Journal of Nigeria Studies Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2012

MIGRATION, CONFLICTS AND STATEHOOD PROBLEM IN NIGERIA: THE SELF-DETERMINATION ISSUE

By

OLAJIDE O. AKANJI (PhD)

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

REDEEMER’S UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA

akanjijide@yahoo.com

Abstract

This paper interrogates the interface between migration, conflicts and the challenges of state building in

Nigeria. Scholars of Nigerian politics have shown that the numerous political conflicts and series of

recurring subnational tensions in the country, pose a serious threat to the country’s corporate existence

and democratic survival. However, this paper contends that the issue of right to self-determination is the

major factor underpinning most of the country’s lingering protracted conflicts. This issue, the paper

argues, is the result of the patterns of migratory flow in the political history of the country, an issue

further compounded by colonialism and the country’s governing class.

Introduction

The history of the human race is that of migration and conflicts. Man, by nature, is designed to

be mobile. He moves, as the need arises, from one location to another in search of a variety of things. In

the same vein, conflict is inherent in human relationship. Whether at the interpersonal or

organizational/societal or national or international level, human interactions are laced with issues for

conflicts. In Africa, like other continents of the world, migration and conflicts have contributed to the

making and shaping of the histories of the people. This is because at different points in the political and

social histories of the African people, records revealed a large scale of in and out-migration as well as

2

different kinds of conflicts. The historic contacts with Europeans, the Arabs, the Chinese and others at

different times are all products of migration. Similarly, the various inter-ethnic civil wars, state wars of

expansion, religious conflicts, trade and commercial crises are all indices of the prevalence of conflicts

on the continent.

In recent time, Africa has witnessed many protracted and gruesome conflicts, that have sparked

off a wave of demographic movement of people both within and outside of the continent. Among these

are the protracted civil war in southern Sudan, the Liberian civil war, the Rwanda genocide, and the

crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Sierra Leonean civil war, the Nigerian civil war,

the Darfur crisis, Somalia crisis and a series of boundary clashes among many others. Several other

natural occurrences particularly famine and drought have occasioned mass displacement of people.

Alongside these, the problems of bad leadership and poverty have combined to further accelerate the

rate at which Africans migrate in droves to different parts of the continent and to other parts of the world

while at the same time increasing the frequency and potency of political, ethnic and religious conflicts in

the continent. As it were, Africa seems to account for the majority of the total global conflicts. Kofi

Annan, in his report to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) titled: ‘The causes of conflict and

the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa,’ noted that, “… 14 of the

continent’s 53 countries were afflicted by armed conflicts in 1996 alone, and over 30 wars have

occurred…since 1970, mostly within states. These accounted for more than half of all the war-related

deaths worldwide…”1 The implication of this is very grave as the ability of African states to evolve into

political nations, rather than continuing as cultural nations that colonialism configured them to be, is

being threatened. Indeed the current waves of democratization that could have ushered the states of

Africa into the orbit of political nations are seriously being undermined. A myriad of other issues have

equally emerged to compound the effort of African states at nation-building.

1 Cited in Aboagye, F.B. (2009) Confronting complex emergencies in Africa: Imperatives of a search for a new doctrine of

humanitarian ‘security’ interventions. ISS Paper 24, November. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), p.1

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Self-determination, Migration and Conflicts: a conceptual analysis

Three concepts, namely self-determination, migration and conflicts, are critical to the analysis in

this paper. The three concepts, however, suffer from a neat universal definition. The problem stems from

the myriad of perceptions of the phenomena. The concept of self-determination, for example, has

different meanings in the literature. Wehmeyer, for instance, defined self-determination in the context of

the disabled as “the attitudes and abilities necessary to make choices and decisions regarding one’s

quality of life, free from undue external influences or interference.”2 According to Nanda, the concept of

self-determination is vague, illusive and ambitious.3 The fact that the term is used in justifying claims by

a group against another creates the difficulty in finding a universal operational definition. Patrick

Thornberry however argued that self-determination “represents a collective right of peoples to determine

their own destiny.”4 Accordingly, Umozurike pointed out that “the principle [of self-determination]

recognises the right of a people to shape their future; and politically, may take the form of unitarism,

federalism, confederalism, association or any other form acceptable to the people.”5 One simple

interpretation of the concept is that it refers to the right of a people to statehood, self-government, self-

management or home rule. Also, Brookfield, writing on the types of claims specific to groups, notes that

the exercise of self-determination by groups involves a range of political models, which includes the

choice of independent statehood or some form of autonomy or associated statehood.6 Generally, under

international human rights law, self-determination is construed in three different ways.7 The first is the

right of colonial peoples to self-determination, which is how the term is used in the United Nations

Charter and in many other sources of international law.8 Thornberry, for example, remarked that, “in the

2 Wehmeyer, ‘Transition and self-determination,’ Centre for independent living: building support for transition-aged youth,

at: http://www.wnyilp.org/RRTCILM/bestpract/transsd.html. Accessed 28/10/2006 3 Ved P. Nanda ‘Re-visiting Self-determination as International Law Concept: A major challenge in the post-cold war’ in

http://www.tamilnation.org/selfdetermination/96nanda.htm, Accessed 28/10/2006 4 P Thornberry (1997) “Contemporary legal standards on minority rights” in MRG International (ed) World directory of

minorities. London: Minorities Rights Group, p. 697 5 UO Umozurike (1992) The African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal

Studies, p.10 6 FM Brookfield (1992) Treaties and Indigenous Peoples. The Robb lectures. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp 39-40

7 diDaniele Archibugi ‘A Critical Analysis of the Self-determination of Peoples’, in

http://www.tamilnation.org/selfdetermination/o2archibugi.htm. Accessed 24 October 2006 8 See for example, Article 1 (1) of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Article 20 (1) of the

African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights; Article 1(1) of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Articles

1 and 55, Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the UN Charter

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great rush to decolonization, self-determination became identified with that process and the ‘people’

with the ‘whole peoples’ of emerging States.”9

The second meaning is related to secession, and encompasses the requests of minorities, which

intend to break away from the state they belong to. The third meaning refers to certain ethnic or cultural

groups, which, although intending to continue to be part of the sovereign state they belong to, wish to

attain certain group rights. Some of the group rights recognized by international human rights

instruments, which ethnic or cultural groups may seek to attain within the sovereign state to which they

belong, are the right to development,10

right to group culture, religion and language,11

right to group

identity,12

and the right to family protection.13

These rights are distinguishable from individual rights in

the sense that they are exercised and enjoyed by individuals in community with other individuals. The

third meaning of self-determination is what is sometimes referred to as democratic or internal self-

determination14

or minority autonomy15

, while the first and the second meanings are referred to as

external self-determination.16

By international standard however, minorities, groups and indigenous and tribal people are, as a

rule, not entitled to the right of external self-determination, which is only applied to decolonization.

Minorities and groups seeking collective/group rights are only entitled to internal self-determination

rights. The exercise and enjoyment of internal self-determination rights can take different forms,

including the granting of appropriate local or autonomous administrations to minority groups within a

sovereign state, legislative recognition of minority laws and customs, guaranteed seats for minorities in

legislative and other political organs, the appointment of officials chosen by the group to either specific

positions or to a fixed percentage of general posts, among others. Essentially, internal self-determination

rights are expected to be enjoyed in a manner consistent with the principles of international law

regarding state. These principles relate to respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of States, and

9 Thornberry, op.cit

10 See Article 22(1&2) and 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights

11 See Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

12 See Article 1(2) of the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (November 1978)

13 See Article 18(1&2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights

14 Thornberry, op. cit

15 Alfredsson, G. (2000) Minority Rights: International Standards and Monitoring Procedures. Lecture delivered during the

one-day course on “The International Protection on Human Rights” Reproduced in AdzeTaku, N..(ed.) From Human Wrongs

to Human Rights Part III, Pretoria: Centre for Human Rights. p.38 16

Ibid; and Thornberry, op. cit

5

the maintenance of international peace and security.17

Therefore, the right to internal self-determination

is not envisioned under international law to lead to the disintegration of the state, but to improve the

quality of life of members of such groups.

Arguably, the concept of self-determination (in all its variants) is founded on the premise that the

peoples, groups and minorities are holders of certain fundamental rights. Reference to self-determination

is made in a number of international human rights instruments. The United Nations Charter, for

example, introduced the right of all people to self-determination into the framework of international law.

The Charter refers to the principle of self-determination in articles 1 and 55. Specifically, article 1(2) of

the Charter states:

“To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of

equal right and self-determination of peoples, and to respect for human rights and

fundamental freedoms for all without destruction as to race, sex, language or religion.”

Furthermore, articles 2 and 56 of the Charter obligate member states to implement the mandate

of articles 1 and 55. Chapters XI, XII and XIII, which address questions of non-self-governing and trust

territories, equally recognize the principle of self-determination because the provisions require member

states to give effect to the principle.

Similarly, the right to self-determination appears in Article 1 of both the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights (ICESCR). Both documents provide that;

“All people have the right of self- determination. By virtue of that right they freely

determine their political status and freely purpose their economic, social and cultural

development.”

The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights equally provides that:

“All people shall have right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and

inalienable right to self- determination.”18

The provisions of the aforementioned human rights instruments suggest that the principle of self-

determination has acquired the status of an enforceable legal right under international law.

17

Umozurike, op cit; Alfredsson, op.cit p. 43 18

Article 20 (1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights

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Consequently, states parties to the above instruments have a duty under international law to provide and

respect the self-determination rights, particularly the internal self-determination rights of their citizens.

Given the conception of self-determination in international law, as shown above, and the nature and

causes of some inter-group and intra-group conflicts in the country, as shown below, it is possible to

categorize some of the conflicts as conflicts for internal self-determination right, and the secession

attempt by the Igbo people of southeastern part of the country between 1967-1970 (the civil war years)

as the conflict for external self-determination right.

With respect to the concept of conflict, the literature reveals that the concept is a highly complex

one replete with different meanings, categories and theories of causality. Attempts to develop theoretical

explanations for conflict as a phenomenon have often involved the analysis of multiple, interactive

variables. As a result, researchers often try to employ appropriate framework to categorize the concept.

Defining conflict, Gurr, for instance, explains it as the overt coercive interactions of contending

collectivities.19

Wallensteen (cited in Hefny) explains conflict as a situation in which a minimum of two

parties strive at the same moment in time to acquire the same set of scarce resources.20

One of the most

quoted traditional definitions of conflict comes from Coser, who defines it as a struggle over values or

claims to scarce status, power, and resources, in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to

gain the desired values, but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals.21

Such conflicts, he

opined, may take place between individuals, between collectivities or between individuals and

collectivities. Jordan (cited in Otite) considers conflict as arising from a difference between two (or

more) people necessitating changes in at least one person in order for their engagement to continue and

develop, meaning that the differences cannot co-exist without some adjustment.22

Karl Marx in his sociology of conflict identified two areas of conflict. These are (i) that human

societies are wholes or systems of interrelated parts – institutions, beliefs etc, and (ii) that human

societies are always changing largely through internal contradictions and conflicts.23

In view of the

existence of classes, Marx opined that conflict is inherent in the relations between the classes due to the

19

T.R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970, p.24 20

M.A.M Hefny International Water Issues and Conflict Resolution, African Journal of International and Comparative

Law, June, vol.7, 1995, p.362 21

L.A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict. London: Collier-Macmillan, 1956, p.8 22

O. Otite. Conflicts, Their Resolution and Management. In Otite, O. and Albert, I.O. (eds) Community Conflicts in Nigeria:

Management, Resolution and Transformation,. Ibadan: Spectrum, 1999, p.5 23

T.B. Bottomore, Marxist Sociology. In D.L. Sills (ed) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York:

Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968,

7

fact that the two classes are not equal as a result of the preponderance of economic resources in the

hands of the bourgeoisie over and above the proletariat. Thus, in view of the structure of societies (class

based) in which economic resources are scarce, competition for these between groups and individuals,

Marx noted, is an open source of conflict.

Benedix on the other hand pointed out that Max Weber dealt with the legitimization of power

and how order prevails in society through its use. He situates the sole use of force in the state as a means

of commanding obedience and compliance.24

This implies that a conflict situation will be created when

a person or a group attempts to override the order of the state or when such succeeds in carrying out his

personal will by overcoming the resistance of other groups or persons and their interests in a situation of

scarcity of resources. Accordingly, Otite’s posistion that the concept of conflict is validated daily over

access to a variety of limited resources which are created and distributed within defined establishments

and locations is a valid one. This is made obvious by his description of conflict as a “dynamic and an

endemic phenomenon” and “the very essence of most formal and informal social organizations and

processes.”25

Like the first and second concepts discussed above, the literature on migration is equally replete

with evidences that the concept is not easy to define. There is however a convergence of opinions that

migration usually involves the permanent or semi-permanent change in residence which begins in an

area of origin and ends at an area of destination.26

Migration scholars also agreed as to the determinants

of the phenomenon. The determinants, which are used as the basis of theories or models of migration,

cut across a wide spectrum of social, economic, ecological and behavioral factors. While unemployment

and search for cheap labor and social and political oppression are examples of economic and social

factors respectively, droughts and desertification and individual attributes and motivations are examples

of environmental and behavioral factors of migration respectively. These factors, Barret argued, act in

such a way to push and pull migrants.27

For example, economic factors such as unemployment, may

push a migrant to seek employment elsewhere, but the destination that is chosen may be determined by

social factors, in other words the migrant may be pulled to a location by its recreational possibilities,

24

R. Benedix, Weber Max. In D.L. Sills (ed) International Encyclopedia of the social sciences.. New York: the Macmillan

and the Free Press, 1968, P.497-498. 25

Otite, op cit 26

See for example H.R. Barret, Population Geography: Conceptual Framework in Geography, Essex: Oliver and Boyd,

1993, p.138, and L.O. Stone, ‘What we know about migration within Canada’, International Migration Review, 1974, p.267 27

Barret, p.139

8

such as a golf club, or the nearness of friends and relatives.28

However, the dominance of economic

factor in migration seems to be on the increase in contemporary times. Labo, for example, contended

that “migrants tend to get attracted to areas with significant development indicators of economic

prosperity.”29

This was informed by his observation that since the beginning of large oil exports in the

early 1970s, Nigeria has been experiencing mass influx of immigrants from all over West Africa and

beyond, and that Cote D’Ivoire [during its economic boom] attracted workers from Burkina Faso and

Niger for over 30 years.

There are however many theoretical models of migration. Among these are the systems and

dependency models. The systems model views migration as a system, in which the effects of changes in

one part can have impact on the whole system. For example, Mabogunje, in explaining the phenomenon

of rural-urban migration, argued that potential migrants in the rural areas are often encouraged to

migrate by stimuli from socio-economic and physical environment, which could include land scarcity

and the attraction of the city and its opportunities, as well as the need for cash.30

He further argued that

once migration takes place, it affects both the home and host communities of the migrants. On the other

hand, the dependency model considers migration as the result of unequal development imposed by

developed countries of the world on the peripheral third world states.31

This situation, it is argued, is

maintained through the erection and perpetuation of a regime of economic dependence, where the

peripheral states depend on the core states for survival. Under this circumstance, migration becomes

inevitable from the underprivileged periphery to the privileged centers.

The strength of both systems and dependency models is that they demonstrate that migration is

part of an interlocking series of events that occur locally and internationally. More importantly, the

systems model of Mabogunje provides a theoretical explanation for the migration within the Nigerian

state by individuals and groups, who often are stimulated to migrate by the need for a better socio-

economic environment.

However, one common fact deducible in both migration and conflict literature is the wholesome

agreement on the interrelatedness of the two phenomena. It is a fact in the literature that migration can

engender conflicts and vice versa. Scholars of migration for instance concurred on the two dimensional

28

ibid 29

Labo, A. (1999) The Motivation and Integration of Immigrants in the Nigeria-Niger Border Area: a study of Magama-Jiba.

Ibadan: IFRA, p.5 30

A.K. Mabogunje, ‘System Approach to a Theory of Rural Urban Migration’, Geographical Analysis, 2 (1), 1970, p. 9 31

Labo, op.cit, p. 8

9

broad effects of migration namely: impact on the area of origin and impact on the area of destination.

Among the identified impacts on both dimensions are the economic consequences in the form of

remittances that migrants send to their families at home and the social consequences.

One of the social consequences of migration is the depopulation of the home community. With

respect to the host community, the consequences range from overpopulation, over stretching of social

amenities, increase in crime rates, cultural pollution, and increased social tension in the form of political,

ethnic and sub-ethnic conflicts. Barret for example, pointed out that when migrants stay for extended

periods they become more assertive of their economic, political, and social rights which may evoke a

reaction from the host community.32

Similarly, Mabogunje in his Systems Approach to the study of

rural-urban migration averred that once migration has taken place, adjustments occur in both the areas of

origin and destination. These adjustments, he opined, could be positive or negative as in encouraging

more flow from the area of origin or conflicts between the migrants and the host community. 33

On the

other hand, Dessaint noted that social conflict could be an immediate cause of migration. Using northern

Thailand villages, he found that though the pressure of land scarcity was an ever present factor for

population flow; social conflicts within the tribes usually trigger the movement.34

Fadayomi et al also

observed that in pre-colonial times in Nigeria, large-scale movements of communities, clans, and groups

of people were mainly the result of social conflict.35

A similar view was held by Shultz with respect to

Colombia in the 1950s and 1960s. He found a positive association between the amount of reported

violence and out–migration.36

However, though migration engenders conflict, migration alone cannot be a sufficient reason or

explanation for conflict generation. This fact is subsumed in Nnoli’s position that it is not the contact

between groups that in itself breeds inter-group conflicts but rather, the degree of competing claims

among the groups.37

This degree of competing claim can be in the form of claims to agricultural land,

political power distribution, economic resources, social amenities, and the preservation of primordial

ties, etc.

32

Ibid 33

Mabogunje, op.cit 34

Y. Dessaint, Lisu Migration in the Thai Highlands, Ethnology, 10(3), July, 1971, p 9. 35

T.O. Fadayomi et.al. Migration and Development Policies in Nigeria. In Toure, M.(ed) Migration, Development and

Urbanization Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. CODESRIA Book Series. 1990, P.52, 36

T.P Schultz, Rural-Urban Migration in Colombia. The Review of Economics and Statistics,53, May, 1971, p.157 37

O. Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978,

10

Thus, migration, as a cause of conflict can only serve as a variable and not totally sufficient on

its own to explain the incidences of conflict arising from inter-group contacts. This position is applicable

to the numerous inter-group conflicts in Nigeria, where, though the role of migration in the generation of

the conflicts cannot be denied, other issues have over the years acted as adjunct factors. Indeed,

confrontations between the groups often start only when claims and counter-claims of various kinds

emerge.

In most cases, the issues of land acquisition and land rights have more than any other thing made

migration a cause of conflict in Nigeria. The preponderance of land question or territoriality with respect

to inter-group conflicts in Nigeria and Africa makes it seems useful to want to explain the conflicts in

the country in terms of territorial imperative theory.

According to Ardrey, a territory is an area of space which an animal or group of animals defends

as an exclusive preserve. It is within such territory that the basic needs and interests of such animals are

satisfied. These needs include security of space and food, identity, prestige etc. The animal (s) therefore

defends such an area at all costs and strives to keep out those who undermine their interests and needs.38

Consequently, to Ardrey, all animals, including human beings have a sense of territoriality, and would

patrol, secure and defend the environment that make up their territory. The defending of one’s territory

encapsulates physical territory (i.e. landmass), wives, families as well as one’s nation, states and ethnic

community. These animal traits, he opines, apply to man by evolutionary inheritance.39

Accordingly, “If

we defend the title to our land or the sovereignty of our country, we do it for reasons no different, no

less innate, and no less ineradicable, than do lower animals.”40

From the foregoing, conflict therefore erupts when the claims of one party to land and territory

become incompatible with the desire of others to satisfy their own basic interests and needs within the

same territoriality. This theory aptly captures the conflicts for internal self-determination by various

groups in Nigeria, which are a response to the need to protect and safeguard their sense of territoriality.

The subsequent section of this paper will demonstrate in clear terms the nexus between conflicts and

migration in Nigeria.

38

R. Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations, London:

Collins, 1967, Pp. 2-4 39

Ibid. 40

Ibid p.5

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Migration and Conflicts in Nigeria

The political history of Nigeria is dotted with series of social conflicts. From ethnic, sub-ethnic,

religious to political conflicts, every geopolitical zone of the country has one or more troubled spots.

These conflicts are as a result of many fundamental issues. Specifically, the interplay of economic

imbalance, political injustices, ethnic chauvinism, religious intolerance, and the nature of the global

economy, may be considered as being responsible for these conflicts. It is however pertinent to state that

many of the protracted conflicts in present day Nigeria have their roots in the pre-colonial and colonial

histories of the country. Documentary records revealed that incidences of conflicts particularly

communal conflicts predate Nigeria even as a colonial state. These are evidenced in the 19th

century

internecine warfare among the Yoruba people to the southwest, the war of attrition by communities in

the deltaic areas over land and claim to resources, and the numerous wars of expansion in the Middle

Belt area especially among the Tiv, between the Tiv and the Jukun, the Nupe and the Yoruba to the

North, and also the religious wars that followed the Sokoto Jihad of 1804 and which altered the socio-

political and religious topography of present day northern Nigeria and its neighbors.

Incidentally, these conflicts continued with renewed zeal during the period of colonial rule due to

the nature of the colonial political and economic policies which neglected the specific histories of the

various groups in the country. It is not surprising therefore that at independence many of the ethnic and

sub-ethnic conflicts continued, and new ones emerged in response to the state structure bequeathed by

the colonialists. In fact, the colonially defined and determined plural nature of the Nigerian state has

been identified as a reason for the continued susceptibility of the country to political and ethnic

conflicts. For instance, Otite observed that, “Nigeria’s constitutional, political and administrative

developments have created and recreated exclusive interests of regionalism followed by those of

statism.” This he pointed out has made Nigeria to be inherently prone to conflicts arising from the clash

of diverse ethnic–cultural interests and goals, and from the political and economic necessities of

survival, as individuals and as identifiable autonomous social groups struggle for advantages.41

41

Otite, op cit p.19

12

Amuwo and Herault also noted the problem in the structure of the Nigerian state when they

remarked that “… whilst federalism has brought several nations within the Nigerian polity together,

actual federal practice has hardly been able to keep them together happily.”42

Thus, the history of the country since independence like the pre-colonial and colonial days is

replete with political, religious and communal conflicts among others to such an extent that a culture of

violence has been created or what has been succinctly referred to as “…zones of violent

confrontations.”43

Notable amongst these zones of violent confrontations are the ethnic and sub-ethnic

conflicts between the Aguleri and the Umuleri communities in southeastern part of the country, the

conflicts involving the Ife and the Modakeke people in the southwestern part of the country, the conflict

between the Chamba and the Kuteb communities, the Tiv-Jukun conflict, the conflict between the Zango

and the Kataf people (involving the Hausas and the Kataf) in the northern part of the country, and also

the conflict between the Ugep and Idomi communities in Cross-River state, the Ijaw-Itsekiri conflicts in

Delta state, and the Ogoni conflict, all in the south-south geopolitical rim of the country.

Alongside all these are many cases of religious and political conflicts. Some examples include

the 1953 Kano riots, the 1966 pogrom, the civil war between 1967 and 1970, the Maitatsine religious

violence between 1980 and 1985, the uproar generated by the annulment of the June 12 1993 elections,

the unending ‘oil war’ in the Niger Delta region among many others. To a very large extent, the problem

of conflicts in Nigeria can not be divorced from the phenomenon of migration. This is because the

accounts of many of the ethnic and sub-ethnic conflicts in the country can be linked to the pre-colonial,

colonial and/or post-colonial migratory patterns of movements of people within the country.

First, in the pre-colonial days, recorded accounts showed that many of the movements were

associated with trade, land colonization, drought, epidemics, and community conflicts. For example, the

protracted sub-ethnic conflict between the Ife and the Modakeke people in the southwest, which started

in 1849, was a product of the migration of the Modakeke people from the collapsed Old Oyo Empire to

the Ife area in central Yorubaland.44

Similarly, the age long ethnic conflict between the Tiv and the

42

K.Amuwo and G. Herault, On the Notion of Political Restructuring in Federal Systems. In K. Amuwo et.al.(eds),

Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum/ IFRA, 1998, p. 5

43 P. Dung , The Settler Question and the Emergence of Ethnic Tension and Violence in Jos, Nigeria In Albert I.O et.al (eds)

Urban Management and Urban Violence in Africa, vol. 2, Ibadan: IFRA, 1994, p.43

44

I.O. Albert Ife-Modakeke Crisis. In O.Otite and I.O.Albert (eds). Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management,

Resolution and Transformation. Ibadan: Spectrum, 1999, pp. 142-183

13

Jukun, dating back to the 1870s, revolves around the issue of which of the two groups can be considered

to be the native/indigene, and which should be regarded as the settler/migrant.45

This distinction is

significant since its determines who has prior and thus present rights to landownership, tributes, and

other statutory rights and privileges. The same can be said of all the other cases of ethnic/sub-ethnic

conflicts in the country. In the same vein, many of the religious conflicts in the pre-colonial and colonial

history of the Nigerian peoples can be linked to the migration of people across ethnic, national and

regional boundaries. For example, the 1804 Fulani Jihad, which swept through the entire northern part

of the country, was a result of the years of contacts between the Hausa-Fulani to the north of what is

now called Nigeria and the Arabs from the Middle East, whose religious teachings influenced the

general religious ideology of the Hausa.46

Principally, the Trans-Sahara trade, involving the Muslim

Arabs, the Maghrebi states and the Hausa and other ethnic nationalities of the northern rim of West

Africa, was a major channel through which Islamic scholars/teachers penetrated into the region, and

later orchestrated fundamental changes in the religion of the people of the northern part of Nigeria.47

Some of the subsequent religious crises that rocked the Nigerian State even after independence

can also be ascribed to the influences and activities of migrants from outside Nigeria. For instance, the

Maitatsine religious violence that ravaged the northern part of the country between 1980 and 1985 was

due to the influences and activities of foreign/external religious zealots.48

In the colonial days, the nature of political and community conflicts in the country was

influenced by the nature and pattern of the in and out-migrations among the various groups and peoples,

but it was also a function of the colonial policies of the British Administration. For instance, the British

acquisition of protectorate rights over the various groups in the area now referred to as Nigeria, and the

eventual amalgamation of these protectorates as well as the introduction of western social and economic

practices, increased the movement of people from one part of the country to the other.

45

G.B. Shedrack, E.I. Alamijeabee and B.S. Zainab, ‘Communal Conflicts and the Possibilities of Conflict Resolution in

Nigeria: A case study of the Tiv-Jukun Conflicts in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State’, in Community Conflicts

in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation, O.Otite and I.O.Albert (eds). Ibadan, Spectrum, 1999, pp.82-89 46

See for example, Gbadamosi T. G. O. and Ade-Ajayi J. F. “Islam and Christianity in Nigeria” in Obaro Ikime (ed.)

Groundwork of Nigerian History, Ibadan: Historical Society of Nigeria, Heinemann Books, Nigeria, 1980, 47

Ibid. See also Oyeniyi, A.B. ‘Nigeria in the Organization of Islamic Countries’ in J. Adekunle (ed) Religious Politics in

Nigeria, African World Press, 2008. 48

See Tamunon T. (1991) Peace and Violence in Nigeria. Ibadan: The Panel on Nigeria since Independence History Project,

pp. 173-185

14

Also, the influx of people from the rural areas to the emerging cities of the time was actually in

response to the nature of the colonial system, which promoted urban growth and development at the

expense of rural development. This was because the most basic infrastructures and amenities provided

were mainly in the urban areas. However, over the years and particularly since independence, the

centrality of migration in conflicts generation has been eclipsed by some other salient factors. These

include contest over land space and resources availability, competition over access to political and

economic resources, and population explosion.

Surprisingly, post-colonial government policies, like the colonial experience, have often

exacerbated tension to the point of conflict or ignited it afresh. Of particular importance are such state

policies as territorial restructuring in form of local and state government creation, revenue allocation,

quota system, and structural adjustment program (SAP), among others.

Suberu, commenting on state and local restructuring policy in Nigeria once lamented that, “it

has not satisfied ethnic demands for equity, but has created more acrimony and increasing demands.”49

Also, he highlighted four reasons for the high rate of ethnic minority discontent under the General

Ibrahim Babangida government. These are (i) the inducement and opportunity which the government’s

programs of democratic transition and economic reconstruction provided for the mobilization,

crystallization and articulation of longstanding ethnic minority grievances (ii) the accumulated

weaknesses, contradictions, inadequacies, or counter-productive consequences of some policies that

have been mounted in response to ethnic minority problems, (iii) the sectionally polarizing impact of

some decisions implemented by the military government for example, the enlistment of Nigeria in the

Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), and the arbitrary trials of ethnic minority activists implicated

in some of the ethnic or ethnoreligious disturbances in the federation, and (iv) the demonstration effects

arising from the global resurgence of ethnic nationality and sectarian movements, particularly in Eastern

Europe and the former Soviet Union.50

Furthermore, the manner in which successive governments have tinkered with the policy of

sharing federally collected revenue has been a serious cause of political and ethnic conflicts and has

even become a threat to the corporate existence of the country. The practice of sharing revenue among

the component units of Nigeria began during the colonial era, particularly between 1951 and 1954, when

49

R.T Suberu, 1991 State and Local Government Reorganizations in Nigeria, Ibadan: IFRA , 1994, p.v

50

R.T. Suberu, Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria, Ibadan: IFRA / Spectrum, 1996, pp.25-26

15

the country became a federation of three regional governments and a federal government. During the

period, the regions enjoyed a measure of fiscal autonomy. For example, the Revenue Order in Council

of the 1951 constitution granted the regions the right to, among other things, keep public revenue

derived from matters stated in the schedule to the instrument. The Order also mandated the payment to

the regions by the central government of annual grants in respect of expenses relating to education and

politics, while specifying that the central government could not interfere with revenues derived from or

specific to the regions.51

This colonial fiscal policy laid the basis for fiscal federalism in the country. It

equally allowed for the economic development of the regions, because each region had to concentrate its

attention on its area(s) of economic strength, such as cocoa in the western region, groundnut and cotton

in the northern region, and palm oil and timber in the eastern region, for survival. After independence,

the country continued with a fiscal arrangement that was based partly on the principle of derivation. As a

result, half of the revenue from the commercial exploitation of oil, for example, was appropriated by the

Eastern regional government (of which the provinces and communities of the Niger Delta were part of)

and the rest were appropriated by the federal government between 1958 and 1968.

Since 1969 however, the regional/state fiscal autonomy has changed to one of federal control. A

number of factors accounts for this change, including the military government’s decree (Decree 13) of

1969, which transferred the bulk of the revenue from oil to the federal government. Thus, as the nation’s

economy became more oil-dependent, and other sources of income became neglected, the revenue

accruing to the federal government increased significantly, while that of the states and local

governments dwindled. This created the need for an acceptable formula for distributing federally

collected revenue among the component units of the federation. However, since the Second Republic

period (1979-1983), the issue of sharing federal revenue has been problematic, owing to the fact that the

issue has been over-politicized. For instance, while the federal share of the federally collected revenue

has always been large, leaving the other two tiers of government with very little, the oil-producing areas

have often demanded that the principle of derivation, which was in place before the Decree 13 of 1969

should be a major determinant in the sharing of the federal revenue. Alongside this, the failure of the

federal government to foster equitable and appreciable socio-economic development in the country, in

spite of its huge earnings from oil, and the enormous environmental and ecological damages resulting

from oil exploration in the Niger Delta communities as well as the official highhandedness of successive

governments in the handling of demands by communities in the Niger Delta for restitutive development

51

S. Aderibigbe, Basic approach to government. Lagos: Joja, 1998, p, 339

16

have further complicated the issue of revenue allocation. As a result, this issue has always pitched the

Niger-Delta area (the major oil producing region of the country) against the Federal government on one

hand, while generating or encouraging communal hostilities among the various communities in the

region on the other hand.

Apart from the revenue sharing policy, some other government policies, particularly the

territorial restructuring and structural adjustment programs, meant to bring government closer to the

people, enhance grassroots political and socio-economic development, and the general economic well

being of the country have also been purveyors of political and ethnic conflicts. However, as shown

above, it is essentially the politicization of government policies that often undermines their

effectiveness. Benjamin (1996), commenting on the territorial restructuring policy under the military,

for example, averred that military governments in Nigeria used the policy as a way to popularize and

legitimize their illegitimate regimes.52

This is because though the creation of states and local

governments by the military was often sequel to agitations by groups demanding for more

decentralization, yet successive military regimes used it to whip up political, ethnic and sub-ethnic

discontents as exemplified by the 1996 exercise, which sparked off series of inter-group conflicts

across the country. Though the territorial restructuring exercises no doubt assuaged the feelings of

some groups, and thus engendered their support for the military, the conflicts and emotions generated

by the policy nonetheless distracted public attention from the critical problems of political instability

and national development, which better served the interest of the military governments to prolong and

perpetuate their hold on power. In fact, the tensions, emotions and conflicts that the politicization of

state policies usually generate in the country between ethnic groups, and also within ethnic groups, has

made it one of the banes of the Nigerian state. It is this (the politicization of policies), as will be shown

below, that underscores and heightens demands for self-determination right (in its external and internal

senses) in the country.

52

S.A. Benjamin , The 1996 State and Local Government Reorganizations in Nigeria, Ibadan: NISER Monograph series No

21, 1999, p.17

17

Challenge of Statehood: The Self-determination Issue

One issue that underlies most of the inter-group and intra-group conflicts in Nigeria is the issue

of self-determination, construed both in its internal and external senses. This is because, in most cases,

contending groups in the country; religious, ethnic or sub-ethnic often clashed in pursuance of their

perceived self-determination right i.e. the right, for example, according to article 1(1) of both the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), ‘of all people to freely determine their political status and freely

pursue their economic, social and cultural development.’ An analysis of some of the conflicts in the

country would reveal their self-determination undertone. However, for ease of analysis and in line with

the conception of self-determination under international law, conflicts in the country are categorized in

this paper as either conflicts for external self-determination or conflicts for internal self-determination

rights. Consequently, the inter-group and intra-group conflicts that can be linked to the quest for

territorial autonomy in the form of agitations for independent local and state government status within

the Nigerian federation; for separate and distinct identity by one group from another group; for religious

tolerance/acceptability; for political inclusion; and for development in the form of agitations for an end

to economic exploitations and environmental degradation. All these can be categorized as conflicts

underpinned by the quest for internal self-determination. On the other hand, conflicts that are related to

secession from the Nigerian federation are conflicts for external self-determination.

Conflicts for External Self-determination in Nigeria

Within the context of the conception of external self-determination, especially its second

meaning in the literature as discussed above, the 1967-1970 Civil War was a war for external self-

determination by the Igbo people of the eastern part of the country. This can be gleaned from the causes,

both remote and immediate, of the war. To a very large extent, it was the perceived marginalization,

oppression and suppression of the interests and aspirations of the Igbo by the Nigerian state which

provoked the three year war. Specifically, for the Igbos, the events preceding and immediately after the

country’s independence in 1960 were pointers to the need to assert their external self-determination

right. Among these events was the display of ethnic politics at the Western House of Assembly by

18

Yoruba politicians of the Action Group (AG) political party against Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (a political

figure of Igbo extraction) of the rival National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC) political

party in 1951. Available records revealed that while Dr. Azikiwe got elected to represent Lagos in the

Western Region’s House of Assembly in 1951 on the platform of the NCNC, his ambition to represent

the regional parliament at the Central Legislature, on the basis of the provision of the 1951 Constitution,

which allowed for a member of the regional parliament to be selected to the Central parliament, was

thwarted by the Yoruba-dominated rival political party, the Action Group.53

This display of ethnic

politics was exacerbated by other issues including the controversy surrounding the 1952/53 census,

which the Igbo, like the Yoruba, considered as not being a true reflection of the actual demographic

composition of the country, particularly as they contested the census figures ascribed to their region (the

eastern region). Along side these was the unprecedented massacre of people of eastern region extraction

(the Igbo) in the northern part of the country between May and September 1966. The massacre is known

in Nigerian history as the 1966 Pogrom. The genesis of the Pogrom was, first, the coup de tat of January

1966, which was interpreted by the northern oligarchies as being masterminded by Igbo military leaders

and targeted at northern political leaders in political power, and second, the perceived inaction or

unwillingness of the Head of the military junta that came to power after the January coup to prosecute

the perpetrators of the coup. Equally gawling to the Northern political elite was the promulgation of

Decree 34, by the Aguiyi Ironsi military government, which abolished regionalism in the country.54

During the Pogrom, a number of people of Igbo extraction were killed in northern Nigeria. Madiebo

(1980) noted that the human cost of the first phase of the Pogrom, which occurred in May 1966, was

over three thousand lives.55

The significance of these events was that they culminated in the counter-

coup of July 1966, which removed General Aguiyi Ironsi (an Igbo man from eastern Nigeria) as the

Head of State and his replacement by General Yakubu Gowon (a northerner), and the subsequent faceoff

between the General Gowon-led federal government and Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu-led military

government of the Eastern region. The inability of both the federal and eastern regional governments to

negotiate a peaceful solution to the crisis of confidence between them, despite international mediation as

evidenced by the peace meetings at Aburi, Ghana, in 1967, resulted in the civil war. In a way, the above

demonstrates that “the civil war was a clash between primordial ethnic forces and state civic structures

53

See, for example, Keay, E.A and H. Thomas, West African Government for Nigerian Students. Third Edition. London:

Hutchinson, 1986 54

see for example, O. Oyediran (ed) Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-1979, Ibadan: Macmillan

Publishers Ltd., and A.A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, Enugu: Fourth Dimension,. 1980. 55

A. A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1980, p. 42

19

that inevitably issued from the growth of regionalism.”56

The aim of the government and people of the

eastern region (otherwise called Biafra) during the war was to secede from the Nigerian federation on

the ground that their collective aspiration could no longer be met under the Nigerian state. The civil war

was one of the earliest challenges to the Nigerian state. As can be gleaned from the above, it was the

politicization of certain issues, including the military coup of January 1966 and the actions and inactions

of the military government that eventually resulted in the civil war.

Conflicts for Internal Self-determination Rights in Nigeria: selected cases

Among the conflicts for internal self-determination rights in Nigeria are the ‘oil war’ in the Niger

Delta region, the rising activities of ethnic militia groups, and a number of community conflicts. Some

of these conflicts are discussed below.

The ‘oil war’ in the Niger Delta

The ‘oil war’ in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, which started as a quiet agitation by the

people of the area in the late 1950s for social and economic development, took on the dimension of

quest for right to internal self-determination because the Nigerian state failed to look into the legitimate

demands of the people. Right from the 1957/58 agitation by the people of the region for a separate

identity within the Nigerian State, in the form of a separate region/state from the dominant Igbo

dominated eastern region, to the February 2, 1966 declaration of the Independent Republic of Niger

Delta by Isaac Adaka Boro and his colleagues, the story of conflicts in the region has become basically

that of internal self-determination. The activities of militants and activists in the area (Niger Delta),

particularly the late Ken Saro Wiwa, and many others, were simply to pressurize the Nigerian

government to correct the wrongs of many years of environmental degradation and insecurity

occasioned by years of oil exploration. It was also a demand for equitable (re)distristribution of the

nation’s wealth, the bulk of which comes from the Niger Delta. Even though the spate of violence,

56

P.P. Ekeh, Nigeria’s Emergent Political Culture. In Ekeh, P.P., Dele-Cole, P. and Olusanya, G.O. (eds) Nigeria since

Independent: The first twenty five years, vol. v, Ibadan: Heinnemman Books,1989, p. 7

20

kidnapping, hostage taking, pipeline vandalization, and general acts of terror in the region since 1999

have begun to blur the very essence of the struggle, yet it is still probable that if the factor, the internal

self-determination issue, underpinning the agitation is not properly managed, the end might not still be

in sight for the problem.

Militia groups and ethnic militancy

The emergence of ethnic militias, representing and agitating for the cause of the different ethnic

groups in the country since the late 1990s, buttresses the fact that internal self-determination is one of

the greatest challenges of the Nigerian State. Since the late 1990s, ethnic militias such as the Oodua

Peoples Congress (OPC) (representing the interest of the Yoruba people to the southwest), the Arewa

Boys (representing the northern peoples’ interest, particularly the mainstream Hausa-Fulani people), the

Egbesu Boys (representing the Niger Delta people), Bakassi Boys and the Movement for the

Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) (representing the interest of the Igbo people

to the east) have prefaced the political landscape of Nigeria with several incidences of politically

motivated ethnic and sub-ethnic conflicts to the extent of threatening the existence of the country. Many

more of such groups have since emerged in the Niger Delta area. Indeed, going by the declared goals

and activities of these groups before the government outlawed them, it was obvious that internal self-

determination, evidenced by demands for political inclusion and right to development, was their prime

objective. Firstly and to a certain extent, the emergence of these groups was an indication of State

failure. It was primarily an indication that the Nigerian State was no longer relevant in the eyes of the

component nationalities, which were willing to, if possible, break away. Between 1999 and 2002, inter-

group relations in the country became fragile and extremely precarious owing to the fact that the

activities of the ethnic militias whipped up ethnic sentiment over national issues and popularized ethnic

agendas.

21

Community conflicts and internal self-determination: Ife-Modakeke case

A number of community conflicts in the country can not be divorced from the issue of self-

determination, particularly the issue of internal self-determination. These include the age long and

protracted conflicts between the Ife and the Modakeke people to the southwest, the Aguleri-Umuleri

conflicts to the southeast, and the Zango-Kataf conflicts and the Tiv-Jukun conflicts in the north. All

these were basically conflicts over identity, resource control and territoriality/land, all of which are

components of the self-determination rights. However, for the purpose of this paper, the Ife-Modakeke

conflict will provide an excellent case for analysis. This is because of a number of reasons: the fact that

Ife-Modakeke conflict is one of the oldest community conflicts in Nigeria, dating back to as far back as

1849; the conflict is a sub-ethnic conflict involving two groups that are dialectally different, although

ancestrally linked; the conflict has undergone diverse transformation in nature, scope, and consequences;

and that a permanent and lasting resolution of the conflict still remains elusive even after over fifty years

of post-colonial rule. One writer has gone as far as to describe this cconflict as being unprecedented in

the history of the Yoruba people: “there were no conflict in Yoruba history, whether in pre-colonial,

colonial and post-colonial times which were as dangerous as that of Ife-Modakeke people.”57

Historically speaking, scholars have situated the genesis of the Ife-Modakeke conflict within the

context of the political crisis in the old Oyo Empire and the invasion of the empire by the Fulani

Jihadists in the late 18th

and early 19th

centuries, both of which led to the collapse of the empire and the

emigration of Oyo people into neighboring towns including Ile-Ife.58

By the mid 19th

century, the Oyo

migrants in Ile-Ife had become sizeable in number and a force to reckon with as exemplified by the

recruitment of some of them into Ife army and the marriage of an Oyo immigrant woman by Ooni

Akinmoyero (the monarch of Ife kingdom between 1770 and 1800), which resulted in the birth of

Abegunle Abewela who later became an Ooni (king) in 1839.59

However, records show that the political

57

Albert I.O. 1999. Ife-Modakeke Crisis. In O.Otite and I.O.Albert (eds.) Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management,

Resolution and Transformation, Ibadan: Spectrum, p.167 58

See for example, Johnson S. 1921. The History of the Yorubas: From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British

Protectorate. Lagos: C.M.S Bookshop, p.13. Akinjogbin,I.A. 1992. Ife: the years of travail 1793-1893. The cradle of race:

Ife from the beginning to 1980. I.A.Akinjogbin. Ed. Port Harcourt: Sunray. Pp.148-149.Ajayi J.F.A. and Akintoye S.A. 1980.

Yoruba land in the nineteenth century. Groundwork of Nigerian history. I.Obaro. Ed. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books

Ltd., p.281 59

O.O. Akanji, Migration, Communal Conflict and Group Rights in Ife-Modakeke, Nigeria. Unpublished PhD Thesis,

Ibadan: University of Ibadan, 2007, p. 70; see also Cradle News, Ile-Ife June 6-19, 1989, p.6

22

power tussle between the Ife and Oyo refugees in the town of Ibadan60

in the late eighteenth century,

which ended in victory for the Oyo refugees, began to strain the cordial relationship between the Ife and

their Oyo refugees back at Ile-Ife.61

Similarly, the emergence and ascendancy of Ibadan as a military

power in Yoruba politics, which culminated in the balkanization of the entire Yorubaland into two

military alliances, namely the Ekiti confederacy (Ekitiparapo) and Ibadan camp (the two camps that

fought during the 1878-1894 Yoruba civil war), and its invasion and overrunning of several Ife towns

before and during the war further deepened the hostility and dislike of the Ife for the Oyo refugees, who

had adopted the name Modakeke after being resettled outside of Ile-Ife by Ooni Abewela Abegunle

before the end of his reign in 1849.62

However, violent open conflict first broke out between the two communities around 1849 (and

has since remained unresolved) after the cordial and peaceful communal relationship was fractured by

politically motivated communal distrust, further compounded by issues of claim to separate identity, and

land/territoriality. Over the years, the situation was exacerbated by the political elites, who manipulated

the fragile communal relationship for sheer political gains. Since 1849 till date, the two communities

have had to engage in bloody conflicts several times; the last being between 1997 and 2001. Apart from

open bloody confrontations, the history of the communal relationship has been interspersed with

occasional skirmishes.

Generally, there is no doubt in the literature that the Ife-Modakeke conflict was largely about

quest for internal self-determination by the two communities involved. First, the nature of the Ife-

Modakeke relations on one hand and the origin, nature, causes and implications of the conflicts between

them, on the other hand, suggest that the conflict was that of one group or collectivity against another.63

Second, though, the causes of the communal conflict are diverse, what is clearly established in the

literature is that over the years, the conflicts had assumed different dimensions. These include quest for

autonomy, quest to maintain group identity, and quest to freely dispose off natural wealth and resources.

Specifically, the history of the conflicts shows a situation where the Modakeke have always being

contending to preserve their existence in their present geopolitical location, which is incidentally

60

Ibadan was an Egba town that was defeated and occupied by a combination of Ife war generals, Ijebu warriors and some

Oyo refugees during the period of political turmoil in Yorubaland in the 18th

and 19th

centuries, and which later became a

dominant power in pre-colonial Yoruba politics. 61

Johnson op. cit. p.525, and Akinjogbin, op.cit. p. 151-152 62

For full details on the Ife-Modakeke conflict, see Johnson op. cit; .Akinjogbin op.cit and Akanji op.cit 63

Johnson op.cit; Ajayi and Akintoye, op.cit; Albert, op. cit; Akinjogbin, op.cit; and I.A. Akinjogbin and E.A. Ayandele

“Yorubaland up to 1800”, In O. Ikime (ed), Groundwork of Nigerian History, Ibadan: Heinemann, 1980

23

encompassed by Ife community, and at the same time insisting that they hold a different identity from

the Ife. On the other hand, the Ife people have always considered the preservation of the territorial

integrity of the entire Ife land area/community non-negotiable. The perspective of the Ife may be

gleaned from the remarks made in 1997 by Orayemi Orafidiya, (the Asiwaju of Ife community), when

he stated that:

“Nowhere is a land carved to a group non-indigenous to the area to form anything or to

qualify for an autonomous local government…”64

This reveals the internal self-determination undertone of the crisis. Likewise, the Modakeke

people’s reactions, for example, to the failure of the Oyo state government to accede to their demand for

a separate local council in 1981, which would have accorded them (the Modakeke) an autonomous

status within Ife equally shows the connection between the conflict and internal self-determination. In

response to the denial, the Modakeke staged a demonstration on 31 May 1981, carrying placards that

blamed the reigning traditional ruler of Ile Ife, Oba Okunade Sijuawade as well as the national leader of

the ruling political party in the state; Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), for

frustrating their ambition. Some of the placards read:

"Modakeke are not Ife and the two communities can never live together peacefully and

happily"65

" Awo, give democracy a chance", "Modakeke must be free", “Freedom is our goal." 66

At one point, the communal conflict assumed the character of a liberation struggle with the

traditional chief of the Modakeke community, (the Baale of Modakeke) Chief Animasaun, threatening

that if the community was not granted a separate local government status it would struggle to achieve

it.67

And when it seemed the dream of the Modakeke was almost being fulfilled in 1989, because the

government placed them in a local government council area not directly under the control of the Ife local

authority, their state of ecstasy as deduced in the expression of I.O.Ajayi (the Otun Asiwaju of

64

Statement by Chief Orayemi Orafidiya in ‘The Guardian’ Lagos, September 5 1997 p.4; See also O.O. Akanji, Migration,

Communal Conflicts and Group Rights in Ife-Modakeke, Nigeria, PhD Thesis, Ibadan: University of Ibadan, 2007, p.134 65

Ibid, p.96 66

ibid 67

Ibid p.90

24

Modakeke), further revealed the strong connection between the communal conflict and the aspiration for

self-determination. The Modakeke people’s state of ecstasy was summed up in the following words:

“... it is sure that we are in the Promised Land. Agitation, oppression and unhealthy

rivalry between Modakeke and Ife have been solved after 150 years [1839-1989] of

wars and near apartheid situation in an independent Nigeria. What an uneasy journey

of 150 years towards the Promised Land.”68

Thus, it is evident that the issue of identity encapsulated in requests for separate local

government was a major factor in the sustenance and escalation of the communal conflict. Available

evidence shows that the Modakeke people began a systematic and persistence agitation for an

autonomous local government council distinct from the Ife, from as early as 1957/58.69

This demand

continued through the 1970s, 80s and even till the 1990s. In the same vein, the Ife people did not hide

their resolve to resist all attempts to balkanize their land. And this they actually did all through the years

each time attempt was made by the government to do so. Above all, the Ife-Modakeke case is an

example of a native/settler-related community conflict, where the Ife people are the host or native

community and the Modakeke, the settler community. Nonetheless, the politicization of the issue turned

the conflict into a protracted conflict, with serious threats to the peace and stability of southwestern

Nigeria and the country in general.

Comparatively, the issues that underpinned the Ife-Modakeke conflict are not different from

those that underpinned a number of other community conflicts in the country. Like the Ife-Modakeke

case, records show that the protracted Tiv-Jukun communal hostility in Taraba state is predicated on the

native/settler dichotomy and land ownership among others.70

The Jukun have always considered

themselves as the landowners (the natives), while the Tiv are labeled the settlers, a tag which the Tiv

never accept. In the same vein, the conflict between the Yoruba in Share in Ifelodun Local Government

Area and the Nupe in Edu Local Government Area (two neighbors) in Kwara state is another example of

a conflict underpinned by the quest for internal self-determination in Nigeria. According to records, the

68

I.O. Ajayi. “Modakeke: Towards the Promised Land,” A mimeograph, n.d., p.8 69

O.O. Akanji (2009) Group Rights and Conflicts in Africa: a critical reflection on Ife-Modakeke, Nigeria. International

Journal on Minority and Group Rights, vol.16, (1), p. 39; O.O. Akanji (2008) Identity-based Conflicts in Africa: the case of

Ife-Modakeke, Nigeria. In Zewde, B. (ed.) Society, State and Identity in African History. Addis Ababa: Forum for Social

Studies/Association of African Historians. P.210 70

Shedrack G.B, Alamijeabee E.I and Zainab B.S 1999. Communal Conflicts and the Possibilities of Conflict Resolution in

Nigeria: A case study of the Tiv-Jukun Conflicts in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State. Community Conflicts in

Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation. O.Otite and I.O.Albert Eds. Ibadan: Spectrum.pp.82-89

25

two groups have engaged in bloody conflict about four times between 1850 and 2000. The first time was

in 1850, followed by 1976, 1978, and 2000 over issues such as the creation of a footpath (land

ownership) and each group’s historical claimant to the Share-Tsaragi territory.71

Though a major feature

of the conflict has been the attempt by each of the communities to lay claim to indigeneship status, while

labeling the other the migrant settler, the politicization of the issues has compounded the problem. In

1976, for example, the creation of Ifelodun Local Government with headquarters in Share was construed

by the Nupe as an attempt by the government to confirm the people of Share (a Yoruba community) as

the landlords.72

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis has helped to establish the centrality of the issue of the quest for self-

determination, particularly in its internal sense, as the major challenge to Nigerian statehood. This issue,

created by years of colonial rule and foreign contacts, both of which resulted from migration, and

sustained and compounded by competing claims to resources and disillusioned political elites in the

corridors of power, has been the force underpinning violent conflicts in Nigeria. Moreover, the

migration of people over the years across ethnic, religious and linguistic boundaries within the country,

which was supposed to foster national unity, integration and development, has become the source of

political, religious, inter-ethnic and sub-ethnic conflicts, due to the politicization of the issue of

citizenship and access to political power. The inability of Nigerians to enjoy the full benefit of their

citizenship, as evidenced by widespread poverty and unemployment, infrastructural decay and social

insecurity, among others, and the marginalization and exclusion of minority groups from political power

by the dominant ethnic groups, exacerbated the demands for internal self-determination rights by groups

in the country to the point of violent conflicts. However, the right to internal self-determination which

the groups in conflicts in Nigeria are entitled to is to be understood as enjoyable, only in a manner

consistent with the principles of international law regarding sovereign State. The principles are to the

effect that the exercise of the right to self-determination does not have to lead to the disintegration of a

71

See The Punch, Lagos, July 26, 2000, pp.19-20 72

Ibid

26

sovereign state, but rather to improving the quality of life of the people, ensuring equal rights and non-

discrimination, and avoiding inter-group tensions.

A number of measures otherwise called specific measures or affirmative actions are

recommended by major international human right instruments, to ensure the full enjoyment of the

internal self-determination rights. These include concrete measures to ensure the adequate development

and protection of members of minority groups. Others are political measures such as allocation of power

disproportionate to the size of both the majority and minority groups in a state, in order to ensure fair

influence and consultation on political issues affecting them, and the granting of appropriate local or

autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of the

various people groups. Legislative recognition of minority laws and customs, guaranteed seats for

minorities in legislative and other political organs, the appointment of officials chosen by the group to

either specific positions or to a fixed percentage of general posts etc.73

In a way, the recognition of these measures in human rights law implies, on the one hand, the

global recognition of the right of people to internal self-determination, and on the other hand, the need

for national governments, in this case, Nigeria, to actually see how the right can be fully exercised and

enjoyed by all groups, whether ethnic, sub-ethnic, religious or linguistic groups in the country. This is a

remedy to the continued threats that agitations for self-determination, whether external or internal self-

determination, pose to the Nigerian State. Therefore, in line with its obligation under international law,

and the conception of internal self-determination rights under international law as the mechanism for

promoting the socio-economic development and political inclusion of minorities, the Nigerian

government should recognize and accord every ethnic minority group in the country the fundamental

right to internal self-determination as contained in international human right laws. This is imperative

given the fact that Nigeria is a signatory to a number of international human rights instruments,

including the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which obligate states to recognize and

provide for the exercise and enjoyment of group rights, including self-determination, by groups, whether

minority or majority groups. Article 20 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights affirms

this when it declares that, “All peoples shall have right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable

right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their

economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen.” The applicability of

73

See paragraph 35 of part IV of the Document from the 1990 Copenhagen Meeting of the OSCE Conference on the Human

Dimension.

27

this provision to groups in Nigeria can be predicated on the argument by Prof. Umuzorike that the term

‘peoples’ used in the Charter “embraces minorities and majorities”74

, and the fact that the country has

municipalized the provisions of the Charter through the (Ratification and Enforcement) Decree No 2, of

1983.75

74

U O Umuzorike (1992) “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal

Studies, p.10 75

See Cap 10 1990 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, Section 1