Mine Explosion U. S. Steel Corporation Frick District · APPENDIXES (run.) Appendix F - Dust-survey...

Mine ExplosionU. S. Steel CorporationFrick District

.FINAL REPORT OF MAJOR MINE-EXPLOSION DISASTER ROBENA NO. 3 MINE

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION

COAL DIVISION, FRICK DISTRICT CARMICHAELS, GREENE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

December 6, 1962

..•..

CONTENTS

Introduction.......................................................... 1Genera1 infor.mation................................................... 2~nlng methods, conditions, and equipment............................. 3

Mini..ng methods................................................... 3E.xp1osiveso.o.................................................... It.Ventilation and mine gases....................................... 5Dust............................................................. 7Transportation................................................... 9Electricity •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• o ••• ~......... 9Illumination and smoking......................................... 13Mine rescue and firefighting facilities.......................... 13

Story of explosions and recovery operations ••~••••••••••• o.o.......... 14Activities of Bureau of Mines personnel.......................... 14Mining conditions immediately prior to the explosions............ 15Evidence of activities and story of explosion~.................. 15Recovery operations.............................................. 18

Investigation of cause of explosions.................................. aoInvestigation committee.......................................... aoMethane as a factor in the explosions............................ 21Flame •.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Go • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 22Forces •••~•••••••••••••• 6 •••••••••••••••••••••••• s •••••••••• D •• e. 23Probable point of origin......................................... 23Factors preventing ~read of explosions.......................... 23Summary of evidence.............................................. 23Discussion of evidence and special tests......................... 25Cause of the disaster............................................ 26

Recommendations •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• os....... 26Acknowledgnlentoa ••• o•o •••••••••••••••••• o ••••••••••••••••• ·~ •••• o..... 29Table 1. - Analyses of mine dUst samples outside.the explosion area

APPENDIXESAppendix AAppendix B - Victims of explosions

Names and addresses of personnel of mine rescue teemsthat participated in recovery work after theexplosions

Appendix C - Barometric pressures and temperature readings recordedat the Morgantown MUniCipal Airport, Morgantown,West Virginia" on December 4, 5" 6, and 7, 1962

Appendix D - Section of Robena No. 3 mine showing ventilation systemand explosion area

Map of Robena No.3 mine showing explosion area,direction of forces, and details within explosionarea (In pocket)

Appendix E

CONTENTS

Introdtic tion " ,... + " ••••.•.•••. ~ •• of e • • • •• " • .,." l' • " •••.• If' y .••••• ., • ",'. ,.. • •. • 1

Ge..lleral Information ...., ~•. t .••••••. 111 •••••••.• 0 f ••• (\ , • , • c ••••..•• ill •• 0 •• CI •. •• • •• ••• •• 2

~lining Methods, Conditions) and Equipmentttnning MethodsBlastirJg .,.... ~.•• "It ••• ~ .• " •• ~ , •• " • r .•.•. ,. • " " •.••. ,.

Ventilation and Mine GasesDust ...............•. ".,,,,. ..~"TransportationElectricityIllumination and Smoking ••••••..••.•.•Mine Rescue

~",. •••• :O ••• "' ••••• ll •• ". ."' ••••••• , •• ,..lo' ••f •••••••.•.• , •• " •

.:- Y I .•••.• " •••••.

......•••••••••....•.. "'•.•••••• ~.•••• ,.f>,..,.~. ... " .

• •• til ••••••••••••

IoIW .••• II •• S''i).It., .••••.••••••••••••••• • ••••••.•.•• V.,. •••

Story of Explosion and Recovery OperationsParticipating OrganizationsActivities of Bureau of Mines Personnel~lining Conditions Immediately Prior to the Explosion •••••••••EVidence of Activities and StorJ of Explosion ••••••••••••••••Recovery Operations

.............. ) ,. .<I: •• ·~IIiI •• r."')"''' •••.•.••••.•

<ll' •••• 'O •••••• .,. ••••••••• , ••••••.•••••••••• IIIl ••••

Investigation of Cause of ExplosionInvestigation Committee ••• < ••••••••

Methane as a Factor in the Explosion .,.•••••••.••••••••••••••FlameFore es .... 11 •• ,. •• " ••••• II •••••••••••••••.•••••••. r •••.••.• r •••.•. 0 • I •••••.•••.• io •

P.cobable Point of Origin •••.••.•.••••••• "..••...•••••••••••••••Factors Prev61ting Spread of ~(plosion ••.•.•••..••••• ,••••••••Sunmary of EvidenceCause of Explosion •.•.

., ............•.•••••..•.••• ,.a ••

•. ll ••• C·.· ••••.•••.•••••••••••••.••.•..•.••.• ~ .•.•.• '.r ••.• c. •• A' •• '""if

c •••. t ••• ,••• "." •.•••••••• ", ••.•.••.•.••.••• ,

Recommendations •••••••••• .J ••• R._ •• " ••.•. 9 •••••• ~ •••.•••••• 1l ••• "i' •.•••••.•••

.•••• • .••• ,..o .•• !.lI'a ••••••••.••• ".·~•••• e ••• " •••.•••••••••••

Air Analyses - Table 1 (2 sheets) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• flo ••••• 9 ••••• ., ••

Dust Analyses - Table 2 (1 sheet) •..•.• ·" • ., ••••••.•• .,.,,11 •••••• ~ ••••••

D~st Analyses - Table 3 (2 sheets) •.••• V~IlVt:l~.,Io .•••••• ,,1I ••••• 4 ••••••••

Appendix A V:i.ctimsof Explosion •••••••••• " .••• " •• a •••••••• 6 ••••• '

Appendix B - Mine Map••••••••••• ••••••• 4i •• , ••••••••• ft •••••• , •••••••

Page

455677910

1111121318

1920222323232326

27

31

APPENDIXES (run.)

Appendix F - Dust-survey map, Robena No.3 mineAppendix G - A~lysis, Frosty Run fan operating chart

Frosty R'lO fan operating chartGarards Fort. fan operating chartBailey fan operating chart

Appendix R - Direct-current power distribution plan,(Nos. 1, 2, and 3)

Appendix I - Report covering results of special testsat the faces of 8 le:rt 4 mains, RobenaJanuary 15, 1963

Sketches showing air quantities, January 15, 1963:TeRt. A-l.Test A-2Teet A-3Test A-4Test A-5Test A-6Test A-7Test A-8Tent A-9

Appendix J - Sample ana]~8es and results of gas-emission testsconducted by members of investigating committee,December 19, 1962

Table 1. - S~mple analyses and results of gas-emission test - face area, December 19, 1962

Map of methane sampling and measuring points(8 left section)

Table 2. - Sample analyses and methane liberationfrom face and a portion of area Qutby the face,December 19, 1962

Appendix K - Gas-eMdssion tests, December 18, 1962Table 1. - Liberation of methane from a portion

of the face area and the returns of the facesplits

Table 2. - Liberation of methane :rrcm the facesand the entry surfaces outby the face to51 crosscut

(In pocket)

Robena mine(In pocket)

conductedNo. 3 mine,

FINAL REPORT OF MAJOR MINE-EXPLOSION DISASTERROBENANO. 3 MINE

UNITED STATES STEELCORPORATIONCOAL DIVISION, FRICKDISTRICT

CARMICHAELS,GREENE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

December6, 1962

By

T. J. McDonaldAssistant to District Supervisor

R. W. StahlMining Health and Safety Engineer

R. J. KirkFederal Coal Mine Inspector

Ralph I. KrekFederal Coal Mine Inspector (Electrical)

John A. NoonFederal Coal Mine Inspector

INTRODUCTION

This report 1s based on an investigation made in accordance with provisionsof the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act (66 Stat. 692; 30 U.S.C. Sees. 451-483).

'1\10 gas and coal·dust explosions, the first at about 1:05 p.m. and the secondat about 1;25 p.m., occurred on Thursday, December6, 1962, in the 4 mainsright area of RobenaNo.3 mine, United states Steel Corporation, CoalDiVision, Frick District, Carmichaels, Greene County, Pennsylvania. Thirty-seven men, all of those working in the 8 left section of the explosion area,are believed to have died as a result of the first explosion, as attestedby the fact that some of the watches, including the watch on the body of theoutermost victim, had been stopped betveen 1;03 and 1:05, while tvo othermen lIno approached the area after the first exploSion were knocked downbutnot injured by the forces of the second explosion. The other 133 men 111 theRobena No·3 mine at the time 'Werevithdraw vithout mishap.

The names of the victims, their ages 1 marital status, occupations, and numberof dependents are listed 1n appendix A of this report.

aareau of Mines investigators believe that the first explosion originatedin the race area of 8 left inby 90 crosscut between Nos. 4 and 8 entrieswhena mixture of methane and air was ignited by one of four possiblesources: A nip station Just outby 90 crosscut on No. 6 entry, a carpuller activated by an open-type electric motor located on intake aira1: the inby right corner of No.6 entry at 90 crosscut, friction sparks:tram bits of a continuous miner being operated at the face of the slantp1ace between Nos. 1 and 8 entries inby 91 crosscut, or an auxiliary tan1D operation and in nonpermissible condition in 91 crosscut between thesl.ent and Bo. 8 entry. (See appendix E.)

!be second explosion originated somewherein 8 left section whengas and/ordust vas ignited by residual fires or by an electric arc, since the main:taD had been restarted and the mine power system had been reenergized soonafter the first explosion. Coal dust assisted in the propagation of bothexplosions.

!he forces of the first explosion radiated from the face area of 8 leftsection extending throughout 8 left and 4 mains and terminating in theemission of dust from the downcast side of Frosty Runshaft. The forcesof the second explosion extended throughout the samegeneral area and alsocaused dust to issue from the downcast side cif Frosty Run shaft. Eachexplosion resulted in stoppage of the Frosty Run fan.

GENERAL :mFORMATION

'Dle Robenamine, operated as one unit, consists of three interconnectedmines, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, located at Greensboro and Carmichaels, GreeneCounty, Pennsylvania, which are served by barges on the MonongahelaRiver.

The operating officials of the companywere:

J. C. Gray Administrative VicePresident, RawMaterials

Vice President,·Operations-Coal

Assistant Vice President,Coal Production

Assistant Vice President,Coal Staff

General Superintendent

Jesse F. Core

E. B. Belson

WoodsG. Ta1J:na.n

Ralph C. Beerbower, Jr.

w. E. Cook Assistant GeneralSuperintendent

Chief Mine InspectorMine InspectorMine InspectorSuperintendent, Robena

No.3 mineMineForeman, Robena

No.3 mine

WayneD. SnellOren HartzelLeo PUssMichael Wydo

Marlon Misiak

2

525 William Penn Place,Pittsburgh 30, Pa.

do.

do.

do.

509 Fayette National BankBuilding, Uniontown, Pa.

do.

do.do.do.

R. D. 1, Box 149,Carmichaels, Pa.

do.

un.expected.Iy, due to caving ground and an Inrush ;)f what is Lccal.Ly re-

ferred to as quicksand. Plans for openi.ng the sus}:er:.d..ed urrt i I

April 23; 1959, when ground was broken for the present heisting shaft.

The hoist or main shaft was completed November 24, 1)(~~: LC\"t:\'er; t:12

further development of the mine was ter;.porarily halted until the sur f'ac e

stru~tures wer-e erected. Coal on one shift was first produ.ced Ju.l;J' }:::,

1961, and continued to be produced in-:ermittently urrttL the da:,' cf t!:o;

\.,;.{plosio:l.. I, full crew on the second s11ift st.arted. t c :;::r.::d~c:.::: ccaL ::::-~e

worki.'1g shifts prior to the disaster.

The partly completed air shaft, located 520 feet ea s t, of the

mair. shaft, 'Was started November 7, 1961. The 6..f'oo t c i rcu.Lar- steel-

lined air shaft had been driven peTiodically to a depth ~f 70 feet belcw

the surface soil and to within 74 feet of the coal D0d at the t~~e ~fthe explosion.

The Immed i.at,e roof is, a medium-finn gray snaLe whici.•. is abcuc

12 inches in thickness, overlaid by 12 f'ect of ha.r-d shale, 3 t2 5 feet sf

limestone, and by IIJ feet of sandstone, succcss tvv..,-. 1':1>.: i:r...r:l<::.uiate !'~::.:.:'

disintegrates after it is exposed to the mine atmcsphcre , and :,j ~T(":'0":::-'

it from weathering approximately 12 to 18 Lnches :JI' t.~)Pc.)[11 ~::: ':":.::~':..

to the mine atmosphere.

The analysis of a coal sample from the Ll.Li ncLs :;,;. 6 coa I

obta i.ned from a coal company located in the iE:rr,cd:':·l:.~vi c ::1:!.r.;: is as

follows: Moisture - 7.2 percent; volatile matter - 3h.3 ~~el"c:::;t.;fix~d

carbon - 51.0 percent; ash - 7.0 percent.

3

The 1a.Dl3.1ns section consisted of 11 ent rf eu which had been developed about1)800 feet inby 8 left junction. Entry development in It. mains had beenstopped and the section was idle at the time of the explosions.

Development in 8 left 4 main section consisted of driving 10 entries on75-foot centers wIth crosscuts at 9O-foot intervals. The 8 left entrieshad been turned off 4 mains and driven about 5,500 feet, at which point itvas necessary to change the direction of developn~nt to intersect a recentlysunk shaft (Kirby) located about 4,300 feet to the right of the active faces.

At this point the customary system of development, which was to advanceentries :from the return-air side of the split toward the intake or fromleft and right toward the center, a very commendable system from a venti-lation standpoint, vas temporarily discontinued, and the cerrtee or intakeentries of both the right and left splits were advanced to get the radiidriven and expedite the construction of overcasts in the section to permitsplitting the air when the 90° turn would be made toward Kirby shaft.Apparently the fact that this rather drastic deviation from the usualdevelopment system would adversely affect ventilation of the faces wasoverlooked, and areas with sluggish ventilation inviting gas accumulationas well as reversal of airflow direction resulted.

Roof bolts were installed in all working sections in compliance with theplan approved by the Bureau of Mines, supplemented by timbers, steelchannels, steel I-beams, and hydraulic roof jacks where necessary. In8 left the bolts were installed on 3- and 4-foot centers to within 4 :feetof the working face before the Goodman boring machine run was started.The boring machine advanced one half the side of a block or a maximum of50 feet into solid coal, then the machine was moved from the place whileroof bolts were installed. The roof was supported by safety posts and/orsafety Jacks during drilling and bolting operations. Roo:f bolts were5/8-inch high-strength steel, 5 to 6 feet in length. In addition to steelstraps, 6- by 6- by 1/4-inch flat high •.carbon-steel bearing plates wereused. Roof-bolting operations were perfonned with compressed-air-activatedequipment.

Two face unf ts consisting of two GOodman 400 Borer machines, six shuttlecars, two of which were not in use, and two ll-BJ Joy cleanup loadingmachines were being used to develop 8 left section. Other electric faceequipment included two auxiliary ..type exhaust fans with tUbing, whichwere used for face ventilation during loading operations, and a Joy lO-RUcutting machine.

E?cPlosivesPermissible-type American Cyanamid Model A explosives and Hercules E.B.instantaneous electric detonators were used for blasting, and they were

4

properly stored in well-constructed magazineson the surface and transportedinto the mine in specially constructed explosives cars. The amountof explo-sives and detonators stored in the section boxes in 8 left for use by theconstructL'1 crew in the explosion area, as found during the investigation,was 1n excess of a 48-hour supply.

Ex:plosives were not used in the production of coal except whenclay veinstoo hard to cut T.nth the boring machinesvere encountered. Reportedly, theface was undercut Or sheared before clay veins were blasted. The face wasblasted on the third (construction and maintenance) shift by certifiedshot firers using permissible blasting units, and the clay and coal. wasloaded into shuttle cars by either the boring machine or a loading machine.Ex:plosives were not stored in the face areas but were taken to the faces inindi vidual containers Whenneeded.

Construction work in the 8 left section (explosion area) consisted mainlyof' installing add!tional roof supports and advancing the main haulage road,approximately 3 feet of bottom rock being removedto makethe desired grade.Boreholes were drilled in the bottom on 4-toot centers to a depth of about3 feet, and, reportedly, these holes were stemmedvi th incombustiblematerials and fired by certified shot firers during the nonproducingshift.Reportedly, tests for explosive gas were madebefore firing each shot orgroup of shots.

Evidence brought out during the official hearings on the disaster disclosedthat blasting was not done on the construction shift on December6, andthere was no indication during the investigation of the disaster thatblasting had been done on the shift on which the explosions occurred.

Ventilation and MineGases

Ventilation in the Robenamine was induced by seven propeller-type fansproperly installed on the surface and equipped with the necessary safetydevices. Onefan, operated blowing, served to ventilate the slope bottomand rotary dumpsand, combiningwith the Colvin fan, ven'tilate<l the haulageroad on 2 main butts of RobenaNo. 1mine. The other six fans were operatedexhausting, three of which (Garards Fort, Bailey, and Frosty Run)were usedto ventilate the No.3 mine. A fan was installed at the recently completedBlaker shaft portal and will be put into operation whenrequired by futuredevelopment. This shaft (Blaker) and the Hartley shaft serve as intakeair shafts. Separation doors were placed at various locations throughoutthe mine to regulate and/or isolate the various fan splits.

The Frosty Runfan, which was affected by the explosion (see appendix n),was operated at a speed of 900 revolutions per minute and developed anegative pressure of 6.2 inches of water gage. The volumeof air measuredat the bottom of the shaft and returning to this fan was about 415,000cubic feet a minute. Nethalle liberation collect.ed by the air returning

5

to this fan vas calculated to be 2,260,000 cubic feet in 24 hours. ElevenspUts of air provided ventilation for the active worldngs in 5 left,1 right, {\left, and 4.mains. The wa other main fans at No·3 mine wereno~ affected by the explosions and continued to operate. (see appendix D.)

A split system of ventilation was used throughout the mne. Overcasts andpel'1'!1aDentstopplngs were constructed of incombustible material. Tenporarymetal stopplngs were used in face areas in addition to those constructedof' mason.rymaterials. Line brattice, auxiliary fans with tubing, and checkcurtains were used to direct air to the face areas. The quanti ties of airpassing through the last open crosscuts in developing entries and beingdelivered to the intake end of the pillar lines during the February 1962Federal inspection were considered to be adequate.

Air measurementsand methanedeterminations madeduring the Federal inspec-Uon in progress at the time of this disaster were as follows:

CUbicfeetVolumeof Methane, of methane

Location air, cfm percent in 24 hours

Return. No. 1 door, Longshaft 102,050 0.24 350,000Return. No. 2 door, Long shaft 103,200 .24- 360,000Return. No. 3 door, Long shaft 139,360 .26 520,000Return. No. 4 door, Long shaft 136,680 .25 490,000Return. No. 1 split, Bowlbyshaft 97 ,500 .09 130,000Return. No. 2 spl1t, Bowlbyshaft 86,400 .06 75,000Return. No. 3 split, Bowlbyshaft 81,510 .06 70,000Return. No. 4 spl1t, Bowlbyshaft 98,150 .06 85,000Return. No. I split, Colvin shaft 14,100 .12 130,000Return. No. 2 split, Colvin shaft 111,030 .16 260,000Return. No·3 split, Colvin shaft 238,520 .13 450,000Return. Slope fan 31,000 .00Return. No.1 split, Bailey shaft 114,240 .21 350,000Return. No. 2 split, Bailey shaft 105,000 .12 1801000Return. No. 3 split, Bailey shaft 95,200 .10 140,000Return. No.4 split, Bailey shatt 1081500 .07 110,000Return. No. 1 split, Garards Fort shatt 126,000 .28 510,000Return. No. 2 split, Garards Fort shaft 109,000 .27 420,000Return. No. 3 split, Garards Fort shaft 1111000 .22 370,000Return. No. 4 spl1t, Garards Fort shaft 102,000 .14 210,000Return. No. I split, Frosty Runshaft 93,000 .60 800,000Return. No.2 split, Frosty Runshaft 107,000 .42 650,000Return. No·3 split, Frosty Runshatt 116,000 .23 380,000Return. No. 4 split, Frosty Runshaft 991000 ·30 430,000

6

The mine is classed gassy by the State and the Bureauof Mines. Preshiftexaminations for gas and other hazards were madeby certified officiaJ.sbefore the first opera.ting shift of each day, and preshift eXaminationsforsucceeding shifts vere madeby the onshift certified official during hisregu.lar toU;"of duty. Onshift examinations for gas and other hazards weremadeby assistant foremen, mine foremen, safety inspectors, certain equip-ment operators, and shot firers. Gaswells penetrating the property wereprotected by blocks of coal left in place. Anabandonedand plugged gaswell was situa.ted about 1,150 feet to the right of the faces in 8 leftsection.

Twospll ts of air ventilated 8 left 4 mains. The intake air was conductedthrOUghNos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 entries to the face area, where it was splitright and left. Regulators installed in the right and left return entriesof 8 left just inby the junction with l,. mainswere used to control thequanti ties in the two separate splits.

Air readings talten by the pre shift examiner on the shift prior to thedisaster showed26,000 cubic feet of air a minute in the left return splitand 36,000 in the right return split. At this time only construction 'Workwas in progress, and the electric face equipmenthad been movedback fromthe working faces. The auxiliary fans used for face ventilation were notin operation, and the air current was conducted to the entry faces by checkcurtains and line brattices. The ventilating spll t for the left side wasconducted through No. 5 entry to 91 crosscut where it subdivided. Onespl1 t was directed to the face of the radius crosscut betlleen Nos. 5 and6 entries and then used to ventilate the workingplaces on the left sideand returned through No. 0 entry to 87 crosscut whereNos. 1 and 2 entriesalso became returns. The other subspli t was directed to the face of No. 6entry, thence through 91 crosscut, and returned to join the right splitat 91 radiUS crosscut betweenNos. 6 and T entries. Air from this pointwas coursed through the active workings on the right side and returnedthrough No. 10 entry to 89 crosscut where No. 10 ended, thence throughNo. 9 entry to 86 crosscut where Nos. T and 8 entries also becamereturns.

The 4 mains idle section inby 8 left was ventilated by 0. separate air splitcontrolled by regulators on the intalte airways Just outby the faces. Testi-monyof the ventilation engineer disclosed that 9,600 cubic feet of air aminute (measured in this intalte) entered this section. In a.ddition, returnair from the right sp11t of 8 left passed through this section.

~

At the time of the February 1962Federal inspection of the RobellO-mine, themine surfaces were generally dry. Dangerousaccumulations of loose coal orcoal dust were not observed. Water was used to allay dust during cuttingand mining operations, on belt conveyors, and to wet downshuttle-carrunways.

7

Dust samples collected on 4 mains rieht haulageway, in the left pars.l1elentry near the junction of 8 left, and in the right parallel of 8 left 1,000teet Inby the .lunctdon during the Federal inspection in progress whentheexplosions occurred contained 90.0, 76.0, and 94.0 percent incombustible,respectively. Amixture of' coak and rock dust from 6 to 8 inches in depthvas observed along shuttle-car runvays.

J)lst surveys (see appendixF) madein 4 mains and 8 left (explosion area.)af'ter the explosions, duz-Lng which 356 sampleswere collected, showedonly16.8 percent above the nurrtmum 65 percent incombustible; hovever, thesesamples are not indicative of the dust conditions in the area prior to theexplosions.

Visual observations in the explosion area indicated a possible deficiency in!'OcIt.-ciustine;,so dust surveys "Teremadein areas of the mine (5 fiats right!f, mains left, 4 mains 4 left 5 butt left, and 4 mains left) not affected bythe exp.Ios Lons to determine if rock-dusting was satisfactory in thesesections, and also as on indication of what might have been in 8 left priorto the explosions. Of the 225 samples collected in these nonexplosion-sft"ected areas (see table 1), 24 percent were belO".lthe required minimumof65 percent incombustible . However,the deficient areas were relativelysmall.

The hearings disclosed that loose coal on the entries and in the crosscutsvas cleaned up promptly after the crosscuts were tapped, but that coalspillage was not promptly removedfronl the shuttle-car runwaysand occa-sionally blanket rock-dusting was done in face areas berore aJ~ loose coaland coal dust had been removed. It was further revealed that rock-dustersvere used for other W'ork,but managementmaintained that a regular scheduleof rock-dusting 'Wasand is being followed.

FUrther testimony during the hearings revealed that 53 loaded care end onepartly loaded car of coal were in the section (2 loaded and a partly loadedcar near the loading rampbetween 89 and 90 crosscuts, 10 cars in 84 cross-cut, 36 cars extending inby from 45 crosscut J and 5 on the right side pickupat 72 ~rosscut). Sixty-three tons of coal were swept from these cars by theforces of' the explosions, and that portion smaller than 20 meshwould havebeen fuel to propagate the explosions. This tonnage figure was determinedby comparingthe average weight of coal in cars loaded before the disasterwith the average weight of coal In the cars in the disaster area. Testimonyalso revealed that it was believed that the explosion originated from anign1tion or gas in the face area of 8 lett and was propagated by the above-mentioned coal dust in addition to 1,400 or morepounds on the mine floorresulting from timber hitches cut in the ribs be~een 76 and 77 crosscutsBo. 5 entry and other coal dust In the entries. This same testimony,together with the directional forces observed during the investigation(see appendix E), disclosed that the explosions appeared to travel thehaulageways and parallels (intake airways) in 8 len, pushing the stoppingstoward the returns on both sides, and that this was because of' the tuelsource in the intaJte airways (coal dust) •

8

Observation in the explosion area revealed that the boring-type continuousminer leaves rather smoothroof and rib surfaces to whiclJ.rock dust does notreadily cling, but coal dust does because the surfaces are wet whenthe coaldust is produced and possibly dry whenrock-dusted.

Bureau of' MineRexperiments have proved that blanket rock-dusting eventhough pr. perly done viII not always stop an explosion where the roof andrib dust is not in excess of the 65 percent minimumincombustible, whichindicates a possible need for addltional protection such as somenewtypeof rock-dust barriers to be installed near the working areas, at loaded-carstorage areas, and in belt-conveyor entries where coal dust Is plentiful.

Transportation

Permissible-type and explosion-tested cable-reel shuttle cars were used in8 left to transport coal from the face areas. The coal. vas discharged fromthem directly into mine cars that were pulled by trolley locomotives to thebottom of the Robenaslope where they were unloadedby a rotary dump. Thecoal was then transported to the surface cleaning plant by belt conveyor.Menvere lowered into and hoisted from the "11ineby elevators at variousshaft locations and transported to and fromworking sections in coveredman-trip cars. Self-propelled mine Jitneys were used for miscellaneous trans-portation requirements. Traffic on the haulage roads was directed bydispatchers using telephones (trolley and conventional) and by a manuallyoperated signal system. The track and rolling stock vere maintained ingood condition.

Electricity

Direct-current power, at 550 volts, was provided for use undergroundby14 rectifiers and 11 motor-generator sets, vith a total rated capacity of12,400 kilowatts. However,at the time of the explosions, the Blaker sub-station was not in service. The conversion equipment, installed in 13 fire-resistant structures on the surface, was interconnected for paralleloperation by automatic reclosing circuit bre~ters located near the bottomof boreholes and shafta. In addition to overcurrent protective devices insubstations, 45 automatic reclosing circuit breakers were instaHed through-out the undergroundd.c . power sys'tem. The automatic reclosing circuitbreakers were eqUippedvi tb a load-measuring device. This device is usedto determine the load current that 'Will flow whenthe cireui t breaker isclosed by determining the load resistance before the circuit brewter isclosed. The load-measuring device responds to the difference in voltagedrop measured across one-half of a load-measuring resistor, as comparedwith the voltage drop measured across the other balf of the load-measuringresistor and the load resistance in series. The device will operate toclose the circuit breaker whenthe load resistance increases to a pre-determined value. If, for example, a zero resistance fault exists in the

9

s:\osteminb •••the circuit breaker-, the device will prevent the breaker fromclOSing. Ute load-measuring resistor is bridged across the circuit breakerto provide a test current of approximately 30 amperes. It is therefore pos-sible m energize the undergroundpowersystemwith this test current byone or moreconversion unf ts feeding power into the system. Powernreswere supported on well-installed insulators, and cutout switches were pro-vided at required locations •. Devices for protection against lightning wereinstalled on pOW'er-transmissioncircuits that entered the mine throughshafts and boreholes. Polarity of the trolley wire was positive. (SeeappendixH.)

A central supervisory control system for mine ventilating fans and sub-stations vas installed in the Coldn substation. The system provideseont!nuou.smonitoring of 7 ventilating fans and remote operation of 22 mine-feeder e1rc:uit breakers located in all substations except Colvin. Thedrem.t breakers in Colvin Bubstation are manually operated , and othersare monitored on a programmedschedule. A minimumof approximately 4 min-utes is required to open all circuit breakers connected to the supervisorycontrol system, and complete removal of electric power from the mine is~all.y accomplished in apprOXimately8 minutes.

Visible and audible signal devices are installed at each fan location, andthey supplement the signals sent back to the supervisory control system inthe Colvin substation from each fan. Anaudible horn and visible lights1~aUng device vas installed in and on the outside of the Colvin hoistroomwhich is adjacent to the substation. Whenan indication of a fanfailure Is received at the control center, the hoisting engineer or otherqualified persons are instructed to removeaD. electric power from the mine.Tbis fUnction is accomplishedby opening the Colvin substation circuitbreakers manually, and all other substation circuit breakers are actuatedthrough the supervisory control system.

All. main exhaust fans are eqUippedwith various protective devices, vhichinclude instantaneous and inverse time overload relays, phase failure orreversal, incomplete starting sequence, bearfng temperature, and reduc-tion of vater gage. Stoppage of the fan for any reason will cause aprimary aUdible and visible signal to be given at Colvin shaft throuBhthe remote fan signal system. SupplementalJ'audible and visible signalswill function siImlltaneously at the affected fan.

During the February 1962Federal inspection, operators of electric faceequipmentmadesui table tests for methanebefore elec'tric equipmentlr"coS taken inby the last open crosscut and at frequent intervals while suchequipmentwas beine; operated in the face ree1ons. Testimonyby witnessesdurlne.the hearings revealed that tests for methanevere not madebeforeelectn.c eqUipmentwas energized. However,tests for methanewere madeIn face areas before the machineswere advanced to the face.

10

The electric face equipment in 8 left section consisted of two perm1ss1ble-type Goodman400 boring machines, six Joy lO-SCshuttle cars (one permissibletype and f1ve explosion-tested type, whichwere l'iDlilar to permissible carsbut were manufactured before the Bureau of Mines tested cable-reel shuttlecars for per,1.ssibili ty), twoperm1ssible-typeauxiliary ventilating fans,two permissible-type Joy ll-BJ loading machines, and one permissible-tj'''PeJoy lO-RUrubber-tire-mounted cutting machine. Fire-resistant-type(polyvinyl-chloride-jacketed) trailing cables were used on face equipmentin this section, and each cable was provided with a power tap and sui tablefuse or a fuse and circuit breaker. Trailing cables connected to electricface equipment were thoroughly examinedand tested, but no defects werefound. As a result of heat developed by the explosions, the plasticjackets of numeroustrailing cables were defonned. Only one trailingcable contained more than the allowable number(five) of temporary splices,and the splices were well made. Tests for continuity of frame-groundwireswere made, but defects were not indicated.

The electric equipment in 8 left section was examinedduring the investiga-tion, and the following permissibility defects were found in the permissible-type equipment:

1. A substitution of trailing-cable size and type and omission of packingin the cable packing gland resulted in an opening in the contactor compart-ment of the Jeffrey auxiliary fan in 91 crosscut betweenNos. 1 and 8entries. The pacldng gland Wasdesigned for a No. 10 three-conductor 'l'ype-Wround cable, but a No.6 two-conductor Type-Gflat cable was used. Thecable conductors were separated and the negative pOW'erconductor was bareat the entrance to the packing gland.

2. The Goodmanboring machine in No. 8 entry had an opening 1n excess of0.004 inch in a cable connection box for the pumpmotor. A cap screwvasalso missing from the cover plate. The trailing-cable packing gland atthe entrance to an isolating-awi tcb compartmeiit·was- not-- pa.cked. The cablewas not provided with a hose conduit and was not clampedsecurely. Inaddition, the machinewas equipped with the following electrical componentsnot covered by Bureau of tUnes approval: A compartmentcontaining an iso-lating switch, the headlight and resistor were replaced with other types,a connection box was installed in the pump-motorcircuit, the control switchtor the pwnp1110tor"Tas relocated and replaced with a sln tch or differentdesign, and an emergency-stop switch was added.

3. A hose conduit for the pump-motorcable was not clampedto a connectionbox on the .roy ll-EU loading machine in No.1 entry between 89 and 90crosscuts.

4. The trailing-cable packing gland at the entrance to the main contactorcompartmentwas inadequately packed on the Joy auxiliary fan in 91 crosscutbetween Nos. 3 and 4 entries. A 19-inch length of 1/4-inch pa.ckingisrequired, but only 6-1/2 inches was used.

11

5- The f'Qlloon~ d€'fcct;.s were found in the GOodm..'1l1borine; mo.ch~nein92 crosscut betlreen Nos. 6 and 1 entries: An:! "specti on cover an the main~ntactQr cOlllPartment\laS not provided \.,:\th a locldng screw, an opening waspresent in the main contactor compartJ:\C:lta.:; a result of the entrance ofthe rotor-motor cable into the compartmentwithout the use of a sui tablepacking gland, the emergency-stop-sri tcb control cable was connected toother cables in the connection box in a haphazard manner, the lsolation-svitch and emergency-stop-switch control cnbles were not clamped and thehose conduit imS inadequate, and pacld.ngvas not used in the cable packingglands in the isolatin~-svitch compartment. This machinewas equipped withthe :following componentsthat are not covered by Bureau of Mines approvalfor this type of machine: A compartmentcontaining an isolating sw1tch,headlight and resistor} and an emersency switch.

6. '!'heheadlight cable and hose conduit on a Sullivan 7-AU track-mountedcutting machine in No. 5 entry be~een 16 and 77 crosscuts were severed,possibly by the e}..l'losions. This machinewas not used inby the last opencrosscut, since trackless rninins methodswere used at the face.

7. OpeninGSin excess of 0.004 inch were present in the main contactor,resistor, and conveyor-motorcontrol compartmentson a ~~er5-Whaleytrack-mountedloading machinein No. 5 entry 62 crosscut. Manycap screws on thema1ncontactor compartmentcover plate were loose, and the motor cable hoseconduit at the entrance to the main contactor compartmentvas broken. Thismachinewas not used inby the last open crosscut, since trackless miningmethodswere used at the face.

These deficiencies in the permissible-type equipment indicated general sub·standard inspection and maintenance of such equipment.

[)erects in permissibility vere not found 1n other permissible-type faceequipment. An examination of the five explosion-tested-type shuttle carsused 1n face areas disclosed no openings into electrical compartments;however, an opening in excess of 0.004 inch was found in the main contactorcompartmentof a Joy lOSClF (explosion-tested-type) shuttle car in No.2entry 50 crosscut.

The electrical controls of the Goodmanboring machine and Joy shuttle carin the slant beween Nos. 7 and 8 entries vere found in the operatingposition. The control switch on the Jeffrey fan in 91 crosscut is amomentary-contact type, and therefore a definite determination as toWhether the fan was in operation could not be made. The pod tion of elec-trical controls found on the Goodmanboring machine in 92 crosscut (leftside), Joy a~<iliary fan 1n 91 crosscut be~TeenNos. 3 and 4 entries,shuttle cars, and other electric face equipment indicated that they werenot in operation at the time of the explosions.

An examination of the electric face eqUipmentdisclosed no electrical faultsexcept, a hendlight ci rcui t in the main contactor compartmenton the Goodman

boring machine be tweenNos. 6 and 7 entries. The conductors had beensevered. Testimony during the hearings revealed that the headlight liasnot in oper•..."Lng conditi on for several days prior to the explosions.

There vas no evidence of burning in the control compartmentof the auxil-iary ventilating fan beb.een Nos. 7 and 8 entries.A distance of 4.75 inches was measuredbetween the frames of the shuttlecar and the boring machine in the slant betweenNos. 7 and 8 entries.

Illumination and Smoking

Permissible electric cap lampswere used for portable illumination under-ground. Smokingwas not perm!tted or observed underground during anyFederal inspection, and searches for smokers' articles were conductedfrequently. Smokingmaterial was not found in the section or amongthepersonal effects of the victims, which 1s Bubstantial proof of strict com-pliance wi. th a no-smoking requirement.

MineRescue and Firefi¢Dting Facilities

A total of 24 trained and active membersOf mine rescue teams and 3 trainedand active station attendants were available, and 29 McCaaself-containedbreathing apparatus were maintained at the Central Rescue Station at RobenaNo. 1 mine (Colvin shaft). Also 12 Chemoxhalf-hour oxygen-generating self-contained breathing apparatus were available in various companymines in thedistrict. In addition, other f\llly eqUippedand trained mine rescue tearoswere available at other mines wi thin a 30-mile radius.

All employees in the RobenaNo. 3 mine carried self-rescuers on theirpersons, and two self-rescuers were kept on each locomotive. In addition,two universal gas maskswere stored at each loading rampand belt head.Each mine ,jitney was equipped "lith one universal gas mask.

SUitably marked escapewayswere available from each working section to thesurface. A check-in and check-out system provided positive identificationupon each person underground.

Firefighting equipment consisted of waterlines 1'1'0111 the sui-race to eachworlting section, air lines that could be converted readily to waterlines,hose trucks located at strategic points along haulage roads, and dry-"cJ'!>echemical. fire extinguishers on each piece of mobile equipment in the mine,at belt heads and tailpieces, and at permanent electric L~stallations. High-pressure rock-dusting machines, vlth ample supplies of rock dust, and.a. foam-generating machine, vith an ample supply of foaming agent, were ava11aole forfiref1ghting service.

13

STORYOF EXPLOSIONSAIm RECOVERYOPERATIONS

Activities of Bureau of Mines Personnel

Abcu.t 3:00 p.rn. December6, 1962, Edvard J. sulllvnn, superintendent otRobena No.2 mine, informed Gerald D. Young, Federal coal mine inspector,Waynesburg, Pennsylvania, that 16 men were trapped in the Frosty Run sectionof' Robena No.3 mine. Young informed the Pittsburgh office of the Bureauof' Mines of' the occurrence immediately, and then notified Federal Coal MineInspector James B. Shonnon, also from the '''aynesburs, Pennsylvania, oftice.Sbmmon vas making an inspection of the Robena mine and was traveling theretQ.rn airwaYS of Robena No. 1mine (Colvin shaft) with I. J. Menarcheck,m:!ne foreman, at the time of the occurrence. Shannon had left the mineproperty about 1:20 pvm, and was unaware of the occurrence until contactedby-Young.

Young and Shannon arrived at the mine about 4:00 p vm, and conferred withcompany officials on the surface. Shannon accompanied a mine rescue teaminto the mine to join another team and companyofficials already under-ground, while Young remained on the surface to check the fan (Frosty Run),determine the qUality of the air returning from the mine, and relay to thePittsburgh office of the Bureau of I-dnes any information gained by Shannon.

The following Bureau of Mines personnel assisted in the recovery operationsandlor subsequent investigations and hearings:

F. Delbert BakerRichard E. BarrJohn BarryJames A. BennettJoseph S. BochnaJennings D. BreedonWilburn C. CagleyJohn T. CallahanGordon W. ChastainWymarG. CooperRobert T. DavisWilliam M. DemkowiczWilliam R. DevettJohn S. EakinsOma.r ElkinsFrank HeffersJohn W. HolcombWilliam H. HooverDonald \,. HuntleyBenjamin J. JonesDonald S. KinBeryRobert J. Kirk

Earl M. KleesRalph I. KrekJames B. l>icCarty, Jr.ThomasJ. t-tcDonaldDonald W. M1tchellJohn NagyJohn A. NoonDavid T. ParryRichard H. ReidJohn RiskoEarle M. RudolphJames B. ShannonR. Ward StahlStacy L. StilesEverett TurnerW. Dan Walker, Jr.Harry F. WeaverJames WestfieldFred A. WilliamsGerald D. YoungMichael A. YuhaseHenry Zavora

14

OnDecember6, 1962, a Withdrawal Order was issued under Section 203(0.)(1)of the Federal Coal l'line Safety Act, debarring all persons from the Robenamine (Nos. 1, 2, and 3), except those needed for exploratory and recoverywork. Before the Order was issued the companyofficials had wHhdrawanallmen, except "those mentioned above, from the Robenamine (Nos. 1, 2, and 3).

Mining Cond!tiona Immediately Prior to the Explosions

The mine was operating normally on the da.yof the explosions, end theweather was cold and stormy. The temperatures and barometric pressuresfrom 6:00 a.m. December4 to 6:00 a.m. December7, 1962, recorded atMorgantownl-lunicipal Airport, l-lorgantown,WestVirginia, are listed inappendix C. The barometric preasure dropped frOlll30.04 at 6:00 a.m.December4 to 29.35 at 1:00 p.m. December6, 1962. The temperature rangedfrom a high of 610 F. to a lOW' of 27° F. during the sameperiod. It is theopinion of the Bureau investigators'that the variation in atmospheric pres-sure did not contribute materially to the explosions.

The reports of the examinations by the fire boss end assistant mine foremanmadeon the last production shift (4: 00 p vm, to 12:00 .D1dnighton December5,1962) in the 8 left section prior to the explosions indicated that gas hadnot been detected in the affected section. Hm{ever,during the officialbearings on the explosions, a continuous-miner opera.tor on that shift statedthat he had found gas at the intersection of lIo. 5 entry anti the inby radiusfrom No.5 to No. 6 entries, and that the a.Ir movementin thiG area "wassluggish. He stated also that the section forenn.i'1was present: vhen the gaswas found and ordered a check curtain erected tc improvel;he ventilation,A bratticeman on the same shift stated that he lias present and observedthat the continuous-miner operator did detect this gas. The foreman insistedthat gas was not found on this shirt, and that he had never' f'oundgas duringhis 2 months' supervision of the section. Furthermore, the section foremanon the construction shift, whomadethe preshif-t exammatacna for the dayshift, stated that he had not found any gas in this ::;ection during the2 years he supervised operations therein. The report of the preshift exam-iner (construction foreman) madeprior to the entrance of the 8:00 a.m. to4:00 p.m. shift on December6 indicated that gas bed not been det~cted inthis section. The hearings disclosed that, in addition to supervising con-struction 'Workin the 8 left section, the consbructd.onforemanmadepreehlftexaminations in both 7 right and 8 left sections, necessitating travel ofabout 12 miles during the shift, 6 miles of loThich'Was by locomotive betweensections.

Evidence or Activities and StofJ" of Explosions

The day shift entered the mine about 7:00a.m, December6, 19:>2, and thoseworking in the 8 left 4 main butts area arrived at the work area about7: 30 a.m., according to the preshift examiner (construction foreman) whomet and conversed with the foreman of the oncomingshift. The 37 persons

15

: " " "

in the 8 left area consisted of ~fO rroduction crews, comprised of acontinu.ous mining-machine operator :md ~,.,oshuttle-car operators each and'r,,ro root-bolters whollOrkedwherever bolting "las necessary; thus the bolterst!"~" be vi th either machine. If the reGUlar bolters Yere busy in one areaand the place beins vorked by the other machine required bolting, the machineouerator and .shuttle-car operators vould do the bolting. The bratt1ceman,~cl1anic, and a Joy ll-W operator and 2-man section transportation crewserved both machines. These 13 menvere under the supervision of the pro-duction foreman. Others in the area were 14 construction men and a toreman,2 repairmen and a foreman, 3 engineers, and 2 main-line transportation men.Since all persons in the section perished in the first explosion, it canon~' be presumedwhat work was in progress wlienthe explosion occurred.

Comparingthe extent to which places had been driven on the previous pro-d..tlctionshift and the places 'Wheremen and machines were found after theexplosions, the following York or activity pattern vas established: Theradius being driven from no. 5 to No.6 entry had been extended from the58-foot mark, cut through to llo. 6 entr~r, and drtven 16 feet beyond No. 6e.."'ltry'Wherethe machine wa.sstopped with the controls in the f·off" position.T"nemachine operator had Joined the section foreman and enginee;rs at the,junction of 91 crosscut and No. 7 entry. The auxiliary fan furnishing airto the faces of this place had been shut downafter the inby radius had cutthrough to No.6 entry, makinBthe ra.dius a dead-air space .. Later testssimulating ventilation conditions presumed to exist before the explosionsproved that the radius betlleen Nos. 4 and 5 entries was a dead-air spaceand the area between Nos. 5 and 6 entries shoved a sl1c;ht air movement.With the auxiliary fan in operation, the lenGth of tubing (200 feet)installed reduced the fan intake to about 3,300 cubic feet a minute, andthe low-air velocity moving through the radius maynot have properly venti-lated. this area. No.7 entry had been extended from 63 feet inby 91 cross-cut to about 85 feet. The slant off 91 crosscut between.Nos. 7 and 8entries had been advanced from the Go-foot point and coal was being minedat t~e time of the explosion, since the machine was at the face with con-trols in the lion" position, a shuttle car under the continuous-miner boomwas partly loaded and the conveyor control WQ.J3 in the "on" position, theshuttle-car operator ,,,as on the seat, and the continuous -miner operationwas found outby the machine controls near the shuttle-car operator. Theauxiliary fan ventilating this place must be presumed to have been oper-ating, since 1t furnished air to this worldng place and the nip was on thepowerline. The location of the spad supports indicated that the tUbing wasabout 32 feet from the face. The continuous miner vas cutting a hard c1~vem extending over muchof the face. Other persons in the section werefound at points where they might have been in the performance of theirdlJ.ties.

!he ~irst indication of trouble in the mine 'Wasnoted by tvo repairmen, whohad Just completed repairing a compressor in the combination fanhouse andcompressor station. According to John Syrelt, repairman, the compressor waS'started at 1;00 p.m., and the two repairmen "'ent to the lamp section of the

16

Appendix

A

V1c't1m

Sof

Explosions

Name

A~e

Years

expe

rt..Years

expe

ri-

ence

inth1s

ence

inMarital

occutlILt1on

coal

mines

status

OccU'PElt1on

Depe

nden

ts(-incl.

chil

dren

under

18

AdamAndrews,

Jr.

NorI:anA.

Benn

ingh

off

William

J.Blacka

James

H.Boyd

Albert

F.Bronakoski

Nico

laCaromano

Albert

Cava1cante

Frank

Hainzer,

Jr.

James

fJ.Hribal

Frank

Hudock

Andy

J.Hv1zdos

Andrew

K.Ka~h

John

Karly8k

.Arthur

tabohs.

Char

lesLat

i~he

r

Alex

Marra

John

E.Martonclk,

Jr.

E:1JD

erW

.McCl1b'if·:

Orrin

E.Mc

DOwe

ll:

Ernest

Mollica

.Hom

erE~·pitt;s'

SamuelRain

Fran

IuinH~R

ltenburg

Allen

J.~6e'j{j!;"er·'...

John

M.San~r

45 57 43 43 18 57 48 40 39 51 41 54 38 31 49 62 45 48 46 58 37 41 51 49·

53

Cutt

ing-

Mach

ine-

Operator

Helper

Mach

ineRepairman

Transitman

Continuous

Miner

Faceman

Cooperative

Student

Mason,

Inside

Mach

ineRepe.1

nan

Con't1nU

o~·M1ner

Opere.'tor

.Ass!stant:·M

li:l~f·F

orem

anRoot·Bol

ter

Motol"lii&ii:

..Cut'tU1&

~h11'i~

Operator

'r1mbe~D

·.

Maso

n,/:Inslde

Continuous

Mirier

Operatoi--

Roek"Dr1ller

Moto~·

ROMiiB

n.·.·

TrimS!tman

T1JD

be~

Lo8d1ng~h1bfiO

perator

B~~ziJ.i#

_..•.•.....

!:=~:reDaD

..•

t•.;

:_

15 8 17 6mo

nths

2-1/

2mo

nths

3 6 2 12 3 17 2 15 6 7 2 3months

14·

.zi 15 io 16 7 2 16

.A-l·

24 27 25 22 2-1/

2mo

nths

32 21 2l 21 33 25 29 20 18 29 34 23 21 25.38

"19

···27

,.··..28

...,.28 25

Married

tI:arried

Married

MArried

S~o&

te

t-1arrl~

M8:fflN'

M41-ffea'

.""'.

:"::::.:.,:~:.:.:':

Married'

Mi1:~tred';

~ri{

~dMfi~fied;::

Mafl.i~(f

=~~f

-:»,

.;

Married:

Marr1~"

~~;~.;

Married;

MafH~a··

MaifH€cf··

=~ *f¥i~· ,.:,•

Wire

Wite

Wifeand

2children

~if.

eand

4children

.~6.rie

vl1.teand

1child

',;tire

THirean

d3children

¥1i~e

and

1child

Wifeand

:3children

titre

and

1child.

·W:Jie

:~fte

and

2children

'WIfe

QUeand4chHd

ren

Mite

wrr~an

d1child

Wifeand

2children

·;w.U'eand

2children

Wife

······W1rean

dlj.ehildren

~echildren

wife

~"'Jfi.t~

and

1child

··'~Wlteand

I.,children

..

service buf Ld.Lng about 50 feet from the comoressor station. Soon afterentering the Lamparea, Syre]\. was apprised b~tPaul Honscker: his helperthat the audible fan siGJlal was soundf.ng an alarm. Looking out the windowSyr'ek said that he suw a white cloud of dust issuing from the nearby ele- 'vator shaft. He inunediately went to the fan and found its topped and wassoon joined by Honseker and Ernest Benchek, the Lampman, He told Bencheknot to star, the fan bu': to call the mine Superintendent and Robert Renniesurface maintenance foreman, whose headquarters lias at Col-vin shaft (Ro"ten~No.1) and who was in charge of all fans. He also asked Honseker to checkthe air line leading to the shat't , as he thought it might have rupturedcausing the white dust cloud.

In the meantime, Donald Sherrow, on electrician, upon telephoned instruc-tions :from Rennie, had arrived from the nearby Blaker shaft;, checked thefan and, finding nothing wrong, started it.

One might conjecture at this point that the fan should not have beenstarted;, since neither a power failure nor mechanical diffiCUlty was indi-cated by the various safety devices on the fan. Certainly the fan chartwould not indicate a mine difficulty, since the pressure would drop tozero when the fan stopped. The only apparent indication of trouble under-ground was the dust cloud which emerged from the shaft, and this was notinterpreted as an explosion.

The hoisting enl3ineer and Rennie deenere;ized the mine inunediately throughthe substation supervt aory-oont roj, equfpment , headquartered at Colvinshaft., and. nennie then remained near a telephone aWaiting :further instruc-tions. He stated that the fan was restarted at 1:10 p.m. Soon thereafterhe received a call from Sullivan, superintendent of No.2 mine, saying thatNos. 2 and 3 mines were ready for pover- . Sullivan had received the messageconcerning No.3 mine after a call from Misiak, mine foreman of No.3 mine.Shortly thereafter Wydo; superintendent of No.3 mine, called \oJalter Cook,assistant general superintendent, and informed him that the affected fan(Frosty Run) was operating and everything was O.K.

Wydohad been underground in the Garards Fort area when the first fanstoppage occurred, but upon learning of the trOUble went immediately toFrosty Run, and the fan vas operating when he arrived. Soon thereafterWydocalled Rennie telling him to put the power on, and Rennie stated thathe had received this message from Sullivan but had no message from No.1mine, except that a company inspector, James P. Flynn (former superintendentof No. 1 mine), had. said that No. I mine was O.K. for power. toJydoreplied,

~ "That 1s good enough for me; put the power on." This action had been takenwi thout knowledge of conditions 1n the 8 left section whereas other sectionshad been contacted.

According to Rennie, the mine was only partly reenergized (not all of the13 Bubstations were restored) When the Frosty Run fan stopped again and themine was again deenergized by the hoisting engineer.

17"

After this second :fan stoppnee \'1ydo,recoc;niz1ngan unusual occurrence,ealled Rennie via the superintendent's clerk at No.1 mine to keep the poweroft. Ite further told the mine foremanto pull pover s'tli tches undergroundwtb}~FrostY' t\t.J.D bottom to makecertain that powerwould not enter theaffected area and, further, sent an electrician to lock out the breakeraem the Masonand Frosty Runsubstations, the only stations feeding directlyinto the area inby the pm.er sYitches deenergized by the mine foreman.

After the second fan stoppage, at which time Wydowas at Frosty Rungivingvarious instructions and had observed the emergenceof black dust from thedovncas"C(elevator) shaft, other officials arrived and plans were made tocope with the underground trouble •

.AnQther indication of trouble in the minewas noted by an assistant mineforeman, whoobserved a sma.ll cloud of dust as he approached the FrostyRunshaft bottom from 5 left 4 mains on a mine Jitney. This, together witha fluctuation and subsequent loss of power in the trolley line, caused himt,o conclude that a trip had wrecked somewhereinby the Frosty Runshaft,never realizing that he had witnessed a result of the first explosion.'l'hen, while walking toward 4 mains to find the trouble, the assistant fore-manand a mechanic, whowas follOYing him about 200 feet distant, wereknockeddownbut not injured by the second explosion.

Recover! Operations

Soonafter the second explosion, recovery operations were started and minerescue teams were summoned. It vas soon discovered that the forces of theexp~osions had destroyed stoppings, the air was shcrn-ct rcut ted about4,000 feet from Frosty Run shaft bottom, and explosive and noxious gasespermeated the atmosphere inby this point. Thus it was necessary to exploreall entries leading to 8 left vi th self-contained oxygenbreathing appara-casto ascertain the presence of and extinguish any fires before ventilation vasreestablished. The follOYing procedure was established and essentiallyfollowed during the entire recovery operations, which encompassedabout8,.500 feet of the 10- to ll-entry system and connecting crosscuts. Aminerescue team or teams equipped with Oxygenbreathing apparatus 'Wouldexploreall entries for varying distances up to 1,000 feet but generally not morethan two to three crosscuts (200 to 300 feet), erect temporary stoppingsacross all the entries at the inby point of exploration, and return to thefresh-air base. Oneor more fully equipped rescue teams were Itept in read!-ness at the fresh-air base should.an emergencyarise while exploratory workwas being conducted. The area thus explored would then be ventilated pro-gressively until ill gas had.been removedand fresh air extended to theadvance'barrier in all entries • A newbase would then be established atthe barrier and the procedure repeated. Anyfires found during the explora-tion by apparatus crewswould be extinguished before any attempt was madeto ventilate the explored area.

18

Six mine rescue teams of the United States Steel Corporation and seven teamsfrom other companiesparticipated in the recovery work, and the namesof themembersare listed in appendix B.

The recovery was a long and tedious opel'ation, taking from about 3:00 p.m.December6 until the morntng of December11, 1962, vhen the face area wasfinally ventilated. The recovery procedures were supervised by managementpersonnel with the continuous assistance of the Secr~tary and staff of thePennsylvania. Department of Nines and Hineral Industries, as well as theAssistant Director--Health and Safety and staff o.f the Bureau of Mines.The then Ac~ingPresident, the Director o.f the Safety Division, and otherrepresentat~ves o.f the United t~ne Workers of Americakept in constant con-tact durinb the recovery operations.

The success.ful completion of the recovery operations in the .face of extremelyhazardous conditions without a single injury demonstrated the competenceandefficiency of all those whohad to do with supervising and directing theopera.tions. The Bureau of Minespays special tribute to the membersof thesuperbly trained mine rescue teams whoprovided the manpower,the uniqueskills flawlessly coordinated, the comprehension, and the oneness of purposethat are so vitally important in such a dangerous, exacting business.

The body of the first victim was found at 3:15 a.m. December8 and the lastwas br-ought to the surface at 2:04 pvm , December11, 1962. The face areawas temporarily ventilated about 9:00 a an. December11 so that the remainingvi ctims could be removedfrom the mine without the use of oxygenbreathingapparatus.

After the last victim had been removedfrom the mine it was decided that theinvestigation would begin December17, -1962. The official hearing wasstarted January 3 and ended January 15, 1963.

During the interim period the area was patrolled continuously by teams com-posed of company,State, and Bureau of f-linespersonnel, and ventilation wasfurther improved throughout the entire explosion area by replacing temporaryventilating devices with permanent stoppings. Anyequipmentmovedby neces-sity to expedite ventilation improvementswas carefully surveyed, located,and marked for further scrutiny.

Whenthe recovery work and investigation were completed, the explosion area.and other sections that appeared to be deficient in incombustible contentwere re-rock-dusted. Defects found in electric equipmentand other sub-standard conditions in the explosion area as '"ell as in other sections ofthe three mines were correctecl. Field approval for modifications to theGoodman400 continuous mininGn~chine5 was requested by managementandgranted by the I3ureauof Nines on January 29, 19\>3·A special inspection \-TUS mat:l<;of Robenamine (Nos. l~ 2, and 3) on.December21-?-2 and 27-20, lSlo:?,and the danger-descnbed in the \ofithdra,,,alOrder issued DecemberG was found to be abated to the extent that on

• . >

>

DeceJllber 28, 1962~the Director of' the Buree.uof Mines revised the Orderto pend~ operation of the Robenandne (Nos. 1, 2, and 3), except the areasbegimdn~ a~ the equalizing overcasts inby the Frosty Run shaft, RobenaBo- 3 mine, vb1ch included 8 left and 4 main butts right section (explosionarea) • A second special inspection made on January 30, 1963, revealed thatthe d.8nger described in the Withdrawal Order of December6, 1962, had beentotall.y- abated, and the Director annulled the Order on January 30, 1963•.

INVESTIGATION OFCAUSEOF EXPLOSIONS

Investigation Committee

United States Steel Corporation, Coal Division, Frick District

James C- Gray.Tesse F- CoreE. B. NelsonVocds Go. TalmanRalph Co. Beerbower, Jr •.tl_ E. CookWa:tne Do. SnellOraD Hartzel.1- P. FlynnLeo PUssA. a. WerftRobert R. GodardGeorge PersonMichael WydoMarion ~U.siakH. o, Hess

Administrative Vice President, RawMaterialsVice President, Operations-CoalAssistant Vice President, Coal ProductionAssistant Vice President, Coal StaffGeneral SUperintendentAssistant General SUperintendentChief Mine InspectorMine Inspector

do.do.

Chief EngineerAssistant Chief EngineerElectrical EngineerSuperintendent, RobenaNo. 3 mineMine Foreman, RobenaNo. 3 mineElectrical Maintenance Foreman

United MineWorkers of America

Charles FergusonRex LauckJohn L. MayoJohn CassidySteve KattaronWilliam RahoPaul Simon

Director, Safety DivisionUn!ted Mine \iorkers JournalPresident, District 4Representative, District 4Safety Committeeman,Local Union No. 6321

do.do.

Pennsylvania Departme~ltof Mines and Mineral Industries

Lewis E. EvansLester D. Kimmelw. Ro:r CunninghamEdvard N. ConnorJ. 14. MuchnokFJiward J. OnuscheckAlbin JohnsonSteve lifars1nek

Secretary of Mines and Mineral IndustriesState Mine Inspector, Bituminous

do.do.do.do.

State Electrical Inspector, Bitwn1nousdo.

20

United States Bureau of ~anesJames WestfieldT. J. lvlcDonald

R. 'yard StahlR. J. KirkRalph I. KrekJohn A. Noon

Assistant Director--Health and SafetyAssistant to District SupervisorHealth and Sa.fety District Bluning Health and Safety EngineerFederal Coal Mine InspectorFederal Coal I·fine Inspector (Electrical)Federal Coal 1·11neInspector

A detailed examination of the area lrl'fected by the explosions was carefullymade by the entire investigating committee. To expedite the work of such alarge group, the committee was divided into four teams, each composed ofrepresentatives of the respective agencfes , Each team was provided with aworlt book containing a mine map properly inscribed so that when the examina-tion was completed each agency had a complete record of the findings. At theend of each shift the data collected vere transferred to a large-scale mapfor final record.

The machines in the explosion area were studied by electrical inspectors ofthe interested groups, and their findings have been recorded heretofore inthis report.

The flame safety lamps in the explosion area were tested in the Bureau ofMines gallery provided for this purpose, but no lamp transmitted an internalexplosion to the gallery; thus the lamps were eliminated as a source ofigni tion. However, one Koehler lamp contained a l'lolf chimney and ign! tel',and a Wolf lamp contained an asbestos gasket under the gauze, which renderedthese lamps nonpermissible.

An analysis of the fan charts of the three main ventilating fans serving theNo. 3 mine is given in appendix G.

Hearings conducted by the Pennsylvania Department of tUnes and MineralIndustries, beginning January 3, 1963, were headed by Hon. Lewis E. Evans,Secretary of l.fines and Mineral Industries, assisted by state mine and elec-trical inspectors. Mr. Evans invited representatives of the United t-tl.neWorkers of America, the United States Steel Corporation, and the Bureau ofMines to participate in the interrogation of anyone who might have knowledgeof events prior to the explosions or practices which might have set the stagefor the disaster.

1.1ethaneas a Factor in the E:<plosions

The following evidence proves that methane was liberated rather freely in the4 mains and 8 left area of No. 3 mine:

1. The official record books kept at the mine indicate that gas had beenfound al though not frequently. The mine forerr.an recorded findine eas nearthe f~ce of No.7 entry (referred to as No.6 entry in this report) 8 left

21

on Deeeliber 5~ 19$2. Oneof the section foremendeclared that he bad notfound ass in the 8 left section in the 2 years he supervised operationstheretll~and.another section foremanstated that he had not found gas duringbis 2 months' supervision of the section--an unusual experience in any gassymne ..

5. Samplescollected on December18, 1962, in the returns of 8 left inby50 crosscut after the recovery operations and during the investigationshaved that as muchas 445 cubic feet of methanea minute was being lib-erated from the faces and entry surfaces. (See appendiXK.)

6. A gas-emission test conducted by membersof the investigating party onDecember19, 1962, after the 8 left section had been ventilated for 8 days,showed 461 cubic feet a minute of methanebeing liberated from the 8 leftfaces and the return entry surfaces to No. 52 crosscut. (see appendix Jfor complete results of these tests.)

2.. Air semples collected. during the Federal inspection in progress duringthe expl.os1.onsshwed a methane liberation of 2,260,000 cubic feet in2lJ hours frOm the Frosty Runshaft.

3. Heavyconcentrations of methanewere found in the explosion area duringrecovery operations. Onebottle sample collected ahead of ventilationshwed 28 percent methane, 1.8 percent h1\irogen, and 1.3 percent carbonaonoxlde.. (see appendix K.)

4-. During the rehabilitation of 8 left prior to the official investigation;an accwm;U.ationof methanevas found at the face of 4 mains inby 8 left.

T. Numerousgas feeders were observed in the face areas of 8 left duringthe investigation.

6. During the hearings e. cont1.nuous-mining-machineoperator and othersstated that an accwnulation of gas had been found at the beginning of thesecond shift on December5, 1962, in the inby radius extending from theface to the continuous miner that had been pulled back to the intersectionof the radius and No. 5 entry. The assistant foreman stated that he did notfind any gaa at the beginning of the second shift on December5, 1962.

9. The first explosion started from tgni tion of a body of methane.

Flame

Very heavy soot deposits were found in the faces of working places in 8 left,end.heavy deposits of coke were found at nwnerousplaces throughout 8 leftend.in 4 mains inby 8 left. Cokewas found.adhering to the roof and timbersal.ong4 mains outby 8 left to a point just inby the first radius inby FrostyRunshaft. Other evidences of flame included seven smoldering fires along

22

4 mains inby and outby 8 left, burned paper, burned and charred timbers,melted plastic brattice cloth, and charred cable insulation. T"neflameextended from the faces of 8 left to the faces of 4 molns and to the firstradius inby Frosty Runshaft. (See appendixD.) Themost outby evidenceof fire vus a burned rock-dust bag near the first radius inby Frosty Runshaft. Dust samples collected in the explosion area showedanything fromtraces to Vf2;:-Y heavy coke pa.rticles. (See appendixF.)

Forces

Statements of witnesses durdng the hearings and.eVidencein the mine indi-cated that the forces of the first explosion radiated from the faces of8 left, traversed all entries in 8 left, and in general d.isplaced.thestoppings from the intake airw8¥s to\rard the returns. The forces thendivided and traveled to the :face of 4 mains inby 8 left, thence outby8 left in 4 mains, diminishing near Frosty Runshaft but still sufficientin intensity to force dust to the surface thrOUghthe downcastside of theshaft a distance of about 2-1/2 miles f'romthe faces of 8 left. (Seeappend.ixD.) Additional information tha.t substantiates the fact thatforces emanated from the faces of the 8 left entries is evidenced.by theout-"'ardpressure that destroyed the metal sto,ppings in Nos. 1 and 2entries between 87 and 88 crosscuts and those in Nos. 7 and 8 entriesbetween 86 and 87 crosscuts.The second explosion traversed the samegeneral area and is believed tohave been more violent than the first; however, the forces abated as theytraveled to-ww."""'dthe shaft, but these also caused dust to emergefrom thesurface entrance to the downcastside of the shaft.

Violence occurred throughout the explosion areas, as evidenced by bentsteel crossbars, derailed equipment, blown-out stopp1ngs (153 in number),demolished overcasts, severed cables, disengaged trolley and feeder wires,and displaced roof supports.

Probable Point of Origin

Bureau of Mines investigators believe that the first explosion originatedin an area of 8 lef't face inby 90 crosscut and betweenNos. 4 and 8 entriesand that the second explosion originated somewherein 8 lett section.

Factors Preventing Spread of Explosions

The area covered by the two explosions was so extensive that a lack of' .t'..telpossibly was the greatest retarding factor. Rockdust prevented the :fUllforces of the explosions from extending to the Frosty Runshaft and through-out the other two mines.

Swnmary of Evidence

Evidence and information educed during the official investigation of andhearings on the disaster are summarizedas foll~is:

23

1. Tiiere,weretwoexp10sionsabOllt20 minutes apart.. : ~ : ".' .

2. "The'victimswere killed by the first explosion, as attested:'b1~thE!f''iLcthat "some-of the watches, including the watch on the body of the outermostc' -

;~1'{>~~~1~~:t~!£'~1:~;2!::~~ ~~Ui~tllilij;1;;;;'"",;,\:routln.etQ9. morecomplexsystemthat madeventilation more'dtf'f'l'cu~t.:to'!,cU'i~~et;eJit:lcontrol. ' ,

••.• There 'was no indication' that blasting had been done on 'the shiftOD- 'whicbthe explosions occurred or that explosives entered into the explosions.

5. Each explosion resulted in stoppage'of the Frosty Runtan.

6. Methanewas liberated freely from tbe coaJ.bedand adjacent strata.,

1. Theexplosions werepropagatedby ettal dust.

8. Loosecoal was observedalong shuttle-car runwaysduring a recent inspec-""-tion, and the hearings revea1edthat spilled coal in face areas wasnotalwaysrem~ed before rock-dusting.

9. Dust surveys conductedin parts of the minenot affected by the explo-sions disclosed small areas that were deficient in incombustiblematerial.

10. Permissibili ty deficiencies were found in seven of the permissib1e-type machinesin the explosion area.

U. Since all the worlanenin 8 left, origin area of the first explosion,we..!.'~killed, the activities ot persons in the area can only be assumedfromtheir pos~tions and the positions of' the machinesafter the explosions.

12• It is assumedthat coal wasbeing loaded at the face ot the slant placebetweenNos. 1 and 8 entries off 91 crosscut, since the operating controlsof the continuousminerwere in the "on" position; coal was present on theconveyorof' the continuousminer; the shuttle car waspartly loaded with theconveyorcontrol in the "on" position; the shuttle-car operator was found onthe seat; and the continuous-miner operator was near the shuttle-car operatoralong thl! rib as if fleeing fromthe face. The auxiliary fan betweenNos. ,1and 8 entries in 91 crosscut can be assumedto be operating, since it was thesour~~of air circulation through the slant place. The continuousm1~r inthe 'radius Just 'inby No. 6 entry vas stopped, as was the' fan whichcausedvent:tlatiori'in this face. Other machineryin the face area indicated nomOtionat the time of the explosions.

13. Bureauof Minestests of the flame safety lampsfound in"the explosionarea disclosed that these were not a source of ignition.

24

'

14~ Fo\u"pQ~$ible sources of len! tion present in the presumed path of' gastrovel 'Ve.re~ A nip station Just outby 90 crosscut in tio. 6 entry; an open-t.ype motor on a car puller at the right inby corner of 90 crosscut in No. 6entry; friction sparks from a continuous miner cutting a hard clay vein at ..'the face of the slant off 91 crosscut between Nos. 7 and 8 entries; and theawd.ltary fan in nonpermissible condit10n between :Nos.7 and 8 entries.

Discussion of Evidence roldSpecial Tests

The actual cause of the disaster can only be presumed, since all persons inthe area encompassedby the first explosion were ldllcd. Knowingthe extentto which the places were advanced during the previous production shift andthe general method of face ventilation from the testimony of both the lastproduction-shift foreman and the preshift examiner just prior to the shifton vhich the explosion occurred, coupled with the position and condition ofmen and machines after the explosions, the following conjectural patternof activities just prior to the first explosion was established. The per-tinent points £"0110\1:

1. The continuous miner in the radius near the junction with No. 6 entrywas stopped, having cut through to No.6 and advanced about 16 f'eet beyondNo.6 entry. This is substantiated by the controls being in the "off'"position and the operator's body being found at the junction of No.7 entryand 91 crosscut with the bodies of the section foreman and engineers.

2. The auxili ary fan between Nos. 3 and 4 entries, used to circulate airthroUgI'1 the upper radius from rIo. 4 to No. 6 entry, was stopped with thecontrols in the "off" position.

3. The continuous miner at the face of the slant place between NOB.7 and8 entries off 91 crosscut was operating, as attested by the controls being1n the "on" position, a partly loaded shuttle car under- the miner conveyorboomwith the conveyor control 1n the "on" position, coal on the conveyor,the shuttle-car operator on the seat, and the continuous-miller operator nearthe shuttle-car operator as it' fleeing from the face. The aUXiliary faninstalled in 91 crosscut between the slant end No.8 entry ~raspresumed tobe operating, since it coursed air circulation through the slant place.

It was also knownthat a permanent stopping was being built across No. 7entry between 89 and 90 crosscuts during this shift, since the masonswerein the section, the lower course of blocks was in place, other blocks dis-placed by the explosions had mortar adhering to them, and the mortar marksappeared on the roof.

Having the foreeoing established, it "ras assumedthat when the auxiliary fanbetween Nos. 3 and 4 entries was stopped, air movementthrough the upperradius between Nos. 4 and 6 entries would be sluggish and. gas might accumu-late in this area. Actual testa on .Tanuary15, 1963 (see appendix I fordetails), d.isclosed that, when the inby radius cut thrOUghto No.6 entry,

25

'the a\lXl.liory fan that vas used to ventilate the radius received all its airtlUIl the NO,~ 6 entl':)""and thus madethe radius between Nos. 4 and 6 entriesu.rtual.lJt a d~-ah' space where methane accwnulated. The same tests alsoshaved that) vith the auxiliary fan stopped, the air would movetoward theloading rampon No. 6 entry. Even though the 8 left face area had beenven:tila"ted since December11, 1962, gas started to accWJIUlatenear the faceof' He. 6 entry and backed up at least 20 feet from the face within the1.5•••. nute test period.

Assuming that the stopping in No. 1 entry between crosscuts 89 and 90 waseampleted at'ter the gas bad accumul.atedin the radius between Nos. 4 and6 entries J a test vas madeto determine what action the air might take asa result of this entry being closed. This test disclosed that any gasae\:Wlllla.ted in the radius would be movedto the face of the radius, downBo. 6 entry- toward 91 crosscut and splitting here with a part going towardRo• ., entry through 91 crosscut and another part traveling toward the rampand Idp station at 90 crosscut, thence through 90 crosscut to No.7, thencebaclt tbrougll Bo. 1entry to 91 crosscut and ,joining the air and gas whichhad passed through No. 7 entry.

In passing, downNo.6 entry to the rampthis gas could also pass over theopen-type motor of the car puller and the nip station. The total volume ofair in 91 crosscut containing the aforementioned gas split at the slant.Flve thousand cfrn of this air ventilated the face of the slant place wherethe continuous miner was cutting a hard clay vein, which could emit sparkscapable 0,1' igniting methane. The remaining 30,000 cfrn of this air passedacross the aUXiliary fan which was not in permissible condition.

!he special tests on January 15 disclosed that the auxiliary fan betweenHos. 3 and 4- entries exhausted only 3,300 cubic feet of air a minute, which~ not have been enough to keep the long radius and face properly ventilated.

A complete description of the foregoing tests and sketches portraying themare inclUded in appendix I.

Cause of the Disaster

!bis disaster vas caused by the 19n1tion of a body of methane by frictionsparks or e~ectric arc. The methanehad accumulated in a portion of theface development that was not ventilated for a short period of time andvas movedover operating equipmentwhencompletion of' a permanent stoppingin the section resulted in a reversal of face airflow.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Insofar as possib~e, mining operations should progress from the return-air side of the section toward the intake-air side so that any gas emittedfrom places already driven will not pass over operating equipment or throughactive faces.

26

2. Whenit is necessary to deviate from the nOnna! or customaryplan 01'mining, such as starting a new section otf a set of entries, a plan ofventilation should be madeand each foreman in the affected section shouldbe informed about the ventilation changes necessary as places are cuttogether.

3. If an auxiliary tan used to induce face ventilation is stOPPedfor anyreSBon" ""line brattice should be installed i!llDediately so the face Is con-tinuously ventilated.

4. Whena main fan stops at a gassy mine, iJllDediateaction should be takento cut off the power and vi thdrav the mentrom the face regions of the mine.Whenventilation is restored, the face regions and other places where methaneis likely to accumulate should be reeXaminedby certified or competent super-visors, and, it found to be tree t'roJIlexplosive gas J paver maybe restoredand work resumed. HOIIever,a main ten should not be restarted ¥ben there isan indication that an underground explosion has occurred until the effectthereof on the safety of the operation 1s known,and power should not berestored until all sections of the mine have been contacted and reportedsate. Wherea mine is ventilated by multiple fans and the split system ofventilation is employed, the foregoing should apply only to the area thatis affected by such failure.

5· A special effort should be madeto obtain end use larger-capacityauxiliary fans to assure an adequate amountof air in the places they aresupposed to ventilate.

6. Fan tubing should be kept ahead of the machine operator and closeenough to the face to properly ventilate the face area.

1· Moreeffort shall be madeto clean up loose coal between loading rumpsand faces, and especially along the shuttle-car runways.

8. Flame safety lamps should be maintained in permissible conditlon.

9· Frequent and thorough gas tests should be madein act! ve working placeswith a flame safety lamp, preferably using a capping flame. Each time gas1s detected by an official, 1t should be recorded in the off:1.cial mine recordbooks.

10. Whererock dust 1s applied, it shall be distributed upon the top, floor,and sides of all open places and maintained in such quantity that the incom-bustible content of the combinedcoal dust, rock dust, end other dust willnot be less than 65 percent. Wheremethane is present in any ventilatingcurrent, the 65 percent of incombustible content of such COmbineddust shallbe increased 1 percent for each 0.1 percent of methane.

11. Consideration should be given to designing and installing effectiverock-dust barriers near worldng faces, 1n areas where loaded cars are stored,and along belt conveyors.

27

' · . . .

12. A regular schedule or rock.-dusting shou1d be established and followedvi tb0u'1ointerruption.

13.. Pe.rm1ssibl.e-type electric face equipment shall be maintained in per-mss1ble condition.

l~. Not more than 8. 48-hour supply of explosives and detonators should bes100redin underground section magazines.

15. Elee'tr1e equipment in face areas, even though pulled back from therace duriug idle periods or between shifts, shouJ.dnot be energized untilthe place has been examined and found to be free from gas.

The following recommendationhas no bearing on the explosions but itsadoption ahould receive careful consideration:

A llOd1t1eation of the tan monttoring and substation control system should1Deludeprovisions tor removing the power trom the mine automatically 1nthe eYent 01' main-tan interruption. SUchsystem should have tail-safefeatures.

28

The writers gratetul.1.y acknovledge the courtesies, cooperation, andassistance extended by officials and employeesof' the United states SteelCorporation, the PeIUlsylvanlaDepartmentof Mines and Mineral Industries,end the Un~ted M1.neWorkers of America.

Respectfully submitted,

tf~~r!l~~~-~~Ralp I.KrekJ:~N~ft--;

Approvedby:

+-:;;:tfie .V=lstant rector--Healtb and safety

t~JDY~Director

29

.,

.

Appe

ndixA(con.)

Vic~

imsorEx

plos

ions

Year

sex

peri

-Ye

arsex

peri

~De

pend

en~s

enee

inth

isen

cein

Mari

tal.

(inc

l.ch

Udre

n

Name

Age

vccu

pa~i

onoc

cupa

tion

coal

mine

ss~

a~us

unde

r18

Char

lesJ.Se

beck

.41

Road

mim

1521

Marr

ied

Wife

and5ch

ildr

enCh

l;;.

rles

J.Se

per

44Co

n~1n

uous~i

iner

2mo

ntbs

21Ma

rrie

dWi

fean

d1cb

ild

Face

man

Geor

geL.

Spee

lman

57Co

ntin

uousMi

ner

544

Marr

ied

Wife

Face

man

Hurl

eyC.

Stal

nake

r50

Moto

man

1730

Marr

ied

Wife

and3ch

ildr

en

lUke

E.St

an1k

60Ro

ofBo

lter

633

Marr

ied

W1fe

andgr

ands

on

John

J.St

.Cl

air

42Ma

inte

nanc

eFor

eman

621

Marr

ied

Wife

and2ch

ildr

en

John

H.St

eeeh

60RO

Ck-L

oadi

ng-M

achi

ne10

43Ma

rrie

dWi

fean

d2ch

ildr

enOp

erat

orJo

seph

V.To

kisb

43Pi

pema

n6

20Ma

rrie

dWi

fean

d3ch

ildr

en

Char

lesS.Va

nDi

vner

39Lo

adin

g-Ma

chin

gOper

ator

621

Marr

ied

Wife

and3ch

ildr

en

'iUl

1amH.R.

Wrig

ht55

Moto

rman

228

Sing

leSi

ster

Euge

neG.

Zuza

k46

Brat

ticema

n17

21Ma

rrie

dWi

fean

d1ch

ild

Paul

C.Zv

olen

ski

40Mo

torm

an7

19Ma

rrie

dWi

fean

d6ch

ildr

en

A••2

~l..mes and Addresses of Personnel of Mine Rescue Teamsihat Ilnrtic1p:3.ted in Recovery Work After the ~losions

Frick District Team No. 1

Va!.ter Vlcinelly ~ CaptainValter ScartonHart1.n Kl1llesRichard Muxphy~v Kost.elnikJoseph F~nnacchlnl

Tof'1.l '-!)"ers, CaptainRenJ.'7 BacanJames Caff'reyRex HartzelJames RichardsWilliam CaffreyCharles zabroskyWalter Kaslevlch

.Alex Whoolery, CaptainRobert MonaghanCharles Schuesslersteve WydoJohn ChambersWilliam HumbertRonald HartzelHarry Stacoviak

Arthur zawackiMarvin Gates

R.D. 1, Box 62R. D. 1, Box 203

Masontown, Pe.do.

Cannichaels, pa.New Salem, Po.Brownsville, Pe.Uniontown, Po.

R.D. 1, Box 221-ADixon Boulevard

Frick District Teem No.2

Main street Smock, Pa.168 Maple Street Carmichaels, Pe.House 83 Nemacolin, Pa.72 Liberty Street smithfield, Pe.Box 187 Grindstone, Pe.512 North Gallatin Extension Uniontown, Po.Route 88 Carmichaels, Pa.65 ~iarion Uniontown, Pa.

Frick District Teem No.3Box 306 McClellandtown, Pa•House 68, Ralph Hibbs, Pe.R.D. 1, Box 598 Uniontown, Pe.Box 86, Footedale Road New Salem, Po.House 76, Cumberland Village Carmichaels, Pa.·R.D. 1, Box 70 Greensboro, Pe.

SInithfield, Pa.Eox 233 McClellandtown, Pa.

Attendants

R.D. 1, Box 347New Balem, Pa.McClellandtown, Pa.

13-1

Appendix B (cen.)',' ' ~'; "~

LYnch District Te~

"

A1bert"Wagers, CaptainFrank'El11i'ngsJobn BodnerRussel BurgeJohn Dickinson

Tennessee Coal and Iron Team.RobertE. Burdette,c8p,taln

William·D. PowellEU8ene B. b!slleRobert C. BieeLeonard N. McCartyJesse E. McGill

613 Glenpark Drive

Route 13, Box 4681312-44th street WestP.O. Box 121129 Heflin AvenueBox 57

AttendantsRobert A. DietzE. L.· BakerJohn Q. 'PughRichard ·B.'Johnson

222 Highland Drive533 Clearview Roadl016-58th street South445 Ridgewood Avenue

1J)u!s Krushansky',Perry SheetsJohn PyshLuther B. SimpsonPaul EvanoffRobert Verbosky

Pursglove No. 15 Mine TeamCaptain 206 Rhode Island

Route 1, Box 246Route 1, Box 2

629 Protzman StreetAttendant

Robert H. Williamson 912 stewart street

B-2

J.iYnCh, Ky.do.

'. ···, ../~,4P,t';<L .....~pp.a;tacti;~.a~''::~a ~I:.yrich~'·KY~,:c"'~"-'

r·'," :...:.{.>~: : ):;::" "'

OaJj,'W~V8'; ,Welch;W'. Va.Havaco, W. Va.'Iborpe, W. Va.Gary, W. Va.

Fairfield, Ala.

Birmingham, Ala.Birmi ngh8!ll, Ala.Mulga, Ala.Birmingham, Ala.Graysville J Ala.

Hueytown, Ala.Birmingham, Ala.Birmingham, Ala.Fairfield, Ala.

westover, W. Va.Mount Morris, Pa.

do."lana, W. Va.Cassville, W. Va.Morgantown, W. Va.

Morgantown, W. Va.

Phillip Hine B, captainWoodrow BrinegarJohn WhiteWorth GreerRev. Robert FoxCharles JiJIm1e

James A. Beck, captainBello MenozziEdward ZemaitisAJIIEt Sn;yderJoe AstorinoCharle B Morgan

Leslie G. Black,Safety Inspector

William Paria1,Director ot Bafety

John Tosie, CaptainJames B. campbellMike WalloFrancis R. William8William LendvalAngelo Grosso

Rudolph Mllovac, CaptainJames Bartoroni'theodore FazzarlJohn Machesky, Jr.Richard MacheskyPete Shenal, Jr.Raymond E. Boyles

Appendix B (Con.)

Osage No.3 MiDI!Team

402 Santord Street537 Milford Street202 Savanah StreetBox 116Route 1Box 171

Montour No. 4. Mine Team

5381 Main street2501 Milford DriveBox 38R.D. 2, Box 2532836 VashiDgton RoadBox 53

Attendants

R.D. 1

Mathies Mine Teem

1301 Edna streetR.D. 3496 Regent streetBox 382417 Walde StreetBox 33

Mather Collieries Team

B-3

Morgantown, W. Va.do.

WestO'ler, W. Va.Dellslow, W. Va.Mount Morris, Pa.Rivesville, W. Va.

Bethel Park, Pe.do.

We stland, Pa.Canonsburg, Pa.Bridgeville, h.Lawrence, Pe.

Eightytour, Pa.

Mount Lebanon, Pe.

Pittsburgh, Pa.rtnleyville, Pa.Houston, Pa.NewEagle, Pa.Pittsbursb, Pa.Houston, Pa.

Mather, P6.do.

Jefferson, Fa.Mather, Pa.

do.do.do.

'

• • , . , • • · ,

• ' \ • , . . . ' • • . .

Appendix IS (Con.)

AlleJ$heDl-Pittsburgh Coal CCJIIR8& Te8JI

bmle E. CulpbeU.captain

Villi_ B.• McCulloughLeo s, Mal.obleQ'

Joseph It.• WaitkusVill181l A. Simpson, Jr.Robert Couturlaux

641 Memorial Dr1ve~ LogansFerry Heights

1819 Kimball Avenue314 Kertis Avenue, LogansFerry Heights

Box 252, Psrnassus Station9901 saltsburg Road201 DaIlbroskiAvenue,

Losane Ferry Heights

IIan'7 Fl.a,yd, captainlIUll_ no,ydGecrae KeDDieCbarl.es DraftJtJbn G. MetzGeorge Glover

Mountaineer No. 9 Mine Team

Box 114Box 2381239 Bellrun RoadRoute 1, Box 186-ABox 28Sycamore Add1 tiOD

AttendantJesse G. Bowers Route 1, Box l54-A

B-4

NewKensington, fa.

Arnold, Pa.NewKensington, Pa.

do.Pittsburgh, Pa.New Kensington, Pa.

Fam1ngton, W. Va.do.

Fairmont, w. Va.Farmington, W. Va.

do.Manni ngton, W. Va.

Falmont, w. Va.

I.•.... \ .

. r ~J I

\.t ( /1~7J-''''\.. .sz: ..':"'::

, :,

\\

<,

APPENOIXOSECI10ft OF ROBENA NO. 3 MINESHOWING VENTILATION S'fSlEM

AHO EllPI.OSlOH AREA1&6.1962

o 600 1,200,...... w.a.SCAI.£. fEET

LEGEND_INTAKE AlR I.4'"C RETURN ~R- UMITOf FU.ME--\UMITOffORCES

I

\

AppendixG

Analysis, Frosty RunFan ~eratlng Chart

Thursday, December6, 1962 - 12:55 to 2:00 p.m.

Ccmment- Inaccuracy of' clock mechanismis such tbat cbart times should becorrected by possibly plus 8 to 10 minutes to ccmparewith times of' the firstfan stoppage, 1:02 p.m., attested to during the official hearings on thedisaster.

Summary- The fan chart indicates that two separate explosions occurredwithin the mine, appraxlmately 20 to 25 minutes apart. Both explosionsexerted sufficient energy acting on the mine ventilation resistance to causea marked reduction of water gage at the fan. The reduced operating-pressureprotective device functioned and stopped the tan in both cases. Neitherexplosion, although evidenced on the surface by dust clouds emanating t:rcmthe intake side of the Frosty Run shaft, was SUfficiently violent to forceopen the explosion protective cover plate on top of the return shaft. Thefirst explosion created sufficient permanent change in the undergroundventi-lating system to reduce the normal fan operating pressure from 6.2 inchesDormaloperation to 5.8 inches after the tan was restarted. The secondexplosion, obviously more violent, reduced the water gage fran the previous5.8 inches to 5.5 inches, as shownatter the fan was restarted and remainedin operation. There was no evident damageto the fan or protect! ve devicesby either explosion as shownby the fan baving been started on tvooccasions.

Chronological analysis of the fan chart - Timesgiven as chart times actualtimes plus 8 to 10 minutes.

12:55 p.m.

12:55 - 1:15 p.m.

1:15 - 1:25 p.m.

Fan operating normal, average water gage reading6.2 incbes.

Fan water gage dropped fran 6.2 to aD.average of0.3 inches, fluctuating both above and below tbe zeroline of the fan chart until the protective reduced pres·aure switch shut off the fan. This fluctuation wascaused as the result of action of explosion forceswithin the mine. The fan remained idle for approxi-mately 15 minutes.

The fan was restarted at approximately 1:15 p.m. Lineson the chart indicate that the fan did not immediatelyfind its stable operating point then settled with avariation of 0.6 inches water gagel average vater ga~reading of 5.8 inches. This reduced water gage of0.4 inches below normal indicates a definite abruptreduction in mine resistance, such as short circuits forair travel. The fan operated for approximately10 minutes.

G-l

APPENDIX G

.a~._ ..•_,__ ~_",_

APPENDIX [;

17

AppendixI (Con.)

Method

ft.e.se teste were conducte.dby omclals of the United States Steel Corpora-tlon, Coal DlvisioD

1Frick District, conformingwith a general plan previ-

ously accepted by the camd.ssion investigattng the cause of the Robenadisaster. Observers consisted of representatives :fran the PennsylvaniaDepartllent of Mines and Mineral Industries, the United MineWorkers orAaer1ea, the untted States Steel Corporation, and the Bureau ot Mines.

Ccmnent

These tests were beneficial and, although conducted under varying assumedeoradltlons, data were obtained :fran which certain evaluations were JDadepossible.

Test A-l

mese - To establish airflow direction and air quantities eXisting immedi-ate~ prior to the cut-through between the upper radius and No.6 entry.

Position ot equipnent -

1.. lttm-car trip in No. 6 entry between 89 and 90 crosscuts.

2. Goodmanl$OO miner located approximately 30 feet fran face of the upperradius.

3. Auxiliary ran located on 91 crosscut between Nos. 3 and It- entries withtubing extended to normal position near operator.

4. Auxiliary fan located in 91 crosscut between Nos. 7 and 8 entries with18-inch tubing to within 16 feet of slant entt"",fface.

5. Nip station on No.6 entry just outby 90 crosscut.

Construction changes - Close off' upper radius by means of a tight check 1nline with the left rib of No.6 entryj close off No. 5 entry with loosecheek at upp"r radius.

Air-measuring stations -

1.. Measuring stations as shownby number, air readings simultaneous.

2. Ventilation control measures as shown. Stoppings made of metal; canvaschecks and line canvas tight and well installed.

I-2

AppendixI (Con.)

!!qs1cal cond1tions - Similar to test A-1 except:

1.. WOe 6 entry vas practic~ open at its connection vith upper radius.

2. Left ventilating fan running.

Comment - This condition showsthat the air volumewas increased 1n theupper racl1us with excess above tan capacity returning to the right split.

Test A-9

rurpose - To determine conditions with left ventilating fan not operating;eoDdl:tdons aS8t.nedto exist at the time of the explosion.

Phyeieal. conditions - Sameas test A-8 except:

1.. Lett ventilating fan not operating.

2. '!be line brattice in No. 7 entry was removedto a line of' spads believedto indicate the location where 1t had been installed previously.

Comment- Tbia showsreversed airflow with:

1. 5,000 ctm returning downNo. 6 entry fiem face of t1pperradius.

2. 7,600 cfmtoward the nip station :£'rem91 crosecut.,

3- A flow through the upper radius of 4,500 cfmtrom ventilation pressurev.tthout the auxiliary fan.

1-6

VeNTILATION STUDY/ACE AREA - 4MAIN /ior rs - 8FLATS LT. SeCTIO,{/

!?OBENA NO.3 MIMECONDITIONS ASSUMED PRIOR To EXPt.oSIO/./ 01-1IJCCEf1BER6. /962

lOSING (;-fOO (IlA/VAS REMoveD 19'rA'~H;:;'ce5-~ ;:::J"G-400--

JY.;ioo~-' I hi -sc.411 12 s;ooo~ TuSING'// ~'Ao-.II • ~

91 J -<l-A l':t----;-----l

3

90 t.,...-;;;;.J::t--1

t2 DOlO8 89 L--fl~-~==:J L..._.....l '--t-.....•.....- .....•

~88 DOD 00 10

87 " • 0DOD D '-::t--'Lnnnnnn ",·o t 2 3 4 5 ~ENTRIES

7 8 9

lEST A-3 DATA SHOWII./6 AIR t;JI./AAlTIT/E5 Cu.rT./MA/.7E-?TS lAKe-AI J-4t</. /~ /963

jJL.AS7"/C SroPP//v6 /Pc/'10VcD

//11 //'/8Y f?-'?.D/OSCOIJO/T/ONS

,Q/6f!T IAN RUNNIIJG

LEFT FAN DOWN ------_ ..__ .._---_._ .._-

SrA. t 25; 6-002 26; 2003 3:55'04-A 34004-8 3,0005-A )/0 NoyEH€/YTS-B SMOKE ;t;6VEHENT

STA. b /G?-500

7 £7008 .5'5;8009 25, 000 _/0 5'L/G-¥!:"_.~#CJKtE M,V~N.c.jlT

II 41.500/2 ~900

APPENDIX

VENTILAT/ON STUDY/ACE A.ReA - 4MAIN BUTTS - 8FLATS Zr SeCTIO,{f

!?OBENA ;(/0 3 M/AiECONOITIONS ASSUMED PRIO;;?70 EXPl.oSION' ON' f)ECEt1BER ~ /962

6-100 (I1AIVAS REMl)l,'eO /9'rRoH rAceS-~ 6-400

s.c:$':Dt>

91 - --

TZ SINo

-

~90t. DDD~59 L--fl~-~==:.J '--~ L--,,+-~ I-_-J~ DOD RccOuDD \0

~88

87 H HOOD 0D ""'-=t---'nnnnnn " "o t 2 345

ENTRIES7 8 9

lEST A-2 DATA SHOWING AIR ~!/A#Tlr/es Cu.rz;lMN.'TESTS lAKEN J,.q,.(l /5 /963__ .._ __ .__ .. __.. __ . '.2- __

COIJDIT/ONS

RIGHT fAN RUNNIIVG

LEFT FAN a,vAlliVG

,4.A5T/C 5roPP/~G ~ffOVGO

/.(/ /N8Y ~.oI..C('.--=:S=-- _

--,. ....._---

STA. 1 Z~,/CJO

Z Z~, zoo3 4-7004-A ¢ooo4-8 3,soo5-A 5Mo.{"E ~V€M€/Vr

S-B 5HOK5 ;%V£l'1'cIYT

STA.0 /02007 3, soo8 38,000

9 2Z800/0 Ala /'IoVEHc/YT

II ~ooo/2 3,000

APPENDIX I

91

VeNTILATION STUDYlACE AREA - 4MAIN 8UTTS - 8HATS iT SECTIOAI

!?OBENA NO 3 /tVt/AiE

~ 90 l""--t----'< DDD'~ 89 L---f!~-~:::::::::::::..J~ DOD D .------..u

~88 M M DDDDD--.l1:87nnnnnn M M

234 5 ~ENTRIES

to

o 1. 7 8 9

7i-ST A-f DATA SHOWING /l/R C;;V,4A1T/T/ES eU. ;-.yiMN.TE5T~~~!'!.-~1.t<I../!&. /963

COMO/T/ONSRIGHT fAN RUNNIIH.i

LEFT FAN RUtllN'IMG

Pt.A:sr/c 'Sro,o,oING ltv /NB'y~

8090/U:5 JC/sr O<{.rsY Alo.~ ENTRY

SrA.l 2b,BOOZ Z£ cOO3 ¢. 7504-A 3.800

4-8 3, 0005~A SMOKE- I"IoVEIVEIVT

SB SHOKE NOVEHEAlT

STA.0 /0- /007 2,'7008 37,SCV9 27,¢OO/0 No /'fOyEMENrII 39J 70CJ/2 Z, 700

APPENDIX I

VENTILATION STUDYr.4CE AREA - 4MAIN _ju7"rS- 8 FLATS Zr SeCTIOA.!

!?OBENA NO 3 MIMECONO/TIONS ASSUMED PR;O,Q lO-Expt.os/oJ./ ON IJEctt1BER b. /962

a-loo (IIAIVAS REMtH'/iO 1f)'F,pOHrAC/f

G-400s.c.

10

7 8

COMD/nONS

RIGHT FAN RUNAI/,vG

LEFT FAN htIVAI/,(/G

lEST A- -I DATA SHOWING JJIR t;JUAA/T/r/E5 Cu.r7./ MN.'!?~!.S??I!E~_:!.1.~__!5; /963

LIA.lE LAAivAS IN #t:, EIY7RYA.L IIY.8Y 1i?40/C/5 OPEN /- ;:OoT

._-_ - _------ _--_ .._-_ .._--SrA. 1 ..?~-too

2 2t1, SOO3 k~4004-4 10,000-,-,,-, __,_0._. __ .._-

4-8 ;flo J%~E/"/ENT-_._-S-A St./6/1T SIYOKc ..#oveHENT

5-B 5UGI-!T 5#C!KE Ho.~£I1.ElYr--

STA. 0 Ii; 7007 IC?-'-/l_t?O'-- _8 30,00_0 _9 17, ~OO.._ _/0 5i./G/IT 5/'?OKE #oJ/eMEtYT

II 40,900/2 D/5COIJTIIVUEO

APPENDIX

~901 < ODD~ 89 L..----4lil:?l--~::::::::::=.J '--...... L--+-...... .....---1

~88 DOD DO 10

87 ~" 0DOD D '----+--I

L

'Inl InnnnlrffM IIo 1 2 3 4 5 ~ 7 8 9

ENTRIES

VeNTILAT/ON STUDYlACE AREA - 4M.4IN BurTs - 8FLATS /r SecT/OA./

!?OBE;VA NO 3 MIMECONOITIONS ASSUMED PRIOR 70 CXPt.OSIOA/ 0/./ [)ECENBER ~ /962

WBI!VtS G·fOO (/JA/VA.SREMOVED 19I,f'oHFAce

G-400Sc.

5.11011

lEST A-5" DATA SHOWIA/(j AIR f;JUAAlTITIE5 Cu.rr/MN.Te?T~. 7A1<c..~._-!~-<.:!:_15;1~63

L/,l../E (AtVV'AS IAl #G__EN.!::,.......;(7y~_-A.?:./NI?,Y R4?lu~__Opel)' j-/OorCOIJDIT/ONS

R/6HT fAN RUNNIN6

LEFT FAN LbwN' .._ ..,_.-----.-_. - .. _ ..._---_.-.~..... -~---_..... _. - -....

SrA. t 2~,/00Z 25;9003 10-0004-A /0,0004-8 S't./GIIT SMOKe?;%v€N8IYT

,S....A Alo !VoYc/Yc/YT5-8 5L./6#T 5NOKE I%Yc/"lEAlT

STA. 0 If/, 800

7 97008 30,0009 18.100/0 5HO-f"E !1JY.EHc).//II 40,300 . _/2 D/5foN.:...r.~/N:...:U.:.::'E:=D::-- _

APPENDIX

VeNTILATION STUDYlAce AReA - 4MAIN !JUTTS- 8FLATS iT. SecT/oM

!?OBEM4 ;VO3 MIMECONDITIONS ASSUMED PRIOR 70 Ex.ot.os/olV OAIDECEt1BER b, 1962

a-Ioo (AA/vAS REMOVeD f9';&"RoHFAce

5-~ G'~OOS.C

5"00

-

90 t~r..,.......,

~ 69 DOD l----fl::;4--..-JBt!===.J ~---' L--+---I '---" ..•.•'1

~ DDDLRTRDeR DO \0

~B8

81 " " DOD00 L--..+--Jl':nnnnnn " "o 1 234 5

ENTRIes

7 8 9

ffST A-a DATA SHOW/Al6 AIR tluA#TITIE5 Cu. ;:-T./NIA/.TESTS 7A~E.AI ../AtV. /~ /963

COMOIT/ONS

RIGHT FAN RUNNING

LEFT FAN !?VN,vfAlG

Pt..AST/C SroPPltY6 /1\1 ;# 7CNP?YBerweeN 891f"90LINE (J;NVAS 11'1#6 £(yrRY 4rINBY /?ADlus 7AKEU Chr.::.:::=-~::....:::...:.._----

SrA. 1 25:400l 29- 7003 /1. 9cJO4-A /s.aoa4-8 3,300S-A 7,7005-B ?;OO

SrA. 0 2'7,6c?07 /0,<2'008 28,5"009 DISCOIYTINUED

/0 'l200/1 39,-'-70.-'--'0 _/2 DISCOtf/TlNUE.D

APPENDIX I

91 -- --

10

8 9

COMO/T!ONS

RIGHT FAN RUNNING

LEFT MN DowN

lE-ST A- 9 DATA SHOW/I/(j AIR t;JtJA#T/T/cS Cu.;:7/ MIJ.7E5TS lAKe N' J,4t</. /5; /963

I?Asr/c 5roPPIN6 /)11 #7 &rRYBETweeN B9~ 90L/Ne C/lNI/AS /N;r?-~ ENTRY ArlA/BY /1.40/(/.5 7AKEN OOT

SrA. 1 20,100Z 29. 7003 IS; 7004..:4 /2, .,1004-8 £0005-A 48005-8 ¢;5"OO

STA. b 28,3007 /Z O~Ul~~==---- _B 29, 1009 OISC.oNTINueo

10 _Z,6CZC!_ ..... ----II 4;{600/2 OIScoNTINUeD

APPENDIX

Appendtx .rsample Analyses and Results of Gas-Emission Tests

Conductedby Membersof Investigating Committee,December19, 1962

en December19, 1962, during the investigation of the disaster, a group can-posed of a representative from the United states Steel Corporation, thePennsyJ.vamaDepartment of Mines and Mineral Industries, the United MineWorkers of America, and the Bureau of Mines conducted a gas-emission surveyin the 8 left faces and return airvaya outby 8 left. The results are summa-rized as follows:

Table 1 shovs the sample analyses and liberation f'ran specific face areas,and the attached map shows sampling and measuring points at which samplesvere collected and air measurementstaken.

Table 2 showsthe analyses of samples collected in the return airways outbythe face, which include the methane liberated at the faces. 'lhe analysesindicated that the total methane liberation from the faces and entry sur-faces fran the face of 8 left section outby to 52 crosscut was 467.41 cubicfeet a minute whenthe samples were collected.

J-1

Appendix

J(Con.)

TABL

E1.-sampleanaly

ses

andresults

ofgas-emission

test

-face

area,

December19

,1962

Quantity

Quantity

meth

ane

Location

Percent

involume

Quantity

metb

ane

liberated

trom

aBottle

inmineor

Carbon

airand

liberated

specific

area

No.

station

No~

dioxide

Clx

:yge

nMeth

ane

Nitrogen

gas

(cfm)

(cfm)

(cfm)

Y-7546

JR0.

0820

.82

0.16

78.9

427

,840

44.5

4X-5378

II.0

520

.84

.J4

18.9

126

,915

31.1

66.

18Y-

9437

2R.0

32O.Bo

.17

19.0

0ll

,,39

019

.36

X-4113

2I.0

720

.88

.14

78.9

1ll

,22)

15.7

13.

65x-

h l'6

83

R.0

620

.84

.13

18.9

71l

,849

15.4

0X-

4767

3I.0

120

.88

.13

78.9

211

,233

14.6

0o.ec

Y-€0

794R

009

2008

5,,1

618

.90

6,32

710

.14

Y-80

834I

.0720

.84

.12

78.9

76,

567

7.88

2.26

x-47

285R

.03

20.8

5.ai

79.0

126

,550

29.2

1X-

4729

5I.0

520

.88

.09

78.9

825

,600

23.0

46.

17X-4813

6R.1

620

.83

.16

78,8

57,33

2ll

.73

Y-73

706r

~07

20.8

8.0

878

.97

7,31

45.

855.

88Y-

&>65

7R.1

520

.86

.13

78.8

68,

880

ll.5

4Y-

8894

7I.0

320

.88

.aa

78.9

88,

922

9.81

1.73

Y-84

188R

008

20.8

9.1

378

.90

25,5

0033

.15

Y-99

448I

.10

20,8

4.l

l78

095

25,4

8128

.03

5.12

x-48

119R

,,07

20.8

6.1

378

.94

28,2

1036

.67

36.6

7Y-

8032

lOR

.05

20.7

7.2

1~'7

8.94

28"

2i.'

67.;

067

.10

x-47

481l

R.0

820

.88

.1178

.93

28, £CO

31.4

6X-4741

III

.06

20.8

801

118

.95

26,5

5029

·21

2.25

--...

...-_.

._---

_._-_.--.•-

I-Intak

eto

place

Liberation

ofplace

orarea

aR-I

R-Return

fram

place

J-2

sr,\ 2·1

ST~\2R, \STAI·r. \

STA. t-R \.\ \

SlA 4-1STA 4-R .

STA \ •STA 3-13-R , .

STA 6-R

S!- STA B-R

soSTA 9-R

88

87

LEGf:.ND

LOADING RAMPCONeRE TE -BLOCK STOPPINGPREFABRICATED ME TAL"DOUBLE BRATTlCf. CLOTH

WITH POSTSPLASTIC CHECK

e MASONRY STOPPING WITHMANDOOR

--_ •• - LINE BRATTICE_.- INTAKE AIR-----< RF.WRN AIRM MANDOOR

APPENDIX J - METHAi,jE TEST, 8 LEFT, ROBENA NO 3 MINE [}lSASTER. DEC. 19, 1962

Appendix

J(con.)

TABL

E2.-~le

analy

ses

andmeth

ane

liberation

from

face

and

aportion

ofarea

outby

the

face,

December19,1962

Percent

involume

Quantity

Quantity

meth

ane

Bottle

Location

inmine

Carbon

airand

liberated

No.

orstation

No.

dioxide

OXygen

Meth

ane

Nitrogen

gas

cfm

(cf'm

U-5l29

oentry

53crosscut

0.19

00.56

1.17

78.08

7 1000

81.90

U-5134

1entry

53crosscut

.21

ro.71

0.79

78.29

141000

110.6

0R-5977

2entry

53crosscut

.17

20.73

.53

78.57

21,350

113.16

W~99

217entry

52crosscut

.12

ro.82

.31

78.75

14,000

43.40

x-4699

8entry

52crosscut

.13

21.75

.56

78.56

14,350

eo.3

6Y-7442

9entry

52crosscut

.1020.75

.71

78.411-

51350

37·99

Total

8lett

faces

and

entries

outby

to52

crosscut

467.41

J-3

Appe

ndix

K

Gas-

Emis

sion

Test

s,De

cemb

er18

,196

2

The

resu

lts

ofai

rsa

mple

scol

lect

edby

aBu

reau

ofMi

nes

insp

ecto

ron

Dece

mber

18,

1962

,to

asce

rtai

nthe

meth

ane

libe

rati

onfr

amth

efa

cear

eaof

8le

ftan

den

try

surf

aces

outb

yth

efa

cear

esh

own

inth

efo

llow

ingt

able

s.Fo

rsa

mpli

nglo

cati

onsr

efer

toth

ema

pwh

ich

1sin

clud

edin

appe

ndix

J.

TABL

E1.

-Li

bera

tion

ofme

than

efr

oma

port

ion

ofth

efa

cear

eaan

dth

ere

turn

sof

the

face

spli

ts

Quan

tity

Perc

ent

invo

lume

Quan

tity

meth

ane

Bott

leCa

rbon

air

and

libe

rate

dN

o.

Loca

tion

inmi

nedi

oxid

eOX

ygen

Meth

ane

Nitr

ogen

gas

(cfu

)(c

fl::

l

x-48

919'J

feet

outb

yfa

ceof

0.07

00.8

80.

1078

.95

22

,e.o

oaa.eo

radi

usof

fNo

.4

entr

y,8

left

(inc

lude

smet

hane

from

entr

ies

5an

d6)

X-53

60No

.0

entr

y75

feet

outb

y.1

020

.78

.19

78.9

329

,400

55

.8

691

cros

scut

,8le

ft(r

etur

nof

left

spli

t)

x-48

92No

.10

entr

y'

75f

eet

outb

y.

0'

700

.85

.15

78.9

323

,400

35

.1

091

cros

scut

,8le

ft(r

etur

nof

righ

tsp

llt)

K-1

Appendix

K(con.)

TABL

E~.-L:f.beration

ofmeth

ane

£'ram

the

faces

andthe

entry

surfaces

outb

ythe

face

to51

crosscut

Quantity

Percent

involume

Quantity

met

bane

Bottle

Carbon

airand

liberated

No.

Location

inmine

dioxide

OXyger.

Meth

ane

Nitr

cgen

gas

is:f'

rn)_

(cfu)

X-53

51No

.0entry

between

0.25

20.6

70.

9878

.10

16,8

0016

4.64

50and51

crosscuts

Y-74

31N

o.1entry

between

.20

20.7

~.7

778

.31

5,60

043

.12

50and5~

crosscuts

X-53

50No

.~entry

between

.13

20.a

:>.5

378

.54

15,40

081

.62

50and51

crosscuts

X-54

73No

.7entry

between

.15

ro.e

o.2

178

.84

J.6,

&:>o

35.2

850

and51

crosscuts

X-54

74N

o.8entry

between

.13

20.8

0.4

178

.66

17,5

0071

.75

50and51

crosscuts

X-53

77No

.9entry

between

.20

20.74

.61

78.4

58,0

0048

.80

50and

51crosscuts

Total

meth

ane

liberated

from

faces

and

entry

surfaces

outby

to51

crosscut

445.

21

Asample

ofair

(bottle

NOQX-

4~53

)collected

ahead

ofventilation

at81

crosscut

No.4entry

during

the

recovery

operations

{Decem

ber10,19

62)showed

the

following

analy

sisin

percent

ofvolume:

Carbon

dioxide,

6.8;

oxygen,J.

o.6;hydrogen,

1.8;

carbon

monoxide,

J..3

;meth

ane,

28.0

;and

nitrogen,

51.5

.

K-~

Date post:	29-Aug-2019
Category:	Documents
Upload:	lambao
View:	222 times
Download:	0 times

Mine Explosion U. S. Steel Corporation Frick District · APPENDIXES (run.) Appendix F - Dust-survey...

Documents