1ncThe 1ac’s model of politics parliamentary deliberation precludes radical political possibilitiesPrecaido 13 [Interview between Ricky Tucker and Beatriz Preciado, professor of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, “Pharmacopornography: An Interview with Beatriz Preciado,” December 4, 2013, The Paris Review]

We don’t have to be afraid of questioning democracy, but I’m also very interested in disability, nonfunctional bodies, other forms of functionality and cognitive experiences. Democracy and the model of democracy is still too much about able bodies , masculine able bodies that have

control over the body and the individual’s choices, and have dialogues and communications in a type of parliament . We have to imagine politics that go beyond the parliament , otherwise how are we going to imagine politics with nonhumans, or the planet? I am interested in the model of the body as subjectivity that is working within democracy, and then goes beyond that.

Also, the global situation that we are in requires a revolution . There is no other option . We

must manage to actually create some political alliance of minority bodies, to create a

revolution together. Otherwise these necropolitical techniques will take the planet over . In this sense, I have a very utopian way of think ing, of rethinking new technologies of

government and the body, creating new regimes of knowledge . The domain of politics has to

be taken over by artists . Politics and philosophy both are our domains . The problem is that

they have been expropriated and taken by other entities for the production of capital or just

for the sake of power itself . That’s the definition of revolution , when the political

domain becomes art . We desperately need it .

Training students to “speak the language of power” teaches mediocrity and complacency – instead educators should strive to disrupt normal patterns of thought and frustrate standards of reasonableness. Endorsing models of mediocrity to the next generation of legal bureaucrats guarantees extremely violent decision-makingSchlag 9 [Pierre, Byron R. White Professor of Law and Former Associate Dean for Research, University of Colorado Law School, “ESSAY AND RESPONSE: Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of the Art),” March, 2009, Georgetown Law Journal, 97 Geo. L.J. 803]

In terms of social organization then, there may be something to be said for creating a professional corps (lawyers) whose modes of communication are widely shared and relatively standardized. Notice that if this is the objective, then the only place where that sort of standardized communication can be widely shared is somewhere close to the middle of the bell curve. Both intellectual sloth and intellectual excellence are, by definition, aberrant and thus detract from our efforts at standardization.

Thus, training for mediocrity does serve a social function (within limits, of course). Mediocrity is not the only aim here. One would like this mediocrity to be the best it can be. We would like legal professionals

to share a language and a mode of thought and, at the same time, for that language and mode of thought to be

as perspicuous and intelligent as possible. Given the omnipresence of the bell curve, these desiderata are obviously in tension. The economists would likely talk about achieving "the optimal degree" of intelligence and mediocrity at the margin, but my sense is this will only get us so far.

For law professors, the tension is bound to be somewhat frustrating. What many law professors would like--because many of them are intellectually inclined--is to bring intelligence to bear within legal discourse. This is bound to be a somewhat frustrating venture.

Legal discourse is not designed to produce intelligence and , frankly, the materials and the discourse can only bear so much.

Good judgment , groundedness, reasonableness--any of these virtues is often enough to snuff out real thinking . Indeed, whatever appeal good judgment, groundedness, and reasonableness may have for a judge or a

lawyer (and I am prepared to say the appeal is considerable), such virtues are not particularly helpful to intellectual achievement . On the contrary, intellectual achievement requires the abandonment of received

understandings. In fact, I would go so far as to say that intellectual vitality (at least in the context of a discipline like law)

[*829] requires some degree of defamiliarization , some reach for the exotic . The thing is, those sorts of efforts are not going to get very far if they constantly have to answer to good judgment, groundedness, reasonableness, and the like.

And at this point, I would like to flip the argument made earlier in the paper. Here, I would like us to think of appeals to good judgment, groundedness, and reasonableness in legal thought as appeals to mediocrity.

Making people see things involves things far different from good judgment, groundedness, or reasonableness. It involves a kind of artistry -- a reorientation of the gaze , a disruption of

complacency , a sabotage of habitual forms of thought , a derailing of cognitive defaults . This is part of what a really good education is about. Constant obeisance to

good judgment or groundedness or reasonableness, by contrast, will systematically frustrate such efforts . n57 This is all rather vexing. Legal academics--with aspirations to intellectual excellence--are thus destined to play out the myth of Sisyphus. The main difference, of course, is that Sisyphus had a real rock to push up a real hill. The law professors' rock and hill, by contrast are symbolic--

imaginative constructions of their own making. Arguably, pushing a symbolic rock up a symbolic hill is substantially easier than doing it for real. At the very least, it is easier to fake it and to claim success. At the same time, though, the symbolic nature of the exercise perhaps makes it more transparently pointless. As

between these two points, there is a certain dissonance. On the one hand, we are dealing with pushing rocks up hills--and that is surely hard work. On the other hand, the rocks and hills are of our own imagination--so it should be easy. This is very confusing. n58 My best guess (and I offer this only as a preliminary hypothesis) is that the dissonance here might yield a certain degree of neurosis. n59

Still the question pops up again: "So what?" So what--so you have maybe seven thousand-something law professors in the nation and you know, maybe ninety-six percent are engaged in a kind of

vaguely neurotic scholarship. So what? Maybe it's borderline tragic. Maybe, these people could have done so much better. None of this, by the way, is clearly established. But let's just assume, it's true.

Who cares? Seven thousand people--that's not a lot of people. Plus, it's hard to feel for them. I know that

nearly all of them would be us (but still). It's an extraordinarily privileged life. So why care about this?

Here's why. The thing about legal scholarship is that it plays--through the mediation of the professorial mind--an important role in shaping the ways , the [*830] forms, in which law students think with and about law . n60 If they are taught to think in essentially mediocre ways, they will reproduce those ways of thinking as they practice law and politics . If they are incurious, if they are lacking in political and legal imagination , if they are simply repeating the standard moves (even if with impressive

virtuosity) they will, as a group, be wielding power in essentially mediocre ways. And the thing is: when mediocrity is endowed with power, it yields violence. And when mediocrity is endowed with great power , it yields massive violence . n61

All of which is to say that in making the negotiation between the imprinting of standard forms of legal thought and the imparting of an imaginative intelligence, we err too much on the side of the former. (Purely my subjective call here--but so is everybody else's.) Another way to put it is that while there is something to be said for the standardization point made earlier, generally, standardization is overdone. n62

The alternative is to throw legal thought into a lake – any other legal orientation folds in upon itself Schlag 9 [Pierre, Byron R. White Professor of Law and Former Associate Dean for Research, University of Colorado Law School, “Law and Philosophy in the Hyperreal”, ch. 30, On Philosophy in American Law, ed. Francis J. Mootz, Cambridge University Press, Mar 23, 2009, google books, p. 263-4]

It is in this way that legal thought folds in on itself. Not so long ago, one might reasonably have believed that rightness disputes were designed and conducted to ascertain the value of the thought or the thinker. Now, however, we seem to be on the other side of an inversion. Now, both the thought and the thinker serve as occasions and vehicles for the prosecution and adjudication of rightness disputes. Combined with a furious focus on productivity and the ferocious pursuit of self-promotion, the rightness orientation leads legal thought to fold in

on itself . This fold is perhaps most easily exemplified in the rankings mania. Once it was thought that the rankings were reflective, or at least supposed to be reflective, of excellence (or the lack thereof). The rankings could be praised or criticized for their success or failure in evaluating excellence. The rankings served as a proxy for excellence. But now rankings mania has folded in on itself. What matters now is not the logic of the proxy, but the logic of self-reference. The whole point of rankings is to rank - just as the whole point of self-promotion is to self-promote and the whole point of publishing is to publish. There is no significant external end. Not long ago, this was the kind of outre claim one might expect of a French philosopher (Baudrillard 1990).Today, it’s just a banal observation . What then can we say of legal

thought? It is what it is . If this seems unduly grim, realize that this ubiquitous phrase, "it is what it is" has a wonderfully ambivalent and ironic cast. On the one hand, it implies resignation, as in "it is what it is and there's not much to be done about it ." But the phrase also implies a

certain mature reflection as in , "it is what it is and so better to focus your energies elsewhere ." CODA Be intellectually serious . Drop the received scholarly agendas .

Forget reflective equilibrium . Ditch the ideal observer . Throw your copy of "The

Concept of Law" into a lake and give "Law's Empire" to a homeless person . Also stop

worrying about helping the courts with their various legitimation needs . They don't need you. Really . They'll be just fine

. Instead , try to find the best description you can of whatever might be called the postmodern condition. May be Postman or Zengotita or Baudrillard or Lyotard, or whoever . It doesn't really matter. Rather, what matters is that you find some salient description of our contemporary intellectual-cultural condition: A description that seems credible and convincing . \Let the

condition become your mind and try to think about law from within that condition . Think

sociologically. Think normatively if you want - but do it from within that condition . Try

to leave the academic formalizations behind. Avoid rightness disputes . If necessary, leave the room . Abjure and disdain scholasticism in all its forms. Avoid tinkering. If you tinker anyway, don't call it philosophy. If you do call your tinkering philosophy, try not to publish it. Try to think from within the as yet undertheorized here and Give it a form. Give law a form. Realize that there is no glory, no virtue, and no challenge in theorizing from the exceedingly well-rehearsed formal frames of jurisprudence and legal philosophy. It's been done . And we do not have a lot to show for it. Instead try to rethink law from a position that is at least plausibly our own. Maybe it'll work for you and maybe it won't. If it does work for you, it's as close as you (and we) are likely to come to doing serious philosophy. Failing that, you can retrieve the soggy book you threw into the lake. But that should be your last, not your first option. Oh hell, it shouldn't be

an option at all: Leave the book alone. Just walk away .

1ncThe United States should establish a regional East Asian cooperative maritime security partnership modeled on the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative to establish a cooperative framework that includes, but is not limited to, disaster relief, information-sharing, crisis consultation, joint exercises and operations, measures to avoid incidents, measures to maintain sea-borne trade, resource management, anti-piracy, space cooperation, cyberspace cooperation and anti-trafficking efforts.The United States should invite all East Asian countries to join the partnership and should immediately begin cooperative efforts with any countries that agree. The United States should rule out pre-emptive strikes against targets within the People’s Republic of China. Counterplan solves the entire case – makes forces non-aggressive Gompert, 13 professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval Academy and an adjunct fellow at the RAND Corporation, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, held a number of corporate executive and senior government positions, including Senior Advisor for National Security in Iraq, Deputy to the Under Secretary of State, Special Assistant to President George H. W. Bush, and Special Assistant to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, ‘13 (David C., “Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific,” RAND)

Given technological trends, an unfavorable time-line, and the fact that the United States cannot retreat from the waters of this vital region, it

should also pursue a political alternative to head-to-head sea-power rivalry— one that engage s its regional

partners and , ideally, China itself. With the rapid expansion of sea-borne commerce and sea-based resource extraction that has accompanied globalization, the idea of collective maritime security , first championed by

Admiral Mike Mullen (in 2005, when he was Chief of Naval Operations), has gained momentum in a number of regions other than

East Asia. If the targeting and networking revolutions invalidate Mahan’s prescription for concentrated naval power, U.S. leadership in organizing cooperative maritime security in East Asia may invalidate his premise that sea power is necessarily adversarial . Even as the dominant sea power, the United States cannot provide sea control in every ocean, littoral, and choke-

point where it is needed in today’s world. Just as the United States is capitalizing on its strength at sea to mobilize and lead others toward cooperative maritime security elsewhere, it should try to do so in the Western Pacific , where the stakes are greatest.

More specifically, the United States should propose and pursue an East Asian maritime partnership, inviting to join all states that share its interest in assured access and passage . Such cooperation could be predicated on the norms that disputes should be settled nonviolently and that civilian shipping engaged in peaceful, peacetime trade should not be threatened. These norms could be buttressed by enhanced maritime information-sharing , crisis consultations , joint exercises and operations (e.g., against non-state threats), and measures to avoid incidents. Realistically, resolving the region’s complex

maritime legal disputes should not be a precondition for creating or joining the partnership; but a pledge to refrain from force in the meantime should be . Neither the United States nor China would be expected to reduce its sea-power capabilities or relinquish any of its options in the event of war. While such

undertakings would not preclude naval/anti-naval competition or conflict outright, they could reduce mistrust and mistakes of the sort that are more likely than rational forethought to trigger Sino-U.S. hostilities .

Everyone says yes – US military presence assures multilateral cooperationGompert, 13 professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval Academy and an adjunct fellow at the RAND Corporation, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, held a number of corporate executive and senior government positions, including Senior Advisor for National Security in Iraq, Deputy to the Under Secretary of State, Special Assistant to President George H. W. Bush, and Special Assistant to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, ‘13 (David C., “Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific,” RAND)

Although naval/anti-naval technology trends are unfavorable to U.S. sea power in East Asia, the improved capabilities of key states that look to the United States for leadership can be a major geo-strategic asset vis-à-vis China’s growing

power. This assumes, of course, that the United States retains their trust by maintaining its power and backing its friends in the region when China attempts to coerce them. It also assumes that the American statesmen and military leaders will be skillful enough to strengthen and expand U.S. security relationships in a way that incentivizes Chinese moderation rather than Chinese hostility. At the same time, the United States cannot fail to support and receive support from its allies and partners out of fear that China will disapprove.

Although there is a regional preference for U.S. power and tentative multilateral cooperation, the United States has no Western Pacific alliance like NATO—and no prospect for one—on which to organize a maritime alliance. China exhibits neither the revolutionary zealotry nor the expansionist drive that the Soviet Union had (in its prime) and that made NATO a requirement in Europe. Moreover, while the Soviet Union was economically and politically completely isolated from Western Europe, China is an inseparable part of East Asia—economically, culturally, and demographically. Barring a burst of Chinese aggressiveness, a U.S.-led NATO-like structure for East Asia is neither advisable

nor feasible. Nevertheless, with growing regional naval capabilities and concern about China, it might be possible for the United States to institutionalize multilateral maritime security —an East Asian maritime

partnership—involving the countries mentioned above and most others.

Generally, the United States has found that its Global Maritime Partnership Initiative has branched into regional endeavors. This comes as no surprise, given that most nations’ maritime interests are more local or regional than global. Because, again, East Asia is a virtual archipelago—with some of the world’s most important and interdependent economies spanning some of the

world’s most important seas—it could be argued that no region has a greater need for a multilateral approach to maritime security. Moreover, because the region’s main seafaring nations are prosperous and have competent navies, it is only reasonable that they should do their fair share in collectively securing waters that are at least as important to them as to the United States.

Of course, the idea of creating an East Asia maritime security partnership raises the question of its relation to China. The argument for excluding China is that its own naval and anti-naval capabilities and activities are the principal threats that would prompt its neighbors to join the United States in multilateral maritime security. By this reasoning, such a maritime security grouping would be a naval alliance against China. However, aligning the region against China could result in economic protectionism, accelerated Chinese anti-access efforts, increased risk of conflict, and diminished maritime security. Moreover, while China’s neighbors are anxious about China’s capabilities and conduct, especially at sea, it is doubtful that they would want to organize against it, with or without the United States.

The argument for including China is twofold. First, it would allay Chinese suspicion that the true goals of the United States in the region are China’s encirclement and containment . Second, with China being such an

important trading partner of all the prospective participants in such a regional grouping, its exclusion from an attempt to secure regional trade would

be anomalous and unproductive. Unlike the Soviet Union’s isolation to Europe, China is an integral part of the region and its economy. Security of regional sea-borne trade and security of sea-borne trade with China are completely entangled.

Under the right conditions, including China in a multilateral East Asian maritime partnership could have a salutary effect on security at sea, on regional security in general, and on U.S. interests. Better to bring

inside than leave outside the rising power with capacities to either improve or degrade maritime security. More generally, better to increase China’s stake in regional arrangements than to cement its isolation and cause it to become revisionist.

Assuming that China would be invited to join it, the question then arises as to what threat, if not China, would motivate the formation of the grouping. As already noted, the Mullen idea addressed both non-state threats to maritime security and dangerous or harmful sea

trafficking by states and non-states. Apart from such external threats, an East Asian maritime partnership including China would constitute a sort of collective security arrangement —one with a circumscribed purpose and scope: to provide maritime security. Generally speaking, collective security is different in kind than a security alliance in that it includes all states in a given geographic domain, whether friendly or not. It is undergirded by an understanding that all participating states will refrain from force and other aggressive conduct. Further, it is disciplined by a corresponding understanding—at least an implication— that the participants will

organize and may act against any state that violates the collective security, even if that state had acceded to the grouping. In effect, a collective security arrangement can be transformed into an alliance against any wayward participant .14

Permutation decimates counterplan solvency – allies would be scared of China – assures widespread conflict escalation, prolif, and Indonesian terrorism Gompert, 13 professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval Academy and an adjunct fellow at the RAND Corporation, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, held a number of corporate executive and senior government positions, including Senior Advisor for National Security in Iraq, Deputy to the Under Secretary of State, Special Assistant to President George H. W. Bush, and Special Assistant to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, ‘13 (David C., “Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific,” RAND)

Regional jitters due to Chinese military power have been aggravated by unease over U.S. steadfastness , especially during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. At present, the United States appears resolved to back its East Asian friends, old and new, in the face of Chinese pressures. This is clear from U.S. diplomatic opposition to Chinese attempts to bully states bordering the South China Sea and from U.S. support for South Korea in the

face of provocations by North Korea, China’s ally. Failure to stand alongside its friends would deplete U.S. influence with these important states and possibly weaken their resolve to resist intimidation. In the case of Japan and South Korea, there is an additional risk that faltering U.S. steadfastness would tempt them to acquire nuclear weapons . Overall, owing mainly to China’s economic success, the steady expansion and reorientation of its military capabilities toward the Pacific,

and signs of its growing reliance on force, East Asia may be entering a period of instability.

Under these conditions, the instinct of the United States—true to its policy since becoming a Pacific power a century ago—is to renew its commitment to regional equilibrium , to its friends (China’s neighbors), to the peaceful resolution of disputes, and to the unrestricted use of the international waters by its shipping and naval forces.7 This is a matter not just of U.S. regional strategy but of U.S. global strategy . In its latest national defense strategy, the

U.S. government has made clear that its preoccupation with the Middle East and South Asia since 2001 has been succeeded by the recognition that its global interests demand greater attention to Asia.

East Asia is a region of global importance not only economically but also in addressing international security

problems of U.S. concern around the world. Japan, Australia, and South Korea, for example, have to varying degrees

supported the United States in stabilizing the Middle East and South Asia and in countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are important in stemming the spread of violent Islamist extremism. Moreover, equilibrium and peace in East Asia are essential if the United States is to confront threats to itself and its interests elsewhere in the world, as it did in the decade following 9/11. Now, with the United States

struggling with mounting debt and domestic challenges—nagging unemployment, lagging education, and sagging infrastructure—East Asia’s stability takes on added significance.

Prolif causes extinction Stephen Cimbala, March 2008. Professor of Political Science at Penn State University. “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia,” Comparative Strategy 27.2, p 113-132.

The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of

nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War , in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another's vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India,

with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states mean s that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender . Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying

nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike-vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation . This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military

Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states , as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete .16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.

1ncMilitary Presence is troopsFlournoy & Tangredi 01 – a. Snr Advisor for Int’l Securty at CSIS, Research Prof at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense U., & b. Captain, Senior Military Fellow at INSS @ NDU – served the Joint Staff of the Secretary of the Navy

[Michèle A. Flournoy and Sam J. Tangredi, Defense Strategy Alternatives: Choosing Where to Place Emphasis and Where to Accept Risk, from QDR 2001 : Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, Ed: Michele Flournoy http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA430963&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]

6. Terms such as presence and engagement are often used rather loosely . Following a survey and analysis of existing sources, we developed or adopted specific definitions for the terms used to describe

these strategy issues. We define overseas presence as military forces permanently stationed or rotationally or

intermittently deployed overseas for the purposes of influence, engagement, reassurance, deterrence, and initial crisis

response. We define peacetime military engagement as encompassing all U.S. military activities designed to enhance constructive security relations and promote broad U.S. security interests, including

activities such as combined training and education, military-to-military interactions, security assistance , and various other programs. U.S. overseas presence forces are often also involved in conducting

peacetime military engagement activities .

VOTE NEG - A topical aff reduces troop levels – that maintains a predictable limit on the topic and fairly divides the ground.

1nc

Long term budget will likely pass because Obama and congressional leaders are committedBolton, 9/29/15 (Alexander, “Boehner, McConnell, Obama to take last stab at budget deal,” http://thehill.com/policy/finance/255378-boehner-mcconnell-obama-to-take-last-stab-at-budget-deal, article posted at 08:14 PM EDT, JMP)

Congressional Republican leaders are launching budget talks with the White House. The talks could give outgoing Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) a last chance at a big deal with President Obama. They could also clear the decks of messy issues that could challenge Sen. Mitch McConnell’s bid to hold his Senate majority in next year’s elections. Boehner on Sunday signaled his interest in getting a deal done, saying he wanted to “clean up the barn a little bit before the next guy gets here.” Yet the talks could be a real problem for House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.), who is running for Speaker and could find himself under pressure to object to any negotiations Boehner engages in with McConnell (R-Ky.), the White House and Democrats. News of the budget talks is already unnerving the same House conservatives who pushed Boehner from power. “Why the president would look to John as being able to speak on behalf of the House is, I think, a legitimate question. The man just quit. I’m not sure how much weight he continues to carry in the body,” said Rep. Mick Mulvaney (R-S.C.), an influential member of the House Freedom Caucus. “Right now, he’s the least accountable that he’s ever been to anybody. And I don’t think it would be fair to take advantage of that circumstance to pass stuff that he wouldn’t have passed before his resignation.” One of Boehner’s most strident critics, Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.), said the Speaker’s entry into budget talks merely illustrated all the problems that conservatives had with leadership. “It was never appropriate for the Speaker to anoint himself Speaker of the United States, and then go have talks with the president and the Senate,” he said. “This thing’s been upside-down the whole time I’ve been here. He goes and cuts a deal with the Senate and the president, and comes down here and asks for my voting card,” added Massie, who said he saw no reason to believe the situation would change under a Speaker McCarthy. Rep. Mike Simpson (R-Idaho), a longtime Boehner ally, said it was no surprise that the budget talks would upset the House’s right flank. “There’ll be some people that will be unhappy with it. But the reality is, we have to get a budget deal somehow,” he said, adding that “we’ve all known for six months, eight months” that negotiations would have to happen. Simpson said that he believes Boehner wants to get a broader budget deal before he departs at the end of October , to give lawmakers a chance to work out the details before December. “It’s one of the things he’s going to try to clear off the table for the next Speaker.” The House and Senate are poised to vote Wednesday on a short-term measure to prevent a shutdown on Thursday and keep the government open through Dec. 11. Even that measure is controversial in the House, and might draw many “no” votes from Republicans. Most will be watching to see how McCarthy and other candidates for leadership positions cast their ballots. GOP leaders are seeking to strike a deal that would set top-line budget numbers for the next two years . Congress also faces pressure to raise the debt ceiling, and Boehner on Tuesday didn’t rule out taking care of that issue before the end of next month. McConnell told reporters

Tuesday that he and Boehner spoke to Obama last week and expect to sit down more

formally with the administration “soon.” “We’d like to settle the top line for both years so that next year we could have a regular appropriations process. The president, Speaker Boehner and I spoke about getting started in the discussions last week and I would expect them to start very soon,” McConnell said. A White House official said McConnell and Boehner reached out to Obama on Sept. 17, the same day the president met with Democratic leaders Harry Reid (Nev.) and Nancy Pelosi (Calif.) at the White House to discuss strategy ahead of the fall negotiations. McConnell and Boehner spoke to Obama again in a follow-up call last week, according to the White House official. A Democratic leadership aide contended that during a conversation with Obama and Boehner, McConnell sought to exclude Reid and Pelosi from the talks. Both the president and the Speaker rejected the suggestion, the aide said. “Obama pushed back and said they should include everybody. Boehner pushed back, too,” the source said, noting that Boehner will need Democratic votes to get a deal passed in the House. A White House official said Tuesday that Obama stressed to McConnell and Boehner that Reid and Pelosi should be included in the budget talks . Don Stewart, McConnell’s spokesman, disputed the claim that McConnell sought to shut out Democratic leaders, noting the Democratic leadership aide “was not on the call” and “we haven’t done any readouts of the call.” A spokesman for Boehner declined to provide a readout. Democrats in the House and Senate would likely be needed to ensure passage of a measure through both chambers. McConnell and Republicans believe they can get a better deal by negotiating bilaterally with Obama, however, pointing to the successful talks between Vice President Biden and McConnell in 2012 to make the Bush income tax rates permanent for people earning under $400,000. Getting a budget deal done is likely to be a tall order given the leadership races in the House. Boehner, who surprised Washington by announcing his resignation Friday, is set to leave his position and Congress at the end of October. It’s not clear when the elections on his replacement will be held. McConnell said Tuesday he did not know how much could get done in the next month. “How much of that could come together before Speaker Boehner leaves, I have no earthly idea. But we have a number of different things that need to be addressed, and the deadline is December the 11th,” he said, referring to the expiration date of the stopgap measure Congress will pass this week. A source close to McConnell said he hopes to secure a deal to increase discretionary spending for defense and nondefense programs in exchange for reductions to mandatory spending. Republican lawmakers say McConnell and Boehner are serious about getting a deal — and that Obama

wants another accomplishment before leaving office . “ The president is concerned about his legacy and has an interest in getting the budget process back on track . It’s chaos now,” said one senior Republican senator.

Plan will be massively contentious --- there is a bipartisan consensus in favor of expanded military presenceBeauchamp, 15 (1/2/2015, Scott --- veteran and writer living in Portland, Maine. His work has appeared in The Atlantic, Bookforum and The

Baffler, “The bipartisan war consensus ; Democrats and

Republicans don’t care what you think; they want to see even more US military overreach ,” http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/1/democrats-republicanswarhawks.html, JMP)

Hawks such as Sen. John McCain and commentators such as former New York Times columnist Bill Keller and Wall Street Journal editor Bret Stephens fret about America’s growing isolationism and the potential for a de-Americanized world, in which the absence of our stabilizing presence

leads to chaos. If you share their fears, rest assured: The U.S. military

isn’t retreating to our shores. It’s already deeply entrenched in a global archipelago of virtually countless bases in at least 38 countries (PDF) around the world. And that’s just troops and bases, to say nothing of the tertiary influence of arms sales. One of the more interesting recent encroachments of our military, which has received only intermittent attention, is the growth of our troop presence in Africa. Nominally, the United States has just one active military base in Africa. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti serves as the headquarters of Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa and acts as the launch pad for drone strikes in the region. Despite the 4,000 troops stationed there, Lemonnier alone doesn’t begin to illustrate the full scope of our presence in the continent. As Nick Turse reported in Tom Dispatch, the U.S. military is involved in the affairs of more than 90 percent of African countries. A discreet mission creep in Africa has led to our government’s quietly building military infrastructure, expanding an intelligence network and training local militias. Without much fanfare or input from the public, U.S. military activity in Africa increased a whopping 217 percent from 2008 to 2013. This happened during a period supposedly defined by American isolationism and cuts to the military required by federal budget sequestration. What’s going on here? Why do elected officials give credence to the myth that U.S. military power is somehow fettered, when our troop presence looms large, even to the point of appearing

overextended? Why does there seem to be a consensus in Washington that assumes a broad, expensive and invasive U.S. military presence to be a panacea? The answer lies in distinguishing the superficial differences in foreign policy debates from the actual policies favored by both parties. The reality is that U. S. foreign policy isn’t nearly as democratic as it should be and the elites forming it tend to pretty much agree on everything . This elite consensus then gets further constrained by the insatiable budget appetites of defense bureaucracy. These are the reasons intervention is so often presented by the defense and foreign policy establishment as entirely obvious and completely inevitable. It begins with a total disregard for public opinion when defense strategy is formulated. Exempting extreme situations,

what the American people want just doesn’t matter all that much. A

hawkish consensus in Washington between Democrats and Republicans , both championing shockingly similar

interventionist ambitions, sets the terms of debate. The inertia of a bloated defense bureaucracy that protects its budget at all costs then sustains interventions. And so we find ourselves in places like Africa, which only an elite few ever want us to be in to begin with. Peter Beinart argued in The Atlantic in August that U.S. foreign policy has traditionally been a blue-blooded affair, well insulated from the vulgarities of public opinion. The gap between the opinions of the elites creating foreign policy and those of average Americans is historically large. Beinart used Hillary Clinton’s hawkishness as an example. Her key advisers are all “good poll readers,” according to Politico, keeping her tethered to the middle of the road when it comes to domestic issues. And yet she remains significantly more hawkish than the public on key hot-button issues such as Iran and Syria. But it’s not just Clinton, and it’s not just a recent occurrence. Political blogger Matthew Yglesias pointed out the divide between mass and elite opinion on foreign policy issues in 2009. He cited a Pew study that year that compares public opinions and those of the foreign policy elite, in this case represented by the positions of the Council on Foreign Relations. The divergence is striking. The American public was resolutely less eager to engage in foreign adventurism than the elites. Yglesias summed it up by writing that “it’s the very eliteness of the elite views that makes them influential out of proportion to the actual number of people who hold them.” It’s a pat solipsism that doesn’t address the quandary of asking working-class Americans to pay and die for policies they don’t have a say in creating. And it doesn’t address the fundamental unfairness of your opinions’ not mattering unless you belong to a prestigious think tank. A point that Beinart emphasized is that the larger gap in foreign policy opinion exists between the mass and the elite, not between Democrats and Republicans. So not only are the people at the top not listening to you; they pretty much already agree with one another. The bipartisan cheer that rose up around the nomination of Ashton Carter for secretary of defense was disturbing evidence of this. It is what MIT professor Barry Posen calls the “liberal hegemony” that exists among

America’s foreign policy elite. Simply put, nearly everyone in Washington agrees on a default policy of internationalist military activism . It’s why Carter, who served as secretary of defense for international security policy under Bill Clinton, was lauded by notorious neoconservative Donald Rumsfeld. Glenn Greenwald responded to a New York Times article describing Carter as “someone who may advocate a stronger use of American power” by asking, “For a country at war for 13 straight years with no end in sight, and which more or less continuously bombs multiple countries simultaneously, what would a ‘stronger use of American power’ look like?” But the point is that Carter was the safe choice for President Barack Obama precisely because he favors stronger use of

American power. It’s at least one position that everyone in

Washington can get behind . Having a liberal hegemony in Washington is great for the Pentagon budget. The recent bellyaching about a shrinking

military after the defense budget sequestration took hold in 2013, a Pentagon official admitted, was nothing more than crying wolf. The defense budget is still stupendous. It perpetually remains obscenely high, larger then the defense budgets of the next eight countries combined. Even more important, as Winslow Wheeler pointed out in The American Conservative, the defense budget is currently larger than its Cold War average in adjusted dollars — $200 billion larger, in fact. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) might be one of the wealthiest terrorist groups in the world, but the Pentagon still spends more in a single day than ISIL will make all year.

Obama’s capital is key to budget that ends sequestrationDennis, 9/9/15 (Steven, “Democrats Want Ransom to Keep Government Open (Video),” http://blogs.rollcall.com/white-house/democrats-want-ransom-keep-government-open/?dcz=%29)

The Planned Parenthood funding fight may have garnered the most headlines, but a bigger fight over the budget — prompted by an emboldened President Barack Obama — could just as easily result in a government shutdown later this fall. The tables have turned from four years

ago , when newly minted Speaker John A. Boehner was the one demanding a ransom — and getting it. The short-lived “Boehner Rule” amounted to a shakedown of Obama : Either he deliver dollar-for-dollar spending cuts for debt-limit increases or the GOP would toss the nation into the first-ever default on its obligations. Obama, facing a potential economic and political catastrophe heading into his re-election, blinked and handed Boehner north of $2 trillion in spending cuts over a decade, including nearly $1 trillion in so-called sequester spending cuts that all sides said they wanted to replace with smarter deficit cuts. Earnest on Shutdown: GOP ‘Judged by Actions’ Obama likewise blinked during the fiscal cliff deal shortly after winning re-election, giving Republicans permanent tax cut extensions for 99 percent of taxpayers — even for the heirs of billionaires — without meaningful concessions on his demands for more spending in infrastructure, research, education and the like. Since then, Obama has driven a harder bargain, vowing to never again bow to the Boehner Rule. And this year, he’s the one making ransom demands. Whereas four years ago Republicans demanded spending cuts or else, now Obama is demanding the GOP reverse some of those cuts or else. Leverage has shifted

in the direction of the short-timer in the West Wing who no longer has to worry about re-election or trying to hold onto a Senate majority by saving the hides of a handful of red-state Democrats. Obama first made his threat back when he introduced the budget, as CQ Roll Call noted at the time. He has repeated it several times since, and his aides have sent a mountain of veto threats down Pennsylvania Avenue for good measure. Senate Democrats have backed the president by filibustering Republican attempts to bring up appropriations bills without a deal for more spending. Press Secretary Josh Earnest repeated Monday the threat not to sign a bill keeping sequestration-level spending caps in place — though he noted that applied to a long-

term spending bill as opposed to the short-term measure needed by the end of the month. The only question seems to be whether Democrats will stand firm behind the president when push comes to shove. Sen. Patty Murray of Washington, who negotiated the 2013 budget deal after the government shutdown drama ended, sounded ready for battle . “ Our principle from the

start has been we are not going to allow sequester to go into effect and it has to be equal defense and non-defense and our members are really strong about it ,” she said. And she warned Republicans about pursuing a long-term bill keeping the sequester level spending in place. “The Republicans would not want to shut down our government over implementing sequestration. It is not a policy this country supports,” she said. Minority Whip Richard J. Durbin, D-Ill., likewise said Democrats were heartened by Obama taking a tougher stand . “I think the resolve of Senate Democrats is there, and has been throughout this

process and I think this resolve is strengthened by the position of the president ,” he said. “I think this president has shown repeatedly now in the closing two years of his presidency that he is going to stand up and take on the leaders on the Republican side in a different way. I think it makes a difference.”

Only a budget increase allows U.S. to prevent multiple nuclear threatsHale & O’Hanlon, 9/9/15 --- *from 2009 to 2014 he served as the comptroller and CFO at the Defense Department, AND **the Sydney Stein, Jr. chair and director of research for the 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings (Robert & Michael, “Budget Insanity: America's Self-Inflicted Defense Drama,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/budget-insanity-americas-self-inflicted-defense-drama-13795)

As Congress and the President return to town [5], Washington is sleepwalking towards another budgetary showdown that could result in sharp cuts in defense and other government spending or even another government shutdown [6]. At a time when the nation has real crises and other urgent, weighty matters to consider—from the Iran nuclear deal [7] to the fraying ceasefire in Ukraine [8] to the upcoming visit of President Xi of China [9] and climate change—we do not need a self-inflicted wound. To be sure, everyone is aware that the federal government may be headed for the brink. But few seem to think it within their power to step back. As things stand, the Budget Control Act of 2011 will sharply limit defense funding — reducing FY 2016 funding by about $34 billion compared to the President’s request, coming on top of a several years of decline in defense accounts— unless a new law is passed to soften the constraints. The law also limits non-defense spending. The Murray-Ryan compromise of 2013 has now run its course and no longer will apply to the 2016 budget year, which begins October 1. Without the added $34 billion , the D epartment o f D efense will not be able to improve military readiness and modernize adequately to produce the force it needs in a world

populated by ISIL [10], a mercurial North Korea armed with nuclear weapons [11], a Russia enamored of adventurism , an assertive Iran , a rising China , and more. Moreover, spending at the level of the budget cap may be the lesser of our problems if there is no budget

at all—at which point another government shutdown would occur. Or, we could have a year-long continuing resolution, which in Defense means funding at the same rate as in FY 2015 in some 50 separate accounts. A year-long continuing resolution , which steers the budgetary ship by its wake, is a bad fiscal strategy because it puts dollars in the wrong pots , prevents new programs from being launched or restricts their growth, and generally causes budgetary mischief . So far neither party seems willing to put politics second and the nation’s interest first with regard to solving broad budget issues. There is a forum for resolving these issues. We have a national-level election campaign now beginning [12], for the presidency and all of the House and one-third of the Senate as well as many state offices, and that is the place to argue the merits of long-term budget choices. Soon, one party or the other will have claim to at least a partial mandate. Will the nation’s top new priorities include stronger defenses, big new education initiatives, tax reform, or pursuit of a major green revolution? These and other choices are being framed by candidates, as they should be. We will know the American people’s mind soon enough. Meanwhile, the likely harm from making a mountain out of a molehill in this fall’s budgetary fight is larger than many realize. We are on the verge of repeating our mistakes from two years ago. Just at the Department of Defense, that year’s budgetary shenanigans caused numerous serious problems including: - Waste of about $400 million of taypayer dollars as 350,000 civil servants were directed not to work during the government shutdown but then were paid anyway by a Congress that tacitly acknowledged the civilian employees were not at fault; - An Army that reduced by half the brigades sent to culminating training exercises at the service’s national training centers and an Air Force that stopped flying for several months nearly one quarter of its operational squadrons. These actions resulted in a military less ready for a major national contingency than it should be, a scary outcome in such an uncertain world. If we fund defense at sequester levels next year, the specifics of the training problems would be different but no less real; - A reluctance to expand multi-year purchases of weapons, even though the multi-year approach can reduce costs by 10 percent or more. Multi-year contracts commit the Department to large out-year costs, a tough decision when budget trends are so uncertain. - Just as seriously, and underappreciated, a drop in employee morale at the Department of Defense and other federal agencies—especially among civilians who have recently suffered through back-to-back furloughs and three years of pay freezes. Another government shutdown, which would lead to yet another round of civilian furloughs, would exacerbate morale problems (with surveys already showing marked decline in morale this decade) at a time when Defense and other agencies need to recruit talented younger Americans to serve in government. The old adage says that insanity is doing the same thing a second time and expecting a different result. Why can’t we avoid marching off another budgetary cliff? We can. The solution lies in another version of the Murray-Ryan budget deal of 2013 that produced some budgetary stability for the past two years. Murray-Ryan II could plus up defense by several tens of billions and perhaps increase wartime or OCO funding (which is not subject to the budget caps) to fund more of those defense budget needs that bear at least some relation to wartime activities. Such a deal could also include some substantial increases in non-defense spending, including added funds for agencies that support national security. As with budget deals in the recent past, this one might need to offset the added defense and non-defense funding through modest cuts in lower-priority entitlements along with increases in fees or other

tax changes not involving rate hikes. Or we could let the deficit, which has declined considerably in size in recent years, temporarily grow by modest amounts. Getting started now is key. Congressional leaders and the Administration need to appoint negotiators they trust and provide broad guidance. Negotiators then need to be put in a room with locked doors. They would get unlimited pizza but no freedom until they reach a deal. Such an approach has worked during past negotiations and could work again. It’s time to order the pizza!

caseChina’s military strategy is expansionist and based on regional coercion---particularly TaiwanDan Blumenthal 14, Director of Asian Studies and a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute; and Eddie Linczer, Asian Studies Research Assistant at the American Enterprise Institute,

As China’s wealth and power increase, its influence and ambitions in the Asia-Pacific expand. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) march towards achieving regional heg emony is driven by the CCP’s paramount goal of maintaining its grip on power . That does not mean an inward turn , as many misinterpret. While Beijing faces “internal” challenges such an increasingly dynamic and wealthy populace, and a restive

empire that includes Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, keeping a grip on power requires far more:

1. Ensuring that the world remains “safe” for autocracies . At the very least it must stop any attempts by the U.S. to press for Chinese liberalization, and prevent the formation of democratic groupings in Asia;

2. Pursuing national rejuvenation . The CCP argues that it is the vanguard of the Chinese project to regain prime status atop the political hierarchy in Asia, and reverse the “century of national humiliation” that it endured. The CCP pours salt on this national wound in order to bolster its case to the Chinese public for a continued monopoly on power;

3. Continuing China’s economic growth, which now means defending China’s growing international economic interests. The PRC’s coastal areas house a large percentage of the country’s manufacturing and financial sectors. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the removal of a major threat to China’s land border, the PLA has been freed up to extend China’s southeastern maritime perimeter. The PRC wants greater maritime strategic depth, as well as an outlet into the Pacific and Indian oceans in order to protect its far-flung economic interests.

Military Strategy of the Aspiring Hegemon: Coercion and Counter-intervention

The CCP military strategy for regional hegemony has been the deployment of coercive combat

power and counter-intervention (also known as A2/AD ) capabilities in maritime East Asia.

U.S. military campaigns during the 1990s and early 2000s played a profound role in shaping the PLA’s regional security strategy. In the two Gulf wars, the U.S. military displayed its unmatched precision strike regime. The U.S. could deploy massive force to the region on its own timeline, because the U.S. military commanded the commons and American forces gained access to the states bordering Iraq through effective diplomacy.

During the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the CCP was horrified by its inability to contest the U.S.’s offshore military presence. President Clinton dispatched two aircraft carrier groups off of Taiwan’s coasts in what must have been a haunting reminder of Western powers’ 19th century gunboat diplomacy against China.

Later in 1999 Chinese military officials warily observed the U.S. launch a 78-day air campaign against Slobodan Milosevic from carriers and land-bases.

The CCP realized that, even as it carried out a long-term naval modernization plan, it also needed to develop counter-intervention capabilities to prevent the U.S. from repeating its actions in the Gulf and the Balkans off of China’s seaboard.

The PLA has created contested zones in its “near seas,” allowing it to deny the U.S. access to the parts of the commons closest to China. The PLA can now threaten the U.S’s logistical supply lines and the use of bases in Japan. It can also contest space and cyberspace. China’s military build-up includes a precision guided-missile force, undersea warfare, integrated air defense, counter-space and cyber capabilities, and bombers and aircraft that could deliver additional firepower against U.S. and allied assets.

Learning from the past two decades of U.S. wars, this military strategy is meant to exact a serious cost on U.S. military forces attempting to project power in the first island chain or the mainland. For example, in the event of conflict, carrier strike groups, the iconic symbol of U.S. power projection, could face swarms of Chinese hypersonic cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles (or what are called in the press “carrier-

killers”), and packs of diesel electric submarines. The PLA air force’s increasingly modern aircraft provides China with additional range in striking U.S. bases and carrier groups. This strategy has undermined the foundations of U.S. primacy.

China’s same “ counter-intervention” forces are also employed for a regional coercion

strategy . The CCP’s main target for possible military action remains Taiwan . Its own precision strike regime – cruise and ballistic missiles launched from land, air and sea knit together with an increasingly

sophisticated C4ISR system – could inflict the kind of pain on the island that NATO forces exacted on Serbian forces in Kosovo. The China that bemoans the gunboat diplomacy once practiced by the Western

powers is now employing the same strategy against its neighbors .

They can’t solve ASB doctrine in the Phillipines, Borneo and MalaysiaLee, ‘13 -- Michael Hintze Fellow and adjunct associate professor at the Centre for International Security Studies, Sydney University. He is also a non-resident senior scholar at the Hudson Institute in Washington DC and a director of the Kokoda Foundation in Canberra.

(Dr. John, 8-21, The Pentagon's plan for an air-sea battle with China, http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2013/8/21/china/pentagons-plan-air-sea-battle-china)

¶ Beginning from the factual premise that America is seeking to maintain its military superiority in East and Southeast Asia , the article is about whether the A ir S ea B attle concept could be effective in achieving that objective , or runs the unacceptable risk of provoking China into an escalatory response that would be an unmitigated disaster.¶ ¶ Let’s look at the major criticism of AirSea Battle.¶ ¶ The concept is designed to deter China from engaging in any major , high- intensity military action from the so-called first island chain that goes from the Kuril Islands in the Russian far east, to Japan, to Taiwan, northern Philippines, Borneo and Malaysia . Remember that AirSea Battle is precisely designed to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities. For the AirSea Battle to be successful, some argue America would have to launch extensive pre-emptive strikes against targets located in Chinese continental territory – a highly provocative act. If America does not launch pre-emptively, then the AirSea Battle logic is lost, since China has been developing A2/AD capabilities for over two decades.

Chinese A2AD capabilities preceded ASB --- removing our ASB capabilities makes Chinese increases the risk of miscalculation and Chinese aggression.Bryan McGrath, 7/15/2013. Founding Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group LLC (FBG), a consultancy specializing in Naval and national security issues, retired Naval Officer, Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute and

Assistant Director of the Hudson Center for American Seapower. “FIVE MYTHS ABOUT AIRSEA BATTLE,” War on the Rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2013/07/five-myths-about-airsea-battle/.

Myth Number 2 : Pursuing Air -Sea Battle makes war with China more likely . The logic of this myth goes like this: “China is rising as a result of its economic might, and its military improvements are designed to increase its own security. Our investments in ASB provide a destabilizing influence, one that is more likely to bring on war with China. We should be finding ways to cooperate with China on regional security in a way that does not threaten it.”

There is an internal logic to this view , but it simply doesn’t account for one significant fact: China’s buildup began long before ASB was even a gleam in the Chief of Naval Operation’s eye, and one can only view that buildup as “increasing its (China’s) own security” if one concedes that reducing U.S. power and influence in the region is a worthy concession to Chinese security. China is not interested in sharing power in the Western Pacific; it is interested in asserting it.

The obvious implication of the view that ASB makes war more likely is that if we abandoned ASB , war with China would be less likely . This is contestable and quite possibly backwards .

One of the reasons ASB was so important to pursue was the growing uneasiness of friends

and allies in the region , uneasiness born of increasing Chinese capabilities and the

aforementioned wobbliness coming out of the Pac ific Com mand at the end of the last decade. Longtime allies began to seriously question our staying power in the face of the growing perception that the PLA could

someday contest U.S. dominance in the region. Would not failure to pursue counter A2AD capabilities (and the concomitant erosion of allied confidence in our ability to provide security ) embolden the PRC in its various regional aims? Would this not create a more unstable security situation

by leaving the PRC more comfortable launching a war , confident that the U.S. would not be able to intervene? Or perhaps a “Findlandization” of the region is tolerable to the anti-ASB crowd, wherein nations pay fealty to a new hegemon and quietly bear what they must?

The danger of miscalculation is the bugbear of great power relations. A strategy of retreat or downsize only increases the odds of such miscalculation . A strategy that asserts our Pacific interests and provides the means to protect them is less likely to create miscalculation. Notice please, that I did not refer to ASB as a strategy.

ASB is primarily in the Southeast AsiaConetta, ’14 – director of the Project on Defense Alternatives

(Carl, 3-3, Asia Pivot and Air-Sea Battle: Precipitating Military Competition with China?, Defense Strategy Review Page, http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/precipitating-military-competition-with-china)

The Pentagon’s tilt toward Asia finds strong support in the US Navy, while A ir- S ea B attle enthuses the Navy and Air Force alike. ASB, and its link to US-China contention, provides a bulwark against defense budget retrenchment as well as a rallying cry for a defense industry that fears a return of Pentagon modernization spending to pre-Iraq War levels.¶ Whether or not China develops into a peer military rival, it does pose a critical challenge to America’s current defense strategy. Ever since publication of the first QDR in 1997, US strategy has premised itself

on global military primacy. All four QDR’s to date have taken primacy to be the cornerstone of American security and, thus, a vital security interest in itself. But the usefulness of this formulation has depended on the unipolar nature of global relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. That condition is now coming decisively to an end largely due to the rise of China and other big, rapidly developing nations. Both the Asia pivot and the ASB concept represent efforts to manage this emergent reality and forestall the end of the ‘American Century.’¶ Also central to the “QDR consensus” has been the notion that the United States should work to prevent the rise of unfriendly regional superpowers or, failing that, join with allies to balance against them. China has been the focus of such efforts in Asia. Its potential for becoming a regional hegemon is readily apparent. Today, China accounts for two-thirds of the total population and 55 percent of the economic strength of the 10 nations that border the Yellow, East, and South China Seas.¶ Successive US administrations have hoped that a combination of close-in military presence, engagement, and activism might convince China’s leaders to be more accommodating. At the same time, talk of China as an emergent military threat or likely competitor has been ubiquitous in America’s security policy debate (and in QDR’s after 2000.) It’s hard to find evidence that the net effect on the Chinese, if any, has been positive. Indeed, there has been unparalleled growth in Chinese defense spending and modernization efforts since 2001. Also, US-China military tensions may be contributing to rather than dissuading China’s strong and growing interest in exerting more control over its maritime perimeter.¶ Many analysts see America’s “Asia pivot,” announced in 2011, as largely a change in military priorities. Some additionally question the substance of this military shift. (The Air-Sea Battle concept is subject to similar doubts.)¶ It’s true that the pivot involves little increase in America’s military presence in Asia. But this is occurring in the context of a longer-term reduction in America’s military presence abroad and a rollback in the overall size of US armed forces to levels current in the late 1990s. Relatively speaking, Asia is being privileged.¶ The pivot is also continuing a trend toward a more flexible and distributed presence abroad, but with greater emphasis on the S outh C hina S ea and Indian Ocean . And it is giving greater emphasis to alliances and cooperation with nations along China’s trade routes south of the Tropic of Cancer . If America’s Asian interests previously centered on Korea, Japan , and Taiwan, they today more evenly mirror the contours of China .¶ In sum, the pivot is optimizing America’s military posture for Asia and for US-China competition, but doing so within the context of mild reductions in US military spending and force size. Also key to this optimization is the ASB concept.

The aff causes miscalculation and war --- only effective deterrence and leadership can make China’s rise peacefulFriedberg 11—prof at Princeton. Former fellow at the Smithsonian Institution’s Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Norwegian Nobel Institute, and Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs. Serves as Chairman of the Board of Counselors for the National Bureau of Asian Research's Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies (Aaron, China's Challenge at Sea, 9/4/11, www.nytimes.com/2011/09/05/opinion/chinas-challenge-at-sea.html?_r=0)

Unfortunately, those constraints are being imposed just as America faces a growing strategic challenge. Fueled by economic growth of nearly 10 percent a year, China has been engaged for nearly two decades in a rapid and wide-ranging military buildup. China is secretive about its intentions , and American strategists have had to focus on other concerns since 9/11. Still, the dimensions, direction and likely

implications of China’s buildup have become increasingly clear. When the cold war ended, the Pacific Ocean became, in effect, an American lake. With its air and naval forces operating through bases in friendly countries like Japan and South Korea, the United States could defend and reassure its allies, deter potential aggressors and insure safe passage for commercial shipping throughout the Western Pacific and into the Indian Ocean. Its forces could operate everywhere with impunity. But that has begun to change. In

the mid-1990s, China started to put into place the pieces of what Pentagon planners refer to as an “anti-access capability.” In other

words, rather than trying to match American power plane for plane and ship for ship, Beijing has sought more cost-effective ways to neutralize it. It has been building large numbers of relatively inexpensive but highly accurate non-nuclear ballistic missiles, as well as sea- and air-launched cruise missiles. Those weapons could destroy or disable the handful of ports and airfields from which American air and naval forces operate in the Western Pacific and sink warships whose weapons could reach the area from hundreds of

miles out to sea, including American aircraft carriers. The Chinese military has also been testing techniques for disabling American satellites and cybernetworks, and it is adding to its small arsenal of long-range nuclear missiles that can reach the United States. Although a direct confrontation seems unlikely, China appears to seek the option of dealing a knockout blow

to America’s forward forces, leaving Washington with difficult choices about how to respond. Those preparations do not mean that China wants war with the United States. To

the contrary, they seem intended mostly to overawe its neighbors while dissuading Washington from coming to their aid if there is ever a clash. Uncertain of whether they can rely on American support, and unable to match China’s power on their own, other countries may decide they must accommodate China’s wishes. In the words of the ancient military theorist Sun

Tzu, China is acquiring the means to “win without fighting” — to establish itself as Asia’s dominant power by eroding the credibility of America’s security guarantees , hollowing out its alliances and eventually easing it out of the region. If the U nited States and its Asian friends look to their own defenses and coordinate their efforts, there is no reason they can not maintain a favorable balance of power , even as China’s strength

grows. But if they fail to respond to China’s buildup, there is a danger that Beijing could miscalculate, throw its weight around and increase the risk of confrontation and even armed conflict . Indeed, China’s

recent behavior in disputes over resources and maritime boundaries with Japan and the smaller states that

ring the South China Sea suggest that this already may be starting to happen. This is a problem that cannot simply be smoothed away by dialogue. China’s military policies are not the product of a misunderstanding; they are part of a deliberate strategy that other nations must now find ways to meet. Strength deters aggression; weakness tempts it. Beijing will denounce such moves as provocative, but it is China’s actions that currently threaten to upset the stability of Asia. Many of China’s neighbors are more willing than they were in the past to ignore Beijing’s complaints, increase their

own defense spending and work more closely with one another and the United States. They are unlikely, however, to do those things unless they are convinced that America remains committed. Washington does not have to

shoulder the entire burden of preserving the Asian power balance, but it must lead.

Assessing Chinese motivation is possible and epistemologically usefulJoseph K. Clifton 11,

Claremont McKenna College “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc_theses

First, motives can be known. Mearsheimer is correct in observing that assessing motives can be difficult, but this does not mean that the task is impossible. There clearly are ways of finding out information about the goals of states and the means with which they plan to achieve them. One of the most important roles of intelligence analysts, for

example, is to determine state interests and expected behavior based on obtained information. The possibility that info rmation may be flawed should not lead to a rejection of all info rmation . People make decisions based

on less than perfect knowledge all of the time. This ability to know motives extends to future motives, because an analyst can use information such as historical trends to observe consistencies or constant evolutions of motives. Prediction of the future is necessarily less certain in its accuracy, but the prediction can still be made.104¶ Second, even if there is still some uncertainty of motives, the rational response is not to assume absolute aggression. Assuming aggressive motive in a situation of uncertainty ignites the security dilemma, which could actually decrease a state’s security. Mearsheimer calls this tragic, but it is not necessary. An illustrative example is Mearsheimer’s analysis of the German security situation were the United States to withdraw its military protection. Mearsheimer argues that it would be rational for Germany to develop nuclear weapons, since these weapons would provide a deterrent, and it would also be rational for nuclear European powers to wage a preemptive war against Germany to prevent it from developing a nuclear deterrent. 105 This scenario is not rational for either side because it ignores motives. If Germany knows that other states will attack if it were to develop nuclear weapons, then it would not be rational for it to develop nuclear weapons. And if other states know that Germany’s development of

nuclear weapons is only as a deterrent, then it would not be rational to prevent German nuclear development. The point is that the security dilemma exists because of a lack of motivational knowledge , so the proper response is to try to enhance understanding of motives, not discard motivational knowledge altogether . Misperception is

certainly a problem in international politics, but reducing misperception would allow states to better conform to defensive realist logic, which results in preferable outcomes relative to offensive realism. 106¶

Assessing motives is vital in the case of the rise of China , because mutually preferable outcomes can be achieved if China is not an aggressive power, as offensive realism would have to assume, but is actually a status quo power with

aims that have limited effect on the security of the U.S. and other potentially affected countries. I do not mean here to claim

with certainty that China is and will always be a status quo power, and policymakers likely have access to more intentional information than what is publicly known. At the very least, valuing motivational assessments empowers policymakers to act on this knowledge, which is preferable because of the possibility of reducing competition and conflict.

All lives infinitely valuable—only ethical option is maximizing number savedCummisky, 96 (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed this way—this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons ? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of one. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can . In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better .

Ethical obligations are tautological—the only coherent rubric is to maximize number of lives savedGreene 2010 – Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University (Joshua, Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”, www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf, WEA)

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise , that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions . Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't . Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization.

It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977).

Missing the Deontological PointI suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I

suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood whatKant and like-

minded deontologists are all about . Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere

objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b).This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view , as I've suggested, may be misleading . The

problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological , though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about

community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view.

In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to

distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics . (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the

difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for

persons , are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share , etc . A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains

from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process . Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational

creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests , i.e. that are impartial . This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the

real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be.What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've

attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others , you will getcharacteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological : " Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't

justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But , as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See

above), they'll make the opposite judgment , even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies

equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these

explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions . But , as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question .

Reducing existential risk by even a tiny amount outweighs every other impact. The math is conclusively on our side.Bostrom 11 — Nick Bostrom, Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute, and Director of the Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology at the University of Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the London School of Economics, 2011 (“The Concept of Existential Risk,” Draft of a Paper published on ExistentialRisk.com, Available Online at http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html, Accessed 07-04-2011)

Holding probability constant, risks become more serious as we move toward the upper-right region of figure 2. For any fixed probability, existential risks are thus more serious than other risk categories . But just how much more serious might not be intuitively obvious. One might think we could get a grip on how bad an existential catastrophe would be by considering some of the worst historical disasters we can think of—such as the two world wars, the Spanish flu pandemic, or the Holocaust—and then imagining something just a bit worse. Yet if we look

at global population statistics over time, we find that these horrible events of the past century fail to register (figure 3).

[Graphic Omitted]

Figure 3: World population over the last century. Calamities such as the Spanish flu pandemic, the two world wars, and the Holocaust scarcely register. (If one stares hard at the graph, one can perhaps just barely make out a slight temporary reduction in the rate of growth of the world population during these events.)

But even this reflection fails to bring out the seriousness of existential risk. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is not that they would show up robustly on a plot like the one in figure 3, causing a precipitous drop in world population or average quality of life. Instead, their significance lies primarily in the fact that they would destroy the future . The philosopher Derek Parfit made a similar point with the following thought experiment:

I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes:

(1) Peace .

(2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population .

(3) A nuclear war that kills 100% .

(2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater . … The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years . Civilization began only a few thousand years ago . If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the

whole of civilized human history . The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the

difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history . If we compare this

possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second . (10: 453-454)

To calculate the loss associated with an existential catastrophe, we must consider how much value would come to exist in its absence. It turns out that the ultimate potential for Earth - originating intelligent life is literally astronomical .

One gets a large number even if one confines one’s consideration to the potential for biological human beings living on Earth. If we suppose with Parfit that our planet will remain habitable for at least another billion years , and we assume that at least one billion people could live on it sustainably, then the potential exist for at least 10 18 human lives . These lives could also be

considerably better than the average contemporary human life , which is so often marred by disease, poverty, injustice , and various biological limitations that could be partly overcome through continuing technological and moral progress.

However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is 10 34 years .[10] Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1071 basic computational operations).(4)[11] If we make the less conservative assumption that future civilizations could eventually press close to the absolute bounds of known physics (using some as yet unimagined technology), we get radically higher estimates of the amount of computation and memory storage that is achievable and thus of the number of years of subjective experience that could be realized.[12]

Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates , which entirely ignore s the

possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an

existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10 18 human lives . This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percent age point is at least ten times the value of a billion human lives . The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1052 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct , we find that the expected value of

reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percent age point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives .

One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any “ordinary” good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives . And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential risk—positive or negative—is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.[13]