Milit~ .... .}lInuury 1979

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Military Review VOLUME LlX JANUARY. 1979

CONTENTS NO 1

PAGE 2 INDONESIA. KEY TO SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA by Major John B Haseman. US Army

11 DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY-THE MISUNDERSTOOD BASICS by Major Ted Schroeder. US Air Force

17 INDICATORS OF THE COMING WAR by Gregory R. Copley

23 BUT WHO IS GUARDING THE REAR? by Major Calvm C Seybold. US Army Reserve

29 A CHALLENGE TO THE SYSTEM LEADERSHIP SELECTION by Major James Talley. US Army

34 VIETNAM IN PERSPECTIVE by General W"ham C Westmoreland. US Army.

44 FRANCE-MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA by Dennis Chaplm

Re/lred

4B SOVIET SPECIAL OPERATIONS/PARTISAN WARFARE by Captam Henry S Whlllier Jr. US Army

59 CARL GUSTAF-A WEAPON THAT WORKSI by Major M R Janay, US Manne Corps

64 THE ULTIMATE DETERRfiNT by Colonel Cee" M MInich, US Army

67 SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE ABROAD THE LESSONS OF SOMALIA by Captam Gary D Payton. US Aif Force

7B STUDIES

79 NEWS

B6 REVIEWS the best from other Journals

B9 BOOKS contemporary readmg for the profeSSIOnal

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Ethics

The US Army school system IS revitalizing its formal courses of instruction in professional milItary ethics. This resurgent, overt interest in ethics, the heart and soul of the mIlitary profession, is an encouraging milestone as we prepare for the 1980s. The subject of ethics, however; must not be relegated to the classroom alone-or to discu>Slon, In the abstract. The blade of military ethics, forged in the servIce schools, mu,t he honcd constantly by the whebtone of day-to-day realitIes in the field. This demands both a common understanding of "'hat our ethic i, and a wlllingne" to dlscu" thIS ethIC In terms of dally occurrences and challenges.

Difference, in the understandIng of the military ethic do exist, and the disparIty is normally a functIon of age. 1 hI, IS natural. SInce we arc shaped hy our expenenees, and the officers comml",oned In the 1970, matured in a different mllteu than those, for example. who we Ie eommi"lOned in the 1950,. Both groups, however, are equally dedIcated to the Army and .to the country,. Their perceptIon,. althougn dIfferent. arc eLJually \,Iltd and hone,t. The constant ta,k we face is to reduce these dlfklencl's In pelceptltln and to cncnura)!e a common under,tanding of our ethiC tlHl1U)!houl Ihe enlne oilleel 'pecllum. from Ilcutenant to general.

lIndl"lanclln)!. ellhel among dtllelent people, or among dlfierenl generati.on,. IS he,1 cngendel~d hy dl.llo!!ue and dl,eu"lon. Optnnallv. such di,cu"ion should he 'pOl1t.llwnll' .lIld Ileqllcnt I he ple"In)! demand, of dally aeti\ltie" ho\\cver. often Imltt,lte ap.lln'l thl' h.lppentng. and II I'. Ihelclore. incumhent upon the seOlor nilicel' tn promote tile'L' c.h"'CU"JOfl .... One tl'L"hniquL' \vhich WInk ... equally well eltltel \l111t.1 't.tli ,eetllln III thlee 1Illleel' IIr.1 hattalton of 30 oiflcers I' to proVide a pOint "I lciercnle 1111 a dl\L'U"10111 and then to .I"emhle the UI1Il offlcels under rL'i,l\l'tl. mlorlll,d l'Plldllh1l1' Inl thL' d'''ClI',''''IOIl.

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Key to Security Southeast Asia In

Major John B. Haseman, US Army

Indonesia is the emerging regional power in Southeast Asia. By land, Indonesia joins the continents of Asia and Aus-tralia. Bv sea, it connects the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Strategi~ally, it can serve as either a bridge or barrier to communications and trade. Its vast untapped natural re-sources make it internationally important to the industrial powers of the world. However, its population imbalance and significant social problems impact on Indonesia's regional policies and progress. Given Indonesia's strategic location, its important eronomie significance and its rising position as a regional power, the United States \should ensure that Indonesia remains unattached to any major power blor and remains friendly toward the United States and its allies. To assist in this goal, the United Statcs has maintained a modest program of military assistalll'" tn Indon('sia and encouraged significant private investment in the area. A stable government which promotes ordel'i.)' growth and development is a must for Indonesia. The Unitl'd Statrs must assist that nation in achieving pcaeeful progress and na-tional stability.

INDONESIA is an immense country of crucial importance to the United States and its allies. In the regional alignment of power in Southeast Asia after the Communist victories in Indo-china, Indonesia has found itself in-creasingly important as a regional power, as well as a target of new world attention. It is in the best interests of . the United States that Indonesia remain friendly to the free world.

Indonesia is important to the United States in three aspects: its strategrc locatIOn; its physical and geographic wealth; and its potential for regional leadership. These factors also make Indonesia of striking im-portance to other nations. The Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Japan and Australia are all closely involved in Indonesia's future policies. \

INDIAN OCEAN

INDONESIA

Furthermore, Indonesia ,is important regionally to the other 'nations of Southeast Asia. Finally, Indonesia has important economic and political ties to the nations of the Middle East and Western Europe. These factors make it obvious that Indonesia will occupy an important role in world affairs in the 1970s and 1980s .

-----Strategic location -----

Indonesia consists of 13,667 \s!ands stretching for some 3,400 .miles along the equator between mainland South-east Asia and Australia.! Its com-ponent islands range from some of the largest in the world-Kalimantcm, Su-matra, Sulawesi, the western half or

.1UIJllfl/ .'-1111

MILITARY REVIEW

Nt'w Guinpa-to o,er 12,000 ;uninhab-ited bits of land. It is the largest archipelagic country in the world.

The Indonesian archipelago joins by land the continents of Asia and Australia;, by sea, it joins the Pacific and Indiim Oceans. However, In-donesia also could function as a barrier tn interocean and intercontinental communications. The islands can block passage between oceans or could becoml' a threat to the national st: curity or economic survival of Aus-tralin. The authority that governs In-donesia, or thl' political mfluence enjoyed by outside powers. will dp tprmine the strategic role that In-donesia will play in this vital part of the world. Dr. Donald E. Weatherbee wrote that:

... from a geostrategic point of 1;/eU', it functions as ezther a bridge or a barner, depending on the nature of the relationship with the eontrollzng authonty . ... "

Indonesin's importance to Japan hes in the realm of international e('o-nomics and shipping. Over 90 percent of Japan's petroleum comes from the Middle East, and all of it must pass through Indonesian waters. Other world shipping is similarly affected though not to such a major extent. More than 4,000 tankers annually pass through the Strait of Malacca. More than 400,000 smaller ships and coastal traders also use the strait, as well as do uncounted thousands of local fishing vessels.'

Indonesian, Malaysian and Sin-gapore officials have cooperated in enforcing strict regulations to protect the ecology of the Strait of Malacca from massive damage from the petroleum-carrying supertankers. These regulations, as well as the

4

shallow draft of the strait, have di-verted supertankers and large war-ships from the internationally con-trolled Strait of Malacca to the deep water Lombok Strait (between the is-lands of Bali and Lombok) which is entirely within Indonesia's national waters. The economic effect of this diversion, which adds several hundred miles to the trip from the Middle East oil fields to Japan, has been increased costs to JapaGese industry.

The political cost has the potential for much more serious problems. The Indonesian government has stated un-equivocally that it will maintain a policy of free rights of innocent passage for thp vessels of all nations using the Lombok Strait. There is no feasible alternative to use of the Strait of Mahcca and Lombok. The Arafura Sea and Torres Strait between New Guinea and Australia are less than 20 feet deep, prohibiting passage of large ships. The overburdened Strait of Malacca is only 30 feet deep in places. A physical or political closure of these Indonesian waterways would have worldwide repercussions.

Thus, the power that controls the straits-Indonesia 01' a hostile outside power-has a very real ability to disrupt the international economy and effect major changes in world power applications. Among other effects such a closure would:

Prevent the United States from moving the 7th Fleet between 'the Pa-cific and Indian Oceans.

Pose major difficulties for the Soviet Union in moving supplies to its increasingly strong Indian Ocean fleet, which is 1I0W largely supplied from bases on the USSR's Pacific coast.

Paralyze. the Japanese economy and the economies of other nations

closely tied to Japan (including the United States).

Destabilize Southeast Asia and cause particular problems to Malaysia and Thailand.'

On land, a hostile presence in In-donesia would provide a springboard for an attack against Australia. An eminent Australian journalist, in his argument for repairs to strained rela-tions between Australia and Indonesia, said:

... it is inconceivable that any power wzth hastde intent could launch an attaek on Australia without taking care of Indonesia on its line of commu-nications."

The immediacy of a disruption in the Indonesian straits to the interests of the United States an,; its allies and adversaries alike is readily apparent.

-- Economic Importance of IndoneSla--

Indonesia has assumed an im-portan t position in world economics. The country is a major producer of strategic raw materials, as well as a consumc>r of multinational pri\'!\te in vestments and government-sponsored economic and military assistnnce. The Intergovernmental Group on In-donesia (IGGI), formed in 1967 to assist the recoverY of the Indonesian economy from th~ disaster of the Su-karno era, has huge investments in Indonesia. The IGGI members include 14 countries, the World Ban~, the Inter-national Monptury Fund nnd the Asian Development Bank. Most of the IGGI investmentfl in the Indnnl'Ilinn economy nrC' finnnced hy .Jnpnn nnd the United Stutes.

Privute Arr.ericun inVI'Htnwnt n]ul1('

INDONESIA

totaled $1.422 billion in. the period 1967-75, and major Western in-vestments since 1967 were more than $3 billion.6 The Japanese Mitsui Group has announced plans to invest as much as $1 billion in Indonesia by 1979." In 1976, Indonesia ranked third in total economic assistance received from the United States government (after Israel and South Korea)." The sheer immensity of the sums of American and allied public and private investment in the Indonesian economy establishes a potent national interest in that country's future.

Indonesia's economy has shown marked improvement since the Su-kamo era. Despite the recent failure of the government-owned oil corporation Pertamina, the Indonesian economy did relatively well in 1977 because of its immense natural wealth. It is a rich country, ranking third (after the USSR and the United States) in its potential wealth in natural resources. Most of these riches are still untapped and await a massive development program.

Perhaps most important to an energy-starved world are Indonesia's petroleum reserves, estimatec\ in 1976 at 14 billion barrels or approximately 2.1 percen t of the world's reserves. 9 Figure 1 shows Indonesia's ranking among producers of major strategic natuml resources. The country also is a major producer of copper, sulphur, nickel, diamonds, gold, quinine, coffee, teu, copra, kapok und numerou~ other mineral and agricultural resources.

The growth of the Association of SouthclIst Asian Nations (ASEAN) as !l rl'gionnl organization has been slow und sporadic'. A series of multilateral nnd bilnteral meetings among ASEAN member states, Japan, the United Stntes lind th{' Indochinese nations

MILITARY REVIEW

began in late 1977. These meetings have not produced any major pro-nouncements or changes in the re-spective policies of the countries in-volved but do indicate continued progress in ASEAN's development. By common consent of its five members-l!ldonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. A flurry of diplomatic missions to and from the Indochinese countries indicates that some success toward this goal of mutual toleration can be achieved without intervention of major power sponsors and friends of the countries involved.

leading Strategic Commodities Produced by Indonesia

0 5 10 15 20 25 Rubber Palm 011 ,,--., .

Pepper

Tin I Forest pl'Oducts

Petroleum 0 --- ---- .--------

Percentage of world exports

Source ASia 1978 Yearbook, Far E.asten1 ECOH{HtltC RUV~DW Inc. Hunq t

.. Indonesia seems to be fashion ing a role as the anchor of a southern 'core' power area explicitly balancing the Hanoioriented northern 'core' power area.'"

While suspicious and distrustful of the Indochinese countries, Indonesia has edged toward a proper relationship with them. The recent visit by a Viet namese delegation to Djakarta was amiable although no major diplomatic announcements were forthcoming as a result of the discussions.

It is natural for Indonesia to occupy a dominant role in regional affairs. Its population of over 135 million is almost three times that of the next largest Southeast Asian country, Vietnam.)) Indonesia is the world's fifth largest country in population (after the People's Republic of China, India, the Soviet Union and the United States). Indonesia's land area is three times larger than Burma, the next largest country in Southeast Asia. If the intervening water area is included in determing size, Indonesia is ex ceeded in size only by the USSR, the People's Republic of China and Canada. The extent to which In donesia dwarfs its regional neighbors is shown in Figure 2.

The country's population growth rate of almost three percent will add to an already desperately burdened popu lation imbalance and enormous social problems. The hard fact is that In donesia will have almost 200 million people by 1990, as shown in Figure 3. This heavy weight of population will certainly play a major role in deter mining Indonesia's regional policies, all well as provide a target for other nations to use in formulating their own political, economic and socinl policicH and assistance to Indonesia.

7

I'NOONESIA

---US Interests in l11donesia _0_-

Given Indonesia's strategic io cation, its important international ec onomic sig~ificance and its rising po-sition as a regional power, it is in the best interests of the United States to ensure that Indonesia remains unat-tached to major power blocs and

fr~endly toward the United States and its aBies. The United States has main-tained a relatively modest program of military assistance to the Indonesian' armed forces in support of this aim.

Indonesia maintains a military and police establishment of approximately 260,000,12 Since declaring independ ence at the end of World War It, Indonesia has received military aid from 13 different countries, but the United States has been its major sup-plier since 1965. The USSR remains Indonesia's largest arms creditor. This debt of about $980 mi~on reflects h,uge shipments of Russian arms to I In-donesia during Sukarno's presidency.13 Sources of military aid to the In donesian armed forces are shown in Figure 4.

In his summary of options prepared for the US Army War College, Dr. Weatherbee stated:

The United States continues to have important political, economic and se-curity interests in Indonesia.

Indonesian requests for US as-sistance are based on realistic ap praisals of need."

Another summary indicated that: Although the United States is not

bound by treaty to assist Indonesia, it would /lot be in the best interests of the United States . .. to stand idly by and watch Indonesia col/apse or fall back under communist influence. 15 '

MILITARY REVIEW

Southeast Asia Population and Area Statistics

pOPulation"a Area (Square miles)

Brunei 177,000 2,226

Burma 31,600,000 I 261,7891

Cambodia J7,887,000' 69,898J

Indonesia 136.200.0(1(1 ~ .E 735 381 ~ Laos 03,580,000 191,430

Malaysia 12,300,0001 127,3161

Territory tJ 2,91 0,000 of Papua 1782601

Philippines 43700000J 116,0001

Singapore :::::J.2 ,278,000 224

Thailand 440000001 198.4561

Vietnam 47149,0001 128.4011

.- -.. ---

Figure before reported mnssncros of 1975 76

Source: Asia 1978 Yearbook. For Eostorn Economic R.,,,IIIW tnc . tionu Kong. 1!J"18 " 70

figu,o :2

8

Indonesia's Projected Population (in millions)

INDONESIA

1990r-----------------------------------------------~

1985

135 155 175 195

Source >lUmted Nations, World Population Prospects, 1970-2000. as Assessed in 1973:' quoted In Shifting Balance of Power in Asia: Implications for Future U.S. Policy, US House of RepresentatIves. Superintendent of Documents. US Gov-ernment Printing Office, Washington, 0 C . 1976.

Figure 3

Sources of Military Assistance to Indonesia, 1965-74 (Total $170 million)

Canada $6 Poland $5 UK $5--l=~----:=~~~ USSR $4 --+--France $1

Source. World Military E.pendituros nnd Arms Tronsfors. 1966. 1975. US Arms Control and Disormamont Agency. Woshmgton. DC. 1976. p 33

Figure 4

9

MILITARY REVIEW

------Conclusions ------

Indonesia occupies an important strategic position that could either facilitate or block movement and com-munications between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the continents of Asia and Australia, It is vital to the Free World that these lines remain

'open and accessible, Indonesia has the potential to

'become a stabilizing power in South-east Asia. It is in the best interests of the United States that SoutJ'east Asia

1 Departmpnt 01 thfl Arm". (DA) I-\Imp"l.'t :>':1(1 1'3 ~1." HandbOOI< tor InctoneSJd Supero'l)pndent 01 DUCurl'l "', IJ':> f )u~ ernrnent Pt,("1I,ng GII,ef' WaSh,nOlon DC 1':)70 pp') Ild 1]

:? Dr Donalu E Weatherbee 1l'fe's VolumpV\J f'.iumt),t 1 I'll/ P 36

.3 Ju~tu~ Milan del KrOf'f !ndones'v" N.JIor,,1 ~,." u' " Problems and StratE'9\' SPf'ct",ffj Ju'~ 197:, p 43

4 Pt>'ph'"II"",{I"',l"",,,II',,.,,,,, ",II,, / .. ,/"./ ,,,;r, '.'

p"/,r ~ IJ, )1",,

I ~I I G .. I .' ,

As the complexity of war illcreases, the basic understanding of iloctrine and strategy becpmes more obscure: in the past few decades, we have tended to view doctrine,as roles and missions and strategy as deployme1J:t. In doing 110, ,J;e have created often complex, un-workabfe structures which are mislabeled as' doctrine and strategy. Perhaps in' all our. sophisticlition, we have lost1sight of the ancient, simplistic fo[m of doctrine and str:ategy, when doctrine was vie,wed as a uniL'ersal SQt of beliefs and $trateg~ as employment as well

as peployment., We could survive with parochial dortrine in the past, one far land and at:zother for. sea. But w~at about today? We have air power added to the equation, com-pounded by space qiu:stio'!s: j.'et to be answered.' Can we "afford anything less than one, universal set of doctrine for all services? . ;() .

Doctrine and Strategy-

The Misunderstood Basics Major '1\,

MILITARY REVIEW

this moment in hiRtory, when we are attempting to formulate an enduring space doctrine and strategy, what could be more important? This article

_ will not enumerate our national strategies amI the resulting doctrines because the author does not believe that doctrines result from national strategies. Nor will it discu~s the doc trines published in various military volumes.

These volumes are intended to guide the commander~ in the conduct of operations and thus prevent dis agreement or confusion over r~les and missions. This is neither doctrine nor strategy, but mere policy and directive glorified in the name of doctrine. This articl .. will not deal with those con cepts of assured destruction, massive retaliation, and so forth, rhich are sometimes termed strategy, sometimes doctrine. The amount of forces (capability) is not a strategy, nor is it a posture, nor is it the restricted, fixed positioning of forces. Doctrine is not methodology. We will explore this ap parent contradiction in an effort to produce an operational definition of doctrine and strategy.

Is the conduct of war an art or a science? While these may be moot points, we can consider that military doctrine is science and strategies are scientific hypotheses. One of the prin cipal goals of military science is to impose order on chaos. Arguing from historical examples, military theorists builli armies supposedly capable of fighting the type of war posited by these historical precedents. These theorists are practicing scientists.

According to Bertrand Russell, "It is not what the man of science believes that distinguishes him, but how and why he believes it. His beliefs nrc

12

tentative, not dogmatic; they are based on evidence, not on authority."!

At various times in history, we have seen a variety of human belief systems dominating the attitudes of Ibilitaiy and political leaders. N'ationalism, theology and racism have each at one time or another functioned as the primary nrbiter for. human belief systems. The purpose of this"article is to investigate the relationship of stratpgy and a-ermipace doctrine, in-cluding their relation to current value systems.

Giulio Douhl:t indicated 'that a: ... d,jctriTl(, ()f u'ar musl simply

correspllnd t;) thC'reaitllcs of war ob taulln,.; at the timl' and to th,' I)('culiar characteristic, of Ihe nat'um It r

/

doctrine at a higher level of' . abstraction than principles (this:

abstraction implies concentration of' essenc.e, not greater complexity). :

. Though both ancient and early' modern states understood the general. principles of warfare, these were first: worked in~o consistent theories by Jomini and Mahan who extended' Clausewitz' theories on the.' relationship of politics to military af -fairs. Douhet's conception of tlHi "command of the air" was similarly derived. These theories may be seen as simple systems of beliefs-doctrines-' encompassing certain proven prin-ciples. These doctrines may be sim-plistically stated as: "War is glory," "Naval power is supreme," and so forth. We may refer to them as the gospels of land power, sea power and air power.

These doctrines became a necessity as modern armlCS evolved because short-term conscription became common. Doctrine permitted the molding of men's minds down to the lowest echelon for quick utilization (mobilization) of the mass armies. The Prussialls, ill order to provide leadership for the inrioctrinated masses, compelled tlwir offIcers to study history "not to pass judgment on a given event _ .. or Aenprnl," but "to insure that their ideas .,. wiII be just." I Strategy, once employed, pm'Hl'S into history to bp condensed into doc-trine: to be ;;tudied by future leaders, to indoctrinate tJw mnssl's. to form the "mind-sets" rpprPRPntint-: th(' wisdom and folklofl' of t-:l'nerations of fit-:htint-: mpn.

Great captains art' rurt', hut geJH'ralb can Jw train!'d-through in-doctrination. Moltkl' rp('ogniz('d that even indifferent stmtcgips have n

13

DOCTRINE AND STRA~EGY I

reasonable ,chance of success if tilOse who enact: them are in -accord.' He organized a'. system for the production of doctrine, the Prussian General Staff. Staff officers were used to broadcast the General: Staffs doctrines through their periodic assignment to field units.

Doctrine is, of necessity, simple because it must be reliably passed from individual to individual until the whole military mass is indoctrinated. While this implies a certain doctrinal stability, it does not imply that doc-trine is stagnant. Changes in inter--pretation due to reanalysis of historical precedent and adoption of new inter-pretation from external sources should be quite common. It is the system of historically based explanation that distinguishes doctrine from dogma. In dogma, arguments and facts are forced to coincide with the dogma. Doctrine may even be revolutionary. Insights derived from careful study may casually annihilate a time-honored belief by revealing new ways to view military-political relationships.

Doctrine is thus Ii series of simple universal principles oC_warfare em-bodied in a set of human beliefs. In contrast, strategy is more closely iden-tified with the application of principles and concepts (doctrine) to a more limited problem. If doctrine is science, then strategy is hypothesis-thp scien-tific method-the application of science to the solution of a problem. The forms of application are so varied that no m'at summary is possible.

There are always new problems ('volving, but the greatest problems h II VI! in vol ved applications of previouRly" existing principles. The strategist n"ks, "How does one use this doctrine to design a strategy that ac-complishes the objective?" It is a mis-

MILITARY REVIEW

fortune that the practical products of Joctrine-strategy and tactics-are viewed with awe while the theoretical structure, or doctrine, may be con-sidered hopelessiy abstract. Doctrine is abstract, but not abstruse.

It was difficulties of supply and transport which first started soldiers of 16th-century Europe "thinking about !>trategy-'grand' as distinct from 'petty' -tactics.'" C lausewitz attempted to define the real nature of war (doctrine) and then compared it with warfare as soldiers practiced it (strategy). Times changed and war beC'ame more complex. J. F. C. Fuller wrote that out of Wodd War I emerged "industrial war demanding political authority, economic helf-sufficiency, national discipline and machine weapons."h This can be interpreted as a requiremE"llt for the integration of politics, economics. doctrine and technology.

As for politics, the advent of nuclear weaponry has caused a shift in civil military relationships. Since the MacArthur Truman contro\"l'rsy, civilian leaders have perceived the need to control the military forces directly. Now, they are the strategists with the military leaders serving as powerful advisers. These leaders should not continue to misperceive strategy as a static condition as did the builders of the various lines-the Maginot, the Bar-Lev, and so forth. These were static emplacements-a pre-positioning of forces-part, but not the whole, of strategy. Nor should they confuse amount of forces (capabilities) or the threat of using them (massive retaliation, assured destruction) as be-ing the whole.

Our current strategies are more political ruses-tactics designed to

14

signal the enemy. Such signal theories require an adversary capable of recetvmg and understanding the stimulus. Such tactics should not be confused with strategy, a dynamic function that includes the preparation for war, the psychological as well as the economic, political and military factors.

The strategist, ~efore he knows doctrine-meaning the distillation of military science-must learn to see the facts, laws and expla'nations in a certain way-he must learn a value system. Strategists accept doctrines rather than derive them. A doctrine ought to be found in books and journals; it is not directly applicable to events. A strategy, on the other hand, can be practically applied, and it tends to be confirmed (considered successful) if actual events agree with those predicted.

One of the reasons people tend to think that military doctrine cannot be applied hy civilian leaders (strategists) is hecause they misunderstand doc-trinal concepts. They think that doc-trinal concepts are like political laws: an individual is forced to follow them (or perhaps be chastised). But doctrines are not prescriptive-that is, they don't say how people or things ought to act. Doctrines are descriptive. They descrihe how people and things do act. If events don't ohey a doctrine, the people are 110t chastised; rather, the doctrine is seen to be invalid. A doc-trine does not compel behavior; it simply describes it.

Economit;s is a limitation on strategy. It conditions the choices available. As weapon!> systems hecome increasingly complex, there is a cor-responding increase in the difficulty of choosing and financinl) the most

effective combination of weapons (a part of strategy). .

The relation between strategy and technology is mutually supportive. Strategy benefits from technological advances, and a great deal of modern technology results from strategic applications. The notion that doctrine develops in an -orderly, systematic fashion is orderly, wishful thinking. Sometimes after much work, a strategist realizes that the doctrine on which his strategy is based is uncon vincing. When the doctrine is uncon-vincing, a new set of principles is necessary.

It is a rare occurrence when a doctrinal shift actually takes place, but, when it does, it is usually a massive disturbance. The technological advent of air power was a crisis-induced doctrinal shift. And it may be argued that the Caesarean birth of the Air Force from the Army did not reduce the process of matura~ion.

Despite massive technological evolution-or perhaps because of it-aerospace "doctrines" are largely policies, some concepts and some values-but most are only slightly tested when viewed in a historical (and a scientific) perspective. Even those derived from land and sea warfare may be questionable. Do doctrines change with alterations in the medium-land, . sea, air or space? Strategies ultimately depend on geography, not because terrain is the all-pervasive element that it once was, but because the sources of power are still predominantly rooted on par-ticular land masses.

Within the doctrine, and sometimes coextensive with it, is the conceptual schema-or strategy. This term refers

15

DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY

to the functional relationship within the military forces. More specifically, a strategy is a set of interconnected statements. This set of statements comprises statements naming a set of entities (terminology), statements that define functional relations among the entities (national doctrine), statements that deal with specialized su,bentities (aerospace doctrine) and statements that relate the doctrinal statements to positional force . structures (strategy).

As for the threat, Clausewitz noted: Danger dominates the leader, not

only by threatening him personal(y, [but also 1 ... those entrusted to him. Who could advise, or resolve upon, a great battle, without feeling . .. more or less . .. paralyzed by the danger and responsibility which such a great act of decIsion carries in itself?7

It is possible that, as the military sciences develop, strategists will be able to pnact plans that tend to ensure certain results. In other words, they will describp strategies to manipulate \ variables so as to determine the choice the opponent will make.

The strategist who knows the laws of behavior in general, the opponent in particular and the ,current cir-cumstances can predict behavior whether the foe exercises free will or not. But he will never be able to predict all outcomes exactly because he can never know every possible event tha( may occur.

I have attempted to answer thel following questions: Where does dOC-I trine come from? What is the purpose I (Jf doctrine? To what audience should it I be written? How does it relate to I national strategy? Should our doc-I trines change with administrations, or I should they be static? These questions have posed both philosophical and

MIlITARY REVIEW

r('sourcE' allocation problems. The military and its civilian

ll'ndl'fship is broken down into air power, sea power and land power ad-vocates. The separate services dis-sl'minate separate doctrines which in crease. rather than decrease, contention. We have created parochial, rather than ecumenical, doctrine. Army generals conducted warfare ;IshO\" following the ancient precepts. While on the seas, battles were fought under the ~aderHhip of the admirals whose guiding principles have been handed down from antiquity. The roles of the two forces did not conflict since the coastline solved any roles and missions problems that might arise.

Today. this situation has been changed radically with the advent of all' power. This new force crosses over the traditional domains of the armies and navies. The 1carcity of resources and the E'verincreasing cost of

1 ae.)rand Russell TIlf' Art 01 SCJpncf' ~ J2 2 Gl.Il,o DO

fro~

WaR , d7. ~~,

Indicators point toward major international CfJTI!tict by , ,

i'iilllTARY REV1E~

:"oup.fantasies are what national ('nnioll polls attempt to capture when :,'.ey periodically try to determine the ',:"70d' of America, and ask people '. ',ethel tile.\' feel their leader is strong

1("'f1/n II i:lg, Ii'hether they feel their . "" fl Y :~ safe or in a state of turmOil, ".'/(,the? the enemy is strOll/< or 'l'cateninR, Ichnt they feci the future

,'I ,y /Jrinq, alld 80 on. Ti,esc 'gut' feelings change in

,; lit," nR . , . III Fact, haue nothing to do . II:, f'lr actual ronditioll of the cOl1n , ' \' . :-Ohcy arc almost wholly dup to , 'f/illi//-, (olllnsies constructed by

:"!pir, alld communicated iJy the ,le(lln, I'.'hich, centpl' on the leader's I-.i,t:. to provide Imaginary nul"

: '? "'ICC to the 'led.' Rut these shifts in ",!('od' are nl'z'ert/zpless real, thpy can 'I' mcasurrd, thcy move in mu/:~ ~; '.1 t~

'p](' "etling in motion of long-term c{(!', ' 8.111 cycles is such that it 'is n;l:>,-,sl n~,:"r Ckll!' when the leader tl'dds or is bei~lg swept along in front of n Cl ,;VC\, \;"o~Ir.er Central Intelligence

!

sistence outlooks, and so on. There fore, the actual utilization of psy-chological warfare operations has more than an immediate effect.

It has collateral damage; it builds up, develop,.s or reinfor

MILITARY REVIEW

forced upon him reinforces the slu/!gishnl'ss and refusal to accept a threat or impending change.

,John 'Kenneth Galbraith, in his The AI/luelll Suclety,' notes th1:t the period In the United States immediately after World War II was one in which the mood of thl' public was for unfettered frpp enterprise, and congressional can-didatl's ran on the platform of less govrrnment interference in the l'l'ollomy. The mood was a reaction to thl' war and the period of great in-dustrial productivity which that war had hrought.

It has taken 30 years for the public mood gradually to change, through the lack of an economic catalyst in the United States, into a form of modified Keynl'sian system in which gov-ernment interference is desirahle and balancing.

This, according to Galbraith, is supportive of the current position of both liberals and conservatives, both of whom see it as an instrument to aid defense ~pending (jobs to one end of . the spectrum, assured business to the other). But the fact that the mood of the United States has taken it from one extreme in the wake of war to another extreme-perhaps just prior to another war-is indicative of the swing, or wave, in the economy of the immediate past.

McMaster's Cycles uf War goes through example after example of "waves" which influence society or which have historically had an im-pact. Significantly, the variety of waves, which are of differing lengths fOJ: differing factors, all coincide in their! depressions around the 1982 period.- These factors or waves include the patterns of weather, agriculture, money supply (that is, inflation), the

20

stock market and fundamental "ci-vilization" cycles.

In Cycles: The Mysterious Forces Which Trigger Events-quoted by McMaster-author Edward R. Dewey noted:

International battles clearly have their counterparts in both biological and economic cycl

to the apocalypse. Signifi~antly, both the publications

quoted at length here-the Journal of Psychohistory and Cycles of War-conclude that the United States would be involved in a major war by around 1982. They both conclude -that the condition of the US population is right for it and that the present leadership is encouraging it.

Both publications go into con siderable detail to support this con-tention. I have been watching a variety of other phenomenon as well around the world. Those other indicators also tend. toward major international con-flict by around 1982.

This i ot to say that conflict could taved off. But historical

i show that war as a re-petitive occurrence is inevitable, that certain conditions do precede it and that those conditions tend to have a psychological base to them. Reaction is one element of that base. A political confrontation of rhetoric and ideology leads to a concern and movement among sensitive elements of a society to try to avoid war. That strong abhorrence of war often (as it has in recent years in the United States and the United Kingdom) causes a societal decision to opt for unilateral reductions in armaments and unilateral gestures of appeasement to show that war was unwanted.

But history has shown-like nature and like the airflows in Bernouli's theorem-that appeasement is a vacuum into which the forces of oppor-tunity will flow. Rationales are developed for appeasement, especially those based on the "logic" of the ad-vocate who deems war and death as unacceptable to his way of life which has, conditioned itself to peace. Logic,

21

WAR INDICATORS

however, is not an immutable: it differs from region to region and 'even sex to HL .)

A failure to evaluate the global environment realistically-quite apart from the USSR-is a mark of the United States' continued introspec-tion. It is a refusal to accept that a global situation may be changing and tending toward conflict which cannot be deterred if it cannot be ,l(erceived.

One such conflict stimu-.which I have noted is the well-documented report on impending Soviet energy shortages which, by 1982', could lead the USSR to undertake armed' ini-tiatives in the Middle East to secure adequate energy."

What appears to be developil}g in the psychological strategic environ-ment are the conditions conducilfe to major international conflict by 1982, or thereabouts. There appear to be too many different strands to the weave to expect that such conflict could be avoided. It is far wider than the "arms race" which is, if anything, the result of the broader psychological, economic and resource factors leading toward conflict.

Even here, there is a tendency toward rationalization. The United States, for example, is stirring in its I outlook on "defense." Press attacks on I the military are considerably less than they were two years ago. The up-: grading of NATO's capabilities is applauded, and public opinion polls show a general support for increased defense spending in the United States.

The rationalization, which amounts to delusion, is that the problem can be solved by bolstering NATO's "deterrent capability" vis-a-vis the Warsaw Treaty Organization. That amounts to dabbing antiseptic on a

, MHlTilRY REVIEW

~.ilHt.".nci(i\il jl:11H':": \Vh.tf !'-l:'\;.L..: t'~ I'; 101., hUHl a PbY'

;l'ilich wiI! furl' best at itG

':dllSHH) TIll~ i~ (wt I,) ad"ocale necessarily

' ... 1 illlinediult, re.ll'rnamcnt is th" undO or optiuD hest suited to the .'S. Hather. !11(''-lns to limit the SCOP2 I hl' cO]1fliIt-1 Jr [yOPS of Wo'lf The tvelf 5q \'eaf~ War \:\-i.le~ tns"tuI8 Kalispell 1I.101'l1 1977

oj Jol"." K-enneTh Galbraith n the ,ntrod.JCI,Of' To I'W 1'3 78 Fr;:;n~l,n 'l.r..rl d ),on ot The AI/fuel)t SorJet'y

b See' tor t;>>

Major Calvin C. Seybold, US' Army Reserve Although the US Army espow,es a concept for re~,. ar2a protection in PM 100-5, the ability to implement rhis concept may be suspect. For example, the United Sta~es has two corps committed in Europe. The Gennan Territorial Forces have certain RAP duties, but their respo,i,sibility begins at the corps' rear boundaries. The US con fie t calls for rear area operations centers, but there are no oes in the active forces. The COS COM commander will ave to depend on service support and combat service suppa t uni{s in the rear areas to handle the RAP mission. Why not assign one or more light infantry battalions to the cOScOM to handle the RAP mission? In addition, these combat units

, could be used by the corps commander to help contain any penetratiun on the corps flanks oft in retrograde operations. Both Reserve and National Guard units aould be targeted fo; this task on a selective basis. '

"A USTERE H is the watchword of today's Army. This is reflected in

every aspect of its tactical, logistical and administrative functions. . But nowhere is it more evident than in our tailoring of support elements to sustain the combat units.

This article will discuss a fun damental problem of deployed US corps-the lack of adequate rear area protection (RAP) operations.

I t is generally accepted that the greatest threat to the United States would be a general war with the USSR.

23

The onlJ' place in the \"orid -",;121"(' the. United States and the ussr, ",0 in direct confrontation is in ~cntl'al Europe. The USSR is the IDainscay of. the Warsaw Pact Alliance, whill the United States is a principal pa~tner in the North Atlantic TrEat:> Organization (NATO):

The United States cun'entl~' hae n;;,o corps aeployed in southern \'! est Germany. These corps constitute a force of over 100,000 troops and aI'' the bulk of the US personnel commitment to NATO.

\

MILITARY REVIEW

The concept for RAP operations for this force is expressed in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operation's, dated 1977:

The rf!ar area must be defen4Gd from air attack and from airmobile or airborne attack. Air cavalry units, if. available, can provide wide area sur-veillanee of rear areas to detect these attacks. As enemy airmobile or air-borne forces are detected, airmobile infantry or other available mobile forces can quiekly concentrate to contain and destroy them. Ad-dItIOnally, attack helicopters can attack and destroy enemy armored elements that have broken through the defense. However, large forees cannot be reserved for these purposes and thus 'support elements must be trained and prepared for self-defense, including defense against armored forces. ~

The field manual goes on to say that host nations' also have overall responsibility for rear area protection in their national territory.3

The West Germans have created a separate force specifically for the protection of its territory and out8ide the jurisdiction of NATO. This element is called the Territdrial Forces. The organizational aspects of the Territorial Forces are shown in the figure.

The Territorial Forces are respon-sible for the following tasks in their regions: area damage control, engineers, traffic control, a reserve hospital organization, and information and liaison to the civilian population .. However, their rear area respon-sibilities officially begin at the US corps' rear boundary and extend to the West German national boundary.5

Could the Territorial Forces be used for some RAP operations by the US corps within their rear areas? This is

24

,

exactly how the German army plans to use them_6 .However, the corps support command (COS COM) commander could be forced to coordinate with three or more military region comma~tls of the' Territorial Forces. This could fragment his RAP planning and re-quire coordination with three or more different organizations-that is, of course, if the military region com-manders would accept the RAP mission. There is nothing that requires them to provide RAP support for a US corps within the US corps area. In fact, considering their present structure and weapons, the German Territorial Forces cannot fully accomplish the tasks which they will have in the event of war. Their capability of destroying air-landed or sea-landed enemy for-mations in the rear area and of con-laining hostile mechanized penetrations is limited. 7

Therefore, a US' corps in Germany must plan on providing its own rear area protection.

What exactly is meant by the phrase "rear area protection operations"? In the case of NATO, the details are spelled out in Standard Agreement (STANAG) Number 2079. A copy of this agreement can be found in most Army field manuals that deal with rear area service supp~rt.8

This agreement defines rear area security (RAS) as:

The measures taken prior to, during andlor after an enemy airborne attack, sabotage action, infiltration, guerrilla action, andlor initiation of psy-chological or propaganda warfare to minimize the effects thereof, 9

And rear area damage control (ADC) is defined as:

The measures taken in military operations prior to, during and after a

WHO'S GUARDING THE REAR?

Federal Republic of Germany Territorial Forces Organizational Chart

Territorial Command

a

I Heavy Signal

Medical Supply Engineer Communications Brigade Brigade Regiment Regiment

Military District (Two or more)

Command

I I Engineer Signal Military Medical Supply Regiment Communications Police Regiment Command Battalion Battalion

Military (MaIn Home (Number of MRC vary) Region Combat Defense '\

Command Element) Group

-.

Signal Traffic Supply Infantry Communications Control Battalion Units Company Headquarters

-

Military (Number of MSRC vary) Subregion "

Command

\ J = ;. I Field Engineer

Replacement Infantry Section f Organization

Company for Demolition Preparation

'-25

~li!.ITAR\, REVIEW

lliu~a dcst,..uctioH ulta .. ).~ or r:fZt~tCi..1 disaster, to minimize thE im;nediate effects tltaeof.ln

Both itpms, of CGurse, constitute HAP operations.

The agreement goe5 011 lO outline the general principles concerning the fllanning and command and control minimums required by the STANAG. However, in a separate paragraph, df'voted specifically to rear area secu

. rity. thl'~e stipulations are made: (c) All Units are respofl61ble for thea

lu,'1l1 sccurity, but, normally. sen'ice troops li.'zll not be allocated any s,'curil., task other thun that of their .HOI instaliatlOn.

(d) Tasks of other than st'I'('zce lruOpS may melude, but fire not Ill'ccssarily lif,rlited to.

(I) Relief and rescue of attfJ.ckcd installatIOns and units.

(Ii) Route pat'rolllllg and COllI',])' prvlt.)t:tz'Olt.

(iii) Saruclliance of pOSSible ,.~J(,ubt areas of Ruerrillus or zn fLit,rators.

(iu) ?lurllllllR for defi!ns2 of possiblp drop and landmg zones.

(c') Finding,' fixlnR and aes(,'uj'lIlg enemy fore es operating in areas II

The S1'ANAC:; al~o provldp~ ex aillpies of RA~ and rear ADC op"rations orders.

The United States, by being a signatory of STANAG ~079, is bound to follow the principleR and procedures spPcified therein, at lea~t ill the NATO operational area

. In compliance with the general principles of the STANAG, the US has Reserve component rear arpil operations centers (RAOes) to snti~f'y the command and control and planning requirements. However, thrl'!'

26

..

are no H AOCs currently in the Active ' component inventory.

While 'i':e may not violate the letter of the agreement, specifically in the area of rear aTea security, it is my contention that we at least violate the spirit.

The current US Army policies on RAP operations are spelled out in FM 31-1l5, Rear Area Protection (RAP) Operations, dated July 1970. This field manual provides detailed guidance as to the what' and how of RAP operations; however, it is very vague as to the who of RAP operationH. It dis cusses in great detail the different forms of RAS12 and ADC phases,J:l but it does not explain where the man power, firepower, communications equipment and transportation required for these operations are to be round. Appendix D of FM ;311\:) "'p'~aks vaguply of the diffprent servic!' and sen.ice support "ll'llwnts providing the required resources for RAP operati()Il~. Sending a reaction platoon from 11 light equipment (gpnt'ral support) maintenancl' ('Olllililtl~'. arn1l'd and equipped as they currently arl' by tables of orgal1lzatlOn :1nd p(jUlpml'nt ('rOE), to re"pond !II 11 gUt'rrilia ambubh of a ('nn\'o~' woule! most likely not only gpt till' l'l'(\('t\on platoon dedrnatpd. but \\ Iluld H'sult in thl' loss of the majo!' portIOn or a dl'~pprnt,'ly needed and IJlghly "p",iall/.pe! light eq ui pnll'l1 t (gPI1 ,'ra I s n pport)

nlaintt~IlHtH'l' {'(unpnny. ~,'r\'il'l' and ,,['r\'I('t' support units

should I", t'xpt'('tl'd !IlHi l'l'ljnil'l'e! to pro\'iti,' 01 aSSIst III t h"11' I"'rsonnl nnd installatIOn sl'('\lnt~, hut Wl' nf!'

, d"('Pivlllg oU1'sl'ln's If Wt' I'XPl'l't tlll'llI to providl' th.. hulk of our HAS "('''pons(' fol'c('l'. EVPlI if tlll'v 11ft' onlY "Il111lllilt('d to H reliction ror;'(' mi .... io;,

for a ft:-~N hours and accomplish that mission, we could be aiding the enemy in the accomplishment of his mission by se:1ding our support elements to de battle with him. It is doubtful our COSCOM could afford many such yictories and still support the com-n;itted combat elements of the corps.

. . What, then, should be done to a\lgme~t the RAOC concept and provide a viable RAP operation fOJ" deployed US corps? We could expect host country forces to help, but we cannot expect them to do our job for us. The use of support units in a traditional combat. role .has some serious side effects.:....that is, loss of support while committed and limitations tQ support after com-mitment due to personnel losses. Ob viously, the only answer i.,; to provide some combat' unjts that possess the personnel, firepow.er, communications and expertise. to handle RAP missions.

Is this possibie? Can we keep our austere farce concepts and proVide combat units .to RAP missions? There are many who say "No!" They feel that we' just have to accept some risks in our rear areas to counter the USSR's great combat strength to our im mediate" front, or :to enhance deployability and respol1s~ time, through an austere "tooth to tail" mtio. .

But, knowing the Soviet doctrine for the \Ise of airborne and/or heliborne-troops in offenshce 'operatWlls to disrupt movement and logistic support in rear areas,14 and the fact that they have at least five airborne' divisions within striking range of NATO forces, are we accepting some' risk .or playing Russian roulette with a loaded pistol?

I feel that we have no choice but to. provide some combat units fo! RAP

27

WHO'S GUARDING THE REAR?

operations. This would not only bring the US forces into conformity with STA..NAG 2079, but ~vould also make good tactical sense. I

What tactical units would provide the greatest flexibility of mission, deployability of equipment and per-sonnel, and aV:;lilability in both the Reserve and Active components?

The units envisioned for RAP operations are light infantry battalions (TOE 7-175H, Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry), Separate LIght In fantry Brigade)." These battalions would be fully capable of providing the wherewithal to accomplish all RAS aspects of the RAP mission. Increased transportation support from COSCOM, like helicopters, could further expand this unit's capabilitie~.

It is recommended that FM 10110-2, Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organiza tional, Technical, and Logistic Data Extracts of Non divisional Tables of Orl{anizatio/l and Equipment, be changed to reflect under TOE 7-175H the added capability' of conducting security missions, par-ticularly RAS missions, and authorize a basis of allocation of one light in-fantry battalion per COSCOM support group. This proposed basis of allocation is only an intuitive guess. A thorough study would have to be made in order to derive the actual optimal basis of allocation of light infantry units to a COSCOM.

There is hidden wealth in this recommended use of our light infantry assets-the primary one being a RAP. force to' deploy with anY US corps contingency operation. No matter where a US corps is deployed, there would be elements to provide RAS and ADC support that could be tailored, as any other COSCOM element, to meet

MILITARY REVIEW

the anticipated reqliirements. . A secondary, but eqllally important,

aspect of this recommendation 1s that' it 'would give the COSCOM com

. mander his own combat power to help protect . COSCOM units during' a general corps retrograde operation,:to help with their displRcement during a'

, corps advance or to be. used by the corps commander to help contain anY enemy pentration threatening his flanks.

The light infan'try battalions used in RAP operations need not he Active components .. Selected' Reserveandl.or National Guardunits could be targeted for this duty. Howe\1er, there is no reason why elite unit~ such a~ the R2d

'Airborne Division or lOIst Airborne Division (Air Assault) could not ac-complish' RAP missions,. at least

.during the initial stages of a US corps . deployment. Both these light infantry .units would be ideal candidates to be the corps' "last.ditch" defense or its offensive "edge" in any high-intensity conflict. .

By allocating light infantry units to the COStOM, we would be ac-complishing the RAP mission and providing more depth to our forces. By

'having the COSCOM provide helicopter and additional vehicle

transportation, we would not tax our .austere force concept while solving our RAp problems for a deployed US corps.

NOTES

1 F,p/d Ma"l"aIIFMI laO ':l Ope!all,ms DeparTmenT 01 Jt\f' A,m~ Wash.nqlo'l 0 C 1 Jul.,. 19713 0 'i:l 1.l

'} In ttli'; (a.,"e West Gefman,. 3 FM 100 'j Or'era/,ans op C" p 136 ~ R(>teH'