Metro Transit LRT Accident Reports

8/16/2019 Metro Transit LRT Accident Reports

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INTRODUCTION

METRO

TRANSIT SAFETY DEPARTMENT

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

Grade Crossing Accident at 26th

St.

on

April

25

2 5

At

8:13

p.m. on

Monday,

April

25. 2005, a northbound Light Rail Vehicle LRV)

operated

by

Metro Transit struck a pedestrian at its grade crossing with 26th St. in

Minneapolis

MN.

The pedestrian was pronounced dead at

the scene.

The student

operator of the LRV,

his

instructor. a second non-operating student and passengers

aboard reported

no injuries and

the

LR

V

was

operable from

the scene

with a broken

windshield and some body damage on the leading nose. Service

on

the rail line between

downtown Minneapolis and Mall

of

America was interrupted for approximately 2

hours

while investigation and clean-up operations were underway.

Metro Transit

began

operating the Hiawatha Light Rail line in revenue service on

June

26. 2004, and this accident was the second

fatality

experienced

by

the system,

INVESTIGATION METHODOLOGY

The Safoty Department is responsible

to

conduct

an

investigation of rail accidents and

relies heavily on the expertise of law enforcement and emergency services personnel. rail

operations and maintenance staff: as well as

its own

experience. This report is

fonnulated

on

observations at the crash scene. interviews

with

appropriate personnel.

review of other agency and internal reports and follow-up analysis. The involved

agencies. personnel and applicable reports are summarized below.

Metro Transit Police Department MTPD) was

on

the

scene and conducted

an

investigation of

he

accident. including interviews with

the

train operator

and

collection

of witness data. Evidence collected was documented. Additionally. responding officers

completed reports

and

submitted them with the required vehicle accident report.

Minneapolis Police Department also responded and their traffic department performed

mapping of the intersection and the placement of the body and the LR V in conjunction

with MTPD. This information was included in the reconstruction report developed by

MTPD

Minneapolis Fire

Department

and Hennepin County

Medical

Center

EMS

personnel

responded

to

the initial call.

The Hennepin County Medical Examiner

was

involved

in

the

on

scene death

investigation

and

disposition

of

the deceased.

Pg. I of


2/152

Metro

Transit staff

was

present

at

the

accident scene representing transportation, traction

power. signals, executive staff, marketing & customer service.

risk

management. and

safety.

Immediately after

the

accident, and prior

to an)'

further

train

movements,

the

Manager of

Signals performed

signal

component downloads on the Vital Process Interlocking (VP )

components

at both Lake

Street and

Franklin

Ave., as

well

as

the

crossing gate

house at

26th

St. These

are

the

controlling units

that would

activate, control.

and

report

the

activities

of the grade

crossing equipment at

the 26th St.

crossing,

The

results of these

tests and reports

were

shared with the safety department and summarized. indicating that

the

crossing functioned properly and as

designed

prior to the

passage of

the

train.

The

car

was

returned to the O M Facility and secured and

the LRV

event recorder was

downloaded

the

following morning.

This

device records

train speed.

master controller

position

(the position of

the throttle/brake controller,

which

controls train acceleration

and

braking),

br.1king

performance.

and

other related infonnation. This downloaded

infonnation for the period immediately before and subsequent

to the

collision was

analyzed and

reviewed y the Rail

Maintenance Oversight Manager and

the

Manager

Transportation,

and

subsequently provided to the safety department

for

review.

The

responding supervisor

from field operations

prepared a

written

report

of his

activities

and observations at

the

crash site.

The safety

department

took

photographs at the crash

scene, made some applicable calculations and measurements regarding braking of the

train, observed

the

police interview of

the Train

Operator and Instructor post accident and

reviewed

the

required Metro Transit vehicle .accident

report

with

the

Operator, Instructor.

and

their supervisor. Supporting documentation, including photographs

and

available

reports. is

on file

with the Rail Safety Officer.

Safety requested that

the

signals and communication department provide a copy

of

all

train

and R radio

and

phone

transmissions

for the period

beginning

with

the first

report

of the

accident

until

approximately

one

hour after. In processing this request.

that

department discovered that radio and phone conversations have not been recording since

December

14, 2004,

and

thus the

information

was

not available.

Since the

accident was

recent,

the

radio conversations could be reconstructed

from

downloading the individual

RCC

radio consoles, but all

phone

conversations were unavailable. due to the

unmonitored

system

failure.

Metro Transit Police downloaded

the

onboard video recorders

on

the

LRV

and

reviewed

the contents, along

with

the

list

of on•board witnesses with

Risk

Management

Two

debriefings

were

conducted

following the

accident, one for executive staff and

one

for

operating staff. Non-contributory response

and

investigation refinements

were

handled therein.

Pg. of6


3/152

DISCUSSION OF EVENTS ND N LYSES

Hiawatha Line

Operating Characteristics

Metro Transit s Hiawatha Light rail

line

currently operates

from

Warehouse station

in

downtown Minneapolis to

the Mall t if

America station, a distance of approximately

12

miles. Operations are governed

by

the Metro Transit

Rules

for Light Rail (Third Edition

February 2005),

the

Metro Transit Hiawatha Light

Rail Line

Revenue Service Timetable

(effective February

28;

2005 at 000 I hours CST), and the current Rail Bulletin 2005-17

(effective

Monday,

April

25, 2005,

at 0001 hours). The

line

section that includes

the 26

1

h

Street grade crossing is operated under BS rules and current of traffic, wherein trains

operate by signal indication, southward

on

main track 2 (MT2) and northward on

MTl).

The

26th

Street grade crossing

is located at

Milepost

MP)

HlA

2. 76,

measured

from the

north end of

the

Hiawatha corridor

at MP

HIA 0.3

at Warehouse station. The northbound

approach trackage comes off a left side curve approximately

0.125

miles south of

the

crossing and is downgrade

to the

crossing itself, entering another very gentle left side

curve immediately north of

he

crossing.

The

26th

St.

grade crossing is protected

by

automatic crossing warning devices consisting

of

crossbucks

with

bells. flashers

and

gate

am1s on the

westbound and eastbound lanes and

has

·Second Train signs that light up

when

multiple trains

are

approaching

the

crossing. The crosswalks each have a yellow

painted stripe across thewalk in

line

with the crossing gate ann (or second train sign

on

the side opposite} and a solid yellow

line

painted across

the

tracks parallel to

the

sidewalk

at the point it meets the ballast. Metro Transit Timetable Special Instructions require all

trains approaching

this

grade crossing to sound

two

blasts ot the

horn as an

additional

warning.

Train speed

in

the

affected area

is MPH on

northbound approach

to the

26th

St.

grade

crossing, increasing

from

35MPH at a

poil)t

approximately 0.1 miles south

of he

crossing near the bottom of the

Lake

Street overpass. These speed limits

and

restrictions

are prescribed

by

Timetable, posted speed limit signs

on the

right of way (ROW).

and rail

bulletin.

Facts

Surrounding

the

ccident

and

Initial Response

On

the evening of Monday, April 25, 2005. the weather was

dark and

a light rain was

falling,

Pg. 3 of6


4/152

Immediately preceding the grade crossing collision, the involved train was operating

northbound with

the "A··

end of

LRV 12 l

leading

its

single car consists on

MTI.

The

train

had

departed Lake St. Station with

the

3 crew members and

42

passengers aboard.

As

the operator approached

the

26th

St.

grade crossing, be sounded the required 2

horn

blasts

approaching

the

crossing and noticed a pedestrian standing next to

the

westbound

crossing gate

on the

northeast comer of

the

crossing. The interview revealed that

the

train operator sounded a third horn blast because he noticed the man near the crossing.

As

the

train was occupying

the

crossing, the individual

looked

at the train and then

ran

directly

in

front

of

the train

us it

approached.

The

train o erator immediate sounded

the

horn

and laced

the

master controller into full brakin .

However,

the

LRV

event recorder confirmed that

the

train was placed

in

emergency brake mode and

was

traveling

at a

speed of IMPH

at the

point

the

brake

was

applied.) The

train

operator

was unable to stop short of striking

the

pedestrian and the train stopped with its

head

end

approximately

504 feet

north

of the

crossing. The body of the victim came

to rest

between main track1 and 2 approximately

125

feet north of

the

crossing.

The

emergency was reported immediately to the RCC, who contacted the Transit Control

Center (TCC) for

MTPD

and EMS response, the Transit Supervisor

on

duty for response,

Signal Department and Tmction Power on-duty for response.

as

well

as

other Metro

Transit staff, as appropriate.

Subsequent

to all

involved parties completing their necessary investigations

at the

site,

the

train was released. the body removed from

the

right-of-way, and

rrain

movement

through

the

area

was

resumed shortly after

IO:OOpm.

nalysis o the facts

The accident occurred

at : l

3pm on Monday,

April

25,

2005.

when a 45 year old male

apparently ignored the warning devices and stepped in front of the approaching train at

the

grade crossing of

the

Hiawatha Light Rail line

and

26th St. By the testimony of all

three crew members,

the

individual was observed standing

next to the

lowered

gate arm

counterweights al the northeast quadrant of the crossing and

ran

in front of the train

as

it

occupied

the

crossing operaling at slightly under

the

posted speed limit of MPH The

student operator

had

sounded the

hom as

prescribed

by

rule

in

approach

to

the

Ct ossing

and was

accelerating

at

the time of the accident. The interview revealed that

the

train

o ·

rator

ound d a thir

horn

b st

because

he

oticed

the man

near

the

crossing. -

As

the

train

was occupying the crossing,

the individual

looke at the

tram and then ran directly in front of

the

train

as

it

Pg.

4 of


5/152

approached, The train operator immediately sounded

the

horn

and placed the master

controller into

full

emergency brake.

The body o the victim was at rest approximately 125 feet north o

the

north edge o the

sidewalk crossing.

The head

end o

the

train

came

to rest

approximately 504 feet north o

that same point. (Exact measurements were

not

taken by Safety Staff due

to

the

Medical

Examiner activities on

the right o way and the

hazards presented

by

the darkness

and

uneven footing; The 504' distance was calculated by counting line side fence posts;

spaced

at

approximately

12'

centers and calculating that distance based

on the nose

o the

LR V being 42 posts north o the crossing.) It appears that the victim may have been

thrown ahead and to

the left o the

northbound train

at

impact; landing

at the left

o the

train

and

rolled

and

dragged

by the

stopping train

to the

point

o

rest. This

is

consistent

with damage noted after the accident

to the

retaining clip on the A'' car truck skirt on the

operators left side

and

blood splattered behind

the l t

access door

on

that same side

o the

LR

V

and testimony o one

o the

witnesses.

According to information from MTPD, post-mortem toxicology reports indicated

the

victim's blood alcohol content o 0.276, almost

3

times the legal limit for

an

operator o a

motor vehicle. This would have indicated severely impaired judgment at the time o

the

accident. Cause

o

death was detennined

to

be multiple blunt force injuries. Post~

accident interviews with the victim's spouse indicated a history o alcoholism, but no

known

suicidal issues.

The instructor on the northbound train immediately radioed the R o the collision,

following appropriate radio procedure, announcing Emergency three times

and

stating

the

location and

the

nature o the accident.

A southbound

LR

V was operating south o

the

24th St pedestrian crossing and passed the

scene

at

approximately the same time

as the

fatal

impact, but did not

see

anything. This

would be consistent with oncoming bright lights from the approaching northbound train

and the fact

that given such lights. the other train operator would

have

focused his

attention ahead

and to his

right in approach of26m SL

That

operator had just entered

the

main~line from the yard and

had not

yet changed

his

radio channel from Yard to

';Operations;' frequency. thus did

not

hear the ·'Emergency call

from

the northbound

train.

Observations at the scene, corroborated by signal department downloads

o the

applicable

grade crossing and VPT appliances and witness testimony indicated that all crossing

appliances were operating properly

and fully

functional

at the

time

of the

accident

The

crossing appliance inspection records indicate regular inspection

and no

reported

anomalies. (The crossing appliance records also indicate that the ·'Second Train

warning

sign

at the

crossing

was

activated at the time

o

impact, triggered

by

the

passage

o both the

affected northbound train

and the

approaching southbound train

to the

26th

St

crossing.)

Pg

o 6


6/152

The download of the

LRV

on-board event recorder indicates that the train was

accelerating and

had

reached 51

MPH at

the point of impact

at

which time the train

operator applied

the

Emergency Brake with the master controller.

All

vehicle

propulsion

and

brake systems were functioning properly and all three headlights were

working. Vehicle specifications indicate that at 51 MPH. the. driver would react

in

56. I

feet and the stopping distance from that point would be 416.6 feet for a total stopping

distance

of

472.56 feet. These specifications assume an instantaneous

and

flat

deceleration

rate. Our calculation

of 504 feet is supported by these parameters, given a

slight descending grade, wet rail,

brake

pressure buildup,

and

human variables

in

the

reaction time and distance of the operator.

Post accident dru and alcohol tests of the train operator

and

instructor

A preliminary police report

was

received

from

MTPD after the accident, and the final

collision reconstruction report was received

on

May

26, 2005.

ON LUSIONS

The pedest ian failed to heed the operating warning devices at the 26

I St. grade crossing

and for unknown reasons stepped in front

of

the approaching train. The train operator

was operating his train within the parameters of rule and timetable instructions and

reacted promptly and properly, but had no chance

to

avoid impacting

the

pedestrian at

the

crossing, resulting

in

fatal impact.

There is no evidence that any operating practices of Metro Transit light rail contributed to

the unfortunate accident

of

April 25 2005.

Pg. 6 of


7/152


8/152

lnvesti ation Follow u nd ction Taken

MTPD and St. Paul EMS were notified and responded; the pedestrian was transported for

treatment.

Rail Operations and Rail Safety responded.

A Bus bridge was initiated,

and

train service

resumed

in approx. 45

minutes.

Vehicle maintenance downloaded the

on

board

LRV

event recorder data and Signals

Communications downloaded

the

VP data to

confirm that the

warning devices functioned

properly. A copy of the LRV download

is

on file with Rail Safety Officer. Manager of Signals

Communication confinns

that

the pedestrian crossing warning devices functioned properly per

VPI

download

and

will

forward

a written summary

to

the Rail

Safety Officer.

The

MTPD

also investigated this incident. A

copy

of the report is on file at MTPD and

with

the

Rail Safety Officer.

Final Report Information

Date Report Prepared:

12/14/05

Report Prepared

by:

John MacQueen, Rail Safety Officer

Page 2 of


9/152

INTRODUCTION

METRO

TR NSIT S FETY DEP RTMENT

CCIDENT INVESTIG TION REPORT

Grade Crossing Accident at 46th St on

August 7, 2 6

At 4:56 pm on Monday, August 7,

2006,

a southbound train departing

the

6th St. station

entered the grade crossing at 46

1

St.

and

noted a bicyclist riding southbound parallel to

the train

suddenly enter

the

tracks

toward

the south edge o the crossing.

The

operator

applied brakes, but was unable to avoid fatally hitting the cyclist. There were no reported

h\juries aboard

the train.

Service on the

rail line between Franklin

station

and Mall

o

America was

interrupted for

approximately 2 hours while investigation and clean·up operations were underway.

Metro

Transit began operating

the

Hiawatha

Light

Rail line in

revenue

service on June

26, 2004.

INVESTIG TION

METHODOLOGY

The Safety Department is responsible for conducting an investigation o

rail

accidents

and

relies on the expertise oflaw enforcement and emergency services personnel,

rail

operations and maintenance stafl: as well as its

own

experience. This report is

formulated on observations

at the crash scene,

interviews

with

appropriate personnel,

review

o

other

agency

and internal reports. and follow-up analysis. The involved

agencies, personnel, and

applicable reports are summarized

below.

Metro Transit

Police

Department MTPD)

was

on the scene

and

conducted

an

investigation o the accident, including interviews

with the train

operator

and

collection

o

witness data. Evidence collected was documented. Additionally, responding officers

completed reports and submitted

them with the

re-quired vehicle accident

report.

Minneapolis

Police

Department

also responded and

assisted with traffic control

at the

intersection.

The

Minnesota

State Patrol

(Department o

Public

Safety) Metro

Crash

Reconstruction Team performed mapping

o

the intersection for reconstruction purposes.

This information

was included in the

reconstruction

report provided

to

MTPD.

There was initial response from Minneapolis Fire Department

and

Hennepin County

Medical

Center ambulance personnel.

Inasmuch as the

injuries

were fatal, the Hennepin

County

Medical Examiner responded

to investigate

and take

custody o the deceased.

Metro

Transit staff responded

to the

accident scene representing transportation. signals,

marketing customer service,

and

safety.


10/152

Safety Department Accident Report

Grade

Crossing

Accident at

46lli Street

on

August

7,

2006

Page 2

The train

was returned to

the

O M Facility

and secured until the LRV event recorder

was downloaded. This device records train speed, master controller position (the position

o

the throttle/brake controller,

which

controls train acceleration and braking), braking

perforn1ance, and other related information. This downloaded information

for

the period

immediately before and subsequent

to

the collision was provided to the safety department

for review.

The responding supervisors from field operations prepared written reports

o

their

activities and observations at the crash site.

The

safety department took photographs at

the

crash

scene, interviewed the train operator.

and

reviewed the required Metro Transit

vehicle accident report. Supporting documentation, including photographs and available

reports,

is

on file

with the

Rail Safety Officer.

Metro Transit Police downloaded the onboard video recorders on the

LRV

and reviewed

the

contents, forwarding this

and the

list

o

on~board witnesses

to Risk Management.

DISCUSSION O EVENTS ND N LYSES

iawatha Line Operating Characteristics

Metro

Transit's Hiawatha Light rail line operates from Warehouse station in downtown

Minneapolis

to

the Mall

o

America station, a distance

o

approximately

2 miles.

Operations

are

governed by the

Metro

Transit

Rules

for Light Rail (Fourth Edition- July

I

0,

2006). The line segment that includes

the

46

h St.

grade crossing is governed by

automatic block signals (ABS)

and

trains operate according to an established current o

traffic.

The

46

1

h


is

located

at

Milepost (MP)

HIA 5.5

L measured

from

the

north end o he Hiawatha corridor at MP HIA 0.3 at Warehouse station. The trackage is

tangent southbound approaching this

grade

crossing, with a very slight curve toward the

east beginning just north o the grade crossing. Trackage

is

parallel

to

Hiawatha Avenue

(which

is

directly east

o the

tracks). The

46th St.

grade crossing

is

protected

by

automatic grade crossing warning devices consisting o crossbucks

with

bells, flashers

and

gate arms

on the

westbound, eastbound,

and

southbound right tum

lane from

Hiawatha Ave. to westbound

46th St.

All gates are o sufficient

length

to fully extend

across appropriate lanes

o

tratlic at the crossing. Additionally, each grade crossing gate

mm

is equipped

with three4 flashers, plus a pair of I2·•

flashers

that provide

the

grade

crossing warning for a motorist traveling the wrong direction. Bells

on

the crossing

appliances sou11d while the gates

are

in a state o travel downward, but do not sound once

the

gate is

fully deployed.

The traffic signals for the intersection o Hiawatha Avenue and 46th St. are

interconnected with the crossing warning devices for several phases o preemption:

I. A clearing signal phase is activated whereby motorists on the tracks are given

priority to clear from the intersection.


11/152


Grade Crossing Accident at 46th Street

on August 7, 2006

Page

3

2.

Grade

crossing warning devices activate to prohibit vehicles from entering

the

grade

crossing via the legally prescribed routes.

3. Motor vehicles approaching

from

all directions are kept in the proper lanes and the

traffic system displays signals prohibiting motor vehicles from proceeding

into

the

area with gates down.

The grade crossing also features a raised curb median in the center o 46

1

h St

on

both

sides of the crossing, separating the eastbound

and

westbound

lanes and

a curbed

median

separating the eastbound lane

o

6th St and the southbound right tum lane off Hiawatha

Ave

on

the

east side of

the

crossing.

The

purpose o

this median

is

to

define traffic lanes

and to discourage drivers from driving around grade crossing protection. There are

curb

cuts to allow mobility device movement

within

the

marked

crosswalks (described

below).

The grade crossing

is

marked with standard pavement markings in accordance with the

Manual

of Unifonn Traffic

Control Devices

MUTCD). These markings delineate a safe

pathway

to

cross 46

1

h and to cross the tracks

to

the ped/bike path, including:

I. A crosswalk parallel to the tracks on the east side

o

the crossing between

Hiawatha

Avenue and the

LRT

tracks

and

outside

the

crossing gates.

2. Crossing

the

tracks at

the

sidewalks

located

on the

north and south

side o 46th St.

Warning devices

in

addition to the standard crossing appliances

include

illuminated

··Walk/Don't Walk'' devices

for

the segment parnllel to the tracks and a yellow diamond

shaped

sign

that

has

Look with a two

headed

arrow} on

both

sides o the tracks.

The

latter also has

an

illuminated Second Train'' feature to

warn

i multiple trains are

approaching the crossing.

The

second train feature would not have functioned in the

accident scenario, as there

was only

the southbound train approaching the crossing at the

time

o

this incident.) Due

to

the wide nature

o

the

north side crosswalk,

an

additional

passive device (Crossbucks

with

a LOOK sign) is in

place, but

would not

have

been

involved in this incident,~ it occurred at the south side o the grade crossing.

A southbound train pre-empts the traffic signals at 6th St. while at the 46

h

St. rail

station

MP

HIA 5.4)

and

the

grade

crossing flashers/gates activate and

fully

deploy

before a southbound train receives a permissive rail signal to depart the station.

Train

speed in the vicinity of46

St. grade crossing is

35MPH

southbound. These speed

limits and restrictions are prescribed

by

Timetable, posted speed limit signs on the right

of way ROW),

and

rail bulletin.

Facts Surrounding the ccident and Initial Response

On the afternoon o

Monday, August

7, 2006, the weather

was

dry and clear.


12/152


Grade

Crossing Accident at

46

1

h

Street

on

August

7, 2006

Page4

Immediately preceding the grade crossing collision,

the

involved train

was

operating

southbound with

the

A''

end

o LR V l

03

leading

the train

consist on MT2. The

train

had departed

46

1

h St. Station with the operator and

196

passengers aboard (95 passengers

in

the lead

LR

V

and

O

I

in

the

trailing

LR

V).

As

the train operator approached the

6th

St. grade crossing, he sounded

the

bell, as

required

b)' rule.

Minneapolis

has

a whistle ban

and the

horn

is

sounded

only in

the

case

of

an

emergency, or

when

meeting another train

on

a crossing. As

the

operator

noted the

bicyclist nearing

the

eastbound

hme o

46

1

h St., he

sounded

the high

horn

as an

additional warning and reduced propulsion.

At

the

point where the train

was

approximately at the center

o

the crossing

a roximatelv even with the center medians , the operator noted

At

the

point o impact

with

the lower (operator s) left comer o the lead LRV. the cyclist

was

propelled toward

the

track center. The bicycle

came to

rest

on the

northward track

(MTI)

and

cyclist struck the catenary pole, located between the tracks immediately to the

south o

the

crossing, with the

body coming

to

rest just south

o

that catenary

pole

between Lhe two

main

tracks. The train stopped at a point approximately

243 feet

from

the point o impact with

the

cyclist.

The emergency was reported immediately to the RCC, who contacted the Transit Control

Center (TCC) for

MTPD

and EMS response. the Transit

Supervisor on duty for

response,

Signal Department

and

Traction Power

on

duty for response.

as

well as other Metro

Transit staff, as appropriate.

Subsequent

to all

involved parties completing their necessary investigations at

the

site,

the deceased was

removed

from the right of way by the

Medical Examiner,

the train was

released

and

removed

from the

scene,

and

nonnal train movement through

the

area

was

resumed shortly

after

7:

15

pm.


13/152

Safety Department Accident

Report

Grade Crossing Accident at 46

~

Street

on

August

7, 2006

Page

nalysis

o

the facts

The

accident occurred at 4:56

pm

on Monday, August 7, 2006, when a southbound

bicyclist riding parallel

to the

tracks

on

the sidewalk/bike path through

the

pedestrian

crossing. located between Hiawatha Avenue and the LRT tracks made

an

improper right

tum, proceeding westbound into the eastbound

lane at

46th St. Despite warning devices

and a properly marked crosswalk,

the

bicyclist entered

the path

o and was struck

by

a

southbound train. These facts are substantiated by witness testimony reflected

in the

MTPD investigation reports. There were no other trains in the vicinity o the crossing at

the time o

he

collision.

The Hennepin County Medical Examiner (ME) report, and associated post-accident

toxicology report, indicated that the cyclist's death was the result o multiple

blunt force

injuries resulting

from

a bicycle-light

rail

train crash. with time

o

death listed

as

4:56

pm

on August

7,

2006.

Blood and

urine toxicology rests were negative

t r

prohibited

substances.

The Accident Reconstruction Report received

via MTPD

from

the

Minnesota

State Patrol concluded that

the

bicycle operator

·•was

riding

his

bicycle inattentive

to

surrounding real

and

potential

hazard.

Observations at the scene, corroborated

by

signal department downloads

o

the

applicable

grade crossing

and

VPI appliances and witness testimony, indicated that all crossing

equipment was operating properly and

fully

functional at the

time o

the accident. The

crossing appliance inspection records indicate regular inspection and no reported

anomalies.

All vehicle propulsion and brake systems were functioning properly and all three

headlights were working. The

LRV

event recorder continued that the train

had

accelerated to a speed of29.8

MPH

after departing

the

station;

and then

reduced

propulsion

to

25 MPH, followed with

an

application

o

track brake,

which

shows

deployment

at

21.7

MPH.

The track brake

was

applied

for 4.

I seconds, reducing speed

from

21.7

MPH

to

4.7 MPH, then shows release. Full service brake

continued

to be

applied, stopping the

train completely

J

7 seconds

later.

The entire stopping

time from

application

o

track brake

was

5.8 seconds.

No

clear markings could

be

identified

on the rail

surface

to

pinpoint a location

for

initial

application

o the track

brake. Absent

such

additional physical evidence,

the

investigation is solely dependant on

the

event recorder to provide detail of

the

braking

time and function. Using a series o calculations involving distance traveled per si. Cond


14/152

Safety

Department Accident

Report

Grade Crossing Accident at 46' Street on

August

7, 2006

Page6

and the speeds indicated

on

the tabular event recorder download, the Safety Department

calculates that the train operator actually achieved track brake application at a point 65

•

•

= - - - ~ -== -=~ -~ -~ - . , ,- ~ -

y

p

speed every full second, so these calculations should be considered reliable, yet

not

exact.

hey do, however

lead

to the conclusion that the events transpired rapidly and

given

the

variables

in

human reaction

as well as mechanical

a liances,

train operators have believed they

had

pushed the master

control forward sufficient

to

achieve an emergency brake application, while actually

achieving only a recoverable track brake application or even full service application.

Despite efforts by the training department

to

stress the proper techniques for

use

of the

master controller in achieving emergency brake application, it is still apparent from these

incidents that there

is

an ongoing issue. either in terms of training or with the mechanics

of the master controller, which

needs

to be addressed to ensure that a

train

operator

can

effectively achieve a non-recoverable stopping mode that offers the maximum braking

potential available in

the

event

of an impending

collision.

A preliminary police report was

received from

MTPD

on

August 30, 3006.

and

the

Minnesota State Patrol Department of Public Safety) Crash Reconstruction Report (Case

Number 06980076)

was

received

from MTPD

on

November

'27,

2006.

ON LUSIONS

The cyclist ignored operating warning devices, departed a marked traffic

path

for

pedestrians and cyclists, entered a lane of traffic a ainstthe le al direction of traffic and

was

struck a southbound train.

There is no evidence that

any

operating practices of

Metro

Transit light

rail

contributed to


of

August 7. 2006,


15/152

METRO TR NSIT S FETY DEP RTMKNT

CCIDENT INVESTIG TION REPORT

Pedestrian

Fatality

at

Franklin

Avenue

LRT

Station on

June

8, 2007

INTRODUCTION

At approximately I 29

pm

on Friday.

June

8. 2007, a northbound train had stopped at the

Franklin Avenue station and was departing

the

station when a passenger

on the

platform

moved toward the moving train and

fell

between

the first and second LRV sustaining

fatal injuries.

The incident was not evident to

Metro

Transit personnel until the arrival of the

next southbound train at Franklin station, when passengers

on the

platform

informed

the

operator of that train of

the

body

lying

on the other track. That operator reported the

emergency

to

the Rail Control Center RCC).

Service

on

the rail line between Lake Street and Cedar Riverside stations was interrupted

for approximately 2 hours, 50 minutes while investigation and clean-up operations were

underway. Substitute bus bridge service was instituted between

Downtown

East

Metrodome} station and the Lake Street station during the rail interruption.

Metro

Transit began operating the Hiawatha Light

Rail

line in revenue service on June

26, 2004.

INVESTIG TION

METHODOLOGY

The

Safety Department

is

responsible for conducting

an

investigation of rail accidents

and

relies on the

expertise oflaw enforcement

and

emergency services personnel,

rail

operations

and

maintenance staff,

as

well

as

its own

experience. This report

is

formulated

on

observations at

the crash

scene, interviews with appropriate personnel,

review of

other agency

and

internal reports,

and

follow-up analysis. The involved

agencies, personnel, and applicable reports are summarized below.

Metro

Transit

Police

Department MTPD)

Was on

the

scene

and conducted

an

investigation of the accident. including interviews with both train operators the incident

train

and

the first arriving train at Franklin Avenue subsequent

to

the accident and

collection of witness data. Evidence collected was documented. Additionally,

responding officers completed reports and submitted them.

Minneapolis Police Department also

responded

to investigate the possibility

of

foul play.

Their investigation quickly

concluded

that

the fall

was accidental and

not

a homicide.

There was

initial

response

from

Minneapolis Fire Department paramedics. Inasmuch

as

the injuries

were

fatal, the

Hennepin

County Medical Examiner responded to investigate

and

take

custody of the deceased.


16/152


Pedestrian

Fatality

at Franklin

Avenue

LRT Station on June 8, 2007

Page

Metro Transit staff responded to the accident scene representing transportation,

marketing & customer service, safety, risk management, and facilities maintenance.

The train was returned to the

O M

Facility

and

secured until

the

LR V event recorder

was downloaded and the exterior could

be

properly cleaned

and

inspected for any

damage. The event recorder records train speed, master controller position (the position

o

the throttle/brake controller, which controls

train

acceleration

and

braking), braking

perfotmance, and other related information. This downloaded information for

the

period


to

the accident was provided to the safety department

for review.

The

responding supervisors from field operations prepared written reports

o

their

activities and observations at the crash site. The safety department took photographs

at

the crash scene, interviewed the train operator, and reviewed the required Metro Transit

accident reports

and

available video recordings

from

the Franklin

Avenue

station.

Supporting documentation, including photographs,

video,

and available

reports,

is

on

file

with the Rail Safety Officer.

Metro Transit Police downloaded the onboard video recorders on

the

LRV and reviewed

the contents, forwarding this to

Risk

Management. Courtesy cards were not collected

from passengers

aboard

the train as the operator was unaware o what

had

occurred until

some time

after

the actual accident.

Subsequent

to

removal

o

the

deceased, Minneapolis Fire Department and

the

Metro

Transit

facilities

maintenance staff cleaned

the

platform area prior

to

resumption

of

service.

DISCUSSION OF EVENTS

ND

N LYSES

Hiawatha

Line Operating haracteristics

Metro

Transit's Hiawatha Light rail line operates from Warehouse station

in

downtown

Minneapolis to

the

Mall

o

America station, a distance o approximately 2

miles.

Operations are governed by the

Metro

Transit Rules for Light

Rail

(Fourth Edition- July,

2006). The line segment that includes the Franklin Avenue Station is govemed by

automatic block signals (ABS) and trains operate according to an established current o

traffic.

The franklin Avenue station

is

located

at

Milepost (MP)

HIA

2.21, measured

from

the

north end of the Hiawatha corridor at MP HIA

0.3

at Warehouse station. The trackage is

tangent

in

the

station

and

enters a gentle curve toward the west immediately north

o

the

station area. The station platform is located between the northbound track (Main Track

l)

and

the southbound track (Main Track 2), The platform surface is brick with a 24

yellow tactile warning strip at both trackside edges o the platform. There is a pedestrian

crosswalk at

both

the north

and

south end

o

he platform and warning bells at those

crossings sound continuously upon arrival

and

until after departure

o

trains.


17/152


Report

Pedestrian Fatality

at

Franklin Avenue LRT Station on June

8,

2007

Page

Train speed

for

northbound trains departing Franklin Avenue station is 35MPH

northbound. These speed limits

and

restrictions are prescribed

by Rule

Book Subdivision

Special Instructions, posted speed

limit

signs

on

the right

o way

ROW), General Orders,

Operational Notices.

and

Track Warrants.


On

the

afternoon

o

Friday, June

8, 2007 the

weather

was

dry and clear.

Immediately preceding

the

incident,

the

involved train

was

operating northbound

with the

LRV IO leading. Upon arrival

at

the Franklin Avenµe station northbound on MTl

),

the

operator made his station stop

and

prior to departure, closed

his

doors and checked

his

mirrors. There was

no

one immediately adjacent to

the

side

o the

train. The operator

then focused

his attention

on the

track ahead, including an interlocking signal, pedestrian

crossing,

and the

upcoming Cedar South interlocking. The operator departed

the

station.

As

the train departed,

the

victim

moved toward the

moving train

and

appeared

to

lose

her

balance falling between the first and second LRV. Review o the video and testimony o

witnesses to police officers substantiate this fact nd do not appear to indicate that she

tripped over any obstacle or obstruction.

As the

train continued northbound,

the

victim

w s caught between the second LRV LR V I 17) and

the

station latfonn with resultin

fatal in·

uries.

The emergency

was

reported

to the RCC,

by

the

next arriving train at Franklin Avenue

station approximately 3 minutes

later). Upon

arrival southbound

on MT2,

Operator

9933

was notified by a patron

on the

platform that there

was

a

body on

the opposite track.

Operator 9933 left her operating cab with a portable radio and upon finding the deceased,

notified the

RCC

and

was

provided a blanket by an unidentified passenger from her train,

with which she covered

the

body The RCC contacted the Transit Control Center TCC)


18/152


Pedestrian Fatality at Franklin Avenue

LRT

Station on June 8, 2007

Page

for MTP and EMS

response, the Transit Supervisor

on

duty

for

response,

as well as

other appropriate Metro Transit staff.

Subsequent

to

al involved parties completing their necessary investigations at

the

site,

the

deceased was removed from

the

right

o way

by the Medical Examiner,

the

train

was

released and removed

from

the scene,

and

normal train movement through

the

area was

resumed shortly after 4:20

pm.

Metro Transit safety department notified

the

State Safety Oversight Agency (Minnesota

State Patrol), the National Response Center (NRC-NTSB), and recorded the incident as a

National Transit Database (NTD) Major'' incident.

nalysis o the facts


at

1

29

pm on

Friday, June

8,

2007,

when

a passenger lost her

balance and fell between the LRVs o a northbound train departing Franklin Avenue

station. These facts are substantiated by witness testimony reflected in the MTPD

investigation reports as well as review

o

station platform video camera footage. There

were

no other trains in

the

vicinity

o

the station

at

the time

o

the accident.

As initial review o he station video indicated other patrons near the deceased. the

possibility of

foul play

needed to be

ruled out.

Minneapolis Police Department homicide

investigators were summoned by MTPO

and,

along

with

MTPD investigators, reviewed

the

video

and

interviewed witnesses. They concluded that there was no foul play

involved

and

that the death

was

the result o

an

accidental fall by the deceased (a

79

year

old female).

According to

MTPD

investigators,

the

Hennepin County

Medical Examiner

(ME)

ruled

the

fatality

to be an

''accidental death'' caused

by

''blunt

force

trauma;' and

the

toxicology

reports showed no abnormal levels. MTPD was unable to obtain a

fit1al

report from the

ME that would give a detailed explanation

o

the victim's prior medical conditions, any

medical diagnosis, or sudden

medical

problem

that

may have caused her to

fall.

While

not directly involved

in

the immediate accident location, Metro Transit signal

department employees downloaded the pedestrian crossing warning devices at the north

end

o the

station platform

as well as the

Vital Process interlocking

{VPI)

controlling

the

Cedar

South

Interlocking. These downloads

show

that

the

northbound train had a

permissive

rail

signal

upon

departure

from

Franklin Avenue station and that

the

pedestrian crossing warning devices (bells and Do Not Walk"

light,;) were

functioning

properly,


19/152

Safety

Department Accident

Report

Pedestrian Fatality at Franklin

Avenue LRT

Station

on June

8 2007

Page

llllllll nt

drug and alcohol test

o he

train operato

A preliminary police report was received from MTPD on June 12 2007. MTPD notified

the Rail Safety

Officer on June

15 2007

that

the

Hennepin County

Medical Examiner

had ruled the death to be accidental and that any criminal investigation was closed. The

Limited Reconstruction

Report

was received

from MTPD

on August 28

2007.

That

report concluded that there did

not

appear to be any factors relating

to

the scene

(obstructed vision,

uneven

surface, placement o warning signs) or vehicle operation

contributing

to the

accident. That report concluded that the incident was not a suicide

and

that because it appears that the

victim loses

her balance and

falls into

the train, a

possible contributing factor may have been

the

victim s physical and/or medical

condition.

ON LUSIONS

There

is

no evidence that

any

operating practices

o Metro

Transit light rail contributed

to


o

June 8 2007.


20/152


21/152

METRO TR NSIT S FETY DEP RTMENT

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

LRV Collision with Pedestrian at 6th Street on November 21 2007

INTRODUCTION

At approximately 2:42 pm

on

Wednesday, November 21 2007, a northbound train

crossing the 46

1

h Street grade crossing in Minneapolis struck a westbound pedestrian at

the

north side crosswalk.

The

pedestrian was fatally injured and rail service was

interrupted for less

than

two hours. Metro Transit began operating the Hiawatha Light

Rail

line

in

revenue service on June 26, 2004.

INVESTlG TION METHODOLOGY

The Safety Department

is

responsible

for

conducting an investigation

o rail accident'>

and

relies

on

the expertise

o

law

enforcement and emergency services personnel,

rail

operations and maintenance staff, as

well

as

its

own experience. This report

is

formulated on observations at the crash scene, interviews with appropriate personnel,

review o other agency

and

internal reports, and follow-up analysis. The involved

agencies, personnel, and applicable reports are summarized below.

Metro Transit Police Department MTPD) was on the scene and conducted an

investigation

o

the accident, including interviews with both the train operator and the

witnesses. Evidence collected was documented. Additionally, responding officers

completed reports and submitted them.

There was initial response

from

Minneapolis

Fire

Department paramedics

and

Hennepin

County Medical Center ambulance personnel. The Hennepin County Medical Examiner

was summoned and investigated the scene as well

as

taking custody

o

the deceased.

Metro Transit transportation and safety staff responded

to

the accident scene, along with

the Assistant General Manager- Admin responded to the accident, to carry out

investigative. restoration, and P O tasks

as

appropriate.

The train was returned

to

the O M Facility and secured until the LRY event recorder

w s

downloaded and damage assessed. The event recorder records train speed, master

controller position the position of the throttle/brake controller, which controls train

acceleration and braking), braking performance, and other related information. This

downloaded information for the period immediately before and subsequent to the

accident was provided to

the

safety department for review. The operating cab LRV

I 06B) was equipped with a forward facing camera, but the camera was not functional at

the time

o

the accident

and

thus offered

no

evidence.

Metro Transit Signal and Communication staff downloaded event recorders for

the

adjacent warning devices

to

ensure proper function.


22/152


LRV Collision with Pedestrian at 46

1

h St

on November

21,

2007

Page 2

·n,e responding supervisor from field operations prepared written reports o his activities

and

observations at

the

crash site;

The safety department reviewed the required Metro Transit accident reports

and

available

video recordings

from the

CCTV equipment located at 46

1

h

St. station. Supporting

documentation. including

video and

available reports,

is on

file

with the Rail

Safety

Officer.

The

train

operator submitted to the required post accident drug and alcohol tests required

under TA regulations. The Operator also prepared the required Metro Transit

rail

accident incident report and

was

interviewed by Metro Transit Safety and

Rail

Operations

management.

Courtesy cards were collected at the scene.

DISCUSSION OF

EVENTS ND N LYSES

Hiawatha Linc Operating Characteristics

Metro Transit's Hiawatha Light rail line operates

from

Warehouse station in downtown

Minneapolis to

the

Mall o

America station, a distance

o

approximately 2 miles.

Operations are governed by the Metro Transit Rules for Light Rail (Fourth Edition- July,

2006).

The

46th


is

located

at

Milepost

MP)

HlA 5.51, measured

from

the

north end

of

the

Hiawatha corridor at

MP HlA

0.3 at Warehouse

station.

Trackage

is

parallel

to

Hiawatha Avenue which

is

directly east o the tracks) and there

is

clear

visibility

of

the crossing to

a

northbound train. The accident location

was

at

the

pedestrian sidewalk crossing immediately adjacent to

the

north side

o he 46

1

hStreet

grade crossing. The adjacent traffic lanes are protected by active warning devices

including crossbucks, flashers, gate.

and

bell

as

well as a second train sign with

the

word

LOOK visiblellt all times. One

o

he bells rings continuously and

was an

enhancement installed subsequent

to

an earlier collision at

the

same grade crossing in

an

effort

to draw

the attention

o

inattentive pedestrians. Additionally, there

is

a passive

crossbuck in the middle of

the

pedestrian sidewalk crossing, along

with red

''Danger -

Moving Trains signs

on

the fence adjacent

to the

crosswalk.

Train speed for northbound trains at 46

1

h

Street

is 45 MPH

approaching

the

grade

crossing and drops to

35

MPH at the grade crossing. This speed limit is prescribed by

Rule Book

Subdivision Special Instructions and posted

speed

limit signs on

the

right o

way

(ROW). Minneapolis city ordinance prohibits

use

o

train

horn

except

in

case

o

emergency, thus normal operating practice is to sound the bell approaching this grade

crossing,



23/152


LR V Collision

with

Pede~tritm at 46th St on November 21, 2007

Page

3

On

the afternoon

o

Wednesday, November

21,

2007, the weather

was

cloudy,

35

degrees

F, with light snow

and

no accumulation.

from

the LRV I06 B cab at the point

o

he accident,

train

was

unable

to stop

short

o

striking

the

pedestrian, who continued onto

the

track

in

front o the

train

(despite functioning active warning devices)

and

the train horn

sounding,

TI1e

pedestrian

was

killed

y the

impact.

The emergency

was

reported

to the RCC by the

train operator. The RCC contacted

the

Transit Control Center (TCC) for MTPD

and EMS

response, the transit supervisor

on

duty

for

response,

as

well as other appropriate Metro Transit staff.

The pedestrian

was

immediately attended

to

by paramedics and the

body

left

in place

for

the Hennepin County Medical Examiner,

who

removed

it

subsequent

to

its

on

site

investigation. '

Records indicate

64

passengers aboard

the

train at the time

o

the collision and no

immediate reports of

injury.

Metro

Transit safety department notified

the

State Safety Oversight Agency (Minnesota

State

Patrol) and

recorded

the

incident

as

a National Transit Database (NTD) ·'Major

incident. Additionally,

the

incident was reported

to

the National Response Center NRC-

NTSB .

nalysis o the Facts


at

2:42

pm

on

Wednesday.

November

21,

2007. when a

northbound train crossing the 46

1

h Street grade crossing

in

Minneapolis struck a

westbound pedestrian

at the

north side crosswalk. The pedestrian

was

fatally injured

and

rail service

was

interrupted

for less than two

hours.


24/152


Report

LRV

Collision with Pedestrian at 46

1

> St on

November 21 2007

Page 4

It is also

possible

to

view the

accident event albeit

t from

some distance)

on the Metro

Transit

CCTV

camera

located

at 46th St Station plarfonn,

The

video showed the

involved pedestrian crossing

Hiawatha Avenue

outside

of the marked

crosswalks

and

against the trnffic I

ght. He

continued

to

step

in

front of the northbound train at

the

pedestrian crosswalk

on

the north side of

46th

Street. being struck

by the front of he

train

and the body propelled towards the chain

link

fence along the east side

of the tracks. The

train comes

to

a stop a short distance

past

the crosswalk. Witnesses interviewed

by

MTPD

corroborated

the victim

crossing Hiawatha A

venue

outside of the marked

crosswalk

and in th . midst

of conflicting traffic.

Metro

Transit

signal

department employees downloaded

the

grade crossing warning

devices at

the 46

1

h St

grade crossing

and found all

devices

were

functioning properly.

Witnesses interviewed by MTPD

also

indicated functional gates, lights, and

bells at the

crossing at

the time of the

incident.

witnesses

interviewed by MTPD indicated hearing the train

horn

immediately prior

to

the impact.

The Hennepin County Medical

Examiner

identified the victim as a 48 year old white

male

and stated immediate cause

of death as

multiple blunt

force

injuries due

to

or

as

a

consequence of, pedestrian-light rail

vehicle

collision.

Date

and time of death

was set

at

November 2I. 2007 at 2:43pm at

the

scene of the

collision. According

to

MTPD reports,

one of the witnesses stated that the victim appeared to be intoxicated and that the witness

could smell

alcohol when near the body. It is

also noted that a partial bottle

of whiskey

was found on the person of the

deceased.

However, the Medical Examiner s

report

indicates that while

Ethanol

alcohol)

was

present

in

the

blood

at

a

rate

of 0.037 gm/di,

this is

at

a

level

where there would be no presumption of impairment under Minnesota

law as it

would relate

to

driving

a

motor vehicle.

Also

that

same

report indicates

evidence of Cocaine Metabolite

in the urine screen, but not

at

a significant level.


25/152


LR V

Collision with Pedestrian

at 46 h St on November 21.

2007

Page 5

ON LUSIONS

The westbound pedestrian stepped in front

o

the northbound train despite passive

warning devices, functioning active warning devices. and

the

train horn

soundino The

pedestrian s actions appeared to be the result o inattention and carelessness.

However the train

was

unable

to stop

short

o fatal contact.

There

is no evidence that.any operating

practices o

Metro

Transit

light rail

contributed

to the

accident of November

21.

2007.


26/152

LRT

Accident Investigation Report

For the

5-24-08 Accident at Hiawatha

26

1

h

St

Page

I

INTRODUCTION

METRO

TRANSIT

SAFETY

DEPARTMENT

ACCIDENT

INVESTIGATION

REPORT

Grade Crossing Accident

at

6th St on

May 24, 2008

At 11: 12

p.m. on

Monday, May 24, 2008, a northbound

Light

Rail Vehicle LRY)

operated

by

Metro Transit struck a pedestrian at

its

grade crossing

with 26

1

h

St. in

Minneapolis,

MN.

The pedestrian \Vas transported rom the scene \.Vith serious injuries.

Service

on the

rail

line

between downtown Minneapolis

and Mall

of America

was

interrupted

for

approximately

I

hour white investigation

and

clean-up operations

were

underway.

Metro

Transit

began

operating the Hiawatha

Light

Rail

line

in

revenue service

on

June

26, 2004.

INVESTIGATION

METHODOLOGY

The Safety Department

is

responsible to conduct

an

investigation of rail accidents and

relies heavily

on the

expertise of

law

enforcement and emergency services personnel,

rail

operations

and

maintenance

staff, as well as its own

experience. This report

is

formulated

on

observations at the crash scene, interviews

with

appropriate personnel,

review of other agency and internal reports,

and

follow-up analysis. The involved

agencies, personnel,

and

applicable reports

are

summarized

below.

Metro

Transit Police Department

MTPD) was

on

the

scene

and

conducted

an

investigation of

the

accident, including interviews with

the

train

operator and collection

of

witness data. Evidence collected

was

documented. Additionally, responding officers

completed reports and submitted them with

the

required vehicle accident report. The

MTPD Accident Reconstruction Specialist

issued

a Collision Reconstruction

Report.

Minneapolis Police Department responded, as one

of their

patrol cars was at the

adjacent

intersection

of Hiawatha Ave. and 26

1

h St. at the

time of

the

collision.

Minneapolis

Fire

Department and Hennepin County Medical Center

EMS personnel

responded

to

the

initial call

to aid

the

victim.

Metro

Transit staff was present at

the

accident scene representing transportation, risk

management. media relations. and safety.

Immediately after the accident, signal department personnel downloaded the

26

1

h t

Highway Crossing Appliance

and

the

Franklin

VPl. which are the

controlling

units

that

would

activate, control, and report

the

activities

of the

grade crossing equipment at

the

26

1

h St.

crossing.

The

results

of these tests and reports were shared with the safety

Pg.

1

of

4


27/152

LIU

Accident Investigation Report

For the 5-24-08 Accident

at

Hiawatha &

6th

St

Page

department and summarized. indicating that the crossing functioned properly and as

designed prior

to

the

passage

of

he

train.

The train was returned to the O&M Facility and secured and the LRV event recorder was

downloaded. This device records train speed. master controller position (the position

of

the throttle/brake controller, which controls train acceleration and braking), braking

perfbnnance, and other related infonnation. This downloaded infonilation

for

the period


t

the collision was subsequently provided to the

safety department for review.

The

responding supervisor from licld operations prepared a written report of his activities

and observations at

the

crash site. The safety department reviewed

the

required

Metro

Transit vehicle accident report with the Operator. Supporting documentation is on file

with

the Rail

Safety Officer.

Metro Transit Police downloaded the onboard video recorders on

the

LRV and reviewed

the contents; along with the

list of

on-board witnesses with Risk Management.

DISCUSSION OF EVENTS ND N LYSES

Hiawatha Line Operating haracteristics

Metro Transit's Hiawatha Light rail

line

currently operates from Warehouse station in

downtown Minneapolis to the Mall of America station. a distance

of

approximately 12

miles. Operations are governed by

the

Metro Transit Rules for Light Rail (Fourth

Edition-July 2006).

The

line section that includes the 26

1


is

operated under ABS rules and current

of

tramc, wherein trains operate

by

signal

indication, southward

on

main

track 2 (MT2)

and

northward

on

(MT

I).

The

26th

Street grade crossing is located at Milepost (MP)

HlA

2.76, measured from

the

north

end of

the Hiawatha corridor at

MP

HlA 0.3 at Warehouse station. The northbound

approach trackage comes off a lel1 side curve approximately 0.125 miles south

of

he

crossing and

is

downgrade

to

the crossing itself. entering another very gentle le l

side

curve immediately north of

the

crossing. The 26th St. grade crossing is protected by

automatic crossing warning devices consisting of crossbucks with bells. flashers and gate

arms

on the westbound and eastbound

lanes

and has Second Train'' signs that light up

when

multiple trains are approaching the crossing. The crosswalks each have a yellow

painted stripe across the

walk in

line with

the crossing gate am1 (or second train sign

on

the side opposite)

and

a solid yellow

line

painted across the tracks parallel

to

the sidewalk

at the point

it

meets the ballast. There is a conventional octagonal STOP'' sign at each

of

the

sidewalk crossings. Metro Transit rules require all trains approaching

this

grade

crossing to sound two blasts

of

the horn as

an

additional warning.

Train

speed in the affected area

is MPH

on northbound approach to the

26th

St. grade

crossing, increasing from 3SMPH at a point approximately 0.1

miles

south

of

he

Pg. 2 of


28/152

LRT Accident Investigation Report

FQr

the 5-24-08 Accident at Hiawatha 26

1

h

St

Page

3

crossing near

the

bottom of the

Lake

Street overpass.

These

speed limits and restrictions

are

prescribed

by

rule and

posted

speed

limit signs

on

the right

o

way

(ROW).

acts

Surrounding

the

ccident and Initial Response

On the evening o Monday, May 24, 2008, the weather

was

dark and it had

rained.

Immediately preceding the grade crossing collision,

the

involved train was operating

northbound with

the

LR V 112 leading

its

consist on MT l.

As the operator approached the 26th

St.

grade crossing, he sounded the required 2 horn

blasts approaching the crossing

and noticed two

bicyclists

and a

pedestrian approaching

the

eastbound crossing gate on the southwest comer o the crossing. The interview

revealed

that

the train operator continued sounding

the

horn blast as

one o

the bicycles

crossed

in

front o the train. but the remaining bicycle and pedestrian appeared

to

be

stopping. As

the

train was occupying the crossing,

the

pedestrian darted toward the train

and

ran

into

the

operator s left (west) side

o he

train.

The

train operator immediately

placed the master controller into

full

service brake to stop the train. The body of

the

victim

came to

rest

between main track

I

and

2

in

the

roadway.

The emergency was reported immediately to the

RCC, who

contacted the Transit Control

Center (TCC)

for

MTPD and

EMS

response,

the

Transit Supervisor on duty

for

response,

Signal Department

for

response, as

well

as other Metro Transit staff , as appropriate,

The victim was

removed

from

the

right-of~way and transported

to

the

hospital.

Subsequent to all involved parties completing their necessary investigations at the site,

the

train was

released and

train

movement through

the

area

was

resumed.

nalysis of

the

facts


at

11:

12 pm on

Saturday, May 24, 2008, when a 20 year old male

pedestrian apparently

ignQred

the warning devices

and

stepped

into

the

side of

the

approaching train

at

the grade crossing

o

the Hiawatha Light

Rail

line and

6th St.

By

the testimony of

the

operator,

the

individual

was

one of three individuals (two

on

bicycles

in

addition

to

the pedestrian) observed

approaching the crossing on the pedestriim

sidewalk at the southwest quadrant o the crossing.

One

of the bicycles crossed in front

Pg, 3 of 4


29/152

LRT

Accidenl Investigation

Report

For the 5-24-08

Accident at Hiawatha &

26

1

h St

Page4

)f the train, while

the

remaining

two

individuals appeared

to

stop.

The

operator

continued

to

sound

the horn for

a longer period

than usual

and

as

he

occupied

the

intersection, the pedestrian

ran into the

west

side of the

train at the front comer

and was

struck at a speed of approximately 54.7 MPH. The

train

operator immediately placed the

master controller

into

full service brake.

The pedestrian

was

transported

to

Hennepin County medical Center

for

treatment of

serious injuries. The accompanying bicyclists

both

minors) were interviewed by

responding police officers

and

indicated that they had been drinking

with the victim

prior

to the collision.

According to information from MTPD. toxicology reports indicated the victim is

blood

alcohol content of 0.24 l, over 3 times

the

legal

limit for an oper tor

of a motor vehicle.

This would have indicated severe ,· impaired judgment at the time of

he

accident.

Witnesses at the scene (including a motorist and

two

Minneapolis

Police

Officers located

in vehicles at

the

adjacent intersection) and review of available

on

board and adjacent

video, corroborated by signal department downloads o

he

applicable

grade

crossing and

VPI appliances, indicated

that

all crossing appliances were operating properly

and

fully

functional

at

the time of the accident.

The download of

the

LRV on-board event recorder indicates that the train was

accelerating and had

reached

54.7 MPH at the point

of impact.

at which

time

the train

operator applied

the ··Full

Service Brake"

with the

master controller. All vehicle

propulsion

and

brake systems were functioning properly. The maximum authorized

speed for northbound trains

at

this location

is

MPH.

Post

accident drug

and

alcohol tests of the

train

operator

preliminaty police report

was

received

from MTPD

at\er

the

accident. and

the final

collision reconstruction report was received

on

July 31, 2008.

ON LUSIONS

The pedestrian

failed to

heed the operating warning devices at the 26

1

h St. grade crossing

and for

unknown reasons stepped

into

the side

of the

approaching train.

It is

presumed

that the pedestrian's high level of intoxication contributed to the collision. The train

operator

was

operating his train within

the

parameters of rule and timetable instructions

and reacled

promptly,

but had

no chance to

avoid

impacting the pedestrian at the

crossing, resulting

in

the

impact.

There is no evidence that

any

operating practices of Metro Transit light rail contributed to

the accident ofMay 24. 2008.

Pg.

4 of


30/152

Minnesota

Rail

Oversight Program Accident Incident Checklist

Caller

Name:

J

MacQueen

ail

Safety fficer

Time and Date of notification: 6/25/08 8:00am

MN Rail

Safety

Oversight Program Representative: Lt.

Tim

Rogotzke

Location of Accident/Incident: Direction transit vehicle was traveling:,SB

@38th

St.

station -

north

crosswalk

Transit

Vehicles

Involved (Vehicle Number): l04/122

Date and Time of Accident/Incident: 6/11/0815:27 hours

Number

of

Injuries, (number requiring medical treatment away from the scene):

Other

Vehicles

Involved:

Type of Incident (collision, derailment, bomb threat, assault, Etc. : collision

Number of Fatalities:

Which

Agencies are

investigating?

MTPD: MT Rail

Operations Safety

Estimated Property Damage if available):

Incident Description: Pedestrian walked in front oftrain@north crosswalk from

bus

loading area toward platform and was brushed aside by train no injury)

Any Preliminary Cause: Ignored train horn and audible/visible active warning devices


31/152

RAIL ACCIDENT FINAL REPORT

Basic Information

o

the Collision

Date Time: Sep. 6, 200910:36pm Location: MP IBA 3.6 South

of

3 nd St.)

Accident Description: Southbound train struck trespasser on

main

track 2

LRV: 123

(

116)

Op e r a t o r

ther Vehicle: None

Facts Surroundin the Collision

SB train struck male trespasser south

of

32nd Street grade crossing. Dark at time of

accident

and

trespasser dressed in

dark

clothing. The trespasser was transported

for treatment

of

injuries. There was a service interruption of I l 2

hours,

with bus

bridge instituted immediately.

Prelimina

Review of

front

facing camera indicated person squatting

on

west

rail

a roximatel ·ust over two catenarv oles south

of

3 °d

St.

Train operator stated

Trespasser was transporte for

treatment

of

injuries. There was

evidence of

emergency

brake

application

sand

and rail abrasion) found on both rails.

Final Accident Report

LR V 123 vs. Ped Accident

of

Sept. 6, 2009

lssued September 9. 2009

Page I of


32/152

Investi ation Follow u and Actions Taken

MTPD and Rail Safety/Rail Operations investigated the accident.

Operator completed required reports,

was

interviewed b MTPD and Rail

Safety/Operations Management

1

MTPD

and Safety Department obtained copies

o

LRV event recorder download

and front facing camera download.

MTPD

requested download o

32°d

St grade crossing appliances, however, Safety

IDepartment

did

not require same, as it

was

a trespasser incident not occurring at or

· involving a grade crossing.

Safety Department notified SSOA

via

e-mail

and

reported NTD incident.

The

LRV

event recorder indicated a speed o 40 3 MPH (less than the 45 MPH

track speed limit)

at the

time

of

emergency brake application (also confinned

by

the event recorder),

and the

train stopped in

8 3

seconds (which

is

consistent

with

the markings observed on the rail at the site

and

the brak ino table rovided b

Knorr brake.)

camera supports the operator s statement.

As the accident occurred at other than a public grade crossing and significant

evidence to conclude

the

investigation

is

available

to the

Safety

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Metro Transit LRT Accident Reports

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