THINK TANK

TAORMINA FORUM

EVA

Position Paper

“Developing the Regions of Africa and Europe” Project Taormina Forum, October 6-7, 2011

By modifying migratory flows between Europe, North Africa and Sub-Saharan

Africa, the events in North Africa have brought to the fore the limits of European

politics in managing a phenomenon on a bi-continental scale.

The EU must take advantage of this situation to adopt a common migration policy

that reflects a long-term strategy capable of taking into account world economic and

demographic trends.

Proper regulation of European-African migration must occur within a win-win policy

on a bi-continental scale that provides for the strategic management of migratory

flows and places center-stage African economic development and employment.

New operational proposals must be developed, such as the creation of a European

Migration Agency which would be an outgrowth of FRONTEX.

Prepared on the basis of the results of research carried out for the Fondazione Banco di Sicilia by The

European House-Ambrosetti, in collaboration with the Comunità di Sant’Egidio.

Migration and mobility:

joint strategic

management between

Europe and Africa

1

The events currently under way in North

Africa have revolutionized the dynamics of the

migratory system between Europe and Africa,

sharpening social and political tensions.

Existing European and African migration

policies have generally shown themselves to be

inadequate: the EU’s “passive” block does not

allow for effective management of mobility,

including within the context of medium- and

long-term demographic and economic needs, and

Africa is basically unprepared to handle the

overall complexity of the phenomenon.

Adoption of a common European policy

regarding migration is the necessary strategic step

towards managing emergency situations in a

more effective manner and capitalizing on

mobility on a bi-continental level, which could

also benefit Africa.

Taking as its starting point the processes

triggered by the revolutions in North Africa, this

document will examine European-African

migratory dynamics and their strategic

implications, while proposing a new approach for

European policy and the creation of a European

Migration Agency that would represent the

evolution of the current FRONTEX agency as

the EU operational instrument for meeting these

objectives.

1. The events under way in North

Africa have revolutionized the

“Europe – North Africa – Sub-

Saharan Africa” migratory system

1. The events in North Africa have

modified the mobility dynamics along the

Europe-Africa axis, creating tensions

(particularly in Europe) and waves of

migration (particularly in Africa).

2. Since the beginning of the so called

“Arab Spring” at the end of 2010:

As of August 2011, the landings on

European shores (virtually all in Italy)

have exceeded 52,000 individuals1;

on the African side, the war in Libya

alone has caused nearly 900,000 people

to emigrate from the country2 (see figure

1).

Figure 1 – Focus on Libya: impact on intra-African

migration (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti

based on Comunità di Sant’Egidio data)

3. The flows have had an impact both up-

and downstream of the Europe –North Africa

– Sub-Saharan Africa systemic chain.

4. Downstream (in Africa) the

reorganization currently underway has

modified the regional migratory status quo,

thus opening new routes between transit and

destination countries, while initiating a

transformation in the migratory profile of the

North African region and the entire continent.

5. Upstream (on the European side), the

landings have created internal tensions in

member states, and on a EU-wide level have:

revealed the problematic areas in crisis

management, detention facilities and

repatriation procedures;

1 Source: UNHCR. 2 Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio, 2011.

2

exacerbated the cultural and political

nature of the debate in Europe on the

immigration issue, accentuating the fear

of an “African invasion”;

highlighted the contradictions in

migration policies structured around

bilateral agreements of

containment/blockage of flows;3

caused the emergence of EC tensions over

sharing the burden of the emergency,

calling into question the cornerstones of

the Schengen Treaty.4

Figure 2 – Immigrants landed in Italy as of August

2011 (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti based on

Italian Interior Ministry and UNHCR data)

6. From a historical perspective, the number

of people landing in Europe following the

so-called “Arab Spring” is lower than in

3 For example, the 2003 Spain-Morocco accords, the

agreements signed with Tunisia starting in 2000 and

Italian-Libyan relations between 2004 and 2008. The

bilateral pacts mentioned provide for controls by the

North Africa countries in exchange for economic aid

(390 million to Tunisia) and investment (5 billion

euros negotiated between Gaddafi and the Italian

government in the Italy-Libya Friendship Treaty). 4 French-Italian relations felt the effects of cross-

border pressures which were solved by the proposal to

modify the Schengen Treaty. The two countries wrote

a joint letter in which it was proposed to lower the

restrictions for adopting measures to close national

borders in the event of emergency.

emergency situations in the past.5 The

interest generated by the situation in

North Africa is more connected to the

strategic nature of the region within the

Mediterranean and African migratory

circuit, than to “quantitative”

considerations. In fact, the processes

under way have underscored the role

played by the Maghreb over the last

twenty years as a: i. bridge for immigration from Africa

towards Europe;

ii. restrictive “safety cordon” for African

migratory flows;

iii. central intersection point for intra-

African migration because of its role as

a pole of internal migration.

7. Immigration is a complex interrelational

issue between Europe, North Africa and Sub-

Saharan Africa. The emergency in North

Africa and its impact on Africa highlight the

need for Europe to comprehend (and regulate)

the interrelationships between migration,

political stability and economic growth on the

African continent. 8. The fluidity of the current situation opens

the way for a reconfiguration of the EU’s

migration policies following canons of

enhanced efficiency and transparency – as well

as the role and relationship with Africa as a co-

partner in the process.

2. African migration is primarily an

intra-continental phenomenon

with dynamics that are

differentiated and complex

9. The processes at work in North Africa

have highlighted the necessity to fully

5 For example, in the first few months of the

Balkan War, Germany alone was forced to accept

350,000 refugees in just a few months.

3

comprehend the logic behind mobility within

the continent in order to evaluate the

economic, political and social impacts on a

continental, European and international level.

10. African migrants show limited

international mobility while displaying high

rates of internal mobility; according to the

World Bank6:

migrants of African origin throughout the

world (including those both in Africa and

resident abroad) are 30.6 million and

represent 3% of the African population;

African migrants (including foreigners

resident on the continent) are 19 million,

9% of the world's migrant population.

11. Over the last twenty years, African

migration has increased, but the continent

continues to have low levels of external

immigration, except for some (often small)

countries where it is over 10%7.

12. The African continent is a “system of

regional migratory systems”:

53% of total African migrants move along

intra-continental routes (see figure 3);

if taken separately from North Africa –

the region in which 90% of migrants

choose to emigrate to other continents –

Sub-Saharan Africa is the most mobile

area on the continent (65% of Sub-

Saharan migrants move along internal

routes, compared with 59% in Europe and

55% in Asia8);

6 Estimates regarding African migration are limited by

the lack of a precise, continent-wide data base. The

figures in this section have been taken from the World

Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix 2011. 7 Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, the Seychelles, Sao

Tome and Principe, Lesotho and Mali. Source: Ratha,

D. et al.(2011), Leveraging Migration for Africa, World

Bank. 8 Source: World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix

2011.

90% of migrants in West Africa migrate

towards neighboring countries and the

same is true for 65% of migrants in

Southern Africa and 50% of those in

Central Africa; lower, but still significant

percentages were recorded for East Africa

(46.6%) and North Africa (20.6%).9

Figure 3 - Intra-African migration (Source: The

European House-Ambrosetti based on World Bank data,

2010)

13. The phenomenon of intra-African

migration is constantly changing. The routes

change, following in the wake of continental

economic growth and conflicts in progress.

Internal instability and differences in growth

between countries constitute the two main

driving forces of mobility on the continent. 14. There exist traditional “hubs” for

continental migration: Libya, Nigeria, Ivory

Coast,10 Tanzania and South Africa.11

Alongside these, other countries are emerging

that are becoming new reception points:

9 Source: Shimeles, A. (2010) Migration Patterns,

Trends and Policy Issues in Africa, African

Development Bank Group, Working Paper no.119,

December 2010. 10 2.4 million migrants, 11.2% of the population. 11 Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio, 2011.

4

Ghana, which in just a few years has

arrived at hosting 1.8 million migrants,

7.5% of the total population (the same

percentage as Italy);

Mozambique, which from being a country

with a historically high level of emigration

to South Africa (also due to the 1976-1992

war) today attracts increasing numbers of

migrants, thanks to levels of economic

growth over 8%;12

Morocco, which, starting in the late 1990s,

has shifted from being a transit country

for migration towards Europe and one of

high emigration, is gradually becoming a

point of destination;13

Gabon, which since 2008 has been

considered one of the new internal

migration centers (as shown by the

continued landings on its shores);

Kenya, which is particularly hit by refugee

flows (350,000 according to 2010 UNHCR

estimates; with the current crisis in the

Horn of Africa, these flows are expected to

rise).

Figure 4 – Migration in West Africa (Source:

Comunità di Sant’Egidio)

15. A significant role in the African

migratory circuit is played by Sahel countries:

Niger and Mali are transit zones for Sub-

12 Referring to the period 1993-2008. 13 This phenomenon involves above all the cities of Fez

and Casablanca..

Saharan migrants going towards Morocco,

Libya and Europe.14 16. The reasons behind migration from and

within the continent are diversified and

depend on whether the push to migrate

originates with factors of

political/environmental instability or the

search for better economic conditions:

i. Refugees. In Africa there are 11 million,

about one third of the world population

of refugees; of these, 2 million fall into

the category of political refugees15 and 1

million that of environmental

refugees.16

ii. IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons).

eople forced to leave their homes for

environmental and political reasons,

but who continue to live in their native

countries. Of the 27 million IDPs in the

world, almost half live in Africa (in

Sudan alone there are nearly 2 million,

in Somalia 1.5 million and in the Ivory

Coast 320,000).17

iii. Economic migrants. There are

approximately 9 million in Africa,

motivated by the desire/necessity to

find a better economic/employment

situation.18

14 As well as being very strong areas of illegal traffic. 15 According to the UN definition, a refugee is anyone

“who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted

for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership

of a particular social group or political opinion, is

outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,

owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the

protection of the country of his former habitual

residence […].” 16 A generally-accepted definition of this type of

migrant has yet to be developed. It involves flows of

people who can no longer guarantee themselves the

means of sustenance in their home countries due to

adverse environmental factors (drought, soil erosion,

desertification, deforestation, floods and earthquakes). 17 Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio based on 2011

World Bank data. 18 For example, female workers from Morocco who

work in France earn 16 times what they would in

5

17. The destination of intra-African

migratory flows is primarily cities. By 2020,

it is estimated that 50% of the African

population will live in urban centers, with

explosive effects on social, housing,

environmental and infrastructure

sustainability. 18. Migration is also an economic

phenomenon. The remittances of African

migrants: total 40 billion dollars (at 2010 values),

contributing 4.2% to the GDP of North

Africa and 2.5% of Sub-Saharan Africa;

they are the second largest flow of funds

towards the continent after foreign direct

investment (52 billion dollars in 202019);

they are a fundamental element in the

economic support of many countries (for

example, in Lesotho, they are 30% of

GDP,20 and even in major countries such

as Senegal and Morocco, they amount to

more than 8%)21.

Figure 5 – Remittances and other sources of financing

(Source: The European House-Ambrosetti based on

World Bank Global Development Finance, 2010

database)

their own country, and the men about six times more.

The wages of immigrants from Algeria and Tunisia are

four to eight times higher. 19 Source: UNCTAD. 20 Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio based on 2011 IMF

data. 21 Ibid.

19. Migration has a two-fold aspect for Africa

(and for the world). It constitutes both a

driver for development (if backed by adequate

strategies and policies)and a source of

emergencies and deprivation of human capital

(if not managed or inadequately managed). 20. As a driver for growth, migrants:

are a stable source of income for their

home countries, making a significant

contribution in the fight against poverty;

provide support for trade and investment

in their home countries;

constitute a resource with major potential

in terms of the transfer of skills and

technology.

21. As a “crisis” factor, the effects can

destabilize entire regional areas. On an African

level, just the “brain drain” (without

considering the economic and social costs

associated with other crises), costs the

continent 4 billion dollars per year (UNDP

estimates). The phenomenon is dramatic: each year, Africa loses 20,000

professionals;22

one out of every eight African college

graduates lives in an OECD country;23

three-quarters of the 211,00024 college

students who each year choose to study

abroad do not return to their home

countries.25

22. Africa needs to reconfigure its migration

policies to regulate the entry of refugees, build

22 This diaspora of professionals makes it necessary to

seek skilled personnel outside of Africa: each year in

Africa, 100,000 foreign professionals are hired for a

total cost of 4 billion dollars. 23 6 of the 10 countries with the highest percentage of

college graduates who live abroad are African. 24 Above all France, the United States, England and

Germany. The flow towards China is growing (21,000

in 2010). 25 Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio, 2011.

6

on the positive impacts of economic migration

and minimize the negative ones.

3. Immigration from Africa into

Europe is overestimated and there

are some “myths” to be

discredited

23. The emergency in North Africa has

generated new fears and reinforced the

perception of an “African invasion”. At the

start of the uprisings in the Maghreb, the

European press hypothesized that the changes

in the region would have generated the

landing of between 500,000 and 1.5 million

people. 24. The figures regarding immigrant

communities in Europe contradict this

perception and reveal a very different

situation: in the EU27, over 50% of foreign

citizens are of European origin26, while

migrants from Africa are the 15%.27

Figure 6 – Main routes towards Europe (Source: The

European House-Ambrosetti based on World Bank data,

2010)

26 The largest immigrants communities in Europe are

Turkish (2,5 million), Romanian (over 2 million) and

Italian (1,4 million). Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio. 27 24. Europe is still the primary destination for

immigration outside of Africa, especially for North

Africans (7.3 million, 29.4% of total African

immigrants)while Sub-Saharan citizens comprise a

minority of immigrants from Africa (11% of the total

immigrant population). Source: Eurostat 2011.

25. In many European countries, even those

with a history of African immigration, the

African communities (with the exception of

some North African ones) do not constitute

the majority of the immigrant population:

In France – the most attractive country

for African immigrants (1.8 million, 35%

of total immigrants) – the Moroccan,

Algerian and Tunisian communities are

the largest, while Sub-Saharan

immigrants are only 12% of the total.

In Italy – a country that plays a key role

as the hinge between Europe and Africa –

the number of African immigrants

decreased by 13% between 1992 and 2009,

dropping from 35.1% to 20% of the total

immigrant population.

In Spain – a country where African

immigration is more recent – immigrants

from that continent are 1.2 million, but

Sub-Saharan immigrants are just slightly

over 240,000, 3.5% of total immigrants.

26. The costs and risks involved in reaching

Europe are a barrier to migratory flows from

Africa, especially the Sub-Sahara:

the journey lasts 2-3 years with many

stops along the way (especially in Sudan

and Libya);

the cost of the boat trip is between 1,000

and 2,000 euros (an amount often several

times the average annual wage);

27. estimates of the number of people who

have died or gone missing in the

Mediterranean from 1990 to the present

are 17,597.28

28 Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio

7

Figure 7– Dead and missing in the Mediterranean

(Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio, 2011)

28. African immigration to Europe primarily

involves the younger age brackets of the

population29 of middle-income countries in

African terms and with an education above

primary school level.30 This refutes yet

another commonly-held belief that migration

from Africa consists of people who are

"desperate".

4. Global demographic and economic

scenarios make it necessary to

reconfigure European and African

migration strategies

29. Global migration scenarios are in the

process of changing due to the shifting of the

world's economic center of gravity from the

West to the East and the demographic trends

currently in progress.

30. The transformation of the world's

economic balances of power will change the

poles of attraction for immigrants very

rapidly. Already in 2010, 75% of GDP growth

was produced by emerging countries. In 2015,

the emerging economies will be making a

29 The average age of African immigrants is 32.3 years,

compared with the European average age of 40.6

years. Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio 2011. 30 Source: OECD Global Migration Outlook 2011.

significant contribution to global wealth and

China alone will carry weight equivalent to

that of Europe and the United States. 31

Figure 8 – Breakdown of world GDP, comparison 1992-

2015 (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti re-

elaboration of IMF and WEF data, 2011)

31. The collapse of the birthrate and aging of

the population in Europe, North America and

Asia will push countries to compete to attract

immigrants. There will be a shortage in the

working age population (see figure 8) which

will have profound impact on the

management of the economies in developed

and emerging countries.

32. By 2050, given current trends, the deficit

of the global population of working age will be

an estimated 200 million people. Only 15% of

this will be able to be met by immigration,32

which will make it even more urgent and

difficult to rely on external employment

“reservoirs”.

31 The year in which China will overtake the GDP of

the United States is being constantly moved up. This

should take place in 2020 and there are those who say

that by 2030 the Chinese economy will wield the same

economic weight globally as the US in the 1970s. 32 Source: Shimbeles 2010.

8

Figure 9 – Percentage of the population of working age

(20-65) in the various regions of the world (Source: UN

2010)

33. This phenomenon will be felt especially in

Europe where the demographic gap of 91

million inhabitants from now to 2050 (Figure

9) will begin to be felt in 2018. In 2050, there

will be a shortfall of 48 million workers.33

Without significant migratory flows, these

trends will make sustainability of the economy

and welfare system extremely problematic.

Figure 9 – EU27 population (Source: The European

House-Ambrosetti elaboration of Eurostat data)

34. Africa will be one of the few continental

areas – together with southern Asia – where

there will be a surplus of working age

population. The so-called “African population

bomb” will mean a doubling of the population

between 14 and 65 years of age from now to

33 Source: Eurostat 2010.

2050 (669 million people will be of working

age). 35. In terms of migration, this will also have

effects on Africa. Without an acceleration in

GDP that could offer new employment

opportunities, the continent will be hit by

flows towards countries with higher growth

and African countries that are stronger

economically. This will mean negative

consequences on social stability and

accumulation of human capital by many

African countries. 36. In light of these scenarios34, Europe and

African have complementary needs:

Europe needs to attract immigrants on a

selective basis over the medium-term

(thus facing growing international

competition) and, at the same time, limit

emergency or illegal flows from Africa.

Africa needs to regulate internal and

external migratory flows, design action

models to limit the negative effects of the

brain drain and prepare action plans for

how to accommodate refugees on a

continent-wide scale.

37. The policies offered by both continents

are not coherent with the needs outlined

above. 38. The limits of the efficacy of the European

initiative can be traced to:

Inadequacy of the currently-existing

institutional framework. Migration issues

are handled by the Home Affairs

Commission from a perspective that is

largely "preventive" in terms of illegal

immigration and in strict correlation with

security and anti-terrorism policies.

34 By 2050 the African inhabitants will be 2 billion,

while the European population will represent only 7%

of world population, composed for one third of elderly

people, Africans will be young (even today the average

age is 18, against 43 in Europe). Source: UN

9

Fragmentation of the legal-administrative

systems. Despite a number of attempts

currently in progress to bring them into

line,35 the differences between national

legislative systems block any truly EU-

wide initiative regarding migration.

Limited operational tools. FRONTEX,36

the only EU-wide tool, operates on the

basis of “passive” measures of simple

border control that do not take into

consideration aspects of normal planning

and management of migratory flows.

Political differences between member states.

The intrinsically political nature of the

immigration issue and its overlap with the

social and economic policies of each state

make it difficult to act on a community-

wide basis.

39. On an African level, the problems

involving management of migratory flows are

even broader. The need for coordination

between countries is even greater given the

extent of intra-continental migratory flows.

Among the basic limitations are:

Lack of legal-institutional support on a

nationwide level. In fact, only a small

number of governments have developed

and implemented tools for regulating

flows of immigrants and refugees.

Lack of operational plans for supra-national

management. Although they promote

greater continental and regional

35 Some progress has been made (Tampere Programme

/ Hague Programme / Stockholm Programme) in terms

of harmonizing legislation regarding family

reunification, flows of skilled immigrants and

procedures regarding granting of political asylum, but

often they are directives which, for the moment, have

little operational relevance. 36 The European agency that oversees international

cooperation at foreign borders. Created in 2004,

FRONTEX is headquartered in Warsaw and is

involved in checks, patrols and monitoring of external

borders, joint repatriation operations and providing

crisis intervention groups in emergency situations.

integration, regional economic

organizations (COMESA, ECOWAS,

EEC, SACU and SADEC), as well as even

the African Union and NEPAD do not

have available trans-frontier tools and

plans to manage regular and emergency

migratory flows.

40. For both continents, the growth of Africa

and its political stabilization constitute the

strategic "recipe" for regulating (in Africa) and

controlling (in Europe) immigration from the

southern shore of the Mediterranean.

41. The limitations of European and African

policies regarding migration must lead to a

reconfiguration of the European migration

strategy that is capable of solving the

contradictions of current plans and is able -

through the inclusion of migration policies in

broader plans of bi-continental cooperation -

of creating win-win policies for the two

continents.

5. Towards a common migration

policy and a European Migration

Agency

42. Migration is a complex issue that requires

EU-wide management and governance for

long-term strategic planning.37

43. Europe must adopt a common migration

policy which, in line with the most recent

official declarations,38 is based on:

i. elaboration of a strategic approach to

relations with third party countries

regarding migration, mobility and

security;

37 For Europe, this is essential for the common market

to function correctly. 38 Source: Justice and Home Affairs Council. Brussels,

May 12, 2011, European Parliament Resolution dated

April 5, 2011.

10

ii. development of an overall migration

strategy which takes into consideration

the requirements of the domestic market,

the capacity of each state to accept

immigrants and the needs of partner

countries.

44. Elaboration of a common migration

policy conforms with the goals established by

the European Commission in 2006 and the

Lisbon Treaty39 to:

i. facilitate demographic renewal;

ii. promote employment;

iii. facilitate European productivity and

dynamism;

iv. welcome and integrate immigrants in

Europe, by also putting a brake on illegal

traffic;

v. guarantee sustainable public finances

from generation-to-generation.40

45. Specifically in terms of Europe-Africa

relations, the adoption of a common migration

policy must be aimed at managing flows on a

bi-continental level, with win-win impacts: In Europe: it will lead to defusing a

political/social “bomb”, thus satisfying

long-term strategic needs and contributing

to the relaunching of Europe-Africa

relations.

For Africa: a common European

migration policy will be linked to the

implementation of measures supporting

governments and supra-national bodies in

the creation of coordinated migration

policies.

In both continents, the new migration

policy will guarantee the activation of a

“positive mobility circle” in terms of

39 Source: COM (2006), 571 final. 40 One of the problems resulting from a shortage in the

working age population is that of being able to sustain

the current model of public spending.

human capital, economic growth and

innovation.

46. European policy regarding migration

must be supported by suitable and coherent

operational tools structured to attain the goals

outlined above. 47. Based on the principles of subsidiarity

and proportionality between member states

and the EU, FRONTEX needs to be

transformed into a European Agency for

Migration and Mobility41 which, following a

logic of “active management” and taking into

account the prerogatives of individual

European countries in this area, would have

among its main tasks:

creation of a unified entry system on a

European level42 (currently, similar

mechanisms are operative in the United

Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark,

but they function in different ways and

modes);

planning of migratory flows and

negotiation of country quotas;

calculation of European requirements by

country/business sector for the creation of

a unified waiting list (with the possibility

of indicating preferences) to meet the

41 The Agency as established by Art. 3 of the

Maastricht Treaty, would operate to the extent to

which: “the goals of its action "cannot be performed to a

sufficient extent by member states, either on a national or

regional and local level but which, due to the extent or

effects of the action in question, could be better carried out

on a Union-wide level”. 42The pioneer country in this area was Canada which

was the first to adopt this type of system in 1967. In

the United Kingdom and Denmark, the point system

entered into force in 2008 and in the Netherlands in

2009. This system assigns points to each applicant on

the basis of a series of criteria established on a national

basis and requires a minimum threshold for

admittance. Briefly, the characteristics evaluated fall

into 5 areas: level of instruction, professional and

specialist training, work history and income and

knowledge of the language of the country of

immigration.

11

demand for manpower not covered by

recruitment by name from individual

countries;43

negotiation with member countries of

annual solidarity quotas (refugees, etc.);

management, relocation and transfer of

refugees and displaced persons.44

preparation and study of “circular

migration programs”.45

48. To render the goal of managing flows on a

bi-continental scale concrete, Africa must be

actively involved and the Agency must be a

reference point and partner for Africa. From

this standpoint, there must be an organized

network of Agency offices in those areas of

maximum strategic importance, organized on

two levels: hubs in internal migration centers and

points of transit towards Europe (e.g.,

Morocco, Ghana, Kenya and

Mozambique);

info-points in the home countries of

migrants (e.g., Somalia, West Africa) to

provide potential immigrants with

information about the process for entering

European countries.46

49. Among the major benefits the Agency

offers Europe and Africa are:

43 Incoming migratory flows would be managed in

such a way as to respect the workforce needs of

member states and leaving to them the decision of how

to utilize recruitment by name. 44 This would guarantee a decrease in illegal immigrant

traffic. 45 By this is meant temporary migration programs

that meet the needs of the destination market and the

willingness of migrants to return to their home

countries. Circular migration programs are the result

of European experience. In fact, it was Germany who

first used them in the 1960s and 1970s with Italian

and Turkish workers. 46 This could help to combat the traffic of illegal

immigrants that is closely tied to the lack of

information available to aspiring African immigrants.

acting as a control room for on-going bi-

continental management of regular and

emergency flows;

increase in protection of migrants and

refugees, including through combating

illegal traffic;

create co-responsibility of the migrant’s

home country and transit country in

adopting development aid, investment,

state-building and training policies;

create a direct point-of-reference for

European companies;

promote initiatives to combat the negative

effects of the brain drain in Africa.

% IMMIGRANTS

Figure 10 – Operational structure of the European

Migration Agency: regional/local hubs

50. A common European policy for migration

and mobility with its “operational branch”

being the European Agency is a strategic step

that Europe, together with Africa, must take

to transform the migration crisis into an

opportunity for joint development and

growth, including on a cultural level.