Military Review November 1967

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UNITEB STATESARMY COMMANDAND GENERALSTAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

COMMANDANTMajor General Michael S. Davison

ASSISTANT COMMANDANTColonel David S. ~ender80n

The Military Review is publ ished by the United States Army Command and GeneralStaff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It providesaforum for the expression of military thought on national and mititary strategy, nationalsecurity affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.

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Military ReviewProfessional Journal of the US Army

Insurgency: Lat i n-American Styl e . . . . Enr ique Mart inez Cod6 3The Quiet War . . . . . . . . M AJ Lewi s S. $orl ey Il l , USA 13Air-Support ed St rat egic Army Corps . . LTC Robert M . Shoemak er, USA 20Red Chi na s Di vided Army . . . Robert S. El egant and Si dney C. Liu 31An M R Speci al FeatureCivi l i an Personnel: Viet nam . . . . . 2LT Larry L. Pressler, USA 39Asian M it i t ary-Pof it ic os . , . . . . LTC George D. Eggers, Jr., LISA 44Thai land: A Confront at i on . . . . . . . Charles W. Koburger, Jr 51Soviet Volunt eers in t he German Army . . . Vyachesl av P. Artemiev 56Douhet Revisi ted . . . . . . . . . . Wi l l i am D. Frankl in 65Force de Frappe . . . . . . . . . . CPT John A. Berry, USA 70A Preface to Forca Planning . . . . . . . . . John F. Scot t 79l iv ing Wi t h Nuclear Pro l i f erat i on . . . SQDN LDR D. C. Mazlin, RAAF 85Hold and Paci fy . . . . . . . . . LTC Ric hard E. M ack , USA 91M i l i t aryNodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

iitmyBooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107)!

The VIEWS expressed in this ma azine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessarily those of theArmy or the Command and Genera Staff College.


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Editor in ChiefCOL Donald J. Delaney

Associate EditorCOL Thomas J. Cleary, Jr.Army War College

Assistant EditorLTC A. Leroy CoveyFeatures EditorLTC Charles A. GatzkaProduction EditorHelen M. HallSpanish-American EditorMAJ Juan Horta-MerlyBrazilian EditorsLTC Paulo A. F. VianaLTC Samuel T. T. PrimoPublication OfficerLTC Edward A. PurcellArt and Design

Charles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW-PubliShed monthly by the U. S. Army Command and Oeneral Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in Englwh, Spanish, and Portu uese. Use of funds for print ing of this publication hasbeen approved by Headquarfera, Department of the Army, 28 May 1965.Second.slaas postage aid st Fort Leavenworth, Kansaa. Subscript ion rata~ $4.00 (US currency) ayear in the United States, imted States military post offices, and those countries which are membersofthe Pan.American Postal Union (including Spain); $5.00 a year in all other countries single coPY Pfice50 cents. Addreaa subscript ion mail to the Rook Department, U. S. Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth, Kanaaa 66027.


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(Extrac ted from a speech by Gwrerel Harold K.AN ANALOGY Johnson, Houston, Texaa, 18 MaY 1967)Recognizing the danger that is always latent in historic analogy,

I would still like to draw ona, just to bring home the point of howfoolish it is to consider the conflict in South Vietnam as a civil war.For our analogy, let ua suppose that the people of Canada, stronglyinfluenced by Great Britain, had refused to accept the terms of the Peace of Paris in 17S3, which, among other things, gave the CoIoniestheir independence and established the northern boundary betweenthem and Canada. Instead or respecting the trea~~ direct parallelwith the Geneva Accords of 1954 which separated North and SouthVietnam-instead of keeping their hands off the young, inexperienced,war-impoverished, loosely united Colonies, let us suppose that thepeople of Canada had sent highly trained groups of Loyalists into theback country of New England, New York, and the Carolinas to train andincite the Loyalists already there to rise against the struggling newgovernment, even before it had time to write a Constitution.Let us suppose that, after a lapse of time for setting the stage,

the people of Canada had sent their regular army troops across theboundary to join forces with the guerrillas and overthrow the government. Would that have been a civi l war; simply because some of thepeople of Canada and the Colonies shared a similar background andspoke the same language? Would it have been a civil war simply because the people from the north chose to call it that? Of course not.The whole thought is ridiculous.

The conflict in South Vietnam is no civil war. It is just one morein a planned series of so-called wara of liberation by which the Communists hope to subvert and overthrow the young, the unsettled, andthe impoverished nations of the globs. And we are in Vietnam, I repeat, by invitation, and because we now know that a threat to freedomand peace anywhere in the world is a threat to all free men. We simplyheve our toes dug in on freedoms line there. We are not even seekingto extend freedom across the territory of any other nation. We arethere to help the South Vietnamese hold on.


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LATIN-AMERICAN STYLEEnrique Martinez Cad6

50 years of existence, commu- Communism has developed a clqs-INnism has not succeeded in bringing sic revolutionary strategy with anany country into its orbit through eye toward the conquest of power. Thkfree choice. In fact, history is quite conquest was to come through variclear on this point. Despite propa- ous means, but there has always beenganda about individual cases, free a common pattern of operation. Theredemocratic play has always been ab- must be a party whkh can initiatesent. The coup dt?tat, revolutionary unrest among the masses. Soon, thiswars, deceit, and the aid of Soviet ~c- party acquires a revolutionary charcupation troops have characterized the acter and is transformed into theadvance of communism. vafiguard of the proletariat, It aeHwemher1967 3


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pires thus to a legal existence so thatit can participate for a time in thenormal political life. This enables theparty to consolidate its position andgain prestige.The party recruits cadres, holds congresses, edits n&wspapers, and seatsrepresentatives in the parliament whowill use their positions to sabotagedemocratic actions. The party also organizes civil resistance, student unrest, strikes, and public demonstrations. Eventually,aPPears and a claorganized.

urbanndestine terrorismmilitia isCounteractionsBut when government counteractioncomes, this clandestine organizationhas not entered into the action or, ifit has done so, it has been in an untimely manner neither forceful nordecisive. It could not act forcefullybecause this would endanger its legal etatus and parliamentary representation so laboriously gained. Thus,the martyrology of the CommunistParties was born.This process, the classic ime, hasdemonstrated its inefficiency in the 50years that communism has held a legal existence. Therefore, it is notstrange that the fundamental successes gained in that time are due tothe large-scale application of anotherstrategyarmed struggle.China, Vietnam, and Cuba are characteristic of this newer method of oPeration. It must be recognized that

Enrique Ma@nez Cod6 is a civilianjournalist living in Bueno8 Airee. Heia the Editor of Manual de Informaciones, official publication of the Intelligence Service of the ArgentineArmy, and of Ucrania L1bre, hsdepewdent magazine publiehed in BnenosAires.

each of these cases follows a differentpattern. It would be a gross error tothink that the process followed inChina was the same as the one triedin Vietnam, or that the one followedin Cuba was like either of the others.In China, for example, the partywas not born to hold or seek a position in the parliament, but for therevolutionary struggle. Following thecalamitous first Chinese Communistrevolution (1924-27), which was characterized by the urban insurrectionand Canton strike, Mao Tse-tung abandoned the cities and fell back towardthe country. Emerging from thegreat march with the nncleus of anarmy, lie increased his strength from40,000 men in 1937 to more than amillion in 1945. The solution to theChineee problem wae, for communism, a purely military solution wherethe Peoples Liberation Army playedthe principal role.Process DiffersThe case of Vietnam, although similar to China, differs, especially inits process of military formation.The Vietnamese Communist partyemerged in 1930, organizing peaeantinsurrections which were promptlyrepressed. Ho Chi-minh stated, in hisfirst program of action, that the onlyway to liberation is the armed struggleof the masses.Soon that struggle took on thecharacteristics of a popular war ofliberation against foreign occupants,the French at firet, the Japanese afterMarch 1939, and the French againin 1945. This means that the preeenceof foreign troops on Vietnamese soilenabled the Iecal revolutionary war toassume from the beginning a clearrole of struggle for liberation whichdid not occur in China.

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INSURGENCYThe fundamental difference betweenthe Vietnamese and Chinese caeessteme from the fact that Mao Tsetung began his s@eond revolutionarywar with a, large, well-supplied army,while Ho Chi-minh had to start fromscratch. Both cases involved a war ofnational liberation against foreigntroops and, afterward, against localarmed forces whom the Communistscalled lackeys of imperialism.

Cuban ExperienceCommunist operations in Cuba dif.fered from both China and V]etnam.In fact, contrary to the classic adviceof fostering urban insurrections,street fighting, and coups to gainpower, Cuba typified the practicalityof developing revolutionary war intbe field and staying away from thecities. With Cuba was born a new concept of guerrilla warfare. This newconcept has not been sufficiently studied and, therefore, has led manyLatin-American guerrilla movementsto be influenced by the external aspectsof the movement rather than theirtrue essence thus inviting failure.Many hasty readers of Mao Tsetung and General Vo Nguyen Giapthought that Fidel Castro was contented with copying their tactics.Other more adventuresome readerstbonght they recognized in the worksof Castro and Major Ernesto (Che)Guevara the texts of the Asiatic

strategists. It is well known, however,that the Cuban revolutionaries did notread the works of Mao Tse-tung untilrecently, after the successful completion of their military campaign. Thosewho believed thue confused the guerr61a combat tactics with the generalstrategy of the movement.

This mistake has led certain Communist revolutionary movements inRwember1967

.Latin America to develop a type ofhybrid form. While influenced bythe experience of Asiatic communism,they were especially influenced by theunusual success of the Cuban courseof action. In this action, everythingdepended on a band of men inflamingthe inhabitant of a mountainous foreet region and frightening tbe ruling regime to the point of collapse.

The failure of the Colombian Communiet guerrillas in Marquetalia, theneutralization of the Venezuelan andGuatemala guerrillae, and the annihilation of the Peruvian and Bolivianguerrillas made the Communist leaders see the need for reevaluating theCuban success. Thk renovating movement, which began in 1965, concludedat the beginning of 1966 with themeeting of the Tricontinental Conference of HavanaTwo OrganizationsTwo organization especially designed to disseminate doctrine werecreatedthe OSPAAAL (Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples ofAfrica, Asia, and Latin America) andthe OLAS (Organization of Latin-American Solidarity). According toits own etatement, the OLAS has theobjectives to:

o Support liberation movemente byall available means.o Lend strong backing to liberatedcountries and cooperate with them. *o Link its action and that of otherparticipating organizations to the activities of the tricontinental organization (OSPAAAL).. Develop a constant campaignagainst the growing political aggression of the United States.In order to spring their program

into action, the two organizations begnn to flood Latin America with bul5


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INSURGENCY

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Ietins, magazines, and pamphlets aboutthe resolutions and revolutionary directives suggested by the Tricontinental Conference. Furthermore, cadreschools as well as special clandestinemessenger also disseminated this newinsurrectional course of action.Armed StmggieOne widely circulated publicationcondensee the new tone of Latin-American style revolution.*The Cuban experience has graphicaUg shown that the sociakt revolution is the result of an armed struggleagainet the armed pawer af the bewrgeois State. Ac-med, revolutwuaqistcwggle encounter specific eanditio?m in each contiuent, in each COW%try, conditions which can only befound through enee own ezperienee.

Further, thie new doctrine estab-Iiehes that:. . . a political line which canuotbe expressed accerding to an effectivemilitarg plan in a preciee arut caherentmilitarg line cannot be held to berevolutionm-g. . . . The Cuban revolution offers to her sieter countries inthe Amemcae a solution that muet bestudied in the light of their own historg and by the more or lese slewbuildup-through guemlfa warelaunched in the most propitious ruralzmwe-of a mobile, strategic forcewhich witl be the nncleus of the peoples army and of the future socinliststate.

Thus, the new revolutionary style,the Latin-American style, establishesin a clear form that the solution isto be armed struggle. It puts asideall deliberative, parliamentary proeeee, all the useless talk, in order toplace maximum emphasis on armed

IR&de Debrar , l tevol . tkm ? . th e Revel . t i .n? , hde m oa de la Eevia tu Casn & la . Am d? [email protected] ,

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INSURGENCYs@uggle and the formation of a regular, revolutionary army.

The fundamental difference betweenthe Latin-American and Vietnamesestyle lies in the fact that, while inVietnam the pyramid of the militaryorganization was built from the baseup in the order of armed groups, guerrilla, regional forces, and regulararmy, in Latin America, the armed,revolutionary forces tend to build f romthe top down. This builds the regnlarforces tiret-the center of the actionthen around the outskirte of theaction, irregular forces, and, finally,the militia at the end, or after thevictory as in Cuba. Also, the enemyto be faced is not foreign, but local,one who ie traditionally reepected bythe people.Poli t ic al AutonomyOn the other hand, the new etyleemphatically imposes strategic andpolitical autonomy on the guerrilla.The guerrilla is the master of his ownpolitics. In thie way, it is the guerrilla, and not the traditional, politicalparties, no matter how leftist theymay be, who dictates the politics of therevolution. The guerrilla are the oneswho Ax the objectives for the armedbranch of the party.

The experiences of Cuba and, morerecently, Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, and other countries, seem toconfirm that gnerrilla combatant develop eooner and more thoroughly Politically by guerrilla participationthan by spending the came amonntof time in a conventional school ofpartkan cadree, According to CheGuevara, a politically well-roundedman who allows himself to be torn topieces in a dungeon without eayinga word is not worth se much for therevolution as one who fmowe how to

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mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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take a machinegun nest By assault.The guerrilla is the core of the political formation of the combatants andis the party itself in gestation.The marked military emphasis notedin the new revolutionary doctrine indicates that there should be a trainedmilitary force from the beginning.The guerrillas primary mission is to

C..rteau of ..thorR6gis Dabmyfight and to evolve into a peoplesarmy or strategic mobile force capable of defeating the governments military structure. However, that initialprofessional force should not be particularly large in the heginning. Onthe contrary, it must follow step bystep in three phases: inception, development, and offensive.

The inception phase ia further subdivided into three periods: Absolute nomadism, a period of

extreme secrecy where the initial center of action knows no rest and the

guerrilla thoroughly reconnoiter thearea of operations. Strengthening or adaptation,during which the combatants become

accustomed to the terrain andweather. Overt operations, during which aminimum area of operations is estab.lished, and where their actions becomeevident to both the local populationand the government forces to form theswell of the next war.In the first two periods of this stage,the guerrillas worst enemy ia him.self. He mtist overcome all hia owuinertia and change the habits of hisbourgeois life. It is a hard strugglewith himself and againet Qhe conditions of land and climate. There memany who abandon the struggle, de

sert, or go on to fill other, less dangerous roles in the insurrection. Theseare often a part of the nrban guerrillaforce whose physical reqniremente areconsiderably less.In the second or development stage,since the existence of the guerrillaforce has already become pnblic

knowledge, the enemy offensive mnstbe confronted with ita own characteristics such ae raids, sieges, airborneassaults, and aerial bombardments. Atthe same time, this ie the indicatedstage fof assuming the tactical initiative, for detaching elements from theprincipal forces so as to create otherzones of guerrilla operations and toform urban guerrillas.

The third stage, the offensive, ischaracterized hy the strategic employment of the militias and the regionalguerrillas against the enemy in combination with the action of the urban guerrillas in unleashing generalstrikes and other harassments. Theessential objective of this stage is to

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destr6y the national military forceswhi$h are the armed support of thegovernment.The guerrilla force also has defenive neede both for itself as well asbr the people who support it. Manywe often wondered how the guer,illae succeed in protecting the zonevhicb serves them ae a base of operations for regrouping forces, hidng, resupply, a d for obtaining re?kteements. According to new direc

tivesfrom Havana, these bases shouldlot be protected in the claesical, tacieal manner by establishing defenfiveperimeter lines firmly tied to the:enter. On the contrary, protectionhould be in a fluid, operative formby acting offensively upon an uncle.iined periphery and far from thecenter.BaseProtect ionA guerrilla base may be protectedby maintaining constant aggreeeiveactivity in a wide area, keeping theeoemy from advancing toward thatcenter, and creating for hlm a trulydefensive complex. Such a guerrillabase may include a field hospital,smallindustries, repair shops, schoolsfor recruit training, the commandwst, and the rebel radio. But, in theinitial stage, the snpport base of theKoerrilla is the knapsack of each combatant and hia hbility to survive.

The establishment of a stable guerrillabaae may take a long time. The@errilla base will grow graduallYss it undergoes changee and its eecurity improvee based on diWIY8meesses. The baee eventually be-Comee free or liberated zone.

The new Latin-Amerieen etyleWint.abjs that the foundation of aO&rilla baae cannot constitute tbeIoain,military objective and primaryhrmber 1967

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INSURGENCYpollcy of the guerrilla. The prime objective of every guerrilla is the destruction of enemy forces and obtaining arme and equipment. Constant, external, offensive action wilf lead to thebase desired for logistic support.How will the course of action forthe new Latin-American style develop ? It will begin with the selection of a group of trained guerrillasto act in a specified zone of operationsin a sparaely populated area. At first,it ia expected that they will he mistrusted. The peasant will follow onlythe one who haa certain powere, particularly the power to accomplish whatbe says be will. Prior to this, the onlypower which the peaeant has known iathe power of the government forces.He knows their arme, their uniforms,and their discipline. Generally, justthe display of armed force ia enoughto impress a defenseless people.Display FerceThe guerrillas must show that theyalso have force. They do this by demonstrating that government soldiersare not immune to bullete and grenades and that they can be defeatedeven with crude weapons if determinedly employed. To accomplish this,Cuban theorists realized that there isnothing better than combat, ambueh,and elimination of land owners or unpopular leaders. Such actiona breakdown the respect for traditional au- *thority and promote respect for tbeguerrillas power.Tbe backing of the peaeant ie almostassured once the guerrilla have succeeded in overcoming hla respect andfear of governmental forces. Incorporation into the guerrilla force andparticipation aa a combatant and esa new ~ember in tbe Communist society will come later. The primary con

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tern is to make him a good fighter.The guerrilla never admits thathe has Communist objectives. Theword Communist has lost prestigein many countries of the continentand ie heard with scorn or fear. Hespeaks only of anti-imperialist liberation, agrarian reform, and socialrevolution.Additional FrontsWhen the etrength of the first nu-cleue of guerrilla forces becomee excessive for local security and the logistic capacity of the zone, the guerrillaforce should break up into column-cells which, in turn, can he transformed into yet another guerrilIafront. In Cuba, four guerrilla frontswere formed this way, but none developed precipitously. Instead, theyformed only after the main focus waewell established.Impatience to create numerousguerriIla fronts without consolidationbrought disaster to the Communistguerrillas who sprouted in Peru twoyears ago. In spite of the great tactical freedom whic~ they enjoy, thismultiplicity of fronts must respect atall times an undisputed central command which will prescribe the generalstrategy of the guerrilla movement.No experienced fighters are rejectedas long as they agree to, conform tothe guerrilla discipline and obey theguerrilla commands. What is rejectedis any alliance or a common politicalfront. The responsibility for the general conduct of the etruggle is notshared with anyone.Once the various fronts have beenformed and hasee of guerrilla operations have been created, the snpremerevolutionary command coordinatesthe convergent action of all forceeupon the governmental power which is

generally based in the capital of thecountry. It turns to the offensive andthe so-called war of movement. Simultaneous] y, it unleashes the urbanguerrillas and promotee generalstrikes to imrnohilizo and divide thegovernment forces which are compelled to protect railway centers, factories, vital public services, and worksof art. This type of diversionary action made it impossible for more than10,000 of the 50,000-man governmentforce of Cuba to enter battle againstCastros guerrillas at one time.A ttegulsr ArmyBut according to Communist doctrine, what still counts most is tostrike the greatest possible number ofbIows at the armed forces of the government. These forces constitute thesustaining support of the governmentand only with their defeat can thefinal objective be attilned. Therefor%it is imperative that the guerrillaunite must transform into a regulzrarmy in order to match the forces ofgovernment regulare on equal terms.

Until a short time ago, it wae main.tained that one of the prime missionsof the guerrilla was dissemination ofrevolutionary doctrine among the population. To accomplish thle, agitationand propaganda patrols were cent toevery zone of guerrilla operatiom.Such action wae termed armed propaganda and wae baaed on unquestionable international experience gainedin Russia, China, and Vietnam. InCuba, that experience either was notused or proved to be inadequate anddangerous. In this confrontation ofdoctrines, the Cuban experience irn.poeed ite own theme which was thatarmed propaganda must follow armedaction, not precede it, since it is d+veloped essentially along the internal

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forced flight the fellow propagandists,and reveak a possible or future zoneof guerrilla action.The instructions recommend that

the guerrilla, in the initial stages,avoidall contact with the civilian POPdation and especially refrain fromgoing to the villages and openly visithg collaborators. There should be ageneral mistrust in regard to the ci-Vilianpopulation. The three characteristics of the work in that periodme the so-called three golden ru]eewhich are constant vigilance, conkber 1967

acquired certain military prestige, itmust keep in contact with the enemymilitary leaders, not to foment a coup*ddtat, but to accelerate the breakdownof the regime and to heighten the unrest within the army. In the beginning, and generally after some resounding success, they should commence to ekhort governmental officiale,inviting them to meet and talkj butwithout imposing humiliating condLtions.Once the prestige of the guerrillamovement hae been recognized, a ra

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dio transmitter is needed so that thehigh command can establish directcontact with the people living outeidethe zones of operations. The guerrillasare cautioned to broadcast accuratenews; they must not remain silentconcerning defeats or exaggerate victories. The radio transmitter offers anew quality to the guerrilla movement.The exact mention of enemy units defeated, specifying, when possible, thenames of the leaders liquidated or captured in combat, has a ruinous effectupon the regular government troops.

With regard to the psychologicalaction for guerrilla troops, the newmethod shows that the guerrillas havetheir own rules of instruction andideological development based primarily on the conviviality o,f guerrilla life.New Latin-American guerrillas, forexample, differ from Communist guerrillas in other places in that politicalcommissary are missing. The strictestmilitary discipline prevails in theguerrilla force, and command is notshared with the political commissar.There is no room, then, for deliberative assemblies, for councils of soldiersto discuss orders issued to launch anassault or initiate a retreat, or forfriction between the guerrilla and theparty.

The guerrilla does not belong toany recognized or previously existingparty. The guerrilla force is a newform which is both military and political at the same time, and its commander in chief is its political director. Therefore, the revolutionary, psychological action is always in thehands of the guerrilla commanderin chief, and there is no chance ofany possible dichotomy or military-political confrontation whatsoever.

This new Communist revolutionarydoctrine, evolved in Havana and basedon the experiences of the Cuban revolutionary process, should alert tbe PO.litical and military leadership in LatinAmerica to the new threat which overshadows the cent inent. The guerrillaswho appear in the future in thesecountries will not be mere groups ofenthusiastic, although unhurried andinexperienced, idealiete, nor will theybe makeshift combatants.When the guerrillas flourish, theywill have already passed through moztof the first or inception stage ofthe revolutionary warnomadism andadaptation. They will be professionalfighters, well armed, instructed, acclimated, and determined to defeat theregular government forces. They willbe acting under military-type ordersissued by a single competent command. This is a threat that can onlybe dealt with by the military forces.These elite professional guerrillas,trained outside the respective countries where they operate as invaders,can be overpowered only by armedforce. They must be detected and suppressed as soon as possible, beforethey pass to the developmental stageand begin their devastating raidsagainst the public peace and the constituted authorities.The period of parliamentary conquest, of legal action on the part ofthe political party, is past history. Theold experiences of China, Vietnam,Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, orthe USSR itself should not impressus. We must face in the future, iafact, some countries are already facing it, a new course of actionthenew, Latin-American style of revolutionary military action at ita highestdegree of perfection.

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,) Th e Qu i et Wa r :Revo l u t i o na r y Deve l o pmen t )Major Lewis S. Sorley III, United States Arm#

R EVOLUTIONARY development, a term heard moreand more often, remains unclear in its meaning tomany Americans, both in Vietnam and at home. Revolutionary development ie the second of three basic steps leading to the establishment of a free and independent Vietnam.It ie preceded by a military offensive and followed by theopen-end procese of nationbuilding. Revolutionary development tasks are to rid an area of enemy main forces, deetroy or neutralize the remaining local guerrillas, and provide security for the population. Other tasks include discovering and destroying the Communist infrastructure,helping the people to initiate self-defense, organizing localgovernment, and instituting economic and social self-helpprojects.The emphasis on self-help and self-defense is intentional, for a primary objective of the program is to get thepeople involved in the management of their own affairs on

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REVOLUTIONARYDEVELOPMENTa community level. This is a Vietnamese program, supported and encouraged by United Statee and other FreeWorld forces to be cure, but essentially Vietnamese in concept and exe.cution. Only if the program can bringabout the involvement of governmentand the people in a cooperative enterprise will it achieve ite revolutionaryaims. Thie muet come from wholehearted Vietnamese commitment torevolutionary development as theirown program.Philosophical MovementMilitary success can be superim-posed on the situation, but eradicationof the causes of insurgency ie equallyessential, and can come only fromwithin. Recognition of this truth andsubsequent restraint on the part ofallies anxioue to see the program moveforward are a necessity.

Revolutionary development is aptIynamed, for if successful, it will bringabout a restructuring of the Vietnamese society that will be truIy revolutionary. In this sense, it is a profoundly philosophical movement, although at the working level and inits impact on the people in the hamleteit ie practical, seeking to bring to

Major Lewis S. Sorley III, a 1956graduate of the US Militarg Academy,is attending the School of Naval Command and Staff of the Naval War C!of-lege at Newport, Rhode Island. Fol-lowing service in armored cavalry regiments (n Europe and the UnitedStates, he attended the Urtivereity ofPennsylvania at Philadelphia wherehe veceived an M.A. degree. He wuean Assistant Prof eesor of Englieh atWest Point, and has served withthe G9 Revolutionary DevelopmentBrawh, 1st Field Force, and with thelet Tank BattaJiow, 69th Armor, inVietnam.

them the essential of physical security, health, and education. But therevolutionary aspects of the plan tobring this about affect both the peopleand their government.

Incipient revolution is a fact of lifein Vietnam. Enough people have be.come aware of the poasibllitiles for abetter life to foredoom the paesive acceptance of an aRotted fate whichprevaiIed for centuries under the oldmandarin system of government. Nomatter who governs in the Republicof Vietnam, thk3 revolutionary potential will have to be reckoned with,Suppreeeion of newly awakened aspirations is not a viable alternative,Political AwarenessThis is not to say that the averagepeaaant possesses a political awarenese which will lead him to active rebellion if he feels exploited; the average peasant probably desires, aboveall, that he be left alone. However,enough opinion Ieadere poseese suchan awareness to foment revolution ifthe government in power fails to meatthe needs of the people or, worse, exploits its position of trust.The international political situationbeing what it ie, the peasants chancesof being left alone are nonexistent.The government of Vietnam, facedwith these realities, has had to makea demanding and courageous choiceinvolving the reformation, not just ofthe government in being and thosewho comprise it, but of the entire philosophy of government of the Vietnamese people.

There exists in the Republic of Vietnam no concept of a dialogue between the government and the people.By encouraging pa~lcipation by thepeople in the management of theirown affairs through the employment

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If revolutionary development cadrecams-specially trained- tack forceeor pacification-the governmentlopes to break down this lack of comrmnication and promote an interchange of ideas. Ideally, the cadre;sams form a link between the popustion and the government.

At the national level, the constituentmembly provides a possible vehicle

REVOLUTIONARYDEVELOPMENTVietnam. The existence of large, racial minorities, often further fragmented into tribal groups, and thefractionalization of life centered aboutthe hamlet or, at best, the village areformidable barriere to a national consciousness. This tendency has been reinforced by tbe actions of governments which have given tbe peoplelittle cause to welcome their influence.

for achieving a similar result. Thus,the critical middle echelons of regional, provincial, and dietrict government from both sides will feel theinfluence of an awakening citizen participation in government. The rewoneivenees of officials at those leveleto the people will play a key role inthe succeee of the Revolutionary Development Program.The attitude of the people, tw, isbeing eubjeeted to revolutionaryChange.NOgeneral concept of nationhood hae existed throughout SouthIbrmber1957

Folklore hae it, with considerablejustification, that the five evils arefire, flood, famine, robbers, and thecentral government. To overcome these,inheritances from the past, to builda viable nation, and to establieh agovernment responsive to the needsof tbe people and capable of inspiringand deserving their truet and willingeupport-these are the goals of theRevolutionary Development Program,goals made more difficult by the neceseity of combating an entrenched andpervasive military invasion.

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REVOLUTIONARYDEVELOPMENTUS support for this program re

flects the realization that it offers atonce the best hope of achieving whatwe want for the Vietnamese peopleand nation and what we want for our

.. .Maior General Nguyen Duc Thang wasMinister of Revolutionary Developmentuntil his August 1967 appointment toeliminate corruption and inefficiency inthe armed forcesselveea worthwhile life free of outside domination for them, and for us,an end to our involvement which validates rather than negates the sacrifices already made.

Properly mudcing, revolutionarydevelopment, is not a program at all,but rather the coordinating of many

different programs which bear on theaccomplishment of the common objective. Heading this effort is a CentralRevolutionary Development Councilwhich numbers among ite membersthe Chief of State, President NguyenVan Thien, Vice President NguyenCao KY, and Major General NguyenDuc Thang who was, until August,Minister of Revolutionary Development.

A tireless traveler, General Thangpersonally visited every province, addressing the revolutionary development cadremen and members of the.revolutionary development councils,counseling, r+dmonisbing, and settingthe example. General Thang was underno illusions about the past:

The old life meame etarvation, mi8-ery, disease, amd illiteracy. It shouldbe eliminated amd the new life shomldbe built with security, freedom, d+mocrexy, justice and hawness.Five VirtuesTo members of the cadre teamsworking in the hamlets, he continually stresged the five virtues: generosity, gratefulness, politeness, spiritand faith, at the same time reminding them of their duty to eliminatetyrannical officials.

General Thang was also namedAssistant to the Chief of the JointGeneral Staff for Territorial Affairsand Pacification. In this post, he setthe policy for military operations insupport of revolutionary development,and exercised operational control overRegional and Popular Forces, the provincial and district defense troops.This appointment had important implications in terms of effective in@gration of the military and civil prwgrams which support revolutiona~development.

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A second key post in the snccess ofthe. Revolutionary Development Program is that of Commandant of theNational Training Center for members of the cadre groups. The post isfilled by Major Tuong Van Nguyen Be,a combat veteran who brings to thetraining miesion great dedication andstrength of purpose. His experienceincludes a widely recognized snccessin achieving pacification of an important area in Binh Dinh Province nowconsidered something of a model program. Overcrowded and austere, thetraining center is itself an introduction to the sacrifice and perseverancewhich Major Be attempts to instill ineach cadreman.Public Service

The concept of public service hasbeen little known in Vietnam. Cadremembers are expected to perform avaluable service in demonstrating thatconcept and the corollary of publictrust. Major Bes influence is widelyapparent. Revisions of the trainingprogram and the internal organizationof the cadre group and faculty havebeen implemented, and a series of seminars has been instituted to keep province and district chiefs and other governmental functionaries abreast of theprogram.

To the training center located atVung Tau, the beautiful seaside village formerly known as Cap SaintJacques, come candidates for the cadreteams recruited from the various provinces, approximately 5,000 t o a class.Each receives 12 weeks of trainingabout equally divided among specialist, parami l i t a ry , and leadersddp subjects. It is significant that all cadremembers are volunteers, some of themM young as 17. Although they aregranted exemption from the draft,

REVOLUTIONilRYDEVELOPMENthis ~xtends only through the periodof cadre service. Following training,they return to their home provincesto be organized into 59-man groups,with leaders chosen by the provincechief based on recommendations madeby the training center.

It is often stated that the war canbe lost in Saigon, but it must be wonin the hamlets, and it is to the hamlets that the cadre goes. Clad in theblack pajamas which they wear toidentify themselves with tbe peasantry, cadre members undertake thetack of hamlet organization. The philosophy of cadre employment entailsplacing the cadre group in a relativelysafe hamlet, with sufficient militarysuPport to enable it to work freely, forthe period of time necessary to achieveits objectives. Emphasis is placed oresults obtained, rather than meetingan arbitrary timetable.Basic ElenssntsThe basic elements of the cadreteam are the peoples main force andevelopment interteams. The mainforce cadre seeks out and attempts tneutralize or destroy the Communiztinfrastructure, then organize antrain hamlet self-defense forcee. Ithe meantime, tbe development cadreconducts census grievance interviews,establishes hamlet records, issuesfamily certificates, conducts elections,and promotes modest economic, Ctural, and social development projects.

A basic element of the cadres approach to each hamlet is tbe censngrievance program. Interviewing antabulating each inhabitant, membersof this team determine who the legitimate residents of the hamlet are anwhat aspirations they have. On thiis based the planning of self-helprojects, projects which are then trul

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REVOLUTIONARYOEVELOPiENTresponsive to the needs of the people,rather than being what the people areassumed to want or need which hastoo often been the caee in the past.

The cadre also attemptc to get thepeople to establish a hamlet council,elect a council of elders, appoint subcommittees corresponding to the various development celle, and conduct ahamlet election to select the hamletchief, his depnty, and a senior administrator. Involvement of the people inthe functioning of the government isthe key:

With the hamlet organized and stabilized, and projects. for its development underway, the cadre team moveson to a contiguous hamlet. In themeantime, the team maintilns a continuing interest in the hamlets inwhich it had previously worked. Thisis done by frequent visits and by leaving representatives of the cadre in thehamlets.Bridge of UnderstandingUltimately, a given cadre mightwork in, perhaps, half a dozen hamletein the area, might remain there permanently, become a part of the community, and provide the nucleus fora civil service. If sncceseful, the cadrewill have formed a bridge of understanding between the government andthe people, and have involved the people in purposeful action which willlead to their exercising greater control over a life with markedly improved prospects for dignity and happiness.

Realistically, it must be recognizedthat the cadre does not in generalpoesess exceptional qualifications forthe tasks which face them. The cadreprogram must compete with the armedforces and the mnkitude of other governmental organizatione for tbe lim

ited resources of the manpower pool.Many of those recruited are quiteyoung, and most lack administrativeand leadership experience. Yet tbecadre team does posseee a greet advantage in training and direction overthe people in tbe hamlets. At the relatively unsophisticated level at whichthey operate, thie is often enough tnproduce very meaningful results. Inaddition, many cadre members poseessreal determination to get the job done,Cadre Meets EnemyThe degree to which the beet of thecadre groups are committed to performing their mission is demonstratedby a group deployed in the Van N]nharea of northern Khanh Hoa Province,Within a few weeks of the completionof its training, this team received intelligence pf enemy activity in thearea. Acting on the information, theteam established a defeneive nightambush position and made contactwith an estimated enemy company.

Following an intensive fire fight inwhich three cadre members werewonnded, the enemy was routed, kszving behind three North Vietnamezssoldiers killed and two weapons captured. Villagere later reported seeing10 more bodies being carried into thehills. This evidence of the cadres determination to cast ita lot with thePeoPle sent ita ateck soaring and gotits program off to an impressive start

It has been accurately observed thatthe first need and absolute necessityof revolutionary development is security. This is largely the task of military forces to provide. Far from beinga static or conservative role, this callsfor aggressive search and destroy OPerations to clear the area to be developed, followed by maturation patrol.ing, amhnshea, and raids over an ex-

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REVOLUTIONARYDEVELOPMENTwork .ti go forward without outeidensivehett

area. Concurrently, there isadvantage of bringing the army interference,intb close contact with the people inthe role of active helper, with a refIultant beneficial modification of theImny attitude toward the people.As the Revolutionary Development1Program gathers momentum, its euc(:ess will force a Viet Cong reactiont;hat should guarantee extensive fur1her testing of the armys combat ee1pabllities. Within the hamlets, it willbe the revolutionary development(:adre that works toward the goals of(development; close in, the Regionalmd Ponular Forces nrovide security:military forces operating in wid~rscope in their traditional role of offensive combat make it possible for that

The formal name for the program

If the revolutionary developmentcadre, eupported by an effective military security force and a relativelyscrupulous government, can succeedto a significant degree in rooting outthe Vlet Cong infrastructure, instilling a sense of national consciousnessin the people, and commencing economic and social improvements, thereis hope that the Republic of Vietnamas a nation eerving the interests ofits people can survive. There appearsto he recognition of the importanceof the program on both sidee of thealliance. How it proepere in the yearto come seems likely to portend theoutcome of the Vietnamese endeavor.

ie Revolutionary Development. It iaa joint effort-mifitary and civifian-Vietnamese and Ameriran. It meanemany typee of security-aecmfty for the future in the form of acheel+security for today in the form of mediral attentionsecurity for tomorrow inthe form of a market place snd a pig farm.

Revolutionary Development not only aecnres what we have won for thepeople-it enables them to pick up the barren threads of their lives andweave them into anme sort of fabric for the future. *

General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.

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Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Shoemaker, United States Army

A NEW era in US military capabilities is unfolding. Two separate but related events mark its arrival. The first is the success of the Armys airmobile division, and the second js the marked increase in military airlift heralded by the present C-130 and C-141, and tbe soon to arrive C-5A. An imaginative marriage of theee two mobility developments can lead to the creation ofmore effective Army forces for typical worldwide stability taske. At the sametime, this could permit the streamlining of the logistic system to eliminate theneed for much of the vast support inf raetructure required for conventional surface operation. .We probably should be proud of tbe awesome base development and construction program in Vietnam. This tremendous and costly outlay of US re 120 Military Revlt?


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sources for the building of Ports, airfields. cantonments, and storage areasin ariother nation halfway around tbeworld is a dramatic example of USpower and determination.It seems clear that we should accelerate a search for new strategic concepts for the overseas projection ofUS power which will eliminate or reduce greatly the need for huge andcostly support facilities such as wefind necessary in Vietnam. The reasons go far beyond the problem ofUS costs alone, although these certabdy are formidable.Magnify Instaldlity

In terms of destabilizing pressureaon the fragile economy typical of developing countries, major clhersionof indigenous skilled and semiskilledmanpower, and the nourishment ofsocial decay caused by inevitable large-scale pilferage and black-market activities, massive US construction andbase activities magnify the instabilityof the host countrythe very problem our presence is designed to helpsolve. In itself, the construction ofgreat, sprawling base complexes creates a credibility problem. It certainlymust be difficult for poor people, orpoor nations, to believe US pronouncements of her willingness to withdrawand vacate such bases.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Shoemaker b with the O@e of the As-Atant Chief of Staff for Force Devef-Wment, Washington, D. C. A gradzuzteof the US ArmII Command and General Staff College awd the US ArmIIWar College, he has served in Koreawith the .23d Infantrg; the MilitaWAssistance Advisosy Grvap fn Iran;the Ilth Air Assault Division, FortBenning, Georgia; and wtth the l.vtCavalry Divieion (Airmobile) in Vietnam.nomdler 1967

STRACOne can argue that our bases inVietnam are unnecessarily elaborate,but aueterity alone will not aolve theentire problem. What is required is

a comprehensive overhaul of our wholeconcept of deploying, fighting, andsustaining expeditionary forces inthe developing world.Test New ConceptTo test the feasibility of a new concept, let us assume that we will deploy acorpsof two divieions,entirelyair supported, at adiatance of efveralhundred miles from sea access.

There is no intent hereto deprecatesealift. The advantages of sealift overairlift for the sustained overseasmovement of large tonnages are certain to remain, although the cost andcapability gap may narrow somewhatwith time. We need strategic choicesother than waiting until ports can beeecured, a military logistics infrastructure created, and surface linesof communication opened up for thecommitment of ground forces.

It is recognized also that a lightcorps force of two divisions may notbeadequate for the job. Sixdiviaions,or more, maybe needed, demanding amaasive logietic surface effort both bysea and land. Even in this instance,the ability of an all-air-supportedforce which can be deployed rapidlyand is ideally suited for a coveringforce or mobile defense operationswould be of the greatest strategicvalue.

There are three principal geographical elements included in the concept:the continental United States (CONUS) base, theoverseas strategic base,and the area of employment, plus, ofcourse, the air routes interconnectingtheee land areas. Also highly desirable i? a sea link between CONUS and21


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STRACthe strategic base. Figure 1 shows aschematic layout of the system.The CONUS base is the reserve orhome base location of the strategicairlift forces, the army strategic corpsand logistical command elements, except for small caretaker and depotdetachments to manage prestockedsupplies at permanent strategic bases.Most all class II supplies are stocked

he within 1,700 miles of the arsa ofemployment-the radius of the C-180Ewith an efficient payload. Okinawa andthe Philippines are excellent examplesof highly developed strategic base facilities.

The experience of the 1st CavalryDivision (Airmobile) in Vietnam hasshown clearly the unique tactical capabilities of an integrated airmobile

here, as are the major reserves for allother classes of supply.The strategic base is an overseaslocation at which the United Stateshas long-term base rights. Deeirably,it ehould consist of a complex including two or more airfields capable ofhandling all types of aircraft, a sea

port, and supply storage and handlingfacilities. Reeerve stocks of classes I,III, III (A), IV, and V supplies wouldbe maintained. The amount of eachwould depend upon the baee location,the significance of the strategic threatin the area, and the. scale of US contingency p]ans for the area. It should

force. Indeed, airmobile operations appear to be the best, if not the onlyway, efficiently to seek out and destroy an elusive enemy in difficult terrain. However, the airmobi]e divisionas presently equipped and based inVietnam does not have the lightnessand agility required in an all-airsupported expeditionary force.Because of the unique etrategic concept in force in the relatively smallares of South Vietnam, elaboratesemipermanent base camps are feasible from a tactical viewpoint. But thisspecial case should not serve as amodel for the future nor deter our

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search to isolate the combat essentials from the administrative nice tohaves. The division contains far toomany wheeled vehicles. Most of theseare required only when the divisionbase operates. and is administered inm environment of ground lines ofcommunication. From the brigade baseforward, howetier, the Ist Cavalry Di

ent airmobile division, even though itis recognized that experience in Vietnam may have shown the need forsome change.Some organizational changes wouldbe made:. No general purpose vehicleswould be provided solely as radiomounts and power sources. Instead,

STS&GIC

Figurevisions operations in Vietnam willserve as an ideal model for ourm+mmed light airmobile division(LAM).

The tactical concept forment includes a divisionwhichone brigade wouldtwo brigades operating

its employ-base fromoperate, andseparatelyfrom bases Up to 75 miles from thedivision base. In turn, infantry battdione might operate up to 30 miles

fromthe brigade bases. For simplicityofcomputations, the LAM would contsin the same riffe strength and theCameircraft and artillery ae the presWe9ier 1987

1.battalion and higher level headquarters would use a-multiple radio package and a small generator mounted onthe bed of a mechanical mule.

No ground fighting vehicleswould be included. This eliminates106-millimeter reeoilless rifles and thewheel-mounted cavalry troop of theair cavalry squadron which would bereplaced by a standard rifle company.

Vehicles would not be providedfor storage or as shelters for repairparts or personneL Lightweight containers or shelters with integral wheelmobilizers capable of being towed,

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STRACtrain fashion, for short distanceswould perform these functions.

Powered, two-wheel, rough terrain scooters would be used in lieu ofjeeps for local command and staff andmessenger communication.

Transportation for supply andservice support would be designed forshort hauls around forward airstrip

troop movements forward of the bri.gade base, but with little capabilityleft over for movements from tbe di.vision base forward to brigade basesor beyond. Therefore, brigade as wellas division bases must contain fixed.wing strips to accommodate air linenof communication (ALOC) aircraft.

The division normally would require

The C-142has already greatly enhanced US ability to deploy and supply ground forcestactical bases employing the warehouse train principle.

o Standard field kitchens would beeliminated except for one mess eachat brigade, division atilllery, aviationgroup, and support command levelswhich could provide an occasional hotB-ration meal to unite on a rotationalbasis.Experience of the airmobile divisionin Vietnam has shown that the division organic helicopter lift is generally adequate for combat supportand logistics movement as well as

three airstrips in simultaneous opera-tionthe division baee and two brigade bases. Base movements will usually require the construction of newstrips. The engineer construction effort, therefore, becomes a prominentconsideration. The engineer battalionof the 1st Cavalry Division has constructed a number of C-1,% and C-190class airfields in Vietnam including.three in which all equipment woemoved to the site entirely by helilift.The average working time for the construction of these strips was 51 hours.

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The probleme of strip construction a$d unloadhg as well as facilitatewillvary with each specific site, but, movement by tow vehicle withh thegeneralizing, based on experience in tactical bases.Vietnam and Exercise AiT Assault II Petroleum, oils, and lubricantsconducted in the fall of 1964, the en- would be delivered in two waye, onegineerconstruction effort will increase of whkh would be by tanker aircraftfrom a factor of one for a C-7A which would pump directly into flex(CV-2) strip, t~ five for a C-L90 ible, pillow tanks. Also, there wouldstrip, to 10 or 15 for a C-5A field. The frequently be a requirement for de

STOCKA6E LEVELSclass Division Base Brigade BaseI 3 days 1 day

II (repair parts) 15 days 15 days11,1 3 daya 1 day111(A) 2 daye 1 day

v 3 daya 1 dayPigure 2.

C-141with its higher ground pres- livery of 500-gallcm fuel bags directlysures requires a better load-bearing to brigade bases.surface than the C-5A. The vulnerability of the bases to ,Auother major factor which must enemy ground or air action must bebeconsidered at the tactical base air- taken into account. Greater risks arfields is the unloading and cargo- gue for the increased insurance ofbondlingcapability. Thie includee euch ermdler sized, multiple deliveries.wbfactors as parking space, material- Stockage levels at forward tacticalbmdling equipment available, size of bases muet be held to the irreducibleomtahers and pallets, comparability minimum. One of the chief hurdleeofcargo-handling systeme and equip- here is psychological. All logieticians,,ment,and, not least, matching of the and commanders, too, are happiersizeof cargo loatfe with needs and when a large reserve or safety factorQpability of the baee being served. ie on hand-except, of course, whenPackages Of about 1,500 pounds aP- they want to move tbe base. Without *Pearto be best. These would be sling strict control, the hoarding or letsWtable by the UH-1, several could double it and be safe instinct can dealbe lifted in clusters by the CH-.47, a deadly blow to mobility. The divisionmd the mechanical mule could move stockage should be no more thanhem for short distances on the shown in Figure 2.wound.Perhaps lightweight, reueable A strategic base 1,500 miles distantW&g platforms with small radius is less than five hours away by C-lSO,dO@nurtwheels could be developed. or no more in time than, a vehicularfbesecould speed up aircraft loading delivery ~rom Qui Nhon to Pleiku,M@er 1967 25


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STRACSouth Vietnam. Assurance of delivery,when and where needed, must be guaranteed. Precise United States AirForce (USAF) navigational and position-fixing systems coupled withimproved air-drop and low-level extraction techniques provide a high aesurance capability. As a further reliability hedge, light cargo aircraft(C-7A) baged witbin the area of em-

to relay logistic traffic from tbe divisions to tb~ Iogiatical command at thstrategic base.o An engineer battalion structurufor airfield construction and helico]ter transportability eimilar to the engineer battalion in the LAM, but wit]an airborne en~ineer light equipmencompany attached. A corps aviation battalion con

DAILY TONNAGES (short Tons)Division Base Brigade Base GrandCorps Base Each Two Each Four Total

Peak 250 400 800 200 800 1,850Average 200 250 600 125 500 1,200

Figure 3.ployment permit the emergency transfer of supply stocks between tacticalbases.

An army corps headquarter,stripped down to bare essentials, willprovide command and control functions for the two-division force. Suitably augmented with air force pereonnel, it could also serve as a joint taskforce (JTF) headquarters if a JTFwere deemed desirable for the mission.In any event, a USAF element to perform direct air support center functions, and, most important, to plan,coordinate, and direct the USAF intratheater airlift supporting the corpe,would be colocated with the corpeheadquarters.

Austerity would prevail in the corpsheadquarters and corps troop list withall elemente being capable of movement by (7-1.90. The short corpe trooplist would consist of:e A signal upit to provide command and adminietrative support links

to the divisions and corps troops, and

taining a general support compan~with twin-engine, utility, fixed-win!aircraft and utility helicopters folcommand, liaison, and messenger sewice; two c7H-47 (Chinook) companieiand a CH-54 (Flying Crane) compm~to provide lift for corps troops antgeneral support for the divisions.e A HAWK battalio; for air d~fense.

e A medical unit to provide mmgical and evacuation support.o Small detachments, as requiredfor specialized functions such as AI10]

Security Agency, military intelligenc~weather, and civil affairs.o An airmobile infantry battaUoOfor security of the corps commandpost (CP) and airstrip. The corps C~could be colocated at a division bse!or it might be as much aa 100 mile!from the division basea and possiblyreceive some security from friend9indigenous units, but the provision dits own eecurity battalion eeeme toMprudent in any event.

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STRAC One vitally important USAF ~hat is, in cases of doubt, the highestunit would be attached to, or in sup- estimate was used eince we are notportof,the corps force, a light trane- concerned here with stockage, but withport (C-7A) squadron. Its ability to meaeuring the capability of the ALOCoperate from small, minimum con- to satisfy peak requirements.struction strips provides the flexibility Considering the factors discussedrequired in the eelection of brigade earlierbase security, strip construcbases. A brigade could be supplied tion requirements, cargo-handlingsolelvbv this. intra-area lift if euit- eauirrment. and size of daily reauireableC-L90 strip sites were not avail- m~rr~s-it seeme clear tha~ br~gad

DAILY SORTIES RE(UIIRED (Peak Loads)Brigade Bases Dhision Bsses Corpe BaseFour Two One Totsl

Option 1C-HO (12.5 ton) 64 64C-5A (50 ton) 16 21(6,300-mile range)

Option 2 IC-190 (12.5 ton) 64 64C-5A (100 ton) 8 3 11(3,500-mile range)

Option 3C-190 (12.5 ton) 64 64 20 148

Figure 4.Me, or if the tactical situation did bases would be best served by thetot allow time for conatructilon to C-190. Aa pointed out previously,?-190criteria. however, there may be times whenAssuming a separate corps base, this may not be possible and C-7Atherewould then be seven airstrips in aircraft will have to make retail deusein the normal employment of the liveries to the brigade from the divi- ,force.mat are the da i ly tormagee sion base. Figure 4 Iiste sortie require-which wOuld be r equi red to be inpu t ments with all deliveries to the briat each?Clase III(A) and claes V are, gade by C-1$0 and alternative optionsOfcourse, the major weight problems. of C-5A or C-130 delivery to the diviones111(A) will also vary, but within sion and corps basee.rnuebnarrower Iimite. But the system It mnst be understood that Figuremusttake care of peak demands. The 4 shows only the requirement for~JY tonnagea shown ifi Figure 3 daily aircraft arrivals at the tacticalW derived from gross calculations bases, and not total aircraft requiredwhichare felt to be on the high eide. in the ALOC stream. If the strategicb 1S67 27


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STRACbase were approximately 1,500 milesfrom the area of employment, individual resupply aircraft operatingtherefrom would probably performonly one round trip per day (flighttirve of 10 hours for the C-I.?O andseven hours for the C-5A ).If we assume the area of employment is 9,000 miles from CONUS, thiswould require a four-day round trip

army logistical command comDonentmanned to perform those combat service support functions normally performed by support increments, lessservices associated with a ground lineof communication. The ALOC auto.matically provides a back haul capa.bility which will be used to full ad.vantage for medical evacuation andevacu~tion of equipment requirin,

DEPLOYMENT OATACorps Force Closes(Days) if C-5A Anew.eble Cargo Load Is:

100 Short 5oTfi#Tww1. 100 C-5As, 100 (!-141s 146 9 162.50 C-5As, 100 C-141s I 7 10 17 303.50 C-5As, 50100 C-f 908 C-141S, I 8 12 19 36

Figure 5.for the C-5A (10 flight hours Der day)to deliver goods dir&tly from-CONUSand to return. Thus, direct deliveryfrom CONUS would require a fleetof operable C-5A aircraft four timesthe size of the daily sortie arrival requirement. The slower C-I.90 wouldrequire a factor of six for the samedistance. Application of these factorsto the daily sortie requirements willquickly highlight the economic andoperational value of forward strategicbases which can be resupplied withheavy tonnage items by sealift.

Approximately half of the tonnagerequirements for the corps force isfor aircraft fuel. Therefore, a tankerconfiguration of the C-5A, as well asfor the C-lSO, is required.

The str~~gic base would contain an

fourth or fifth echelon repair. Even agreat deal of personnel and pay administration could be performed inthe strategic base rather than in thearea of employment.A great proportion of repair parteand class II replacement items wouldbe shipped direct from CONUS. TheRed Ball Express system which isused for the provision of critical parteto Vietnam illustrates one way thiscould be handled. The initial deployment of the force might be acconvplished under these assumptions:. Weight of deployed force iu:E a c h d i vi s io n 9 . 6 0 0 s h o r t t o n s 1 9 , 0 0 0cCmLlstmom 2 , 6 0 0 s h o rt t o m 2 , 6 0 0

m.ti] 21,600 short rmo Deployment distance of 9,000miies.


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o Resupply is moved from CONUSduring the deployment phase, computed at the average rate of consumption for forcee in the area of employment, and included in fleet lift requirements. Two terminal aiffields are avail

able which will accommodate bothC-5A and C-1.41 aircraft. Turnaround time is four days

each for C-5A and C-I4I and six daysfor C-lSO. Aircraft loading: C-141,25 shorttons; C-IW, 12.5 short tons:

DeploymentDateFigure 5 shows force C1OSU%imesunder several air fleet mix and sizeoptions as well as for C-5A loads ofboth 50 and 100 short tons.In the cahxrlationa for Figure 5,

aircraft were dispatched at regularintervals spread evenly throughout theround trip time period. The daily number of aircraft arriving in the objective area would be: Option one, 50;Option two, 38; Option three, 42. Thearrival density under Option one isapproximately one aircraft per hourat each terminal field, and somewhatless for the other options.

Up to this point, the purpose haebeen to outline an all-air concept fora corps force and demonstrate itefeasibility by means of groes calculations, but certain key questione remain.What about those areas of the world

in whkh the United States doee notbeve bases within 1,700 miles of poseible areas of employment? The answer, of course, is to obtain them. Insome areas this may not be possible,or the political cost may be consideredtoo high for the strategic gain.An alternative would be crash negotiations for base rights with]n theNmmher1967

STRAChost country or in an adjacent friendlycountry. Such an alternative might beworkable if aircraft fuel could be procured locally or if the base could besupplied with fuel by sea. We are concerned not only with fuel for the armyforce, which will only be a small fraction of the total required, but withrefueling the strategic aircraft andthe C-1$0S of the intratheater lift. Itis clear that the provision of fqel forthe kntire system is the overridinglogistic problem.What if the environment were suchthat the risk is considered too greatfor C-5A aircraft to operate at division bases ? The answer is establishment of a strategic base complex closeenough to the area of employment sothat C-MO aircraft can make morethan one daily round trip to the tactical basee.Several Workable ConceptsThie atilcle does not addrees theproblem of the deployment and employment of tactical air forces becauseair defense, interdiction, and closeeupport are eseential to support theconcept. Close air support must berelied upon for the fire eupport normally supplied by corps atilllery.There are eeveral workable conceptsfor the employment of the necesearytactical air forces. These might involve the uee of existing host countryor adjacent country bases, perhaps in,conjunction with routine infllght refueling. In any event, it ie probablethat a substantial amount of strategicair2ift would be required to eupportthese forces.

International commitments hind theUnited States to come to the aid ofnatione around the globe should theirindependent exietence be threatenedby agg#eeeion. The etrategic need for

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STRACan all-air, rapid deployment, corps-sized force is preseing. The advent ofthe C-5A will; for the first time, makesuch a force feasible. Much work mustbe done, however, to make the force areality. We are beginning to understand the problems and appreciate thecapabilities associated with strategicand tactical air mobility, but the specifics of organizational structures,joint control, systems compatibility,continuous flow logistics, and operational concepts must still be developedin detail.The Armys approach to the development of tactical air mobilitythatis, creating a major test and development unit to work out the conceptthrough a series of exacting and exhaustive test exercieeshas established a successful precedent for thetask before us. The Commander inChief, US Strike Command, is thelogical commander to be given the job

of testing and developing a corps all.air, strategic force. The target datefor the test should be in 1970 and itshould last for a year or more.I vieualize that the ArnrY wouldcommit to this test necessary logisticunits and the 18th Ahborne Corpwhich hopefully by then would consistof two airmobile divisions. The firstoperational C-5A squadron should alsobe committed to the test as well aother Military Airlift Command andTactical Air. Command units whichwill be required.US strategy demands the development of a flexible, rapid deploymotforce. It hae been shown that sucl aconcept is feasible, but it will notspring forth in final form solely as aresult of studies and analyses. PIwning and preparation should start nowto develop, in the field, an operationalall-air, strategic force at the earliettpossible moment.

With the deployment of the First Csvslry Division to Vietnam andits highly successful employment in the air mobility role, one might well SSYthat Army Aviation has now truly come of age. While there had been somepioneer use of Army Aviation in support of ourselves and the Vietnameseuntil the deployment, Army aircraft had primarily been largely a supplementto conventimml roles and -a premium mesns of carrying out priority tasks.With the acceptance of the air mobility concept, the future of Army Aviationtook on a complete new light.

Lieutenant General Lawrenoe J. Li?woln

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ff~ p~: VW From The Reporter

Red Chinas Diuided ArmyRobert S. Elegant and Sidney C. Liu

JUST 18 years ago, the PeoplesLiberation Army (PLA) was completing the conquest of the worldslargest nation for the new stateidsdogy that Chairman Mao Tse.tung had compounded of Marxism-Leniniem, traditional Chinese politicalthought, and KIS own personal visions. Avowedly baeed upon thePower of the gun: Maos doctrinesHwmher1987

throughout the following decade appeared to be the first effective subati.tute for the state ideology of Confucianism that had shaped Chineselife for more than 2,000 ysare until itdied with the 19th century. The PLAhad, in effset, seized the worlds oldest civilization and wae prepared tOtransform that civilization totally.For the past eight months, the

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RED CHINAPLA has heen playing quite a different role in the midst of a spreadinganarchy that makes the chaos of theKnomintangs last days appear anorderly retreat. It is split into at leasttwo major factionsand probablyadditional emaller factions althoughno one outside the headquarters of thePLA knows the exact categories.Main AssignmentThe PLAs main immediate assign.ment is no longer either internalliberation or external defense, butthe control of civil disorder, the suppression of political riots, and themaintenance of industrial and agricultural production by the threat ofits guns. In pursuit of these duties,the PLA exercises physical control ofmost vital installations from warehouses to banks, from railroad depots to radio stations,. and fromschools to shipyards. If the army didnot occupy them, they would at oncebe fought over by half a dozen conflictin~ factions.Adn&ions by Maoist publicity organs in July indicated the gap between the deceptively straightforwardassignment given the PLA by political

This article was digestedfrom the original, pmblbhed inTHE REPORTER,10 August 1967.Copyrighted @ 1967 by The Reporter Magazine Company.Mr. Elegant h Hong Kongbureau chief for the Loe AngelesTimes and has made a special8tUdv of the Red ArrnY in morethan a decade of Far Easternreporting.Mr. Liu is a correspondent forNewsweek and spent bet year atHarvard University, Cambridge,Massachueette, working on amilita~ hieto~ of Chinese comtnunislh.

leaders who themselves exercise onlytitular authority and its ability-erwillingnessto carry out that assign.ment. Certain units have eupportedthe Maoiet mass organizations intheir campaign to take power fromthe regular structure of the Commn.nist Party and the Peoples Govern.ment. Those units are, however, aminority.Another minority, still quite smallas far ae one can tell, has chosen tesupport anti-Maoist officials in theirparticular provinces and localities.Meanwhile, the major part of thePLA has tried its best amid greatdifficulties to keep the normal pulseof Communist China beating. Likeany peacekeeping force, it has favoredthe side that gives it the least troublethat ie, the moderates.Army IntervenesIn Sian, the capital of Shansi Province, in mid-February, opposing fections of workere and students foughtfor possession of t~e loudspeaker installations dominating the citys mainequare. Each wanted the microphonesfor a maes meeting t o extol its position. Since both factions claimed tobe true revolntionary rebels-loyalMao enpportersthe army merelystood by. But when the mob claehwswelled into a struggle to occupy theoffices of the provincial newspaper,the army did step in to prevent eitherside from winning. Neither factioncould claim a victory, but the moremilitant faction was frustrated by thearnrye intervention.The same pattern had already die-played iteelf in Shanghai when extremists laid siege to the LiberationDai&, the organ of the MunicipalCommittee of the Communist Parb.As attackers hammered on the doorswith makeahift battering rame, ed.

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cessful, so far, in suppressing theinternal strife that dominates the lifeof Communist China today. But evenso, the army ia emerging as the onlyrelatively s~ble institution in thenation.

Increasingly, the military serviceshave beeome the chief instrument ofboth conciliation and indoctrination.Patient officers not only attend massPlitica] meetings, bit sit down withsmall groups of students, workers,and famers to instruct them in theHwulllmr9d7

ment in the turmoil and hk own appraisal of its gravity when he toldsenior commanders: ,Many men and women have committed suicide, and many others havebeen murdered. Production hue frdletz. . . but owrlosses are not as great astheg were during the war against theJafmneee or the civil waragai?wt theKuomintang!In the same speech Lh instructedall units:

Youmust take no actiort ~ithout33


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RED CHINAQcleaving it with higher authoritg. ButIIOU must pay no attention to theprovincial committees of the party.

They are all rotten!The PLA is not s lengthened inits endeavors to keep t i e peace by thefact that a major source of the controversy which has splintered the Chinese nation is military doctrine andthe future of the army. Two fundamental questions are at issue: Is thePLA, springing from the old guerrillaforces of Mao Tee-tung to become amodern technological force, or is it todepend primarily upon what Lin Piaocalls our spiritual atomic bomb, thegreat numbers of the courageous Chinese people ? Is Pekhg justified inrisking confrontation with the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union when thearmy is incapable of tnrning back anattack by either great power?Foreign PolicyAnti-Maoists argue that an adventurous foreign policy cannot be justified until the PLA has acquired possession and mastery of modern arms.Maoists contend that the Thought ofMao Z%e-tungmakes present guerrilladoctrine invincible and guaranteesthe victory of a forward foreignpolicy.The Maoists further insist thatpolitics mnst command. This meanspromoting officers and men for ideological fervor rather than professionalcompetence, and the use of troops ina variety of nonmilitary activitiesranging from farming to buildingdams.

h Jui-thing, the PLAs Chief ofStaff from 1959to 1966, espoused thefirst position. He was purged by theMaoistq~L]n Piao, Minister of Defense since 1959, is a wholeheartedpnblic advocate of the sscond position.Their divergent views-and disparate

fatesarise from the essential character of the PLA.The PLA is today a force of some.

what more than 2.3 million men, in.eluding 1.3 million in the infantry,135,000 in the navy, and 100,000 inthe air force. The ground forces, 90.percent infantry and largely post-Korean War in weapons and training,also include the substantial logisticapparatus called the Rear Area Command. The navy is most powerful insubmarines, with 30, and in a var.iegated fleet of minesweepers, torpedoboats, gunboats, and other craft num.bering about 75o.The air force was once rankedfourth in the world in size and presumably in capability until it wcsdeprived of replacement aircrafispare parts, fuel, and new technological devices ae a result of the Sin&Soviet quarrel in 1960. It is stiisizable with its 2,500 aircraft, mostof them MiG fighter bombers, but itcould not meet the first-rank airforces of the world. Despite its numbers, and even despite the rapid de.velopment of the Chinese nuclearbomb, the PLA is not a modern, firstrank force.Secrr r i ty Pol ic e and Mi l i t iaIn the task of maintaining a degmof order within Communist Chiwthe army is, in theory, assisted byPublic Security Forces numberingeeveral hundred thonsand, and thePeople>e Militia with a nnmericdstrength of about 10 million. BIItneither the security police nor themilitia is a reliable reserve in theburrent internal conflict. Both smbven more closely bonnd by local loy~lties than is the regular army, andlboth have tended to support antiMaoist local party leaders.

The burden, therefore, falls dirsctlyI


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I~ RED CHINA

poses further handicaps for the jobin hand. Although the regular armyhas been a more or less autonomousstate within a state since the establishment of the Peoples Republie in1949,it is still divided by the regionaland clique loyalties of its commandersand soldiers.A primary concern of the P8rtYcenter has been the attempt to fosternational loyalties among the messesOfChina. The taaehing of Kuo-z/ii, thenational language: the diseemina~e+ber 1967

try to uproot all regional cbaracterietics and loyalties all at once. From1959 to 1966, however, Lin Piao at-,tempted precisely that feet with thePLA.. His text was the Thought of~ao 1ss-tcmg; his practical meanswae massive reeesignment of officereand, in 1965, the abolition of formalranks to discourage profeeeionalism? He was, perhaps, moderatelysueceseful in no more than 40 percentof the major units. For the rest, it wasagain the armys deeply rooted tradL

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RED CHINAtion of autonomy that defeated him.

From the heginning of its formalexistence in the guerrilla capital ofYenan in the distant northwest in themid-1930s, army headquarters hasheen a rigidly restricted area, inaccessible even to high-ranking government officials unless they held specialpermits. The army has possessed itsown intelligence network, its ownfactories, and its own channels ofcommunication which even the partysomnipresent security apparatus couldnot often penetrate.Security and IntelligenceThe armys Political Security Burean, which is responsible for thesafety of senior leaders, has alwaysbeen the most powerfnl security andintelligence organization in China. ItsLeaders Safety Office even maintainsits own farms to grow tobacco andfoodand separate factories to process bothall to guard its chargesagainst poisoning.The PLA maintains its own newspapers, radio networks, and theatricaltroupes under its own PropagandaDepartment. Just as the military Railroad Corps is out of bounds to theMinistry of Railways, the army as awhole is beyond the control of whatremains of the Peoples Government.Under Lin Piao, however, the PLAwas encourag~d to become more directly involved in national activities.From the time he assnmed control in1959 until the Great Proletarian CulturaI Revolution threw everythinginto disorder in 1966, the army methodically thrust its tentacles into everycorner of civilian life. Retired military men took on diverse roles, including the presidencies of universities,government posts, editorships, andeven film stardom. Major ministrieswere tilled by generals, and sergeants

became leaders of production brigadeson rural peoples c0mmune9 or fOremen in civilian factories managed bycaptains and majors.In the early stages of the culturslrevolution, the militarys organ, tbeLiberation Army Dailv, became tbeintellectual and doctrinal bellwetherof the country, and Lin Piao himsslfwas hailed as:

. . . the closest comrade-in-arms ofChair-man Mao, the deputy supremecommander of the nation, Mao Tsetungs best disciple, who has creativel~ interpreted and applied theThought of Mao Tse-tung.In theory, Lin Piao held a nearlyunassailable position atop the militarystructure when he began the culturalrevolution. In his position as de factohead of the Communist Partys Military Affairs Committee, he was nominally in a position to control all unitaPersonal LoyaltyIn addition to having at bis co rn .mand the armys channels of communication and the secret dossiers whosereading and disposition can literallymean life or death in a totalitariansociety, Lin Piao had been assiduousin replacing men who were not. conpletely loyal to him with his ownadherents. For instance, the post otDirector of the General Political Department of the PLA was given to h isfaithfnl follower Hsiao Hua who was,in terms of military rank, mnch ts+junior for the job. Similarly, a formerorderly of Maos became a divisioncommander.But not all Lin Piaos shntfling ofsenior commanders could break tbofundamental matrix of the PLA. R@gional predilections and personal lopalties have demonstrably proved to b?stronger than tbe cult of Mao Tsetung or the fear of Lin Piao.


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A rough measure of the degree ofLin Piaos failure can be drawn froman analysis of the situation -in thoseareas formerly controlled by the fourgreat field armies and still occupied,for the most part, hy the same troops.

L]n Piao himself commanded the4th Field Arwy whose strength, forcomplex historical reasons, lay in Manchuria in the north and in the sliceof provinces from Hunan south toKwangtung known as the South ChinaArea. Most of the troops in thoseareas are, quite naturally, still loyalto Lin Piao. But the situation is farfrom satisfactory in Maoist eyea.Violent FightingHeilungkiang, in Manchuria, oneof the four provinces that Pekhrgclaims to rule, is shaken hy violentfighting between Maoists and anti-Maoists. In Canton, the metropolis ofthe south, there is, in reality, no functioning government, but only a .tenuous military administration that can,at best, keep disorder witbin certainbounds. Still, the former area of the4th Field Army as a whole is the bestof a bad lot for the Maoists.

In the East China Region, area ofthe former 3d Field Army commandedby Field Marshal Chen YI, now Foreign Minister, the situation is slightlyworse for the Maoists. Chen Yi hasmanaged to survive in office despitea fusillade of verbal attacks by theRed Guards. His former soldiers, aeone authority put it, take a non-positive attitude, maintaining a degreeof order without helping the Maoistsvery much. The three senior commanders of the areas troops includetwo old followers of Chen Yi and onedevoted Uln piao man who has themisfortune of commanding two armycorps made Up of Chen Yis old troops.

The 2d Field Army area has beNovember1967

RED CHINfIcome, in effect, an anti-Maoist redoubtin the Southwest China Region despite Lbs attempts t o regain influence by sbutftiug commanders. Theagricultural abundance of SzechwanProvince and the mineral resourcesof its neighboring provinces are vir

t?esue Mi l i t .$vs( r In fmmlt iOn

Chsn Yi, Fereign Minister ef CommunistChinatually denied te the Maoists as is al

most all administrative authority.In an attempt to appease the recalcitrant troops and civilians, ChangKuo-hua, who had himself defied the

Maoists as corninander of the TibetM~litary Region, was transferred toChengtu, the capital of tbe southwest,as First Political Commissar. His attempts at conciliation have had aslittle effect as the attempt at opensuppression made by the areas military commander, Huang Hsing-ting,a dedicated follower of Lkr Piao who,it is ,eaid, would willingly sacrifice an

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RED CHINAentire army of 30,000 men t o satisfyhis mentors slightest wish. Widespread violence in the entire area andits defiance of the Maoists have demonst rated his inability to bring eithertroops or civilians under control.

The 1st Field Army in the Northwest China Region was formerly commanded by Field Marshal Peng Tehhuai wbo was simultaneously deposedas Defense Minister and the nationsforemost soldier when Lin Piao tookover in 1959. His fall from grace wascaused by his uncompromising advocacy of professional military standarde, the alliance with the SovietUnion abroad, and more pragmaticpolicies at home.

Much of the area which lay underthat army is now commanded fromLanchow in Kanau Province by an obscure general who has proved unableor unwilling to bring the barrennorthwest, with its nuclear and rocketry installations, under the Maoistscontrol.As the Peking regime becomes evermore isolated and civil strife increases, the armys role in Chinesesociety becomes critical. It would bemisleading to suggest that the military is moving toward complete control of the state and civilian institutions in the manner of Burma,Indonesia, or the United Arab Republic. But if it is to salvage anythingof the past accomplishments of thePeoples Republic, it may have tochoose between at least two difficultand perilous courses of action.An acceleration of present tendencies, if sufficiently prolonged, couldwell see China splintered into regionalgroupings roughly corresponding tothe vicer@@ies, each composed offour or five provinces, which enjoyeda large measure of autonomy during

the last decades of the Ching dynasty.Still acknowledging the titular suzerainty of Peking and the preeminenceof Mao Tse-tung, each Red viceroymight go his own way in internalmatters and, to a certain extent, evenin dealing with the foreign nationson which hie fief abutted.

The PLA has already demonstratedthat it is capable of moving a gooddistance toward such a loose federation, with each general supporting hislncal political ruler-or becoming thatruler. Even so, the PLA would not beapt to lose its national character.It would become a wide-meshed netcast around the fragments of a Chinathat would otherwise drift

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Military Review November 1967

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