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MilitaryAssistanceandHumanRights

Colombia,

U.S.Accountability,andGlobalImplications

July2010

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ExecutiveSummary ...............................................................iiiIntroduction ..........................................................................1U.S.militaryassistancetoColombiasince2000 ...................3Evaluatingvetting..................................................................5Whatis“credibleevidence”ofaviolation? ..........................5Geographicanalysis:Mappinghumanrightsvetting ............6Are“effectivemeasures”and“necessary correctivesteps”beingtaken?...............................8Whatconstitutesaunit? .......................................................8Theendof“falsepositives”?.................................................9Mappinghumanrightsimpact ..............................................10RoleofSOAtraining ..............................................................13Increasesinmilitaryaidandreportedkillings: hypothesesandpossibleexplanatoryfactors ........13WhyhastheLeahyLawnotbeen implementedeffectivelyinColombia?...................16UnitStudies ...........................................................................17FUDRAandLaMacarenagravesite ......................................25Mobilebrigadesandotherunits ...........................................28Commandercasestudies ......................................................29Policekillings .........................................................................31U.S.officials’responsibility....................................................32GlobalImplications:U.S.militaryaidand humanrightsinPakistan ........................................32Conclusionsandimplications ................................................35Recommendations ................................................................36Notesonsourcesandmethodology .....................................37AnnexI:Reportedexecutionsinbrigadejurisdictions afterincreasesanddecreasesinU.S.aid ...............38AnnexII:Annualreportedexecutions bybrigadejurisdiction ...........................................39Notes ................................................................................40

Table of Contents

PublishedbytheFellowshipofReconciliationP.O.Box271,Nyack,NY10960Tel:8453584601www.forusa.org

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ExecutiveSummary:MilitaryAssistanceandHumanRights:Colombia,U.S.Accountability,andGlobalImplications

ThescaleofU.S.trainingandequippingofothernations’militarieshasgrownexponentiallysince2001,buttherearemajorconcernsabouttheextenttowhichtheU.S.governmentisimplementingthelawsandmonitoringtheimpactitsmilitaryaidishavingonhumanrights.ThisreportbytheFellowshipofReconciliation(FOR)andU.S.OfficeonColombiaexaminestheseissuesthroughadetailedcasestudyofU.S.militaryaid,humanrightsabuses,andimplementationofhumanrightslawinColombia.TheexperienceofUSmilitaryfundingtoColombiashowsalarminglinksbetweenColombianmilitaryunitsthatreceiveU.S.assistanceandciviliankillingscommittedbythearmy.TopreventsimilarerrorsinAfghanistanandPakistan,relevantCongressionalcommitteesandtheStateDepartmentOfficeoftheInspectorGeneralmustthoroughlystudytheColombiacaseandimplementationofU.S.lawdesignedtokeepsecurityassistancefromgoingtosecurityforceunitscommittinggrosshumanrightsviolations.Whileresearchingthisreportoveraperiodoftwoyears,wedrewonarichsetofdataaboutmorethan3,000extrajudicialexecutionsreportedlycommittedbythearmedforcesinColombiasince2002andonlistsofmorethan500militaryunitsassistedbytheUnitedStatessince2000.FORfoundthatU.S.officialsneglectedtheirdutiesundertheLeahylaw,andthatmanyColombianmilitaryunitscommittedevenmoreextrajudicialkillingsduringandafterthehighestlevelsofU.S.assistancetothoseunits.Whatevercorrelationmayexistbetweenassistanceandreportedkillings,thereareclearlyotherfactorscontributingtohighlevelsofkillings.Yet,whilewecouldnotfixthecausesofincreasedreportsofkillingsafterincreasesinU.S.assistance,ourfindingshighlighttheneedforathoroughinvestigationintothereasonsforthisapparentcorrelation.AnumberofU.S.lawsaredesignedtoprotectagainsttheuseofU.S.foreignaidtocommithumanrightsabuses.AprincipaloneistheLeahyAmendment,whichprohibitsassistancetoanyforeignsecurityforceunitiftheStateDepartmenthascredibleevidencethattheunithascommittedgrosshumanrightsviolations.ThecountrywhereapplicationoftheLeahylawhasbeenthemostrigorous–accordingtotheStateDepartment–isColombia.YetouranalysisstronglysuggeststhatimplementationofLeahyLawinColombiarequiressuspensionofassistancetonearlyallArmyfixedbrigadesandmanymobilebrigades.MostmilitarytraininginColombiaisfundedbytheDefenseDepartment.Howshouldembassypersonneldeterminewhetherunitsshouldreceiveassistancewheretherearehighnumbersofreportedviolationsforwhichtheresponsibleunithasnotbeenidentified?Thedatashowsthatthebrigadejurisdictionwhereareportedviolationoccurredisareliableindicatorofwhatunitcommittedit.Moreover,inColombia,extrajudicialkillingsreportedlyoccurredinnearlyallArmybrigadejurisdictions,whichputsindoubtthelegalityofassistinganysuchbrigade.

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TheLeahyLawincludesanexceptionontheprohibitionofassistanceif“effectivemeasures”(or“necessarysteps”forDOD‐fundedtraining)arebeingtakentobringthoseresponsibleforaviolationtojustice.YettheStateDepartment’sdocumentationillustratesthatonly1.5%ofthereportedextrajudicialexecutionshaveresultedinconviction.Asthedatainthisreportindicate,afterNovember2008,thenumberofreportedkillingsofciviliansbytheColombianarmedforcesdroppedprecipitously,apparentlyduetoaninstitutionaldecisiontoaddressthepractice.Thedecreaseinkillingsattributedtothearmedforceshasbeenaccompaniedbyasteepclimbinthenumberofreportedkillingsbyparamilitarysuccessorgroups.TheimplicationsofreducedreportsofciviliankillingsforcontinuedU.S.assistanceundertheLeahyLaw,however,areminimal,sincethelawrequiresnotsimplyanendtothekilling,but“effectivemeasures”tobringthoseresponsibletojusticebeforeneworcontinuedassistancetothearmedforcesislawful.IfU.S.assistancewerehavingapositiveeffectonthehumanrightsconductofassistedunits,wewouldexpecttoseelownumbersofreportedextrajudicialkillingsbythearmyinthoseareaswhereaidtothearmyisconcentrated.Inordertoisolatetherelationshipbetweenassistanceandsubsequentexecutionsfromotherpotentialfactors,weidentifiedthebrigadejurisdiction/yearswhenunitsinthejurisdictionreceivedthelargestincreasesinU.S.assistance.WefoundthatreportedextrajudicialkillingsincreasedonaverageinareasaftertheUnitedStatesincreasedassistancetounitsinthoseareas.Forthe16largestincreasesofaidfromoneyeartothenexttoarmyunitsoperatinginaspecificjurisdiction,thenumberofreportedexecutionsinthejurisdictionincreasedanaverageof56%fromthetwo‐yearperiodpriortotheincreasetothetwo‐yearperiodduringandaftertheincreasedassistance.Inotherwords,whenthereweresignificantincreasesinassistancetounits,therewereincreasesinreportedkillingsintheperiodsfollowingtheassistanceintheassistedunits’areasofoperation.Ontheotherhand,inyearsafterlevelsofassistanceweremostreducedforunitsoperatinginajurisdiction,thenumberofexecutionsreportedlycommittedbyunitsoperatinginthejurisdictionfell,alsobyanaverageof56%.Overall,regionswiththebiggestincreasesinmilitaryaidgenerallyexperienceagreaterincreaseorasmallerdecreaseinthenumberofextrajudicialexecutionsthandoregionswiththebiggestdecreasesinmilitaryaid.Thosejurisdictionswherethenumberofreportedkillingswasthehighestafterreceivingincreasedassistanceallhadreportedmultiplearmykillingsofciviliansintheperiodbeforetheincrease.Thissuggeststhataproblemthatwasignoredindecidingtoincreaseassistancetoaunittendedtobecomeworseafterward.Therearesignificantgapsinourknowledgetohelpusunderstandandinterpretthecausesforwhatwefound.Nevertheless,webelieveitisimportanttoconsiderpotentialexplanationsandinterpretationsofourfindings,andourreportmakespreliminaryreflectionsonseveralhypotheses.Wealsoconsideredpossibleexplanationsforwhythe

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LeahyAmendmenthasbeeninadequatelyimplementedinColombia,includinginsufficientstaffingandprioritization,lackofinformationonreportedviolations,anddifferinginterpretationsof“credibleevidence.”ProfilesoffourteenbrigadesandbattalionsandtwoArmycommandersgivemoredetailtotheanalysis.Wealsoreviewedthemulti‐billion‐dollarU.S.militaryassistanceprogramandhumanrightsviolationsinPakistan.ItisunclearwhethertheFrontierCorpsandotherPakistanimilitaryunitstrainedandequippedbytheUnitedStatesareparticipatinginthecountry’sextensivehumanrightsviolations.However,wherethereiscredibleevidenceofgrossabusescommittedbyanassistedinstitution,theLeahyLawrequiressuspensionofaidtothe“smallestoperationalgroupinthefieldthathasbeenimplicatedinthereportedviolation.”TheFrontierCorpsiscrediblyimplicatedinseriousviolations.IftheStateDepartmentcannotdetermineasmallerunitresponsiblefortheseviolations,thentheLeahyLawrequiressuspensionofassistancetotheFrontierCorpsitself.Furthermore,DOD‐fundedassistanceandreimbursementsshouldnotbeexemptfromtheLeahyLawhumanrightsvettingrequirement.Theuseoffundstoreimburseaforeigngovernmentforspecificmilitaryoperations,effectivelymakingthatmilitaryaproxyforU.S.policy,doesnotremovethegoalsoftheLeahyLaw:topreventU.S.fundsfrombeingusedtosupportmilitariescommittinggrossabusesofhumanrights.

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InColombia,U.S.militaryassistancecontinuesatahighlevel.IfColombiarepresentsthemostrigorousapplicationoftheLeahyLaw,whatcanbeexpectedelsewhere?Moreover,theU.S.recordinColombiaisseenasamodelforpolicyinAfghanistanandothercountries.AnyevaluationofmilitaryassistanceshouldnotbelimitedtowhetheritcomplieswithLeahyLaw,sincesuspensionofaidtospecificunitsunderLeahyLawdoesnotalterorreducetheoverallamountofmilitaryassistance.ConsiderationofmilitaryassistanceshouldaddressthebroadercontextofU.S.humanrightsgoalsandobligations.BecausesuchalargeproportionoftrainingandotherassistancetoColombiacomesunderDODauthority,itisespeciallyimportantthatsuchassistancebetransparent,consideredbyCongressaspartoftheappropriationscycle,andregularlyevaluatedforitshumanrightsimpacts.WealsorecommendfurtherstudyofseveralphenomenainColombiathatwewerenotabletoexamine,includingcollaborationbetweenparamilitaryforcesandofficersandmembersofthearmedforces,andtherelationshipbetweenforceddisplacement,reportedextrajudicialkillings,andunitsthatreceivedU.S.assistance.Finally,apartfromLeahyLawimplementation,theincreaseinreportedciviliankillingsbyArmyunitsaftertheyreceivedU.S.assistanceraisesseriousethicalquestionsaboutsuchassistanceinColombiaandinothernationswheresimilarconditionsofwidespreadimpunityandwarfarepertain.Recommendations1. CongressshouldrequiretheStateDepartmenttodocumentthehumanrightsrecordsof

unitsreceivingU.S.assistance,andevaluatethehumanrightsimpactsofsuchassistance.TheresultsshouldbeunclassifiedandpostedtotheDepartment’swebsite.

2. TheDepartmentofStatemustfullyimplementLeahyLawinColombia.Ataminimum,thisrequiressuspendingassistancetobrigadesforwhichthereiscredibleevidenceofextrajudicialexecutionscommittedbyitsmembers,untilandunlessthosekillingsarefullyinvestigatedandthecivilianjusticesystemreachesajudgment.Suchevidenceexistsforallarmydivisionsandnearlyallbrigades.

3. RelevantCongressionalcommittees,theNationalSecurityCouncilandtheStateDepartmentInspectorGeneralshouldgiveincreasedscrutinyofU.S.militaryassistanceinnationswhereconditionssimilartoColombia’sprevail(highlevelsofsecurityforceabuses,highlevelsofimpunity,highorinstitutionallevelsofU.S.assistance),includingColombia,untilpolicy‐makersprovideCongresswithacredibleexplanationfornegativehumanrightsimpactsandvettingfailuresinColombia,anddemonstrateconcretechangestoensuretheseimpactsandfailuresarenotreplicated.

4. BecausethefailuretoapplytheLeahyLawhasledtoUnitedStatestoassistbrigadesthathavecommittedlargenumbersofextrajudicialexecutions,theUnitedStateshastheresponsibilitytodoeverythingpossibletoensurejusticeforthesecases.U.S.aidtoColombianjudicialandoversightagenciesshouldbetiedtoconcreteresultsinreducingimpunity.

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MilitaryAssistanceandHumanRights:

Colombia,U.S.Accountability,andGlobalImplicationsIntroductionTheUnitedStateshasalonghistoryofprovidingsignificantmilitaryassistancetoforeigncountriestoadvanceU.S.interests.InitsQuadrennialDefenseReviewissuedlastyear,theDefenseDepartmentarticulatedaplanfor“buildingpartnershipcapacity”withalliedmilitaries,andinstitutionalizingirregularwarfarecapabilities.Thetargetgroupsandresultsofsuchassistanceinhumanrightsterms,however,receivelittlescrutiny.TherearemajorconcernsabouttheextenttowhichtheU.S.governmentisimplementingthelawsandmonitoringtheimpactitsforeignsecurityaidishavingonhumanrightsabroad.ThisreportexaminestheseissuesthroughadetailedcasestudyofU.S.militaryaid,humanrightsabuses,andimplementationofhumanrightslawinColombia.TheUnitedStateshasexpendedapproximately$35billionsince2001ontrainingmilitaryforcesinIraqandAfghanistanalone,andplanstotrainmorethan100,000soldiersinAfghanistanoverthenextthreeyears.1Ithassuppliedmorethan$12billioninmilitaryassistancetoPakistansince2001.PresidentObamahasrequested$1.66billioninsuchfundingforPakistanforFiscalYear2011alone.ThescaleofU.S.trainingandequippingofothernations’militariesinordertomeetU.S.objectiveshasgrownexponentiallyduringthisperiod.Howthatsecurityassistanceisbeingusedisnotalwaysclear,however.In2009,humanrightsgroupsandTheNewYorkTimesreportedbetween300and400extrajudicialkillingsbythePakistaniArmy.2Afghanistanhasahistoryofbrutalwarlords,manyofwhomhavereceivedextensiveU.S.assistanceandhaveroutinelycommittedegregioushumanrightsviolationsagainstthelocalpopulation.3ThousandsofcivilianshavealsobeenkilledbytheUnitedStatesitself,includingthroughdroneattacksexecutedbythePentagonandtheCIAinAfghanistanandPakistan.4PresidentObamahasexpressedhiscommitmenttopromotehumanrights,yetastheUnitedStatesdramaticallyscalesupitsmilitarytraininginthesetwocountries,howwilltheU.S.governmentensurethatthecivilianpopulationissaferandthattherearefewerhumanrightsabuses?WhatisthetrackrecordforensuringthatU.S.militaryaiddoesnottrainthosewithhistoriesofabuse,andwhatisthehumanrightsimpactofsuchmilitarytraining?TheexperienceofUSmilitaryfundingtoColombiaisinstructiveandshowsalarminglinksbetweenColombianmilitaryunitsthatreceiveU.S.assistanceandthecommissionofciviliankillingsbytheArmy.InordertopreventsimilarerrorsinAfghanistanandPakistan,relevantCongressionalcommitteesandtheStateDepartmentOfficeoftheInspectorGeneralmustthoroughlystudytheColombiacaseandimplementationofU.S.lawdesignedtokeepsecurityassistancefromgoingtosecurityforceunitscommittinggrosshumanrightsviolations.Whileresearchingthisreportoveraperiodoftwoyears,theFellowshipofReconciliation(FOR)drewonarichsetofdataaboutmorethan3,000extrajudicialexecutions5reportedlycommittedbythearmedforcesinColombiasince2002andonlistsofmore

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than500militaryunitsassistedbytheUnitedStatessince2000.FORfoundthatU.S.officialsneglectedtheirdutiesundertheLeahylaw.WealsofoundthatmanyColombianmilitaryunitscommittedevenmoreextrajudicialkillingsduringandafterthehighestlevelsofU.S.assistancetothoseunits.Whatevercorrelationmayexistbetweenassistanceandreportedkillings,thereareclearlyotherfactorscontributingtohighlevelsofkillings.Yet,whilewecouldnotfixthecausesofincreasedreportsofkillingsafterincreasesinU.S.assistance,ourfindingshighlighttheneedforathoroughinvestigationintothereasonsforthisapparentcorrelation.AnumberofU.S.lawsaredesignedtoprotectagainsttheuseofU.S.foreignaidtocommithumanrightsabuses.AprincipaloneistheLeahyAmendmentorLeahyLaw,whichprohibitsassistancetoanyforeignsecurityforceunitiftheStateDepartmenthascredibleevidencethattheunithascommittedgrosshumanrightsviolations.ThecountrywhereapplicationoftheLeahylawhasbeenthemostrigorous–accordingtotheStateDepartment–isColombia.6InorderfortheU.S.GovernmenttobeincompliancewiththeLeahyLaw,itmustreviewthehumanrightsrecordofsecurityforceunitsthatarepotentialrecipientsofU.S.assistance–aprocessreferredtoas“vetting.”IfthereiscredibleevidencethatasecurityforceunitproposedfororreceivingU.S.assistancehasengagedingrossviolationsofhumanrightstheU.S.governmentmustbringthecasetotheattentionoftheColombiangovernmentandmakeadecisiontoprovide,continue,ordiscontinueassistancebasedontheColombiangovernment’seffortstobringthoseresponsibletojustice.InthecaseoftrainingprovidedbytheDefenseDepartment,theStateDepartmentmustbringthecasetoDOD’sattention,whichmakesadeterminationonhowtoproceedbasedonnearlythesamecriteria.TheLeahyLawisaveryimportantmechanismtoensureUSmilitaryaiddoesnotendupinthehandsofsecurityforceunitscrediblyreportedtohavecommittedgrossviolationsofhumanrights.ButifU.S.officialsdonotapplythelawbyrigorouslyvettingallunitsthatreceiveUSassistance,andarenotheldtoaccountforthetransparentandeffectiveimplementationofU.S.laws,thousandsofcivilianswillcontinuetolosetheirlivesinU.S.‐backedmilitaryactivities.ThisreportbyFORandtheU.S.OfficeonColombiafocusesnarrowlyontherelationshipbetweenU.S.militaryassistanceandreportsofextrajudicialkillingsbyColombianArmyforces,specificallyadoptingananalysisofspecificarmyunitsassistedbytheUnitedStates.ThisanalysisstronglysuggeststhatimplementationofLeahyLawinColombiarequiressuspensionofassistancetonearlyallArmyfixedbrigadesandmanymobilebrigades.Humanrightsvettingislargelytheresponsibilityofembassystaffintherecipientcountry,accordingtotheStateDepartment’sguidanceissuedin2003,aswellasa2007“GuidetotheVettingProcess.”7InColombia,theU.S.ambassadorsoverseeingLeahyamendmentimplementationduringmostoftheperiodreviewedbythisstudywereAnnePattersonandWilliamWood.AmbassadorPattersonhasbeenU.S.ambassadortoPakistansince2007.AmbassadorWoodwasU.S.ambassadortoAfghanistanfrom2007to2009.U.S.policyinColombiaisbeingtoutedasamodelofmilitarysuccessandhumanrightsvettingtobe

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replicatedinAfghanistanandelsewhere.InlightofthisclaimandtheenormousmilitarytrainingeffortundertakenbytheUnitedStatesinAfghanistan,Pakistanandelsewhere,ourfindingshaveprofoundimplicationsforforeignpolicy.ThereisapracticebywhichColombiansoldiershavedetainedcivilians,sometimestakenthemfaraway,executedthem,thenclaimedthemasguerrillaskilledincombat.Theseareknownas“falsepositives.”Whilecasesof“falsepositives”datebackatleasttothe1990s,8thenumberofreportsexplodedin2004‐08,becoming“widespreadandsystematic,”accordingtoPhilipAlston,UnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuronExtrajudicialExecutions.Humanrightsorganizationsdenouncedincreasingreportsofsuchexecutions.Then‐DefenseMinisterCamiloOspinaBernalissuedadirective(Directive29)inNovember2005thatestablishedlevelsofpaymentforinformationleadingtothekillingofmembersoftheguerrillasandotherarmedgroups,whichsomeobserversinterpretedascreatingincentivesfortheillegalkillingofciviliansandclaimingthemasguerrillas.“It’sentirelylikely…therewerebadincentivesinplace”thatledto“falsepositives,”AmbassadorWoodtoldFOR.9InSeptember2008,theColombianmediarevealedthatyoungmenfromSoacha,apoorsuburbofBogotá,hadbeenluredawayfromhomebyjoboffers,broughttoOcañaandothercitiesmorethan300milesawayand–withinthreedays–wereclaimedbytheArmyasguerrillasorcriminalskilledincombat.Afterinitiallydenyingthereportsandsayingtheyoungmen“weren’tgoingwiththepurposeofworkingandharvestingcoffee,”PresidentUribedismissed27soldiers,includingthreegenerals.10ArmycommanderGeneralMarioMontoyaresignedshortlythereafter.U.S.MilitaryAssistancetoColombiasince2000WhileU.S.militaryassistanceinColombiadatesbacktothe1940s,includingsignificantsumsofassistanceinthe1990s,U.S.involvementtookaqualitativeleapwithpassageofPlanColombiain2000.Thetwo‐year$1.2billionpackagewas81%militaryandpoliceassistance,andinitiallyfocusedoncounter‐narcoticsobjectives.Althoughpreviouscounter‐narcoticsassistancehadbeendirectedprimarilytothepolice,whiletheArmyfocusedonfightingguerrillaforces,PlanColombiafundschanneledcounter‐narcoticsaidprimarilytotheArmy,aswellastoU.S.contractorsresponsibleforcocafumigationandotheractivities.AfterSeptember11,2001,however,authorityforU.S.militaryassistanceinColombiawasexpandedinFY2002toincludesupportforcounterterroristobjectives.11Initially,thisincluded$98millionindedicatedfundstocounterattacksontheCañoLimon‐Covejasoilpipeline,knownastheInfrastructureSecurityStrategyprogram.AccordingtoLieutenantColonelDarrylLong:

TheU.S.ArmyMilitaryMissionconcentrateditsinvestmentsinsupportforthegrowthanddevelopmentofmobilityprovidedbyArmyAviation,theequippingandtrainingofnewunitscreatedsince2001,servicesforlogisticalsupportandmaintenance,medicalcapacity,andsupportforColombianarmedforces’initiativesforrecoveringthecountry’sminedareas.Additionally,throughPlanningandAssistanceTrainingTeams,thereiscontinuedsupportforColombianArmybrigadesanddivisionsintheintegrationofintelligenceintocombatoperations,planningofjointoperationswiththeColombianAirForceandNavy,andmilitarytrainingofsmallunits.12

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Manyofthenewunitscreatedsince2001aremobilebrigadesthatconsistprimarilyofcounter‐guerrillabattalions,andtheUnitedStateshasassistedthemajorityofthesebrigadesandbattalions.FormerArmedForcescommanderGeneralCarlosOspinatoldFORthatU.S.strategicsupportforcounterinsurgencyonlyarrivedafter2003.After2004‐05,thegeographicreachofU.S.assistanceandvettingofunitsspreadenormously,andoverthecourseof2000‐2007,theUnitedStatesalsotrainedindividualsfromunvettedArmyunitsacrossthespectrum,includingthosewiththeworsthumanrightsrecords.13

AgooddealofcurrentassistanceistoincreaseColombianmilitarytrainingcapacity.Twentydifferentmilitarytrainingcentersandschools,foreverythingfrominfantryandspecialoperationstoaviationandofficertraining,areapprovedforUSassistancethisyear,aswellastwopolicetrainingcenters.ColombianofficialshavestatedthatthemilitarybaseagreementsignedwiththeUnitedStatesonOctober30,2009willstrengthenColombia’smilitarytrainingprogramandhelpittoselltrainingtoothernations,despitetheColombianmilitary’shistoryofsystematichumanrightsviolations.UnitswhosehumanrightsrecordsarevettedandapprovedforassistancebecomeeligibleforassistancefromarangeofU.S.programs.MostmilitarytraininginColombiaisfundedbytheDefenseDepartment.FundsforassistingColombianArmyunitscomeprimarilyfrom

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threeU.S.programs:Section1004Counternarcoticsfunds,whicharebudgetedthroughtheDepartmentofDefense,andInternationalMilitaryEducationandTraining(IMET)andForeignMilitaryFinancing(FMF),bothofwhicharepartoftheForeignOperationsbudget.SomeassistancetothearmyalsocomesthroughCounter‐TerrorismFellowshipProgram(CTFP).Itisreasonabletobelievethatsomeassistancetothearmyisalsopartofcovertbudgets.Seventy‐ninepercentofthemorethan70,000Colombiansreceivingmilitarytrainingbetweenfiscalyears1999and2007receivedthisassistancethroughSection1004funds,asillustratedinthefollowinggraph:

Just18%ofColombiansreceivingmilitarytrainingduringthesameperiodreceivedassistancethroughtheStateDepartment’sForeignOperationsfunds(InternationalMilitaryEducationandTraining[7.4%],Narcotics/LawEnforcement[6.8%],ForeignMilitaryFinancing[2.8%],andForeignMilitarySales[0.8%].14EvaluatingVettingWhatis“credibleevidence”ofagrosshumanrightsviolation?TheStateDepartment’sguideforvettingsaysthisaboutdeterminingwhatevidenceiscredible:

Thelawdoesnotspecifywhatconstitutes“credibleevidence”ofahumanrightsviolation.Note,however,thatthedraftersofthelawdidnotintend“credibleevidence”tomeanonlyevidencethatwouldbeadmissibleinacourtoflaw;thisgivesyougreaterlatitudeinevaluatingthecredibilityoftheevidence,andaccordinglyyouareaskedtoexerciseyourgoodjudgmentandcommonsense.Itisalsousefultocompareinformationfromvarioussources,andtoconsiderthereliability/credibilityofallsourcesofinformationwhenmakingadecision.15

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Inthislight,webelievethatreportsofextrajudicialexecutionsthatresultintheProsecutorGeneral’sofficeorInspectorGeneral’sofficeopeningaformalinvestigationconstitutecredibleevidencethatthemilitarycommittedtheviolation.WealsoareawareofthestrictstandardsusedbythehumanrightsorganizationsthatconstitutetheWorkingGrouponExtrajudicialExecutions,andcontendthatreportsofextrajudicialexecutionsfromtheseorganizationsalsoconstitutecredibleevidence.ElementsoftheColombianandU.S.militarycontestthiscredibilitywithathesisthatmanyorevenmostreportsofextrajudicialkillingsareaformof“judicialwarfare”or“lawfare.”16Underthisthesis,killingsnotcommittedbythemilitaryareexploitedbytheFARCandattributedtothemilitary.Askedwhyreportsofextrajudicialexecutionswereatsuchahighpointin2007,BrigadierGeneralJorgeRodríguezClavijo,chiefoftheArmy’srecently‐createdhumanrightsdivision,saidthattheArmy’soperationswerehighthatyear,andthattheFARC,becauseitwaslosing,foughtbackbyfacilitatingclaimsthatmanyofthosekilledwerecivilians.17Thiswouldnotexplain,however,whyreportsofexecutionsdroppedin2008andfurtherin2009,whentheFARCwasmorestrategicallyweakenedandthe“falsepositives”scandalhadbroken.GeographicAnalysis:MappingHumanRightsVettingThemapsonthisandthefollowingpageshowthelevelofU.S.assistancetounitsoperatingwithineachbrigadejurisdictionovertwosuccessivetwo‐yearperiods,andthenumberofreportedkillingsbytheArmyinthatjurisdictionduringpreviousyears.Inspiteofthelargenumberofsuchkillings,manyunitscontinuedtoreceiveU.S.assistance.Themilitaryunitreportedlyresponsibleforanabusefrequentlyisnotidentifiedbythosedenouncingitorinofficialinvestigations.StateDepartmentvettingguidancerecognizesthisambiguity.“Inabilitytoidentifyaparticularindividualasaperpetrator,”statesthe2003guidance,“wouldnotprecludeaconclusionthattheunithascommittedagrossviolationofhumanrightsiffactsotherwisejustifysuchaconclusion.Postsshouldkeeptrackofallegationsofgrossviolationsofhumanrightsinvolvinganyunitofthesecurityforces,regardlessofwhetherthatunitiscurrentlyreceivingtrainingorassistance.”18Howshouldembassypersonneldeterminewhetherunitsshouldreceiveassistancewheretherearehighnumbersofreportedviolationsforwhichtheresponsibleunithasnotbeenidentified?Forexample,insomeareasofColombia,bothabrigadewithterritorialjurisdictionandamobilebrigadeoperate.However,thedatashowsthatthelocationwhereareportedviolationoccurredisareliableindicatorofwhatunitcommittedit.Forthosekillingsfrom2002to2009inwhichtheArmybrigadereportedlyresponsiblewasidentified,79.5%occurredwithinthejurisdictionofthearmybrigadeoperatinginthatarea.Thisdemonstratesthestronglikelihoodthatthearmybrigadeinwhosejurisdictionanextrajudicialkillingisreportedwasresponsiblefortheexecution.Oftheremaining20.5%wheretherewasnotagreementbetweentheunitreportedresponsibleandjurisdictioninformation,13%wereattributedtomobilebrigadesoperatinginthefixed

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brigade’sjurisdiction.(OurmeasurementsofU.S.assistancetoeachjurisdictionaccountforassistancetosuchmobilebrigades.)Moreover,inColombia,extrajudicialkillingsreportedlyoccurredinnearlyallArmybrigadejurisdictions,whichputsindoubtthelegalityofassistinganysuchbrigade.In2007,reportedkillingsbythemilitaryoccurredin23outof25brigadejurisdictions,thesoleexceptionsbeinginremoteandsparselypopulatedeasterndepartments,wherethelikelihoodofviolationsbeingreportedisconsiderablylessthanotherareas.Inaddition,142reportedkillingshavebeendirectlyattributedto14differentmobilebrigades,11ofwhichwerevettedtoreceiveassistancein2008‐09.19Are“effectivemeasures”and“necessarycorrectivesteps”beingtaken?TheLeahyLawincludesanexceptionontheprohibitionofassistanceif“effectivemeasures”arebeingtakentobringthoseresponsibleforaviolationtojustice.TheStateDepartmentdefineseffectivemeasuresas“takingstepssothatindividualswhohavecommittedgrosshumanrightsviolations‘faceappropriatedisciplinaryactionorimpartialprosecutioninaccordancewithlocallaw.’”Itexcludesfromeffectivemeasuresthetransfertoanotherunitofindividualscrediblyreportedtohavecommittedviolations.InthecaseofDOD‐fundedtraining,thestandardforthisexceptionis“unlessallnecessarycorrectivestepshavebeentaken.”TheStateDepartmentguidancedoesnotdefine“necessarycorrectivesteps.”20

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OneColombianhumanrightsattorneyexpressedfrustrationthat,whentheColombianAttorneyGeneral’sofficehasnotopenedaninvestigationintoakilling,Embassypersonnelsaythatthereislittletocorroboratenon‐governmentalreportsthatthekillingwasanextrajudicialexecution,despitetheabsenceofanyrequirementforcorroborationorjudicialreviewintheLeahyLawforaclaimtobeconsideredcredible,butthatwhentheAttorneyGeneral’sofficeopensaninvestigation,itiscreditedasprogress,an“effectivemeasure.”Othersnotethatmanyinvestigationsareopened,butfewadvance.Ofthe3,014killingsreviewedinthisstudy,morethan1,500wereunderinvestigationbytheAttorneyGeneral’soffice,butonly43hadreachedaverdictasofmid‐2009,andprocessesforjust20victimshadresultedinasentence.21TheStateDepartment’smostrecentmemorandajustifyinghumanrightscertificationalsoillustratethatonly1.5%ofthereportedextrajudicialexecutionssince2002reviewedbytheStateDepartmenthaveresultedinconviction.22Whatconstitutesa“unit”?TheColombianSupremeCourtruledrecentlythatcommandersareresponsibleforabusescommittedbytheirsubordinates.23Brigadecommandersactwithlittlesupervisionandhaveagreatdealofdiscretion.AccordingtoColombianhumanrightsorganizationsweinterviewed,somecommandersalsoaresubjecttoinfluencebyregionalpoliticalandeconomicelites.Forthesereasonsweassignhighimportancetobrigadecommandstafffortheconductoftroops.Colombiancourtshaveacceptedthecommander’sresponsibilityforthecrimescommittedbyagentsundertheirsupervision.Inthemostrecentcaseoftheuseofthislegalargument,ColonelLuisAlfonsoPlazasVega(Ret.)wasfoundguiltyinJune2010fortheforceddisappearanceof11peopleduringthemilitaryoperationtoretakethePalaceofJustice,seizedbyguerrillasin1985.Suchresponsibilityisknownasindirectresponsibilityororganizedpowerstructures.Underthistheoryofthe“manbehind,”apersonhaslegalresponsibilityifhehascontrolwithinanorganizationandcanensuretheproductionofanoutcomethroughtheapparatusunderhiscontrol,withouthavingtoacthimself.24TheLeahyLawdoesnotestablishajudicialstandardofresponsibilityforabuses.GiventheColombiancourts’supportforthetheoryofcommandresponsibility,Leahyimplementationshouldincorporatethisrecognitionofcommandresponsibilitybysuspendingassistancetounitscommandedbyofficerspreviouslyresponsibleforunitswhosemembersarecrediblyreportedtohavecommittedgrossabuses,untileffectivemeasuresaretakentoholdsuchcommandersresponsible.Thisincludesnon‐combatunitscurrentlycommandedbysuchofficers.Themapsshownheretoillustratehumanrightsvettingandtheimpactsofmilitaryassistancedon’treflectaidtoindividualsinunvettedandsuspendedunits,whichwouldindicateevenmoreU.S.aidinbrigadejurisdictionswithhighnumbersofreportedexecutions,butinmostcasessuchaidtoindividualscouldnotbetrackedbyyear.25

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TheDataFor1,087killingssince2002,witnessesidentifiedamilitaryunitresponsibleforthekilling(orthemilitaryitselfidentifiedtheunitinclaimingacombatdeath).Inthisanalysis,wealsoexaminedwhethertheunitsreceivedU.S.assistancepreviousorsubsequenttothereportedexecution.26Figure1showstheprogressionofthesekillings,from2002through2008(inonlyonekillingin2009wastheunitidentified).AlthoughthenumbersofexecutionsreportedlycommittedbyunitspreviouslyorsubsequentlyassistedbytheUnitedStatesroseandfellwiththeoverallpattern,thepercentageofkillingsreportedlycommittedbyunitsthatsubsequentlyreceivedU.S.assistanceroseprogressivelyovertheperiod.By2008,formorethan79%ofthe147killingsinwhichaunitwasidentified,theunitwassubsequentlyapprovedtoreceiveassistance.Thiswastrueeventhough,bythattime,theperiodsubsequenttothekillinginwhichassistancecouldbegivenwasshort(sixtoeighteenmonths),anddespiteextensiveattentiongiventotheLeahyvettingprocessinColombia2008and2009.Figure2

Theendoffalsepositives?Asthegraphsanddatainthisreportindicate,afterNovember2008,thenumberofreportedkillingsofciviliansbytheColombianarmedforcesdroppedprecipitously,apparentlyduetoaninstitutionaldecisiontoaddressthepractice.Inthisrespect,theworkofhumanrightsadvocatesinColombiaandtheinternationalcommunityseemstohavehadasubstantialandmaterialimpact.Still,althoughColombianauthoritiesclaimedtherewasnotasinglereportofextrajudicialkillingsincethattime,thisisnotthecase.TheColombianCommissionofJuristsdocumented16casesindetailfromNovember2008toMarch2010.27Experiencealsoshowsthatsomereportsofkillingslagconsiderablyovertime.In

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addition,thedecreaseinkillingsattributedtothearmedforceshasbeenaccompaniedbyasteepclimbinthenumberofreportedkillingsbyparamilitarysuccessorgroups,asindicatedbythenumberofextrajudicialkillingsdocumentedbytheCenterforInvestigationandPopularEducation,CINEP28(seeFigure2).Colombianhumanrightsorganizationsalsoreportincreasedaccountsofforceddisappearanceallegedlycommittedbyarmedforces.TheimplicationsofreducedreportsofciviliankillingsforcontinuedU.S.assistanceundertheLeahyLaw,however,areminimal,sincethelawrequiresnotsimplyanendtothekilling,but“effectivemeasures”tobringthoseresponsibletojusticebeforeneworcontinuedassistancetothearmedforcesislawful.MappingHumanRightsImpactIfU.S.assistancewerehavingapositiveeffectonthehumanrightsconductofassistedunits,wewouldexpecttoseelownumbersofreportedextrajudicialkillingsbythearmyinthoseareaswhereaidtothearmyisconcentrated.Thetwomapsshow(withdensityofcolor)theextentofaidtounitsoperatingineachbrigadejurisdictionduringtheindicatedyears(seep.33forhowwemeasuredaid).Theyalsoindicate,withcircledstars,thenumberofarmykillingsofciviliansreportedintheseareas,inthetwoyearsimmediatelyfollowingtheperiodofU.S.aidshown.However,themapsdon’tindicatechangesineitherU.S.assistanceorinnumberofreportedkillings.Soalthoughitisclearthatreportedkillingswerehighinsomeareaswhereassistancewashigh–especiallyvisibleinthesecondmap‐themapsalsoshowahighlevelofreportedkillingsinsomejurisdictions,suchastheFourthBrigadeinAntioquia,whereU.S.assistancewasrelativelylow(seep.22forFourthBrigadeprofile).Wealsousedstatisticalmeanstomeasurehumanrightsviolationsofunitsaftertheyreceivedassistance.Inordertoisolatetherelationshipbetweenassistanceandsubsequentexecutionsfromotherpotentialfactors,weidentifiedthebrigadejurisdiction/yearswhenunitsinthejurisdictionreceivedthelargestincreasesinU.S.assistance.WefoundthatreportedextrajudicialkillingsincreasedonaverageinareasaftertheUnitedStatesincreasedassistancetounitsinthoseareas.Forthe16largestincreasesofaidfromoneyeartothenexttoarmyunitsoperatinginaspecificjurisdiction,thenumberof

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reportedexecutionsinthejurisdictionincreasedanaverageof56%fromthetwo‐yearperiodpriortotheincreasetothetwo‐yearperiodduringandaftertheincreasedassistance.29Inotherwords,whenthereweresignificantincreasesinassistancetounitsoperatinginanarea,therewereonaverageincreasesinreportedkillingsinthoseareasintheperiodsfollowingtheincreasedassistance.Ontheotherhand,inyearsafterlevelsofassistanceweremostreducedforunitsoperatinginajurisdiction,thenumberofexecutionsreportedlycommittedbyunitsoperatinginthejurisdictionfell,alsobyanaverageof56%.Overall,regionswiththebiggestincreasesinmilitaryaidgenerallyexperienceagreaterincreaseorasmallerdecreaseinthenumberofextrajudicialexecutionsthandoregionswiththebiggestdecreasesinmilitaryaid.However,thereisvariationovertime,andotheranalysesofthisdatacouldsuggestlessofacorrelation.Nevertheless,someunitsmayhavebeen“de‐vetted”orsuspendedfromU.S.assistanceinyearsofdecreasedassistance,whichmayhaveledthoseunitstoattempttocontrolhumanrightsabuses.30Ifthiswerethecase,itwouldsuggestthatsuspendingassistancetounitsisasignificantinfluenceonthoseunits’humanrightsconduct.InallsevencasesofabrigadejurisdictionthatsawadecreaseinreportedkillingsafteranincreaseinU.S.assistance,thedecreasesoccurredin2008and2009.Duringthisperiod,humanrightsgroupsreportchangedmodalitiesofabuses(forexample,disappearances),andadelayinreportsofextrajudicialkillings,particularlyfor2009.Atleastasimportant,judgingbythedecreasesinreportedciviliankillingsacrossthecountry,thearmedforces

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appeartohavemadeaninstitutionaldecisiontoseriouslycurtailthepracticeaftertherevelationsofthekillingsinSoachaledtohigh‐levelmediaandinternationalscrutiny.RoleofSOAtraining:ThelargemajorityoftheColombianarmy’sbrigadeanddivisioncommandersreceivedtrainingattheUSArmySchooloftheAmericas.In2009,forexample,30of33brigadeanddivisioncommanderswhocouldbeidentifiedattendedoneormorecoursesattheSchool.31Inmostcases,thistrainingtookplacemorethan20yearsbeforetheofficercommandedabrigade,thoughtheexperiencemayhavebeenformative.WefounditdifficulttotracktheinfluenceofSOAtrainingonindividualofficersandcommanders,butitissignificantthattheUnitedStateshastrainedvirtuallytheentireclassofColombianArmycommanders.Thosejurisdictionswherethenumberofreportedkillingswasthehighestafterreceivingincreasedassistanceallhadreportedmultiplearmykillingsofciviliansintheperiodbeforetheincrease.Thissuggeststhataproblemthatwasignoredindecidingtoincreaseassistancetoaunittendedtobecomeworseafterward.CorrelationofIncreasedMilitaryAidtoIncreasesinReportedKillings:HypothesesandPossibleExplanatoryFactorsTherearesignificantgapsinourknowledgeandunderstandingtohelpinterpretthecausesforwhatwefound.Nevertheless,webelieveitisimportanttoconsiderpotential

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explanationsandinterpretationsofourfindings,andwecallforfurtherinvestigationofthesehypotheses.ProponentsofmilitaryassistancetoColombiaarguethattheimpactofsuchassistanceonhumanrightsispositiveor,atworst,neutral.“Forthemostpart,unitsthathaveaUSphysicalpresencetendtohavelessproblemseitherbecausewearemakingapositivechange,and/orbecausetheyareafraidthatwearewatchingthem,”accordingtooneU.S.militarytrainerwithsignificantexperienceinColombia.U.S.assistance“givesanopportunitytoinfluence,”anothermilitarytrainerwithexperienceinColombia,nowworkingintheJointChiefsofStaffofficetoldFOR.“Ifyoulookatwhenwedidn’tassist–likeinGuatemala,therewasnoassistanceintheworstperiod.Whenassistancebeganagain,humanrightsviolationsdeclined.”32InColombia,withtheexceptionoftheSixthBrigadeoperatinginTolima,thedataonreportsofarmykillingsdon’tsupportthatthesis.Higherlevelsofviolenceinsomeareasthanothers.Someobservershavesuggestedthatthelargernumbersofextrajudicialkillingsareoccurringinareaswithhighlevelsofviolence.“Thenumberofcombatdeaths,thenumberofviolentcombatoperations,allofthosenumberstherearemuchhigherthaninotherpartsofthecountry,andsothefactthatwemayhaveahighnumberofallegationsofextrajudicialkillingsisactuallyconsistentwiththisoveralllevel,muchhigherlevelsofcombat,”anEmbassyofficertoldFORin2008.33Iftherewereacorrelationbetweenlevelsofoverallreportedviolenceandlevelsofreportedextrajudicialkillings,isthisavalidexplanationfortheincreasesinextrajudicialkillingsafterunitsreceivedU.S.assistance?OnehypothesisholdsthatU.S.assistanceisdirectedtoareaswithhighlevelsofoverallviolence.Thismightsuggesthigherlevelsofextrajudicialkillings(aswellasotherviolence)thaninareaswherethemilitaryreceivedlessU.S.assistance.Butitwouldnotexplainchangesinthenumberofreportedarmykillings,unlesstheoveralllevelofviolencealsogrewafterincreasesinU.S.assistance.Suchanoverallincreaseinviolencewouldalsoraiseseriousquestionsabouttheefficacyofassistance,sinceitwouldindicatethatU.S.assistancewascontributingtoorpartofgreaterviolenceoverall.AccordingtotheCoordinaciónColombiaEuropaEstadosUnidos(CCEEU),the“overwhelmingmajority”ofkillingsanalyzedinthisstudywerefalsepositives.AnanalysisbytheColombianInspectorGeneral’sofficein2009outlinedfivemodalitiesemployedinsuchkillings:

1. Recruitmentofvictimsbyprivatecitizenswhodeliveredthemtosoldiers.

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2. Arrestofvictimsbythemilitary.3. Arrestbymilitaryofinformantsorcollaboratorswithillegalarmedgroups,with

helpfromformercombatants.4. Arrestofvictimsbyparamilitarygroupswhoturnedthemovertomilitarytobe

executedandpresentedaskilledincombat.5. Arrestofvictimsbymilitaryandturnedovertoillegalarmedgroupstobe

executed.34Thesemodalitiesdonotappeartocorrespondtohigherlevelsofoverallviolence,andinsomecasesmightmoreaccuratelycorrespondtolowerlevelsofguerrillaactivity,orgreaterdifficultyinmilitarilyengagingguerrillasonthebattlefield.Increasednumberofsoldiersinassistedunits.IfU.S.supportallowedforanincreasednumberofsoldiersineachassistedunit,thenthiscouldcontributetoexplainingwhyassistedunitshadmorereportedexecutionsonaverage.Infact,thenumberofarmysoldiersoverallnationallynearlydoubledduringthisperiod:fromabout145,000attheendofthe1990s,tosome285,000inearly2010.However,mostofthisgrowthwasaccommodatedbyaddingnewunits:twonewdivisions,twelveterritorialbrigades,19mobilebrigades,and11specialforcesgroupswereestablishedduringthisperiod.35Thenumberoftroopsineachbrigadedidnotgrowsignificantly,certainlynotinproportiontothegrowthinreportedexecutionsduringthesameperiod.Changesinpopulationinjurisdictionsofassistedunits.Ifregionalpopulationsgrewordeclinedsignificantly,thismayhaveprovidedmore“opportunity”forciviliankillings.However,wefoundnocorrespondencebetweenpopulationandnumbersorchangesinreportsofciviliankillings.Possibledifferencesinreportingkillingsbyassistedunits.OnepossibleexplanationofincreasesinreportsofarmykillingsisaninclinationtoreportkillingsbyunitsassistedbytheUnitedStatesmorethanthosenotassisted.OtherinvestigatorshavefoundthatmanyhomicidesinColombiagounreported.36Webelievethisexplanationisimplausible,however,becauseU.S.assistanceistypicallynotvisibleeithertothepopulationortohumanrightsgroups,exceptforsomehighlypublicizedcases.The“pushintotheSouth”inPutumayoandCaquetáinthe2000‐03periodreceivedmuchpublicattention,forexample,buttheincreasesdonotreflectsuchhighlypublicexamplesofU.S.assistance.ThedifferencesbetweenU.S.ambassadorsorU.S.presidencies.Ambassadorssetthetoneandprioritiesinanembassy.PossibleexplanatoryfactorsforthefailuretofullyimplementtheLeahyLawincludethedifferentwaysthatthreesuccessiveU.S.ambassadorsaddressedhumanrightsconcernsgenerallyandLeahyimplementationspecifically.Suchanexplanationwouldassumethattheembassyhasacriticalroleinthesettingofsuchpriorities.AmbassadorAnnePatterson(1999‐2003)oversawthebeginningofPlanColombia,whichaccordingtooneCongressionalobserverwas“dumpedon”her.WhileassistancetosomeunitswassuspendedduringAmbassadorPatterson’stenure,shealsoparticipatedintheprocessforthefirsthumanrightscertificationsoftheColombiamilitary.

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AmbassadorWilliamWood(2003‐07),ontheotherhand,reportedlydidnotacttosuspendassistancetoasinglemilitaryunit,oversawanexpansionofgeographicreachofassistedunits,andwaschiefofmissionatthetimetheArmycreatedinstitutionalincentivesforbodycounts,whichappearstohavecontributedtotherapidgrowthofextrajudicialexecutionsreportedlycommittedbytheArmyin2006and2007.AmbassadorWilliamBrownfield(2007‐present)hasoverseenboththecontractionofU.S.militaryassistanceapprovedbyCongress,theeruptionofthe“falsepositives”scandalandconsequentpressuretotakeaction,andthesuspensionofU.S.assistancetoseveralunits,includingthe11thBrigade,SecondandSeventhDivisioncommands,and14thEngineeringBattalion.37WhereastheembassyinBogotáhasthebulkofresponsibilityforLeahyvetting,thehumanrightscertificationthatcontrolsabout$100millioninmilitaryassistanceayearis“aWashington‐drivenprocess,”AmbassadorWoodtoldFOR.TheprocessrequirestheSecretaryofStatetocertifythattheColombiangovernmentis“vigorouslyinvestigatingandprosecuting”membersofthemilitarycrediblyallegedtohavecommittedgrossrightsviolationsandisseveringlinkswithparamilitarygroups.Whilehumanrightsconcerns–especiallyinCongress–havedelayedorputaholdonfundssubjecttocertification,theStateDepartmenthasneverultimatelydeclinedtoissuethecertification.OnehypothesisisthatU.S.assistanceincreasedtheperceivedlegitimacyofthoseunitsreceivingassistance,andthatsuchexternally‐createdlegitimacybroughtwithitagreatersenseofimpunityandentitlement.“Colombianscantrainsoldiersjustaswellasagringocan.Butit’sthatpsychologicalimpactthatagringoishelping,”theU.S.militarytrainertoldFOR.“Thatpsychologicalimpactmayonlybeforafewmonths.Butifhethinkshe’sbetter,that’sagoodthing.”38Colombianmilitaryleadershaveemphasizedthat“legitimacyisthecenterofgravity”oftheircounterinsurgencyfight,anditisclearthataperceptionthatthearmedforcesrespecthumanrightsiscentraltosuchlegitimacy.RecognitionbytheSecretaryofState,intheformofperiodiccertificationofrespectforhumanrightsmaybeperceivedaslegitimizingtheColombianmilitary’sconduct.“ThehumanrightscertificationofthearmedforcesbytheU.S.DepartmentofStateisarecognitionoftheeffortrealizedbytheArmyinthismatter,”GeneralMontoyasaidinApril2007,evenasthenumberofreportedciviliankillingsbytheArmywasatitspeak.39WhyhastheLeahyAmendmentnotbeenimplementedeffectivelyinColombia?OnehypothesisisthattheStateDepartmentwasunawareofcrediblereportsofabuses.Publicreportsbythemediaandhumanrightsorganizationsoftenconcentrateonseveralselectedkeycasesofreportedabuses.Untilrecently,NocheyNieblaandtheCINEPdatabasewerethemostthoroughpubliclyavailableinformationonreportedkillings.However,lessthan25%ofthevictimswhosecasesareanalyzedinthisstudywerelistedintheCINEPdatabase.WhileinmanycasestheCINEPdatabasedocumentedabundantevidenceofexecutionstomeritsuspensionofaid,forsomeArmyunitstherewerefew

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reportsdirectlyattributedtotheunitintheCINEPdatabase.40In2008,CCEEUreleasedareportthatindicatedreportsofextrajudicialexecutionsby28armybrigades,althoughitdidnotincludeindividualcaseinformation.41TheEmbassyalsohasavailabletherecordsofinvestigationsundertakenbytheProsecutorGeneral’sandInspectorGeneral’soffices.TheProsecutorGeneral’sofficeprovidedColombianhumanrightsorganizationsin2009withalistof1,726namesofvictimsanddatesofallegedextrajudicialexecutionssince2002thatitwasinvestigating.Thelistdidnotindicatetheunitsofsoldiersunderinvestigation.IntheearlyyearsofPlanColombia,U.S.AmbassadorCurtisKammanexpressedfrustrationwiththeconditionsofrelevantrecordsoninvestigationsintoreportsofabuses.“Recordkeepingineachinstitutionismarginalatbest,”Kammanreported.“Thosedatabasesthatdoexistarepoorlymaintained.LocalofficesdonotalwaysprovideinformationtocentralofficesinBogotá.Finally,thereisthewillandinterestofthesearcherstoactuallyfindrequestedinformation.”42HumanrightsorganizationsandEmbassypersonnelcontinuetoobservedifficultiesinobtainingconsistentnationalandcomprehensiveinformationonthestatusofinvestigationsintoextrajudicialkillingsfromtheProsecutorGeneral’sandInspectorGeneral’soffices.TheEmbassymayhaveonlyconsideredreportsthatidentifiedaspecificunitresponsibleforaviolationbynameas“credibleevidence”thatmembersoftheunitwereresponsible.Withoutageographicanalysisofunitjurisdictions,the1,927killingsattributedtothemilitarystudiedinthisreportforwhichaunitwasnotidentifiedcouldhavecompletelyescapedLeahyimplementation.Forsomeunits,greaterresourcesdevotedtohumanrightsvettingbytheStateDepartmentmayhaveresultedinmoreextensivedocumentationofseriousabuses.WhatevertheinadequaciesofinformationobtainedbyEmbassypersonnelinthepast,therearenowabundantcrediblereportsofextrajudicialexecutionscommittedbynearlyeveryarmyterritorialbrigade,andmostmobilebrigades.AnotherhypothesisholdsthattheStateDepartmentknewofproblemsinunitsbutthatofficialsinWashingtondiscountedthemorplacedahigherpriorityonotherperceivedpolicyobjectives.AmbassadorWoodtoldFORinaninterviewthatembassystafftookthevettingprocessseriously,leadingtodelaysinassistanceofuptosixmonths.“Itendedupbecomingcounterproductive,”hesaidofvetting.ThelowerpriorityplacedonimplementinghumanrightsobjectiveswasreflectedintherepeatedcertificationsbytheSecretaryofState.SuchanorderingofprioritiescouldhavebeenreinforcedbyaperceptionthatthereportsprovidedbyhumanrightsNGOsarenotsufficiently“credible”andmustbetemperedbyArmyclaimstothecontrary.

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UnitStudiesEleventhBrigade.TheEleventhBrigadeoperatesintheCaribbeandepartmentsofCórdobaandSucre,aswellastheBajoCaucaareaofnortheasternAntioquia.Thesezonesinthelate1990sbecamethecradleofparamilitarisminColombia.Paramilitaryleadershereestablishedtrainingcamps,operatedfreely,andestablishedallianceswithlocalbusinessandpoliticalelites.ItwasinCórdobathat26politicianssignedthe“RalitoPact”withparamilitariesin2001to“re‐foundthenation,”whichbecameabasisforthe“parapolitical”scandal,inwhichnearly30percentoftheColombianCongressisunderinvestigationorhasbeenjailedduetotheirtiestoparamilitarygroups.Inthiscontext,the11thBrigadeadvertisedonitswebsitethesaleofweapons,includingmachineguns.CurrentArmycommanderOscarGonzálezPeñacommandedthebrigadein2002‐03.By2005,theguerrillapresenceinCórdobaandSucrewasnegligible,andtherewasnotasignificantamountofcocaleafplantedinthearea.TherewasnoclearlyvisiblestrategicvalueinU.S.assistancetothebrigade.Yetin2005,afternodirectunitassistancetothebrigadeatleastsincePlanColombiabeganin2001,theUnitedStatesapprovedandassistedsixbattalionsinthe11thBrigade,aswellasthebrigadecommand.Inthepreviousyear,12killingshadreportedlybeencommittedbythearmyinthebrigade’sjurisdiction;witnessesinfourofthemhadidentified11thBrigademembersasauthors.TheyearU.S.assistancebegan,22killingswerereported.Thefollowingyear,2006,49armykillingswerereportedinthe11thBrigade’sjurisdiction,allbutfiveofthemunderpreliminaryinvestigationbytheInspectorGeneralorAttorneyGeneral’sofficeasof2009,43yettheUnitedStatescontinuedtovetandassistvirtuallytheentirebrigadein2007.In2007,thenumberofreportedarmykillingsinthejurisdictionincreasedto101.TheseincludedthekillingofLeonardoMontesbyaU.S.‐assistedbattalion

inwhichMontes’brotherwasasoldier.Thesoldiertriedtopreventthemurderofhisbrother,whohadbeenpickedupaspartofaplanto“legalize”akillingandcounthimasaguerrillakilledincombat,butwasnotsuccessful.44WhenabattalioncommanderandsixothersoldiersfromthebrigadewerearrestedinApril2008forcollaborationwithaparamilitarysuccessor

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groupcompetingfordrugtraffickingroutesintheregion,theUnitedStatesfinallysuspendedassistancetothebrigade.45AfterU.S.assistancewassuspended,thenumberofreportedarmykillingsinthebrigade’sjurisdictionfellprecipitously–to14in2008andthreelastyear.Alargemajority–67.3%–oftheciviliankillingsinthe11thBrigade’sjurisdictionthatwereattributedtoaunitwerereportedlycarriedoutbymembersofthe11thBrigade.46Foranyoneofthe167killingsreportedlycommittedbytheArmyinthebrigade’sjurisdictionforwhichaunitwasnotidentified,thelocationoftheincidentinthebrigade’sjurisdictionindicatesaprobabilitythatitwascarriedoutby11thBrigadesoldiers.FORaskedStateandDefenseDepartmentofficialsonfourdifferentoccasionswhatmissionwasservedbyassistingthe11thBrigade,butnonehadadefiniteanswer.Somenon‐governmentalanalystsspeculatedthattheassistancemighthavebeeninsupportoftheoperationagainstFARCcommander“MartinCaballero,”whichculminatedinthebombingofhiscampinOctober2007.Thismaybethecase.However,Caballero’scampwaslocatedoutsideofthe11thBrigade’sjurisdiction,andtheoperationwascarriedoutbytheCaribbeanJointCommandandreportedlyledbytheSecondInfantryBrigade.47CodazziBattalion.TheAgustínCodazziEngineeringBattalionoperatesaspartoftheThirdBrigadeinValledeCauca,andhasreceivedunitassistancefromtheUnitedStateseveryyeargoingbackatleastasfarasthe2000‐03period.Individualsfromthebattalionalsoreceivedassistanceinperiodswhenitwasnotvetted(presumablyduringthe2000‐03period).In2004,CINEPreportedonthekillings,reportedlybymembersoftheCodazziBattalion,ofCarlosRodrigoLargoinCorinto,CaucaonJune16andofClaudiaPatriciaMoralesinPalmira,Valle,onMarch14.ThekillingofLargowaspartofavillageraidinwhichCodazzitroopsreportedlythreatened,robbedandbeatvillagers.ThereisnorecordthatthesekillingswereinvestigatedbytheAttorneyGeneral’sofficeorInspectorGeneral’soffice.In2007theCodazziBattalionwasidentifiedastheauthoroftenciviliankillings,andthesamenumberagainin2008.48Onlyfourofthetwentyreportedexecutionsin2007‐08areunderinvestigationbytheAttorneyGeneral’soffice.Therearenoreportedconvictions.Inspiteofcrediblereportsofgrossviolationsofhumanrightsin2004,and20subsequentreportedkillingsbythissinglebattalion,theUnitedStatescontinuedtoprovideassistancetotheunitbetween2008‐2010.Whileengineeringbattalionsdobuildroadsandwells,theyalsoengageincombat.AlthoughtheThirdBrigadehas12battalions,theCodazziwasreportedlyresponsiblefor22outof53executionsattributedtothebrigade.Yet,itwastheonlyunitinthebrigadethatcontinuedtoreceiveassistancefrom2008to2010.TheCodazziisoneofseveralengineeringbattalionsreceivingU.S.assistanceinbrigadesthatotherwisereceivelittleornodirectU.S.support.49

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NinthBrigade.TheArmy’sNinthBrigadeoperatesinthesoutherndepartmentofHuilaandismadeupoffivecombatbattalions,supportandtrainingbattalions,andananti‐kidnappinggroup.50WhentheNinthBrigade’scommandandunitswerevettedforthefirsttimeinthesummerof2005,16civiliankillingshadreportedlybeencommittedbythemilitaryinHuilasincethebeginningof2002.FiveoftheseareunderinvestigationbytheInspectorGeneral’soffice,thoughalloftheinvestigationswerestalledasofmid‐2009.In2006,another17armykillingswerereported,buttheU.S.continuedtoassistfourcombatbattalionsin2007,includingtheMagdalenaandPigoanzaBattalions.Thatyear,everyarmykillingreportedinthebrigade’sjurisdictionattributedtoaspecificunitwasreportedlycommittedbyoneofthesetwoU.S.‐assistedbattalions.In2008,theUnitedStatesfinallysuspendedassistancetotheMagdalenaandPigoanzaBattalions.Twenty‐eightkillingswereattributedtothetwounitsthatyear,andnonein2009.YettheU.S.continuestoassistthebrigadecommand,presumablyontheassumptionthatitwasnotresponsibleforthesetwounits,despitethefactthatanadditional22killingsbythemilitarywerereportedinthebrigade’sjurisdictionin2008,inadditiontothoseattributedtotheMagdalenaandPigoanzaBattalions.Thebrigade’scommanderfromatleastSeptember2006toNovember2007(aperiodwhenthebrigadecommandstaffandthreebattalionswerevettedandassisted)wasColonelJaimeAlfonsoLasprillaVillamizar,whowasfreshfroma10‐monthcourseattheNationalWarCollegeinWashington.In2002‐03,then‐Lt.Col.LasprillaservedasaninstructorattheSchooloftheAmericas,wherehehadalsobeenastudentasacadet.DuringhistermasNinthBrigadecommander,atleast49civiliankillingswerereportedlycommittedbythearmyinthebrigade’sjurisdiction,31ofthemattributedbywitnessesdirectlytoNinthBrigadesoldiers.LasprillawassubsequentlypromotedtotherankofbrigadiergeneralandcommanderoftheU.S.‐supportedTaskForceOmega.HecurrentlycommandstheArmy’staskforceintheconflictiveParamilloKnot(NudodeParamillo)area.Nearlyall–97.6%–ofthe85civiliankillingsinHuilaattributedtoaunitwerereportedlycarriedoutbymembersoftheNinthBrigade.Forthe49killingsreportedlycommittedbytheArmyforwhichaunitwasnotidentified,thelocationoftheincidentconstitutescredibleevidencethattheywerecarriedoutbyNinthBrigadesoldiers.SixthBrigade.TheoutliertothepatternofkillingsincreasingafterU.S.assistanceistheSixthBrigade,operatinginTolimaDepartment.Thebrigade’scommandstaffreceivedassistancefrom2000to2005.Duringthattime,50civiliankillingsbythemilitarywerereportedinthebrigade’sjurisdiction,includingthewell‐knownCajamarcamassacreoffivepeopleinApril2004.In2006and2007,assistancetothebrigadeceased,andthenumberofciviliankillingsincreasedduringthatperiod.Aidtothecommandstaffresumedin2008,togetherwithaidtothebrigade’santi‐kidnappinggroup,aftersoldierswereconvictedfortheCajamarcamassacre,andintheperiodfollowingthisassistance,thenumberofreportedkillingsfell

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from53to21.Thefollowingyear,aftertheU.S.increasedassistanceagain,toincludethreecombatbattalionsinthebrigade,thenumberofreportedkillingsfelltozeroin2009.ThiscouldbeinterpretedasapositiveimpactofU.S.aidonthehumanrightsconductofthisbrigade.Ontheotherhand,in2008‐09,andagainthisyear,theUnitedStateshasbeenfullyassistingabrigadeinwhosejurisdictiontheArmyreportedlykilled124civilianssince2002,inclearviolationoftheLeahyLaw.51Ahighpercentage–87.5%–ofthe42civiliankillingsinTolimaattributedtoaunitwerereportedlycarriedoutbymembersoftheSixthBrigade.Forthe82killingsreportedlycommittedbytheArmyforwhichaunitwasnotidentified,thelocationoftheincidentconstitutescredibleevidencethatalargemajoritywerecarriedoutbySixthBrigadesoldiers.FifthBrigadeprovidesanexampleofaunitreceivinglittleU.S.assistanceandshowinglowerthanaveragereportsofciviliankillings.TheArmy’sFifthBrigadehasjurisdictioninmostofSantanderdepartment,anduntiltheformationofthe30thBrigadein2005,ithadresponsibilityfortheCatatumboregionofNorthSantanderandsouthernCesaraswell.Duringthe1980sand1990s,thebrigadewasreportedlyresponsibleforanumberofabuses,documentedbytheNuncaMás(NeverAgain)project,togetherwiththe2ndMobileBrigade,thenoperatingintheregion.52Morerecently,incomparisontootherbrigadesandtheirjurisdictions,therearenotasmanyciviliankillingsattributedtotheArmy.Nevertheless,52killingsattributedtothearmyhavebeenreportedinthebrigade’sjurisdictionsince2002,and20ofthesedirectlyidentifiedFifthBrigadetroopsasresponsible.Twenty‐fourwereunderinvestigationbytheAttorneyGeneral’soffice,yetonlyonehadreachedaverdictbyJuly2009.Thebrigade’sRafaelReyesBattalionwasimplicatedinthekillingoffivevictimsaspartoftheSoachascandal.ThebrigadehasnotbeenasignificantfocusofU.S.assistance.Itscommandstaffandbattalionshavenotbeenvettedtoreceiveaidsince2000.However,individualsfromthecommandstaffandeightcomponentunitswereassistedduringthisperiod.ThisincludedtrainingattheNationalWarCollegeinCarlisleBarracks,Pennsylvania.Nearlyall–90%–ofthe20civiliankillingsintheFifthBrigade’sjurisdictionattributedtoaunitwerereportedlycarriedoutbymembersoftheFifthBrigade.Forthe32killingsinthejurisdictionreportedlycommittedbythearmyforwhichaunitwasnotidentified,thelocationoftheincidentconstitutescredibleevidencethattheywerecarriedoutbyFifthBrigadesoldiers.SixteenthBrigade.Formedin1992intheeasternoil‐producingdepartmentofCasanare,the16thBrigadewasreportedlyresponsibleforanincreasingnumberofextrajudicialexecutionsafter2004,withahighnumberin2007.Ninety‐oneciviliankillingshave

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reportedlybeencommittedbythearmyinthebrigade’sjurisdictionsince2002;thirty‐oneofthesewereattributedbywitnessesdirectlytomembersofthe16thBrigade.The16thBrigadebeganreceivingU.S.assistancein2005,anddidsoforthreeconsecutiveyears.Assistancewasfocusedonfourcombatbattalions;theUnitedStatesapprovedassistanceforthecommandstaffandtwootherbattalions,butreportedlydidnotimplementtheassistance.Duringthethreeyearsofassistancetothe29thCounterguerrillaBattalion,theunitreportedlycommittedfourciviliankillings;noreportedkillingshavebeenattributedtothebattalionbeforeaidbeganorsinceaidtoitceasedin2008.Thesameisthecaseforthe44thInfantryBattalion,assistedfrom2005to2008,duringwhichtimefourextrajudicialkillingswereattributedtoit.Elevenciviliankillingswereattributedtothebrigade’santi‐kidnappingunit(GAULA),nearlyallofthemin2007.TheUnitedStatesassistedindividualsintheunitbetween2000and2007,butwewerenotabletodeterminewhenorwhatkindofassistancewasgiven.Nearlyall–96.3%–ofthe31civiliankillingsinCasanareattributedtoaunitwerereportedlycarriedoutbymembersofthe16thBrigade.Forthe60killingsinthedepartmentreportedlycommittedbythearmyforwhichaunitwasnotidentified,thelocationoftheincidentconstitutescredibleevidencethattheywerecarriedoutby16thBrigadesoldiers.EighteenthBrigade.The18thBrigadeoperatesinconflictiveandoil‐producingAraucaDepartment,ontheborderwithVenezuela.TheFifthMobileBrigadealsooperatesinthearea.The18thBrigadewasanimportantfocusofU.S.assistanceuntil2008,especiallyaftertheauthorityforassistanceexpandedbeyondcounternarcoticsaidin2002.TheFifthMobileBrigadealsohasreceivedU.S.assistancesinceatleast2003.Forthefirsttimesincethen,thisyeartheUnitedStatesdidnotapprovethemobilebrigade’scommandstaffforassistance,butitcontinuestoapprovefourcounter‐guerrillabattalionsforaid.The18thBrigadebecameaprominentfocusofhumanrightsandlaborgroupsandtheU.S.Embassyin2004,whentroopskilledthreetradeunionists.Thepreviousyear,eightkillingswereattributedtothebrigade,includingamassacreoffourindigenouspersonsandtherapeoffourteenagedgirlsonMay5,2003,allegedlycommittedbymembersofthe‘NavasPardo’EngineeringBattaliondressedinparamilitaryuniforms.53ThebattalionwassupportedbytheUnitedStatesduringthe2000‐03periodandagainin2005‐2007(theunitwasvettedbutnotassistedin2004).Therewereciviliankillingsattributedtothebrigadeeachyear,buttheUnitedStatescontinuedtoassistthebrigade’scommandstaffandevenincreasedthenumberofbattalionsassistedthrough2007.

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Most–75%–ofthe44civiliankillingsinAraucaattributedtoaunitwerereportedlycarriedoutbymembersofthe18thBrigade;theremainderwerecarriedoutbymobilebrigadesthatalsohaveconsistentlyreceivedU.S.assistance.Forthe63killingsinthedepartmentreportedlycommittedbytheArmyforwhichaunitwasnotidentified,thelocationoftheincidentsuggeststhattheywerelikelycarriedoutby18thBrigadesoldiers.FourthBrigade.TheFourthBrigade,withheadquartersinMedellínandjurisdictionformuchofAntioquia,hasbeenapowerhouseofthearmy,withseveralofitscommandersrisingtoleadershipofthemilitaryinrecentyears,includingthecurrentandpenultimatearmycommanders.54Extrajudicialkillingsbythearmyinthebrigade’sjurisdictionalsooutnumberbyfarthoseofanyotherbrigade–608since2002,withmorethan100ayearfrom2004through2007.Humanrightsorganizationshaveextensivelydocumentedthesekillings,includingresponsibilityoftheFourthBrigade,particularlyina2007reportonextrajudicialexecutionsineasternAntioquia.55TheFourthBrigadeassuchhasnotbeenapprovedtoreceiveU.S.assistance,indicatingthatwhatevercorrelationexistsbetweenaidandlevelsofextrajudicialkillings,thereappeartobeotherfactorspresent.However,thereareatleastfiveavenuesbywhicharmyunitsoperatingintheFourthBrigade’sjurisdictionhavereceivedandapparentlycontinuetoreceivesuchassistance.Theseavenuesare:aidtotheregionalarmyintelligenceunitbasedintheFourthBrigade;aidtoanurbanspecialforcesunitinAntioquia;aidtoindividualmembersoftheFourthBrigade;aidtothe11thMobileBrigadeoperatinginthejurisdiction;andassistanceinthepasttocurrentbrigadeofficers.TheArmy’sSeventhRegionalIntelligenceUnit,knownasRIMENo.7andbasedattheFourthBrigadeinMedellín,suppliesintelligencetosupportbrigadeoperations.TheUnitedStateshasassistedtheRIMENo.7in2006and2007,andhascontinuedtoapproveaidtotheunitsincethen.ArmycommanderGeneralGonzálezPeñaconfirmedtoFORthattheseunitscontinuetohavethepresenceofU.S.militaryadvisors.56AssistancetothearmyintelligenceunitthatsupportstheFourthBrigadeisacrucialformofassistancetothebrigadeitself.57TheUnitedStateshasaidedindividualsfromthecommandstaffand13differentFourthBrigadeunitssince2000,includingtheunitsidentifiedmostoftenbytheAttorneyGeneral’sofficeandbyhumanrightsorganizationsasresponsibleforciviliankillings.58TheStateDepartmenthasnotdisclosedwhatkindorhowmuchassistancewasgiventoindividualsintheseunits.TheUrbanSpecialForcesAnti‐TerroristGroupNo.5,basedinMedellín,hasalsoreceivedU.S.assistance,in2006‐07.MembersofthisunitreportedlykilledfourciviliansinItuangoin2004andMedellínin2005and2006,withofficialinvestigationsstillinearlystagesasof2009.Yettheunithascontinuedtobeapprovedforassistancesince2008.

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Since2006,theUnitedStateshasalsoassistedthe11thMobileBrigade,whichoperatesinpartsofAntioquia.TheAttorneyGeneral’sofficehasopenedinvestigationsintofourkillingsreportedlycommittedbythe11thMobileBrigadeinItuangoin2005‐06,withintheFourthBrigade’sjurisdiction.Nonehadmovedpastaninvestigativestagein2009,buttheStateDepartmenthascontinuedtoapprovethe11thMobileBrigadeforassistance.Finally,FourthBrigadeofficershavereceivedextensiveU.S.assistancefrombeforetheirtenureintheFourthBrigade.Thecurrentcommander,BrigadierGeneralAlbertoJoséMejíaFerrero,trainedandstudiedforseveralyearsinU.S.militaryinstitutions,includingFortBenning,Georgia;FortLeavenworth,Kansas;theArmyWarCollege;andtheNavalPostgraduateSchool.FormerFourthBrigadecommandersalsoreceivedextensiveU.S.trainingbeforerisingintheranks.Aidtoindividuals,aidtocommandersgivenprevioustotheirserviceinthebrigade,andaidtotheregionalintelligenceunitdidnotfigureinthemetricweusedtomeasureassistance,sinceitwasimpossibletodosocomprehensivelyforallbrigades.ButthisreviewshowsthatevenifotherfactorscontributedtothehighrateofreportedexecutionsintheFourthBrigade’sjurisdiction,credibleevidenceofviolationsrequiressuspensionofassistancetoallarmyunits(andindividualswithinthem)currentlyreceivingU.S.aidinthatjurisdiction.SeventeenthBrigade.Soldiersofthe17thBrigadehavereportedlybeeninvolvedinhundredsofviolationsagainstmembersofthePeaceCommunityofSanJosédeApartadóandofseveralAfro‐ColombianandindigenousrivercommunitiesinChocódepartment.Theseincludealargenumberofkillingsofcivilians,includingthemassacrebymacheteofeightindividuals,includingthreechildren,inSanJosé,onFebruary21,2005,incollaborationwithparamilitarygunmen.InAugust2005,theStateDepartmentreportedthatithadinformedtheColombiangovernmentthattheUnitedStates“willnotbeprovidingassistancetothe17thBrigadeuntilallsignificanthumanrightsallegationsinvolvingtheunithavebeencrediblyaddressed.”59StateDepartmentofficialsalsoinformedFORthatassistancetothe17thBrigadehadbeensuspendedsinceatleast2002,althoughindividualsfromthebrigadereceivedde‐miningassistanceduringthisperiod.Moreover,thesuspensionapparentlydidnotapplytotheMarineInfantrybattalionnominallyattachedtothe17thBrigadeandbasedinTurbo.In2005,internationalobserverswitnessedU.S.uniformedpersonnelcarryingoutapparently‐officialactivitiesontheTurbobase.60Initshumanrightscertification“justification”documentinMay2006,theStateDepartmentcitedseveralmeasurestakentoimprovethebrigade’shumanrightsperformanceandtoinvestigatetheFebruary2005massacre,althoughthesuspensionofaidtothebrigadewasapparentlystillinforce.61EighthBrigade.TheEighthBrigadeoperatesinthecoffee‐growingdepartmentsofQuindio,RisaraldaandportionsofValledeCauca.Since2002,ninety‐sixciviliankillingshavebeenreportedlycommittedbythearmyinthebrigade’sjurisdiction,with42ofthemattributed

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directlytothebrigade.Thebrigade’sCisnerosEngineeringBattalionreportedlycommittednineofthesekillings,mostlyin2006and2007.TheCisnerosBattalionreceivedU.S.assistanceforseveralyearsbetween2000and2005,andwasvettedtoreceiveaidin2008.Additionally,individualsfromseveralcombatunitsandcommandstaffreceivedaid,asdidaserviceandsupportcompany.Thebrigade’santi‐kidnappingunitwasvettedforassistancein2008,althoughthekillingin2004ofJuanPabloBuenoPérez,attributedtotheunit,isunderpreliminaryinvestigationbytheAttorneyGeneral’soffice.Everysingleoneofthe41civiliankillingsintheEighthBrigade’sjurisdictionattributedtoaunitwasreportedlycarriedoutbymembersoftheEighthBrigade.Forthe55killingsinthejurisdictionreportedlycommittedbythearmyforwhichaunitwasnotidentified,thelocationoftheincidentconstitutescredibleevidencethattheywerecarriedoutbyEighthBrigadesoldiers.SeventhBrigade.TheSeventhBrigadeoperatesinsouthernMetaandGuaviaredepartments(untilthe22ndBrigade,whichoperatesinGuaviare,wascreatedin2008).Fourmobilebrigadesalsooperateinthearea.Atotalof256civiliankillingsbythearmyhavebeenreportedinthebrigade’sjurisdictionsince2002;ofthese,81wereattributedeithertotheSeventhBrigadeoroneofthemobilebrigades.OfficersoftheSeventhBrigadeanditsJoaquinParisBattalionwereimplicatedintheMapiripánmassacrein1997,inwhichparamilitariesmassacredordisappeared49residentsoverthecourseoffivedays.Twenty‐twokillingshavebeenattributeddirectlytosoldiersofthebrigade’s21st‘Vargas’Battalion.TheUnitedStatesapprovedassistancetotheSeventhBrigade’sengineeringandanti‐kidnappingunitsin2008and2009,aswellasassistancetoindividualsoldiersduringearlieryearsintheJoaquínParisBattalion,brigadecommand,andsixotherunitsinthebrigade.The‘Albán’engineeringbattalionreportedlyshottwomenataroadblockonJuly26,2003,killingoneofthem;accountsdifferonwhetherthemenwerestoppedorwerefleeingtheroadblock.62TheFourthMobileBrigade,towhich23killingswereattributed,primarilyin2006and2007,hasbeenvettedaseligibleforassistancesince2003.TheSeventhMobileBrigade,alsooperatinginMetaandpartoftheRapidDeploymentForce,reportedlycommittedtwociviliankillingsinJanuaryandApril2008;ithasreceivedU.S.assistanceeveryyearsince2003.TheNinthMobileBrigadehasalsoreceivedU.S.assistanceeveryyearsince2003;in2005,NocheyNieblareportedthatNinthMobileBrigadetroopskilledFlorentinoQuirogaandclaimedhewasaguerrillakilledincombat.63The12thMobileBrigade,towhich12killingswereattributedin2006,wasvettedandassistedin2006.Atthetime,thebrigadewascommandedbyColonelCarlosHugoRamírezZuluaga,whohadbeennamedinthe1994bookTerrorismodeEstadodeColombiaasaparamilitarydeathsquadcollaborator.64InApril2006,accordingtoCINEP,soldiersfromthe12thMobileBrigadeopenedfireonaciviliandwellinginSanJuandeArama,and

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continuedshootingevenafterpeoplefleeingthedwellingshoutedtostopandthewoundedwereheardcryingout.Thesoldierskilled10people,includingthreechildren.65In2007,thebrigadestoppedreceivingassistance,andonlyoneexecutionwasattributedtoitthatyear,andnonein2008.BecausesomanymobilebrigadesoperateintheSeventhBrigade’sjurisdiction,andapproximatelyhalfofallexecutionsreportedinthejurisdictionwereallegedlycommittedbymobilebrigadetroops,itisdifficulttoattributeexecutionstoaunitinMetaandGuaviarewhentheunitwasnotidentifiedbywitnesses.However,thereiscredibleevidenceofexecutionscommittedbymembersoftheSeventhBrigadeandallfourmobilebrigadesoperatingintheareaforwhicheffectivemeasureshavenotbeentakentobringthoseresponsibletojustice.FUDRAandLaMacarenaGraveSiteWithinthespectacularlybeautifulnationalparkofLaMacarenainMetaDepartment,thearmy’sRapidDeploymentForcehasabase.TheRapidDeploymentForce,orFUDRAinitsSpanishacronym,initiallywasformedfromseveralbrigadesinDecember1999.FUDRAis“thetipofthespearoftheColombianmilitarystrategy,”66andhasbeenacenterpieceofTaskForceOmega,attheheartoftheUnitedStates’supportforthewaragainsttheFARCwithaspecialfocusinLaMacarenainsouth‐centralColombia.FUDRAanditsfivecomponentmobilebrigades(1,2,3,7and10)haveallbeenvettedtoreceive(andtypicallyhavereceived)U.S.assistancesince2005.67In2009,investigatorsdiscoveredalargegravesitenexttotheFUDRAbaseinLaMacarena.Initialreportsindicatedthatthearmy,possiblyincombinationwithotherarmedgroups,haddepositedmorethan800andasmanyas1,500bodiesinthesite.68Until2002,thesitewaspartofterritorycontrolledbytheFARC,whichalsoreportedlyburieddeadthere,butsincethenthearmyhasbroughtbodiesfromothermunicipalitiestobeburiedonthesite,accordingtolocalauthorities.TaskForceOmegacommanderGeneralJavierFlorezassertedthatthearmyhadconductedburialsinalegalmanner.69Localresidentshavereportedlyfiledcomplaintsthattheburialsiteisindangerofcontaminatingdrinkingwatersources.70Soldiersfromthe78thCounterguerrillaBattalionintheFUDRA’sTenthMobileBrigadekilledfiveciviliansandclaimedthemasguerrillaskilledincombatin2005inGuaviareDepartment,accordingtoDairoAlbertoBorja,asoldierwhoparticipatedinthemassacreandiscurrentlyunderwitnessprotection.71Althoughthekillingsonlycametolightin2010,theUnitedStateshasvettedandassistedthe78thCounterguerrillaBattalionsince2005.FUDRAappearstobeproudofitsreputationasabrutalforce.Apageonitswebsitetitled,“ArchangelSaintMichael,FUDRA’sProtector,”

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praisesSt.Michaelbecause“He,onmultipleoccasions,hasputSatanunderthefeetofourheroes,achievingthedestructionofsinbytheforceofgood.”ThepageconcludeswithaquotefromRomansthatmustbechillingforColombianhumanrightsactivists:“IfGodiswithus,whoisagainstus?”72GeneralAlejandroNavasRamos,appointedcommanderofthearmyinJuly2010,commandedtheFUDRAfrom2004to2006.TenthBrigade.TheTenthBrigadewasestablishedinAugust2005,andoperatesinthenortheasternCesarandGuajiradepartments.Sincethattime,174killingsbythearmyhavebeenreportedinitsjurisdiction,69ofthemattributeddirectlytomembersoftheTenthBrigade.Witnessesattributed16killingstothe‘Rondon’CavalryGroupand14tothe‘LaPopa’Battalion.’Theciviliancourtshavetriedandconvictedmembersofthe‘LaPopa’Battalionfortwoofthesekillings.Exceptforapprovalthisyearofaidtotheanti‐kidnappingunit,thebrigadeasawholehasnotreceivedU.S.assistance.However,theUnitedStateshasgivenassistancetoindividualsinvirtuallyeveryTenthBrigadeunit,includingthe‘Rondon’CavalryGroupand‘LaPopa’Battalion.Nearlyall,or98.5%,ofthe69civiliankillingsintheTenthBrigade’sjurisdictionattributedtoaunitwerereportedlycarriedoutbymembersoftheTenthBrigade.Forthe105killingsinthebrigade’sjurisdictionreportedlycommittedbythearmyforwhichaunitwasnotidentified,thelocationoftheincidentconstitutescredibleevidencethattheywerecarriedoutbyTenthBrigadesoldiers.TwentyeighthBrigade/EasternSpecifiedCommand.ThisbrigadeoperatesontheeasternplainsofVichadaandMeta.Theareaisremoteandsparselypopulated,presentinggreatdifficultiesforthecivilianpopulationtodenounceviolationsandforinvestigation.In2000,U.S.AmbassadorCurtisKammanwrotethatmembersofthe38thCounterguerrillaBattalionhadreportedly“killedfivebusinessmenandwoundedeightothersonFebruary1,1998inLaPrimavera,Vichada.”73TheAttorneyGeneral’sofficeisinvestigatingfivekillingsreportedlycommittedbythemilitaryinVichadain2006,andonein2008.TheCommandwasvettedforandreceivedassistanceinthe1990s.74Morerecently,thebrigadehasbeenapprovedforassistanceeveryyear,butmaynothavereceivedassistancesince2004,whenanofficerfromthebrigade’s32ndCounterguerrillaBattalionreceivedhumanrightsinstructionattheSchooloftheAmericas.75

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CalibioEngineeringBattalion.Thisunitformspartofthe14thBrigadeandoperatesintheMiddleMagdalenaRiverregion.ThebattalionreceivedU.S.assistancefrom2003until2008.Thebattalion’stroopsreportedlycommitted12extrajudicialkillingsfrom2006to2008,nineofwhichareunderpreliminaryinvestigationbytheAttorneyGeneral’sorInspectorGeneral’soffices.Nociviliankillingshavebeenattributedtothebattalionsinceassistanceendedin2008.ThirtiethBrigade.The30thBrigadewasformedinNovember2005,andoperatesinNorthSantanderDepartment,neartheVenezuelanborder.Shortlyafterward,inJanuary2006,thearmyactivatedthe15thMobileBrigade,operatinginthesamearea.InAugust2006,the15thMobileBrigadecameunderthecommandofColonelSantiagoHerrera.76

In2007,theUnitedStatesvettedandassistedthe30thBrigade’scommandstaffandthreeofitscombatbattalions.77Whilethe15thMobileBrigadedidnotreceiveassistanceasaunit,individualsfromthebrigade’scommandstaff,aswellastwobattalions,receivedU.S.assistance.In2006,humanrightsorganizationsreportedfivekillingsattributeddirectlyto30thBrigadetroops,andoneattributeddirectlytothe15thBrigade.Another11killingswerereportedlycommittedbythearmyinthebrigade’sjurisdiction.Thekillings

ofJoséHugerLópezandGeovaniPérezOrtizinSanCalixtoonJune6,2006,reportedlyby30thBrigadetroops,wasalreadyunderinvestigationbytheInspectorGeneral’sOfficeinJuly2007,atthetimethattheUnitedStatesapprovedassistancetothebrigade.78In2007,tenmorekillingswereattributeddirectlytothe30thBrigade,and38wereattributeddirectlytothe15thMobileBrigade.Another27killingsreportedlycommittedbythearmyoccurredinthe30thBrigade’sjurisdiction.Bothbrigadescameunderextensivecriticism,andtheUnitedStatesdidnotvetthe30thBrigadeforassistancein2008.ColonelHerreraleftascommanderofthe15thMobileBrigadeattheendof2007,andin2008thenumberofkillingsattributedtothebrigadefellbymorethanhalf.The30thand15thMobileBrigades,aswellastheSecondDivisionthatcommandsthem,cameunderscrutinyfortheSoachascandalinOctober2008,asmostoftheyoungmenwerekilledintheirjurisdiction.Thecommandersandotherofficersfrombothbrigadesweredismissedbecausetheywereimplicatedinthescandal,althoughnonehavebeenprosecuted.TwentythirdBrigade.The23rdBrigadewasformedinearly2009andoperatesintheconflictiveNariñoDepartmentinsouthwesternColombia,formerlyinthejurisdictionofthe29thBrigade.Inthebrigade’sfirstyearofoperations,theUnitedStatesapprovedassistancetotwoofthebrigade’sbattalions(NinthInfantryBattalionand93rdCounterguerrillaBattalion).Thisyear,theU.S.continuedassistancetothesebattalionsand

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inmid‐2009approvedaidtothebrigadecommand,ledatthattimebyColonelJoaquínHernándezBuitrago.GonzaloRodríguezGuanga,anA’waindigenousman,waskilledonMay23,2009,ashewalkedwithhiswife,SixtaTuliaGarcíaintheGranRosariocommunity.TuliaGarcíasaidthatmenwithcamouflageuniforms,blackbandanasandyellowarmbandsdetainedherhusband,tookhim20metersawayandshothiminthehead.The23rdCounterguerrillaBattalioninNariñofiledareportaboutthekilling,claimingthatRodríguezGuangawasaguerrillakilledashefiredaweapon.79TuliaGarcíadenouncedthemurderofherhusband,andsubsequentlyreceivedthreats.OnAugust26,2009,armedmenfiredindiscriminatelyintoahouseinGranRosario,killingTuliaGarcíaand11otherindigenouspeople.80MobileBrigades.Colombiahasusedmobilebrigadestobringthecounterinsurgencywartotheguerrillas,withstrongU.S.support.AccordingtoformerarmedforcescommanderGeneralCarlosOspina(2003‐06),“Thefixedbrigadeshaveaterritorialconcept:thecommandstaffisinthecity,andthatrelationbringsitclosertothepeople.Theyhaveterritoriallimits.Themobilebrigadesdomobilecombatagainsttheenemies,whilethefixedbrigadesaremorepolitical.”81Divisioncommandershaveauthorityforbothfixedandmobilebrigades.TheUnitedStatesdirectedextensiveassistancetomobilebrigadesduringthestudyperiod,aiding20outof25.Exceptforthe12thMobileBrigade,19ofthesewerevettedtoreceiveassistanceduringthelasttwoyears.From2002to2009,extrajudicialkillingswereattributeddirectlytothe1st,2nd,4th,5th,6th,7th,8th,9th,11th,12th,13th,15th,17th,and20thMobileBrigades–14ofthe25mobilebrigadesoperatingduringtheperiod.OtherUnits.Morethan100ColombianArmyorjointunitsbesidescombatbrigadesreceiveU.S.assistance,andgenerallyreceivelessattentionthanthosethatareinthefield.Theseunitsarecriticalcomponentsthatcontributeataninstitutionalleveltoeachunit’sconduct.Inaddition,theunitsaretypicallycommandedbyofficersthathaveruncombatunits–manyofthemwithhistoriesofgrossabuses.AfurtherareaforstudyandforimplementationoftheLeahyAmendmentistoreviewthehistoriesofcommandersofnon‐combatunits,includinginbrigadesthatreportedlycommittedextrajudicialkillingsundertheircommand.Forexample,topromotehumanrights,theUnitedStatesmaywishtosupportthearmy’shumanrightsdirectorate(jefatura)createdin2009.ThatdirectorateiscommandedbyGeneralJorgeRodríguezClavijo,whocommandedthe17thBrigadein2007.Duringthattime,residentsinSanJosédeApartadóexperiencedanincreasedpresenceofparamilitarygunmen,someofwhomkilledDairoTorresonJuly12,2007.Specialscrutinyshouldbegiventothemilitaryschoolsandtrainingunitsproposedforassistance,sincetheyhaveamultipliereffectonthebulkoftroops.

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CommanderCaseStudiesJustasbrigadecommandershaveastrongimpactontheconductoftheirtroops,armyleadershipsetsthetonefortheinstitutionasawhole.U.S.assistancetotheColombianArmyisinstitutionalinnature,andbothvettingandhumanrightsevaluationsshouldconsiderwhethersuchleadershipcontributestorespectforhumanrights.GeneralMarioMontoyaUribe(formerarmycommander).GeneralMontoyawasastarofficer,prominentlyfeaturedinU.S.mediaandgovernmentreportsaswellascommanderofunitssupportedbytheUnitedStates.Montoyaservedasaguestinstructorforayearin1993attheU.S.ArmySchooloftheAmericas(SOA),somethingonly20Colombianofficershaddonebeforehim.In1997,theU.S.ArmyawardedhimtheArmyCommendationMedalforhisserviceatSOA.In1999,aDefenseIntelligenceAgency(DIA)cablepraisedMontoyaas“highlydecorated”and“widelyrespected,”whocompleted“multiplesuccessfulstintscommandingcombatunitslocatedalongthetroublesomenorthernborderregion.”ThesamecabledismissedreportsthatMontoyahadcollaboratedwithaparamilitarygroupearlierinhiscareer,saying“evidencestronglysuggests”thiswas“asmearcampaign.”TheDIAauthorsgavenoevidencecontradictingtheclaim,whichwasmadeina1993bookpublishedbytheBelgianbranchofPaxChristi.82AttheoutsetofPlanColombia,U.S.resourceswereconcentratedonthe“pushintothesouth,”inthedepartmentsofPutumayoandCaquetá,andtheoperationsofJointTaskForceSouth,whichwascordonedofffromthemilitary’scounterinsurgentunits,toconductspecificallycounter‐narcoticoperations.GeneralMontoyacommandedJTF‐Southfrom1999untilOctober2001.AsFORreportedpreviouslyin2008,83Colombianinvestigatorsin2007unearthedthebodiesof105peoplebelievedtohavebeenkilledbetween1999and2001intheDepartmentofPutumayo,followingthediscoveryofhundredsmoreshallowgravesin2007.Mostofthebodiesfoundhadbeendismemberedbeforeburial.84AU.S.Embassycablein2000notedpersistentallegationsthatthe24thBrigade,underMontoya’scommand,had“beencooperatingwithillegalparamilitarygroupsthathavebeenincreasinglyactiveinPutumayo.”85WhenPresidentÁlvaroUribeVéleztookofficeinAugust2002,oneofthefirstmilitaryoffensiveshepromotedwasOperaciónOrioninMedellín,inwhicharmyunitsbattledurbanguerrillamilitias,tookoverpoorsectors,andwerefollowedquicklybyparamilitaryorganizationsledbyDiegoMurilloBejarano,alias“DonBerna.”GeneralMontoyathencommandedtheFourthBrigade,whichexercisedjointjurisdictionfortheoperation,togetherwithmetropolitanpolice.In2009,theAttorneyGeneral’sofficeopenedaninvestigationintoGeneralMontoyabasedon“DonBerna’s”declarationthathismenhadcollaboratedwithMontoyaintheoperation.86AspartofPlanColombia,theUnitedStatesalsopromotedjointorganizationsandoperationsbetweentheColombianArmy,NavyandAirForce.OneofthefirstmajorventureswastheCaribbeanJointCommand,ofwhichMontoyawasthefirstcommanderin2005.

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AscommanderoftheSeventhDivision,GeneralMontoyaalsoparticipatedinorderingandtheplanningoftheoperationinFebruary2005thatledtothemassacreofeightindividualsinthePeaceCommunityofSanJosédeApartadó.Accordingtotwocolonelswhoalsoparticipatedintheplanningmeetings,Montoyaorderedthepresenceof“civilianguides”witharmyunitsontheoperation,andtheseguidesinpracticewereparamilitarygunmenoftheHéroesdeTolováBlockunderthecommandofalias“DonBerna,”60ofwhomaccompaniedthearmywhenthemassacretookplace.87WhentheLosAngelesTimespublishedaleakedCIAreportin2007thatMontoyahadcollaboratedwithaparamilitarygroupresponsibleforkillingciviliansinMedellín,theStateDepartmentcontinuedtosupporthim.Thiswasatthepeakofciviliankillingsbythearmy.88GeneralMontoyacurrentlyservesasColombianambassadortotheDominicanRepublic.Nochargeshavebeenfiledagainsthimforhisactionsduringhismilitarycareer.GeneralOscarGonzálezPeñaArmycommandersinceNovember2008,GeneralGonzálezwasdescribedtoFORbyaU.S.militarytrainerasa“Montoyaprotégé.”ThetrainerwasreferringtoGonzález’sapproachtotheconflictandhumanrights.Butindeed,GonzálezfollowedinMontoya’sfootsteps:ascommanderafterMontoyaoftheFourthBrigade,JointCaribbeanCommand,VIIDivision,andtheArmyitself.DuringthetimethatGeneralGonzálezwascommanderoftheFourthBrigadefromDecember2003toJuly2005,unitsunderhiscommandreportedlycommitted45extrajudicialexecutionsineasternAntioquia,accordingtoareportbyCCEEU.89AskedaboutcivilianskilledbytheArmy,Gen.GonzálezPeñasaidin2006:“Thenumberofcomplaintsisdirectlyproportionaltothesuccessoftheunits.…Thisiswhatsomesympathizersofthesubversivesdototrytohaltthemilitary'soperations.”90Thedayafterhisappointmentasarmychief,hereferredtoclaimsofarmyviolationsasa“judicialwar”againstthemilitary.91InagenerousinterviewwithFOR,GeneralGonzálezsaidanygrossabusescommittedbyarmytroopswerearesultnotofinstitutionalincentivesorimpunity,butbecauseofbadvaluesreceivedfromtheirparents.HealsoconfirmedthatDirective29(whichprovidespaymentforinformationleadingtokillingguerrillas)isstillinforce.GeneralGonzálezPeñaalsocommandedthe11thBrigadeinCórdobain2002‐03,whenparamilitaryforcesoperatedfreelyintheareaandthearmyapparentlycoulddonothingaboutit.In2005,hecommandedtheSeventhDivision,withjurisdictionoverthebrigadeswithamongtheworsthumanrightsrecordsinthearmy:the4th,11th,14th,and17thBrigades.U.S.militaryofficersareawareofGeneralGonzález’sattitudes.“Herepresents–notastepback,buthe’sdefinitelytainted,”anofficerworkingintheJointChiefsofStafftoldFOR.“It’snotinthebestmutualinterestofbothournationsthatheisthearmycommander.ItmakesitmoredifficultinWashingtonwhentherearecharacterslikehim.”

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PoliceKillingsAlthoughinthedataweanalyzed,morethan89%ofkillingsforwhichabranchwasidentifiedwereattributedtotheColombianArmy,theColombianNationalPolicewerereportedresponsiblefor193extrajudicialexecutions.TheUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuronExtrajudicialExecutions,PhilipAlston,recommendedthat“TheGovernmentshouldprioritizetheinvestigationandprosecutionofpolicekillings.Civilsocietygroupsshouldplaceincreasedemphasisonresearchingandreportingsuchkillings.”92TheUnitedStateshasprovidedextensiveassistancetoColombianpolice.Althoughmuchoftheassistanceisfocusedonnationalanti‐narcoticunits,assistancehasalsoflowedtocitypolicein67municipalities,todepartmentalpoliceineverydepartment,toanti‐kidnappingsquads,andotherunits.AnumberofkillingsreportedlycommittedbypoliceoccurredinmunicipalitieswherecitypolicereceivedU.S.assistance.Theseinclude:Armenia,Barbosa,Barrancabermeja,Barranquilla(where12killingsbypolicewerereported),Bogotá(23policekillingsreported),Bucaramanga,Buenaventura,Cartagena,Cucuta,ElPeñon,Florencia,Girardot,Ibague,LaVictoria,Manizales,Medellín(17policekillingsreported),Monteria,Neiva,Palmira,Pasto,Pereira,SantaMarta,andTulua.Mostassistancetocitypolicewasgiveneitherfrom2007to2009,ortoindividualpolicefromcityforcesnotvettedfortheirhumanrightsrecords.Noneofthe193civiliankillingsreportedlycommittedbypolicehadresultedinaknownconvictionorsentenceasofmid‐2009.

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U.S.Officials’ResponsibilityU.S.officialsresponsibleforthevettingprocesshavecredibleinformationavailabletothemfromNGOs,publications,andjudicialrecords.ThehumanrightsorganizationCINEPpublishesanextensiveregistryofreportedgrossviolationsofhumanrightsandinternationalhumanitarianlawinasemi‐annualreportcalledNocheyNiebla,easilyavailabletoembassyofficers.Althoughitdoesnotreportallcases,CINEPalsomakesavailableontheirwebsiteasearchabledatabaseofsuchreportedviolations.BothU.S.organizationsandColombianhumanrightsorganizationsthatrepresentvictimsofgrossabusesmeetperiodically(approximatelyevery90days)withStateDepartmentofficialstoconsultandshareinformationonhumanrightsabusesandconcerns.Thetaskoftrackingreportedabusesinrelationtothemorethan500unitsinColombiavettedeachyearisdaunting.YetalthoughtheU.S.EmbassystaffinBogotácontinuedtogrowinsize,accordingtotheStateDepartmentInspectorGeneral,specialfundsforvettinghadtobeappropriatedbyCongresstoincreasethestaffassignedtothetask.Whiletheembassyemployedmorethan1,400peoplein2008,notincludingcontractors,onlyonewasassignedfulltimetovettingthetensofthousandsofcandidatesformilitaryassistanceeachyear.93GlobalImplications:U.S.MilitaryAidandHumanRightsinPakistanColombiaisnottheonlycountrythathasreceivedlargeamountsofU.S.militaryaidinthelasttenyears.OurfindingsregardingthehumanrightsimpactsofU.S.militaryassistanceinColombiasuggesttheimportanceofexaminingthesamequestionsinothernationsreceivinglargeamountsofsuchaid.Pakistanhasbecomesecond‐largestrecipientofU.S.militaryaidatpresent,withassistanceaimedtoserveU.S.counterterrorismgoalsinthatcountry.TheUnitedStateshasincreasedsupportforlawenforcementandcounterinsurgencytrainingandequipmentforoperationsneartheAfghanistan‐Pakistanborder,including$400milliontotrainandequiptheFrontierCorpsin2009and2010.94TheFrontierCorpsisalocally‐raisedmilitiathatreportstoPakistan’sInteriorMinistry,exceptduringwartime,whenitreportstothemilitary,withwhichitcarriesoutjointoperationsintheFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas(FATA),afrontierprovinceinPakistan.In2010theUnitedStateswillreportedlysupplyPakistanwithsophisticatedlaser‐guided‐bombkits,12U.S.‐madesurveillancedronesand18late‐modelF‐16fighterjets.95TypesofFundsReceivedbyPakistanThelargestshareofmilitaryaidischanneledthroughtheCoalitionSupportFund(CSF)andthePakistanCounterinsurgencyCapabilityFund(PCCF)(Fig.1).CSFisusedtoreimbursePakistanforconductingoperationsagainstalQaidaandTalibanforcesalongtheAfghanistanborder96.Italsoincludestheauthoritytoprovidesuppliesandspecializedtrainingandequipment.97Pakistanhasdeployed120,000militaryforcesintheFATAandhelpedtokillandcapturehundredsofsuspectedalQaidaoperatives.98GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO)reportsindicatethattheoperationsinFATAhavebeenreimbursedtothePakistan’s11thArmyCorpsandFrontierCorps.99CSFreimbursementsarenotofficiallydesignatedas“foreignassistance,”accordingtotheCongressionalResearchService.100GAOstatesthat,“oncepaid,CSFreimbursementfundsbecomesovereignfundsandtheU.S.governmenthasnooversightauthorityoverthesefunds.”101

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Figure6DirectOvertUSAidandMilitaryReimbursementtoPakistan,FY2002FY2011

(Roundedtothenearestmillionsofdollars)

PreparedforCongressionalResearchServicebyK.AlanKronstadt,Specialist,SouthAsianAffairs,June7,2010

ProgramofAccounts

FY2001FY2004

FY2005

FY2006

FY2007

FY2008

FY2009

FY2010(est)

Programoraccountdetail

FY2011

1206 ‐ ‐ 28 14 56 114 c 212 c

CN ‐ 8 24 49 54 47 38c 220 c

CSFa 3,121b 964 862 731 1,019 685d 756d 8,138d d

FC ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 75 25 ‐ 100 ‐FMF 375 299 297 297 298 300 298i 2,164 296IMET 3 2 2 2 2 2 5 18 4INCLE 154 32 24 24 22 88 170f 528 140NADR 16 8 10 10 10 13 21 87 25PCF/PCCF ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 400 700 1,100 1,200TotalSecurityRelated

3.669 1,313 1,260 1,127 1,536 1,674e 1,988 12,567 1,665

Sources: U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development Abbreviations: 1206: Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163, global train and equip) CN: Counternarcotics Funds (Pentagon budget) CSF: Coalition Support Funds (Pentagon budget) FC: Section 1206 of the NDAA for FY2008 (P.L. 110-181, Pakistan Frontier Corp train and equip) FMF: Foreign Military Financing IMET: International Military Education and Training INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (includes border security) MRA: Migration and Refugee Assistance NADR: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related (the majority allocated for Pakistan is for anti-terrorism assistance) PCF/PCCF: Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (transferred to State Department oversight in FY2010) Notes: a. CSF is Pentagon funding to reimburse Pakistan for its support of U.S. military operations. It is not officially designated as foreign assistance. b. Includes $220 million for FY2002 Peacekeeping Operations reported by the State Department. c. This funding is “requirements-based;” there are no pre-allocation data. d. Actual CSF payments total about $7.2 billion to date. Congress appropriated $1.2 billion for FY2009 and $1.57 billion for FY2010, and the Administration requested $2 billion for FY2011, in additional CSF for all U.S. coalition partners. Pakistan has in the past received about 80% of such funds. FY2009-FY2011 may thus see an estimated $3.4 billion in additional CSF payments to Pakistan. e. Includes a “bridge” ESF appropriation of $150 million (P.L. 110-252), $15 million of which was later transferred to INCLE. Also includes FY2009 supplemental appropriations of $66 million for INCLE and $2 million for NADR. f. The Administration’s request for supplemental FY2010 appropriations includes $40 million for INCLE and $60 million for FMF funds for Pakistan. These amounts are included in the estimated FY2010 total.

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TherearereportsthatthePakistanigovernmenthasdivertedfundsandusedthemforthepurposesotherthanservingUSintentions.

PakistanCounterinsurgencyCapabilityFund(PCCF):Establishedin2009,thePCCFisusedtoreplaceequipmentthePakistaniArmyandtheFrontierCorpslosesduringcounter‐terroristoperations,andincludes$1.1billionfortrainingandequippingcounter‐terroristforces,includingtheFrontierCorpsin2009and2010.102ItwastransferredtoStateDepartmentoversightinFY2010,andissubjecttoLeahyvettingprovisions.

Section1206andOtherFunds:Section1206oftheNationalDefenseAuthorizationActhassince2006providedthePentagonwiththeauthoritytotrainandequipforeignmilitaryandforeignmaritimesecurityforces,particularlyforemergencyneeds.PakistanhasreceivedthelargestshareofSection1206funds‐morethan$300million.ForeignMilitaryFinancing(FMF)funds,averaging$300millionannuallysince2004,havepurchasedhelicopters,howitzers,andothermilitaryequipment.Inaddition,throughInternationalMilitaryEducationandTraining(IMET)andFMFfunds,theUnitedStateshasbroughtthousandsofPakistanimilitarypersonneltotheUnitedStatesandothersitesfortraining.103LeahyLawvettingisapplicabletobothIMETandFMFassistance.InOctober2009,PresidentBarackObamasignedintolawtheEnhancedPartnershipwithPakistanAct2009,knownastheKerry‐LugarAct,whichpromisedmilitaryassistanceoveraperiodoffiveyearstoFY2014,andisalsosubjecttoLeahyvetting.

HumanRightsViolationsinPakistan104AmnestyInternational,HumanRightsWatch,AsianHumanRightsCommission,HumanRightsCommissionofPakistan,UnitedNationsHighCommissiononRefugees(UNHCR)andotherhumanrightsorganizationshavereportedforceddisappearances,unlawfuldetentionofsuspectedterrorists,extrajudicialexecutions,andmassiveinternaldisplacementcausedbymilitaryoperationsinFATA,NorthWestFrontierProvince(NWFP),andBalochistan.TheStateDepartment’shumanrightsreportfor2009statesthat“ongoingbattleswithmilitantscreatedafluctuatingnumberofinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs).Atyear’sendtherewereanestimated1.2millionIDPsintheNWFPandFATA.”105TheAsianHumanRightsCommission(AHRC)andInternalDisplacementMonitoringCenter(IDMC)estimatethatthreemillionpersonswereinternallydisplacedin2009,ofwhichabouthalfhavereturnedhome.106.HumanRightsWatchreported200documentedcasesofextrajudicialexecutionsofallegedTalibansupportersandsympathizersinSWATregioncommittedinbetweenAugust2009andMarch2010107.Independentjournalistsandlocalresidentswidelybelievesecurityforceswerebehindthem.108AsifHellFellonMe,aJune2010reportbyAmnestyInternationalbasedoninterviewswithnearly300people,saysmillionsliveina“humanrightsfreezone,”wherePakistanisoldiershavecommittedseriousviolations,includingindiscriminateartilleryfireandextrajudicialexecutions,asthearmysweptacrossthetribalbeltoverthepastyear.109ThereportdocumentedhumanrightsviolationsduringjointoperationscarriedoutbythePakistaniArmyandFrontierCorps.

Takingintoaccountthereportsonmassinternaldisplacement,illegaldetentionsandextrajudicialexecutionscommittedbyPakistanisecurityforcesinSWATandotherborderregions,militaryaidtoPakistanmustbebroughtunderrigorousscrutiny.TocomplywiththeLeahyAmendment,embassypersonnelmustactivelymonitorthehumanrightsbehaviorofmilitaryunitsthatbenefitfromU.S.militaryassistance.

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ItisunclearwhetherPakistanimilitaryunitstrainedandequippedbytheUnitedStatesareparticipatinginhumanrightsviolations.However,wherethereiscredibleevidenceofgrossabusescommittedbyaninstitutionreceivingassistance,theLeahyLawrequiressuspensionofaidtothe“smallestoperationalgroupinthefieldthathasbeenimplicatedinthereportedviolation.”110InthecaseoftheFrontierCorps,clearlyimplicatedinseriousviolations,iftheStateDepartmentcannotdetermineasmallerunitresponsibleforcrediblereportsofextrajudicialexecutions,forceddisappearances,andforceddisplacement,thentheLeahyLawrequiressuspensionofassistancetotheFrontierCorpsitself.Furthermore,DOD‐fundedassistanceandreimbursementsshouldnotbeexemptfromtheLeahyLawhumanrightsvettingrequirement.ThefactthatCSFfundsareusedtoreimburseaforeigngovernmentforspecificmilitaryoperations,effectivelymakingthatmilitaryaproxyforU.S.policy,doesnotremovethegoalsoftheLeahyLawitself:topreventU.S.fundsfrombeingusedtosupportmilitariescommittinggrossabusesofhumanrights.ConclusionsandImplicationsInColombia,U.S.militaryassistancecontinuesatahighlevel.IfColombiarepresentsthemostrigorousapplicationoftheLeahyLaw,whatcanbeexpectedelsewhere?Moreover,theU.S.recordinColombiaisseenasamodelforpolicyinAfghanistan.ThecountrieswheremajorU.S.officialsresponsibleforColombiapolicyimplementationduringtheperiodreviewedarenowpostedareunlikelytohavethekindofdetailedhumanrightsdocumentationreflectedinthisstudy.InPakistan,whereAnnePattersonisnowservingasambassador,itisunclearwhetherandtowhatextenthumanrightsvettingisoccurring,muchlesswhattheprospectivehumanrightsimpactswillbeofmorethanabilliondollarsinassistancetothePakistanimilitary.DefenseSecretaryGateshaspubliclystatedthathewasmindfuloftheLeahyLawinPakistan,butdidnotsaythatitwasactuallybeingimplemented.111However,anyevaluationofmilitaryassistanceshouldnotbelimitedtowhetheritcomplieswithLeahyLaw,whichisinsomerespectsalimited–iflegallybinding–measure.ConsiderationofmilitaryassistanceshouldaddressthebroadercontextofU.S.humanrightsgoalsandobligations.Inmoderntimes,armedconflictvictimizesciviliansatmanytimestherateofcombatants.Ifexternalmilitaryaidiscontributingtotheextensionofanarmedconflictthatitselfgenerateshumanrightsviolations,thenitiscontributingtoviolationsindependentoftherecordofthespecificassistedunits.Inaddition,suspensionofaidtospecificunitsunderLeahyLawdoesnotalterorreducetheoverallamountofmilitaryassistance.IfmilitaryaidtovettedunitsisfungibleandallowstheColombianarmytouseitsownresourcestosupportunitswithhistoriesofgrossabuses,thenLeahyLawisnotsufficienttodenyresourcesflowingfromU.S.aidtoabusiveconduct.Andifmilitaryaidisunsuccessfulorwastefulinreachingitsstatedaimstoreducedrugtraffickingorviolence,itrepresentsadisplacementofpublicfundsfromprogramsthatmeetotherneeds.TheseconstitutereasonstoseekanegotiatedendtothearmedconflictandtosuspendallaidtotheColombianmilitary.

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BecausesuchalargeproportionoftrainingandotherassistancetoColombiacomesunderDODauthority,itisespeciallyimportantthatsuchassistancebetransparent,consideredbyCongressaspartoftheappropriationscycle,andregularlyevaluatedforitshumanrightsimpacts.Wealsorecommendfurtherstudyofseveralphenomenathatwewerenotabletoexamineindepthinthisstudy.Theseinclude:

a) Collaborationbetweenparamilitaryforcesandofficersandmembersofthearmedforces.Someobserverssuggesttheremaybeacorrelationbetweenperiodswhenexecutionsattributeddirectlytothearmedforceswerehighandperiodswhenparamilitarykillingswerelower(andvice‐versa,betweenperiodofintenseparamilitaryviolenceandrelativelyfewerreportsofarmykillings).ParticularlybecauseceasingcollaborationbetweenstateforcesandparamilitaryforcesisacriterionforU.S.humanrightscertification,unitswhosecommandstaffincludeColombianofficersimplicatedinparamilitaryconfessions(“versioneslibres”)shouldbeexcludedfromU.S.assistance.

b) Relationshipbetweenforceddisplacement,reportedextrajudicialkillings,andunitsthatreceivedU.S.assistance.

Finally,apartfromLeahyLawimplementation,theincreaseinreportedciviliankillingsbyArmyunitsaftertheyreceivedU.S.assistanceraisesseriousethicalquestionsaboutsuchassistanceinColombiaandinothernationswheresimilarconditionsofwidespreadimpunityandwarfarepertain.Recommendations:

1. CongressshouldrequiretheStateDepartmenttodocumentthehumanrightsrecordsofunitsreceivingU.S.assistance,andevaluatethehumanrightsimpactsofsuchassistance.TheresultsshouldbeunclassifiedandpostedtotheDepartment’swebsite.

2. TheDepartmentofStatemustfullyimplementLeahyLawinColombia.Ataminimum,thisrequiressuspendingassistancetobrigadesforwhichthereiscredibleevidenceofextrajudicialexecutionscommittedbyitsmembers,untilandunlessthosekillingsarefullyinvestigatedandthecivilianjusticesystemreachesajudgment.Suchevidenceexistsforallarmydivisionsandnearlyallbrigades.

3. RelevantCongressionalcommittees,theNationalSecurityCouncilandtheStateDepartmentInspectorGeneralshouldgiveincreasedscrutinyofU.S.militaryassistanceinnationswhereconditionssimilartoColombia’sprevail(highlevelsofsecurityforceabuses,highlevelsofimpunity,highorinstitutionallevelsofU.S.assistance),includingColombia,untilpolicy‐makersprovideCongresswithacredibleexplanationfornegativehumanrightsimpactsandvettingfailuresinColombia,anddemonstrateconcretechangestoensuretheseimpactsandfailuresarenotreplicatedinrelevantembassies,commands,andbureaus.

4. BecausethefailuretoapplytheLeahyLawhasledtoUnitedStatestoassistbrigadesthathavecommittedlargenumbersofextrajudicialexecutions,theUnitedStateshastheresponsibilitytodoeverythingpossibletoensurejusticeforthesecases.Todothis,CongressshouldrequiretheStateDepartmentandtheJustice

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DepartmenttoreporttoitperiodicallyonhowU.S.justiceandoversightprogramsarehelpingreduceimpunityforhumanrightscases,especiallyextrajudicialexecutions.U.S.aidtoColombianjudicialandoversightagenciesshouldbetiedtoconcreteresultsinreducingimpunityforthesecases,andU.S.officialsshouldcontinuetoraisetheissuewithColombianagencies.

5. NotesonSourcesandMethodologyDataonreportedextrajudicialkillingswascompiledbytheHumanRightsObservatoryoftheCoordinaciónColombiaEuropaEstadosUnidos(CCEEU),basedondocumentationfromtheColombianAttorneyGeneral’soffice,InspectorGeneral’soffice,and20humanrightsorganizations,whichareorganizedinaWorkingGrouponExtrajudicialExecutions.112Thiswassupplementedbydatafromthemilitaryjusticesystem.DataonunitsvettedandassistedbytheUnitedStateswasprovidedbytheU.S.StateDepartment.DataonoperationaljurisdictionsandorganizationalstructuresofColombianmilitaryunitswasdrawnprimarilyfromonlineinformationpublishedbytheColombianMinistryofDefense.TheStateDepartmenthadnotattimeofpublicationsupplieduswithdataonthedollaramountortypeofassistancesuppliedtovettedandassistedunits,althoughweaskedforthatinformation.However,wewereabletomeasureassistancetoarmybrigadesthroughascoringsystemthatweightedU.S.assistancetocomponentunits(battalions)ineachbrigade,tocommandstaff,andtomobilebrigadesthatoperatewithinthejurisdictionsoffixedbrigades.Ourscoringsystemgavevaluesofone(1)foreachbattalionassistedduringayear;four(4)forabrigade’scommandstaffassistedduringayear;andtwo(2)foreachassistedmobilebrigadeoperatinginthejurisdictionofthefixedbrigade.Thesevalueswerebasedonouranalysisoftheresponsibilityofeachofthesecomponentsforarmyoperationsandsoldiers’conductinagivenarea.TheCCEEUreviewedalldatatoensurethatnovictimsappearedtwice.Whenavictimappearedinmorethanonesource,thesewerecombinedtoindicatemultiplesourcesforeachvictim.ThereportwascoordinatedbyJohnLindsay‐Poland,ResearchandAdvocacyDirectoroftheFellowshipofReconciliation,withcontributionsfromKellyNicholls,ExecutiveDirectoroftheU.S.OfficeonColombia;RenataRendón,anindependentadvisorandresearcher;FORColombiaProgramdirectorSusanaPimiento;andPeterCousins,RachelDickson,andAnjumanAraBegum.ThemapswerecreatedbyEliMoore.LilianaDeLucca‐ConnortranslatedthereportintoSpanish.Ourteamreviewedallstatisticalcompilationandanalysisofdataatleasttwice,withindependentcompilationsfollowedbyexaminationofalldiscrepancies,toensurethehighestaccuracypossible.Theauthorsconsultedstatisticalanalysts,andalthoughmostcommentswerenotavailableintimetoincorporateresponsesintothestudy,asummaryreviewofthereport’sstatisticalcontentisavailableatwww.forcolombia.org/statisticalreview.WeinterviewedhumanrightsorganizationsintheUnitedStatesandColombia,StateDepartmentofficials,U.S.andColombianmilitaryofficers(includingarmycommanderGeneralOscarGonzálezPeñaandformerarmedforcescommanderGeneralCarlosOspina),andreviewedmediareportsanddocumentspreviouslysubmittedbyhumanrightsorganizationstotheStateDepartment.ThereportwassupportedinpartbyagrantfromtheFoundationforanOpenSociety.

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AnnexIReportedExecutionsinBrigadeJurisdictionsafterIncreasesinU.S.Aid

BrigadeJurisdiction

YearsofIncrease

Aidscoreincrease

ReportedEJEspreviousyear&1styear(annualaverage)

ReportedEJEs2dyear&

yearafter(annualaverage)

Percentagechange

7 2005‐06 3 13.5 95.5 607.41%11 2004‐05 5 6.5 35.5 446.15%30 2006‐07 4 16 60.5 278.13%9 2004‐05 3 4 15 275.00%16 2004‐05 4 5.5 18 227.27%12 2004‐05 8 13.5 24 77.78%9 2007‐08 3 30.5 25 ‐18.03%6 2007‐08 3 26.5 10.5 ‐60.38%28 2007‐08 10 2.5 0.5 ‐80.00%27 2007‐08 3 30.5 6 ‐80.33%2 2007‐08 5 8.5 1 ‐88.24%6 2008‐09 3 24.5 0 ‐100.00%26 2007‐08 5 0 0 0%13 2007‐08 3 4.5 0 ‐100%NavyPacific 2007‐08 3 1 1 0%23 2008‐09 4 0 0 0% Total 188 293 56.00%

ReportedExecutionsinBrigadeJurisdictionsafterDecreasesinU.S.Aid

BrigadeJurisdiction

YearsofDecrease

Aidscoredecrease

ReportedEJEspreviousyear&1styear(annualaverage)

ReportedEJEs2dyear&

yearafter(annualaverage)

Percentagechange

28 2003‐04 ‐4 1 0 ‐100.00%16 2007‐08 ‐4 59 3 ‐94.92%11 2007‐08 ‐7 150 17 ‐88.67%18 2007‐08 ‐10 52 7 ‐86.54%30 2007‐08 ‐7 91 47 ‐48.35%18 2003‐04 ‐5 22 26 18.18%12 2006‐07 ‐7 48 58 20.83%12 2003‐04 ‐6 15 34 126.67% Total 438 192 ‐56.16%

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AnnexII:AnnualReportedExecutionsbyBrigadeJurisdiction

Annualtotalreportedbyjurisdiction

Brigade

Totalinbrigadejurisdiction

Totalreportedbyunit 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

1 15 2 0 1 5 3 1 3 2 2 103 15 14 21 34 15 9 8 2 03 86 53 1 0 11 12 23 23 16 04 608 267 40 66 104 121 137 112 28 05 52 31 3 10 12 9 4 3 11 06 124 42 8 20 21 1 25 28 21 07 256 42 11 13 15 12 57 134 12 28 96 42 4 3 4 11 13 27 31 39 134 85 2 2 6 13 17 44 50 010 174 69 ‐ ‐ 3 34 53 61 23 011 207 35 5 1 12 22 49 101 14 312 136 27 3 12 15 19 29 30 28 013 21 7 1 2 6 3 6 3 0 014 141 24 6 26 15 4 21 46 23 015 2 12 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 2 0 016 91 31 2 1 10 16 20 39 2 117 86 22 1 3 16 37 12 14 3 018 107 32 11 11 14 12 9 43 7 027 88 18 0 1 7 7 20 41 12 028 7 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 029 128 36 2 2 11 20 35 34 21 330 138 33 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 16 75 46 1

Navy 4 14 2 1 1Jurisdictionnotidentified 12 1 6 3 2 Total 2816 1087 116 195 321 377 564 875 354 14 Police 193 35 21 39 27 31 24 13 3AirForce 5 2 1 2 3014 153 217 362 404 595 899 367 17

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Notes1SeeMichaelS.Cohen,“ArmsfortheWorld,”Dissent,Fall2009,pp.69‐74.2DepartmentofState,2009HumanRightsReport:Pakistan,March11,2010,athttp://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136092.htm3“WarlordsToughenUSTaskinAfghanistan,”TIME,December9,2008,accessedathttp://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1865255,00.html4NewAmericaFoundationstudyoncivilianskilledasaresultofUSdronestrikesinPakistan,2010,http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones5ThedeathpenaltyinColombiaisillegal,sothatanykillingbystateforcesisextrajudicial,unlessitiscommittedincombatandwithrespectforinternationalhumanitarianlaw.Here,weadoptthephraseascommonlyusedbyhumanrightsorganizations,tomeankillingscommittedbystateforcesofcivilians,outsideofcombat.Weusethephrases“extrajudicialexecution”(EJE),“civiliankilling”,and“extrajudicialkilling”interchangeably.6InterviewwithU.S.Embassystaff,August2009.StateDepartmentofficialshavereportedlymadethisclaimtoothersaswell.InMarch2008,StateDepartmentofficialstoldFORthat[theU.S.embassyin]Colombiahas“atremendousdatabase”forvetting,“probablythebest.”77The2003guidanceisState34981,“CompliancewiththeStateandDODLeahyAmendments:AGuidetotheVettingProcess,”February6,2003,p.3;documentproducedin2007,providedtoFORbyUSSouthernCommand.8NationalSecurityArchives,“DocumentsDescribeHistoryofAbusesbyColombian,”ElectronicBriefingBookNo.266,January7,2009.9InterviewwithFOR,Washington,DC,April21,2010.10ElEspectador,October7,2008,accessedathttp://elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/articulo‐uribe‐dice‐desaparicidos‐de‐soacha‐murieron‐en‐combates;ElEspectador,October28,2008,accessedathttp://elespectador.com/noticias/opinion/editorial/articulo86620‐los‐desaparecidos‐de‐soacha11HR4775,2002SupplementalAppropriationsActforFurtherRecoveryfromandResponsetoTerroristAttacksontheUnitedStates,Sec.305(a)(1),authorizinguseoffunds“againstactivitiesbyorganizationsdesignatedasterroristorganizationssuchas”FARC,ELNandAUC.SubsequentlycodifiedNationalSecurityPresidentialDirective18,November2002.12LTCDarrylLong,“ColombiayEstadosUnidos:AmistadyCooperaciónporAmérica,”RevistaEjércitoNo.139,May‐June2008,p.31.TranslationbyFOR.13TheseincludetheFourthBrigadeanditsbattalions;15thMobileBrigade;‘LaPopa’Battalion;17thBrigade;JoaquínParisBattalion;29thBrigade;andmanyothers.14DepartmentofState,ForeignMilitaryTrainingandDoDEngagementActivitiesofInterest,athttp://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/index.htm.15“AGuidetotheVettingProcess,”op.cit.,p.19.16SeestatementbytenformerArmycommanders,May12,2010;andinterviewwithGeneralHaroldBedoya,ElEspectador,June5,2010,accessedathttp://www.elespectador.com/impreso/cuadernilloa/entrevista‐de‐cecilia‐orozco/articuloimpreso‐207046‐mi‐palpito‐los‐cuarteles‐de.StatementsbyU.S.militaryarenotaswidespread,butinclude:CaptainC.PeterDungan,“FightingLawfareattheSpecialOperationsTaskForceLevel,”March‐April2008(vol21),pp.9‐15;andinterviewwithU.S.militarytrainers,February2010.17InterviewwithFOR,Bogotá,18June2010.18Embassiesarealsorequiredtoreport“anyinformationwhichreasonablycouldbedeemedtobecredibleevidenceofgrossviolationsbyanyunit”receivingU.S.subjectassistance,“regardlessofthesourceofsuchinformation.”SecretaryofStatecabletoallposts,“RevisedGuidanceRegardingLeahyAmendmentsandU.S.ForeignAssistance,”February6,2003.ThisdocumentisstillreferencedasprincipalguidanceinrecentStateDepartmentdirectivesonhumanrightsvetting.19Thesemobilebrigadesarenumbers1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12,13,15,17and20.20“AGuidetotheVettingProcess,”op.cit.,p.18.21Theseincludesentencesunderthemilitaryjusticesystemforcasesofthreekillings.22SeeDepartmentofState,“MemorandumofJustificationConcerningHumanRightsConditionswithRespecttoAssistancefortheColombianArmedForces,”forFiscalYear2009.

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23“CorteSupremasugierequealtosmandosrespondanporfalsospositivos,”ElEspectador,21October2009,http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/articulo168011‐corte‐suprema‐sugiere‐altos‐mandos‐respondan‐falsos‐positivos24JuzgadoTerceroPenaldelCircuitoEspecializadodeBogotá,June9,2010,RUN:11001320700320080002500;LuisAlfonsoPlazasVega;DesaparaciónForzada.25UnvettedunitsarethosethathavenotbeenvettedandthereforecannotreceiveUSassistance.Suspendedunitshavebeenvettedanddeemedineligiblebecauseofhumanrightsconcerns.AswereportedwithAmnestyInternationalin2008(http://www.forcolombia.org/sites/www.forcolombia.org/files/ResponsetoJul%E2%80%A62008Final.doc),overthecourseofeightyearsbetween2000‐2007theUnitedStatesprovidedeithertrainingorequipmenttoindividualsfromatotalof558“unvetted”unitsoftheColombianarmedforces,includingmorethan300armyunits,accordingtotheStateDepartment.MostoftheindividualsweremostlikelytrainedatschoolsintheUnitedStatesandwerelikelyofficers,judgingfromtheForeignMilitaryTrainingreportspublishedbytheStateDepartment.26Documentedassistancebeganinthe2000‐2003period.Thus,forsomeexecutionsreportedin2002and2003,itcouldnotbedeterminediftheunitidentifiedwaspreviouslyassisted.27ComisiónColombianadeJuristas,“Colombia:casosdeejecucionesextrajudicialesatribuidasalafuerzapública,1°denoviembrede2008a31demarzode2010.”28NocheyNiebla,“Cifras,”innos.36,38and40.29Assistancewasmeasuredbythenumberandtypesofunitsassistedannuallyineachbrigadejurisdiction.TherewereseveralinstancesofunitsreceivingincreasedU.S.aidwherereportsofciviliankillingsdecreased,butthedecreaseswereconsiderablylessthantheincreases.Whenthechangesinnumbersofexecutionswereweightedaccordingtotheamountofincreasedassistance,theaverageincreasewasnearlythesame–85%.SeeAnnex1andthenoteonmethodology,tobeelaboratedinannexofforthcomingreport.30Thisappearstobethecaseforthe11thand30thBrigades,operatinginCórdobaandNortedeSantander,suspendedin2008,afterwhichthenumberofreportedarmyexecutionscommittedintheirjurisdictionsfellprecipitously.However,inthecaseofthe12thBrigadeinCaquetá,suspendedin2007,thenumberofarmykillingsinthejurisdictionincreasedslightly.31CommandersoftheSecond,Fifthand13thbrigadesdidnotattendSOA.Recordswereambiguousforfourbrigadecommanders.AllsevendivisioncommandershadattendedtheSchool.32Infact,whenverylimitedamountsofU.S.militaryassistancetoGuatemalaresumedafterthe1996peaceaccords,andmoresubstantiallyin2005,therehadalreadybeenadeclineinrightsviolationsyearsbefore.33FORinterview,May14,2008.34ProcuraduríaGeneraldelaNación,“EjecucionesArbitrariasenPersonaProtegida,”Powerpointpresentation,2009.35DireccióndeEstudiosSectoriales,MinisteriodeDefensa,“LogrosdelaPolíticadeConsólidacióndelaSeguridadDemocrática,”Marzo2010;ThomasMarks,“ColombianArmyAdaptationtoFARCInsurgency,”2002,p.10;EduardoMatyasCamargo,“LaSeguridadDemocrática:OtroFalsoPositivo,”April5,2010.36“ToCounttheUncounted:AnEstimationofLethalViolenceinCasanare,”BenetechHumanRightsProgram,February10,2010.37Reuters,“U.S.saysnoaidforColombiaarmyunitsinscandal,”http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN06394035._CH_.2400,accessedMay23,2010;USEmbassyinterviewwithFOR,May14,2008.OtherunitsalreadysuspendedincludedtheFourthand30thBrigadesand12thMobileBrigade,aswellasthePalanqueroairbase(resumedin2008)andsubsequentlydisbanded20thBrigade:http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/justicia/precision‐sobre‐alcances‐de‐veto‐a‐tres‐comandos‐de‐unidades‐del‐ejercito‐pedira‐gobierno‐a‐eu_4649948‐1,accessedNovember7,2008.StateDepartmentofficialsalsoinformedFORthatassistancetothe17thBrigadehadbeensuspendedsinceatleast2002,althoughindividualsfromthebrigadereceiveddeminingassistanceduringthisperiod.38FORinterview,February17,2010.39“ConsatisfacciónrecibeComandantedelEjércitocertificacióndeEstadosUnidos,”April11,2007,athttp://www.ejercito.mil.co/?idcategoria=19082940Thisisthecase,forexample,withtheFirstBrigade,forwhichonlytwoexecutionswereattributedtobrigademembers,bothin2007,reportedbynon‐governmentalorganizations,andonlyoneoftheseappearedintheCINEPdatabase.41ObservatoriodeDerechosHumanosyDerechoHumanitario,“EjecucionesExtrajudiciales:RealidadInocultable,2007–2008.”

42

42CurtisKammancable,March27,2000,releasedtotheNationalSecurityArchivesviaFreedomofInformationAct(FOIA)request.43TheAttorneyGeneral’sofficeopenedinvestigationsintothe2006killingsinCórdobabetween2006and2008,butasof2009,nonehadadvanced.44FrankBajak,“Whotokill?Colombiaarmypickssoldier’sbrother,”AssociatedPress,November13,2008,http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Who+to+kill%3f+Colombia+army+picks+soldier%27s+brother‐a01611713184.“Mihermanofueunfalsopositivo,”Semana,October25,2008,http://www.semana.com/noticias‐nacion/hermano‐falso‐positivo/117023.aspx45“AlaFiscalíapasaronmilitarescapturados,”http://www.eluniversal.com.co/noticias/20080418/mon_suc_a_la_fiscalia_pasaron_militares_capturad.html;U.S.Embassyofficer,June2008.46SixteenotherexecutionswerereportedlycommittedbyunitsfromtheFourthBrigade,SecondBrigadeandFirstMarineInfantryBattalion.47ThecampwasinCarmendeBolivar,BolivarDepartment.“'MartínCaballero',jefedelFrente37delasFarc,murióencombate,”ElTiempo,at:http://poorbuthappy.com/colombia/post/martn‐caballero‐jefe‐del‐frente‐37‐de‐las‐farc‐muri‐en‐combate/.Seealso“BloqueCaribedelasFARCquedaheridodemuerte,”Semana,at:http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?idArt=107192and“Dadodebaja‘MartínCaballero’y18guerrillerosmás,”at:http://www.ejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=195568Wewerenotabletodeterminewhetherthe11thBrigadeisacomponentoftheCaribbeanJointCommand.48Thebattalioncommanderduringthisperiod,ElmerMauricioPeñaPedraza,attendedtheSchooloftheAmericasin1987.49OtherengineeringbattalionsvettedforU.S.assistanceareintheSeventhand14thBrigadesinMetaandMagdalenaMedio,respectively.TheCalibioBattalioninthe14thBrigadewasimplicatedintheSoacha“falsepositives”scandalanditscommanderwassuspendedinOctober2008.50The18thMobileBrigadehasalsooperatedinHuilasince2006,andtheUnitedStatesbegantosupportitin2008.The21stMobileBrigadeisbasedinHuila,andtheUnitedStatesapprovedsupportforitthisyear,butitoperatesinotherpartsofthecountry.Seehttp://www.quintadivision.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=233932andhttp://www.prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?article611.51Forty‐twoofthese124killingsweredirectlyattributedtomembersoftheSixthBrigade.OnlyintheCajamarcacaseoffivevictimshadanycourtreachedajudgment,accordingtoinformationavailabletoCCEEU,constitutinga96%impunityrateforcasesinthebrigade’sjurisdiction.52See“ElSurdeCesar:EntrelaAcumulacióndelaTierrayelMonocultivodelaPalma,”and“NortedeSantander:TerritorioDiversa,InfamiaAguda,”athttp://www.colombianuncamas.org.53NocheyNieblaNo.27,p.210.Oneoftheteenagedgirlswassix‐monthspregnant,andtheattackersremovedherfetus,throwingitandthebodyofthegirlintotheriver.TheColombiangovernmentallegedthatthearmywasnotinthevicinityandthattheattackerswereparamilitaries.“AdiciónalinformedelRelatorEspecialsobrelasejecucionesextrajudiciales,”2004,E/CN.4/2005/7/Add.1,accessedathttp://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/3393.pdf54GeneralsOscarGonzálezPeñaandMarioMontoyaUribe,respectively.BGHaroldBedoya,brigadecommanderin1990,becamearmycommanderin1995‐96.GeneralJorgeEnriqueMora,brigadecommanderin1994‐95,becamearmycommanderin1998‐2002.55ObservatoriodeDerechosHumanosyDerechoInternacionalHumanitario,Ejecucionesextrajudiciales:elcasodelorienteantioqueño,2007,availableathttp://www.dhcolombia.info/spip.php?article36256InterviewwithGeneralOscarGonzálezPeña,June18,2010.57InMedellin,variousintelligencereportshavecometolightapparentlypreparedbyTechnicalInvestigationUnit’s(CTI)74thprosecutorinAntioquia,incollaborationwiththeRIMENo.7andtheFourthArmyBrigade.Thereportsstatethatarangeofnon‐governmentalorganizationsandhumanrightsdefendersarepartoftheFARC.ThesereportsmentiontheJudicialFreedomOrganization(CJL)anditslawyersElkinRamirezandBayronGóngora,renownedhumanrightsdefenderswhohavebeensubjecttopreviousbaselessprosecutions.Góngorasubsequentlyreceivedcredibleinformationthatacontracttokillhimhadbeenpaid,andhewentintoexile.InDecember2009,FORandHumanRightsFirstwrotetoAssistantSecretaryofStateArturoValenzuela,recommendingsuspensionofassistancetoRIMENo.7.Herespondedthattheunit’sreportedactions“donotrisetothelevelofgrossviolationsofhumanrights,whichisthelegalstandardfordeterminingeligibilityforU.S.assistance.”ArturoValenzuelalettertoHRFandFOR,February2010.

43

58TheseincludetheFourthCavalryGroup“JuandeCorral”;FourthArtilleryBattalion"CoronelJorgeEduardoSanchezRodríguez”;FourthEngineeringBattalion“GeneralPedronelOspina”;32ndInfantryBattalion"GeneralPedroJustoBerrio";andFourthCounterguerrillaBattalion“Granaderos.”59DepartmentofState,“DeterminationandCertificationRelatedtoColombianArmedForcesunderSection553oftheForeignOperations,ExportFinancingandRelatedProgramsAppropriationsAct,DivisionD,ConsolidatedAppropriationsAct,2004(P.L.108‐199),andSection556oftheForeignOperations,ExportFinancingandRelatedProgramsAppropriationsAct,DivisionD,ConsolidatedAppropriationsAct,2005(P.L.108‐447),”May26,2006,pp.4‐5.60TrainingInFiscalYear2002,VolumeI,”U.S.DepartmentofDefenseandU.S.DepartmentofStateJointReporttoCongress,“CountryTrainingActivities,”at:http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/21823.pdf,p.IV‐219.61DepartmentofState,“DeterminationandCertificationRelatedtoColombianArmedForcesunderSection556oftheForeignOperations,ExportFinancingandRelatedProgramsAppropriationsAct,2005(DivisionD,P.L.108‐447),”May26,2006,pp.4‐5,19.62NocheyNieblaNo.28,pp.66‐67.63NocheyNieblaNo.30,p.238.64TerrorismodelEstadodeColombia(EdicionesNCOS,1992),p.272.RamírezZuluagawasarrestedinApril2007forresponsibilityforthedisappearanceoffourpeasantsinJanuary2006,buthewasreleased,reportedlyinerror,inNovember2007andfled.http://www.radiosantafe.com/2008/03/19/capturado‐ex‐coronel‐del‐ejercito‐implicado‐en‐desaparicion‐y‐asesinato‐de‐campesinos/andhttp://colombiaadistancia.blogspot.com/2008/01/coronel‐r‐acusado‐de‐desaparicin‐de.html(accessed26May2010).65NocheyNieblaNo.33,p.88.66EjércitoColombiano,FUDRA,September2007,p.5.67MobileBrigades1,3and7alsoreceivedassistanceduringthe2000‐04period.68“Laúltimamorada,”ElEspectador,September11,2009,http://www.elespectador.com/impreso/articuloimpreso160963‐ultima‐morada;FORinterviewwithinvestigator,October6,2009.69“Laúltimamorada.”70GonzaloGuillén,“Hallanfosacomúnconcercade2,000cadaveresenelorientedeColombia,”ElNuevoHerald,January29,2010,http://www.elnuevoherald.com/2010/01/29/640282/hallan‐fosa‐comun‐con‐cerca‐de.html71“Confesionesdeunpositivo,”ElEspectador,May17,2010,accessedathttp://www.elespectador.com/impreso/judicial/articuloimpreso‐203695‐confesiones‐de‐un‐positivo.72http://www.cgfm.mil.co/CGFMPortal/index.jsp?option=contentDisplay&idCont=45273U.S.AmbassadorCurtisKamman,cabletoSecretaryofState,March2000,obtainedbyNationalSecurityArchivesviaFOIArequest.74Ibid.75“ForeignMilitaryTrainingInFiscalYears2003and2004,VolumeI,”U.S.DepartmentofDefenseandU.S.DepartmentofStateJointReporttoCongress,“CountryTrainingActivities,”at:http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45793.pdf,p.IV‐271.76http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/justicia/presion‐por‐resultados‐era‐muy‐grande‐coronel‐santiago‐herrera‐destituido‐por‐falsos‐positivos_5328709‐177Thesewerethe15thInfantry“Santander”Battalion,basedinOcaña;FifthMechanizedCavalry“Maza”Battalion,inCucuta;andthe46thCounterguerrilla“HeroesdeSaraguro”Battalion,inTibu.Theaidincludedfirstaidtraining,accordingtoonemediareport.HughBronstein,Reuters,“U.S.soldiershelpwaragainstrebelsinColombia,”February5,2008.78ProcuraduríaGeneraldelaNación,archivofísico,respuestaaJomaryOrtegón,26dejuliode2007.79“LamasacredeNariño,¿unavenganza?”Semana,August27,2009,accessedathttp://www.semana.com/noticias‐conflicto‐armado/masacre‐narino‐venganza/127864.aspx80ComisiónColombianadeJuristas,“Colombia:casosdeejecucionesextrajudicialesatribuidasalafuerzapública1°denoviembrede2008a31demarzode2010,”May2010,pp.8‐9.81InterviewwithGeneralCarlosOspina,April21,2010.82DIAcable,September14,1999,obtainedbyNationalSecurityArchives,accessedat:http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB223/19990914.pdf

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83AmnestyInternationalandFOR,“AssistingUnitsthatCommittExtrajudicialKillings:ACalltoInvestigateU.S.MilitaryPolicyinColombia,”April2008,pp.17‐18.84May6,2007,http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/06/world/americas/06colombia.html85http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/part3.htmlSeeDocuments69and7086“FiscalíainicióinvestigacióncontraexgeneralesMarioMontoyayLeonardoGallego,”VerdadAbierta.com,June16,2009,accessedat:http://www.verdadabierta.com/parapolitica/antioquia/1433‐fiscalia‐inicio‐investigacion‐contra‐ex‐generales‐mario‐montoya‐y‐leonardo‐gallego‐87TestimoniesofColonelJoséOrlandoAcostaCeli(Ret.)andColonelNestorIvánDuque,citedinappealbyJorgeMolanoRodrígueztoProsecutorGeneralGuillermoMendozaDiago,May2010,Radicado11,722.88“Colombiaarmychieflinkedtooutlawmilitias,”PaulRichterandGregMiller,LosAngelesTimes,March25,2007.89ObservatoriodeDerechosHumanosyDerechoInternacionalHumanitario,Ejecucionesextrajudiciales:elcasodelorienteantioqueño,2007,availableathttp://www.dhcolombia.info/spip.php?article36290ElTiempo,November6,2008:http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/justicia/desplome‐de‐sus‐hombres‐debilito‐al‐general‐montoya‐quien‐se‐va‐tras‐purga‐por‐los‐falsos‐positivos_4644888‐191“Nosoyunclon,tengomisellopersonal,”Semana,athttp://www.semana.com/wf_ImprimirArticulo.aspx?IdArt=11751892“ReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronextrajudicial,summaryorarbitraryexecutions,PhilipAlston,”March31,2010,p.28.93DepartmentofStateOfficeofInspectorGeneral,“ComplianceFollowupReviewofEmbassyBogotá,Colombia,”p.9.InaninterviewinOctober2009,embassystafftoldFORthattherewerebythentwofull‐timestaffforvetting.94 Congressional Research Service, “Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan‐Afghanistan Border Region and U.S.Policy,”November21,2008,p.13.95“U.S.OfficialsSeeWasteinBillionsSenttoPakistan,”http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/24/world/asia/24military.html?_r=1&pagewanted=2 accessed June 22,2010.96DefenseSecurityCooperationAgency(DSCA)FY2011,http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_OCO_PARTS/DSCA_OCO_FY11.pdfaccessedJuly12,2010.97Ibid.98CombatingTerrorism:theUnitedStatesLacksComprehensivePlantoDestroytheTerroristThreatandClosetheSafeHaveninPakistan’sFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas,PublishedApril2008,availableathttp://www.cfr.org/publication/16058/combating_terrorism.htmlaccessedJuly12,2010.TheUnitedStatesLacksComprehensivePlantoDestroytheTerroristThreatandClosetheSafeHaveninPakistan’sFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas,GAO‐08‐622,http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d08622high.pdfaccessedJuly12,2010.99U.S.OversightofPakistanReimbursementClaimsforCoalitionSupportFundshttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08932t.pdfaccessedJuly13,2010.100DirectOvertU.S.AidandMilitaryReimbursementstoPakistan,FY2002‐FY2011,,http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdfaccessedJuly12,2010.101Securing,Stabilizing,andDevelopingPakistan'sBorderAreawithAfghanistan:KeyIssuesforCongressionalOversight,GAO‐09‐263SPFebruary23,2009.102http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Enhanced_Partnership_with_Pakistan_Act_of_2009/Title_II#Sec._204._Pakistan_Counterinsurgency_Capability_Fund.andhttp://www.defence.pk/forums/world‐affairs/36335‐britain‐train‐pakistan‐s‐frontier‐corps‐troops‐baluchistan.htmlaccessedJuly7,2010103http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/index.htmaccessedJune24,2010.104FordetailedaccountofhumanrightssituationinPakistan,referto:AmnestyInternational,AsifHellFellonMe:TheHumanRightsCrisisinNorthwestPakistan,June2010;http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA33/004/2010/en/1ea0b9e0‐c79d‐4f0f‐a43d‐98f7739ea92e/asa330042010en.pdf;andAsmaJahangir,Atragedyoferrorsandcoverups:TheIDPsandoutcomeofmilitaryactionsinFATAandMalakandDivision,HumanRightsCommissionofPakistan,June3,2009,http://www.hrcp‐web.org/showprel.asp?id=74.

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1052009HumanRightsReport:Pakistan,March11,2010,http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136092.htmaccessedJune24,2010.106TheStateofHumanRightsinPakistanin2009,http://material.ahrchk.net/hrreport/2009/AHRC‐SPR‐006‐2009‐Pakistan‐HRReport2009.pdfaccessedJune23,2010,Pakistancountrypage,http://www.internal‐displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/A5D488969B1E5FBFC125767400397C48?OpenDocumentasonJuly12,2010.UNHCRreportsthatthereareabout1.8millionIDPsinPakistan:2010UNHCRcountryoperationsprofile–Pakistan,http://www.unhcr.org/cgi‐in/texis/vtx/page?page=49e487016accessedJuly12,2010.107HumanrightsreportthreatensaidtoPakistan,April6,2010,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2010/04/05/AR2010040504373.html accessedJune22,2010108“Pakistan'sArmyaccusedofextra‐judicialkillings,”http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6340HN20100405accessedJune22,2010.109AmnestyInternational,AsifHellFellonMe,http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA33/004/2010/enaccessedJune30,2010,http://www.allvoices.com/contributed‐news/6073578‐amnesty‐international‐and‐fata accessed June 24,2010.110 Secretary of State Colin Powell, Cable 34981, February 6, 2003, “Revised Guidance Regarding LeahyAmendmentsandU.S.ForeignAssistance.”111SenateAppropriationsSubcommitteeonStateandForeignOperationshearing,March25,2010.112Theworkinggroupincludesthefollowingorganizations:HumanRightsandHumanitarianLawObservatoryofCCEEU;JuridicalLibertyCorporation(CorporaciónJurídicaLibertad);JoséAlvearRestrepoLawyersCollective(Cajar);ColombianCommissionofJurists;Cos‐pacc;HumanidadVigente;Minga;BancodeDatosdelCinep;ComitédeDerechosHumanosdelBajoAriari;Sembrar;PoliticalPrisonersSolidarityCommittee;CorporaciónReiniciar;PazconDignidadColombia;Redher;CorporaciónYiraCastro;Justapaz;ComisiónInterclesialdeJusticiayPaz;ColectivodeAbogados“LuisCarlosPérez”;GrupoInterdisciplinariodeDerechosHumanos;andCorporaciónClaretianaNormanPérezBello.

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