MILLONHATESPEECH
byBenjaminWatts
Bachelorthesisinpracticalphilosophy
SupervisedbyCathrineFelix
UniversityofGothenburg
DepartmentofPhilosophy,LinguisticsandTheoryofScience
HT2016
1
TableofContents
1.Introduction....................................................................................................................2
2.Millandtheharm-principle............................................................................................3
3.Whatishatespeech?......................................................................................................5
4.TheargumentsofOnLiberty...........................................................................................9
5.Sayinganddoing...........................................................................................................135.1Theimportanceofauthorityandcontext............................................................................16
5.Dignity..........................................................................................................................18
6.Harmtodeliberativefreedoms.....................................................................................20
7.Objectionstotheharm-principle..................................................................................21
8.Concludingthoughts.....................................................................................................23
Bibliography.....................................................................................................................25
2
1.IntroductionThis text will explore the philosophy of hate speech. The question I am interested in is
whetherornotweoughttobanhatespeech.Morespecifically,Iaminterestedinhowthis
questionmight be answered if we adopt a position similar to the one defended by John
StuartMillinhisclassicessayOnLiberty.
Iwill firstbrieflydescribeMill’sharm-principleandprovideageneral ideaofhisstanceon
freedomofexpression.NextIwillattempttoprovideadefinitionoftheterm“hatespeech”
anddescribehowitwillbeusedinthistext,alongwithashortdiscussionofrelatedtopics.
IwillthentakeacloserlookatJohnStuartMill’sargumentsinOnLiberty,focusingmainlyon
what he took to be the strongest reasons in favor of extensive freedom of thought,
expressionandaction. Thiswill help clarify the reasoningbehind theharm-principle.As it
relatestohatespeech,Iamprimarilyinterestedinfreedomofexpression.Millproposeda
fairly radicalprinciplewhichhehopedwouldprovidepeoplewith the freedomneeded to
flourishas individuals,andthatwouldbeconducivetoprogress ingeneral.Anyrestriction
on the libertyof the individual isonly justifiable if this isdonetopreventseriousharmto
others.Thequestionthenbecomeshowhedefinesseriousharm,andwhetherornothate
speech sometimes is anexampleof suchharm.Mill sets thebarhigh, and restrictionson
expressionswouldonlybepermissibleiftheyarelikelytocauseseriousharm.
Therefore,Iwillbeadiscussingthesortsofharmthatwecanexpecttobecausedbyvarious
formsofhatespeech,aswellashowthismightrelatetotheargumentspresentedbyMill.It
is certainly not obvious that hate speech always or even often presents a threat to basic
rights.At thesametime, itwouldbestrange toclaimthat itdoesnotcausesomesortof
harm.
FollowingthisIwilllookcloseratsomeoftherecentargumentsthathavebeenputforward
infavorofbroaderregulationsofhatespeech,andhowthesecouldbeviewedinrelationto
Mill.IshaniMaitraandM.K.McGowanhavearguedthatwearesometimesmistakenwhen
weclaimthathatespeechmustbeallowedduetoourcommitmenttofreeexpression.One
central claimofMaitra/McGowan is thatwe often do thingswithwords apart from their
purelyexpressivecontent,andonthisIagreewiththem.Theyalsoclaimthattheeffectsof
hate speechareharmful enough that it ought tobeunder stricter regulation. Iwill argue
3
thatthesortofharmtheydescribewouldnotconsideredseriousenoughaccordingtoMill.
Thiswillleadintoadiscussiononauthorityandcontext,whereItrytoshowthatignoringor
minimizingtheimportanceofeitherraisesproblems.
The next section will briefly describe the reasons in favor of hate speech legislation
presentedbyJeremyWaldroninhisrecentbookTheHarminHateSpeech.Waldronfocuses
ontheeffectthathatespeechcanhaveonthesenseofdignityofthosetargeted,aswellas
questioningwhetherhatespeechdeservesaplaceinanygoodsociety.
NextIwill lookathowMill’sargumentsmayactuallypermitbroaderregulationsofcertain
forms of hate speech. David O. Brink has argued that Mill’s principle of harm may be
compatible with regulation of expressions that threaten certain practices, namely our
deliberativepractices.Thiswillbefollowedbyageneraldiscussiononsomeobjectionsthat
could be made to Mill’s harm-based principle. Some of these objections will have been
toucheduponinprevioussections.
Finally,Iwillofferafewsummarythoughtsonthecontentsofthistext.
ItshouldbestatedthatIwillnotbeexamininganyspecificlaws.Theprimaryaimofthistext
istoexamineMill’sideasonlibertyofexpressionandtothencomparethesetomorerecent
workonthesubjectofhatespeech.
2.Millandtheharm-principleFirstpublishedin1859,OnLibertybyJohnStuartMillpresentsastrongdefenseofindividual
libertiesandrights.Dealingprimarilywiththequestionofwhenandwhythelibertyofthe
individualcanandshouldbelimited,Millstateshisintentionintheintroduction:
Theobjectofthisessayistoassertoneverysimpleprinciple,asentitledtogovern
absolutelythedealingsofsocietywiththeindividualinthewayofcompulsionand
control,whetherthemeansusedbephysicalforceintheformoflegalpenalties,orthe
moralcoercionofpublicopinion.Thatprincipleis,thatthesoleendforwhichmankind
4
arewarranted,individuallyorcollectivelyininterferingwiththelibertyofactionofany
ofanyoftheirnumber,isself-protection.Thattheonlypurposeforwhichpowercanbe
rightfullyexercisedoveranymemberofacivilizedcommunity,againsthiswill,isto
preventharmtoothers(Mill,2002,p.8)
Mill is claiming that the freedom of the individual can be limited only if this is done to
preventseriousharmtoothers.Itmayseemthathemeansanyharmorharmingeneral,but
heactuallyonlyseescertainkindsofharmasseriousenoughtowarrantlimitingtheliberty
ofanyindividual.So,althoughnotstatedintheabovequote,Millisclaimingthattheliberty
oftheindividualmayonlybelimitedifthisisdonetopreventseriousharmtoothers.This
principlewill be referred to as the “harm-principle”. FollowingMill’s early statement, one
important question becomes which restrictions could and should reasonably be enforced
basedonthisprinciple.Whatisseriousharm?
Millseesanythreattobasicrightsasseriousharm.Theharmthatwesufferasaresultof
beingexposedtoavulgarslurorwhatwethinkofasanimmoralorfalseopinionwouldnot
beanobviousexampleofseriousharm.Beingcalledsomethinginsultingwould,ingeneral,
notjustifypunishmentorrestrictions.Thisseemstomeanthatmuchofwhatmightactually
beharmful,butnotharmfulenough,isinfactnotcoveredbyhisprinciple.Onecouldclaim
thathatespeechispreciselyfalseandimmoral.Harmto life,propertyandthebasicrights
thatheclaimsarevitalifwepeoplearetolivegoodlives,wouldjustifyrestrictions.Ifmylife,
libertyorproperty isharmed, thatwouldbe seriousharm.Oneexample thatMill uses to
showwhathethinksshouldandshouldnotbeallowedtoexpress, involvesahypothetical
scenariowith a corn-dealer. He claims that it is perfectly acceptable to publish an article
claimingthatcorn-dealersarestarvingthepoor.Makingthesamestatementtoanexcited
mob gathered outside home of a corn-dealer should not be allowed (2002, p. 46). The
former isnotaviolationof thecorn-dealers rights,but the latter ispromotinganobvious
threattothesafetyofthecorn-dealerslifeandproperty.
The right todiscuss,questionanddeliberateoverallmatters is centralamong thesebasic
rights.Onlyifwehavetheserightscanwetrytoliveourownlivesthewaywewant,andthis
process iscrucial in thereasoningofOnLiberty. Iwouldseemthenthat thebasic right to
5
freelyexpressanyideaisbasicright,andthiscannotbelimitedtopreventinsultoroffense
in others since this is not serious harm.More serious consequencesmust be expected in
ordertomotivaterestrictions.
ForMill,expressionsthathurtoroffendthefeelingsofanotherpersonwouldbepermitted.
So, calling someoneuglyor stupidoranyother insultingwordwouldbeallowedbyMill’s
principle.Whatisconsideredseriousharmcanbedescribedasharmtobasiclegalrights.For
instance,hethinksthatoneshouldnotbeallowedtostokeanangrymobandtherebyhelp
cause physical damage to those then harmed by the mob. It would be perfectly fine to
publisharticlesattackingtheverysamepeoplethatthemobisangrywith.Hethinksofharm
intermsofharmtophysicalsafetyandpersonalliberty,aswellastherighttonothaveones
propertystolenordestroyed.Millneverthelesspresentedastrongseriesofargumentsthat
seemtofavoragreatdealofindividualfreedom,eventhefreedomtoexpresswhatcouldbe
classifiedashatespeech.Simplyput,Millclaimedthatweoughttobepermittedtoopenly
discuss or defend any idea or opinion, nomatter howwrong or immoral itmay seem to
others. Thus, not even themost inaccurate or immoral opinion should be silenced based
solelyonitsbeinginaccurateorimmoral.IfonewantstoadopttheMillianapproachtothis
question, any restrictions on hate speechwould first need to show that it causes or can
causeharmtobasicrights.Ofcourse,hatespeechmaybethecauseofthekindofharmor
un-freedomwhichMillisclaimingthatwedeserveprotectionfrom.
Iwillnowprovidearoughdefinitionofhatespeechaswellasdiscusshowitmaycauseharm.
3.Whatishatespeech?Hate speechwill herebedefined as derogatory expressions directed at an individual or a
groupbasedon(forexample)theirrace,ethnicity,genderorsexuality.Perhapsthewaywe
normallythinkofhatespeechisasexpressionsofhatredtowardsminorities(Wolfson,1997),
butthereisnoprincipledreasonwhyitmustbelimitedtominorities.Womenorsubjected
populationsincountriesthatareruledbysmallgroupsofpowerfulelitescanalsobetargets
of these sortsof expressions. It is easy to thinkof someveryunpleasantexpressions that
wouldfitmostdefinitionsofhatespeech.Callingablackperson“nigger”orcallingaJewish
6
person“kike”orcallingahomosexualperson“fag”areexamplesofone-wordslursthatgive
usaclear ideaof thekindsofexpressionsweare talkingabout. It isofcoursepossible to
expresssimilarsentimentsinmoreexpandedwaysandeveninmoresophisticatedlanguage.
JeremyWaldronpointsoutsomeoftheproblemsthattheterm“hatespeech”mayraise.It
mayimplythatwearediscussingwhetherornotweshouldrestricthatefulthoughts,butno
oneissuggestinglawsagainstthought-crime.Wemayalsogetstuckwhentryingtoclearly
define hatred as such (Waldron, 2012, p. 34-36). If we were to try to restrict hateful
expressionsingeneral,thatwouldbetomissthepoint.
Acloselyrelatedtopicisofcoursehatecrimes.Hatecrimescanbedescribedascrimesthat
aremotivatedbythesamesortsofprejudices,biasesandopinionsthatcould,whenverbally
expressed,beconsideredhatespeech. Ifsomeonewhoisaracistcommitsacrimeagainst
someonebecauseoftheskincolorofthevictim,thismaywellbeconsideredahatecrime.
TheFederalBureauof Investigation (FBI, n.d)defineshate crimesas a criminal act that is
wholly or partlymotivatedbybias. The important distinctionhere is that hate crimes are
crimes that are distinguished by the motivation or reason which led the perpetrator to
choose a certain typeof victim. The “hate” is an added factor inwhat is already a crime.
Althoughclearlyanimportantquestion,Iwillnotbediscussinghatecrimesfurther.
Myfocuswillbeonhatespeech,soImustfirstestablishmorespecificallywhat Itakethis
termtodescribe.Also,wemustdiscussthesortsofdamageitmaycause.
“Speech”will heremean the expression of ideas, opinions, emotions and so forth, either
verbally,inprint,orinanykindofartisticform.Iwilltakespeechtoinclude,forexample,the
personwhostandsinatownsquarewithasignexpressingsomesortofmessage.Itwillnot
includesimplyholdinghateful thoughtsofanykind.Whendiscussinghatespeech ,what I
amdiscussingistheexpressionofcertainkindsofderogatorywordsandideas,suchasthose
mentionedatthestartofthissection.Iwillbetakingforgrantedthatintentionsmatterin
thesensethatwemustbeabletousewords,phrasesandideasinthiskindofdiscussion.So,
itisnotactuallyuttering,forexample,theword“kike”thatisatissuewhendiscussinghate
speech.Rather,Iaminterestedinthecaseswherethesekindsofwordsareexpressedwith
theintentionofcommunicatingamessage.
7
It is important to clarify that I am primarily interested in situations where the person or
groupexpressing thehatefulmessageor idea isdoingsowithoutauthorityorpowerover
anyorallrecipients.Simplyput,Iaminterestedinhatespeechexpressedbycivilians.Iam
takingforgrantedthatweshouldnotallowapoliceofficer,doctororanyotherprofession
toengageinhatespeechwhileperformingtheirrespectiveduties.Becauseoftheirauthority
inprofessionalsituationsthiswouldlikelycauseseriousharmtomanypeople.Authorityis,
thus, not here considered only as legal authority. I will be including (for instance) the
authority that thebankerhasoverhis/herbankor theauthority that thenightclub-owner
hasoverhis/herestablishment.Thesepeoplewould,iftheyweretoputaracistsigninthe
doorhopingtodiscourageacertaingroupfromentering,becommittinganoffensethatIam
assumingshouldbeillegal.Iwilldiscusstheroleofauthorityfurtherinpartfive,sinceitties
inwiththeargumentspresentedbyMaitra/McGowan.OnereasonthatMillappearstouse
infavoroftryingtoseparateactionsfromwordsisthatweriskunderminingthelegitimacy
ofanylawsifweforbidexpressingresistancetotheselaws.Inotherwords,ifweenactlaws
against,forinstance,racistdiscrimination,itweakensratherthanstrengthensthelegitimacy
ofthislawtoforbidexpressionsthatclaimittobeabadlaw.
It is of course important to consider the sorts of consequences and damage that can be
causedbyhatespeechifwewanttoseewhatMillmighthavemadeofthem.
Whensomeoneaddressesapersonorgroupinawaythatdescribesthemasinferiororsub-
human,thisisofcoursegoingtobeupsettingtothosewhoaretargeted.Shoutingracistor
sexistepithetscanbethreatening,insulting,deeplyoffensiveoralloftheseatonce.Telling
someone that they are ugly or stupidmay of course cause this person to be insulted or
offended,sosimplycausinginsultoroffensecannotbeclaimedtobeuniquetohatespeech.
Ifanutteranceisinfactathreat,thatwouldbemuchmoreserious.JeremyWaldronclaims
that hate speech often sends themessage that certain groups are notwelcome and that
theyshouldbepreparedtosuffervariouskindsofharminthefuture(2012,p.2).Inother
words, hate speech can in this way be used to convey threats. Threats are clearly not
acceptable in most legal systems, so if any particular incident of hate speech is actually
equivalenttoathreat,legalactionwouldnotbeproblematic.Whetherornotaspecificlaw
wouldthenbeneeded,apartfromexistinglawsagainstthreats,isanotherquestion.
8
Ifthegrouporindividualtargetedbyhatespeechispartofaparticularlymarginalizedgroup
itmay be extra important to bewary of their status. If, for instance, a certain group has
historicallybeenpersecutedandtreatedbadly,itmaybereasonabletothinkthatatcertain
timestheirsafety ismuchmoreeasily jeopardized. If theriskofseriousharm isgreater in
any given scenario, anyone interested in limiting destructive consequences would have
reasontowanttostopthisfromhappening.
Onecanalsoimaginethatdifferentsocieties(asawhole)willsometimesbeinsuchastate
thatchaosiseasilybroughtabout.Ifriotsandwidespreadharmisjustunderthesurface,it
wouldofcoursebereasonabletoclaimthatextrastrictrulescouldbeapplieduntil things
improve.
Eventhoughmanyexamplesofhatespeechinvolveminorities,therearemanycasesthatdo
not.Sexisthatespeechisanobviousexample.Thesexistslursthatwomensufferandhave
sufferedarenolesstroublesomethanotherkindsofhatespeechmentioned.Andherewe
are talkingabout fullyhalfof theentirepopulationofany society. If sexisthate speech is
showntobeseriouslyharmful,wewouldsurelybeobligatedtoconsiderrestrictions.
We might also ask what the difference is between aiming expressions directly at an
individual ormore generally at a group?One can imagine that personal attacks aremore
likelytocausedirectharm,howeveronewantstodefineharm.ToaJew,beingpersonally
confrontedby a swastikamay cause a different reaction as opposed to reading an article
containing anti-Semitic statements. This particular kind of problem is similar to Mill’s
hypothetical example involving the corn dealer. Attacking a group by publishing or
broadcastingmessagesofhatespeechcanofcoursecausediscomfortor fear in thesame
way.Itmightalsocauseageneralmarginalizationofthetargetedgroup.Ifcertainmessages
are allowed space in a society it may undermine the ability for certain groups to live
peacefully.Inextremecases,suchas1930´sGermanyorearly1990´sRwanda,whatwecall
hatespeechservedasapromotionofthemosthorrificeventsofrecenthistory.Thestability
ofanyparticularsocietywillofcoursebeonefactorwhenconsideringtheconsequencesof
actions.
IshallnowtakeacloserlookattheargumentsputforwardbyJohnStuartMillinOnLiberty.
9
4.TheargumentsofOnLibertyForMill,itwasofgreatimportancethateveryonehadtherighttovoiceanyideaoropinion,
as long as thiswouldnot harmothers. Thismeans that even those convictions thatwere
considered by most or everyone else to be immoral, untrue or unimportant should be
protected.Thefactthatwhatisexpressedbyonepersonmightbeoffensiveordisturbingto
anotherisn’tstrongenoughgroundsforrestrictions.
If the arguments of the present chapter are of any validity, there ought to exist the
fullestlibertyofprofessinganddiscussing,asamatterofethicalconviction,anydoctrine,
howeverimmoralitmaybeconsidered(2002,p.13)
Even if a certain opinion was supported by only one person, this person should not be
preventedfromvoicingthisopinion(2002,p.14).Harmis,crucially,quiteanarrowtermfor
Mill.Threateningorphysicallyattackingsomeonewouldofcoursebeconsideredharmful,as
would likely harm or damage to property. Being verbally unpleasant to someone would
probablybepermittedaccordingtotheharm-principle.Ifsomeonepassingmeonthestreet
calls me ugly I would be upset, but based on the harm-principle I would not be legally
protected.Tobeclear,thefactthatIamupsetoroffendedisnotastrongenoughreasonto
silenceorpunishthespeaker.
Thisisnotbecausetherearenotmanycaseswhenitisreasonabletobeupset,butbecause
theactofrestrictingsuchspeechwouldbeaviolationofwhatMillarguedweshouldvalue
most.Thisseemstoentailthatcallingsomeone“kike”or“fag”is,althoughveryrude,isnot
seriousenoughanoffencetowarrantlegalpunishment.ItseemsthatMillwantsthissortof
rudeness to be attacked “by opinion, not by law” (2002, p. 63). So, we can ridicule or
counter-attacksuchexpressions,butnotlegallyforbidthem.ThisisalittlepeculiarfromMill,
becausehealsoseemstobeworriedbythepressureputon individualsbypublicopinion.
The third chapter of On Liberty is clearly expressing his dislike for what he calls the
“despotism of custom” (2002, p. 58). People are too often pressurized to conform to
10
customsofbehaviors,desires,thoughtsetc,andthisMillseesascontrarytothe“spiritof
liberty”(2002,p.58-59).
ForMill,attemptingtosuppressor forbidany ideaoropinionwastoassumetoknowthe
absolutetruth.
Torefuseahearingtoanopinion,becausetheyaresurethatitisfalse,istoassumethat
their certainty is the same as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an
assumptionofinfallibility(Mill,2002,p.14-15)
OneofMill’scentralideasisthatfreeexpressionistheonlyreliablewaytopromotetruth.
Onhisview,restrictingspeechiscounterproductiveifwewanttoallowthetruthtoemerge
inanygivensituation.Thisisperhapseasytomisunderstandwhenrelatingittotheproblem
of hate speech. How could banning hate speech somehow be harmful to our search for
truth?Milldoespointoutthatwhenwepreventanideaoropinionfrombeingexpressed,
wemaybe silencing the truth,buthealsoplaces valueon the freedom tobe completely
wrong. In relation to thekindsof speechwearediscussinghere–suchas racist, sexistor
homophobicspeech–thepossibilityofthesecontainingtruthseemsunlikely.Asamatterof
principleitmightbeappealingtowithholdanyclaimstoobjectiveoreternaltruth,butwe
arequiteright toconsider, forexample, racistspeechtobebothoffensiveanduntrue.As
arewe, Iwouldargue, inhavingextensive lawsagainstdiscrimination.Canwehold these
twoideasatthesametime?Interestingly,Mill’spointseemstobethatit’squitenecessary
thatwedoso.Millarguedthatweareonly justified intakingastancestrongly ifwehave
allowed our convictions to be confronted with all possible objections. Silencing even a
wrongfulopinionrobsothersoftheopportunityofstrengtheningtheirreasonsforholding
theright idea(2002,p.14). Ifwearetocommittoanyprinciplewhichpermitshatefuland
bigoted speech it does not seem appealing to do this because we expect this speech to
containsomepartofthetruth.Theracistsandsexistsofthisworldareunlikelytobethose
promoting truth. More interesting would be the claim that our own convictions, and
subsequently any actions that follow, are somehow unwarranted unless we grant even
unpleasantanduntrueideastobefreelydebated.
Millseemstobedescribingdifferentwaysinwhichgoodideassufferfromlackofinteraction
orcollisionwithbadideas.Firstisthatwecannotbejustifiedinthinkingandactingonour
11
convictionsunlessweallowthemtobequestioned(2002,p.16).If,forinstance,weenacta
lawagainstsomeformofbehavior, itunderminesthevalidityofthis lawtoforbid itbeing
called into question. If we decide that a particular action is the best way of achieving a
particulargoal,forbiddingotheroptionsfrombeingdiscussedseemstoweakenratherthan
strengthenthevalidityofourdecision.Anymoralorlegalprinciplewhichisnotallowedto
bequestionedistherebylessjustified,accordingtoMill.Howcouldwetrustanyruleorlaw
thatwasnotallowedtobecalled intoquestion?Theveryreasonanything iswarranted in
beingagroundforaction is that ithasbeenthoroughlycriticized.Anydoctrinethat isnot
allowedtobequestionedistherebylessjustified.
Whatalsohappenswithanyideathatisneverquestionedis,accordingtoMill,thatitloses
power.Itbecomesdogmaandthosewhoholditarelesssureofwhytheydoso.HereMill
makesanhistoricalclaim,explainingthatthishashappenedto“almostallethicaldoctrines
andreligiouscreeds” (2002,p.32-33).This ishard tobesureabout.Eventhough it isnot
easytoknowhowwewouldtestthisclaim,itdoesnotseemverypersuasivetoclaimthat
weneed, for example, racists inorder tomaintainour commitment to combating racism.
Woulditnotbeenoughtostudyhistoryandlearnfromthepast?Also,sinceitseemslikely
that the burden of racism, however heavy one actually thinks it is, will probably not be
sharedevenly,wewouldbeaskingcertainpeopletoputupwithracisminordertoremind
othersjustwhyracismisbad.
It’simportanttoseeMill’sreasoningonfreedomofexpressioninthelightofwhathethinks
is a good life for a human being. It is crucial thatwe develop and exercise our ability to
evaluateanddeliberateon important issuesregardinghowweshould liveour lives (Brink,
2001,p.126).Thefreedomtodeliberateiscrucialifwearetofullydevelopourcapacities.
One can perhaps summarize Mill’s reasoning by saying that he wants to permit almost
unlimitedexpressionanddeliberationonanyissue,sincethiswillallowustofullyallowusto
beautonomousinhowwechoosetoliveourlives.Thiswillincreaseourwell-being.Howwe
choose to live our lives, what we decide to do and what we put into action, cannot be
grantedthesamefreedomasourdiscussionsordeliberations.
Noonepretendsthatactionsshouldbeasfreeasopinions(2002,p.46)
12
Mill’semphasisontheimportanceofdeliberativefreedomisimportanttokeepinmind,asit
canbearguedthatthiscanpavethewayforrestrictionsonexpressionsthatcanbeshown
tolimitthedeliberativefreedomofothers.
So,whatshouldwetakeMill´sreasoningtosuggestregardinghatespeech?IngeneralMill
seems to think that the right to express themost vulgar idea ismore important than the
rightofothers tonotbesubjected to it. It isnotclear thathatespeechclearlyharms the
basicrightsofthosetargeted.Thefactthatwethinkofhatespeechasaclearexampleof
insultingandimmoralexpressionsofthemostunimpressivekinddoesnotseemtowarrant
forbidding it according toMill. Neither does the fact that hate speech appears to be full
falsehood.Banningallfalsestatementsorclaimsmaybetempting.Iwouldpersonallythink
that aworldwithout “psychics” and “homeopathic healers”wouldbe a betterworld. But
theseareexamplesofpracticesthat ifwewanttoban,weshoulddosobecausetheyare
cheatingtheircustomers.IfsomeonetellsmethatElvisisalive,noharmwillcomefromit.
RestrictingalluntruespeechwouldcontradictMill’sreasoningbothbyassumingtheposition
ofobjectivetruth-tellerandbyviolatingtherighttopromoteanydoctrineunlessdoingso
seriouslyharmsothers.
There are of course ways in which we can justly restrict or punish false statements. If
someone knowingly spreads false information with the intent of harming, it would seem
reasonable to consider any reference to free speech as a defense to be unwarranted. If,
however,ideasorinformationwearethoughttobecorrectarespread,it islessclearhow
justifiedanybanwouldbe.
Mill had some strong reasons why the question of truth is important, but for him the
importance of truth is a general reasonagainst regulating speech.Mill reasoned that the
onlywaywecanhopetobesurethatwearegettinganythingrightisbyexposingourideas
to ruthless and unending challenges. The harm principle proposed by Mill would not
considerthefalsehoodofanexpressionstrongenoughreasonforrestrictionorpunishment.
Norwouldtheunpleasantness,vulgarityorimmoralityofanexpression.
Oneway of attackingMill´s arguments could be to claim that hemakes toomuch of the
differencebetweenexpressinganideaandactuallyenactingitsmessage.Weshallnowlook
atthewayinwhichIshaniMaitraandM.KMcGowanhaveapproachedthisquestion.
13
5.SayinganddoingIt isquiteclearthatwedothingswithwords.Sometimeswesimplyexpresssomething(“I
amsohappy!”),andothertimeswordsareusedtoachievemoresubstantialchangesthat
affect ourselves and/or others. Often several things are done with a single expression.
Talkingaboutdoingsomethingnastyorillegalisofcoursenotthesameasdoingsomething
nastyorillegal.IfItellmyfriendthatIfeelstronglythatIshouldstealacandybarfromthe
localshop, this isverydifferent fromactuallystealing it.But, therearealsoways inwhich
particular expressions can themselves constitute actions of greater or lesser significance.
WhenIsay“hello”tomyneighborinthemorningIamperformingtheactofgreetingthis
person.Actually, I amperforming (at least) twoacts: theactofmakingaparticular sound
andtheactofgreetingmyneighbor.Forthelattertobeagreetingitseemstodependon
my intention, on whether or not my neighbor can hear me, and on whether or not we
understandthis interactioninthesameway.ThegreetingalsotellsmyneighborthatIsee
him/her,perhapsthatIwishtoactfriendlyandthatIamprobablyexpectingaresponse.
As mentioned, Mill’s claim was that we ought to be allowed extensive freedoms of
expression, and this would include many hateful and unpleasant utterances. Freedom of
actionshouldnotbequiteasfreeaccordingtoMill,sinceactionscaneasierintrudeonthe
freedomofothers.But, if thereactually isnotmuchofadifferencebetweendoing things
withorwithoutwordsthatwouldpresentMillwithaproblem.
IshaniMaitraandMaryKateMcGowanhavearguedthat,insomecases,hatefulexpressions
causedamageinawaythatmeansitwouldbewrongtoeventhinkofitasaquestionoffree
speech. In their paper “On Free Speech and the Scopeof a Free SpeechPrinciple” (2010)
theyarguethatifweunderstandhatespeechcorrectly,itwillbecomeclearthatregulations
areperfectlyreasonableandcompatiblewithastrongfreespeechprinciple.Theirreasoning
isthatcertainformsofspeechdothingsthatwewouldwanttoforbidiftheyweredonein
anotherway.
In the example with me and my neighbor it seems clear that when I say “hello” that
constitutesagreeting.Theverbalexpressionisthegreeting.Thisdependsonthecontext.IfI
14
wasalonewhenIsaid“hello”Iwouldbeperformingadifferentact(partlyatleast).Ifwesee
someonekneelingandaskingtheirpartner if theywillmarryhim/her,wearewitnessinga
proposal. Proposing or greetingmy neighbor aremaybe not themost striking or serious
actions, butwe can easily think of scenarios that are legally, politically and sociallymore
consequentialandserious.
Maitra and McGowan present some suiting examples to make it clear how we can do
different thingswithwordsdependingonthecontext inwhichtheyareuttered.Whenan
employer (Donald Trump in their example) says “you are fired” to an employee, this
utteranceitselfisafiring(Maitra/McGowan,2010,p.350).Thatparticularsentenceuttered
inthatparticularcontextmeansthattheemployeeisthenfired.Thiswillregisterwiththe
peopleinvolvedandthenhavetheeffectthattheemployeeisinneedofanewjobandso
on. The very same sentencewould not do the same thing if uttered to a stranger on the
street.Verbalcontractsalsoworkinasimilarway.Iftwopeopleverballyagreeonthesaleof
acertainitemorservicetheyareobligatedtosticktothisagreement.
Itiseasytothinkofscenarioswhereverbalexpressionscanbeusedtodiscriminateon(for
example)racistgrounds.Ifasecurityguardatapubliclibraryapproachesavisitorandtells
themthattheymaynotvisitthelibrarybecausepeoplewiththeirparticularskincoloraren’t
welcome,thisseemsaclearcaseofracistdiscrimination.Thesecurityguardshould inthis
hypotheticalexamplecouldbebothfiredandarrested.There isofcoursemorethatcould
besaidaboutwhythesevariousutterancesfunctionthewaytheydo,butthepointhereis
toshowthatthereoftenisnotaclearordeepdifferencebetweensayinganddoing.Amore
distinctdifferencecanbefoundinthefunctionofexpressionsbasedonthecontextwithin
whichtheyareuttered.
In their paper they introduce the term “significantly obligation-enacting utterance”. If a
certainutterancecanbeshowntoenactordissolveoneormoresignificantobligations,the
argumentgoes,thiscouldbeareasoninfavorofrestrictionorpunishment.WhenIgreetmy
neighborIamenactinganobligationformyneighbortorespond.IfIringhis/herdoorbellI
amenacting an obligation to open the door. The employerwho fires his/her employee is
bothenactingobligations(tonotexpectapaycheck,toleavethebuildingandsoforth)and
dissolvingobligations (theemployeeno longerhas to showup forworkor answer to the
15
employer). Inthecaseoftheverbalcontract,bothpartieshaveenactedobligationsto live
uptotheirendoftheagreement.IfIamoutwalkingmydogandsomeonecriesoutforhelp
becausetheyaredrowning,Iamofcourseobligatedtohelpthem,evenifnolawsapply.I
ammorallyobligatedtohelp.
Wehavenowseensomeexamplesofmoral,socialandlegalobligations.Foranutteranceto
significantly obligation-enacting it needs to affect obligations of a certain kind. If an
utteranceenactsanobligationthat,iffulfilled,meansImustcommitacrime,thiswouldbe
significant.Thesamewouldapplyifanobligationisdissolvedeventhoughthelawrequires
thattheobligationbefulfilled.
MaitraandMcGowanclaimthathatespeechcaninfactaffectsocialcontextsinwaysthat
are significantly obligation-enacting. They point to the fact that we have obligations to
refrainfromengagingindiscrimination,forexample.Ifanutterancesomehowdissolvesthis
obligation,andtherebyleadstouscommittinganillegalactofdiscrimination,thisutterance
issignificantlyobligationenactingandopentolegalrestriction.Intheexamplesmentioned
previouslyIdescribedhowitseemsplausibletoconsidercertainactsasobligation-enacting.
Myneighborhasakindofobligation to reply tomygreeting,and theemployeewhogets
firedbothlosesandacquirescertainobligationsasaresultofthefiring.Noproblemssofar.
MaitraandMcGowanalsousetheexampleofarestaurantownerwhoputsupasignsaying
“whitesonly”.Clearly,thisisunacceptable,andtheirargumentisthattherestaurantowner
has enacted obligations that are significant. These obligations are, as they put it, neither
legalnormoralastheownerlackstheabilitytoenactsuchobligations.Theobligationsare,
in this case, social. Whites are encouraged to participate in the illegal activity of
discrimination.
It seemsclear that theowner’s intention is tokeepnon-whitesaway fromtherestaurant.
Even though the owner cannot control the laws on discrimination, it seems obvious that
he/shehasakindofauthorityoftherestaurant.Thisishowwethinkofrestaurantsandany
otherbusinessesthatareopentothepublic.If Ienteraclothingstoreandtheownertells
me that Imust not use a particular changing roomwhen trying a shirt on, I will comply.
There is, ingeneral,aclearunderstanding that theownersets the rules.Theownerhasa
legal obligation tonot engage indiscrimination.We, as potential customers, arenormally
16
expected to complywith the rules setby theowners. If these rules are in fact illegal, the
ownerwillrightlybeintroublewiththelaw.Theowneroftherestaurantisdiscriminatingin
awaythatclearlyshouldnotbeprotectedbyafreespeechprinciple.
As in the hypothetical case with the guard at the public library, we can clearly see the
problemduetothefactthattheyarebothactingfrompositionsofauthority.Eventhough
we should all resist these sorts of discrimination, these examples are meant to show
examplesofscenarioswherewearegenerallyinclinedtofollowinstructions.
Apartfromarguingthatutterancesthataresignificantlyobligation-enactingshouldbeoutof
reachofanyfreespeechprinciple,MaitraandMcGowansuggestthatracisthatespeechcan
functioninsuchawaythatmeansitmeetstheircriteriaforsuchutterances(2010,p.369).
They point to the work of Charles Lawrence and his claim that segregation and racist
discrimination is illegal (in the U.S.A)mainly because of themessage it sends. Therefore,
sendingthismessageshouldalsobeillegal.Astheyputit,Lawrenceclaimsthatracisthate
speechlabelscertainpeopleasinferiorandtherebylegitimatesdiscriminationagainstthem
(2010, p. 369). This seems problematic, since it labels the recommending of a particular
practiceasequallyillegaltoactualenactingofthepractice.Itclaimsthatutterancesinfavor
of racistdiscriminationare racistdiscrimination.Maitra/McGowanappear to claim that, if
Lawrence is right, utterances that for instance recommend segregation in restaurants
legitimize discrimination in a similar way to when the owner puts up a sign stating that
discriminationisanactivepolicy.
ThisseemstobluralinethatMillconsideredimportant.Aswehaveseen,Mill’sclaimisthat
anylawmustbeopentocriticismifitistobeconsideredjustified.Furthermore,heclaimed
thatrestrictingcriticismweakensourunderstandingofwhygoodrulesareinfactgood.The
latterpointislessstrongthantheformer.
5.1TheimportanceofauthorityandcontextHowwerespondtothepeopleweinteractwithisofteninfluencedbyhowwerelatetoeach
other in particular contexts. Upon entering a public library, I am inclined to pay close
attentiontoanythingsaidtomebythestaffatthelibrary.Iamalsolikelytoberespectfulof
17
theparticularrulesorcustomsinplaceatanyshoporrestaurantIvisit.Ifawaitertellsme
thatanemptytableisreservedforanotherguest,Iwillrespectthis.
Theargumentput forwardbyMaitraandMcGowan ismeanttoshowthatutterancescan
enact or dissolve obligations and that if this can lead to criminal activity thatmakes the
utteranceextrasignificant.Thesamegoesiftheobligationsareregulatedbylawingeneral.
Theproblemhere is that this implies thatanutterancecould reasonablyberegulated if it
causedanyonewhofollowedittocommitacrime.
Thereasonthatthesecurityguardortherestaurantownercannotdefendtheiractionsby
claimingtheywereexercisingtheirrighttofreespeechisbecausetheywereinpositionsof
authority.Thereasonthattheemployerwhosays“youarefired”toanemployeeisenacting
asignificantobligationisthattherearelawsinplacethatregulatetheseinteractions.
Shouldwethinkofutterancesmadebypeoplewithoutauthorityinasimilarway?Imagine
thatyouarewalkingtoyourcarinthemorning,andyoucomeacrosssomeonethattellsyou
thatyoushoulddriveonthewrongsideoftheroadthatday.Youaretoldtobreakthelaw
and put lots of other people at risk. Could we therefore reasonably ban this sort of
expression? An opponent of such a banwould likely concede that it could preventmuch
harm,evenifitcouldbeshownthatthevastmajorityofpeoplewouldknowbetterthanto
obeythissortofrequest.Butwouldsuchabannotimplythatweinfactarenotcapableof
tellingagood idea fromabadone? It seemstoshift the responsibility inaway thatboth
positionsusasthoughwecannotbeexpectedtoresistacalltoact inan illegalaway,and
that risks making many seemingly harmless utterances open to regulation. If those
addressed can reasonably be expected to not comply, it seemswrong to ban this sort of
expression.Thischangesifthecircumstancesdictatethattheexpectationisthatyoushould
infactdriveonthewrongsideoftheroadwhentoldtodoso.Itisnotclearthathatespeech
tendstodothismorethanotherformsofspeech.
Theharm-principleseemstobeatoddswiththeargumentsofMaitra/McGowanasregards
what is acceptable to express. First, they argue thatwe are sometimeswrong to think of
hate speech asmainly expressive. Secondly, the argument (originallymade by Lawrence)
thatitisactuallythemessageofsuchthingsasracistdiscriminationthatisforbiddenwhen
18
wemakeanti-discriminationlaws,isnotcompatiblewithMill´sclaimthatweshouldbeable
tosupportandexpressagreementwitheventheworstpossibledoctrines.
5.DignityWhatshouldagoodsocietylooklike?Moretothepoint,dowewantasocietythatcontains
visible messages contradicting the values that generally form the basis of a liberal
democraticsociety?JeremyWaldronhasarguedthatifpeoplearesubjectedtohatespeech
inpublic spaces this canundermine their senseofdignity (2012,p.16). Liberty is certainly
somethingwevaluehighly,butsoisequality.Ifasocietywantstobeopenanddemocratic,
theequalrightsof itscitizenswouldseeman important ingredient.Whatpeopleget from
exposure to hatefulmessages is,Waldron argues, the opposite of a sense of dignity and
equality. Iteventhreatenstheirabilityto livetheir livesunhindered.Waldron invitesusto
think of hate speech laws as a societal agreement to ensure the equal dignity and social
standingofeachcitizen(2002,p.16).AsWaldronpointsout,thebanningofcertainthoughts
oropinionsisnotwhatheissuggesting.Rather,hewantsustoconsiderwhethertheactual
exposuretothesemessagesisreasonableina“well-orderedsociety”(2012,p.16).
Waldronclaimsthatthemainworryshouldbetheeffectsof lastingmessagesratherthan,
forinstance,theshoutingofobscenitiesorvulgarepithets.
Buttomymind,itistheenduringpresenceofthepublishedwordorthepostedimage
thatisparticularlyworryinginthisconnection;andthisiswherethedebateabout“hate
speech”regulationshouldbefocused(Waldron,2012,p.37-38).
Posting vulgar images or holding up a racist sign is certainly not very sophisticated, but
Waldronseemstobeinterestedinmoreconsideredexpressionsofhatespeechaswell.Of
course,Waldron’s position is that awell-ordered society could certainly restrict themore
vulgarstreet-levelobscenitiesaswell,butwemightwellaskifweshouldgrantfordifferent
libertiestothosewhoengageinhatespeechinamorepolishedway?Forinstance,should
wetreathomophobic,racistoranti-Semiticexpressionsdifferentlyiftheyareshoutedinthe
streetsratherthanpreachedinachurchorspokenatapoliticaldebate?Ontheonehand,it
19
seemsplausiblethatpoliticaldebatesorprivatereligiousceremoniesareentitledtocriticize
orpromotemanydifferentideas,andMillwouldlikelyagreewiththis.Ontheotherhand,
dowereallywanttoclaimthattheordinarypersonshoutinghomophobicslursinthestreet
shouldbesilenced,while(forinstance)allowingoldandreligiouslygroundedhomophobiato
beexpressedbecauseit’spartofestablishedtraditions?Thisisnotveryappealing.
Waldronisemphasizingdignityratherthaninsultoroffense.Harmtothedignityofcitizens
iswhatWaldronishighlighting,particularlyifthesecitizensarepartofaminoritygroup.We
should also remember thatWaldron is focused on the visual presence of messages that
wouldfallunderthetermhatespeech.Heisarguingthathowthingslook,literallytheway
theyappeartous, isat leastpartofhowthingsare.Andhewantsustoconsiderwhether
hatefulandprejudicedmessagesshouldbeallowedtobeapartofwhat thegoodsociety
consistsof(2012,p.68).Wemightthinkofitlikethis;dowewanthatespeechtoapartof
the“furniture”ofoursociety?Ifwedo,itmaybethatitendsupaffectinghowweliveand
atleastinpartgainlegitimacy.
HowmightMill view the question of the dignity of eachmember of a society?We have
alreadytoucheduponMill’sgeneralsuspiciontowardsmostformsofrestrictionsonspeech,
but it isalsocrucial tonote thathe isprimarily interested in the freedevelopmentof the
individual.AsJonathanRileypointsout,Millcertainlyseesthevalueofobediencetosocial
normsandthe fundamental rightofeachpersonto livewithout fearofharmfromothers
(1998, p. 77-78). But harm to the dignity of an individual would probably not meet the
criteria for serious harm unless circumstances dictate that thiswould lead to othermore
serious harms. Overall, his reasoning indicates that dignity would be more harmed by
restrictions than by expressions of hate speech. As far as messages that undermine the
values of a particular society, this was almost described as necessary by Mill. Allowing
oppositiontoalldoctrinesaddsratherdiminishesourrighttoactuallydefendtheoneswe
enact. Let us look at how the fundamental motivations of Mill may still leave room for
restrictionsonsomedestructivespeech.
20
6.HarmtodeliberativefreedomsDavidO.Brinkhaspointedout that someof thebasic ideaswhichMill baseshis valueof
libertyoncouldactuallybeusedasargumentsinfavorofatleastconsideringregulationsof
certainformsofspeech.Ifwearetostriveformaximumdeliberativefreedom,asMillthinks
we should, any expressions or speech that clearly restricts/limits this freedom could be
restricted.AsBrinkpointsout,Millwouldconsider those libertieswhicharemostneeded
whendecidingwhatkindofpersontobe,tohavethehighestvalue(2001,p.126-127).More
importantly,BrinkpointsoutthatMill’sclaimthatcertainlibertiesarecruciallyimportantis
explained by how these liberties allow us to exercise our “deliberative capacities” (2001,
p.138).
We must remember that Mill, although in principle opposed to constraints upon the
discussing,expressingordefendingofanydoctrine,is interestedinfindingthebestwayto
alloweachindividualtoshapetheirownlifeasmuchaspossible.Thisispartlyachievedby
developingourintellectualfacultiesandlearninghowtomakeinformeddecisions.Todothis
wemust be free to consider and express all options andpotential answers. If it could be
shownthatcertain formsofhatespeechclearlyhas theoppositeeffectonothers,or that
hate speech regulation advances rather than restricts (overall) deliberative freedoms, this
wouldseemtoundermineanyclaimthathatespeechshouldbeprotected inthenameof
deliberative freedom,evenonMill’sown reasoning (Brink,2001,p.138).Millwouldhave
seenthefreeexchangeofideasandperspectivesasonewayofprovidinguswiththeinput
used to guide our decisions. It is not hard to imagine that hate speech, in any given
environment, can have the effect of preventing rather than promoting the maximum
amountoffreeinquiryanddiscussion.
IfBrinkiscorrectinthathatespeechcanbeempiricallyshowntoeffectivelyexcludecertain
groupsfromparticipationin“deliberativecontexts”,thisprovidesuswithgoodreasontoat
least consider regulating certain forms of speech (2001, p. 140-141). Of course, it is still
important to think of this in relation to other forms of speech that may cause similar
problems. Would it seem reasonable to restrict any form of speech that diminishes the
libertyofothers?Onepotentialproblemhereisthatwemayseesimilareffectsinpoliticalor
religious discussions. Perhaps we should place greater importance on context. No one is
forcedtoattendapoliticaldebateorareligiousceremony.
21
Aswehave seen,Millwarnedagainstbothassumingabsolute truthandunderminingour
consideredjudgmentsbyforbiddingattacksonthem.Thelatter isclosertowhatwecome
upagainstwhenconsideringhatespeechbans.
7.Objectionstotheharm-principleIfweacceptMill’sargumentsinfavorofextensivefreedomsofexpressionanddeliberation
weseemtohavegoodreasontoallowextensivecriticismofprettymuchanything.Perhaps
most in regards toanyprinciple thatwewant tomake into law,orwheneverwewantan
opinion toguideactions. Inotherwords, ifwewant tomake (forexample)discrimination
illegalitwouldunderminethestrengthofanysuchlegislationifweweretothenconsiderit
off-limitsintermsofcritiqueoropposition.
IfoneacceptsthataprinciplebasedonharmsimilartothatofMilliswellsuitedasgrounds
forourapproachtohatespeech,whatarethemostobviousproblemsandweakpointsof
this position? Perhaps there are equally or even more unsatisfying difficulties for this
position?
Oneobviousproblemisdefiningclearlywhatisasignificantenoughharm.Fromthisfollows
thattheprincipleofMillseemstobeopentotheobjectionthatit’sbothtoowideandtoo
narrow.Thisproblemisinawaysimilartotheproblemfacedbyanyoneproposinglimitson
speechbasedoncontent,becausethereisnoclearwayofdrawingthelineregardingharm.
People seem to be harmed by all sorts of things, and exposure to ideas and opinions
contrarytotheirowniscertainlycapableofcausingharm.Ifweassumethatphysicalharm
andotherkindsofharmcanbeexperiencedasequallystrong,anyattempttodrawalineat
physicalharmmayseemarbitrary.
If onewere to argue thatMill’s principle allows toomuch harm to be caused,mental or
psychologicalharmseemsagoodplace to start.Onecouldargue thatMill should, ifhe is
indeedinterestedinlimitingharm,havepromotedbansonmanymoreformsofexpression
thanheactuallydid.Beingtoldthatyouaregoingtohellwhenyoudieduetoyoursexual
orientation,orthatyourparticularethnicgrouporgenderhassomenegativecharacteristic,
22
or that thepolitical party you represent is ruiningpeoples’ lives,or that you shouldn’tbe
allowed full participation in society, these are all no doubt hurtful, provocative and
saddeningwordstohavetoendure.Itisnotunreasonabletoclaimthattheeffectofthese
kindsofexpressionsnegatively impact the livesof those targeted.Thesortsof things that
Millvalues,suchasliberty,autonomyandthedevelopmentofeachindividuals´intellectual
capacities, may be better promoted by freeing people of as much harm as possible, no
matter its cause. What should we make of the harm principle if we assume that the
examplesmentionedhere above are as harmful someof theharms thatMill thinks justly
opentopunishment?
Inaway,thosewhoarguethatMillpermitstoomuchharmmayhavemoreuseforthetype
of principal that he outlines. It could be argued, in line with Waldron and (in part)
Maitra/McGowan,thatwesimplyneedtowidenthereachoftheprinciple,andthereby“get
rid”of lotsofharm, including thesortofharmtodignityandour senseofequal standing
that Jeremy Waldron described. On this account, Mill’s principle would considered too
tolerant,whilestillfocusingonharmastheguidingprinciple.
But,onecouldalsoclaimthat the fact thatmanyof themostbarbedexpressions thatwe
encounterinpoliticalorreligiouscontextsareseriouslyharmful,andthatifwewereactually
committed to preventing harm we should restrict much, much more speech than what
seemsrealistic.Intheareasofpoliticsandreligionwecaneasilythinkofalltheharmcaused
whendifferentideasandbeliefscollide.Thiscouldplausiblybeusedasanargumentagainst
basinganyfreespeechprincipleonharm.Ifseriousharmiscommoninsituationswewishto
keepfreefromregulation,maybeweshouldfocusonotherthingsthanharm?Weseemto
beable to findproblemswith theharmprincipledependingonwhatwe think isharmful,
anddependingonwhatwe think aperson should reasonablybeexpected to endure.We
should remember thatMill is claiming that priority should be given to liberty to explore
differentways of life. Therefore,we could also questionwhy the liberty of the individual
shouldbeourprimaryconcerninthismatter.
ForMill, the answer to this would be that if we are not granted the basic liberties he is
defending, we are limiting our ability to make good decisions, both individually and
collectively.Theclaimseemstobethat ifweacceptthatweneedtoalloweventhemost
23
despicableideatobeexpressed,wewillgetbothabettergraspofwhichideasaregoodand
bejustifiedinourconvictions.
ItcouldbearguedthatMillispresentingamodelthat,ifappliedinpractice,wouldinreality
exposemanymarginalizedpartsofsocietytoattacksfromstrongergroups.Wemayinfact
beobligatedtoconsiderthis,butit’sveryclearthatMill istryingtodefendpreciselythose
whoareinaminority.Asheputsit,notevenaminorityofoneshouldsufferatthehandsof
themajority.
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the
contraryopinion,mankindwouldbenomorejustifiedinsilencingthatoneperson,than
he,ifhehadthepower,wouldjustifiedinsilencingmankind(2002,p.14).
Onemay claim thatMill’s principlewould in fact exposeminorities to attackswhich they
cannotdefendthemselvesfrom,butitwouldbewrongtosaythatMillwasarguinginfavor
ofthemajorityandtheirrighttosuppresstheminority.
8.ConcludingthoughtsTheargumentspresentedinOnLibertyclearlygiveprioritytolibertyonthegroundsthatit
promotesbothprogressingeneralandtheautonomousdevelopmentoftheindividual.
We have seen some examples of hate speech and how thesemay cause harm. Ifwe are
interestedinpreventingseriousharm,asMillwas,weprobablyhavetobeawareofthefact
thatthestateofthesocietyinquestionisanimportantfactor.Inanidealsociety,Millseems
to claim that we should allow even hate speech in most cases, as it is not clear that it
violatesbasicrightsofothers.Ifandwhenitcanbeshownthatinstancesofhatespeechare
equaltoathreatoradirectincitementtoviolence,Millwouldhavebeenstronglyinfavorof
state intervention. Falsehood, insults or seemingly immoral doctrines are, however,
compatiblewithMill´sprinciple.
24
The arguments presented by Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan present a clear
description of how and why utterances are more than just expressions in many cases. I
argued that they ignore the role of authority in a way that means we miss something
important.Their claim,basedpartlyonworkbyCharlesLawrence, that racisthatespeech
mayactuallyberacistdiscriminationisproblematicinthatitappearstoequatetheapproval
ofdiscriminationwiththeactofdiscrimination.Itseemsstrangetoacceptthisreasoningin
other casesof expressions in favorof illegal activity. If I claim thatpunchingmyneighbor
wouldbegreatideaandshouldbeallowed,itistoomuchofastretchtoequatethisinany
waytotheactofactuallyattackingmyneighbor.Ifonewantedtosaythatracisthatespeech,
forexample,isthreatening,thenwecouldactbasedonlawsagainstthreats.
JeremyWaldronraisedtheinterestingquestionofwhetherhatespeechcanreasonablybe
considered tohaveaplace inanywell-ordered society.Wewouldof coursebebetteroff
withoutracism,homophobia,sexismandmanyothersimilarproblems.TheMillianapproach
tothiswouldlikelybethattheabilitytofreelyengageineventhesesortsofexpressionsare
basic rights that, at least inmany cases, aremore important than the rights of others to
avoid them. It isworth consideringwhether clear violations of dignity seriously limits the
livesofothers,ifsoitseemsthatevenMill’sliberalstancecouldpermitregulation.Itdoes
notseemclearthatharmtodignityisthesortofharmhethoughtserious.
The importance of deliberative freedom, the freedom for all to partake in the sorts of
discussionandinquirythatMill isplacingsuchimportanceon,wasanaspectthatDavidO.
Brinkshowedasapossiblereasontoconsiderbroaderregulationsofhatespeech.Itwould
behard todefendMill’sharmprinciple in the faceof any speech that is clearlyhindering
ratherthanenhancingdeliberativefreedoms.
25
BibliographyBrink,D.O.(2001).MillianPrinciples,FreedomofExpressionandHateSpeech.LegalTheory,7,pp119-157.:http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1352325201072019
FBI–HateCrimes(copiedJanuary18):https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/hate-crimes
Maitra, I.McGowan,M.K. (2010)On Racist Hate Speech and the Scope of a Free SpeechPrinciple.CanadianJournalofLaw&Jurisprudence:
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-journal-of-law-and-jurisprudence/article/div-classtitleon-racist-hate-speech-and-the-scope-of-a-free-speech-principlediv/2DA9E778F117633D9160B4ED8C3A047F
Mill,J.S.(2002).OnLiberty.NewYork:DoverPublications,Inc.
Riley, J. (1998). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to: Mill on Liberty. London/New York:Routledge
StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy:https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freedom-speech/#ResHarPri
Waldron,J.(2012).TheHarminHateSpeech.Cambridge/London:HarvardUniversityPress
Wolfson,N.(1997).Hatespeech,SexSpeech,FreeSpeech.Westport,CT:PraegerPublishers.
