmaustohisconfusedanddisgruntleddisciples,in

ordertoalonecompletethehermeneuticintheEucharisticmoment.Itisthis

interventioninperson,by“thetruereferent”oftheScriptures,whorubber

stampshismarkat“thecentreoftheirmeanings,oftheWord,outsideofthe

works,toreappropriatethemtohimselfas‘whatconcernshim’”(Luke24:17).

AndthisonlyhappensatthecelebrationoftheEucharistwherethehermeneutic

(hencefundamentaltheology)willtakeplace.

Thus,itisonlyinthespaceoftheEucharistthatthetruetheologianisfound.Itis

amongtheChristianassemblythatcelebratestheEucharistthatthetrue

theologian’shermeneuticissecured.Anassemblywillcontinuallyreproducethis

hermeneuticalsiteoftheologyeverytimeitcelebratestheEucharist.Thetexts

arereadbeforetheassemblybeginsitsprocessofbuildingaspaceforthetrue

exegetetoenterandmeetwiththem.ItisthePriestwhopresidesoverthe

Eucharistwhopetitionsinthenegativebyaskingforaninterpretationto

comprehendnotwordsofthetext,buttheWord.SowhenthePriestbeginsby

carryingoutthehermeneuticofthetextstheassemblyisunawarethatinthe

Priest“theWordinperson”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,147),had

takenresidenceamongthem.Theinterpretationisverballyexecutedinthe

homily–“theliterarymodeparexcellenceofthetheologicaldiscourse”(J.-L.

Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,153).Thismust“beaccomplishedinthe

EucharisticritewheretheWord,visibleabsent,makeshim-selfrecognisedinthe

31DanielL.Migliore,FaithSeekingUnderstanding(Michigan:Ww.B.EerdmansPublishingCo,2004),288-293.SeeanarrayofwaystointerprettheLord’sSupper.ThesecanbeseenasdestabilizingMarion’sonlywayofinterpretingtheLord’sSupper.

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breakingofthebread,characterisesthePriestashisperson,andassimilatesto

himselfthosewhoassimilatehim”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,153).

Theassemblyhearsthewordspassingthroughthemverballytowardthe

referentWordasthecarnalWordwalksalongwiththecommunityandthe

communitywithhim.Theassemblyinterpretsthetextinviewofitsreferent,but

theassemblyisalsointerpretedbybeingcalledtobeconvertedandinterpreted

byitsreferentandtoactasasacramentwhichisbyactuallyactinginthe

community.Itis“theliturgicalserviceofthetheologianparexcellence,the

Bishop”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,153),thatallowsthecommunity

tobeinterpretedbytheWordbutalsobyallowingitselftobeassimilatedand

interpreted.

TheWorddeterminesanytrueinterpretationofthetextbecauseheisitstrue

referent.ThereferentcanonlypresentintheEucharisticcelebration.Therefore,

truetheologicaldiscourse,devoidofidolatroussubversionofitsreferent,occurs

onlyinthespaceoftheEucharisticcelebration.Thisisthesitewherethereferent

enters,authorisingthecelebranttosayhisWordandtheblessing.Itisthe

celebrantwhofindshimself“investedbythepersonaChristi;thenonemust

concludethatonlythebishopmeritsinthefullsense,thetitleoftheologian”(J.-L.

Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,153).InfollowingorthodoxCatholictradition,

heistheonewhopresidesovertheEucharistand“theteachingoftheWord

whichcharacterisestheapostlesandthosewhofollowedintheirplace”(J.-L.

Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,147).Itisthe“bishopwhodelegatestothe

simplePriest”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,147)tooverseethe

Eucharistbut,inthesameway,thatthePriestfallsoutofcommunionwiththe

Bishopandcannolonger“enterintoecclesiasticalcommunion”,theteacheralso

“whospeakswithout,evenagainst,theSymboloftheapostles,without,even

againsthisBishop,canabsolutelynotcarryonhisdiscourseinanauthentically

theologicalsite”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,153).Noteachercanbe

designatedasbeing,orperformingthetaskof,“aTheologian”whenhedoesnot

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“inscribehimselfintotheEucharisticriteopenedbytheBishop”(J.-L.Marion,


DistanceandtheEucharisticGift

Mariondrawsinthewideraudience/readership(communionofthesaints)with

furtherexplanationontherightattitudeofapproachtoGod.Havingbeen

releasedfromthiscategoryofbeing,amoreappropriateonemustbesoughtso

astoadvancetowardagodliergod.Inthecaseathand,Marionselectstwo

conceptsthatherecognisesthatcanopenontothisgodliergod:“vanityand,

conversely,charity”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,169).Wemustmake

ourapproach,whilstalwaysbeingmindfultoavoidthepitfallofthehorizonof

being,throughanassumptionthatgoddidnothavefirsttobebeforehecameto

firstloveusandsothislovewasalwaysbeforewecametobeinthebeingof

beings.Thismeanswedonothavetolinger,waitingforourowncategoryof

beingofbeingsfromwhichtoadvancetoenvisagehim,onthecontrary,wehave

tobreaktherulesofbeinginordertorisklovinglove–bare,raw.Thus,Charity

shutsusoutofourprioritywhichactuallyresidesinthecategoryofbeing.

Therefore,wemustapproachthegodliergodfromitsantagonisticconcept

vanityviamelancholy,andnotfromthatoflove.

Marionclaimsthateventhosewhodonotlovedoindeed“experiencemorethan

nothinginthisdisaster”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,132).Thismust

meanthattheyatleastexperiencevanitythroughmelancholy.TakingMarion’s

conclusionforgranted,thatweareactuallyinadisaster,then,canbeunderstood

tomeanthatwheneverwetrytoaspiretolovetheonlywayopentousisfroma

placeofmelancholywithitsonlyresultantgainloveofvanity.Therefore,Marion

claims,weonlyessentially“experiencetheirreducibilityoflovebydefault”(J.-L.

Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,133).Itisfromthisrationalethatananswer

emergestothisproblem;itistheconceptdistance.Thiswillsaveusfromthese

twomanaclesofmelancholyandvanity,whichhavekeptusheldinitsall

persuasiveprisonofbeing.

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WehaveatendencytolimitGodwithinourownconceptualbounds,butachange

inournegativeperceptionofdistancewillhelpreleaseusfromthesebounds.For

itisoutofthisGroundofgroundingdistance,thatoursaviourfigureemerges

transformedbytheconceptofdistanceintoanabandonedlove,andfromthis

abandonedloveintothegiftofloveandfinally,intothegodlierGodasagift.This

godlierGodprecedesourbeingandthemetaphysicalcategoryofbeing.Weall

experienceagift,although,intheformoftheloveofvanitywhichhavebeen

spawnedfromfeelingsofmelancholy–distance/disaster–andallthewhile

beingunawarethatitisoutofloveforourownvanitythatourconceptionsofthe

divine,intheformofanidol,cometoeventuate.Yetacompletelydifferentpath

hasbeenforgedforusinordertofindagodlierGod.ThisgodlierGodcanonly

becomeapparentdevoidofourownattachedidolatrousreflectionofthedivine,

throughanunderstanding,intheChristiantraditionalsense,oftheicon.

Therefore,God,understoodasaGodthatisnolongerundertheaegisofbeing,is

nowenabledtocometousinandasagift.ForGoddidnothavetofirstbe,since

helovedusfirstandtheGodwhoisnothassavedHimself,asthegift,fromthe

categoryofbeing.Foragiftdoesnothavetofirstbe,beforeitpoursitselfoutin

abandonthat,alone,actuallycausesittobe.Hesavesthegiftfromthecategory

ofbeingingivingitbeforewecametobe.Thewayisnowclearedtoopenonto

thegiftorcharityandalsoitsnegativeaccomplicevanity.Loveismademore

thanitisanalysed.MarionproceedsviatheEucharisticritualoftheWordwhich

hebelievesdeliversitself“fromthewordsofthetext”inorder“tobemadeflesh”.

Itisoutsidethetextthat“lovecreatesitselfabody”(J.-L.Marion,Godwithout

Being1991,110).Thislove“passes”viatheEucharisticgifttoform“onebody

withourbody”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,112).Heclaimsthat“if

thenweareonebodywiththeWordthensurelywecanspeakaboutorforthis

Word”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,112).Thismeanswehavefinally

beenreleased“tospeakandnotremainsilent”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing

1991,114).

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Dissemination

SituatedwithintheChristianmeta-narrative,32Marion’snarrativeisCatholicand

itstrajectoryemergesfromwithinamysticaldiscoursefoundintheChristian

Patristicapophatictradition(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,75-78).It

thereforehasanemphasisonprotectingthetranscendentattributesofthe

ChristiantraditionalGod33fromungodlyhumanconceptsandlanguage.He

acceptsHeidegger’sdeconstructiveaccountofthemetaphysicaltradition34and

thetraditionaltheologicalcritiqueofidols35(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing

1991,68-69),bysublatingHeideggeraccountintoPseudo’account.Hewillthen

goontosustainthat“itisinappropriatetoattempttoobtainknowledgeofGod

throughvisualorconceptualidols”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,82).

SuchaconclusionresultsinadenialofanyGodtalkandultimatelycanendin

completesilence.Marioncollapsesthedisseminationofthemetaphysical

tradition(SeeanotherdiscoursewhichdestabilizesHeideggeronto-logical

dissemination,Chapter1,pp.35-37)backandintothecategoryofonto-

theological“Being”(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,75-78).Although

Heideggerwasnotatheologianhewrotethat“ifheweretowriteatheology–to

whichIsometimesfeelinclined–thentheword‘Being’wouldnotoccurinit.

Faithdoesnotneedthethoughtof‘Being’.Whenfaithhasrecoursetothis

thought,itisnolongerfaith.ThisiswhatLutherunderstood.”(Caputo,

DemythologizingHeidegger1993,44).

32MeroldWesphal,OvercomingOnto-theology:TowardaPostmodernChristianFaith(NewYork:FordhamUniversityPress,2001),xii.“Inthefirstplace,aphilosophicalofhistory,abigstoryinwhichweplacethelittlestoriesofourlivesasindividualsandcommunities,inthissenseChristianityisundeniablyameta-narrative,aHeilsgeschichte(salvationhistory),thatrunsfromCreationandtheFallthroughthelife,death,andresurrectionofJesustothesecondcoming,theresurrectionofthedead,andthelifeeverlasting.Amen”.33Jean-LucMarion,IdolandDistance(NewYork:FordhamUniversity,2002),144.“Languagecarriesoutitsdiscoursetothepointofnegationandsilence.Butjustasthedeaththatisrefusedaccordingtothelovematuresintotheresurrection,sosilencenourishesinfiniteproclamation”.34MeroldWestphal,OvercomingOnto-theology:TowardaPostmodernChristianFaith(NewYork:FordhamUniversityPress,2001),4.“ItisacritiqueofametaphysicaltraditionthatextendsfromAnaximandertoNietzscheandincludesAristotleandHegelashighpriests”.35Jean-LucMarion,IdolandDistance(NewYork:FordhamUniversity,2002),144.“TheidentityoftheGodwhorevealedhimselfwithoutvisualrepresentation(Ex3:4)andthecrucifiedonewhoinparadoxicallanguageiscalledtheiconoftheinvisibleGod(Col.1:15)”.

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Yetinaccordwiththepostmodernviewtheindefinitearticlescouldbeusedhere

–aCatholicview,anApophaticview–whichwouldsignifythatthesetitles

cannotsumupanentiregroup’sviewpoint.Thisissimplybecauseagroupis

madeupofindividualswhohavedifferingviewpoints.Thisisunderpinnedby

the/apostmodernidealoftheshowingupofdifference.Ofcourseusingthe

indefinitearticleineverycaseisimpracticalandinstitutingsuchrulesdoesnot

necessarilychangeone’sview.Yetitdoesserveasareminderatthispointthat

thebestwaytoapproachmetaphysicalnarrativesisfroman“openstance”,and

byseeingnarrativesascontainingamixoftruth36andnontruth(Ricoeur,

InterpretationTheory1976,25-34)willhelpencouragethisopenstance.

Marion’sperspectiveonrealityconsistsofatrinityoftierswhichexistsofthe

invisibleinfinitedepth,thegapandtheworldofdifference.Hisidealprojectisto

protectanyhumanattributesbeingtransferredtohistranscendentGodthrough

theirconceptsandlanguage.Thisprotectiveinclinationcomesfromthepremise,

hisacceptanceofHeidegger’scritiqueofmetaphysicsandPseudo’critiqueof

idols,thathumanityhad,always,containedGodintheirownconceptualideals.

Thesearethereforeidolatrous.Atthebottom,hebelievesthattheintentionality

ofhumanendeavours(willtopower)producesamirrorwhichforcesrealityto

conformtoanindividual’spresuppositions,sothatwhenthetermGodisthought

humanconceptsforthisGodareimmediatelyinstituted.Itistheseconceptsof

Godthatarereflectedbacktotheindividualusuallyrepresentativeoftheirsuper

self.Thissuperself,asGod,isthensetinplacetocontrolallotherreality.

SoitisassumedthatMarionwantstohelppracticingCatholicsabandonthis

sinfulhumanprojectionofGod.ThishumanprojectiononGod,ashe

36MeroldWestphal,OvercomingOnto-theology:TowardaPostmodernChristianFaith(NewYork:FordhamUniversityPress,2001),84.“Becausewecannottranscendthelimitedperspectiveofourlocationintimeandinculturalhistory,knowledgecanneverbeTruth(capital‘T’).Butculturalpractisesarenotjustfiniteandcontingent;theyarealsofallenandcorrupt,apointthepostmodernistsarenotslowtopointout(eveniftheydon’tspeakthelanguageofsinandthefall).ThistakesusfromthehermeneuticsoffinitudetothehermeneuticsofsuspicionandintroducesustoanotherwholeclassofreasonswhyTruthexceedsourgrasp.AsNietzscheputsit,pureTruthisnotexactlythehighestpriorityofourwilltopower”,orasPaulputittherearethose“whobytheirwickednesssuppressthetruth”(Rom.1:18).

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understandsit,comesfromaperson’sintentionality.Althoughhisproposalcan

seemnon-sense,thinkingaGodoutofhumanmotivations,thinkingand

language,37yetinhisattempt,heassumesathreetieredunderstandingofreality:

thehomeofGod,thetemporalhomeoftheCatholicChristian,andthehomeof

thosewhoarenotCatholic.Thiscompartmentalisation,whetherinmindorreal,

helpstocreateanidealhomeforhis“crossedoutChristianGod”,onethatis

separatefromanyofthesehumansubjections.

MediationbetweenthisGodandhumanitywillbeviaanextendedportalwhich

opensoutontohumanthinkingandlanguage.Opposedtotheworldofhuman

thinkingandontheothersideofthisportal,istheinfinitedepth,thehomeofhis

crossedoutGod.ToachievehisprojectMarionhaspresupposedathreewaysplit

intheworldofhumanthinking.Attheextremeendofacontinuumisthehomeof

thecrossedoutGodandattheother,theworldofdifference,orwhichcanalso

beimplied,thenonCatholicandCatholicworld.Heestablishesthebordersof

eachsideofthissplit,byadoptingtwophenomenologicalperspectives,whichhe

seemstohavederivedfrompsychologicalmeans.Hehopestosqueezeoutall

humanmotivationsfromhistruepictureofGod.Atthecentreofthiscontinuum,

isaplaceofcompleteneutralitybetweenthesetwoextremeperspectives.Such

neutralityresultsinaperspectiveofcompletesuspensiondevoidofany

conclusionsaboutultimatereality,inclusiveofGodandthehumanworldof

difference,ortheCatholicandnon-Catholicworlds.Thisplaceofsuspension

seemstobereachedthroughaprocessofpsychologicalstates.

Thisprocessissetofffromaninteriorfearthattheoutsideworldisfraughtwith

manydangers.Despitesomeofthesedangersbeingmanageable38manyarenot

37KevinWHector,TheologywithoutMetaphysics(CurrentIssuesinTheology)(NewYork:UniversityofCambridge,2011),22.Marionhasmerelysubstitutedonesetofconditionsforanother“.AnyonetryingnottothinkofGod,withoutconceptualizingonefirst,willrealisticallyfinditanimpossibletask.Also,thereisnowayoftellingwhetheraconceptualGodiswrongorright,tothink,sincethereisnoGod’seyepointofview,andthereforethismustfirstbedecideduponby,thethinker,himselforherself.38JohnCaputo,PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)(Nashville:AbingdonPress,2006),1.“Onceuponatime,onalittlestarinadistantcorneroftheuniverse,cleverlittleanimalsinventedforthemselvesproudwords,liketruthandgoodness.Butsoonenoughthelittlestarcooled,andthelittle

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andsothismakestheworldaverysadplace,adisaster(SimiliartoNeitzsche’s

horrorsceneseeCaputo2006,1).Thisinturnproducesamelancholicmental

statewhichmaterializestotransformone’sworldintoaboringplace(Similiarto

Derrida’understandingof‘Khora’seeShakespeare2009,103-5)devoidofany

selfsignificance.Suchafullyfledgedstateofboredomcreatesaworldof

meaninglessness.Thisdisinterestedoutlookbringsonetoreassesstheirreality.

Andforatimeonewillbeunsureofone’spurposeintheworld,atthesametime,

reassessingtheworld’smeaning.Whatitdoesistounhingetheirassertionson

liferesultinginthemsuspendingtheirjudgementonsuchavowals.Initially,

whenthisstateisreacheditmakesthemvulnerabletoanyandevery

perspective,nomatterhowbizarre,sinceitisaplacewhereone’sseemingly

solidintentionality(motivations)isbreached.ItcanbededucedthatitisMarion

desire’stodescribethispsychologicalstateinthephenomenologicalterm,of

suspension,andgraftitintoaCatholicreligiousstate.39Accordingtothis

synergisticunderstanding,hepresentsthesepsychologicalprocessesasan

explanationfortheprocesseswhichareexperiencedinachurchworshipservice.

Thisexperientialprocessbeginswithentryintothechurchbuildingand

culminatesintheEucharisticevent.

ItisthisphenomenologicalperspectivethatMarionplacesinthegapbetween

thetwoworlds,theworshippingCatholicandthenon-worshippingCatholic,and

throughwhichhefurtherdelineatestheconfinesoftheirborders.Heachieves

thisbycentringit(thissuspendingperspective)betweenthehomeofthe

transcendentunthinkableorindeterminateGodononeside,andontheother,

theborderseparatingit(thisperspective)fromthehomeofthenon-Catholicor

worldofdifference.Morestrictly,theCatholicChristian’sphenomenological

animalshadtodieandwiththemtheirproudwords.Buttheuniverse,nevermissingastep,drewanotherbreathandmovedon,dancingitscosmicdanceacrosstheendlessskies”.39RobynHorner,Jean-LucMarion:ATheo-logicalIntroduction(Surrey:Ashgate,2005),14.Thiscaneasilybeimpliedfromthefollowingcitation;“ItisimportanttorealizethatMarion’smorespecificallytheologicalinterestsandideashavearisenincloseconnectionwithanattempttodevelopfurtherEdmundHusserl’sphenomenology”.ShecitesJean-LucMarionBeingGiven:TowardaPhenomenology(Stanford:UniversityPress,2002.),71-4includingn2p342,andJean-LucMarionIdolandDistance(NewYork:FordhamUniversityPress,2002.),xxxi-ii.

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perspectiveisdefinedbymeaninglessness,whenitiscontrastedwiththatofthe

non-Catholicphenomenologicalperspectiveofmeaningfulness.Therefore,itis

theirrelevantviewsonreality40whichdeterminemeaningforthem.

Thispostmodernoutlookofsuspension(Marion,GodwithouBeing,108-18;

Shakespeare2009,24-32)isthecatalysttochangeone’sperspectiveand

establishanalternativeperspectiveinitsconcurrencewitheveryprocess;

suspensionthenCatholicpositionputforward...untilthisCatholicposition

becomestheperson’spermanentanddominantoutlookonreality.This

phenomenologicalperspectivecanbeseentoconvertaperson’snon-Catholic

perspective,tothatofaCatholicperspective,butitcanalsohelp,psychologically,

indealingwithlife’sirruptionsbyhelpingonetomasteritstwistsandturns.

Theworshipperinasuspendedstateofmindisnowopentonewmeaningand

thisisintensifiedthroughthecelebrationoftheEucharisticevent.Thiseventacts

asavisibleicontoastorehouseofexcessivemeaning.Itistheapexofthisportal

whichallowstheWord(Christ/Gift/Love),whoistheinvisibleiconsoficons,to

burstforthandimbibethewordsoftheCatholicbishop,sothattheWord’s

wordsbecomethewordsofthebishop(SeediscussiononAugustine’s

understandingofinnerandexternalword/s,Jensen2007,18-25).Thisalso

allowsMarion’sinvisibletranscendentGodtomaintainanaloofnessfromhuman

lifedeterminedbythecategoryofBeingorDaisen(beingintheworldof

existence)(Seesecondidolatry,J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,45-48).It

isviatheEucharisticeventandthebishopthatGodcommunicatestothe

Assembly,withoutbeingdeterminedbyanyhumanidolatrousintentions,or

conceptsimposedbytheworshippers.Marion,therefore,makestheCatholic

ChurchandtheEucharisticeventtheonlypropersiteoftheology.Moreover,he

makeseachCatholicbishopthetheologianparexcellence(J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,139-160).Thishelpsparishionersstayconnectedtothe

CatholicChurchaswellashavingtheabilitytoconvertnewentrants.

40JohnCaputo,PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)(Nashville:AbingdonPress,2006),45.“Weareintruthshapedbythepresuppositionsweinherit”.

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Anthropologicallyspeaking,thisisalifeaffirmingstoryifoneacceptstheseatof

Marion’ssystem,givingupone’sownintentionality(willtopower)foranother’s

(thecrossedoutGodexpressedbythebishop),andputtingtheirtrustinthe

Catholicchurch.NotonlycanapersontrusttheCatholicChurchtowashaway

theirsins,onecanalsobereassuredthatitistheonlysiteforhearingfromGod,

relievingthemofamajorheartache.Thismajorheartachecanbeconstruedasa

constantstruggle,ofdistinguishing,betweentheirownthinkingandintentions,

andthoseofGod’s.And,although,theworshipandEucharisticeventmayinitially

impressnegativethoughtsofmeaninglessness,whencomparedtothenon-

Catholicworldofdifference,theoverallresultforthemwillbetoreaffirmtheir

spiritualwell-beinginthelovingarmsofGodexpressedthroughtheCatholic

Church.Theywillfeelmoreandmoreliketheyhavemadetherightdecisionin

obeyingGod,injoiningandcontinuingwiththeCatholicChurch,andbyadhering

totheproperoutlookregardingtheirrelationshipwiththetruecrossedoutGod.

Ontheonehand,Marion’stoneandstyleissomewhatstoried,whichhasa

positiveeffectthatportraystheCatholicChurchasGod’splace.Onecanimagine

suchaplace,whereoneisusheredintothewarmthoftheassemblystepbystep,

andafterenteringthroughitsdoors,onemayfindthatoneisstillshivering,from

theresidualcoldexperiencedfromthestruggles,strains,andstresses,thathad

beencontractedintheworldofcompetition.Yetonceonehascrossedthe

thresh-hold,betweenthetwoworlds,onebeginstofeelsoftened,bytheloving

andradiantwarmthoftheinvisibleindeterminateGod,whopermeateswithinits

secureprecincts.Theinitialglance,thefirstbrilliance,ofeveryicon’sdesigner,

soonbecomesinone,alockedandfixedphenomenologicalgaze,andasoneis

drawninbytheinfiniteeyesofeveryicon,one’sinterestswithlife,outsidethe

church,slowlybeginstodissipate.

Ontheotherhand,theworshipperisbroughttofocusonhumanwordsasthey

listeninamazementtotheWordspeakingthroughthevocalchordsofahuman

being.TheinvisibleGodisinterpretingHisownwordsthroughthevisiblemouth

ofhisbishop.Whatwisewords!Whatexquisitewords!Believeandbefilledwith

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theWordspokenthroughthewordsofhisbishop.Invisibilityhasmeshedwith

visibility,subjectwithobject,referencewithreferencesandthelinesbetween

innerWordandexternalwordsaresubsequentlydissipated.Thereisno

difference.Thereisnoseparation.Thebishopisinterpretingthewrittenwords

totheassemblyjustlikeJesus–theWord–whohadinterpretedthedisciples

concernsonthatfamousroadtoEmmaus(Luke24:13-33).Worshippersare

encouragedtoacceptthatGodisspeakingtotheminthehereandnow.

Ironically,whatMarionachievescanbeseenasareversalofthemessageof

Christ’sdisciples,andtheorthodoxCatholictradition’screeds.41Byattemptingto

protecthisGodfromthehumancategoryof“Being,”heexhumesthe

reconciliatoryelementout42ofthegospelmessage.ThewritersoftheNew

Testamenttellastorywhichbringshumanitybackintocommunionwiththe

oncetranscendentalandHolyGod(Jn.14:6,20:31;Luke24:47;Rom.1:7,5:1).

Theytellofahumanitythatwas,initially,unabletobridgethegapbetween

themselvesandthedistantGod.43YetMarionwantstodrivethisGodbackinto

thedistance,onlytoconstrainhimtoonesignifier:thebishop/Eucharisticevent.

HepushesreceptivehistorybackintoapaststorylinetothepositionwhereGod

hadexcommunicatedhumanityfromthegarden(Gen.3).Yet,itwasthisGod’s

lovefortheworld(Jn.3:16)that,ultimately,drovehimtobridgethisprimordial

gap.

41SeefollowingonideasofR/revelation.AlisterE.McGrath,(London:Wiley-BlackwellPublications,2011.),63,77-78,120-172.WillistonWalker,AHistoryoftheChristianChurch(NewYork:CharlesScribnerandSons,1997.),88-101.DanielL.Migliore,FaithseekingUnderstanding:AnIntroductiontoChristianTheology(GrandRapids:EerdmansPublishingCo,2004.),20-53.42RoyalHumbert,ACompendiumofAlexanderCampbell’sTheology(StLouis:TheBethanyPress,1961),38.Godhascomedowntous;“InhimwemayapproachGodwithfreedomandconfidence(Eph.3:12)&‘Letusapproachthethroneofgracewithconfidence,sothatwemayreceivemercyandfindgracetohelpusinourtimeofneed(Heb.4:16).43RoyalHumbert,ACompendiumofAlexanderCampbell’sTheology(StLouis:TheBethanyPress,1961),45.Godhasraisedusuptohim;“AndGodraisedusupwithChristandseateduswithhimintheheavenlyrealmsinChristJesus,inorderthatinthecomingageshemightshowtheincomparablerichesofhisgrace,expressedinhiskindnesstousinChristJesus.Foritisbygraceyouhavebeensaved,throughfaith–andthisisnotofyour-selves,itisagiftofGod–notbyworks,sothatnoonecanboast”(Eph.2:8-9).

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IttellsofaGodwhowasbornofawoman(Matt1:18-24c.f.Luke2:6-7)and

thereforeintoBeing/Dasein.(AgainstMarion’ssecondidolatry,J.-L.Marion,God

withoutBeing1991,37-48).Hegrewupengaginghumanthinkingand

theologicaldiscussions,destabilizesMarion’sonlyveiw,thatGodabhorshuman

speechandconceptsregardinghimself,J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,1-

2c.f.Luke2:41-52).Hespoketowomen(Jn.4),taxcollectors(Luke.5:27-32),and

religiousleaders(Matt.21:23-27)abouttheirunderstandingofGod.Hespoketo

theblind,lame,andthosewithleprosy(Jn.5:1-15).Hisentireprojectwasto

relatetoallofhumanity,personally,whichisanaspectunderstoodintheword

salvation(Acts.4:12).DespiteMarion’sdetermination,itisamessagethat

continuestobedemonstrated,atleast,inmanyofthemainlineChristian

religiousgroups,inclusiveoftheCatholicChurch.

Itisamessagethatwasproclaimedthroughcommonmen,suchasfishermen

(Jn.4:18-22),andtheyspoke,aboutthisGod,usinghumanwordswhichalso,

obviously,containedhumanconceptsforthisGod(i.e.Father).TheytellofaGod

whohumbledhimself.Thishumilitywasanemptyingthatrestrictedhisdivine

advantages(Phil.2:5-8),soHewastoexperiencehumanityattheircore(Heb.2:

14-15).Hewasonewhodidnotstandalooftohumanity,butinvolvedhimselfin

thethickofhumanity’sworld,andthisdemonstrationcertainlydidnotonly

communicatehistranscendence(Matt17:5),butmorequantitativelyhis

immediateimmanence.44Allofthiscommunicationinvolvedhumanlanguage,

notdivinelanguage,thatis,ifsuchalanguageactuallyexists;hecommunicated

withhumanityastheirequal.Allthisspeaksofhisdesireforhumanityto

understandHimtotheutmost(Eph.3:4).ItportraysanotherGod,onethatis

contrarytoMarion’sGodandwhodoesnotonlyspeakthroughtheCatholic

44RoyalHumbert,ACompendiumofAlexanderCampbell’sTheology(StLouis,TheBethanyPress,1961),54.Campbellbringsupaninterestingthoughtinthe“TheNewTestamentunderstandingofGodasJesusChristposesnoproblemwithhumanlanguage.Itonlyposesaproblem,supposedly,withtheOldTestamenttranscendentunderstandingofGod”.

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bishop,andmanyhaveacceptedthisunderstandingofGodbyreadingand

acceptingtheseNewTestamentwritingsasGod’sself-revelation.45

Suchthinkerstestifythatthesewritingsgivethemconfidenceinlife.Itislife

affirmingtothem.Goddoesnotofferthemsalvation,whichisamessagethat

reversedoneman’sdisobediencebyone’sman’sobedience(Rom.5:12-21),only

toretracthimselfbackintotheinvisibledeeptobeshroudedinmysteryagain.

ThisiscertainlySaintPaul’sunderstandingofthegospel,notasamystery,butas

amysterycompletelyrevealed(Eph.3:2-6).46Peteralsowitnessestothis;

“Concerningthissalvation,theprophets,whospokeofthegracethatwasto

cometoyou,searchedintentlyandwiththegreatestcare,tryingtofindoutthe

timeandcircumstancestowhichtheSpiritofChristinthemwaspointingwhen

hepredictedthesufferingsofChristandthegloriesthatwouldfollow...that

havenowbeentoldtoyoubythosewhopreachedthegospeltoyoubytheHoly

Spirit”(1Peter1:10-12).ThisGoddoesnotwanthumanitytoremainignorantof

45DanielL.Migliore,FaithseekingUnderstanding:AnIntroductiontoChristianTheology(GrandRapids:EerdmansPublishingCo,2004.),46.“Withinthebiblicalwitness,thereisrelentlesscriticismofeveryauthoritythatidentifiesitselfwiththeultimateauthorityofGod.Jesusrefusedtoascribeultimacyeithertoreligiousdoctrinesandtraditions(Matt5:21ff;Mark11:28ff.)ortotheclaimsofthestate(Mark12:13-17).TheapostlePauldistinguishedbetweenwrittencodesthatkillandtheSpiritthatgiveslife(2Cor.3:6).Thisremarkablebiblicalheritageoffreedomfromallidolatry,includingbibliolatry,wasvigorouslyupheldbyMartinLuther,whousedthetermstrawtodescribeallscripturaltextsthatfailedtoexpressclearlytheliberatingmessageofChrist.JohnCalvinwasnotasboldasLutherinhisdoctrineofScripture;nevertheless,inhisownway,healsorefusedtoseparatetheauthorityofScripturefrom‘thatwhichshowsforthChrist’andinsistedthatitis‘thesecrettestimonyoftheSpirit’thatfinallypersuadesusofthetruthofScripture.Inshort,theReformersviewoftheauthorityofScripturewasintimatelyboundtoitsproclamationofnewlifeandfreedominChrist”.46RoyalHumbert,ACompendiumofAlexanderCampbell’sTheology(StLouis:TheBethanyPress,1961),38."Goddesiresallpeopletobesaved.HeshouldnolongerbeconsideredanationalGodbutaninternationalGodwithamessageofinvitationtoall.Allhavethefreechoicetorespondtothismessage”.MeroldWestphal,OvercomingOnto-theology:TowardaPostmodernChristianFaith(NewYork:FordhamUniversityPress,2001),23.TalkoftheselfrevelationofGodseemstosuggestthatweknowallthereistoknowaboutGod.Yetthisclaimtototalknowledgeisemphaticallyrejectedbypostmodernphilosophersandtheologians,“whobelieveallsuchclaimsisinherentlyarrogantandinevitablyleadstooppressionofonesortoranother.Humanknowledgeisfragmentaryandincomplete.Ifthisistrueofourknowledgeofour-selvesandourworld,itissurelytrueofourknowledgeofGod”.Yetwhatiscompleteandnotfragmentary,accordingtoPaulatleast,isthegospelmessage.ItisacompleterevelationofGod’sdeterminationtosaveindividuals.It’sfirstandforemostmessageisthatJesuswascrucifiedforoursins(1Cor.15:2-8),it’simportanceisnotaboutrevealingeverythingaboutGod,buthowindividualscanbebroughtbackintorelationshipwithGod.IwouldthinkthatitisasadaffairifanindividualknowsallthingspertainingtoGod’scharacter,andaccordingtothescriptures,thenmissits’mostimportantmessagebynotrespondingaccordingly.

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whathehasdone,buttounderstandwhattheyneedtodoaboutit(Acts2:37-

38).Verysimply,acceptit.Oneman’sactionhasreversedeveryobstacle

betweenhumanityandGod.FromGod’spointofview,onecouldconclude,the

wayisclear.ContrarytoMarion’snarrative,thisunderstandingofsalvationdoes

notrequirehumanitytodiganydeeperintoGod’snaturetobesaved,but,

ultimately,tosimplyacceptGod’sgracefulacceptanceofthemassaved.Itisnot

somecomplicatedriddle,requiringsomesortofsecretknowledge,or

understanding.Itdoesnotseek,somuchas,moreunderstanding,butratheran

understandingthatstopsatanacceptance.Ithasbeenwritteninhuman

languageinordertobeunderstood!

TheseNewTestamentnarratives47reflectaGodthatdoesnotwanthumanityto

thinkoflifeandtheworldasmeaningless,butonehavingapurposefuloutcome.

It,essentially,portraysaGodwhowantstogivemeaningtoit,byencouraging

humanitytoindulgeinallofwhatlifehastooffer.Hisinsiststhathecamesothey

cantakeamoremeaningfulpartintheto-ingsandfro-ingsoflife(Jn.10:10)He

is,also,resolutethathewantstoparticipateinalloftheseto-ingsandfro-ings

whichalsoincludelanguage,thinkingandconversations(1Jn.2:20,27)For

thosewhohaveacceptedthisexistentialperspective(Humbert1961,34;

Wesphal2001,xx;Shakespeare2009,42),Marion’sconceptualunderstandingof

idolatrydoesnotposeanyproblemtothem,sinceGodcametodwellonearthin

thosewhobelieve(Jn1:18).HisGodisapartofadistantand,potentially,

47EmmanuelLevinas,TotalityandInfinity:AnEssayonExteriority(Pittsburgh:DuquesneUniversityPress,2015),89.“Thereisnothoughtbeforelanguage.Thereisnoappealingtoanyfoundationorcertaintybeyondsigns.”MeroldWestphal,OvercomingOnto-theology:TowardaPostmodernChristianFaith(NewYork:FordhamUniversityPress,2001),xx.“Thehermeneuticsoffinitudeismediationonthemeaningofhumancreatedness,andthehermeneuticsofsuspicionismediationonthemeaningofhumanfalleness.”Thisunderstandingisbasedonahermeneuticalphilosophythatinterpretstextsfromtheperspectiveof“humanfinitude”and“suspicion”.TheNewTestamentwritersarehumannotdivine,anyanalysisoftheirwritingsmustbebasedon“thefinitudeofhumanknowledge”orintheologicalterms“byanunderstandingofourcreatedfinitude”.Theirtextsneedtobeviewedwithsuspicion,inclusiveoffictionalornonfictionalmaterial,andthereforeinterpretedaccordingtoone’sexperienceoftheworld.Suchwritingsareinterpretedinaccordancewithlinguisticideasinsimilarfashionaswithanyothertextoneisendeavouringtounderstand.Thesearenarrativesofeachwriter’sunderstandingoftheirworld.Theirindividualstoriesenvelopedaroundtheirunderstandingsofultimatereality.AsIseeit,myunderstandingofthegospel(Jesusdiedformysins)givesmethisfreedomofinterpretation.

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forgottentranscendentunderstandingofGod(Rom.8:1-3).Itisapartofanold

reality,onethatceasedwiththeemergenceofanexistentialGod(Jesus)who,

nowpotentially,canindwellhumanheartsandminglewiththeirthoughtsbyhis

Spirit(Acts2:38;Jn16:12-15;1Peter1:10-12;1Jn2:20,27).

Itisthissamehermeneuticalconsciousnessthatseesthelinebetweentruthand

non-truth48intextsasdeterminedbysuspensionandthewordperhaps

(Shakespeare2009,193).Yetitisaconsciousnessthathasbeenbroughtabout

byhumandiscourse,49thenlife,andnotverseversa.Thisunderstandingof

consciousnessisthereforetransposedintoalternativeformsofunderstandingin

conjunctionwithlife’sexperiences.Textscategorisedascontainingtrueandnon-

truematerial,arebasedonreallifeexperiencesaswellasmaterialimagined,yet

bothareweavedintonarratives.Anauthor’snarrativeiscategorisedassuch,as

theretellingofaretellingofaretellingofanhistoricalevent(Shakespeare2009,

48PaulRecoeur,InterpretationalTheory(Texas:TexasChristianUniversityPress,1976),39.“Weareconcernedherewithdialogueinthesenseofaspokencommunicationbetweentwosubjectsrecordedandinscribedasawrittentext.Weinheritmeaningfromotherswhohavethought,spokenorwrittenbeforeus.Andwherepossible,werecreatethismeaning,accordingtoourownprojectsandinterpretations.Butwearealwaysobligedtolistentowhathasalreadybeenspoken,inothertimesandplaces,beforewecaninturnspeakforourselvesinthehereandnow”.49StevenShakespeareDerridaandTheology(NewYork:T&TClarkInternational,2009),37.“Expressionispure,butbecauseitisstillasign,itrepresents.Asignmustbeopentothepossibilityofrepetition.Otherwise,itwouldjustbeaonceoffevent,withnoabilitytocarrymeaningacrosstime.Asignwhichwouldtakeplacebut‘once’wouldnotbeasign:apurelyidiomaticsignwouldnotbeasign.Asignifier(ingeneral)mustbeformallyrecognizableinspiteof,andthrough,thediversityofempiricalcharacteristicswhichmaymodifyit”.Thedistinctionbetweenidealmeaningandempiricalrealityisonlypossiblebecausesignscanberepeated,thusmakingthepureselfpresenceofidealmeaningunattainable.Difference,timeandnon-presencearebuiltintothesign.Whatthesignmakespossible–anidealpresence–italsomakesimpossible.Thereisnonewinthenew.RichardKearney,DialogueswithContemporaryContinentalThinkers(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,1984),128.KearneyquotesHeidegger’sErlauterungenzuHolderlinsDichtung,4thedn.(Klostermann:Frankfurt,1971),38-40.“Bothbeing-in-dialogueandbeing-historical–areequallyold,belongtogether,andarethesame”.AlexanderJensen,TheologicalHermeneutics(London:SCMPress),76.“Allunderstandingisinterpretation,andallinterpretationislinguisticallymediated.ThemoderncriticismofChristianityandreligioningeneralisbasedonthepresuppositionthat,ifthefoundationaltextsofareligiondonotreflectrealityadequately,thentheyareworthless.Atthesametime,modernfundamentalismisbasedonthesamepresupposition.Ifthereveredtextsaretobetrue,thentheymustdescribeobjectiverealityaccurately,andonemustinsistthattheyareabsolutelyreliableattheliteral-historicallevel.Betweencategoricalrejectionandacceptanceofthetextsattheliteral-historicalleveltherearepositions,whichwouldacceptparts(thosewhicharedeemedessential)astrue,whileothers(thosewhicharetakentobeperipheral)maybehistoricallyuntrue.However,intermsoftheirhermeneuticalapproach,thesepositionsdonotavoidtheshortcomingsoftheextremes–theyrelyonanaiveviewoflanguageandreality”.

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46-68),andtheseretellingscontaineachwriter’sownpresuppositionsaboutthe

retellingofthatevent.Ithasbeen,andis,theirperspectiveontheevent,yetit

hasbeenlockedintoaspecifictimeperiod.Therefore,someaspectsofthisevent

arelostinitscontinuedretelling,yetallthesepreviousretellingsareinaccord

withawriter’spresuppositionsandviewpoint.Thiscanexplainwhythere

shouldbenoclearlinesdemarcatedbetweentruthandnon-truth(andnot

Truth)ofeachretelling(Ricoeur,InterpretationTheory1976,54).

AlthoughlookingforMarion’smotiveswouldinvolveavaluejudgment,onething

isassured:heshouldnotbeabletosupersedehisownsystem.Ifallhumanityis

unabletotranspiercetheirfirstvisible,becausetheirfirstvisibleissetupby

theirownintentionality(willtopower),thentofindanunbiasedfoundationto

beginone’ssystemisunachievable.Hemustalsobeassessedfromsucha

position,unabletotrans-piercehisfirstvisible,itmustfollow,then,thatpeople

whoaccepthisnarrativewillonlybeconvertedtohisownintentionality,rather

thantohis,ideal,Godoutsideeveryhumanintention.Marion’sidealmerely

resultsinanoxymoron;anon-humanhumanperspective.

RatherthanacceptMarion’ssuggestionthatoneshouldtrytoescapeDaisen

(beingintheworld),byattemptingtoseeitasmeaningless;analternative

proposalcouldbetoviewlife,inthisworld,asvitallypurposefulandtherefore

meaningful.Onenarrative,thatcouldbeusedasananalogyofthisview,isthe

accountofJesustalkingtoaSamaritanwoman,wherehepredictsthatthosewho

worshipGod,inthefuture,willnotworshipinacertainplace,butcandoitin

sinceritytotheirunderstandingofGod’shumancommunicationwiththem(Jn4:

24).ThisaccountdoesnotexpressaseparationfromGod,orfromcommunity,

butitdepictsanevendeeperrelationshipbetweenhumanityandGod,onethatis

morewholesome.

Justasone’smindshouldnotconsistofcompartments,oneconsistingofwrong

thoughtsandtheotherofrightthoughts,oneshouldnotseethecommunityas

separatedintotwodistinctdistricts,therighteousandtheunrighteous.If,

accordingtoMarion,theCatholicEucharististheonlytruetheologicalsiteto

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hearfromGod(Marion1991,153),then,surely,suchacompartmentalisation

canbeimpliedinhisview,whichseesonepartofthecommunityin

communicationwiththetrueGodandworshipping“iconically”,whilsttheother

partisoutofcommunicationwiththetrueGodandisworshipping

“idolatrously”.

AlthoughMarion’snarrativedoesretainCaputo’sandDerrida’spostmodern

flavour,hedoesnotmaintaintheirdeterminationtoleavedifferenceasthelast

word.Hedoesnotthinkthatoneshouldsuspendone’sjudgment,asfarasTruth

isconcerned,withtheword“perhaps”.Marionbeginswithdifference,butthen

returnstomakeajudgmentthatseesonlypractisingCatholicsasnon-idolatrous

andtherestofsocietyasidolatrous.

ContrarytoMarion’snarrative,thatthepropersiteforanytheologyisthe

CatholicChurch,theologystartsinanindividual’smind.Itusesanalogiestaken

fromone’sexperiencewhile“already”intheworld(Westphal2001,30-31).

Thesearethenexpressedwithhumanwords.Thesearenotsinful,asMarion

supposes,butGodgiven(Gen2:23).Ifonewastorepenteverytimeonehada

thoughtaboutGod,thenonewouldendupwithcamelkneeslikeJames,Jesus’

halfbrother(Jobes2011,64).Also,anatheistwouldbebetteroffthanatheist,

sincetheassumptionisthatthesedon’tconsideranyultimatepowerasbeing

responsibleforourultimatereality,andsoconsiderationforsuchanentityas

Goddoesn’tevencrosstheirminds(Noise2012,23).Itjustsohappensthat

graceisextendedsothattheydon’tcommitthesinofidolatry.

Again,ifGoddesiresaprayinghumanity,howisthissupposedtohappenifall

languageisidolatrous?Thereisabetternarrative,onethatismorelifeaffirming

thanthatofMarion.AGodinus(1Jn2:20)isbetterthanaGodshroudedbehind

amysticaleventintheEucharist.AdiscourseofatalkingGodisbetterthanone

thatportraysasilentspaceoranabyss.ApersonalGodisbetterthanan

impersonalanduntouchableone.AdirecttalkingGodisbetterthananindirect

onewhotalksonlythroughaCatholicBishop.Actually,Marion’sapophatic

positiondoesviolencebothtotheGodofChristiantraditionandtothe

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postmodernview,sincebothallowformanyinterpretationsandexperiencesof

God(Jensen2007,74).

Inthenextchapter,IsetdownHector’srevisionistmetaphysics,“arevisionary

metaphysicswhichisconcernedtoproduceabetterstructurewhenthis

assessmentprocessitselfpresupposessomestructure”(Flew1979,213).

Hector’sbookisprofferedasacontributiontoaChristiantheologywhichworks

fromtheperspectiveoffaithseekingunderstanding–anexercise,thatis,in

tryingtoexplain,asfaraspossible,thatwhichChristiansbelieve.However,he

willborrowfromphilosophyandsocialtheory,as,andwhenhebelievesthat

theycanshedlightonChristianbelief.Buthenotesthathemust,bynecessity,

interactwithphilosophy,especiallyinregardtodefendinghisclaimsaboutthe

waythatlanguageworks.Theseinteractionsmustfirstbemadeindependentlyof

theChristiantheologicallanguagegame.Butheisquicktopointoutthat

theologydoesnotbecomesomethingelsewhenitmakesuseofinsightsfrom

otherdisciplines.Thesewillbetransposedtobecometheologicalinsights.Itis,

therefore,atheologicalprojectpredominatelyfocussedontheproblemof

theologicallanguage.

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Chapter3

KevinHectorandaProtestantTherapeuticTheory

Introduction

KevinHector,inhisworkTheologywithoutMetaphysics,focusesonresolvingthe

problemthatlanguageisinherentlymetaphysicalandsoinevitablyshoehorns

objectsintoapredeterminedframework,therebyinflictingviolenceuponthem.

Hectorbeginshisprojectwiththeconceptofmetaphysics,whichheexplainsby

highlightingtwoofitsmainfeatures.Thefirstisessentialism,whereanobject’s

ultimaterealityisidentifiedwithareal,idea-likeessencethatstandsataremove

fromordinaryexperience.Theobjectitselfmaycometoseem“shadowy,second-

rate,arealmofmereappearance”(Hector2011,14).Andsincemetaphysics

understandsthatfundamentalrealityisthusthoughttostandapartfrom

experience,itfollowsthathumanknowersareseveredfromrealityassuch.The

secondfeatureiscorrespondentism.Correspondentismisimplementedtobridge

thegapthatiscausedbytheacceptancethatthereisdistancebetweenone’s

understandingofrealityandessentialreality.Theonlywaytobridgethisgap,it

seems,istoacceptthatourideasandlanguagecancorrespondtoreality.Hector

claimsthatoncethesefeatureshavebeenmadeexplicit,itiseasytoseewhyone

wouldwanttoavoidmetaphysics,sinceitseemsalienating,violent,and

idolatrous.

TheViolentNatureofMetaphysics

Inordertoelaborateonthenatureoflanguage,asmetaphysical,Hectoruses

Heidegger’soutlinewhichidentifiesthreeconsecutiveperiodsinthe

developmentofunderstandinginWesternmetaphysics(Hector2011,4-14).

Thefirstperiod,intheeraofPlato’sphilosophy,the“Being”ofbeingsis

identifiedwithideaswhichareunderstoodasbeing“objectivelyreal…partofthe

futureoftheuniverseasitwere”(Hector2011,3).Therefore,aperceptionis

developedthatdeemshumanknowledgeasbeingdependentuponsomething

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thatisexternaltoit.Inthesecondperiod,Descartes’philosophy,the“Being”of

beingsisidentifiedbyasubject’spredeterminedcategories.Therefore,the

startingpointistheautonomoussubject,yetthesecategories/ideasarestill

assumedtobeexternaltohumanknowing.Inthethirdandlastperiod,Hector,

citingHeidegger,referstoNietzsche’sphilosophyasthemodelwhich,incontrast

toPlato’sandDescartes’,assertsthattheonlyrequirementforknowledgeto

countasobjectiveknowledge,isforahumansubjecttodecidetocountitassuch.

Thus,Nietzsche’shadnohesitationtoassertthatDescartes’decision,tocount

objectsinmathematicalterms,wasjustthat,hisdecision.

HectordistinguishestwomainfeaturesinCartesianmetaphysics.Thefirstisthat

of“essentialism”,whichidentifiesanobject’sultimaterealitywitharealidea-like

essencethatstandsataremovefromordinaryexperience.Throughthislens,the

objectcanbegintoappeartobelessreal,theshadowoftherealidea/essence.

Fundamentalrealityisthusthoughttostandapartfromtheirexperienceandthe

resultisthatthehumanknowerbecomesseveredfromthisexperientialor

groundofreality.Thesecondfeature“iscalledcorrespondentism”(Hector2011,

11).Correspondentismiscalledupontobridgethegapopenedupby

essentialism.Thisdoesnotmeantryingtoconciliatetheideaofanobjectinone’s

mindwiththeobjectinexperience,suchconciliationwouldbeincidental.Rather,

wemustacceptthatourideasandwordsdo,andmust,correspondwithreality.

Hectorcontendsthatthesefeaturesofmetaphysicsjustifyapositionthat

endeavourstoavoidmetaphysicsaltogether,becauseitseems“alienating,

violent,andidolatrous”(Hector2011,15).Thedifficultyis,asmetaphysicians

presentit,WesternmetaphysicsisindissolublytiedtoWesternlanguage.

Hector’sspecificconcernishowthisproblemoflanguagerelatestothechurch

andGod.Iflanguageismetaphysical,thenwemustkeeplanguageatadistance

fromGodbecausethiswoulddoviolencetoGodandhisnature,byshoehorning

him/her/itintohumanideasandcategories.Andthisistheapophaticposition

heldbycertainscholarssuchasCaputoandMarion.ThedilemmaforHector(and

probablyanunderlyingconcernforMarion)isthatthisproblemwithlanguage

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leadstoafurtherproblem,thealienationexperiencedbythechurch,because

theycannolongeraddressGod,orevenknowhim.WhileHectorwillconcede

thattheproblemoflanguageisinescapable,yetasonewhoisconcernedwiththe

well-beingof“theReformed,evangelicalofliberalProtestantchurch”(Long

2013,95),heclaimstoprofferanovelapproach,whichmaymoderateonthe

extremepositionthatwecannotspeakofGod.Hewillcontendthat“thereisvery

goodreasontothinkthatlanguageisnot–orneednotbethoughttobe–

metaphysical”(Hector2011,5-6).Thushisapproach,whichhecallstherapeutic,

proffersanalternativeviewtotheextremeapophaticposition.Hishopeisthat

hisdiscussionwillatleastcontributetocurrentdeliberationsoftheological

languageaswellastometaphysics.

Startingpoint:OrdinaryLanguage

Thestartingpoint,ormajordifficultyinovercomingmetaphysics,asHector

viewsit,isthattheretendstobeanuncriticalacceptanceofitsprecepts.

Thereforeacriticalstepinovercomingmetaphysicsistoprovideits

presuppositionsperceptibleaspresuppositions.Thesepresuppositionsareout

oftouchwithordinarylifeexperienceandordinarylanguageuse,assuch,they

tendtomakeonefeeloutoftouchwithreality.

Wittgenstein,inhisdiscussionon“languagegames”(Labron2009,25),notes

thatwordsseemtoinvoketheideaofclarity,thattheyhavethissenseofnon-

ambiguityaboutthem.Hectorclaimsthatthis“crystallinepurity”senseofthe

wordcomesfromapresuppositioninmetaphysics,the“essentialist

correspondent”understanding(Hector2011,15).Thiscrystallinepurityideaof

languagehoweverisnotborneoutinreality.Suchpre-understandingsneedtobe

adjustedtosuitwhatisactuallythecase,asHectorcontends,theordinary

languagepictureisnotthepicturethatisoutoftouchwithfundamentalreality,

butitisthecrystallinepuritypicturethatdoesnotcoherewithreality.Itisonly

inthecontextofspeakingthatone’ssemanticrangeisnarroweddownsothata

word’smeaningcanbedeterminedyeteventhiscanbeambiguous.

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Therefore,Hectorappliestherapeuticanti-metaphysics,inwhichhereversesthe

priorityexplanationofreality.Insteadofacceptingmetaphysics“essentialist

correspondent”understanding(Seeexplanation,Hector2011,25-48),51his

strategyistousethemeasurementthatiscloseathand,theordinarypractices

andexperiencesoflanguage,asitisusedineverydaylife.Thisreversalof

perspectiveshelpshisoverallprocessofmitigation.Itunderminesmetaphysical

notionsattachedtolanguageandwhatitmeanstobeintouchwithreality,atthe

sametimedemonstratingthatoneneednotappealtosuchinflatedideals.

Languageneednotbethoughtofasintrinsicallyorirretrievablyviolent,

especiallywhenitisunderstoodinitsordinaryuse.

CreaturelyLanguage

However,Hector’slineofargument,basedonordinarylanguageuse,uncovers

anotherproblem.Languagebeingordinaryandthuscreaturelyleadstoafurther

contention,asexpressedbytheapophaticanti-metaphysicians,thatGodmust

standataremovefromtherealmofcreaturelylanguageandexperience.Hector,

inthedevelopmentofhistherapeuticapproach,seekstoprovideanalternative

positiveperspectiveratherthanaseeminglyunbridgeablegap“betweenGodand

God-with-us”(Hector2011,26).Hiscounterintuitivepositionenliststhe

Christiantraditionalperspective,againstartingwithWittgenstein.

HavingalreadyimplementedWittgenstein’sideaoflanguagegames(See

exampleHector2011,29-32),HectorcannowinstalltraditionalChristianity,as

thelanguagegame,toruletherangeoftheologicalsemantics.Thisinturngives

himjustificationtoenlistBarth’sunderstandingof“God’sbeing-inGod-selfas

ontologicallyfitforbeing-with-us”(Hector2011,31).Hefurtherelaboratesthat,

sinceGodisresponsibleforcreationitalsomakeshimcommittedtothis

creation;Godwho“creates”and“governstheworld”isthesameonewhois

“determined”tobe“God-with-us”(Hector2011,31).Therefore,evencreaturely

51AlexanderJensen,TheologicalHermeneutics(London:SCMPress,2007),25-42.DiscussionaboutAugustine’suseofsigns:thedifferencebetweenhistheoryofsignsandhisinnerwordexternalworddualism.

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realityshouldn’tposeanyobstacletoGodbeingwithus.Yet,thecreaturewould

stillbeunabletotalktosuchaGodbecause,asHector,Marion,andCaputohave

alreadyconcluded,thecreature’sconceptuallanguagewillmakethisGod-with-

usintoanidol.

HectornowcallsonSchleiermacher,andhisnon-inferentialsystem(Kearney

1984,128),todotherapyupontheproblemofcreaturelyGodtalkasbeing

idolatrous.Schleiermacher’ssystemisbasedonthenotionoffeelingpriorto

thinkingorreflection;thepersonhasafeelingofcompleteharmony,ofbeingat

onewiththemselvesandtheirphysicalandspiritualenvironment.Importantly,it

isinthisframeofattitudethatthesubject-objectdichotomybecomesadisplaced

notion(Hector2011,73-101).

Hectoremphasisesthespontaneousnatureofthisexperience,itisnotbasedona

consciousanddeliberateeffortonthepartofthe“participator”;onesimply

comestothesecircumstancesalreadybeingaffectedbyandhavingtocopewith

them,“priortoandapartfromconsciousreflectionandjudgment”(Hector2011,

77).Thisstandsincontrasttoaprocesswherebyapersonintentionally

conceptualisesGodandthereforecreatesanidol.Indeed,thereisnosuch

objectification,becausesubject-objectdualismhasbeenovercomeinthenon-

inferentialsystem/process.52

Hectorfollowsthiswithaproposedunderstandingofarecognized-recognizer

systemwithintheChristiantradition,inthiswaysuggestingaparallelbetween

thetwosystems.ThereforeallthepositivesofSchleiermacher’ssystemcannow

beappliedtoHector’ssystem.Themostimportanttraittobecarriedacrossis

thatthissystemofrecognized-recognizeroperatesonadeeperinter-subjective

levelofrecognitionandthus,anon-conceptuallevel.ThisChristianity,which

Hectoralsocharacterisesashavingacertainintegrityandconsistencyfromits

52KevinW.Hector,TheologywithoutMetaphysics(CurrentIssuesinTheology)(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2011),77.Hectorgivesanexampleofhittingthebrakesinstinctivelywhenachildrunsinfrontofone’scar.“Onhasanimmediate,non-inferentialfeelforoneselfandone’scircumstances,anditisbymeansofthisfeelthatoneisalwaysalreadyattunedtothesecircumstances”.

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earliestwitnessesthroughtothepresent,cannowbeviewedasnon-idolatrous

andthereforeassourcedinGod.Thisisthethrustofhisfinaltherapysession.His

positionisfurtherreinforcedwithanargumentbasedonprecedence.

PrecedenceofTradition

Theideaofprecedencecomesfromthecommon-lawtraditionwherebyJudges

decidenovelcaseswithreferencetopriorcases.Theconsequenceofsucha

practicewentintosettingupthecommonlawtradition.Thelegalcommunity

callsuponthistraditionasakindofauthorityforendorsingallofitssubsequent

judicialcasesandthustheyformpartofanauthoritativetradition.Thesamecan

beappliedtotheuseofconcepts,thattherearecertainconventionsfor

understanding,totheaffectthat;whenapersonusesaconceptheorsheintends

thisusagetoberecognised,bythosewhomtheyrecogniseasusersofthe

concept.Thus,one’suseofaconceptisanimplicitclaimtonormativeauthority

overotherusers,putsimplythisishowwe(should)normallyunderstandthis

concept.

HectorappliesthisideaofprecedencetotherecognitionoftheSpirit’sworkof

transformingoneintoGod’schild,viaachainofrecognition.Itisachainthat

stretchesallthewaybacktoChristhimselfandisperpetuatedbythenormative

Spirit(disposition)ofChrist.Christrecognisedhisoriginalfollowersashis

disciplesandhethenauthorisedthemtorecognisefuturefollowersashis

disciples.Theyinturnrecognisedandauthorisedthosewhofollowedaftertheir

authoritativeandnormativepracticeandinthiswaythechain,basedonthis

originalrecognitionornormativeSpiritofChrist,continuedstillfurtherintothe

futureandtoeternity.Eachsuccessiveepochofdiscipleswereconformedto

Christ’snormativeperformancesandinthiswaytransformedintoachildofGod.

ThisisthemannerinwhichtheSpiritofChristtransformsafollowerintoachild

ofGod,guidingeachdiscipleintoallthetruthandwritinghislawupontheir

hearts.

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Hectorconcludeshisaccountwiththisstatement,“thatneitherScripturenor

traditionhasofferedanycanonicalexplanationofhowtheSpiritdoesthese

things”(Hector2011,80),itfollowsthenthatthereisnoreason,inprinciple,not

tothinkoftheSpiritasaccomplishingthatwhichisascribedtoitbycirculation

throughaprocessofinter-subjectiverecognitioninwhichonelinksupwith(and

carrieson)achainofrecognitionthatstretchesbacktoChrist’sownrecognition

ofhisdisciples.Therefore,anyconceptualmeaningsoftheologycanonlybe

divulgedintermsthataredeterminedbythenormativeSpirit(theworkofthe

TriuneGod)whicharealsomediatedthroughthesesamesocialpracticesofa

Christiantraditionaltheologicalcommunity.

WhatMetaphysics:Heidegger

Hectorclaimsthattherehasbeenarecurrentrebellionagainstmetaphysics,but

moderns,inanefforttoevadeit,onlyfindthemselvesbeingsuckedbackintoits

orbit.Yetmetaphysicscanbeunderstoodinvariousways.Hectoriscertainlynot

rejectingeverythingthatgoesbythenameofmetaphysics.Inparticular,heisnot

interestedindoingwithoutmetaphysicsdefinedas,“anysetofclaimsaboutthat

whichtranscendsnature,oranysetofclaimsaboutwhatthingsarelike”(Hector

2011,11).Therefore,hisapproachcouldbeunderstoodasasortofrevisionist

metaphysicsalthough,headds,hisbookisnotseekingtodefendthisposition.

Exactlywhatmetaphysicsheisconcernedindoingawaywithdemandssome

elaboration,whichisthediscussionweturntonow.

HectorbeginshisaccountwithHeidegger’spresentationofthesubjectbecause

hebelievesthathehashadadominantinfluenceincontemporaryanti-

metaphysics.Heidegger’sgeneraldefinitionofmetaphysicsis,“anattemptto

understandbeings‘assuch’thatis,whatbeingsareasbeings”(Hector2011,18).

Furthermore,thefundamentalrealityofbeingofbeingsisequatedwithcertain

conceptionsofthem.Metaphysicsunderstoodthisway,Hectorconcludes,“fits

beingsintoapriorconceptualframework”(Hector2011,20).Toillustrate,

Hectornowprovidesexamplesinhistory,beginningwithDescartesand

Nietzsche,whomhebelievesepitomisesthissortofmetaphysics.Onceagainhe

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enlistsHeidegger’spresentation,notbecausehebelievesthatheisareliable

guidetothesetwofigures,neverthelesshistreatmentofthemdoesactuallyshed

invaluablelightonHeidegger’sownthought.And,accordingtowhatHectorhas

alreadycontended(above),appreciatingHeidegger’sthoughtissimilarto

appreciatingthedominantcontemporaryunderstanding/viewofmetaphysics.

ForHeidegger,Hectorclaims,Descartes’philosophyisthebeginningofthe

realisationofWesternmetaphysics.InthewakeoftheRenaissanceandthe

Reformation,Descarteshadtofindanalternativegrounduponwhichtoplacehis

beliefsandactions,sincetheformerfoundationofthechurchlyandsupernatural

oneshadbeenrigorouslychallengedandtheirauthoritydiminished.Descartes

consideredthattheonlysolidgroundleftforhisbeliefsandactionswasthatof

the“humanknowerhim–orherself”(Decartes1998,45-56).Thegoalof

Descartes’metaphysicalwork,accordingtoHeidegger,was“tocreatethe

metaphysicalgroundfortheliberationofthehumanpersontolibertyastheself

determiningthatiscertainofitself”(Thomson2000,305).Therefore,thefinal

outcomewasanewfoundationbasedontheperson’sliberatedreason,the

“cogitoergosumhadbecomethemeasureofallthings”(Decartes1998,53).In

thisrespect,fundamentalrealityorsubstancebecomesthatwhichaperson

“clearlyanddistinctlyperceives–thatis,withthatwhichtheyrepresentto

themselves”(Decartes1998,54).

Therefore,thebeingoressenceofanobjectisequatedwiththeperson’smeasure

ofit,theirownrepresentationalcontent.Itistheserepresentationsthatarenow

validatedasbeingsandthemannerandtruthofanybeingisgroundedupona

person’sownpresentedrepresentations.Heideggergivestheexampleof

Descartes’ownvalidmeasureofobjectsaccordingtomathematicalcategories

suchasextension,shape,position,andmotion.AsDescartesseemsto

demonstrate,itisaperson’spredeterminedmeasurethatdeterminesallobjects

andisthusguaranteedinadvance.Thismeansthatobjectsthatdonotfitintothe

subject’spredeterminedcategoriesaresubsequentlyrelegatedtoasecondclass

categoryofnon-beingormereappearance.Therefore,Heideggersummarises

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Descartes’metaphysicsasthatdisciplinecharacterisedbyanaccountofbeing-

as-suchandoftherepresentationstowhichsuchbeingsmustcorrespond.

Descartescertainlybrokenewgroundbygivingprioritytotherepresenting

subject.Indeed,HeideggerconcludesthatDescartes;whosemetaphysicshadits

beginningsestablishedinthePlatonicsystem;subsequentlyendedallthe

metaphysicalsystemsbeforehim.Thisconclusion,notesHector,isbasedupon

anunderstandingofmetaphysicsthat“attemptstosecurehumanknowingby

identifyingthebeingofbeingswithhumanideasaboutthem”(Hector2011,10).

Heideggergoesontoidentifytwostepsthatledtothedevelopmentofthistype

ofmetaphysics.

Thefirststepwastodistinguishbetweenthe“that-ness”and“what-ness”ofa

being(Thomson2000,306-7).Bywayofexample,thebeingofastonecanbe

determinedintermsofitsexistence–thatveryfactthatthereisstone.Yetitcan

alsobeunderstoodbyitsessence–whatmakesitthethingitis,namelyitsstone-

nessoridea.Thenextstepwastoclassifythewhat-nessofabeing,thatwhich

makesitfundamentallyreal.Importantly,theseessenceshavebeenestablished

inadvanceaccordingtopre-determinedhumancategories,“thefundamental

realityofanobjectisidenticalwithtermsbywhichhumansknowitnamely,in

ideasorcategories”.Descartes’“representationalism”,Heideggerconcludes,only

makesexplicitwhathadformerlybeenhiddeninPlato–“namely,the

identificationofthebeingofbeingswithhumanideasaboutthem”(Hector2011,

12).Inthiscase,thetypicalreferencetoPlato’smetaphysicsas“theviewfrom

nowhere”iseasilyunderstoodasasatiricalphrasemeaning“man’sview”

(Hector2011,15).

Nietzsche,asHeideggerinterpretshiswork,completelydrawsoutthis

understandingofPlato’sandDescartes’metaphysics.Thisisclearinhis

descriptionofNietzsche’sphilosophyas“thefulfilmentorcompletionofWestern

metaphysics”(Hector2011,7).Thusheelaborates,bothPlatoandDescartes“see

ideasandrepresentationsascorrespondingtothewaythingsreallyare–and

identifythewaythingsarewithextraphenomenalessences”whileNietzsche

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makesmoreexplicittheactualoriginofthesesocalled“extraphenomenal

essences”(Hector2011,7).HeoverridesDescartesidealoftheclearanddistinct

bystatingthatallthesepredeterminedcategoriesaremerelydeterminedbyour

owndecisionstotreatthemassuch.

AccordingtoHeidegger,therefore,itisfromNietzschethatanewconsciousness

isbirthed.Theonto-theologicalcategoryofbeingofbeingsisequatedwitha

person’spsyche.Themotivatingforcebehindanyhumanpsycheisonlytheirwill

forpower.Heidegger,Hectornotes,thinksthat“thereisnothingnovel”(Hector

2011,7)aboutNietzsche’sunderstanding,thenoveltyisrather;thathemade

thisunderstandingexplicit.Asaconsequence,thethinkercannolongerappeal

tothevalidityofatruthbasedonametaphysicalauthoritywhichtranscends

humanpositing,suchappealsarenowvoidofanyphilosophicalortheological

authority.Thisis,asHeideggerviewsit,the“consummationofmetaphysics”

becauseitmakesitexplicit“thatthehumanpersonanswersonlytohumanly

positedvalues”(Hector2011,9).

Hector’sconclusion,basedonHeidegger’sanalysisofWesternmetaphysics,is

thatthefulfilmentofWesternmetaphysicshasthreedistinctstepstoit.Plato

“identifiesthebeingsofbeingswithideas,butthinksoftheseideasasobjectively

real–aspartofthefutureoftheuniverse,asitwere–andsothinksofhuman

knowledgeasdependentuponsomethingexternaltoit”(Hector2011,10).

Descartestakesthenextstep,by“identifyingthebeingofbeingswiththatwhich

fitswithintherepresentingsubject’spredeterminedcategories”(Hector2011,

11),buthestillthinksthatthesepredeterminedcategoriesareactuallyexternal

tohumanknowing.YetNietzsche,incontrasttoPlatoandDescartes,assertsthat

theprerequisitetoknowledgebeingcountedasobjectiveknowledgeisthe

humansubject’sdecision.Nietzsche’sstep,expressedanalogically,istofinally

identifyDescartes’decisiontocount“objectsinmathematicalterms,”withjust

that,hisdecision(Hector2011,15).

Therefore,Hectorcontinues,thewaysinwhichweunderstandtheworldare

“irreduciblyourideasandvalues”(Hector2011,9).Moreover,theapriori

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metaphysicalgroundingissecuredinNietzsche’swilltopower.AsHeidegger

argues,“itisthesolecriterionofallsecuringandthusofwhatisright...Whatit

willsiscorrectandinorder,becausetheWilltoWillistheonlyorderthat

remains”(Hector2011,9).AccordingtoHeidegger’spresentationmetaphysics

takesonananthropomorphiccentre,itisthehumanwhobeholdstheworldand

formsitaccordingtotheirownimage.

ItisfromHeidegger’svantagepointthatHectorunderstandstheterm

metaphysicsanditisfromherethathebeginsdischarginghiscritiqueofsuchan

understanding.HebeginsbytakingupHeidegger’sconcernregardingthis

metaphysics(ashehaspresentedit),thatit“precludesbeingitselfcominginto

view”(Hector2011,10),becauseitpicturesthebeinginitsexistenceas

groundedinthebeingasessence,ratherthanviceversa.Expressedin

Heidegger’sterms,itgrounds“that-ness”in“what-ness”(Thomson2000,300-6).

Abeing’sexistenceisgrounded“withinbeingsthemselves,therebytaking‘Being’

(asopposedtonothing)forgranted”(Hector2011,10).Moreover,whenitcomes

tothesupreme‘Being’,itsexistenceorthat-nessistakenforgranted,whichin

turnbecomesthegroundforwhat-nessoressenceofallotherbeings(Hector

2011,10).

Heidegger’scritiqueisthereforelevelledagainstthemetaphysicsthatforgetsto

dealwithapriorityquestionoftheexistence/non-existenceofaSupremeBeing,

andthisisexactlyHeidegger’s“project”,todealwiththisquestioninhis

examinationofmetaphysics(Thomson2000,318-320).Asitstandstherefore,in

metaphysicsitishumanpersonswhogivebeingstheirmeasure,inthatthey

determinefromandbythem-selveswhatshouldbeallowedtocirculateasa

being.AsHeideggerhasalreadyclaimed,beingsarethereforeprohibitedfrom

comingintoview.Basedonthisargument,thelogicalconclusionisthattheonly

worldthatexistsistheoneconstructedfromhumanrepresentations–the

metaphysicallystampedone.

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ProblemswithMetaphysics

Thereforethecontentionagainstthistypeofmetaphysics,whichHectorlabels

correspondent-essentialistmetaphysics,isthatthispredetermined

metaphysicallyconstructedworldviewdoesviolenceagainsttheobjectitself.As

Hectorstates,objects“showup–indeed,tobe”whentheyfitintoanalready

constructed“frameworkestablishedbyonesideas,wordsandcategories”

(Hector2011,8).Yetthisideathatthemindcorrespondswithrealityshouldnot

beunderstoodasbeingonedimensional.Thefreightisactuallycarriedinboth

directions.Thatis,themind“picturesone’swordsandcategoriesas

correspondingtoanobject’sfundamentalreality”(Hector2011,9).Yetitalso

endsup“equatinganobject’sfundamentalrealitywiththatwhichfitswithinthe

boundsofthosecategories”(Hector2011,8).

Theobviousdangerwiththistypeofmetaphysicsisthatitisdictatedbycertain

preconceptionsandthus,willtendtomakeobjectsconformtothesepre-

conceptions.Hectorgivessomeexampleswhichillustratethisdanger,

particularlyinthesituationswherehumansaretreatedasobjects.Womanmay

showupthroughalensofpriorconceptionsoffemininityandifweaknessispart

ofthislens,thenwomenareviewedasbeingweak.Again,one’sownprior

conceptionofblacknesswillsetthescopewhenapersonshowsupwithinits

sight;apersonwhoisdarkmaybeperceivedasbeingshadyorsinister.Thissort

ofmetaphysicslimitsanobject’sparticularity,bindingupobjectsandforcing

themintoitsownpreconceivedideas.Itis“commonly”disparagedasbeing

“totalizing,calculating,andinstrumentalizing”(Hector2011,49).Itmayalsogive

“comforttoothersortsofviolence”(Hector2011,51).

Anotherdanger,pointedoutbyHector,isthatthismetaphysicalviewmaygive

risetofeelingsofdistanceandnotbeingintouchwithreality,everydayobjects

canseemlikemereappearances,evenourownexistencemaybequestioned.The

onlyreasonthatmetaphysicianslike“DescartesandPlatowerenottroubledby

thisfeelingofdistance,Hectorsuggests,isbecausetheyclaimedthathumans

have“anexperience-transcendingfacultytobridgeit”(Hector2011,30).This

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bridgeisprovidedbythescepticalworriesthatareinherentwithinthem.Asto

howthesescepticalworriesactasabridge,Hectorisnotclearonthismatter,but

theoutcomeisastrongercorrespondence,acorrectingofone’sideasandtobe

morebalanced.Thatcorrectnessconsistswhollyinone’sstandinginacertain

relationshiptoobjectsisapertinentpointforHector,becausethisuncovers

anothernegativeaspectofthismetaphysics.

HectorquotesRichardRortywho“wantstoseehumanpersonsasanswerable

onlytothosewhoanswertous–onlytoconversationpartners,wearenot

responsibleeithertotheatomsortoGod,atleastnotuntiltheystartconversing

withus”(Hector2011,29).Hector,ingeneralagreementwithRorty,addsthatif

onecouldreleaseoneselffromthis“correspondentist”viewitwouldinturn“free

oneselffromthissenseofincapability”(Hector2011,30).Itwouldallowoneto

“arriveataview”thatwouldonlyanswerto“objectsbyansweringtoone’s

peers”(Hector2011,32).

ThatHectorisingeneralagreementtoRortyisworthnoting.Rortyclearlydoes

notbelievethattherehasbeenanypriorvoiceofGod,whetherbytheWordof

Godoranyothermeans.Hector,asaprotestantChristian,clearlydoesbelieve

thatGodhasspoken.Yet,evenifRortyisanatheisthisargumentfitswellinto

Hector’spresentationandsoheishappytoplundertheEgyptians.

HectorwillusetheEgyptian’sgold,nottoformanidol,buttobolsterhisown

systemofinter-subjectiverecognitionwhichcohereswellwithanswerabilityto

peers.Yetatthesametimehegivesitaspiritualormysticaloverlayinhisoverall

presentation/understanding.Thisanswerabilitytopeersbecomesmimeticwhen

appliedtothesystemofinter-subjectiverecognition.Thismimeticsystem

enablestheperpetuationandcontinuationofanapostolicparadigmorlinethat

goesrightbacktoJesus,andissomehowcarriedalongbytheSpiritof

recognition.Essentially,itisanswerability,nottoanidol,buttoGod.Andhere

wearriveatHector’ssubjectproper.

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SubjectProper:ObjectificationofGod

Hector’smaintopicofconcern,ashasalreadybeennoted,isthatcorrespondent-

essentialistmetaphysicsfitsGodintoitsownpre-conceptions.Godisobjectified

andforcedtocorrespondtoone’sideasofGod.Thismetaphysicaltheismclearly

createsGodintoitsownimagetovenerateandthereforemustbeidolatrous.

HectorgivesHeidegger’sverdictofthisimage,“onecanneitherfalltoone’s

kneesinawe,norcanoneplaymusicanddancebeforesuchagod”(Hector2011,

12).Ironicallythisessence,thisconceptionofGod,ismerelyaprojectionofour-

selves.

Thistypeofmetaphysicscouldeasilybeinterpretedastheattempttosetthe

boundsofrighteousness.Inthisrespect,Hectorstates,metaphysicsis

“fundamentallyanactofself-justification”(Hector2011,14).OnceagainHector

appealstoHeideggerwhocontendsthatmetaphysics“justifiesitselfbeforethe

claimofjustice”duetothefactthatit“positsthoseboundsofjusticeitself”

(Hector2011,14).Itisthisjustificationthatissetwithinthesecularrealmand

equivalentto“thetheologicaldoctrineofjustification”(Hector2011,14).

Metaphysics,atitsbottom,then,“canbeseenasatheologicalproject–

specifically,theprojectofselfjustification”(Hector2011,14).

Hectornowsumsupthemetaphysics,presentedbyHeidegger,byhighlighting

twoofitsmainfeatures.Thefirstfeature,essentialismgivesapictureinwhichan

object’sfundamentalrealityisidentifiedwitharealoridea-likeessencethat

standsataremovefromordinaryexperience.Thelattermaycometoseem

shadowy,second-rate,arealmofmereappearance,itfollowsthatthehuman

knowerscanfeelseveredfromthisreality.Thesecondfeaturecorrespondentism

isimplementedtobridgethegap,followingtherealisationthatthereisa

distancebetweenhumanpersonsandthatoffundamentalreality.Theonlyway

tobridgethisgap,orsoitseems,istoresolvetoacceptthatourideasandwords

areincorrespondenceofsuchreality.ThusHectorconcludes;oncethese

featureshavebeenmadeexplicit,itiseasytoseewhyonewouldwanttoavoid

metaphysics,sinceitseemsalienating,violent,andidolatrous.

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TheExtremePosition:ApophaticAnti-metaphysics

Howevermetaphysicsmaybeverydifficult,ifnotimpossibletoavoid,aproblem

thatHectornowaddressesbycitingDerrida.Itisnotsimplythateveryday

conceptsreflectandreinforcemetaphysicalpresuppositions;itisthat“language

useisitselfmetaphysical”(Shakespeare2009,35).Conceptuseisinextricably

tiedtothewholeessentialist-correspondentprocess,suchthat,whenoneapplies

aconcepttoanobject“onefitstheseintoitspredeterminedframework”(Hector

2011,14).AccordingtoDerrida’sview,theonlywayoutofthismetaphysical

bindisto“loosenone’sgripoflanguageandconceptuse”inordertotrytodo

awaywithmetaphysics(Derrida,SemiologicetGrammatologie1972,176-79).

Thisendeavourtosomehowdeliveroneselffromconceptusecanleadto

extrememeasures.ThisisundoubtedlythepointthatHectorwishestoillustrate

inpresentingtwoscholarswhohaveresortedtothistypeofapproach,Marion

andCaputo.

Marionconsidershimselfforemostaphilosopher(J.-L.Marion,IdolandDistance

2002,23),yetasotherphilosopherscontendedwiththisconcern,regardingthe

problemofmetaphysics,itclearlybecomesatheologicalconcern,andtherefore

howcantheCatholicChurchworshipGodwithoutmakingHimintoanidol?

Giventhissubject-mattertheproblemoflanguagebecomesextremely

problematic,atleastasfarasMarion(thetheologian)isconcerned.Itisaserious

matterwhenGod,whoisconceptualised,isconsideredtobenogodatall,butan

idol,andthisisjusttheclaimthatMarionmakes.Hejustifiesthisclaimbyhis

definitionofaconcept.Aconceptisthatwhichconsignsinasignthatwhichthe

mindfirstseizedwithitand,asaresult,seizurebecomesthemeasureofthe

divineandnotviceversa.Onceithasseizedthedivineinitsconceptualholdit

willgoforthandnameitGod.Oncedefined,thispredeterminedhuman

conceptualGodmeasuresthe“ChristiancrossedoutGodorthemoredivinegod”

(J.-L.Marion,GodwithoutBeing1991,78-80).

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TheChristiancrossedoutGodisMarion’swayofexpressingthe

incomprehensibleandunspeakablenature,andnameofGod,itservesto

accentuatehispointthatourconceptsofGodareidolatrous.Hectoragreeswith

Marion,addingtheco-joiner,inasmuchasherightlyunderstandshim.Ifitis

agreedthat“IdolatryisthesubjectionofGodtohumanconditionsforan

experienceofthedivine”(Hector2011,16),andif“conceptsareindeedakindof

humancondition”(Hector2011,16),andthatbytheseconceptsGodissubjected

totheir/people’sboundaries,thenheandMarionareinagreement,Godattained

byconceptualuseisanidol.

Marionelaboratesfurtheronthisproblemofconceptuse,yetironicallyheusesa

concepttodoso:theconceptofincomprehensibility.AccordingtoMarion

“incomprehensibility”isa“formaldefinitionofGod”(Hector2011,17),yet

categorisinghisconceptasformal,doesnot,inmyview,makeitanexceptionto

anyotherconceptuse.Thisinconsistencyaside,Marion’spointisthatwhenwe,

inourexpressions,claimthatwecomprehendtheGodwhoisincomprehensible,

whatweactuallydoissubjectHimtoourhumanlevel,accordingtoourfinite

mind.Thus,likeanyobjectthatweconceptualise,weforceHimtosubmittoour

measure,whichislessthanGod,whichisanidol.Thedivinenatureisof

necessitytoexceedone’sunderstandingsothat“Godmustutterlytranscend

one’sconceptionofGod”(Hector2011,17).Therefore,accordingtoHector,

Marionconcludesthatinordertoavoidthisconceptualidolatry,theologymust

atbottomnotapplyconceptstoGod.

HectornowpresentsMarion’ssuggestionforawayoutofconceptuse,a“non-

predicativeunderstandingofGod-talk”(Hector2011,17).Marionsuggeststhat

thesolutionistosubstitutepredicationwithpraise.Whenaperson“uses

languagetopraiseGod”,thissuspendspredicating“conceptsofGod”(Hector

2011,17).Thepersonwill“lifttheirvoice”indirect“praisetotheunknowable

Giverofthegift”(Hector2011,17).Theirvoicewillbedirectedtotheunknown,

thereforeeliminatinganyconceptualpicturefortheGiver.Marion’sideaof

praiseisdrawnfromPseudo-Dionysius,whereby,therelationshipbetween“the

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requestant”(thespeaker)and“theRequisite”(theGiver)isconceived“wherethe

latterisinherentintheformer”(Hector2011,18).

HectorunderstandsMarionassayingthatwhenonepraisesGodaswise,for

example,themeaningofwiseisusuallydeterminedbyitspredicativeuseand

thereforewithreferencetocreaturesandtheirunderstandingofwisdom.Yet

thisisnotthecasewithpraise,Godaswisedoes“notpredicatethisconcept(of

humanwisdom)ofGod”,butthispraiseofwisdomgoes“beyondthehuman

concept”(Hector2011,18).Ittrans-pierces(penetratesthrough)thehuman

conceptofwisdomintoandontothe“One,uponwhosegivingallthings–

includingcreaturelywisdom–depend”(Hector2011,18).Thereforewhenthe

speakerutterspraisetoGodthe“as”in“Ipraiseyou,Lord,asbeauty”bustspast

theaimofthespeaker,whichincorporatestheirconceptofbeauty,andintothe

infinitebeyondtotheOne.Yetthisrequiresthespeakerto“first”seethis“One’

astheGiverofallgoodthings”(Hector2011,18).Thisultimatelymeansthatthe

speakerwill“returntotheRequisitethegiftsandthenamesthattheRequisite

ensuresindistance”(Hector2011,19).

ThisisamajoraspectinMarion’sapproach,statesHector,whereheinsistson

the“absoluteontologicalandtheologicalpriorityofCharity”(Hector2011,19).

Hisnon-predicativeunderstandingofGod-talkisbasedonthisdeepappreciation

thatGodistheGiver,Hisgivingorcharityenablesbeingandispriortobeing/s.

Thisperfectgiftofcharitydoesnotwhollyreside“withintherealmofthatwhich

itgivestobe”,butthatwhichgives“tobe”mustbethoughtofindistance(Hector

2011,19).ThisisbecausetheGiverhasabsoluteprecedenceoverallbeings.

Beingsacknowledgetheirdependenceuponapriorgiftwhichresultsin“asense

ofGod’sdepth”(Hector2011,20).Thegiftoffered,asthisdepth,andunderstood

asinconceivableknowledgeleavesthischarityalonetoappear.

CharityisthemostappropriatenameforGod,Marionthinks,becauseit

expressesHisinfinitenaturewhichinturndistinguisheshimfromallother

beings.Andtheonlyfittingresponsetothischarityispraise,Godgives,andto

sayGod,istoacknowledgethereceptionandthereturnofthegift,eventhough,

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thisreturnofthegiftisessentiallyredundantbecauseofthe“imponderableof

thedonation”(Hector2011,21).Thispraiseisanaction,Marionadds,becauseit

encompassesalifethatislivedinanattitudeofpraise.

Marion’sapproach,Hectorsummarises,isunderstoodasan“apophaticanti-

metaphysicaltheism”,asopposedtoa“metaphysicaltheism”(Hector2011,21),

thelatter(asexpressedabove)isunderstoodashumaneffortstofitGodinto

theirowncorrespondentideas/terms.TheepitomeofMarion’sapophatictheism

isexpressedinhisstatement,“sinceallotherrealitiesdependwhollyuponGod’s

originaryactofgiving-to-be”,thenitmustfollowthat“Godisabsolutelyprior”

(Hector2011,21)toallotherrealitiesandnotviceversa.Allrealitieswould

necessarilyincludehumanlanguageaccordingtoMarion’sview.

Caputo’srebuff

Caputoisanotherinfluentialscholarofapophaticanti-metaphysics,ormore

specifically,asHectorlabelsit,a“deconstructiveanti-metaphysics”(Hector

2011,20),andbythishemeansthatCaputocritiquesanddeconstructsthe

argumentsofotheranti-metaphysicianssuchasMarion.Caputo’sfollowing

critiqueofMarionexposestheimpossibilityofavoidingconceptuse.Yet,atthe

same,itservesHector’spurpose,inrevealingtheapophaticanti-metaphysic’s

extremeviewofthemetaphysicalproblem,leadingtoanextremeapproach.

Hector’sstrategicuseofCaputoeffectivelyprovidestheopportunitytopresent

hisownmoremoderatetherapeuticapproach.

Inprinciple,CaputoagreeswithMarionontheproblemofconceptuse,yethe

takesanevenstrongerposition,languageismanifestlyviolentandthereisno

wayoutofit.Violenceissointegratedintolinguisticstructuresthatitindeed

constituteslanguageitself.Accordingtothisextremeperspectivethereis

nothingwecansayaboutGodthatisnotviolent.Hector’sviewisthatCaputo

bringshometheimplicationoftheviolentuseofconceptsinamosttroublesome

way.Caputocontendsthatwhenalanguageclaimstobethelanguageofreality

andatthesametimecontainsaconceptionalsystemofexclusions,then,itcan

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resultin“bloodspillingviolence”(Hector2011,18).Suchaharrowingimageof

language’spotentialforevilisveryworrisomeandseemstojustifytheformof

reliefthatHector’stherapyoffers.

ThoughCaputooffersasolution,ofsorts,itdoesnotoffermuchrelief.He

believesthattheonlywaytocurbthispropensitytowardsviolenceistobe

constantlyremindedthatlanguageisinherentlyviolent.Caputo’sprojectenlists

adeconstructiveapproach,basedontherationalthatconceptualviolenceis

inescapableandthereforeweneedtoberemindedthatourlanguageisoftennot

anexactrepresentationofreality.However,justbecauseourlanguageis

inherentlyviolent,itdoesnotmeanthatweshouldsuccumbtoits“arch-violent”

spirit(Hector2011,19).Wemustendeavourtoavoidlanguagethatincites

violence,suchasthatwhichwouldexclude,excommunicate,orsilenceothers.

HectorviewsbothMarionandCaputo’sstrategiesasdeconstructive,inthatthey

revealthereis“noreferencewithoutdifference,noreferenceoutsideofatextual

chain”(Hector2011,19).Themeaningofanytermisdeterminedbyitsplacein

anoverallsystematiccodewhichhasbeenestablishedovertimeandwithin

culturesand/ortraditions.ThepointthatHectorwishestoemphasisehereis

thatourrealityisalwaysamediatedrealityandthus,shouldnotbeunderstood

ascorrespondingtoanobject’sown-mostreality.Itisonlythroughthis

understanding,ofmediation,thatonecanhopetobe“freefromthinkingthat

objects–Godorotherwise–canbepinneddown”(Hector2011,22).Yetatthe

sametimeitalso“protectstheirotherness”,sothatthisallowsthe“thingitselfto

slipawayleavingnothingbehind,savethename”(Hector2011,20).

CertainlythethingitselfslippingawayismademoreapparentinCaputo’s

critiqueofMarion,asHectorelaborates.Ashasbeenseen,Marionclaimsthat

thereisanon-conceptualandthusnon-idolatrousmeansoftalkingtoGod.

Againstthisclaim,Caputocontendsthatthereisno“non-predicativemeans”by

whichto“referone’swordstoGod–evenwordsofpraise,sinceintentionalityis

anirreduciblyconceptualaffair”(Hector2011,21).Wehaveanintentionto

directourpraisetowardGodandthisdirectionispre-determinedaccordingto

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theconceptsbywhichweunderstandtheGodwearegoingtopraise,whether

“oneaddressesGodas‘you,’the‘GodofIsrael,’or‘TheUnknown’–onewillby

necessityemployconcepts”(Hector2011,20).Caputoclearlybelievesthatitis

absurdtopositanypraiseaddressedtoGodthatdoesnotinvolveconcepts,“for

apartfromsuchconceptualuseone’spraisewouldremainundirected”(Hector

2011,20).Therefore,hisargumentcouldbesummedup,doingawaywith

conceptsequatestodoingawaywiththeconditions(definedbyconcepts)which

makeitpossibletoaddressoreventhinkofGodinthefirstplace.

CaputothenturnsthisargumentagainstMarion,beginningwithMarion’s

contentionthat“Godmustnotbesubjectedtoanyanteriorconditions,suchas

thoseofbeing/s”(Hector2011,23).Caputo’srebuffisthatMarionhasactually

violatedhisownruling,inthisregard,byhismeresubstitutionof“onesetof

conditionsforanother”(Hector2011,23)–thatis,hisown.Moreover,Caputo

insiststhatMarionhasinnowayavoidedconditioningGod,andreiterates,that

“whenonespeaksofGodwithout‘Being’,orbeyond‘Being’,itisnotasifyouhad

somehowjustextricatedGodfromallanteriorconditionality”(Hector2011,24).

WhileMarionmaybelievethathehasconditionedit/him/her/Godto“something

better”,CaputocountersthatallMarionhasdoneistoconstruetheconditionsto

“better”suithis“religioussensibility”(Hector2011,24).

ForCaputothereisno“God’seyepointofview”andalthoughMarionmayclaim

suchaview,allhehasmanagedtoshowusisapointofviewofacertainhuman

religiousexperience.Thisexperienceis“fromoneendtotheother”an

expressionthatis“thoroughlydefinedinthehumantermsofloving,giving,and

earthlyglory”(Hector2011,27)Eventhetermlove(MarionbelievesGodloved

beforeexistence/being)ishumanlymediatedandisdeterminedfromourhuman

side,asCaputocontends;lovedoesnotescapethevortexthatsubjects“anobject

toitsconditions”(Hector2011,26).Marion’sattempttoavoidthisvortexof

violence,byhisuseoftheconceptloveonlyfurther“perpetuatestheillusionthat

Godcorrespondstoone’sownlanguageofGod”(Hector2011,26).

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AsCaputocontinuestochallengeMarion’sposition,itisclearheisdeterminedto

makethepointthatwecannotescapetheviolenceoflanguage.53More

significantly,CaputoisbeingusedtodemonstrateHector’spointthatthe

apophaticapproachdoesnotsolvetheproblemofGod-talk,butonlyfurther

accentuatesthedifficulty.

CaputoviewsMarion’sattempttoreleaseGodfromanyhumanconditionsisat

best,“misguided”,andatworstactuallyleadstoviolence.IfMarioninsistson

submittingallGod-talk(theology)totheauthorityofaCatholicbishopwhoisa

member“ofanexclusiveecclesiasticalhierarchy”then,Caputocontends,thisis

“ethico-onticalviolence”whichis“theworsesortofviolence”ofall(Hector2011,

23).

SummarybasedonMarionandCaputo

Hectorhassetforthtwodifferingmethodsofovercomingtheviolenceinherent

inlanguage,becauseofitsmetaphysicalnature.AlthoughMarionandCaputo

suggestthatlanguagemustbekeptatadistance,fromitsobjects,thewayto

achievethisdistanceistorelegateGodtotherealmoftranscendence.This

meanssettingupagapbetweenthehumanpersonandhisworld,andGod.Yet

Caputofurtherassertsthattheexperienceofthe“Other”mustbeinaccessibleto

myperception,otherwisetheother’sexperiencewouldbemineandthatheror

hisothernesswouldbeinvadedordamaged.ThusGodmustremainabsolutely

“Other”,sothatHistranscendenceisnotcompromised.

Marion,incontrast,understandsthatanallegedexperienceofGodnecessarily

involvescertainpreconditions.Thesepreconditionsaresuchthatdistanceis

maintainedbetweenGodandthepersonsothatone’sexperiencescannotbe

identifiedwithGod.Thus,hissolutiontotheproblemofidolatry,“thesubjection

ofGodtohumanconditionsforanexperienceofthedivine”,istorestrictany

connectionin“experience”betweentheparties(Hector2011,26).Sinceitis

53StevenShakespeare,DerridaandTheology(NewYork:T&TClarkeInternational,2009),92.DerridaagreeswithCaputo;“thepossibilityofviolencecanneverbewhollyeliminatedfromtheworld”.

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God’sactualdistance“thatidentifiesandauthenticatesthedivineassuch”

(Hector2011,26).

Havingsummarisedtheseviews,IthinkHectorhasclearlydemonstratedthe

pitfallsintryingtochangetheessentialist-correspondentistpicturecreatedby

Westernmetaphysics.ThereseemstobenowayofexpressingGod-talkwithout

treatingGodasanidol.InHector’saccount,Caputoestablishesanunbridgeable

gapbetweenGodandman,andMarion’sefforttoclosethisgapheseriously

challenged.Wearecondemnedtodistance,alienatedfromourmaker,wemay

evenneedtherapy.Hectorisnowwellpositionedtopresenthisalternativeto

theseapophaticmethodsofdoingwithoutessentialist-correspondentist

metaphysics.Thisalternativehetitles,“Therapeuticanti-metaphysics”(Hector

2011,27).

Thistherapeuticstrategyisnotoriginaltohim,heexplains,butisthejoint

inspirationofWittgensteinandSchleiermacherrespectively.Therefore,inthe

followingaccount,heelaboratesonthewayhehasuniquelyappliedthis

approachasameansofavoidingtheessentialist-correspondentistmetaphysical

picture.Thefirststepistomakecertaincommitmentsfoundinthemetaphysical

frameworkexplicit,andinordertoachievethis,hewillputanothermore

reasonablepicturealongsidethismetaphysicalone.Thisalternativepicture,he

believes,willhelpfreeonefromtheirresistiblenessoftheformerone.Yetthe

processofchangingonesviewmaycauseafeelingofdislocationor

homesickness.Withhisspecialbrandoftherapy,Hectorintendsto“treatthe

homesicknessonemayfeelforthatwhichhasbeenleftbehind”(Hector2011,

28).

Homesickness

Thefeelingofhomesicknessisespeciallyapparentforthosewhohavebeenheld

inthegripofcorrespondentismforalongperiodoftime.Ifapersonbelievesthat

theiressentialistviewdirectlycorrespondstorealitythensubsequent

dislodgementfromthisviewwillmakeonefeeloutoftouchwiththeworld,asif

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theyareto-ingandfro-inginshadowyworldwithoutanysubstance.Sucha

sensationisusuallyaconfirmationthatoneisstillintheclutchofametaphysical

frameworkand,asaconsequence,theyarestrugglingtoletgoofcertain

inflationaryclaimsaboutreality.Hectorclaimsthatametaphysicalframeworkof

realityfostersafalsesenseofsecurity,becauseitclaimstohaveabsolutetruths,

yettheseareunqualified.

Hectorclaimsthatapophaticanti-metaphysics,andsimilarpostmodern

approaches,donotalleviatethisfeelingofhomesickness,insteadtheirapproach

createsadistancethatisroughlyequivalent.Thisisbecausetheapophatic

position,inreactiontothemetaphysic’sideaofcorrespondence,tendstogothe

otherextremeofpositingthatthepersoniscompletelyoutoftouchwithGodand

otherobjects.Theproblem,asHectorviewsit,istheirstartingpointwhichleads

themtodevelopaninflationaryclaimofwhatitreallymeanstobeintouchwith

reality.

Apophaticanti-metaphysiciansestablishtheirgroundbybeginningwitha

meticulousreductionismofthekataphaticposition54anditspresentationof

reality.Yet,Hectorpointsout,thisuseofthereductionistapproachisactuallyan

indicationthattheyarestillinthegripofametaphysicalframework.Onecannot

performreductionismwithoutacceptingmetaphysicaldualisms(oropposites:

below)andthistendstokeeptheminitsgrip(Shakespeare2009,19).This

seemstobeHector’spointhere,whichisfurthersupportedbyhisexampleof

Rorty.

54AndrewLouth,TheoriginoftheChristianMysticalTraditionfromPlatotoDenys(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2007)“TwowaysofspeakingaboutGodkataphatic(positivelypredicated)andapophatic(negativelypredicated).”Kataphaticmeaning“tocomealongside,”whenappliedtolanguageaboutGodmeant“tobringGoddowninsuchawaysoastobeabletospeakofHim.”Patristicapophatictraditionneverclaimedthat“thekataphaticwayofspeakingaboutGodwasidolatrous.”Their“apophaticmodewasalwayssubordinatedtoanaffirmationmodeoftheology,whichmaybeindispensiblenomorethantoqualify,albeitinacrucialmanner,kataphaticGodtalk.”Thereisnotmuch“evidencethatthePatristicapophatictheologyistobecriticalofreligiousormetaphysicalidolsassuch”.SarahKlitemic-WearandJohnM.Dillon,DionysiustheAreopagiteandtheNeo-platonistTradition:DespoilingtheHellenes(Surrey:AshgatePublishing,2007),14.NegativetheologyfunctionedasaguardianagainstabuseofaffirmativeGod-talk,itespeciallyfoundproblemswhenGod-talkhadtheunivocal(havingonlyonepossiblemeaning)applicationinmattersdivine”.

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Rortyisadamantthat“inordertoseeoneselfasanswerabletoone’speers,one

mustfirstseeoneselfasunanswerabletoGodandotherobjects”(Hector2011,

40).Byemphasisingtheneedtobeanswerabletoone’speers,Rortyclearly

believesthathehasrejectedthe“opposite”kataphaticcorrespondentistpicture

of“answerabilitytoGodandotherobjects”(Hector2011,29)Hewouldbelieve

thathehasreleasedhimselffromthemetaphysicalbind(asheviewsit).Rorty

maynoteventhinkthatatrueGodactuallyexists,notesHector,butthisaside,in

ordertobetruetohisowncontention;hestillneedstoaccepthispeers’

consensusspeculationsabouttheideaofGod.Ironically,itisonlytheir

speculationsofaGodthatheisnotanswerableto.Hisowneither/orabsolute

stancehastrappedhim.ThusHectorconcludes,forsomeoftheseanti-

metaphysicianstojust“rejectmetaphysics”donotseemto“free”themfromits

grip(Hector2011,32).

Hector,havingspentsomuchtimeexpoundingontheapophaticposition,has

disclosedit,asaninflatedpositionwhichisreductionistandabsolutistinits

stance.Yetheexposesthemwithverylittleeffort,onlyenoughtoopenthedoor

towhatheclearlyconsidersisamorebalancedapproach.Hehaspavedtheway

forhisalternativetherapeuticstrategyforthosewhofeelalossaftertheyhave

decidedtorejectametaphysicallyinflatedsenseofreality.Thistherapydoesnot

trytoresolveanytheoreticalproblemassuch,butfocusesonidentifyingthe

presuppositionsthatinitiallycausedtheseproblems.

HectorenlistsWittgenstein’soriginalitytoelucidatemoreofwhatthis

identificationprocessinvolves.Wittgensteinnotesthatpeopleseemtotakefor

granted“acertainpictureoftheessenceofhumanlanguage”(Hector2011,30).

Wehumansthinkthatthe“wordsoflanguagenameobjectsandthatsentences

arethecombinationsofsuchnames”(Hector2011,30).Thesewordsinturn

becometransparentcontainersofmeaning.Suchwordsstandtallasamarkerfor

theobject.Thisistheactualpictureoflanguagethatweacceptandtakefor

granted,wordsarematchedwithmeaninganditistheir“meaningsthatarethe

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fundamentalrealityoflanguage–wethinkoflanguageinessentialist-

correspondentistterms”(Hector2011,31).

However,thispictureischallengedbyeverydayuse,whichistheaspectthat

HectorwishestostressinWittgenstein’saccount.Wittgensteinelaborateson“a

strangephenomena,wherebytheunambiguouspicturesuddenlyseemstobe

muddied.The“crystallinepurity”(Hector2011,30)ofwordsaccordingto

essentialist-correspondencepictureisnotconsistentwithordinarylanguageuse,

butappearstotranscendit.Theonlywaytoclearthisapparentlymuddypicture,

experiencedineverydayconversation,istoresistbeingmesmerizedbythe

crystallinepicture.Whenapersonresolvesnottobecaptivatedbythispicture

theywillgraduallybereleasedtoaccept“thatthereisnothing‘muddy’about

ordinarylanguage”(Hector2011,31).

Wittgensteinsuggeststhattheinterpretershouldturnhis/herwholeview

aroundsothattheymayacceptthatlanguageexplainsitselfaccordingto

acceptedconventionsinlife.Inthisrespect,hecontendsthatordinarylanguage

isactuallynotoutoftouchwithfundamentalreality,itisthepuritypicturethatis

actuallyoutoftouch.Itisintheordinaryprocessofcommunicatingthatone’s

semanticrangeofawordanditsmeaningsisdevelopedandsolidified.Weadopt

certainlanguagecategoriesaccordingtoconventions,aprocessWittgenstein

referstoaslanguagegames,andinthiswaythesemanticrangeofwordsis

developed.

HectorproceedstolayWittgenstein’sframeworkalongsidetheessentialist-

correspondentistoneinordertochallengeitspresuppositions.Bythis

therapeuticmethodheseekstodemonstratethatonecanimplementthis

framework,withitsordinarypractices,anduseitasanaccurateparadigmto

adjustthecrystallinepuritypicture/framework.Hepresentshistherapeutic

anti-metaphysicsasanadequateapproachtoovercomingthishomesickness,

becausehebelievesthatitmaycontributetofreeingpeoplefromthinkingthat

theyhavelostanythingbylettinggooftheessentialist-correspondentistview.

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ThusHector’stherapeuticstrategyworksoffthedepreciationofthe

metaphysicalviewbyreversingthepriorityofwhatdeterminesreality.It

prioritiseswhatliesneartohandbyidentifyingexplanationsaccordingto

ordinarypracticesandexperienceoflanguageasopposedtothatwhich

metaphysicspurportstoexplain.Metaphysicspurportstoexplainwhatrealityis

likeandwhatitmeanstobeintouchwithreality.Hector’salternativestrategy

venturestoexplainrealityandwhatitmeanstobeintouchwithitbyappealing

tosupposednon-metaphysicalmeans.Byhiscounterintuitivemethodheseeks

todemonstratethatoneneednotappealtotheseinflatedmetaphysicalideals

whichcanonlyleadtoover-reactionssuchthoseoftheapophaticanti-

metaphysicians.

Toreiterateanearlierpoint,Hectorisreferringtoaspecifickindofmetaphysics;

heisnotsuggestingawholesalerejectionofeverythingmetaphysicalforthis

wouldnecessarilyexcludebeliefand/ordiscussionsregardingGod.Onthe

contrary,hisconcernforthechurches’relationshiptoGodisclearlythedriving

forceofhiswriting(Long2013,95).Hisnextstep,therefore,istocontestthe

assumptionoftheapophaticanti-metaphysiciansthatGodmuststandata

removefromtherealmofcreaturelyexperience.ForHectorthiswouldmakeGod

amereappearance,atbest.Andthisunderstandingwouldresultintherebeing

“agapbetweenGodandGod-with-us”(Hector2011,31).

Hectorchallengesthisblackorwhiteapproachwhichseemstoforceoneto

acceptcorrespondentismorsubmittotheseapophaticassumptions.Asfurther

explanation,HectorpresentsKaufman’sview.

Kaufman’spictureofGod,accordingtoHector,isthatHeshouldalwaysstandat

aremovefromhumanencounter.Godasthe“ultimatepointofreferenceforall

experience”(Hector2011,32)shouldnotbeconceivedasbeingpartofordinary

encounters.IfGodistheonewhoisuniquethenGodshouldnotbesubjectedto

anyhumanmeasurement,accordingtoaclaimtohaveknowledgeorexperience

ofGod.ThereforedistancemustbemaintainedbetweenGodandall/any

creaturelyencountersand“theveryideaofanexperienceofGodis“acategorical

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categorymistake”(Hector2011,32).Kaufman’sdogmaticconclusion/statement

isthattheremustbe“anontologicalandepistemologicalgap”maintained

between“one’s(putative)experienceofGodandGod”(Hector2011,33).

Hector,inresponse,typicallyseekstomitigateonsuchanextremeposition.

Kaufman’spositionputshumansoutoftouchwithGod’sfundamentalrealityand

isinneedofsometherapeuticalinput.Thus,Hectorclaimsthatthereisa

“differencebetweenclaimingthatGodneednotbethoughttostandataremove

fromthatwhichispubliclyexperienceableofGod,andclaimingthatGod’sbeing

inGod-selfmustcorrespondtoone’spreconceivedideas”(Hector2011,33).

ClearlyhebelievesthatwecanhaveanexperienceofGodwithoutthismeaning

thatwehavesomehowsubjectedHimtoourpreconceptions.Hectornowsets

outtoestablishhowthisisvalidbyenlistingWittgenstein’slanguagegamesand

Barth’ssuggestedparadigmforworship.

Wittgenstein’sestablishmentof“languagegames”(Labron2009,24)justifiably

includesthetraditionalandauthorisedChristianlanguagegame.Hectorusesthis

justificationasastartingpointtolayclaimtothe“Barthianstrategy”(Hector

2011,34)ofworship.Hecontendsthatthisisanacceptableparadigmof

worshipbecauseitfallswithintheauthorisedscopeoftheordinarypracticesand

experienceofthetraditionalChristianlanguagegame.AccordingtoBarth’s

understanding,“God’sbeing-inGod-self”isthearchetypeof“God’sbeing-with-

us”andthelatteristhe“repetitionadextraofGod’sbeing-inGod-self”(Hector

2011,35).ThisBarthianstrategythereforepictures“God’seternalbeingasthe

ongoingactivityoftriunecommunion”,whichunderstands“Godasbeing

wholeheartedlyidentifiedintheseacts”totheutmost(Hector2011,35).

ThepointthatHectorwishestostressthroughthisapplicationofwhatheterms

asBarthianstrategyisthattheremustbe,insomeway,divineinvolvementinthe

churches’worshipinthisongoingTrinitarianactivityofGod’sbeinginGod-self.

Indeed,thegiftofhissonistheemphaticdemonstrationofhiscommitmenttous,

asHectorclaims:God“sacrificedthatwhichisessentialtoGodinordertobe

withhumanity,surelythisshouldserveasapowerfuldemonstrationofhis

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wholeheartednessinwantingtobeontologicallywithus”(Hector2011,32).

Therefore,if“God’sbeing-inGod-selfisontologicallyfitforbeing-with-us,”then

itshouldfollow,thinksHector,that“God’sappearanceintherealmofcreaturely

experienceneednotbeconstruedasmereappearance”(Hector2011,32).

Hector,however,isnotsatisfiedtoconcludethematterhere.Hehasestablished

somegroundforGodbeingwithus,butKaufmann’sassumptionisall-

encompassing,thewholeofcreationhassomehowbeenrenderedunfitforGod’s

presence.BycounteringthispositionHectorgiveshimselftheopportunityto

bolsterhisargument.Godmadethiscreation,surelythisproveshehasa

commitmenttoit,iftheonewhocreatesandgovernstheworldisthesameone

whoisdeterminedtobeGod-with-us,thenitmustsurelyfollowthatcreaturely

realityshouldn’tcauseanyhindrancetoGodbeingwithus.YeteventhoughGod

mayacceptbothcreatureandcreaturelyhabitat,itdoesnotnecessarilyfollow

thatHeacceptscreaturelytalk,onthecontrary,ithasalreadybeenestablished

thathumanconceptuallanguagemakesthis“God-with-usanidol”(Hector2011,

34).

TheissueofdistancestillremainsifonecannotaddressGod.Therefore,Hector

mustnowapplyhishealingpowerstothisproblemofourdiseasedlanguage.The

dilemma,ashasalreadybeendiscussed,istheinescapabilityofhumanconcepts.

AsHectorpointsout,thishealedlanguagemustbeapriorieventodistance,

whichonlyexistsaccordingtoahumanconceptofspaceandtime.Surelysuch

conceptswouldbeunsuitableforspeakingwithanincorporealandholyGod,His

supernaturaltalkwouldbede-divinized.Hectorwillnowtrytoanswerthis

dilemma:“howGodcouldmakeuseofhumanlanguage,andhowlanguagecould

befitforthisuse”(Hector2011,37).Then,onthewaveofthisdiscussion,hewill

presenthisalternativetherapeuticstrategy.

Violenceofconcepts

Hector,inhispresentationofMarionandCaputo,hasalreadyconcededthat

languagedoesviolencetoobjects.Afacthenowreaffirms,atthesametime

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emphasisingthatthisviolenceisduetotheapplicationofconceptstoobjectsina

totalizingway.Whenaconceptisappliedtoanobjectitassimilatesthatobjectto

anantecedentlydefinedessence-likecategory.Inthesameway,Godis

objectifiedbypredeterminedcategories,suchasgreatandwise,andrestrictedto

thoseparametersthathavebeenestablishedbyhumanunderstanding.To

demonstratehowthishappens,Hectorgoesontodiscussthisconceptualising

process.

Intheprocessofcomparingandgroupingsimilarobjectsthemeaningofa

conceptisdevelopedwhichthentakesonanover-ridingmeaningunderwhich

theseobjectsaresubjected.Hectorgivestheexampleoftheconceptred,which

canbeunderstoodtomean“whateverthatstopsign,thisfiretruckandthose

cherrieshaveincommon”(Hector2011,49).Therefore,theseobjectsare

preselectedaccordingtoasimilartraitandaconceptissubsequentlyappliedto

these“creaturelyobjects”.

Hectorpointsouttwopotentiallynegativeaspectsofconceptusethatbecome

mostapparentwhenappliedtoGod.Firstly,themeaningofanyconceptbecomes

“fixedbyitsapplicationtosuchcreaturelyobjects”andsecondly,“aconcept

appliesonlytoobjectsthatstandinauniformserieswithothersuchobjects”

(Hector2011,38).Therefore,whenGodissubjectedtothisconcept-determining

processGodissetalongsideothercreaturelyobjectsinaseries;itthereby“cuts

himdowntotheircreaturelysize”(Hector2011,49).HectorcitesBarthwho

insiststhat“Godisneverandnowhereidenticalwiththatwhichwename“God”

orwiththatwhichweexperience,orapprehend,andworshipasGod”(Hector

2011,50).Suchhumanmeaningsofconceptsshouldnotand“cannotmeanthe

‘same’thingwhenappliedtoGod”(Hector2011,50).

Whatsurfacesasaproblemofconceptuse,accordingtoHector,isthissameness

ofmeaningwhichisestablishedwhenaconceptisappliedtodifferentobjects.

Thissamenessistraditionallyreferredtoas“univocity”.Toexpoundonthisidea

of“univocity”HectorcallsonKant,whosetsup“akindofrule”regardingsuch

conceptualsameness(Hector2011,53).Kantdefinesaconceptas“something

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universalthatcanserveasarule,wherearuleistherepresentationofa

universalconditionaccordingtowhichacertainmanifoldcanbepositedin

uniformmanner”(Hector2011,53).AccordingtoKant’sdefinition,concepts

servetoestablisharuleofsamenesstobringaboutuniformityamongobjects,

Hectorprovidesexamplestoillustrate.

Onecansaythistomatosauceisred,thatbarnisred,andthesepoppiesarered,

thenonewouldbeapplyingtheconceptrednessoverandoveragaininthesame

waysothatonemightapplytherule‘x+1.Similarly,theconceptGodmustbe

comparedandmeasuredunivocallytoaseriesofothersimilarpre-established

concepts.Giventheseillustrations,theproblemofunivocitybecomesobvious.

Insofarasconceptsrefertoactualobjectstheydo“violencetotheparticularity

andotherness”(Hector2011,51)oftheseobjects.Thatis,ifthisishowtheuseof

conceptsnormallyworks.ButHectorchallengesthisunderstandingofconcepts,

whichheviewsasakindof“metaphysicalfantasy”(Hector2011,51).Andhis

proof,whichhenowpresents,isderivativeofordinarylanguageuse.

TheNormativePragmaticsofOrdinaryConceptUse

Onecanbelulledintothinkingthatmeanings,expressedinconcepts,havebeen

setinadvancebytheirprevioususeandcontinuedapplication.Theyhavebeen

usedandappliedtoobjectsandthensetoverandagainstotherobjectstomake

thesefitintoauniformseries.Tocounterthisnormalviewofconcepts,as

somehowhavingafixedmeaning,Hectorprovidesanalternative.Hisisbasedon

Wittgenstein’spraxis,thesemanticrangeofaconceptsetonthebaseof

pragmatics,whereby,inordertodeterminenormsoneneedstoexamine

meaningsofconcepts“inrelation”tothosethatarealready“implicitinoursocial

practices”(Hector2011,52).WhatHectorsetsouttoestablishisthatwhenit

comestodecideonthemeaningofaconcept,asappliedtoGod,itwillhavetobe

determinedonarangethatissetby“theologicalsemantics”(Hector2011,58).

Moreover,suchmeaningscanonlybedivulgedin“terms”thataredeterminedby

the“normativeSpirit”whicharealso“mediated”throughthese“samesocial

practices”oftheChristiantheologicalcommunity(Hector2011,61).

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ApplyingKant’sUniversalRule

Inordertoshifttheviewofconceptuse,HectorbeginsbyexaminingKant’s

definitionasaframeworkforthepraxisofthetraditionalChristianChurch.

RecallingKant,aconceptis“somethinguniversalthatcanserveasarule,where

aruleistherepresentationofauniversalconditionaccordingtowhichacertain

manifoldcanbepositedinuniformmanner”(Hector2011,53).Thus,inthecase

ofchurchpraxis,Kant’suniversalrulecanbeappliedtoamanifoldofone’s

experiences.Thisparadigmaticexperiencecanthenserveasaruletodetermine

allothertypeexperiencesthatissimilartoit.Theseothertypeexperiencesare

therebyorderedtobeinaharmonicunionundertheirparadigmaticone.

Toexpoundonhowtheruleisappliedtoasetofmanifoldobjectswhichhave

beensetinuniformitytosimilarexperiences,Hectorimplementstheexperience

ofhiswriting.Herehebeholdsthemanifoldofobjectswhicharespreadacross

hisdesk:“books,pens,andseveralotheritems“allatonce–a‘manifold”(Hector

2011,58).Theseobjectshaveafamiliaritywhichmakesthemcomparablewith

previousexperiences;hismindwillautomaticallycomparethiswriting

experiencewithallofthoseothersimilarones,involvingtheseobjects.Therefore

theseobjectswillbejudgedasgivingasimilarsense-impressiontothatofhis

writingexperience.Theoutcomeisthatthewritingexperienceisconceptualized

and“thoughtofasarulebywhichonecanorderthemanifoldofone’s

experiences,andjudgescertainaspectsofthatexperiencetoberelevantly

similartootheraspectsinallthoseothersimilarexperiences”(Hector2011,59).

HavingillustratedKant’sfairlystandardideaofaconcept,asitisworkedoutin

praxis,Hectorgoesontoadjustthissothatitisinaccordwithhisown

understanding,notinghisdepartureincertainkeyrespects.HeacceptsKant’s

claimthat,intheapplicationofaconcept,oneobjectisjudgedtobesimilarto

anotherandthatthishastheappearanceofarule.Yet,atthesametime,he

wantstodemonstratethattheconcept,understoodasinherentlymetaphysical,

“neednotbeunderstoodascontainers,assettingobjectsinauniformseries,and

norashavingtheirmeaningfixedinadvancebyapplicationtocreaturelyreality”

125

(Hector2011,73).Henowgoesontodemonstratethisbycorrecting“somewhat

drastically,whatisusuallyunderstoodbysimilarityandrulefollowing”(Hector

2011,53).

Hector’scorrectivebeginsbydistinguishingbetweenbehaviourthatcountsas

conceptusefromthatwhichdoesnot.Infantsmakethesoundmamabutthis

doesnotcountstrictlyasconceptualuse.Butiftheymakethesamesound

“mama”onlyaroundtheirmothers;wouldthiscountasconceptuse?Whiletheir

soundsmaycorrelatewithobjects,thisdoesnotnecessarilycountasusing

concepts.Anon-conceptusercanrespondreliablyanddifferentiallytoparticular

aspectsoftheirenvironment:icerespondstothepresenceofheatbymelting,but

thatdoesnotcountasapplyingtheconceptheat.Thus,ababyrespondingtoits

motherwiththesoundmamadoesnotcountasconceptualuse.Since,conceptual

useinvolvesmorethanmakingcertainnoisesincertaincircumstances.Itisa

particularbehaviourthatshouldcountasconceptualuse,especiallyso,whenitis

recognisedasintendingtogooninthesamewayasprecedentuses.

Thisbehaviourinvolvestwoconditionalcomponents.Thesearetheintentional

componentandtheinthesamewaycomponent,respectively.Justbecause

someoneisvoicingtheconceptredthisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheyare

usingthisconcept.Theymustnotonlybevoicingit,theymustbealso

demonstratingothercertainbehaviour,andthatbothoftheseshouldmatchup

withusingtheconcept.Yet,eventhisisstillnotsufficienttobecountedasusing

aconcept.Thevoicingandbehaviourmustbeunderpinnedbythetwoother

conditionalcomponents.Theconceptusermustintendasgoingoninthesame

wayasothersusers,whichisjusttomakeoneresponsiblefordoingso.

Hector,havingintroducedhismorecorrectwayofdeterminingconceptuse,

accordingtopraxis,willgoontoelaborate.Priortothis,however,headdresses

theissueoftwopresuppositions,whichheclearlybelieveswillbeastumbling

blocktoacceptinghisnewview.Thepresuppositionsare:“theideathatsuch

samenessisdeterminedbyaruleanditisdeterminedbytheregularityimplicit

inaseriesofbehaviours.”Thewaythissamenessisobservediswhenitfollowsa

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serieslikein“20,002,20,004,20,006,20,008...’whichwouldbethoughttogo

oninthesamewayas‘0,2,4,6...’becauseitwouldfollowtherule‘x+2.”

(Hector2011,57)Hectorcontends,however,thattherearecertainproblems

withusingaruletomeasurewhatisgoingoninthesameway.Inorderforthis

ruletobestrictlyapplied,onacasebycasebasis,onewouldneedanotherrule

forhowthisruleshouldbeapplied,ineachcase,andafurtherruleforthisrule

andsoon,whichwouldinvariablyleadto“aninfiniteregressofrule

applications”(Hector2011,59).

Havingexposedtheproblemofarulefordetermining“sameness,andtherefore

conceptuse,Hectornowchallengesthesecondpresupposition.Thusheposits

thatonecouldendeavourtoovercomethisproblembyclaimingthatthe

regularityexpressedinaseriesofnumberscouldbeusedtomeasurewhether

somethingisgoingoninthesameway.Yet,thisdoesnotsolvetheproblem.The

seriesonitsowndoesnottellhowwearetogooninthesameway.Bywayof

example,wecouldcontinuelikeso:“0,2,4,6,8,10...’oritcouldjustasequally

golike:0,2,4,6,4,2,0...’oranyothersuchcombinations”(Hector2011,57).

Neitherarule,northeconsistencyinaseries,providesasolution,Hector

concludes,rather,thesolutiontothisproblemisan“appealtocommunal

disposition”(Hector2011,57).

Inthecaseofthenumberseries,forexample,mostofuswouldcarryonthe

seriesof“0,2,4,6...’withthenumbers‘8,10,12...”butthis“isneitherarulenor

regularityimplicitintheseries,butbyourrulingdispositiontogooninacertain

way”(Hector2011,57).Itisthiscommunaldispositionrule,then,that

ultimatelydetermineswhatitmeanstogointhesameway.Yet,thistypeof

rulingisalsounderpinnedwithothers;thatis,thiscommunaldisposition

involvesotherpre-determinations.Inexplainingwhathemeansbythenecessary

considerationofotherpre-determinations,Hectorpresentsananalogical

problem,thatofdistinguishing“betweendiamondsandhighqualitycubic

zirconia”(Hector2011,58).

127

Giventhatitisourdispositionthatissupposedtoarbitratebetweenadiamond

andzirconium;thispresentsitselfwithanotherproblem/consideration:what

arethecandidatesthataresupposedtosupplythedeterminationofour

dispositions?Hectorsuppliesthreesuchcandidates:“licensedgemmologistsin

theUnitedStates;everypersonwithina100-mileradiusofone’spresent

location;oreverycompetentspeakerofEnglish”(Hector2011,59).Following

theanalogy,indecidingonacandidateorarbitratorforwhosedispositions

shouldcount,threecommunitieswereproposed,yetallthesewereselected

arbitrarily.Thishighlightsafurtherconsideration,besidesthe“innumerable

waysofspecifyingthecommunity”(Hector2011,59)todeterminewhose

dispositionsshouldcount;onemustalsorecognisethattheseselectionshave

alreadybeenselected“onthebasisofapriordeterminationaboutwhatcounts

astherightdisposition”(Hector2011,60).

Yetanotherproblemariseswhenitisassumedthatthecommunity,accordingto

theirdisposition,makeanincorrectclassification.Thusdiamondsandcubic

zirconiaarebothcategorizedasdiamonds.Hectornotesthat,eventhoughthis

canbedeemedasanobviousmiss-classification,therewouldbenowayof

recognisingthiswhenanentirecommunityiswrong.Therefore,giventhese

problems,“itappearsthatthecommunaldispositionview,likerulefollowingand

regularityviews,providesinadequatemeansastowhatshouldcountasgoingon

inthesameway”(Hector2011,60).YettheemphasishereshouldbeonHector’s

phrase“itappears”(Hector2011,60),sinceHectorisnotgivinguponhisown

view,rather,heisanticipatingcertainobjectionsfromthereaderandproviding

anopportunitytoanswertheseandinthisway,offeraviablesolution.

ThusHectoradmitsthatallthesewaysofdeterminingnormalconceptuse,

includingthecommunaldispositionview,facethesameproblem.Theyallhave

attemptedtoderivenormativity(inthiscasehowoneshouldgoon)afterhaving

alreadysupposedun-normedfacts(whattherulesaysorthepatterninthe

numbersorourdispositions).Hector’scontention,therefore,isthatwecannot

deriveconclusionsonwhatisthenormalfromwhatispresumablyun-normalset

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ofdata,thiscanonlybedoneretrospectively,whenoneknowswhatconclusion

isright.Presumably,thismeansthatnorms(basedondataordispositions)are

onlynormsinasfarastheyarerecognisedandaffirmedinpraxis.Thisis

certainlysupportedbyHector’snextsuggestion,thatthewaytoasolutionisby

giving“anaccountaccordingtowhichnormsareimplicitin,andthecreaturesof,

everydaysocialpractises”(Hector2011,67).

Theaccountonwhichhenowelaboratesistheideaofintentionalbehaviour(see

above).Havingestablishedtheproblemsindeterminingconceptuse,thisidea

cannowbeperceivedasthesolution.Asheexpressedearlier,werecognise

someoneusingconceptswhenweseetheirbehaviourasintendingtogoonin

thesamewayasacertainsetofprecedents(usuallypertainingtohowweusea

concept).Byenlistinganotheranalogy,Hectornowsetsouttoexplainwhat

shouldcountasintendingtogooninthesameway.First,hedepictsthesituation

ofhimteachinghissontheconceptofheat.Heonlysaysthewordheattohisson

whenandonlywhenheatissensiblypresent.Theboyimitateshisfatherby

sayingthewordheat(ideally)accordingtothesameconditions.Secondly,andto

serveasacomparisontohissonusingaconcept,hedepictssettingupalumpof

icetoa“moisturesensorandasound-makingdevice”sothatwhentheicemelts

“itwillemitthesound,heat!”(Hector2011,60).Hethenposesahypothetical

question:“onwhatgroundswouldItakeitthatmysonistryingtousethe

concept‘heat,’andwheretheicelumpisnot?”(Hector2011,60).Thedifference,

hecontends,isthatifmyson“weretomakejudgments”aboutthe“correctness

ofhis‘heat’saying,orifsuchjudgmentswereimplicitinhisbehaviour”(Hector

2011,61)surelyyouwouldthinkthatthiswouldcountasbeinganinstanceof

himusingtheconceptheat.

Inordertomakethispointclearer,Hectorcontinueshisheatanalogy.Suppose,

hesurmises,thathissoncomesacrossaventblowingairand“saysheatbut,as

hegetscloser,hisbehaviourindicatestherealizationthatitisnotatallheat”

(Hector2011,61).Hemaysayexplicitlythathe“thoughtitwasheat,’butit’snot,

orhisfacemayregistersurprise”(Hector2011,61).Surelythismustcountas

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himusingtheconceptheat.Therefore,Hector’spointisthat,thedistinguishing

facttocorrectnessandnon-correctnessofconceptusemustberecognisedina

person’sbehaviour.The“recognition”ofaperson’s“behaviour”canserveasthe

“normativeassessment”of“correct”conceptualuseandthat“byundertakingthis

behaviour,onemustbeinsomerespectinvitingsuchassessment”(Hector2011,

61).

RecognitionisakeyterminHector’soveralltheoryandinvolvedintheuseofa

conceptisanappreciationofthisprocessofrecognition.Theprocessis“to

recognizeothersandseektheirrecognition,toconferauthorityonothersand

seekauthorityforone-self,andtodemarcatean‘us’andseekinclusioninit”.

OriginatinginHegel,itisthisnotionofrecognitionthatisdeterminativeofone’s

statusasaconceptuser.One’suse“mustberecognizableasusingthesame

conceptasothers,whichistosaythatitmustgooninthesamewayasusesthat

arerecognisedasbeingprecedential”(Hector2011,61).

Inthiswaycertainconceptualusesareestablishedascorrect,andhavegained

normativeauthorityoverotherusages.Inacceptanceofsuchusage,oneintends

one’sownusagetoberecognisedasimplicitlyofferingprecedenceforfurther

uses.Whatthiseffectivelymeansisthat,notonlydoesoneconfer“normative

authorityuponcertainprecedentuses”(Hector2011,62),onealsoconfers

authorityonone’sownuseatthesametime.Fortheonewhomintendstogo

alongwiththenormativeconceptualusemustbeseenasusingtheconcept

correctly.Andtheywillberecognisedasusingitbythosewhoarealreadyusing

itcorrectly.Theresultisthataconcept’scorrectnessisalreadysetinadvance

andinaccordancewithitsprecedentialusage.

Hectorfurtherestablishesthisideaofrecognitionbyusingtheillustrationof

common-lawtradition.Judgesdecidenovelcaseswithreferencetopriorcases

whichhavealreadybeenjudgedupon.Andtheiroutcomesaretakentoseta

precedentuponfurthercasesthatsharesomeofthesamecircumstances.The

consequenceofsuchpracticewentontosetupacommonlawtraditionwhich

thelawcommunitycallsuponasakindofauthorityforendorsingallofits

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subsequentjudgments.Ajudge’sdecisionisalso“recognisedbyotherjudgesas

beingpartofthisauthoritativetradition”(Hector2011,78).

Inthesameway,whenapersonusesaconceptheorsheintendsthisusagetobe

recognised,bythosewhomtheyrecogniseasusersoftheconcept.They

accordinglyuseitwithincertainacceptedprecedents.Itisthisbodyofusagethat

isrecognisedasconferringauthorityontheperformancetowhichtheyare

answerable.Theirconceptualuse,then,isalsoimplicitlyseekingthesame

authorityforitsuse.Inusingconceptsoneundertakestoacceptacertain

responsibilityforitsuse.Thus,one’suseofaconceptisanimplicitclaimto

normativeauthorityoverotherusers.Byanalogy,ifoneusestheconceptsheep

incorrectly,forinstance,byapplyingitindiscriminatelytosheep,cattle,dogs,and

otherfarmanimals,andifyoursonlearnstheconceptbyfollowingyour

example,thenonemustsurelybearsomeresponsibilityforhisflawedusage.In

thesamerespect,oneshouldbecommittedtousingconceptscorrectly,and

susceptibletocorrection,aswellasbeingpossiblyobligatedtojustifytheir

usage.

Aprerequisiterequirementtothistheoryisthatadistinctionmustbemade

betweentwokindsofrecognition.Thereistherecognitionofperformances(i.e.,

usesofaconcept)andthatofperformers(i.e.,conceptusers).Theusesofa

conceptarerecognisedascorrectwhentheygooninthesamewayasprecedent

performancesandiftheperformanceisrecognised,“…thenitwillcontributeto

theprecedentialtrajectory,inviewofwhich,stillotherperformancescanbe

recognized”(Hector2011,79).Theconceptusersthemselvesarepersons

recognisedascompetentinaparticularpracticeonlyifheorshecanpurposely

andappropriatelycarryiton,andheorsheisrecognizableassuchonlyifhisor

herjudgments(normativeassessments)aboutwhatwouldcarryiton

themselvesgoingoninthesamewayasthosewhosejudgment(normative

assessments)hasbeenrecognized.

Whatthismeans,then,isthatifapersonwantingtojoinacertaingroupobserves

someofitsmembersengaginginaparticularpracticeandheorshedecidesto

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learnhowtoimitatethisparticularpractice,theywillsubmittheirperformances

andjudgmentstotheserecognisedmembers,whowillinturnhelpthemperfect

thispractice.Oncethesemembers,whomarecompetentwiththepractice,

recognisetheseincompetentnovices,asbeingcompetent,theywillrecognise

themasbeingoneofthem.Theirpracticeswillbethesameasthosefullyfledged

members.Now,theirknow-howcomestoactasthebasisforstillotherstolearn

thepracticefromthem.

Theirknow-howwillnowalsocontributetothenormativeconceptionof

knowinghowtoengageinthispractice,suchthathisorherjudgmentsare

authoritative,notonlyfornewcomers,butalsoforthosefromwhomheorshe

learnedthepractice.Thisiscalledthe“reciprocal-recognitionmodel”(Hector

2011,79).Hectorclaims,itistheonethatisadoptedby“thecommunitiesto

whichphilosophersandtheologianscommonlyappeal.”(Hector2011,79).

Furthermore,thesecommunitiesareanongoingconstructedproductofour

normativeattitudes(dispositions)ratherthananextra-normativegiven.They

areestablishedthroughanongoingprocessofmutualrecognition,andthe

dispositionsthatcountarethejudgmentswhichthecommunityrecognisesas

goingoninthesamewayasprecedentjudgmentsthatitrecognises.Itisonlythe

accepteddispositions,ofthecommunity’sfullyfledgedmembers,whichare

givenauthorityfornormativeconceptualuseandpractice.

VeryBriefHistory

Beforebringinghisnextelement,thatofthenormativeSpiritofChrist,Hector

willgiveabriefhistoryoftheChristiantradition’sauthority.Thishistorywillact

asabackdroptohisslightlynuancedunderstandingofhowtheSpiritworksin

thechurch.Heclaimsthatthe“Catholicmodelofauthority”became“unableto

provideanobjectivestandardbywhichtojudgeprevailingteachingsabout

justificationandthelike”(Hector2011,74).ThesubsequentProtestantappealto

authority,wheretheindividualwastojudgeforthemselveswhetheraparticular

teachingshouldbedeemedascorrect,alsocameunderfirefromCatholiccritics,

because,attheonsetofissuessurroundingtheLord’sSupper,differentgroups

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wereunabletosubstantiatetheirinterpretativepositionsoutsideoftheirown

interpretivedecisions.ThusCatholictraditioncouldnotbecalledon“asameans

bywhichtojustifyitsownclaimsabouttradition”(Hector2011,75),andnor

couldProtestantism’scalluponscripturetojustifyitsownscriptural

interpretation.Bothofthesepositionsfailedtoprovideasolidgroundforbelief

andaction.Anditwasduetothisfailure,oftraditionandofrevelation,which

resultedinanauthoritativeshiftintheepistemiclandscape.Thischangeledto

Christendombeingfurtherundermined“withthedominationofscientific

inquiry”(Hector2011,76).

ItwasKantwhodealtasignificantblowto“thequestionofGeneralMetaphysics,

andindealingwithit,killedit.TheveryexistenceoftheGod,whohadgivenso

manydifferentinterpretations,wasshownbyKanttobenotevendemonstrable.

KantnotonlyshowedthattheGodoftheChristianscouldnotbeproved,butthat

theproofsofallGods,allMetaphysics,wereimperfect,impossible–imprudent”

(Hector2011,81).However,inregardtomorality,Kantallowedthe“re-

establishmentofthoseprincipleswhichtheonesaboveimply,namely:the

existenceofGod,andtheimmortalityofthesoul.Although,Metaphysicsisnota

possiblescience,letus;acceptwhatwehavealreadybeengiveninthisrespect.

Revealedreligionisalreadywithus;itmaybeneedfulforustohavesucha

religion;inanycase,itisacomfort:letustolerateit”(Ludovici1909,61-62).Yet,

Kantnowhadtofindajustificationformoralitywithouttosomedegreere-

institutingtheChristianGodwhostoodbehindit.Hefoundthistasktoodifficult

andbeyondhiscapacity.

ItwasleftuptoNietzschetodeliverthefinalblowuponthechinofChristianity.

HeunderminedtheKantianconstructeddivineAbsoluteofmoralitywhichKant

hadexpoundedintheCritiqueofJudgmentandinBeyondGoodandEvilby

advocatingarightandwrongthatwasdecideduponby“anindividual’spersonal

decision”(Hector2011,75).Thisdecisionwasunderwrittenbyone’sown“will

topower”(Netzsche1908,56).Hector’sconclusiontothisverybriefsummary,

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asitpertainstothehistoryofauthority,isthat“onemustthinkforoneselfabout

one’scommitments”(Hector2011,75).

Justificationforbeliefandactionwasnowbaseduponexperience(empiricism)

orreason(rationalism).Yetneitherofthesecouldfurnishanultimateauthority

toarbitrateonthetruth.ReturningtoKant,thiswastheconclusionthathecame

to;itwasamistaketothinkthatwhatoneoughttoinfer,judge,believe,ordo,

canbereaddirectlyoffthefaceofsomegiventhatis,somefactofthematter

conceivedasstrictlyexternaltoanynormsweapplytoit.Evensenseexperience

isnotexcludedfromthesehumanconceptsbecausetheyrelyonthem,concepts

arenotborrowedfromexperience,buttheysupplyappearanceswiththeirlaw

likenessandsomakeexperiencepossible.One’sunderstandingisthelawgiverof

nature.Whetherweappealtosenseexperience,Scripture,thecontentsofone’s

ownmind,orthelawsofnature,thesecannotdictatewhatoneoughttodoor

thinkapartfromtheapplicationofnormstothatfact.

Therefore,factsareunableassertnormativeauthorityoverone’sbeliefsand

actionsbecausetheyareunabletoprovidetheanswerstowhyonebelievessuch

orsuchanddosuchandsuch.Thereexistsnomeasureofstandardnormsfrom

whichtoclaimafactasbeingnormative.Kantinsiststhatourjudgmentsare

actuallyinvolvedfromtheverybeginning.Thesenormsarealreadyimplicitin

ourownjudgments.Weareleftstrandedbeingill-equippedtojudgeourown

judgments!IfCatholicismandProtestantismhadbeenunabletoprovide

authorityforknowinganddoing,andnowthe“complexreasonablebeing”(Kant

1956,65)had,also,beenunabletoprovidethisadequatefunction,then;what

canweappealtoinordertoaccomplishthisgreatfeat?

HectornowinjectsSchleiermacher’sproposalintohisdiscussion,whichturnson

thenotionoffeeling.Anunderstandingofhisnotionoffeelingrefers“tothe

immediatepresenceofwhole,undividedexistence(sensibleaswellasspiritual),

theunityofapersonandhisorhersensibleorspiritualworld,wherethe

subject-objectoppositionisentirelyexcludedasinapplicable”.Thisnotion,then,

ispriortoknowinganddoing.Itisanunderstandingthatcomesviathebeliefin

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apre-reflectiveharmonyorat-onenessbetweenoneselfandone’senvironing

circumstances,thoughitisimportanttonotethatthisharmonyincludesakindof

comportmenttoordispositiontowardthosecircumstances.Thus,thispre-

instinctiveunderstandingofharmonywilldictateallofone’sknowinganddoing.

Aswell,itisthispre-instinctiveharmonicattitudethatisanon-reflectiveone.It,

therefore,doesnotinvolveaconsciousdeliberationonthepartofthereasonable

being.Actually,onecanconcludethatone’scurrentcircumstancesisjustsimply

so!Since,onesimplycomestothesecircumstancesalreadybeingaffectedby,and

copeswith,thempriortoandapartfromconsciousreflectionandjudgment.For

example,whenonehearsaChristmasCarolandareovercomewithnostalgia(or

revulsion).Thereasonforsucharesponseisthatoneisalreadydisposedin

advancetothiscircumstance.Orabetterexample,onemayhearateachersay3x

4andimmediatelythenumber12springstomind.ImportantlyforHector,inhis

understandingSchleiermacher,thispre-instinctiveharmonicattitudeisevidence

ofonebeingintunewithoneselfandone’senvironment.

Hectormaintainsthatthiswillavoidtheregressofreasonsproblembecausethis

isafeelingthatisimmediate,therefore,itdoesnotrequireanymomentof

reflectivethoughtinordertodetermineone’sresponse.Hectorseesthisas

overcomingKant’sevaluationofgivenness.Kant’sassertionisthat“one’s

attunementtocircumstancesmustbemediatedbytheapplicationofconcepts”

(Hector2011,82).WhatthismeansisthatKantbelievesthatconcepts(universal

framework)orintuitions(particularframework)arealwaysgivenasthe

immediatereferencesiteforanypiecemealknowledge.Yet,Schleiermacher

contends,“thatthewayheunderstandsthis“attunement”isthatitis“non-

inferential”andtherefore“norm-laden”(Hector2011,80).Thewayhe

considereditwasin“termsofthe‘circulation’and‘internalization’ofcustom”

(Hector2011,79).AtheorythatisperfectlyconducivewithHector’sowntheory

ornorms.

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TheNormativeSpirit

WorkingwithSchleiermacher’ssystem,therefore,thisprocesscanbe

understoodinthefollowingmanner.Normallyapersonwillrespondtoanon-

referentialcircumstance(internalorexternal),yetthisresponsewillinvariably

involvesomesortofgestureandaperson’sexpressionofattunementwill

alreadybeembeddedinthisgesture.Atthesametime,thisexpressionof

attunementwillalsohaveabsorbedanimitation(internalization)ofother

(persons)previouslyidentifiedexpressions.Othersmaythenbeurged

(immediately)toidentifywiththisperson.Iftheydeemthattheperson’s

expressionis“howonenormallyresponds”inthiscertainsituation,theywill

subsequentlyimitatethatperson’sresponseinothersimilarcircumstances.Each

imitatorwillsuddenlybecomereliablydisposedtorespondwiththesame

gesture.Yet,theseresponsesarenon-inferentialinthesesameorsimilar

circumstances.Itwillbeanautomaticexpressionoftheir(own)attunementto

thesecurrentcircumstances.

Fromthisintuitiveknowingofhowoneshouldrespondinacertaincircumstance

therecansubsequentlycirculateanynumberofexpressers,andthatwillbe

pickedupbyanynumberofperceivers.Itwillbethisprocessofcirculationthat

willbetheultimatedrivingforcebehindwhatisimitatedtotheimitator,andit

willgoonforanindefiniteperiodresultingin“amultifariouscommunity”

(Hector2011,84).Therefore,iflikenedtoanengine,thisprocessofcirculationis

thedefinitivedynamismthattransformsone,fromaself-consciousnesstoa“us”

consciousness(andviceversa),andthatthistransformationwillbetosuchan

extentthatthisconsciousness,ofthe“we,”willbecomesoconcentratedthatit

willevencometotakeoverthepartaker’sown“selfconsciousness.”Therefore,

Hectorinsists,“itistheinnerunionofkind-consciousnesswiththepersonalself-

consciousnesswhichprocuresallrecognitionofothersasofsimilaressence,or

again,thatitispreciselyinvirtueofthisever-renewingcirculationofself-

consciousnessthatonecancometosomedeterminaterecognitionofwhich

individualsbelongtoacommunityandwhichdonot”(Hector2011,89).

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Hectorselectscertainclaimsintheologytodemonstratehowthisbeingattuned

circulatesthroughcustom.Todothis,hepresentstheologyasthediscipline

“whichsystematizesthedoctrineprevalentinaChristianChurchatanygiven

time,andheunderstandssuchdoctrines,inturn,asaccountsoftheChristian

piousdisposition-statesportrayedinspeech–asaccounts,thatis,ofthatwhich,

inthepublicproceedingsoftheChurch...canbeheardasaportrayalofits

commonpiety”(Hector2011,92).Thus,theChurch’steachingsareidentifiedas

anexpressionofitscurrentfaithfulnessanditisthesethatserveasexpressions

ofauthorityandtheyarealsothosewhichithas“conferreduponthe

community’sacceptanceoftheseexpressions”(Hector2011,98).Itisthis

acceptancewhichisgivenbythecommunity,sinceitistheythatgiverecognition

ofaparticularexpressionasbeinganexpressionofitsauthorizedpiety.Andfor

ittohavegainedsuchcurrency,“theexpressionmustberecognizedashaving

suchcurrency”(Hector2011,95).

Thecharacteristicofcurrencyissubjectedtotworequirements.Foran

expressionoftheChurch’spietytobevalidandtocirculateassuchitmustbe

seenbyitsmembersasgoingoninthesamewayasprecedentswhichhave

circulatedassuch.Hectorclaimsthat“thenameof‘Dogmatics’cannotbegranted

toapresentationcomposedofnothingbutidiosyncraticdoctrines,andthat,

indeed,eventheearliestpresentationsoftheevangelicalfaithcouldbearthat

onlyinsofarastheylinkedupwithwhatwentbeforeandhadmostoftheir

systemincommonwithwhatwasecclesiallygiven”(Hector2011,95).

Therefore,thecommunitywillfirstrecognizeanexpressionasgoingoninthe

samewaybylookingtopreviousChristiancommunitiestovalidatethatsuchan

expressionisanexpressionoftheirpiety.

Thiscurrentcommunityistotreatthispreviouslyvalidatedexpressionasbeing

normativeforallsubsequentexpressions.Thisexpressionofpietythatgoesonin

thesamewaywillbealinkinachaingoingallthewaybacktothefirstChristian

community(apostoliclineofsignifierssignified).Itwillalsobealinktoconnect

futureexpressionsofChristianpietyascountingasnormativeonlyifcurrent

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communitiesfindsitnormsinthatdoctrine.Anovelexpressionwillbeassessed

bythecurrentcommunity’srecognizedexpressionsthathavebeenattunedto

priorexpressionsandiftheygooninthesameway,onlythen,“willitcontribute

tothenormaccordingtowhichstillotherexpressionsmightberecognised”

(Hector2011,97).ThusHectorconcludes,thatthese“normsareimplicitin

attunement,andthisattunementisaninternalization(imitation)ofthatwhich

circulatesincustom,andthiscirculationisexplainedintermsofanongoing

processofrecognition”(Hector2011,101).

HectorbringstheSpiritofChristintothisnormativecirculation.Christian

traditioninsiststhattheHolySpirit,amongotherthings,indwellsone,writes

God’slawonone’sheart,transform’soneintoGod’schild,bearswitnessto

Christ,andleadsoneintoalltruth.HectorpointsoutthatSchleiermacher’s

pneumatologicalpragmaticsishisbeliefintheHolySpiritandhissubsequent

searchtounderstandhowtheHolySpiritworks.HefirstexplainsthattheHoly

SpiritistheSpiritofChrist.ThebelieverwhoisindweltbytheSpiritofChristis

enabledtogointhesamewayasChrist.ThecontentofChrist’swayofgoingon

meansthatChrist’snormsarecarriedon,andthatthesearecarriedthroughbya

modeofmutualrecognition.Thisishisexplanationof“howthesupernatural

Spiritcouldenterintothenaturalcirculationofnorms”(Hector2011,97).

Toexplainhowthisprocessofmutualcirculationofnormsworks,withregardto

Christandthebeliever,Hectorfocusesonabeliever’stransformationintoGod’s

child.ChristwasacceptedastheonlybegottenchildofGod,sothisshouldalsobe

anormwithregardtothebeliever.Abelievermustbeconformed

(metamorphosis)intotheimageofChrist.Itis,further,confirmedbyalongline

oftheologiansthat,insofarasthisconformationisconcerned,itisone’s

covenantalfaithfulnessthathastobecomeone’sown.Christ’ssonship

demonstratedawholehearteddevotiontoGod’swillandonebecomesGod’s

childbyrepeatingthisdevotionasone’sown.Thusone’sdevotionmustnotbea

sheerimitationordoingwhatoneistold,butforChrist’sdevotiontocountas

one’sownconformity,onemustbeabletoperformthemonone’sown.This

138

changehappensinternally,asthewordmetamorphosis(conformed)indicates,

andso,forsuchactionstocountasone’sown,onemustbeabletoproducethese

actsspontaneouslyinspiredfromtheinsidetotheirdemonstrationinone’souter

acts.Thus,tobeperformancesthatcount,asconformingtoChrist,onemust

makeajudgment.Unfortunatelythisjudgmentposesanotherproblem.Whatwill

itmeanforone’smeasurementtocoincidewithwhatbeingconformedtoChrist’s

measuremententails,inotherwordswhoorwhatisgoingtodecideonChrist’s

measurement.Sinceifwereturn,briefly,tothetimeofthedisciplesitwasChrist

himselfwhodeterminedwhichactswereconformedtohisnorms.Yet,ifChristis

theonlyonewhocandeterminewhicharetheactsthatconformtohisnorms,

andwhicharenot,then,Hector’sentiresystemfallsdown.Sinceitisclearthat

Christisunabletospeakorjudge.Hector’snexttaskwillbetoovercomethis

dilemma.

Itseems,then,thatitwasonlyhisoriginaldisciplesthathadtheprivilegeof

havingtheiractsrecognisedandarbitratedbyChristhimself.Yet,accordingto

Hector’sscheme,theactsofthediscipleswerestillonlytheirownactualacts.

Thisstillrequiredthemtojudgeforthemselveswhethertheywerefollowing

Christ,thatis,besidesthoseactualactsthatwerejudgedbyhim.ButHector’s

pointhereisthat“thecriticalmomentintheirtransformationonlyoccurred

whenChristrecognisedcertainoftheirperformancesasfollowinghim,butalso

recognizedthemasfellowrecognisers,thatis,asthemselvescompetentjudgesof

whatcountsassuch”(Hector2011,99).Jesusshowedthemthattherewere

appropriateresponsesrequiredincertainsituations.Theylearnedtheseasthey

livedwithhim.Yet,therecameapointwhenherecognisedthemasbeing

capableofreplicatinghisperformances.Anditwasatthatpointwhenhis

performancesbecametheirownactualperformances.Thepointwhenhetrusted

themtothemselves.Itwashisacknowledgmentthattheywerenowcapableto

carryforwardhislegacyofperformances.Anditwasnowuptothemtopass

theseperformances,whichembeddedtheirteacher’steachingsandacts,forward

tootherswhowouldrepeatthesameprocessastheyhadfollowed.Yet,thisdid

notrequireeachdiscipletolivewiththeirteacher,sincethisrequirementwas

139

onlyduetoatraditionofthattime.Thisdid,however,laydownafoundational

performanceplatformuponwhichallsubsequentperformancesweretofollow

inthesameway.ThisresultedinaChristianmultifariouscommunityof

attunement.Eachdisciple’sgestures,words,actions,andrecognition-laden

responseswerereliablydisposedtorecogniseeachotherandberecognisedby

eachother.

TheSpirit’sworkoftransformingoneintoGod’schildhappensviaachainof

recognition.ItisarecognitionchainthatstretchesbacktoChristhimself.The

Spirit’sworkiscollapsedintothischainofrecognition,sincewhatiscarried

forwardisthenormativeSpiritofChrist.Afterallitwasfromthisoriginalchain

ofrecognition,thatis,fromChristhimself,whichauthorizedtheoriginal

disciples.Christrecognisedthesedisciplesasbeinghisfollowers.Heauthorised

themtorecognisefuturediscipleswhofollowedaftertheirauthoritativeand,

subsequent,normativepractice.Itwasthesethatwereauthorisedtocarry

forwardtheoriginalrecognitionchain,ornormativeSpiritofChrist,stillfurther

intothefutureandtoeternity.Eachsuccessiveepochofdiscipleswere

conformedtoChrist’snormativeperformancesandthereforeintoachildofGod.

ItisthemannerinwhichtheSpiritofChristtransformsafollowerintoachildof

God,guideseachdiscipleintoallthetruth,andwritesGod’slawupontheir

hearts.Hectorconcludeshisaccountwiththisstatement:“thatneitherScripture

nortraditionhasofferedanycanonicalexplanationofhowtheSpiritdoesthese

things,itfollowsthenthatthereisnoreason,inprinciple,nottothinkofthe

Spiritasaccomplishingthatwhichisascribedtoitbycirculationthrougha

processofinter-subjectiverecognitioninwhichonelinksupwith(andcarries

on)achainofrecognitionthatstretchesbacktoChrist’sownrecognitionofthe

disciples”(Hector2011,91).

ConceptualUse

AccordingtoHector’ssystemconceptsmustbestandardisedbyChrist.Andmore

sharply,theseconceptsmustthusbefaithfultoGod’srevelationinChrist,and

theyaretocount,assuch,onlywhentheygooninthesamewayasprecedential

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usesstretchingbacktoChristhimself.JesusrecognisedcertainclaimsaboutGod

asbeingcorrect.Healsorecognisedcertainpersonsasbeingcompetentjudgesof

assentingtosuchclaimsasbeingcorrect.Thesejudgesalsorecognised

subsequentpersonsasdoingthesame.HectorassertsthatChristsetdownan

apostolic,“withasmall‘a”(Hector2011,89),chainofsuccessionandthatthisis

themannerwhichhecarriedonhisauthorisation.Thusitisalsothewaythat

theologicalconceptualusecouldbeauthorisedbyhim.Itis,again,theSpiritof

Christthatsuppliesthenormaccordingtowhichtheologicalconceptuseisto

submit.ItisthissuccessivechainthatistheChristcarrierofwhatcountsas

normativetheologicalconceptuse.

Theologicallycorrectconceptualusageshouldnotbethoughtofasbeingfixedin

advanceorofbeingpredictable.InHector’sunderstandingone’suseof

theologicalconceptsistointendone’susagetoberecognisableasusingit,and

oneintendsthisbytryingtocarryonthenormativetrajectoryofusesthatone

recognisesascorrect.Ifone’suseisrecognisedascorrect,thiswilladdtothe

currenttrajectory.Itsusewillinfluencesubsequentusesasgoingoninthesame

way.Thisunderstandingwillresultinatheologicalconceptbeingopento

change.Whenanewuseisrecognisedascorrectlycarryingonitsusage,i.e.,in

thesameway,itisthenincorporatedintothisstreamofcurrentuses.Whatthis

meansisthattheologicalconceptsarealwaysbeingcontinuallyreconstituted.

Hectorclaims,further,that“itmakesnosense,then,totalkaboutthemeaningof

aconceptbeingfixedbyitsapplicationtocreaturelyreality,sinceitmakeslittle

sensetotalkaboutthemeaningofaconcept,noraboutsuchameaningever

beingfixed”(Hector2011,100).Italsomakeslittlesensetotalkaboutconcepts

ascontainerssincewehavedonewithoutcharacteristicsnecessarytothinking

thattheycouldcontainsomething:either,thatconceptsareliterallything-like

containers,orthateverypossibleextensionofaconceptiscontainedinitin

advance.Mostimportantly,though,conceptsarenotnecessarilymetaphysical(in

thesensethatone’suseofthemcorrespondstoanessencelikeideaor

predeterminedcategory),then,anditisatleastpossiblethattheycouldbe

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appliedtoGodwithoutthereby“cuttingGoddowntocreaturelysize”(Hector

2011,101).ThemeaningofaconceptiscarriedforwardbythenormativeSpirit

ofChristthatstretchesbacktoChrist’sownuseofatheologicalconcept

Dissemination

Therefore,givenHector’sperspective,foranyspecifictheologicalconceptualuse

tobeacceptedascorrectitmustberecognisedascarryingonaseriesof

precedentialusages.Hectorfirstproposedthatonemustacceptthat“concepts

aregenerallyunderstoodasaclassofnorms”(WittgensteinandKant).Yetfor

themtobespecificallyChristianandtheologicaltheymustalsobeconformable

tousesthatChristrecognised(Schleiermacher)assuch,whichobviouslymeans

thattheymustnotbeexternaltotherevelationofGod(theBible).Second,one

mustlearnhowtousespecifictheologicalconceptsnormatively,bysubmitting

one’sperformancestoChrist’sauthorisedsuccessivechainofperformersand

performances,andacceptingthatthesecurrentnormativetheologicalconcepts

areallthetimebeingusedbytheseperformersaswellasalwaysencompassedin

theirperformances(Wittgenstein,Schleiermacher,andKantasapostolic

succession).Andthirdly,followingtheChristiantradition(Barth),onemustsee

thatanycorrecttheologicalconceptualusageistheworkoftheTriuneGod.

Admittedly,readingthroughHector’snarrative55framedaroundtheProtestant

traditionalnarrative(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)

2006,48-49)isabitmorechallengingthanreadingMarion,becauseatsome

pointsitisacutelypolemical.Nodoubtthisisthepoint,sincedrawingoutthese

otherstrongpositionsgivesHectortheopportunitytomediateonthedilemmaof

violenceinlanguage.

Hector’sconcernabouttheviolenceoflanguagemightbeillustratedbythe

concernoftheeco-theologians,thatmankindhasdoneviolenceagainstnature

andthatnaturedoesnothaveavoicetodefendher-self(Migliore2004,111).At

thesametime,thiscanalsotriggerthethoughtthatGod,likenature,doesnot

55SeeIntroduction:postmodernthought.

142

haveavoice,oratleastnovoicethatwecanclearlydiscern.Evenifthebiblical

revelationcouldbeviewedasGod’svoice,inwholeorpart,thereisnoclear

understandingofit;“perspicuity”wasthethwartedidealofthereformation

(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)2006,34).Therefore,

Godcanneitherconfirmnorrefuteourhumanutterances,asthepostmodern

viewcontend,thereisnoGod’seyepointofview.

HectorandMarionhavefoundtheirownsolutionstothisproblem.Marionin

moreconcretetermsbelievesthatthebishopduringtheEucharistaffirmswhat

isthetrueword/voiceofGod,yetCaputo’scriticism,ascitedbyHector,

challengesthisbelief.Atthesametime,Hector’sidealoftheSpiritofrecognition

couldbeviewedasanaffirmationofcertainProtestantexpressionsofGod,albeit

amoresubtleaffirmationthanMarion’s.ThepointisthatHectorandMarionare

simplypresentinganarrativeaccordingtotheirownparticularperspectives,

withpredictablycontrastingoutcomesofthewaythatGodorhumanityshould

communicate.

YetbothMarionandHectorhaveacceptedthehermeneutictraditions

understandingofhowlanguageworks.Thiscouldbecategorisedastheidealist

viewoflanguagesinceitassumes“thatobjectsmustconformtoourknowledge”

(Westphal2001,90).Theinnerwordisalreadypresupposedandisexpressedin

externalwords.Thisinvariablymeansthatsomethingislostinthetransferfrom

innerwordtoexternalwords.ThisaccountsforMarion’sandHector’sconcerns

aboutthestartingpointoflanguage.Butwhatifthisstartingpointisdestabilized

byanotherdiscoursethatseeslanguagedifferently?Thisalternativeideaof

languageisassumedintherealistidea,whereitisassumedthat“allour

knowledgemustconformtoobjects”(Westphal2001,90).

Asnotedinchapter1,earlystructuralismledtoanassumptionthatlanguage

(externalwords)isthemechanismthatproducesmentalconcepts(innerwords),

andthatconceptsinturndeterminethewayweperceivetheexternalworld.Ifit

islanguagethatpredeterminesallthepossibilitiesofmentallife,thenitmust

followthatitalsodeterminesthesortofhumanbeinganindividualistobe.One

143

wouldthinkthatlanguagemustconstructanddevelopitsownstructural

scaffoldswithinthehumanmind,aswellasallitsassociatedmeanings,anditis

thesethatdirect,store,andcategorizeallworldlyphenomena.Hencethesaying,

“languagewasnotmadeformanbutmanforlanguage”(Labron2009,278).

Iflanguageisunderstoodthisway,asthatwhichproducesknowledge,then

adoptionofWestphal’sexamplewilldestabilizebothHector’sandMarion’s

proposalsatthesametime.WestphallikensthemindtoaTVset.Heposesa

hypotheticalquestiontoinitiateadiscussionwithhisstudents:howisitpossible

formetoknowthatthenewsannouncer’stiewillbevariousshadesofgray

beforeIhaveeventurnedontheTVset?Heanswersthatheisabletoknow

beforehandbecausehewillbewatchingthenewsannounceronablackand

whiteTVset.Inthesameway,helikensourmindstoa“kindofreceiving

apparatuswhosespontaneitypermitsthings,regardlessofwhattheyareactually

like,toappearonlyincertainways”(Westphal2001,91).Thisapparatusfixes

somefeatures–suchasthetie’scolor–butnotothers,“suchaswhetheritis

polkadotorstriped”.Itsuppliesthe“formsofintuition”andthe“categoriesof

understanding”andthereforesuppliesthe“basicstructureofthingsintheworld

tothenoeticactivityofourminds”(Westphal2001,91).Westphalposesanother

question,followingthisone,ofwhethertheexistenceofathingisowedtothis

noeticactivity.Thereis,heobserves,“aredandbluetiethatisintheTVstudio”

(Westphal2001,91),butIcannotseeitduetomyblackandwhitereceiving

apparatus.Hefurtherstates,though,therearenottwotiesbutonlyone–yet

“therearetwowaysofseeingthatsametie”(Westphal2001,91).InthestudioI

seeitasit“trulyis”,butwhenIseeitathomeIseeit“assystematicallydistorted

byareceivingapparatusthatsimultaneouslymakesitpossibleformetoseethe

tieatall(sinceIamnotinthestudio)andmakesitimpossibleformetoseeitas

ittrulyis”(Westphal2001,91).

ForWestphal,tobeinthestudiomeans“quitesimplytobeGod”,andthiswould

meanthattheredandbluetiecanonlybeapprehendedbyGod(Westphal2001,

93).Thepointoftheanalogyistodistinguishbetweenappearancesandthe

144

thingsinthemselves,and,morespecifically,todistinguishbetweenhumanand

divineknowledge,betweenthewaytheworldmayappeartoGod’sinfiniteand

eternalmind,andthewayitappearstoourfiniteandtemporalminds.This

distinctionwouldseemtohimtobe“essentialtoanykindofChristiantheism”

(Westphal2001,94).Ourhumancognition,evenwhenworkingproperly,is

essentiallydifferentincertainimportantwaysfromGod’s,“sinceGod’sisthe

standardoftruth,reality,andhence,objectivity”(Westphal2001,94).Human

understandingissubjective.Yetthereisacertainobjectivitythatcanbe

conferredonhumanknowledge.ComparedwithGod’sobjectivity,itissubjective,

butseenfromtheempiricalrealmitisobjective.Thereare“twokindsoftruth

thatcannotbedissolvedintosubjectiveskepticism:theTruthrepresentedbythe

knowledgeofGod,andthetruthrepresentedbythehumanmind,properly

functioning”(Westphal2001,95).Whatweknowaboutthe“natureofdivine

knowledgeissomewhatoverwhelminglyexceededbywhatwedon’tknow”

(Westphal2001,97).

ThisunderstandingcannowbeappliedtoMarion’sandHector’sconcernsabout

idolatry.ThereisnowayforustoknowwhatGodthinksaboutourlanguagein

regardstoGod,sinceonlyheknowstheabsoluteTruthaboutthematter.Heisin

TheStudio,wearenot.Evenifweaccepttheviewofbiblicalrevelation,the

critiqueofmetaphysics,ortheChristianmysticaltradition’s,thesecannotclaim

TheStudioViewonthematter.Andgivenourhermeneuticoffinitudeandour

hermeneuticofsinfulness(Rom1:18),ourinterpretationscanonlybetaken

fromourblackandwhiteTVreceivers.ThisdoesnotmeanthatthereisnoTruth

onthematter,though;itisjustthatwearenotcapableofdeterminingit.Evenif

Godwasintime,theremightwellbeasignificantdifferencebetweendivineand

humantemporality,sinceasWestphalputsit,“thedistinctionbetweentheworld

forGodandtheworldforusremainsanecessaryforthetheist”(Westphal2001,

98).Thereis“TruthforGodandthereistruthforus”(Westphal2001,94),and

thesetruthsareinnowayunivocal.Theyaredifferent.Allthatcanbesaidisthat

perhapsMarionandHectorareright–butwewillneverknowinanyabsolute

sensewhetherthatisthecase.

145

Hector’sunderstandingoftheSpiritofrecognitionmightbeillustratedbythe

wayamicroprocessorworksinsomeofthelatermodelcars,especiallyin

connectionwithgoverningthestressesputontheenginebydriverignorance.

Thistechnologyisironicallynamedbycomputerbuffsasfuzzylogic.Itisironic

duetoitsbaseprinciplebeinginheritedfromthefoundingphilosophical

principleofthemoremodernthinker.Thisapproachisgroundedinthebelief

thattruthvalueisbasedondegreesratherthanontheusualabsolutisttrueor

falsestandard.Thisworksitselfoutincomputing,atleast,bygivingvaluetoany

decimalnumberbetween0and1,whereastheBooleanlogiconlyattributes

truthvaluetothenumbers0and1.

Asitpertainstocardesigners,driversvaryintheirdegreesofstyle,and

designersofthesemoremoderncarshavegivenconsiderationforsuch

differences.Suchtechnologyhasbeendevisedbymanyyearsofresearch,by

computerexperts,andhasbeentakenupbycardesigners.Itsutilityhas

enhancedthedurationofcarenginesbyeliminatingunnecessarywearandtear

causedbyvariousanddiversedrivingstyles.Inreality,thecontrastofdriving

stylebetweensaythatofanolderfemaleandthatofayoungmalePplater

certainlyneedsnofurtherexplanation,yetitisthismicroprocesserthathas

allowedforbothextremedrivingstyles,aswellasallthoseinbetween.To

governfuelutilizationtotheengine’sinjectorsisjustoneofitsmanybenefits.

Whatitdoesistoautomaticallyanalyseadriver’sidiosyncraticdrivingstyle

throughsensorsconnectedtoavastarrayofitsmovingparts.Itpicksupthese

signalswhichitinturnimmediatelyanalysesandsubsequentlyre-calibratesits

movingpartstosynchronizewiththeconcerneddriver’sstyle.Afteran

accumulationofdata,overtime,itwillautomaticallyrecognisearegulardriver’s

styleandroboticallyimplementthenecessaryengineefficiencycontrolstosuit

thisstyle.Itisonlywhenadriverdrive’ssomeoneelse’scar,onethatiswithout

suchtechnology,thattheymightbecomeawareoftheirinefficientand

inadequatecontrol.Yetmostdriversareunawareofthisprotectioninitiative,or

howitworks,theironlyconcerniswhetherthecarmoveswhenprompted.

146

Atbottom,Hector’sprojectisanattempttoovercomethepotentialoflanguage

toinciteviolence,andisseatedinaninvisibleregulator,muchlikethemicro

processorregulatingthemoremoderncars.Inthewaythatcardesigners

implementedthemicroprocessortoprotecttheengine’smovingparts,by

regulatingandcalibratingthemtocoincidewitheachdriver’sstyle,Hectorhas

implementedtheideaoftheHolySpiritinordertoworkmysteriouslyby

regulatingtheperformancesofChrist’sdisciplessoastoprotecthis(Christ’s)

originatingchainofperformance,aswellastoguardoverhisdivineconcepts.

However,insteadofleavingChristtodeterminethisprotection,Hectorhas

punchedinhisownquasi-Protestantblueprint(Long2013,95),soasto

determinethisoriginarychain.Yetheoffers“verylittlematerial(i.e.dogmatic)

descriptionofthecontentsoftheology”(Vanhoozer2013,107),butcontends

thatwhatevercurrentProtestantgroups56mayconsider,asgoingoninthesame

wayasapreviousgroup/s,this,ultimately,isthatwhichwilldetermineablue

printforpraxis(Vanhoozer2013,108).AccordingtoHector,then,itisthe

ProtestantblueprintthatbecomestheHolySpiritandnotanypersonalliving

identity(D.B.Wallace2000,174).Actually,Hector’sHolySpiritdoesnoteven

dwellinabeliever,andnorisheapersonalentityoftheTriuneGod(Acts5:3-5)

whojoinswithahumanspiritinconformingthem(Rom8:16)internally(Rom

8:11)toChrist’simage(Rom.8:29),butHector’sSpiritisanimpersonalentity,

onewhichisembeddedinexternalperformancesthereforemakingthisSpirit

equivalenttotheseperformances.Hisunderstandingofsanctificationor

transformationisnotusuallyhowtraditionalProtestantchurchesunderstand

theHolySpirit’spresence,orhisworkinsuchatransformation(Migliore2004,

223-246;McGrath2011,289-291;Humbert1961,109-125,269-301;Schreiner

2001,219-251;Tillich1965,240-252).

Hectorinsiststhatitisthecommunitywhichprovidesthemeansaswellas

determiningtheprogressofthistransformation(Rom12-15;Eph4-6),yetthisis56StephenLong,“OpposingorIgnoringMetaphysics?ReflectionsonKevinHector’sTheologywithoutMetaphysics”JournalofAnalyticTheology,Vol.1,No.1,May2013,95.”Theaudienceisprimarilytheantiorpost-metaphysicalproponentsofade-HellenizedChristianitywhotendtobeReformed,evangelicalorliberalProtestant”.

147

nottheonlybiblicalinterpretationthisnarrativecandepict.Onesuch

interpretationofthebiblicalaccountattributeseverybelieverwithamaster,

whoisChrist(Rom7:4),andthatitishewhohasultimatelyprovidedthemeans

(Gal3:1-2),aswellasdeterminingtheeventualoutcomeofthistransformation

(Gal3:3-5).Italsodepictsthatabelieverisnevermadeawareofthiseventual

transformationuntilthedayofsalvation(1Th4:13-18)ortheLord(Schreiner

2001,219);suchisalsoimpliedbytheselectionofthewordmetamorphosis

(transformation).Itisadivinepassive(D.Wallace2010,34)i.e.letyour-selves

betransformed(Rom12:2),andisderivedfromanunderstandingthatdescribes

theprocessacaterpillargoesthroughinbecomingabutterfly(Humbert1961,

285).

Thisprocessparallelsaperson’stransformationfromaperspective–ofthe

physical–toonewhichisnolongerseen(only)fromthephysical,butonethatis

seenthroughthelensoftheafterlife(Humbert1961,269).Thecaterpillarisonly

awareofitslifefromtheperspectiveofbeingacaterpillaryetitbuildsacocoon.

Thiscanbeascribedtoaperson,whoiswithoutknowledgeofChrist,yetthey

areconvertedbyreadingandstudyingthescriptures(renewingtheirmind),this

istheirmetaphoricalcocoon(Humbert1961,270).TheHolySpirit,whomthey

receivedthroughtheirphysicalactofbaptism(Acts2:38),istheonewhosecures

theirsalvationthroughhisworkoftransformation.Theyarepassiveinthis

transformation(Rom.8:8-11).Theironlypartistorenewtheirmindswiththe

scriptures(Rom.12:2).Alloftheirotherperformances,beforethebaptismalact

arevalueless(Humbert1961,198)beforeGod,andalloftheirperformances

afterthisactareunabletosecuretheirsalvationeither(Rom4:2),theseare

ineffectualforthispurpose.Theperformanceofanotheristhatwhichhad

securedtheirjustification(Humbert1961,135),anditistheperformanceof

anotherwhichhadsecuredtheirtransformation(Humbert1961,288).

Therefore,thisnarrativehasverylittleforthemtodo,sinceGod’sjustificationis

uponJesus’performancealone,andtheironlytasktoappropriatethis

justificationistobebaptised.And,theironlytaskinsanctificationistorenew

148

theirmindswiththescriptures.SojustificationbelongstoJesus,and

sanctificationtotheSpiritofChrist.Transferofbelieversintothenextlifeis

entirelyuptotheirmaster,againJesus(Humbert1961,89).

Yetforthosewhodesiretodoactsofpiety,Hector’snarrativecancertainlyoffer

themsomelifeaffirmingpossibilities.Hisprocessofsalvationand

transformationcanbeideallythoughtofaspositivewaystoenhanceone’s

fellowshipandcommunityspirit.Yetitisunfortunatethathisnarrativelacksany

content;hedoesn’tgivethereaderanyindicationofexactlywhatthese

performancesmightinvolve.Therefore,byimplication,hisnarrativedepictsthat

Christianconversionmightbeanexternalprocessofpiousacts,andwhichmay

happenoveralongperiodtime.Ifthisisthecase,thenchurchbecomesavery

importantplace,andthechurchserviceaveryimportantoccasion.Seenthrough

Hector’seyes,newattendeesmustmasterthegroup/sexternalperformances

beforebeingadmittedaplaceonitsmembershiprole.Itisonlywhentheycan

mimicamajorityofthegroup/s’performancesthattheywillattaintheirfull

membershiprights,conversionandsalvation.

Churchesmaypossiblybeoverflowingwithattendeesifthisunderstandingwas

presentedtowidersociety.Sinceconversionwillnotbeconsideredacrazyaffair

(Acts9:1-9)involvingabeliefinmurder,crucifixion,andsins,since“thedeath

forusisthatitiseventofviolence”(Migliore2004,188),butitcannowbe

consideredasaslowalterationfromworldlyperformancestochurchy

performances.Thisconversioncouldbeginfromitsmargins.Newentrantswill

watch,asmembersperformbeforeoneanotherlikebirdspreparingtomate.

Theywillobserveamembergivinganotherhisorherperformance.Thisnovice

willwatch,beingveryattentivetotheperformancesofothermembers,andthen

he/shewillendeavourtoimitatetheirperformance.Iftheycorrectlyimitatethe

originalperformance,thenitwillnotberepeatedagain,butiftheyfailtoimitate

it,theperformancewillberepeated,whilstagainemphasizingtothemimicker

thebitswhichtheyfailedtocorrectlymimic.Therewillhavetobeseveral

performancesthatanovicewillhavetomasterbeforetheywillbeabletobe

149

consideredafullyacknowledgedmember.Acknowledgedmemberswillaffirmto

novices,aftersuchperfections,withgestures,likelittlenods,winks,andwith

gentletouchesonthenovice’sforearm,aswellasalongwithaffirmingsmilesof

satisfaction.Thepracticeandperfectionoftheseperformanceswillbedelivered

wheneverthegroupmeets,usuallyeverySunday,becausesuchattendanceis

alsoanessentialperformancerequirement.

Hector’sperformancesareopenended,buthavingexperiencedvariouschurch

services,Ihaveonlyimaginedwhatsomeoftheseperformancesmightlooklike

inaprotestantcongregationalcontext.

Perhapsheisright.Perhapsheiswrong.Butbybeingvague,aboutthecontent,

canbeaconvenientwayofavoidinganycriticism,especiallyfromtheapophatic

theologian,sinceitisveryhardtocriticisesomethingthathasnoexact

conceptualprescriptionstocriticise.Histypeofresponse(therapy)isnotthat

dissimilartotheRomanticresponse,tohistoricalcriticisminthemodernera,

whichDunntermed“theflightfromhistory”(Dunn1998,49).TheRomantic

claimtointuitiveknowledgeprotectedthemfromthebarbsofrational

arguments,butitalsodiscountedthemfromusinganyrationalargumentsfor

theirclaims(Walker1997,44).

Hisnarrativecertainlylendsitselftothepostmodernprinciple,theshowingof

differencethroughtheopenstance(Vanhoozer2013,95)ofsuspension,and

expressedintheword“perhaps”.Thisisespeciallysowhenhedoesnotgiveany

concreteexamplesofsuchperformancesbybelievers,noranyconceptual

examplestodowiththeirunderstandingsofGod.57Yetthiscanbeseen

positively,fromthepostmodernperspectiveatleast,asadiscoursewhichkeeps

anopenstanceduetoacceptingthelimitofhumanknowledgeandits

contingency(Caputo,PhilosophyandTheology(HorizonsinTheology)2006,

56).57KevinJ.Vanhoozer,“Ontology,Missiology,andtheTravailoftheChristianDoctrine:AconversationwithKevinHector’sTheologywithoutMetaphysics.”JournalofAnalyticTheology,Vol.1,Issue1,(May2013):107-119.“Heiscarefulnottowaxtotalitarianandinsistthateveryonehastothinkorusetermsthewayhedoes,”p107.

150

Conclusion

Againstthebackdropofpostmodernunderstandingsofmetaphysics,Ihave

offeredaninterpretationofJean-LucMarion’sGodwithoutBeingandKevin

Hector’sTheologywithoutMetaphysics.Heideggerunderstandsmetaphysicsas

onto-theologyandthishasadirectbearingonMarion’sapproach.Marion

translatesHeidegger’scritiqueofthemetaphysicaltraditionintothetheological

critiqueofidolstakenfromthebiblicalandmysticaltraditions.Iarguedthat

MariondevelopsaCatholicpostmodernism,interpretingtheEucharistasa

portalwhichenablesabridgebetweenunknowabletranscendenceandthefinite

worldofdifference.ForMarion,thethinkerparexcellenceisaCatholicBishop.

Heistheonlyproperlyauthorisedpersontodotheology.

Inamoreexplicitway,Hectoralsoworksfromtheperspectiveoffaithseeking

understanding,thoughthistimeasaProtestant.Again,thetruthofChristian

traditionisalreadyacceptedasapresupposition.InHector’sperspective,every

theologicalconceptdependsonaseriesofprecedentialusages.Heseesconcepts

asaclassofcommunalnormswhichmustalsoconformtothenormsusedby

ChristintheBible.Allconceptsarethereforemeasuredagainsttheworkofthe

TriuneGodasunderstoodinatraditionalProtestantsystem.Forthosewho

desiretodoactsofpietyHector’snarrativeofferssomebenefits.Itspeaksofthe

performanceofconceptsintheChristiancommunity.Yetitdoesnotofferany

dogmaticdescriptionofthecontentsoftheseperformances,nordoesitgiveany

cluesastowhichProtestantgroupwillbeusedtomeasurethevalidityofany

givenperformance.

Emphasizingthegapbetweendivinetranscendenceandhumanunderstanding,I

arguedthatHectorandMariondonotfinallyescapetheproblemsofthe

metaphysicaltradition,noraretheirproposalsultimatelygrounded.Each

presentsanaccountaccordingtotheperspectiveofhis(own)tradition,

producingpredictablycontrastingconclusionsregardingthewayGodovercomes

theproblemsofknowledgeandrepresentationthroughlanguage.But

metaphysicalthinkers,bydefinition,havenoaccesstotranscendentknowledge

151

andcannotbreachthegapbetweenGodandtheworldofdifference.Perhaps

MarionandHectorarerightthat,bychanceorsomemiracle,theirprojectshave

alignedwithGod’spointofview.Buttheywillneverknow,andnorwillwe.

152

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