Military Review May 1969

7/27/2019 Military Review May 1969

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ilitaryVIew

III This Issue

+ Unified Command+ US Global Strategy+ Horsepower for Vietnam

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UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERALSTAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

COMMANDANTMajor General John H. Hay, Jr.

ACTING DEPUTY COMMANDANTColonel Benjamin D. Capshaw

The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and GeneralStaff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides aforum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, nationalsecurity affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.


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Military Review Professional Journal of the US Army

Is the Unified Command Obsolete? LTC Sam L. Barth, USA 3 Military Assistance to Latin America . . James C. Haahr 12 Warnings Must Be Heeded . GEN J. A. Grat von Kielmansegg, FRG Army, Ret 22 Warsaw Treaty Organization LTC Paul R. Shirk, USA, Ret 28 Tukhachevsky: Dynamic Revolutionary LTC Hugo W. Matson, USA 38 The Collapse of US Global Strategy . Howard G. Kurtz 43

Harriet B. Kurtz Japan: Eye on 1970 . . . . John K. Emmerson 53 Fortifications in Theater of Operations COL W. G. Stewart, USA 67 Fathers of the Blitzkrieg . . LTC Bruno J. Rolak, USA, Ret 73 Red Army at the Bavarian Border Wilhelm MeyerDetring 77 Horsepower for Vietnam MAJ James L. McCoskey, USA 85 The Bayonet CPT A. L. Thompson, British Army 93 Reader Forum 98 Military Notes 99 Military Books 109

library of Congress Catalog Card No 34-33760 RevThe VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of the


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Editor in ChiefCOL Donald J. Delaney

Associate EdOorCOL John B. B. Trussell, Jr. 'Army War College

Assistant EdOorLTC A. Leroy Covey

Features EditorLTC Robert G. Main

Production EditorHelen M. HallSpanishAmerican Editor

MAl Juan HortaMerlyBrazilian Editors

LTC Samuel T. T. PrimoLTC Romero Lepesqueur

Publication OfficerMAJ Donald E. Tuman

Art and DesignCharles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. Use of funds for printing of this publication hasbeen approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 25 July 1968.Second-class postage Caid at Fort' Leavenworth, Kansas. Subscription rates: $4.00 !US currency) ayear in the United States, nited States military post offices, and those countries which are members ofthe PanAmerican Postal Union (including Spain), $5.00 a year in all other countries, single copy price50 cents. Address subscription mail to the Book Department, U. S. Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.


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jltlttnru itultw .Awnrb .Antelt

The Military Review announces the selection of the following arti-cle from the March 1969 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARDARTICLE:"Mao's Thoughts: Still a Blueprint for Action"Colonel John B. McKinney. United States ArmyColonel McKinney discusses some of Mao's basic philosophy and inter-prets some actions which may be taken by Communist China in the future.Mao's published thoughts show that he takes the long view of history andis willing to accept tactical losses to achieve strategic victories. Hisstrategy is timeless and the United States is the implacable foe. Mao'sgrand design is to restore the boundaries and grandeur of the MiddleKingdom with Peking once again as the center of the universe.

* * *COMING:Stanley L. Harrison, in "NATO's Role After Czechoslovakia," discusses theevents which led to the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the re-actions by the various members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.As a result of the invasion, he feels the alliance will alter, and he sees heart-ening signs in the efforts of President Richard M. Nixon to turn the UnitedStates toward Europe in a positive manner. He suggests that NATO willchange internally, and he anticipates changes in the role to be played by eachmember state.Colonel Robert B. Rigg, United States Army, Retired, in "How Not to Reporta War," writes of the paradox concerning the Vietnam war which is the bestdocumented war in all history, yet is the least understood in terms of mili-tary and political progress. He discusses the credibility gap between pressand governmental reports and suggests that the surrender rate would be a muchbetter gauge than the popularized "body count' to determine who is winning.


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1922 1969


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IsLieutenant Colonel Sam L. Barth, United States Arm/l

The 'Views expressed in this ar-ticle are the author's and do not nec-essarily reflect those of the Depart-ment of Defense or its agencies.-Editor.

T HE United States, in playing amajor role in world affairs, hascontinually sought to improve themanagement of her participation. Oneof the earliest post-World War II contributions toward improved coordina-

tion of the elementa of national security was unification of the militarydepartments. Preceding this step, however, was the establishment of unified military commands for exercisingjoint control over all of the militaryservices stationed within a designatedarea.Despite the national and regionalunification of command of the armedservices, integration of the other aspects of national security with the


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UNIFIED COMMANDmilitary element has not been as suc-cessful. Real coordination of the po-litical, psychological, and economicfacets of national power with the mil-itary factor often has been left tochance. Although the National Secu-rity Act of 1947 established a Na-tional Security Council, it did not pro-vide a comprehensive mechanism forinsuring that all of the elements ofour strength would regularly bebrought to bear in achieving o ~ r goalsthroughout the world.US EmbassyThe most extensive experience inintegrating all of these factors hastaken place at the point farthest re-moved from Washington-the US Em-bassy. There, the Ambassador presidesover a Country Team, adhering to aconcept which was codified by Presi-dent John F. Kennedy in his letter ofauthority to each of the US Ambas-sadors. In it, he wrote that "1 shallcount on you to oversee and coordinateall of the activities of the UnitedStates government in...." However,as the President pointed out, the au-thority did not "include US militaryforces operating in the field wheresuch forces are under the command of

Lieutenant Colonel Sam L. Barth ison the faculty of the US Naval WarCollege. He holds a B.S. from IndianaUniversity, Bloomington;- an M.S. inInternational Relations from theAmerican University, Washington;and is a 1968 graduate of the USArmy War College. He has served withthe US Military Mission with the Iranian Army; the 81d Airborne Division; the 8th Infantry Division inGermany; with the Office of the Dep-uty Chief of Staff for Personnel, De-partment of the Army; in Korea, with.the fd Infantry Division; and with.the Office of Personnel Operations inWash.ington.

a United States area military com-mander."This line of authority, he empha-sized, ran from the area commanderthrough the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) and the Secretary of Defenseto the President. Nevertheless, theAmbassador was charged with work-ing "closely with the appropriate areamilitary commander." In the eventthat the Ambassador believed that "ac-tivities by the United States militaryforces may adversely affect our overallrelations with the people or govern-ment of . . ." then the Ambassadorwas to "promptly discuss the matterwith the militarycommander." I f theywere unable to resolve the question,the Ambassador was to "request a de-cision by higher authority." ,New ConceptLater, in order to improve in Wash-ington the integrated direction of allof the elements of national security,approval was given for the creationof something "analogous to the Am-bassador and his Country Team." Un-der this new concept, each "regionalAssistant Secretary of State wouldhead an interdepartmental committeecalled the Interdepartmental RegionalGroup (lRG)." Above it, and simi-larily organized, is the Senior Interde-partmental Group (SIG) headed bythe Under Secretary of State. As "ex-ecutive chairman," the Under Secre-tary and the Assistant Secretarieshave "not only the authority but alsothe responsibility for settling any is-sue on the agenda.'"Permanent membership in the SIG

1 Subcommittee on National Seeurity Staftlngand Operations, Con:amittee on Government Op.eratfons. United States Senate. "The Ambassadorand the Problem. of Coordination,'- US Government Printlpl' Ofllce. Washlnirlon. 1963. pp 166..167. Maxwell D. Taylor. nThe Development ofStates Role In Coordinating Forefa'h Aft'alrs," De .PQrlment of State N61D8lettu. May 1966. p 4.


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and the IRG includes representationfrom State, Defense, JCS, Agency forInternational Development (AID),Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),and the US Information Agency (US-IA). Other agencies such as the Treas-ury Department and the Departmentof Agriculture can participate when

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relationships are shown in Figure 1.Because the nonmilitary agencies donot have regional organizations, theIRG's must serve not only for policycoordination. but hopefully as a meansfor integrating US activities withinthe area as well. While policy bearingupon military forces may similarly

REGIONAL COORDINATION OF FOREIGN ACTIVITIES

/ ~ TAlE SENIOR

INlEROIPMITIIEMTAI. GIIOIlI'

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OTHIR ~ ,N F O R M A ~ IGNCY ~ , ,,"AGIIICYIOII ; '; ' .. ~ OF DEfEIISIItlEII!IAlIOIIAI. ~ .............. DIP_ IH r - - ~ ; : .l'IElOI'IIDITI r' ; ',,"H CEN1RALINTIIUGHCEIGNCYI

UIIIfI!DCOIIIWIJ I I1.1 _ ______ ..1.___._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _COUNTRY TEAM

- - -D IRECT lOH---- COORDINATIONFigure 1.

"business affecting them is on theagenda." An indication of the author-ity found in the SIG can be noted bythe requirement that the Deputy Sec-retary of Defense and the Chairmanof the JCS represent their respectiveorganizations. Presumably. the nextlevel of officialdom meets in the IRG.Thus. there have been developmentsat both ends of the spectrum whichare directed toward bringing the mil-itary elements and the nonmilitarycloser together. The remaining orga-nizational anomalies. however. need tobe emphasized. Current organizational

be coordinated. it is expected that op-erations will be directed by the uni-fied commanders. However, the unifiedcommander is forced to become in-volved in foreign policy matters when-ever the Ambassador of any of thecountries within the command bringsto his attention any "activities by theUnited States military forces" which"may adversely affect" US relationswith that particular country.'

The unified commander is also re-sponsible for providing guidance forS Subeommfttee on National Security Staffineand Operations, loe. cit.


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UNIFIED COMMANDthe Military Assistance AdvisoryGroups and other military aid missions in countries within his areas ofcommand. Again, policy coordinationbetween the unified military commander and the individual Ambassadors and their Country Teams is required.The unified commander has a political advisor (POLAD) on his staff to"advise and consult with tile commander on political, politico-militaryand economic matters" within thecommand. However, the POLAD is notconsidered to be an institutional representative of the Department of Statenor a liaison officer. Thus, he is notin a position to coordinate many ofthe nonmilitary problems arisingwithin the region.Crises Management

Readily apparent, even from a casual knowledge of the events since1946, is the fact that the unified military commands have not conductedregional military operations in themanner of World War II. Not so apparent, though, is the role which theunified commander has played in therepeated international crises whichhave faced the United States duringthe same period.One crisis, the Korean Conflict, wasconfined to that peninsula. Responsibility for the conduct of the war fellto the commander of a relatively smallregional organization-the Far EastCommand. Its first commander, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,was relieved by the President of theUnited States for publicly advocatingan expansion of the war beyond thelimited area of his responsibility.Similarly, in Vietnam, military operations are being conducted withina rather closely defined area. There

has been considerable emphasis onkeeping the war restricted. However,for the first time in our history, wehave a "fighting" Country Team on thescene. There, under the Ambassador'sdirection, is an integrated effort employing all of the elements of our national power, including a coordinatedmilitary organization, in order to accomplish our goals.Although the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, is a nominalsubordinate unified component of thePacific Command, the Country Teamconcept and the close Washington supervision place the Commander inChief, Pacific, in a supporting role. So,just as occurred during the KoreanWar, the Pacific Command has a secondary function in the limited wararea.Berlin ConfrontationAn excellent example of the mannerin which Washington controls crisissituations can be noted in the 1961Berlin confrontation. At that time,President Kennedy appointed GeneralLucius D. Clay as his personal representative to Berlin. Although cautioned to remain "in close touch" withboth the US Berlin commander andour Ambassador, there was no doubtthat General Clay had direct access tothe White House.' Because of Clay'sline of communications, the US European Command commander and theUS Ambassador must have thoughtthemselves somewhat superfluous.A year later, during the Cuban missile crisis, the President watched thetracking of each ship in the WhiteHouse Situation Room.' I t would certainly seem accurate, in view of this

.. "Clay Will Return to Berlin to RepresentPresident.'" The NetI! York Timel. 81 August1$61. p 2.A Theodore Sorensen, Ktmttedll. Harper" Row.N. Y.. 1965, p 710.


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UNIFIED COMMAND

high-level concern, to say that theCommander in Chief, Atlantic, musthave felt that his freedom of actionwas highly circumscribed.More recently, during the Dominican Republic crisis, the President hada direct line to our Ambassador there-no r is there likely to be a significant

In the future, it is expected that ourforward deployed forces will be reduced because of the contribution ofthe C-5A and the fast deployment logistics to an improved capability fora rapid, substantial employment of ourgeneral purpose reserve forces. Thesignificance of the present concept of

AREAS WHI!RE MILITARYCONSIDERATIONS PREDOMINATE REGIONAL TEAM AREAS

Figure 2.change in the President's participationin crises in the future. The issues aretoo great for him to forego this responsibility.

Contributing to the growth of centralized control has been the continued ill\Provement in more rapid meansof communication and transportation.As the world grows smaller and theopportunity for friction between thegreat powers continues to increase,there is little possibility that the autonomy of field commanders will berestored.

a unified military command is likelyto diminish under this development.Yet the military services will continueto have a significant role to play inthe regional overseas operations of theUnited States.

Now, and in the future, the UnitedStates must watch in all directions forsituations dangerous to our securityand to our national purposes. Can wewatch, coordinate, and act upon multiple crises of the future in the samemanner as in the past? With morethan 130 sovereign countries in the


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world, this is not possible. We needto develop new mechanisms. It is timethat we remolded our out-of-date regional military organization into anintegrated area organization for "waging both peace and war."An organization which will provideregional direction to aU of the US participants in world affairs must possess

should be able to employ military elements in whatever manner the situa-,tion dictates. These forces may come :from those already deployed within the 'area, or they may come from our strategic reserve, based in the UnitedStates.

A regional team, utilizing the bestfeatures of our Country Teams and

'US REGIONAL TEAM

Figure 3.a number of capabilities. I t must beable to apply aU of the elements of USnational power toward accomplishingour goals within a region. This requires a wide spectrum of means ranging from the psychological to militaryforces.

A new area grouping must also beable to monitor closely and to reportregional developments affecting the interests of the United States. Whencrises occur, the organizational headquarters must be able to respondquickly and in precisely the mannerdecided in Washington.

I f required, the regional focal point

organized to meet an area mISSIon,could fulfill these requirements. However, organizational differences between State and Defense Departmentsregarding the countries which comprise different regions must be overcome. For instance, it must be decidedif Greece and Turkey belong in Europe, a part of the European Com-mand, or are more properly within thesphere of the Assistant Secretary ofState for Near Eastern and SouthAsian Affairs.

Figure 2 is a map indicating a POS-sible alignment of regional responsibilities. Shading of the areas indicates


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regions where military considerationsmay dominate. Particularly influenc-ing this evaluation is the probabilitythat we would continue to have de-ployed forces within those areas. Thefinal determination as to the dominant

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team would have an integrated staffof military. political. economic. psycho-logical. and intelligence representa-tives. Whether headed by an Ambas-sador or a senior military officer. theteam chief would be referred to as the

PROPOSED REGIONAL COORDINATION OF FOREIGN ACTMTIES

d us INfORIIAIION ~ " STATE ; , ~ OTHERAG!ItCY " ," SOIIOiIH GIIfCYRill ~ - - - - ; ; INlERDIPAII1IIIItTAl.G!IOII' -::---1 IlIPAII1IIIItTIXlERIIAIIOfW. Of 0IfDISE0EYII.0I'IIIIfT IHlBIIlIPARTlmllAI. II " IiGIONAl_P IH ~ , / ICflIIRAL IINTIIlIGfHC[ IAGf8CY II II I1----_______ - - - - - - - - ~ I1----------- -------_ ...DIRECTOR

REGIONAl TrAIl

us fIlRCSIIIIL

--- DIIiCIION AND POlICY- - - - COORDINATJOM-AGENY ItIATTIRS

Figure 4.influence would. undoubtedly. be leftto the President.

The reason for differentiating be-tween these two considerations is toestablish responsibility for control anddirection. Areas where military inter-ests predominate would have the re-gional team headed by a military offi-cer. The other regional teams would beheaded by US Ambassadors. The dep-uty would always come from the op-posite service.

Regardless of the designation. eachMay 1969

US Regional Director. Figure 3 con-tains a proposed organization chart.On the military oriented team. oneof the major components might be asmaller version of our present unifiedcommands. In that case. the Assistant

Director for Military Affairs wouldalso serve as commander of the mili-tary component of the team.

Regional team directors would re-port to the appropriate IRG executivechairman for policy direction. A pro-posed chain of command is shown in9


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UNIFIED COMMAND

Figure 4. There would be no changein the present work of either the SIGor the IRG in establishing policy, butthey would be restrained from gettinginto operational details. However, justas the military departments are authorized direction of their respectivecomponents of the unified commandson uniservice matters, so the agencieswould have access to their representatives on either the regional or CountryTeams. Policy would continue to flowfrom the IRG's to the regional directors.The relationship of the regionalteam directors with the US Ambassadors in their area would be a delicateone. I t is expected that much of theroutine diplomatic business pertaining to the individual activities of thecountries would continue to take placedirectly between the foreign capitalsand Washington. The regional director must be kept informed of significant developments if he is to exercisehis responsibilities.A Working Concept

I t can be seen from Figure 2 thatthe proposed number of regional teamsoutnumbers our present six geographic unified commands. I t is expected that a smaller, more compactarea of responsibility would permit theregional director to supervise his areamore closely. In order to assist control further, it is expected that theregional headquarters would be locatedwithin this area. From this point, itis believed that all of the US representatives would tend to devolop acommon "feel" for developments.The opportunity to coordinate theeconomic and Military Assistance Programs regionally would be particularlyvaluable. Possession of this coordination authority would contribute to the

authority of the regional director andfacilitate the accomplishment of theteam's mission. I t would also assist theUnited States in furthering her nationbuilding tasks in the newly emerging areas.Nonmilitary MissionsThe operations of the nonmilitaryregional teams have great promise.The South Asian Regional Team, forexample, would probably have as itsprime mission the stabilization of thearea. Through an integration of eco-nomic, political, and psychologicalteams, they could well contribute toward the reduction of the historicaltensions between India and Pakistan.

I t is possible to visualize the MiddleEastern Regional Team taking theinitiative in developing joint functional projects for the purpose of stabilizing that area. I t is only througha regional team concept that we canapproach the area as a strategic whole.Where would individuals be foundto staff the regional teams? The director should be a highly qualifiedmilitary or foreign service officer withexperience in two or more of the countries within his area of responsibility.The nonmilitary staff might comefrom within the ranks of the StateDepartment, the AID, and the USIA.Hopefully, those organizations will beable to reduce the amount of their detailed operational work because of thecapabilities of the regional teams.However, it might fall upon the military services, with their years of experience in regional operations, to provide much of the staff initially.The regional team concept presentsthe United States with a realistic op-portunity to accomplish many regionalstrategic goals without resort to war.A US organization on the spot can en-


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courage other nations to cooperate inthe interests of peace.If, in spite of our best efforts,threats to our national interests doarise, we must be capable of copingwith them immediately and within astructure incorporating all of the elements of national power. If we mustresort to military force, the integratedregional national security headquarters, located close by, can direct theentire US effort In support of militaryoperations.

UNIFIED COMMAND

Through the regional team conceptwe can overcome the present organizational inconsistencies between military and nonmilitary agencies. Thenonmilitary agencies are also offeredan opportunity to reduce their presentoverwhelming span of operational control.

In turn, this wiJI permit the SeniorInterdepartmental Group and the Interdepartmental Regional Group to devote more time to the vital matter ofUS strategic policy.

MILITARY REVIEW BINDERSAre your back issues of the Military Reviewbecoming dog-eared? Bind them in a sturdy,hard-covered binder.

Holds 12 issues and the index. Gold lettering on maroon. $2.50 plus 85 cents postage($1.10 to foreign countries).

Send check or money order to: Book Department, US Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.Please include name, address, and Zip code.

May 1969 11


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MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA

James C. Baahr

UNITED States military commitments to, and interestin, the principle of inter-American military coopera

tion have been in existence for a number of decades. Debateduring the past few years on what US military assistancepolicies toward Latin America should be contains many ofthe same elements of indecision and uncertainty that havecharacterized past debate and discullsion with respect tothose policies. The problem, therefore, is not new eventhough new dimensions have been added.

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The modern beghmings of thosepolicies took place in 1946 when President Harry S Truman made his initialproposal for a program of interAmerican military cooperation. However, it was not until the passage ofthe Mutual Secui"ity Act of 1951 thatan effort was made to put into policyform those elements of wartime co-operation that the United Stateswished to see continued in LatinAmerica. Standardization of equipment was one of thesll elements.Objectives Stated. Authorization for such a programwas contained in the 1951 act, and theprogram's objectives were stated asfollows: to maintain the security and topromote the foreign policy of theUnited States by authorizing military,economic, and technical assistance tofriendly countries to strengthen themutual security and individual and col-lective defenses of the free world, todevelop their resources in the interestof their security and independence andthe national interest of the UnitedStates and to facilitate the effective

James C. Haahr, a Foreign ServiceOfJicer, is Supervisor of the PoliticalOfJice of the American Embassy inSanto Domingo., Dominican Republic.He served as Vice Consul to the Amer-ican Consul General in Frankfurtand in Hamburg, Germany, with theAmerican Consulate in Martinique,French West Indies, and in MedeUin,Colombia. He was with the AmericanEmbassy in The Hague, Netherlands,and was Special Assistant to theUnder Secretary of State, Washington,D. C. He was assigned to the AmericanEmbassy in Lima, Peru, as Consul andas Political Military Affairs Advisor.He holds a B.A. from George Washing-ton University and is a 1968 graduateof the US Army War College.MI,I989

LATIN AMERICA

participation of tltose countries in theUnited Nations system for coUectivesecurity.The act stated that: military assistance may befurnished to the other American Re-publics only in accordance with de-fense plans which require the re-cipient nations to participate in mis-sions important to the defense of theWestern Hemisphere. 1

Resolution RecommendedAt the consultative meeting ofAmerican Foreign Ministers in Washington in March and April 1951, a resolution was adopted recommendingthat the American Republics: orient their military prepara-tion in such a way that through self-help and mutual aid . . they can with-out prejudice to their individual self-defense and their internal security:(a) increase those of their resourcesand strengthen those of their armedforces best adapted to the coUectivedefense, and maintain those armedforces in such status that they can bepromptly available for the defense ofthe Continent; and (b) cooperate witheach other, in military matters, inorder to develop the coUective strengthof the Continent necessary to combataggression against any of them.The adoption of the resolution waslargely the result of the United Statesseeking support for the war effort inKorea and for the adoption of a common program to resist the Communist threat. Following these developments, Congress appropriated 38million dollars for Latin-Americanmilitary aid in 1951, and negotiationsbegan for the purpose of concludingmutual defense agreements. The first

1 Section 105. Mutual Security Act of 1961.:: The Department of State Bulletin. 9 April1951. pp 566-567.

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LATIN AMERICA

such agreement was concluded withEcuador in January 1952. The UnitedStates agreed: . to make available . . equipment,materials, services, and other militaryassistance designed to promote the defense and maintain the peace of theWestern Hemisphere.'Similar agreen\mts were signedwith Chile, Colombia, Cuba, and feruin 1952; with Brazil, the Domin'icanRepublic, and Uruguay in 1953; with

LatinAmerican Military AssistanceProgram away from the concept ofhemispheric defense toward an emphasis on meeting the internal subversive threat.There have been many twists andturns in US military assistance policytoward Latin America, and the UnitedStates herself has given a new direction to the purpose of military assistance for Latin America. However,the principle of hemispheric solidarNicaragua and Honduras in 1954 ;( '- ' ity and defense remains in the exist

with Haiti and Guatemala in 1955;\and with Bolivia in 1958. r: lPolicy Assumptions lThus, in this period, US secu'ritypolicy assumed that the: Hemisphere was threatened byCommunist aggression both fromwithin and without. Security of strategic areas in thehemisphere and of inter.Americanlines of communication was vital to

the security of every American Re.public. Protection of these strategicareas and communications was a common responsibility.'I t is these policy assumptions thatwere questioned and challenged begin.ning in the late 1950's and which haveproduced many of the problems nowconnected with US Military Assistance Programs to Latin Ameriea.Many hearings, study committees, andreports were required to bring USpolitical and military action into linewith the change in doCtrine. As a reo

suit, it was not until 1964 that the De-partment of State, in an informalmemorandum, stated that the admin-istration was seeking to orient the1 9 : 1 h : p D ; r s ~ ~ ~ n t of State BuUetjn, 8 March

f The Department 0/ Stats BuUetin. SO March1954. pp 463..,64.

ing mutual defense assistance agreements and continues to haunt US policy toward that area.Present ProblemThe entire question of military assistance to Latin America has beendebated with considerable heat in Con.gress. The issue is also a source ofcontroversy not only among variousinterested agencies of the US Government, but also within the separateagencies-notably the Departments ofState and Defense. Congressional pro.posals to prevent the sale of sophisticated military hardware to Latin.Ameriean countries or to deduct fromeconomic assistance programs thoseamounts spent on such equipment byLatinAmerican armed forces aresymptomatic of the new mood.The present climate in Washingtonis a great change from that existingin the early 1950's, a climate whichinsisted that the objective was common for all American nations andwhich led to the significant amountsof military assistance extended toLatinAmerican nations up to thepresent time.The major problem now facing USpolicymakers is to attempt to rationalize military assistance to LatinAmeriea at a time when the threat

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has changed significantly, when thehemispheric defense concept is nolonger valid and has not been for anumber of years, and when the economic development needs of the LatinAmerican countries have assumed farmore significance and priority thantheir defense requirements.The entire Military Assistance Pro-

LATIN AMERICA

The Military Assistance Programhas been charged variously with furnishing aid to dictators, with encouraging large military forces where theyare not needed, with discouraging economic development, with providingequipment that cannot be utilized,with discouraging the growth of democratic elements and perpetuating

US Armll'Demands for economic and social progress make it necessary to apply maximumresources toward those endsgram, including the sales program,has come under sharp attack at homebecause of the existence of an allegedarms race in Latin America and because many of the Latin-American nations maintain and support armedforces at levels considered by certainquarters in the United States to befar beyond their requirements. Suchcriticism, of course, is not new.

"militarism" in Latin America, andwith leading to military coups againstlegitimate governments.'The history of social, economic, andpolitical development and change inLatin America is so complex and embraces such a variety of factors aliento development in the United States

HaroJd A Hovey, United Statu Militaf1l Auist-4nce. Frederick A. praeger. N. Y.. 1966. pp219228.


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LATIN AMERICA

during the same period that it seemsimpossible to justify the charges directed against US Military AssistancePrograms in Latin America.The role of the military forces inLatin America is equally complex anddifficult for the average American tounderstand in the context of his own

America during the past few decades,and the pronounced change in thecharacter of the armed forces of thatregion, it is equally possible to arguethat the situation now prevailing inthe region could have been considerably more unstable and dangerous forUS security interests had it not been

Peru ultimately turned to France to modernize her air force through purchase of the Miragf! VP. The fuselage of one of the craft is shown here about to be loaded into a TransoU C160 for delivery to Peru. environment. I t is, perhaps, safe tosay that the image which still prevailsin the United States today of theLatin-American military leader includes those characteristics whichwere, in fact, operative up to the early1900's and, in some cases, even later.

However, that image fails to takeinto account the change from militarism to professionalism in the LatinAmerican military services, the trendtoward acceptance and support of democratic administrations, and the development of professional armedforces led, for the most part, by dedicated and sincere patriots.Given the nature of political, social,and economic developments in Latin

for the existence of politicaJly strongand cohesive armed forces.The question of the nature and extent of Latin America's military requirements has assumed new importance for both United States andLatin-American policymakers in recent years. The trend of present policy formulation is considerably different from the statements made in thelate 1940's and early 1950's to justify military assistance to LatinAmerica. Preoccupation with LatinAmerican military expenditures hasbeen expressed both in the UnitedStstes and in Latin America althoughthe bulk of the criticism has beenvoiced in this country.


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The most recent attempt to face theproblem was at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in April 1967, but the agreedposition expressed in Chapter VI ofthe "Declaration of the Presidents ofthe Americas" 'left much to be desired.That position, in essence, recognizedthat the demands of economic and social progress made it necessary to apply the maximum resources to thoseends, and that, consequently, militaryexpenditures should be limited.Requirements DifferHowever. the statement added thatsuch expenditures would be limited inproportion to the actual demands ofnational security, in accordance witheach country's constitutional provisions, and would avoid those expenditures not indispensable for the performance of the specific duties of thearmed forces. This means that the decision to limit military expendituresor not is left to each country to decidebased on what it sees as its own security requirements. Those requirements will inevitably be viewed differently in Peru than they will be inEcuador and Chile on the one hand,and in Argentina as opposed to Braziland Chile on the other.Subsequently, on 31 October 1967,Chile's President Eduardo Frei Mon-talva stated that, while his government neither supported nor sponsoredthe disarmamllnt of Latin America, itbelieved it necessary to limit the acquisition of arms and wished to signify its willingness to participate inany high-level meeting that I!light becalled to consider the general problem. I t is likely, though, that President Frei's statement was' prompted,in part, by Peruvian press and congressional reports attempting to justify feru's possible acquisition of

LATIN AMERICAFrench Mirage fighter aircraft on thebasis of alleged Chilean arms purchases from Great Britain and sourcesother than the United States.Replacement CycleIs there, in fact, a new arms racein Latin America? I t does not appearthat much basis exists for this charge.When he was commander in chief ofthe US Southern'Command, GeneralRobert W. Porter testified before theHouse Committee on Foreign Affairsthat he had no evidence to suggestthat any Latin-American country wasinvolved in a genuine arms race. Headded that what was involved was areplacement of obsolete and antiquatedequipment, and that most militarypurchases had been within normalbudgetary levels.

On the other hand, Peru has beenportrayed in the US press as embarking on an extensive rearmament program. However, Peru is, perhaps, atypical case of a Latin-American nation which for the past decade or sohas traditionally devoted some 85 to90 percent of its annual military budgets to administrative support, forcemaintenance, and nonmilitary projects. Few funds were left over for thereplacement of equipment deemed tobe obsolete.

What has happened, then, is that anormal replacement cycle arrived, andthe US press and other quarters usedthe occasion to represent Peru as inspiring a new arms race in LatinAmerica. As a result of Peru's requirements, she unsuccessfully soughtto replace her aging F-80 and F-86fighter aircraft with the US-built F-5,having in mind a phasing out of theF-80 and F-86 squadrons. Followingthe initial US decision that the F-5would not be available for Latin


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LATIN AMERICA

America for several years, Peru thenturned to Great Britain and ultimatelyto France for what she saw as hermoderliization needs.In one sense, however, US policiesmay be at fault in that they can leadto unilateral restrictions on materielacquisitions. Such restrictions on

policy that would take into account agradual phasing out and replacementof obsolete equipment in the inventories of Latin-American armed services.There is little argument in favorof an unlimited military assistancepolicy toward Latin America. Eco-

US AnnJlThe United States has a great stake in Latin America and should participate in the

area's futuretypes of equipment, unfortunately,were not adopted multilaterally atPunta del Este in April 1967. Thesubsequent US decision to offer theF-5 to Peru on a commercial salesbasis tended to alienate the Peruvianmilitary leaders further following theinitial decision not to provide the air-craft until about 1970. I t also appearedto indicate the lack of a long-range

nomic and social development requirements should have first call on thelimited financial resources available.Logic, therefore, points necessarily tothe need to limit arms acquisitions byLatin America.

However, the case-by-case basis thathas characterized recent US policy hasnot improved our stance in LatinAmerica, and it is sometimes forgot-MilitarJ Review


23/116

ten that the United States is dealingwith sovereign and independent countries whose own view of their best interests often conflicts with that of theUnited States.' What is required is acommon understanding of the natureof the problem and the developmentof a clearly defined policy.Present PollcrThe nature of present US militaryassistance policy seems to be that:

Each program should relate directly to important US security andforeign policy interests.

The program should reducechances that assistance might supportregional conflicts or undemocratic regimes. Grant aid should be terminated,and essential military equipment provided on a sales basis, when a recip

ient country has aeveloped the abilityto bear its own defense burden.With particular regard to LatinAmerica, the United States desires toinsure that available limited resourcesare devoted to economic and social ob-jectives and a regional arms raceavoided. Intentions have been that military assistance to Latin America encourage realistic policies in such diyerse areas as modernization requirements, lower force levels, decreaseddefense expenditures, internal security needs, and economic developmentsupport. The Fiscal Year 1968 program was planned at a level of 45.5million dollars in grant aid, of which18 million dollars was for training.The cash-and-credit sales plan totaled52.5 million dollars.This description of the nature andintent of the program is far differentfrom that presented in the early 1950'sand serves to indicate how far theUnited States has moved away from

1969

LATIN AMERICA

the concept or myth of hemisphericdefense. However. it is difficult to seehow a program which envisages thetermination of grant aid and tightceilings on military sales can at oneand the same time necessarily serve toreduce force levels and defense expenditures.Political InterestsIt should be stated with all frankness that the primary purpose of pastand present military assistance toLatin America has been political. Itis the United States who will have toassume the burden of the defense ofthe Western Hemisphete in case ofneed. The Latin-American countriessimply do not have the capability orthe equipment to participate but marginally in hemispheric defense, norhave they been overly concerned aboutCommunist encroachments in areasviewed by them as having little or noimportance to their national interestor security. Perhaps Korea and Vietnam are the best examples of LatinAmerican disinterest in matters thatdo not affect them directly.The concern of the United States,on the other hand, has been with internal security in the countries to thesouth, with securing actual or potential base rights, with influencing military counterparts, and with gainingLatin America's collaboration in military and political matters of importance to the United States. All in all,if this has, in fact, been the primaryobjective of military assistance, thepolicies pursued have been reasonablysuccessful up to now.

More recently, however, with grantaid to be terminated and with increasingly stringent restrictions beingplaced on military sales, politico-military relations between the United


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LATIN AMERICA

States and Latin America may be infor a changed and somewhat bleak future in terms of US interests.Will the termination of grant aidlead to a vacuum that could be exploited by European nations and possibly the Soviet Union? Will restrictions on sales, both in terms of typesof equipment and funds, automaticallytend to drive Latin America to. European ~ r m s suppliers? I f both questionsare answered in the affirmative, a newlook should be taken at the future ofUnited States-Latin-American relations in this field.Future RecommendationsNow that the myth of hemisphericdefense has been removed from policyformulation, if not completely in policy execution, an agreed statement ofthe purpose of inter-American military collaboration appears to be required. Over the short and long run,the following steps could serve as thebasis for a new type of collaborationamong the countries of the hemisphere'and one which would better serve theinterests of the United States: At the highest military level,representatives of the United Statesand the Latin-American nationsshould meet for the purpose of ar-riving at an agreed position on thenature of the threat facing LatinAmerica and the hemisphere as awhole. The present threat would appear to be essentially internal, aidedand abetted from abroad.

Once the nature of the threat hasbeen determined, attention should bedirected to the type of equipment andforce structures that the Latin-American armed forces will require to meetthe threat.

The United States should thenindicate her willingness to assist in

the establishment of realistic forcelevels and equipment requirements under a new and modified military assistance policy to include grant, training, and sales assistance. The United States, in consultation with Latin-American armedforces, should establish a long-rangeplan for the provision of certain typesof equipment for Latin-Americanarmed services. Stress would be placedon internal security and civic actionrequirements, but there also should beprovision for gradual replacement ofother types of equipment which theUnited States now views as unsuitable for the inventories of the LatinAmerican armed forces. This wouldinclude more modern destroyer-typevessels to replace the cruisers now inservice in certain naval forces and anoffer to supply a more modern fighteraircraft provided older models werephased out and no increase in forcelevels resulted from the change.

The United States, with theagreement of the Latin-Americanarmed forces, should substantially reduce the size of her military groupsin Latin America, eliminating positions once required under the hemispheric defense concept, but no longerneeded.

The countries should proceed atthe diplomatic level to confirm agreements reached and to take whateverinitial steps that might be possible toreach agreement on a nonreceipt typeof arms limitation agreement relatingto the acquisition of certain types ofhardware by the armed forces ofLatin America.

As a result of these actions, forcelevels could be reduced, defense expenditures cut, and equipment mod-


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ernized. At the same time, each nationwould maintain adequate, well-trainedarmed forces capable of meeting internal threats, but with some equipment necessary to satisfy Latin-American requirements for professionalforces as viewed by them.This program, utopian as it mayseem and which does not meet theproblem of securing the support of theUS Congress for a long-range MilitaryAssistance Program, has been pursued, in part, by the United States.Perhaps the time has come to take theLatin Americans into our confidenceand discuss frankly with them the mutual problems relating to inter-American military cooperation.It probably is not in the best interests of the United States to eliminatethe grant aid program for LatinAmerica or to place so many restrictions on the sales program that the

LATIN AMERICA

United States ultimately will lose theinfluence, prestige, and investment established over so many years of hermilitary presence in Latin America.It seems much more preferable to furnish certain arms than to leave avacuum. I t seems equally desirable torecognize that the Latin-Americannations will retain certain types ofequipment in their: inventories and willmaintain force structures sometimesill-suited to their actual needs.However, the United States has agreat stake in Latin America andshould participate in that area's future, shaping it as opportunities permit rather than abdicate interest andresponsibility. The suggested programmight contribute at least a beginningtoward that mutual understanding andcollaboration that have not been tooevident recently in US military relations with Latin America.

Latin America has so far avoided an arms race with great success, notonly in comparison to other regions but in absolute terms. Despite certainoutstanding exceptions, Latin America as a whole has also been notablysuccessful in controJling military expenditures over a period of many years.There is, moreover, no evidence that any level of military expenditure is re-lated to political ambitions: in point of faet, cheap weapons tend to be moreuseful for coups d'etat than jet planes and aircraft carriers.

Covey T. OliverUS Executive Director, World Bank


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A . ~ l r t ) ~From Die Welt (Federal Republic of Germany)

WARNINGSMUST BEHEEDED

General Johann A. Graf von Kielmansegg, West German Army, Retired

UNINFORMED, unprepared, completely surprised, stunned, helpless-those were the words used byjournalists in all Western capitals todesctibe government reactions to theSoviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Wasthere no recognizable warning? Orwas it once again a failure to understand what had been happening? Hadanalysis been based on wishful thinking?

Ten months before the invasion,there were the first signs of the be

ginnings of considerable change inCzechoslovakia. In January 1968, theso-called "spring of Prague" started.During the four months preceding theinvasion, continuous military maneuvers took place at a time of year notgenerally chosen by the Warsaw Pactfor major exercises.

First, there were the "staff exercises" of the Warsaw Pact countries-with the exception of Romaniawhich took place on Czech territory.At the start of the exercises, it took

MiliWy Revie.2


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the Soviet troops three days to moveinto their positions, but it took fiveweeks for the same movement in theopposite direction.During the same period, frequent

"air defense" 'exercises took place inthe territory of East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union borderingon Czechoslovakia. In addition, socalled supply and logistic exerciseswere underway which were describedby Red Star as the biggest since 1945,a description that was no doubt correct. A Soviet declaration issued atthe end of July stated publicly thatthe troops "were in a high degree ofreadiness for military action."New Exercises ContinuedThis series of military maneuverswas declared at an end on 10 August,but new exercises continued in thesame areas from '11 August onward;they did not receive special names,however, and were hardly reported. Onthe night of 20-21 August, they turnedinto the invasion mounted from fivedirections on land and by air.For the military observer, even

This article was trans14ted andcondensed trom the original, published in DIE WELT (Federal Republic of Germany) 2 ~ Auguat1968, under the title, "Warnungen Milssen Auch Genutzt Werden."General Grof von Kielmansegg,now retired, re8ide8 in Bad Krotzingen. His active duty as8ignmentB included two tour8 with theDefense Ministry and as the military repre8entative oj the German Federal Republic to the Supreme Headquarter8, Allied Power8, Europe, in Paris, 1955-58,and as Commander in Chief, Allied Force8, Central Europe,1966-68.

May 1889

WARNINGS

without access to classified information, the picture. of an almost classicaldeployment of troops, in logical sequence, became clear no later than thebeginning of July. Staff prepsrationsand exercises-eoupled to an extentprobably never enjoyed before withreconnaissance on the spot-eamouflaged partial mobilization, installationand activation of air defense, logisticdeployment, and troop deployment. I tcan safely be assumed that the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization Command had a clesr and detailed pictureof the potential of all this. The military intention to invade Czechoslovakia became more and more apparent.Passivity ExhlbHed

But Moscow's political intention, theintention behind the troop deployment,became apparent only insofar as theescalation from normal maneuvers toa maneuver of blackmail could not gounnoticed. The ''hot line," installed topermit a dialogue in times of crisis,was, it seems, not employed. Moscow,not surprisingly, did not reveal its intentions over the "hot line," but therewere no questions either from Washington, Instead, passivity was exhibited in various forms.There is no doubt that Moscow has,in the last few months, given a demonstration to the world which is of extreme interest. For a preliminary analysis of the question of warning time,it should be remembered that thestrategy officially agreed on by theNATO powers in the spring of 1967,the strategy of a flexible response toany military preparations and actionsby the Warsaw Pact countries directedagainst the West, depends for its success, both in theory and in practice,on the assumption of warning timebeing given and acted upon.

23


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From left to right: Czeehoslovak Marshal Ivan I.Yakubovsky, Czechoslovak Party Secretary Alexander D u ~ e k , and Czeehoslovak Pre-mier OIdrieh Cernfk reviewing Warsaw Pact maneuvers at Miloviee, Bohemia, 2 July1968fits certain preconceived views. This would lack both sense and caution if-and, indeed, the whole notion of he revealed his aggressive intention.warning time-was not accepted with- On the contrary. he would try by allout objections from some of the NATO possible means to deceive the rest ofallies, among them the Federal Repub- the world, his own country, and hislic of Germany, but the fact remains allies included-as we have just wit-that it was accepted. nessed.To the concept of strategic and mil- The concept of military, as opposeditary warning time, always considered to political, warning time is based ona first essential in assessing the situa- the observation of military and civiltion, another concept was added, some movement and actions which point tosay invented-that of political warn- deployment, to suppressive measuresing time. This was based on the thesis or preparation for attack; political in-that, in the world of today, the inten- dications have, of course, to be con-tion, possible or probable, of any sidered as well. While the concept of

WARNINGS

This is stated expressly in the 9May 1967 Ministerial Guidance whichis the political guidance to NATO mil-itary commanders. The experience ofCzechoslovakia not only warrants, butI\rgently requires, a sound assessmentof the actual implications of this no-tion of warning time.

First, two concepts of warning timethis

power or group of powers to use forcefor political ends can be recognizedweeks, or even months, in advancethat is,' within a period of time thatcan be used to prepare the necessarycountermeasures.Of course, a correct assessment ofpolitical intentions cannot be dis-counted, but it is highly improbable

Military Review4


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political warning time is not susceptible of precise calculation, this is notso with military warning time. Military action and movement can, to acertain extent, be analyzed and calculated by a trained observer and makeit possible, therefore, at least to assess the minimum and the maximumperiod available for countermeasures.Length of PeriodThe length of this period is, ofcourse, subject to differing assessments as there are bound to be manyuncertainties and confused pictures,not to mention differences of opinionon the value to be put on incidents.But there is certainly a minimum period which can be arrived at althoughhere and there analysis may, perhaps,be manipulated to support a particularpolicy.However, it should be understoodthat military warning is not based onspeculation about intentions, but onthe analysis of facts that there is, onthe other side of the border, preparation for a military attack. Whateverthe nature of warning time, it can onlyserve its purpose, which is to allowfor timely and adequate countermeasures, if it is not only heeded, but actedupon. The experience of the summerof 1968-and, indeed, of the last 35years-gives little ground for optimism.The first, and minimum, requirement for action to be taken by NATOin the event of a warning in centralEurope would be to bring back thoseground and air units that have beenwithdrawn since 1967, and those thatprobably will be withdrawn from central Europe in the future. As was indicated during the negotiations concerning the first slice of troop withdrawals some time ago, the UnitedMIY 1969

WARNINGS

States requires 30 days for Army, and15 days for air units to get them backover the ocean. Similar movement byBritain would also take more than afew days.There is no doubt that these figuresare correct. They will only surprisethose who are unaware that, while thetime required for mere transportationmay be short, and even shorter in thefuture, a lot of time is needed beforeand afterward, particularly for the decision to return troops.Lessons to Be LearnedLet us, as a hypothesis, look at the30-day timescale against the background of the events of the Czechoslovakian invasion. We would find thatthe return of the US forces previouslywithdrawn would have had to havebeen started by 22 July, the day whenMoscow agreed to hold talks in Cierna.

Let us imagine this to have been,instead, a conference in Geneva. Fromthe beginning of such a conference until 16 August, a Big Lif t operationcould only have had an escalatoryfect, and, in all probability, therefore, Washington would have decidedagainst it. Only on 18 August, justthree days before the invasion, werethere new political warning siguals.The parallel with a genuine period ofEast-West tension should be obvious,and so is the conclusion.For all those who are willing tolearn, the "maneuvers" taught at leastfour very important lessons for Western security and defense planning: The Soviets have proved-not for

the first time, but most convincingly- tha t they are able to launch maneuvers and get a major deployment oftheir own and allied ground and airunits underway without any visiblesigns of preparation and, even more

25


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WARNINGS

important, within a very short time.While it was part of the purpose ofthese maneuvers to attract attentionby the use of carefully phased announcements, it is easy to imaginethat, without such announcements, thesurprise effect in other circumstanceswould be even greater. This is the lesson to be drawn from the first phaseof the Warsaw Pact maneuvers ofJune-July 1968.

July when combat readiness was saidto have been achieved, an announcement that obviously escaped attentionin the Western chancelleries. That military readiness can be continuously increased without revealing the true political intention behind it is the lessonto be drawn from the August phaseof the maneuvers. The military and strategic warning time started, at least, with the The Soviet beirinnilllg of the mobilization

Eut E1UOJ)fJ Photo.

Leaders of live Soviet-bloc parties meet with Czechoslovak leaders in Bratislava on 3 August 1968. Soviet party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev is on extreme right. hiding her real intentions until thevery last moment. This remains true,even if the decision to invade was notfinally taken until the talks betweenWalter llibricht and Alexander Dub

~ e k at Karlovy Vary on 12 August asmany indications would suggest. Thedecision to provide the necessary military capability was, however, possiblymade at the conference of the fiveWarsaw Pact members in Moscow on8 May.This military capability had probably been provided not later than 31

and the escalation of the maneuversin mid-July. Yet it seems that thesame political importance was not attached to this as it wss to the peaceful intentions exhibited in Cierna andBratislava. I f these maneuvers hadbeen intended as a deployment directedagainst Western Europe, NATO wouldnot have had 80 or even 15 days leftto bring its defenses up to full readiness by the return of the troops withdrawn and by mobilization. One lesson seems clear enough:Whatever the strategy, it cannot be

Military Review8


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based on the concept of political warning time that rests on speculationsabout possible political intentions. Theconcept of military warning time, formilitary countermeasures, has to bebased on the assumption that it maybe the shortest period conceivable. I tcanm.\t exclude total surprise. Hesitation in taking political and militarydecisions can be fatal in a crisis.As far as action on warnings generally is concerned, I quote from theDaily Telegraph of 20 August 1968:

The present situation demonstratesthe weakness of the NATO system.Whenever tension arises the NATOauthorities, far from taking any pre-cautionary steps-for fear of worsen-ing the situation-shy away from anymove.This is, in general, correct as is thefact that apprehension about one's

own courage breeds weakness. But theBritish paper reproaches the wrongpeople. The NATO commanders lackthe authority to take steps on theirown in a period of tension. They cannot turn on NATO's useful and effective alert system. All they can do isorder, to a certain degree, a state ofhigher readiness in the garrisons, butdecisions on further steps to meet acrisis, or even any military movements, are beyond their authority.These can only be taken by tbe political authority, the NATO Council,but even the council cannot by itselfdecide on the necessary action. It represents the sovereign countries of the

WARNINGS

Atlantic alliance and depends, therefore, on their instructions. I t can actonly if every single government approves of joint action in the council.I t is the governments, therefore,that should be prompted by the lessonsof the maneuvers around and in Czechoslovakia to examine very carefully,and very quickly, the main premises ofthe strategy of flexible response to seeif they are still valid. This requiresobjective rethinking, free from theemotion caused by the crisis. Wishful

thinking and self-deception must notbe part of it. Above all, it must startfrom the fact that Moscow's politicallogic, and its political thinking, arenot the same as Western political logicand thinking. No amount of brains orcomputers will reach correct resultsif they work on Western logic alone.This has nothing whatsoever to dowith a cold war mentality, nor does

it imply that the aim of reasonableand true detente should be given up.Security based on a sufficient degreeof power and detente are not antagonistic but complementary componentsof a goal to be achieved. But on thelong road toward this goal, it shouldbe kept in mind that the policy ofdetente will only be successful if theAtlantic alliance as a whole, and theFederal Republic of Germany as oneof its members, is assured that notonly can any crisis be met effectively,with adequate and timely preparation,but that they are also visibly resolvedto meet it.

1969 27


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Lieutenant Colonel Paul R. Shirk, United States Army, Retired

T HE Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council of-Mutual Economic Aid are the two institutional structures binding the countries of Eastern Europe to one another and to the SovietUnion.The creation of the WTO, however, was not the beginning of empire building in the military sphere by the Soviets in Eastern Europe,but was viewed by them as the capstone of their effort to Sovietize thearmed forces of the Eastern European nations. One analyst has expressed the significance of the Warsaw Pact as the "culmination ofthe military integration of Eastern Europe under Supreme SovietCommand which had been in process over the preceding decade.'"The signing of the pact and the creation of the WTO may be viewed,therefore, as one step in the development of the armed forces of theEastern European countries.This development proceeded through four identifiable phases. The

1 Hanns von Krannhals. "Command Integration Within the Warsaw Pact," MUita11l Re-view, May 1961. p 40.


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WARSAW TREATYphases were not necessarily concurrentfor each country although each country did pass through each one. Thefirst phase can be termed the periodof preparation during which Sovietpolicy was to minimize the role of thearmies of Eastern Europe to remove apotential obstacle to the eventualformation of Communist Governments.Origin of GroupsThe period actually started duringWorld War II with the formation ofnational armies in the Soviet Union.Not all countries provided cadres fora Moscow-oriented formation, butmembers of the armies of Poland,Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Germany were recruited into Soviet-sponsored national formations.The Czech group had its origins inthe group which had traveled to Krakow in April 1939 to aid in the defenseof Poland against Germany. With theadvent of the war, these Czechs, under the leadership of then LieutenantColonel Ludvik Svoboda, became refugees in the USSR. During 1941, theCzech-London government-in-exile andthe Soviet Union signed an agreementto provide for the formation and training of Czech units in the USSR.

Lieutenant Colonel Paul R. Shirk,US Army, Retired, is on a FeUow8hipat The American Univer8ity, Waah-ington, where he is currently instruct-ing in the School of GO'IIemment whilecompleting work on his Ph. D. degree.A graduate of the US Army Commandand General Staff CoUege, his aasign-ments have included duty in Germany,Thaimnd, and with the Military AB-sistance Command, Vietnam. Prior tohis retirement in August 1968, he waawith the US Army Combat Develop-ments Command Institute of LandCombat.

Approximately 350 Czech enlistedmen were trained as officer candidatesin Soviet military schools and commissioned as Czech officers. A battalionwas committed in action under Sovietcommand for the first time in January1943. Svoboda was promoted to therank of general and given command ofwhat eventually evolved into the 1stCzechoslovak Corps. By the end of thewar, this force was about 80,000strong and destined to become thenucleus of the postwar Czechoslovakian Army.In a similar fashion, two Romaniandivisions were formed in the SovietUnion from among the 180,000 prisoners of war who were susceptible toSoviet indoctrination. These two divisions became the nucleus for the Ro-manian 1st and 4th Armies. In 1946,an additional 500 Romanian officerswere returned from Soviet prisonerof-war camps after their indoctrination and integrated into the army.Polish FormationPoland presents the most strikingexample of a national Communistarmy formed during the war in theUSSR. The first Polish formation organized and trained by the Sovietsthe Kosciusko Division-was formedin May 1943 and became the nucleusof the postwar Polish Army. By theend of World War II, the Soviet-sponsored forces totaled almost one-halfmillion men divided into three armies.

Although not organized in the Soviet Union as a "national army," thepresent East German Army has a similar foundation insofar as the backgrounds of its personnel are concerned.Because of the delay in creating anarmy in East Germany, there is no direct relationship either to the GermanArmy of World War II or to the pris


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WARSAW TREATY

oner-of-war groups formerly in theSoviet Union. However, when about7,500 police were transferred into theembryonic army in 1948, indicationswere that a great majority of themhad been prisoners of war and had

Lif.Marshal of the Soviet' Union Ivan S.Konevundergone the familiar Soviet indoctrination program.The formation of the "national armies" under Soviet sponsorship andtutelage was but one measure in thesanitization of the Eastern Europeanarmed forces. The forces were extensively purged. Thousands of Bulgarianofficers were tried as collaborators andexecuted or imprisoned. Polish officersauffered mass arrests and deportations. The Hungarian Army was virtually nonexistent by the war's end.Nevertheless, the few officers who had

survived the war were rapidly purged.In Czechoslovakia, the potentiallyanti-Communist underground was virtually eliminated by the Germans during August and September 1944, afterSoviet promises of aid did not materialize although the Red Army was onthe border of eastern Slovakia. Sincethe political climate did not permit actual purging until after 1948, the Communist Party accomplished the sameresult by shunting officers not sympathetic to their cause into unimportantpositions. For example, General Sergey Ingr, leader of the Czech "LondonArmy," was sent off as Ambassadorto the Netherlands although PresidentEduard Benel! planned to appoint himMinister of Defense. General Svobodagot the post instead.MilitalJ Alliance System

The period of preparation drew toa conclusion with the construction ofan elaborate military alliance systemduring 1947 and 1948. All similar inwording, the treaties were designed to"prevent any attack on the part ofGermany, or any other nation whichwould ally itself with Germany." Thetreaties committed the cosignatories tomutual defense against aggression,particularly aggression by a rearmedGeiman state. In this regard, the trea-ties concluded with East Germanywere called only friendship treaties.I t was not until June 1964 that theGerman Democratic Republic-SovietUnion agreement was upgraded to thelevel of a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.When the political goal of havinga Communist government in eachstate had been achieved during 1948,the second phase in the postwar development of the Eastern Europeanarmies was initiated. Extensive So-


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viet military aiq was supplied to thenations of the area, administered bylarge Soviet missions in the country.During this period, the armies evenbegan to look alike since insignia anduniforms were widely copied from theSoviet example. By the early 1960's,the armies of the various countrieshad achieved the goal of reorganiza-

WARSAW TREATY

alism rather than the strictly bilateralmethod of doing business with theSoviet Union. Thus, starting in thegeneral timeframe of 1960-61, the nature of the WTO began to shift. Substitution of the concept of muItilateralism for bilateralism in any alliancesystem introduces a corollary conceptof greater autonomy for the individual

WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION STRuctURE

I'OlIl1C.II. CONSULTA1M COIIIIITTHFIRSI SECIIEIAR1IS Of PARTIESatIffS Of STAlEI RMIDGII IIIIOSlERS0fDISE IIIIOSlERSI PRIIAIIEIIT IOMMISSIONJOINT ARMED RIRCES COIIIIMD

COIIMAIIIER III CHIEF0fDISE IIIIIISTERS IDB'U1Y COMIIMOERS IN allEl)CIIIEFOfSTm*

-1btDlalnnln of tilt Jairt SecrttIrIIt Ibo sems IS ChIef of SIdItIIo__ f aRn_

JI JOINTSECRETARIAT' I

tion along Soviet lines and under Soviet tutelage.As the armies achieved a measure

of professionalism, they embarkedupon a third period which can be regarded as one of further development.This period started in the middle orearly 1960's. I t was during this timethat the Warsaw Pact was signed-but it was a period still belonging tothe USSR and was characterized bythe ultimate of military dependencyof the Eastern European countries onthe USSR.

Nevertheless, the signing of the pactcarried with it a notion of muItilater

members. The culmination of this phenomena in the case of the WTO wasthe expressed desire first of the Romanians and then of the Czechs fora greater voice in the Joint Staff.Czechoslovakia's geographic. location made autonomy an impossibilityfrom the point of view of Moscow. As

a result, when she attempted to sether own course in relations with theFederal Republic of Germany, the Soviets decided invasion was necessary.The WTO was intended by the Soviets as a counterfoil to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, morespecifically, to the accession of the


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Ivan Konev as Commander in

WARSAW TREATY

A tank is transported across the V1tava River during Warsaw Pad maneuvers inCzechoslovakia

Federal Republic o ~ Germany toNATO. The Bonn government joinedNATO on 5 May 1955-the WarsawPact was signed on 14 May.

The preamble of the treaty is a re-flection of this motivation. I t de-nounces the increased threat of war

the military sphere and speaks of adesire for a system of collective European security. The key articles inthe treaty are the fourth, which pro-vides for immediate assistance by allmeans if a member country is at-tacked in Europe; the fifth, which es-tablishes a joint command for thearmed forces of the several nations;and the sixth, which deals with thePolitical Consultative Committee.

That the WTO was intended to bea creature of the Soviet Union wasindicated by the announcement on theday the treaty was signed that theJoint Command Headquarters wouldbe located in Moscow, and by the ap-pointment of Marshal of the Soviet

BCIfI E_Y'OP6

Chief of the Joint Command. Konevcontinued to serve as Deputy Ministerof Defense in the Soviet Council ofMinisters-a duality of role perform-ance which continues today in the per-son of Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky.The pact was clearly an instrumentof multilateral diplomacy, but this didnot mean that the countries who weresignatories to the pact, in fact, gaineda greater voice in the management of


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Eastern European military policy. Nojoint maneuvers were .held during thi3early period, and the much publicizedJoint Command remained largely a paper organization as a staff sectionwithin the Soviet High Command.

The Political Consultative Committee, obligated to meet not less than biannually by the pact provisions, metonly twice during the first five yearsof the WTO's existence. The only significant military development duringthis period was the extension of theair defense and early warning systemof the USSR into Eastern Europe. TheCommander in Chief of Soviet Air Defense served concurrently as Commander in Chief of WTO Air Defense.Final PhaseThe final phase in the developmentof the armies of Eastern Europe wasthe modernization and the transformation of the WTO. I t was the intervention by the Soviet Army in the fall1956 uprising in Hungary which setinto motion a shift in philosophy visa-vis the WTO. The intervention wasjustified on the basis of the pact byboth the Soviets and the Hungarians.This interpretation, however, was notuniversally accepted. Poland, in particular, felt the provisions of the pacthad been severely misinterpreted. I tthus became apparent that tensionsexisted concerning the role of Soviettroops in the Eastern European countries.The immediate result was the expressed willingness of the USSR to reexamine "the question of Soviet troopsstationed in the territory of WTOcountries." Accordingly, status-offorces agreements were signed withPoland, East Germany, Romania, andHungary-the only countries whereSoviet forces remained.

WARSAW TREATYBy these agreements, the EasternEuropean countries concerned gaineda large measure of control over theSoviet troops stationed in their re

spective countries. The negotiations ofthese agreements were a significantstep toward transforming the WTO.They represented tacit recognition bythe Soviets that, if future incidentssimilar to that in Hungary were to beavoided, the Eastern European countries must have some access to thedecision-making process within the institutional framework of the WTO.Political Motivation

I t was not until 1960 that the overtmanifestations of the new trend became apparent. The international relations of the Soviet Union, in general,may have accelerated the trend. TheU-S incident of May 1960; the subsequent breakoff of the scheduledParis Summit and worsening UnitedStates-USSR relations; and a definiteworsening of Sino-Soviet relationsmay all have provided political motivation for improving the force structure of the Eastern European countries.Within' the Soviet Union, a debatewas being conducted between NikitaS. Khrushchev, who favored a reduction of Soviet ground forces andgreater reliance on technology, andthe more traditionalist marshals, whourged that vast ground forces werestill necessary in the nuclear age. Upgrading the value of the collectivestrength of the WTO forces was oneway to support the contention thatSoviet ground forces could be reduced.

An overt manifestation of this debate was the relief of Konev as Com-mander in Chief of the WTO, andfrom his position as Deputy Ministerof Defense. Konev, who had been luke


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WARSAW TREATY

warm to the idea of upgrading theWTO forces, was replaced by MarshalAndrei A. Grechko. Significantly,Grechko had served in the Kiev Military District with Khrushchev duringWorld War II, had been Commanderof Soviet Forces, Germany, during the1953 revolt, and had been created a

Following a meeting of the WTODefense Ministers in Moscow duringSeptember 1961, the first joint maneuvers were conducted the followingmonth with the participation of Soviet, Polish, Czech, and East Germanforces. The pattei'll for joint militaryexercises was thus established. GreatHero of the Union these

Warsaw Pact tanks are refueled during Exerelse Neman In late July-August 1968shchev in 1958. He was appointed tohis present position as Soviet Ministerof Defense on the death of MarshalRodion Y. Malinovsky in 1967.The convening of the Political Consultative Committee on 4. February1960, after an almost two-year periodof dormancy, was another indicationthat new life was about to be breathedinto the organization.An impressive program of modernization of the armed forces of theEastern European countries was undertaken, focusing on the longneglected ground forces. The obsoleteTal, tanks were largely replaced withmodern T51, and T55 models. MiG-f1aircraft replaced older models. Sophisticated armaments such as antitankmissiles, self-propelled guns, and rockets capable of carrying nuclear warheads were provided.

vers as signifying the development ofthe WTO into a true coalition.The device of joint maneuvers hasapparently reaped dividends in raising the armies of Eastern Europe toa high level of professionalism. Following the September 1966 ExerciseVltalla as the maneuvers were called,"Western sources pointed out that the40,000 troops . . . were well trained,well deployed, and well equipped.'"The official Czech news agency,Ceteko. (CTK) , reported that mocknuclear weapons were used in thecourse of the exercise, a training vehicle also used in the October 1964maneuvers. The deployment of highlytrained Polish parachute troops in Soviet aircraft haa also been a featureof WTO maneuvers in recent years-another indicator of high profession

2 The New York Timu. 26 September 1966. p 2.


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alism within the Eastern Europeanarmed forces.I t is obvious that the WTO and thearmed forces of Eastern Europe have

undergone a dramatic transformationI!ince the signhig of the pact in 1955.Initially, the creation of the WTO hadbut scant effect on the armed forcesof the area. Today, they are wellequipped and well trained.Greater RoleAs the Eastern European countrieshave seen their forces achieve an unprecedented level of professionalism,and hence the ability to assume alarger share of the WTO military responsibility, they have apparentlygrown more determined to share inthe WTO decision-making process.Maneuvers since October 1962 haveusually been at least nominally underthe command of a non-Soyiet officer.This helps to create the impression ofa greater role for the Eastern European countries at the level of jointaction, as should be the case in a truecoalition.However, at the level of the highcommand, control is little changedfrom the 1955 arrangement. Sovietscontinue to occupy the posts of Com-mander in Chief and Chief of Staff,and central planning and coordinationare still conducted by a special branchof the Soviet General Staff.Although permanent representatives of the coalition members areposted to Moscow, they retain theirnational identity under their respective Ministers of Defense who serveconcurrently as Deputy Commandersin Chief, WTO, and retain commandof their own respective nationalforces. Thus, the permanent representatives are in Moscow more as liaisonofficers than as members of a truly in-

WARSAW TREATY

tegrated combined staff. Such an arrangement is certain to create frictionand resentment.This staff arrangement reflecta Soviet military doctrine which envisagesthe incorporation of the various armies into the strategic aims of theUSSR. The Communist Party of theSoviet Union's First Secretary, LeonidI. Brezhnev, has repeatedly called forthe further strengthening of the WTOby welding the armies into a moremonolithic structure.

This desire has been resisted, particularly by Romania. The 11th anniversary of the WTO was pointedlyignored in 1966 as a measure of herdisapproval of this policy. The Ro-manian leaders have expressed the desire for absolute control over theirown national forces while, at the sametime, advocating a larger voice in thedetermination of coalition strategyand a veto over the use of nuclearweapons by Soviet forces in EasternEurope.Nuclear ControlRomania's policy concerning nuclearweapons was further indicated by herrefusal to sign the statement concerning the nuclear nonproliferation treatyissued by the pact's Political Consultative Committee at the end of theMarch 1968 meeting in Sofia. The Ro-manians insisted upon two provisionsquite unacceptable to the Soviets.They wanted some system of international control over the nuclear powers and guarantees written into thetreaty for protection from nuclear attack-a nuclear "umbrella."Romania's position vis-a-vis theWTO reflects the basic lack of homogeneity of Eastern Europe. This problem is recognized by the Soviets whospeak of "surviving nationalistic tend


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encies from the past," but proclaimthat Western "splitting attempts" arebound to failure.First Strategic EchelonThe basic cleavage in Eastern Eu-rope is further reftected in the factthat joint maneuvers generally havecombined either the Balkan group orthe northern tier of countries lyingabreast the northern European plain,and that the latter group has r ~ c e i v e dthe emphasis. Poland, East Germany,and Czechoslovakia have been referredto publicly as the "first strategic ech-elon" of WTO. This regional differen-tiation is one of the principal prob-lems of WTO and is a modern mani-festation of the historic Problem ofthe lack of unity of action and pur-pose among the countries of EasternEurope. This point has been empha-sized since the August 1968 invasion.

The concept of Czechoslovakia beingin the "first strategic echelon" hasboth geographical and force value com-ponents. The former played a majorrole in the decision to invade. The act-ing Foreign Minister of Poland em-phasized this point in September:When Czechoslovakia showed signsof leaving the Warsaw Pact, it endan-gered the balance of Europe. Czech-oslovakia is a long finger reaching 600miles right into the heart of Europe,pointed at the frontier of Russia. I t. . cuts the Socialist world in two.We cannot permit the Socialist worldto be divided.This theme was mentioned by CzeCh-oslovak Party Secretary Alexander

D u b ~ e k , also in September, when heacknowledged he had "underesti-mated" the strategic and military im-portance the WTO members placed onhis country. Thus, although ForeignMinister J i ~ i Hajek and other Czech-

oslovak leaders had repeatedly assuredthe Soviets that the country wouldstay in the pact, Prague's repeatedinsistence for a free hand in her rela-tions with the Federal Republic ofGermany made those assurances in-credible in East Berlin, Moscow, andWarsaw. The future force value of theCzechoslovak Army must be of con-siderable concern to the Soviet Union.'Uncertain PeriodThe WTO is passing through a pe-riod of uncertainty-even of crisis.Alliance systems by their very natureare dynamic. This dynamic quality canassert itself by changes in member-ship, organization, and role. The roleof the WTO as originally conceived byits creators is obviously no longerviable.

Within the structure of the WTO,the armies of Eastern Europe havebeen developed to a level of profession-alism unparalleled in their histories.This role, or function, of the WTOhas, therefore, been discharged. Sim-ilarly, the jurisdiction of WTO is nolonger appropriate. Poland and EastGermany are concerned with the "Ger-man threat" much more than Hun-gary, Bulgaria, and Romania.

Clearly, new roles must be soughtwhich are applicable to the entire or-ganization if the WTO is to remainviable. This implies that WTO couldassume a greater political role as atrue coalition. Any situation wherebythe USSR would cease to be the majorand even dominant member of the al-liance is inconceivable, by virtue ofher predominant power. Nevertheless,the power of the Eastern Europeanmembers is increasing in absoluteterms, as well as relative terms.

II The Waahinllton Post, 15 and 22 SeptemMr1968.Military Review6


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An alliance must reflect, in its decision-making apparatus, the relativepower of its members. I f it does not,the alliance will be in disequilibrium,and tensions will grow. I f the nationsof Eastern Europe are successful ingaining a greater voice in the organsof the WTO commensurate with theirincreased national power, the over-aUpolitical autonomy of the individualcountries will be. enhanced, but notnecessarily at the expense of weakening the WTO. Indeed, its evolutioninto a true coalition, with a greatercognizance of the compelling nationalinterests of the respective memberstates, could strengthen Eastern European cooperation.However, the WTO invasion ofCzechoslovakia makes it manifestlyclear that the Soviets regard the evolution into a true coalition inimical totheir own interests. The 3 AugustDanube declaration provided for a"strengthening" of the pact, but provided no details of the means to accomplish it. The Czechoslovak view of"strengthening" the pact was in thedirection of a true coalition. DefenseMinister Colonel General Martin D ~ u rhad insisted that member nationsshould share senior positions of theJoint Staff-a proposition Moscowconsistently rejected when mentionedby the Romanians, and likewise rejected at Bratislava.

WARSAW TREATY

The Soviets had an excellent opportunity for at least token integrationon the Joint Staff when the Chief ofStaff, General Mikhail I. Kasakov, retired in August. The appointment ofGeneral of the Army Sergey M. Shtemenko, a Deputy Minister of Defensein the last years of Joseph Stalin'srule who was removed from his postand demoted following the latter'sdeath, is about as far in the oppositedirection as the Soviet leaders couldgo.The invasion has, in fact, reducedthe possibility of evolution into a mutual partnership in the immediate future. The invasion led to the formalwithdrawal of Albania, long a nonactive member of WTO. This action drewstrong praise from Communist Chinawhere both the Peking People's Dailyand the Liberation Army Daily announced the USSR would suffer "athorough, ignominious and irrevocabledefeat" if the WTO attempted intervention in Albania.A Pravda editorial on 20 September,calling for "further strengthening" ofthe WTO because of the "growing aggressiveness" of NATO, is probablyan indication that Marshal Yakubovsky's trip to Sofia the preceding dayfor a WTO conference on the subjecthas probably resulted in, if anything,even less autonomy for the membernations.

May 1969 37


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Dynamic RevolutionaryLieutenant Colonel Hugo W. Matson, United StateB Armg

FROM 1937 until 1964, Marshal ofthe Soviet Union, and early leaderof the Red Army, Mikhail N. Tukha-chevsky was an unperson. He was ex-ecuted by Joseph Stalin's order in thepurge of the army in 1937; his writ-ings disappeared from the shelves ofmilitary libraries; and his name wasdeleted from the encyclopedias. Fromall outward evidence, he might neverhave existed. But the force of histhought was too great and his contri-butions to Soviet military doctrine tooimportant for his memory to be

erased. Following Stalin's death, hewas rehabilitated posthumously. In1964, his writings were republished,and he is again stu

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Military Review May 1969

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