Military Safeguards: An Outlier Case · IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear - Agosto 2014 10 ....

IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear 11 e 15 de Agosto de 2014

Engenharia Nuclear da Escola Politécnica da UFRJ

Military Safeguards: An Outlier Case

Orpet Peixoto

ABACC - Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material

E-mail : [email protected]

1 IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear - Agosto 2014

mailto:[email protected]

Outline

• Nuclear Safeguards in Brazil

• ABACC System

• Military Safeguards

• Special Cases

• Opportunities


O Regime De Não-proliferação Nuclear

Proteção

Física

Acordos mundiais,

regionais,

bilaterais

Regimes de

controle das

exportações

Salvaguardas

da

AIEA

Fornecimento

de material,

tecnologia

e equipamentos

Nucleares e duais

Proteção contra

apropiação, roubo

e outras atividades

ilícitas

3 IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear -

Agosto 2014

History

• Import of Nuclear material and installations;

• Agreement type INFCIRC /66

• Specified Equipment

• Indigenous Programs

• International Pressure

• Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements

4 IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear -

Agosto 2014

Argentina and Brazil Facts

Argentina and Brazil are, respectively, the 8th and 5th largest countries by landmass in the world (11.3 million square kilometers);

Population of ~240 million inhabitants;

Two thirds of South America's surface, population and Gross National Product (GNP);

Nuclear program – highest development in Latin America – wide technological fuel cycle

Industrial e technological capacity;

Growing and economical situation;

Tension, conflicts and hegemony.

5 5 IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear -

Agosto 2014

Historic Facts from Argentina and Brazil

• No real tension between the states;

• The culture of non discriminatory

acceptance;

• The international pressure for peaceful use

guarantees;

• The technical community collaboration;

• How to give the international steps

to demonstrate the peaceful use of

nuclear energy.


INSTALLATIONS SAFEGUARDED BY

ABACC

• 2 Multipurpose reactors (materials tests and radioisotope)

• Isotopic Separation Laboratories

• Small Power reactor

• Land prototype naval reactor

Type of installation Argentina Brazil Total

Conversion and Fuel Fabrication 8 2 10

U-Enrichment Plants 1 3 4

Power Reactors 3 (*) 3 (*) 6

Research Reactors 6 6 12

Others (R&D, Storage, LOF) 24 11 35

Total 42 25 67

(*) Including one Power Reactor under construction in each country.


ABACC - Foundation and

Purpose

• Binational organization created in July 1991

with the purpose to manage and apply the

Common System of Accounting and Control of

Nuclear Materials (SCCC), established by the

Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic

of Argentina.

• Its headquarters are located in Rio de Janeiro,

Brazil. ABACC also has an office in Buenos

Aires, Argentina.


The Common System of

Accounting and Control of Nuclear

Materials - SCCC

• The Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials is a mechanism created in order to verify if Argentina and Brazil utilize their nuclear materials exclusively for peaceful purposes.

• The SCCC consists of the General Procedures and the Application Manuals for each installation.

– The General Procedures contain the directives of the SCCC.

– The Application Manuals are negotiated between the ABACC and the respective country for each facility.


The Bilateral Agreement In July 1991, the Bilateral Agreement on the Exclusively

Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy was signed.

• Established the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC)

• Created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).

The Basic Undertakings of the bilateral Agreement between Argentina and Brazil are:

To use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes.

To prohibit in the respective territories:

The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means of any nuclear weapon; and

The receipt, storage, installation, deployment or any other form of possession of any nuclear weapon.


ABACC-IAEA relationship

the Quadripartite Agreement

The Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the

IAEA for the Application of safeguards, called the Quadripartite Agreement, entered into force in March 1994.

The Basic Undertakings of the Quadripartite Agreement are:

– The acceptance by the State Parties of safeguards on all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities within their territories, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

– The IAEA, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the SCCC.


Organization of the Secretariat

• Commission

– 2 Argentinean members

– 2 Brazilian members

• Secretariat

– Professional Staff (12)

• 6 areas

– Clerical Staff (9)

– Inspectors (around 90)

• Cross inspection system

• Budget - Aproximate 5 Millions US$

12 12 IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear - Agosto 2014

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Ins

pe

cto

r d

ays

Inspection Effort

Argentina Brasil Total


0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Nu

mb

er

of

ins

pe

cti

on

s

Total of Inspections

Argentina Brasil Total

14

Legal Framework - NPT – INFCIRC 153 NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED lN NON-PEACEFUL

ACTIVITIES

14. The Agreement should provide that if the State intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is

required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards

under the Agreement, the following procedures will apply:

(a ) The State shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:

(i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an

undertaking the State may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the nuclear

material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and

(ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the

production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) The Agency and the State shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in sue h an activity,

the safeguards provided for in the Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent

possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards

provided for in the Agreement shall again apply as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful

nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded

nuclear material in the State and of any exports of such material; and

(c ) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency.

The Agency's agreement shall be given as promptly as possible; it shall only relate to the temporal and procedural

provisions, reporting arrangements, etc., but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military

activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.


Legal Framework - Quadripartite – INFCIRC 435 SPECIAL PROCEDURES

Article 13

If a State Party intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded under this

Agreement for nuclear propulsion or operation of any vehicle, including submarines and prototypes, or in such

other non-proscribed nuclear activity as agreed between the State Party and the Agency, the following procedures

shall apply:

(a) that State Party shall inform the Agency, through ABACC, of the activity, and shall make it clear:

(i) that the use of the nuclear material in such an activity will not be in conflict with any undertaking of the State

Party under agreements concluded with the Agency in connection with Article XI of the Statute of the

Agency or any other agreement concluded with the Agency in connection with INFCIRC/26 (and Add.1) or

INFCIRC/66 (and Rev.1 or 2), as applicable; and

(ii) that during the period of application of the special procedures the nuclear material will not be used for the

production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) the State Party and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, these special procedures shall apply only while

the nuclear material is used for nuclear propulsion or in the operation of any vehicle, including submarines and

prototypes, or in such other non-proscribed nuclear activity as agreed between the State Party and the Agency. The

arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which the special procedures

shall be applied. In any event, the other procedures provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the

nuclear material is reintroduced into a nuclear activity other than the above. The Agency shall be kept informed of

the total quantity and composition of such material in that State Party and of any export of such material; and

(c) each arrangement shall be concluded between the State Party concerned and the Agency as promptly as possible

and shall relate only to such matters as temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall

not involve any approval or classified knowledge of such activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material

therein .


Military Installations - Nuclear Process Technology

• Nuclear Conversion Facilities

• Uranium enrichment facilities

• Fuel fabrication facilities

• Uranium Isotopic Separative

Laboratories

• Storage Places

• Nuclear Process Technology

• Land Prototype Nuclear Reactor 17 IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear - Agosto 2014

Previous Cases • Enrichment Plants

– Special Agreements

– High inspection effort

• Nuclear Weapons States – VOAs

• India

• The case !!!


Boundary conditions

Control of Nuclear Material and

Installation an environment of:

• Nuclear Process technology

– Fuel

– Reactor

• Technological Issues

– Special Engineering Solutions (Nuclear and

Naval)

• Military Strategic Data

– Submarine performance (vehicle & warship)


Parameters for nuclear material control

• Significant Quatity

– Direct Use Material:

• Pu less than de 80% de Pu238 8 kg of Pu total

• HEU (U e ≥ 20%) 25 kg of U235

– Indirect Use:

• U with e < 20%) 75 kg of U235

Note: Nuclear naval reactors few thousand (2 to 10) tons of U / 100 to 500

kgs of Pu per core

LEU more Pu Production

• MATERIAL “TIMELINESS”

– Direct use (non irradiated) 1 month

– Direct Use (irradiated) 3 months

– Direct use < 1 SQ 1 year

– Indirect Use 1 year


Concepts • Safeguards implementation for a State is

governed by the rights and obligations of the

ABACC/IAEA and the relevant State contained

in the safeguards agreement;

• Safeguards are the technical means for verifying

compliance by the State with their respective

legally binding undertakings set out in the

relevant safeguards agreements

• IAEA and ABACC apply safeguards effectively

and efficiently

• Technical Guarantees of non diversion

21

IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear - Agosto 2014

Safeguarding • Bulk Material

• Fuels

– Shape and design (remain for the rest of fuel

cycle)

– Indirect measures

• Challenging instruments

• Transfers

– Loading and Unloading flasks

– Transfers

– Indirect measures

• Unattended monitoring Systems


Safeguarding • Reactors

– Fueling load (process – integrated load)

– Access to core x Access to the ship

– Containment and Surveillance?

• Type of containment (seal)

• Frequency of verification

• Long time refueling

• Spent Fuel Storage

– Containment and Surveillance

• Pool storage

• Dry storage


//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d7/Naval_Reactor_Compartment_Packages_in_Trench_94_at_Hanford,_WA.png

Safeguarding

• Design Information Verification - DIV

– Access

– Strategic Points

• LEU and HEU fuels

– Timeliness

• Plutonium – guarantee of non reprocessing

• Special Procedures

– Exemption (quantity)

–Special rules 24 IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear - Agosto 2014

Safeguarding

• Challenges

– Access without disclosing sensitive data

• Protection

• Non proliferation

– Access in a timely manner

– Special safeguards tools to perform verification

• Indirect measurement (attended and unattended)

• Sealing

– Findings achieved in very non deterministic

approach


Initiatives

• Neither IAEA nor ABACC has experience

• ABACC and IAEA are discussing the initial steps

of the land prototype approach (LABGENE)

• IAEA include the issue on the 2012- 2022

Strategic Planning


Remarks • Rights and obligations shall be followed;

• Brazilian non proliferation credentials is an

important component to allow discussion of

special procedures and to minimize international

concern;

• ABACC and IAEA shall guarantee that the

nuclear material, while in use at submarines will

not be used for production

of nuclear weapons


Opportunities at Safeguards and

Regulation Area

• National Authority – 20 to 25 persons;

• Operators – 15 to 20 persons;

• AIEA – 15 to 20 persons;

• Analytical Laboratories – 15 to 20 persons;

• ABACC – 6 to 10 persons;

• Experience is required;

• Technology development;


NDA and DA

• Inter-comparison of DA results;

– Needs to be re-start;

• Standards for NDA calibration;

• Special systems for enrichment plants;

• Swipe sampling results comparison and

analysis


Destructive Analysis

UF6 sampling methodology with alumina pellets

ABACC Cristallini Method

• IAEA Qualification - Status

• ASTM Qualification – Project


Surveillance

• Fast PTI surveillance

system;

• Incorporate:

– Authentication;

– Revision

– Containment tools

• Of the shelf items

Test bench for new or

upgraded systems


Load cell authentication

32

State of health

33

State of health

34

Mund

35

ABACC Inspectorate • Around 45 professionals per country, coming from the

nuclear area.

• Proposed by the country, and approved by the Commission.

• Temporary relationship with ABACC, only for the time of “inspection mission”.

• The Secretariat selects the inspectors, according to special needs.

• The inspectors of each state party perform inspections at the other country's facilities.


ABACC’s Inspectors

Background

Chemical Engineering/

Industrial Chemistry

28%

Electrical/ Electronic/

Network Engineering

21%

Physical/ Chemical/

Biochemical/

Mathematical/

Geological Sciences

25%

Mechanical/

Metallurgical/ Civil/

Naval Engineering

22%

Chemical/ Electrical/

Electronical/

Mechanical Technician

4%


ABACC Inspectorate Number of years in the field


Technical implementation of ABACC

- Safeguards international

inspectorate must have:

- human resources capacity;

- a set of well developed and

useful equipment;

- a trained and knowledgeable

inspectorate body; and

- a good headquarters support.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Gas_centrifuge_cascade.jpg

Building Competence

• Safeguards studies – Concepts and approaches

• Non Destructive Assay (NDA) and Destructive Assay (DA)

• Swipe sampling

• Containment and Surveillance (C&S)

• Training

• Data management

• Headquarters support

• Special knowledge – Assessment Groups – analysis and suggestion on safeguards

issues

– Special technical meetings;

– Swipe sampling


Cooperation on Developing a Spent Fuel Gross Defect Detection System at ATUCHA-I

ABACC/LLNL

Action Sheet 22


THANK YOU


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Military Safeguards: An Outlier Case · IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear - Agosto 2014 10 ....

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