BillyDunawayDraft7/26/09

MinimalistSemanticsinMetaethicalExpressivism

JamesDreier(2004)raisesapuzzleabouttherelationshipbetweenmetaethicalRealism

andExpressivism,whichhecallsthe"ProblemofCreepingMinimalism".TheProblem,hesays,

seemstohavetheconsequencethat"thoseofuswhofeelconfidentthatthereissomedifference

betweenthetwometaethicalcamps[i.e.,RealismandExpressivism]shouldbeconcernedthat

wedon'tknowhowtosaywhatthatdifferenceis".1Sincesucharesultwouldbebothinteresting

andcounterintuitive,letusbeginbystatingtheCreepingMinimalismworryasfollows.

(CM)ExpressivismcanrenderitselfindistinguishablefromRealisminawaythatmakesitdifficulttosaywhatthedifferencebetweenExpressivismandRealismis.2

WhatleadsDreiertoworryabout(CM)?Theworrystemsfromthesemanticproject

associatedwithSimonBlackburn's"quasirealist"Expressivismwhich,accordingtoBlackburn,

allowsanantirealistmetaethicaltheoryto"mimictheintellectualpracticessupposedly

definitiveofrealism"3andto"[try]toearn,ontheslender[i.e.,antirealist]basis,thefeaturesof

morallanguagewhichtemptpeopletorealism."4

ThebasisfortheseassertionsisBlackburn'sobservationthat,byadoptingtheappropriate

theoryaboutthemeaningofthesentencesthatwetraditionallyassociatewithRealism(thatis,

sentencesthatseemtobeinconsistentwithExpressivism),Expressivistscanalsoacceptthese

sentences.IwillcalltheseclaimsaboutthemeaningofRealistsentencesthatExpressivists1Dreier(2004),p.31,hisitalics.2Dreierthinksthatwecan,ultimately,tellthedifferencebetweenthetwocampsbythinkingaboutdifferencesintheexplanatoryroleentitiesplayinthetwotheories.SeeDreier(2004),pp.3942.Thepointbehind(CM)isthatnoneofthetraditionalwaysforsayingwhatthedifferenceisareavailable.3Blackburn(1980),p.353.4Blackburn(1984),p.171.

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mightmakeminimalistsemanticclaimsaboutthosesentences.Exactlyhowthisprojectmightbe

carriedoutisthesubjectofmydiscussionbelow.Fornow,whatisimportanttonoteisthatwe

havetheresourcestosaywhatliesbehindDreier's(CM)worry:itisthatthereseemstobeno

limittotheminimalistclaimstheExpressivistmightmakeinwhichcase,theExpressivistmight

beabletoacceptallofthesentencesRealistscanaccept.Andifthereisnoclaimoverwhich

RealistsandExpressivistsdisagree,thenitishardtoseehowwecansaywhatthedifference

betweenthetwoviewsis.

Blackburn'sdescriptionofhisquasirealistdoesnotalwayssuggestthathehasthis

unlimitedminimalistprojectinmind,andtherecertainlyareplaceswhereBlackburnseems

concernedonlytoclaimthatthequasirealistwillapplyminimalistinterpretationstoalimited

rangeofRealistsentences.5Onthislimitedproject,Expressivistswouldmakesminimalistclaims

tobeabletoacceptbasic"objectlevel"sentenceslike'itistruethattellingliesiswrong'or'itis

afactthatgivingtocharityisgood',andsobeabletoacceptsome,butnotall,ofthesentences

wemighthavethoughtonlyRealistscouldaccept.Thisprojectwouldleavethetheoretical

claimsmadebytheRealistuntouched.However,thereisamuchmoreambitiousproject,which

tomyknowledgeBlackburnneverdefinitivelyruledout,onwhichtheboththeRealist'sobject

levelandtheoreticalclaimswouldbegivenminimalistinterpretationsthatallowExpressiviststo

acceptthem.6ThisistheprojectwhichinspiresDreier's(CM)worry,sinceitistheproject

which,ifsuccessful,wouldallowExpressiviststouseminimalistsemanticclaimstoaccept

everysentenceRealistscanaccept.Letuscallacollectionofminimalistclaimsthatallows

5See,forinstance,Blackburn(1984),p.171;alsoBlackburn(2007),pp. 160 1.6ThisseemstobetheideabehindBlackburn(1980);seealsoBlackburn's"ModalsandMorals"(1993),p.58fn.5,whereheglossesthe(1980)paperasexploringthepossibilityofa"generalizedquasirealistmove"which"allowseventheuseofaconceptinexplanatoryroles,butstilldefendsanantirealistconstructionofit".Otherauthors,suchasWedgwood(2007),p.39seemtothinkofBlackburn'sprojectasthemoreambitiousone.

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Expressiviststodothisaglobalminimalistsemantics.

Thereareinterestingphilosophicalconsequencesofthepossibilityofcoupling

Expressivismwithaglobalminimalistsemantics,beyondthefactthatitleadstoDreier's(CM)

worry.Blackburn,forinstance,suggeststheavailabilityofsuchasemantictheorywould

automaticallyvindicateExpressivism.Thisisbecause(trivially)theRealistcanhaveno

disagreementwiththeExpressivistwhoacceptsaglobalminimalistsemantics,andsincethe

Expressivistbeginsfromarecognizablyantirealistperspectiveshebeginsbyspeakingonly

aboutthingsanantirealistiscomfortablewith,andthenshowswiththeglobalminimalist

semanticshoweverysentencetheRealistwantstoassertisconsistentwithinthebasicantirealist

pictureherviewismoreeconomical.TheRealistthenhasalesseconomicalwayofgettingthe

sameresults,andsohasalesssatisfactorytheorythanExpressivismcoupledwithaglobal

minimalistsemantics.7

GideonRosen,ontheotherhand,suggeststhatitisactuallyabadresultforExpressivism

ifitcannotdistinguishitselffromRealism.Hesays:

[A]fullyworkedoutquasirealismlookslesslikeantirealismandmorelikeasophisticatednonreductiverealism.Theviewlicensesthewholeheartedassertionofeverythingtherealisthaseverwantedtosayabouttheobjectivityandfactualityofthedomainatissue[]Attheendofthedaywehaveratherapairofequallylegitimaterepresentationsofourthoughtinthearea,withnoclearbasisforsayingthateitherismorerevelatoryofitsnaturethantheother.8

SinceRosen'sideaseemstobethatExpressivistswouldloseanygroundsforfavoringtheirview

bygoinginforaglobalminimalistsemantics,ifheisright,theyshouldthenavoidtheambitious

7SeeBlackburn(1980).8Rosen(1998),pp.4001.

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semanticproject.

IfExpressivistscanadoptaglobalminimalistsemantics,notonlywouldwehavetosettle

whetherBlackburnorRosen(orneither)isrightabouttheconsequencesforExpressivism,there

isafurtherproblem:toavoidDreier'sworrybystatingthedifferencebetweenRealismand

Expressivism.Thethesis(CM),asIhavestatedit,onlysaysthatitisdifficulttosaywhatthe

differenceis.Aswecannowsee,itwouldbedifficulttostateifExpressivistsacceptaglobal

minimalistsemantictheorybecausetherewouldbenosentencewecanusetosaythatitstruth

valueiswhatRealistsandExpressivistsaredisagreeingover.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatthereis

nowaywhatsoevertostatethedifferencebetweentheviews.Andsolutionstothispuzzlehas

beenattemptedintheliterature:Dreierclaimsthattheviewsdifferovertheexplanatoryrole

playedbydifferentkindsoffact.Othershaveproposeddifferentsolutiontothisproblemas

well.9

Tosummarize,whatwehaveseenabouttheProblemofCreepingMinimalismsofaristhat

theProblemarisesbecauseofthepossibilityofcouplingExpressivismwithaglobalminimalist

semantics,andthataglobalminimalistsemantics(i)isaviableextensionofthequasirealist

projectwhichhasnotbeenruledout,(ii)wouldpotentiallyhavesignificantphilosophical

consequences(althoughthereisroomfordisagreementoverwhattheywouldbe),and(iii)

wouldmakestatingthedifferencebetweenRealismandExpressivismachallengingprojectthat

needstobeaddressed.

ButallofthisispredicatedupontherebeinganoptionforExpressiviststoadoptaglobal

minimalistsemanticsinthefirstplace.Thispaperchallengesthatassumption:Iwanttoargue

thatthereisnoglobalminimalistsemantictheoryavailabletoExpressivists;thatis,thereisno

9SeealsoChrisman(2008).

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wayforthemtoconsistentlyinterpretallofthesentencesRealistscanaccept,inordertomake

themconsistentwithExpressivism.Thismeansthattheycannotrendertheirview

indistinguishablefromRealismintheway(CM)saystheycan.Italsomeansthatthedebate

betweenBlackburnandRosendoesnotneedtoberesolved,andthatotherattemptstocapture

thedifferencebetweenExpressivismareRealismarenotnecessary.

Beforeturningtomyargumentforthisconclusion,Ifirstwanttonoteacomplicationin

statingwhataglobalminimalistsemantictheorywouldlooklike,whichhasnotyetbeen

acknowledged.Earlier,Isaidthatsuchatheoryisacollectionofsemantictheseswhichallows

ExpressiviststobeabletoassignasuitableinterpretationtoeverysentenceaRealistcanaccept.

However,thiscannotbeexactlycorrect,sincewecaneasilyseethatthereisnosuchsemantic

theoryavailabletoExpressivists.ConsideraRealistwhoacceptsthesentence'allminimalist

semanticthesesarefalse'.ForanysentencestatingaminimalistsemanticclaimthatExpressivists

needtomakeinordertoacceptaRealistsentence,thenthishypotheticalRealistacceptsthe

negationofthatsentence.ClearlyExpressivistscannotmimicourRealistinthiscase:

ExpressivistsneedtoacceptsomeminimalistsemanticclaimsinordertocapturetheRealist's

sentencesstatingsubstantiveclaims,suchas'itistruethattellingliesiswrong'.TheExpressivist

canonlyacceptthefirstifsheacceptssomesentencethatsaysthat'itistruethattellingliesis

wrong'meanswhatMmeans(whereMistheExpressivist'sminimalistinterpretationof'itistrue

thattellingliesiswrong'seesectionIformoredetails).ButtheRealistweareconsideringwill

rejectthesentence''itistruethattellingliesiswrong'meanswhatMmeans',sincesherejectsall

minimalistsemantictheses!Adilemmathenarises:Expressivistsmusteitherfailtoagreeover

thesentencesstatingthesubstantiveclaims,ortheymustfailtoagreewiththeRealistover

sentencesaboutwhatthosesubstantiveclaimsmean.

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Butthisjustshowsthatweneedtobemorecarefulinsayingwhataglobalminimalist

semantictheorywouldbe.(CM)saysthataconsequenceofaglobalminimalistsemantictheory

isthatitisdifficulttosaywhatthedifferencebetweenRealismandExpressivismis.Thefact

thatRealistsandExpressivistsmustdisagreeoverthesentence'allminimalistsemantictheses

arefalse'doesnotshowthatitisnotdifficulttosaywhatthedifferenceis,sinceallthistellsusis

thatRealistscanrejectaparticularclaimaboutthemeaningofsomewordswhichExpressivists

mustaccept.Plausibly,thisdifferencedoesnotconstitutethedifferencebetweenExpressivism

andRealism;itisnotadeepdifferencebetweentheviews.Itisonlyadifferenceinwhatclaims

aboutmeaningtheviewsarecommittedto,anditwouldbesurprisingiftherealdifference

betweenRealismandExpressivismliesinthiskindofpurelysemanticdifference.

(CM)shouldbeconstruedasonlyrequiringthatExpressivistshaveavailableacollection

ofminimalistsemanticthesesthatallowsthemtoacceptalloftheRealist'ssubstantive,non

semanticclaims.Itdoesn'thavetoallowthemtoacceptsentenceslike'allminimalistsemantic

thesesarefalse'.Sofromhereon,Iwillunderstandaglobalminimalistsemantictheorytobeone

whichallowsExpressiviststoacceptallofthesubstantiveclaimsaRealistcanmake.Sucha

theorywouldstillgiveusreasontoshareanontrivialversionofDreier'soriginalworry:we

couldsay,"thoseofuswhoareconfidentthatthereissomeinteresting,nonsemanticdifference

betweenthetwometaethicalcampsshouldbeconcernedthatwedon'tknowhowtosaywhat

thatdifferenceis".

Iwanttoargue,then,that(CM)isfalsebecauseevenontherevisedunderstanding,

Expressivistsdon'thaveaglobalminimalistsemantictheoryavailabletothem;theyhaveto

disagreewithRealistsoverthetruthvalueofsentencesthatmakeadeeporsubstantiveclaims.I

willmakethispointbyarguingthatExpressivism,coupledwithanysetofminimalistsemantic

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claims,isinconsistentwithsomesetofsentencesRealistscanaccept.Inmostcases,the

followingsetofsentencesissufficienttoillustratethepoint(foranagentTed,andanEnglish

indicativemoralsentenceS):

(1)IfTedbelievesthatS,thenTedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatS.

(2)Necessarily,ifTedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatS,thenthereissomethingwhichissuchthatTedstandsinthebeliefrelationtoit.

(3)ThepropositionthatSisamindindependententity.

(4)ThepropositionthatSisanonlinguisticentity.

(1)(4)areclaimsthatExpressivistsmustbeabletoaccept,if(CM)istrue:theyarenot

sentenceslike'allminimalistsemanticthesesarefalse'.Toseethis,considerwhatwecansay,if

Expressivistsshouldrejectthem.Iftheyreject(1),forinstance,wecansay"Realistscanhold

thatifTedbelievesthatS,thenTedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatS,while

ExpressivistsarecommittedtoholdingthatTedneverstandsinthebeliefrelationtothe

propositionthatS".Similarly,iftheyreject(3),wecansay"RealistscanholdthatIfTed

believesthatS,thenTedstandsinthebeliefrelationtoamindindependententity,whereas

ExpressivistsarecommittedtoholdingthatTedneverstandsinthebeliefrelationtoamin

independententity".Theseclaimsseemtocapturesubstantivedifferencesabouthowtheworldis

accordingtoExpressivismandRealism,iftheyaretrue;theyarenotsolelyaboutdifferencesin

thepurelysemanticcommitmentsoftheviews.Hence,Itakeitthatifitcanbeshownthat(1)

(4)arejointlyinconsistentwithExpressivism,wewillhaveadecisivereasonforthinkingthat

(CM)isfalse.

Thefirstsectionofthispaperattemptstooutlineageneralprogramformaking

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minimalistsemanticclaims,byinvestigatinghowExpressivistsmightgominimalistinasimple

case:forsentencescontaining'true'.SectionsIIthroughIVthenapplythisgeneralstrategyin

ordertomakespecificminimalistclaimsabout(1)(4);inparticular,Ipresentanaturalwayfor

Expressiviststobeabletoaccept(1)and(2).Ishow,however,thatthiscommitsExpressiviststo

themeaningofthepartsofthesentencesmakingup(1)and(2),andthatthiscommitsthemto

rejectingeither(3)or(4).BytheendofsectionIV,wewillhavethemaincasethat(1)(4)are

jointlyinconsistentwithExpressivism.SectionsVandVIoutlineandrejectseparateproposals

Expressivistscouldtakethatmightbethoughttoavoidthisresult.IthenclosewithsectionVII,

whereIshowthatmyargumentisgeneralinotherwords,thecaseagainstthepossibilityofa

globalminimalistsemantictheorydoesnotdependonidiosyncraticfeaturesofthesentences(1)

(4)Idiscusshere,butcanbemadeusinganynumberofexamples.

WhileIwillbearguingthat(CM)isfalsebecause(1)(4)arejointlyinconsistentwith

Expressivism,itisalsoimportanttobeclearaboutwhatIamnotarguingfor.First,Iamnot

arguingthatExpressivismsimpliciterisfalse:IamonlyarguingthatExpressivismcannotbe

coupledwithaglobalminimalistsemantictheory.Second,Iwillnothavearguedthatallofthe

claimsmadebyBlackburn's"quasirealist"arefalse.Theprojectmightbeunderstoodtobe

smallerinscope,aimingonlytoacceptalimitedclassofRealistsoundingsentencesthathave

previouslybeenthoughttobeinconsistentwithExpressivism(forinstance,sentenceslike'itis

truethattellingliesiswrong',butperhapsnot(1)).Ihavenothingtosayaboutthismorelimited

project.Nonetheless,Ithinkthatmyresultissignificant,asitshowsthatthequasirealistproject

isnecessarilyconstrainedinwaysthatitsproponentshavenotclearlyacknowledged.Italso

showsthatthedebatesovertheconsequencesofadoptingaglobalminimalistsemantictheory

(e.g.,thedisagreementbetweenBlackburnandRosen)donotarise,anditshowsthatthe

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attemptstosolvetheProblemofCreepingMinimalismbysayingwhatthedifferencebetween

RealismandExpressivismis,evenwhenExpressivistsadoptaglobalminimalistsemantic

theory,areunneeded.

I.Thegeneralminimaliststrategy:minimalismabout'true'

ToshowthataglobalminimalistsemanticsisnotavailabletoExpressivists,weneedfirst

toseehowExpressivistscangoaboutmakingminimalistsemanticclaims.Todothis,Iwill

considerabasiccase:moralsentencescontaining'true'.Then,wecanmakesomeobservations

aboutthegeneralfeaturesofthissimpleminimalistclaiminordertomakesimilarclaimsforthe

Realistsentences(1)and(2).

If(CM)istrue,Expressivistsdoneedaminimalistreadingforsentencescontaining'true'.

Realistscanacceptthattherearemoraltruths.Since,accordingtoExpressivism,moralsentences

expressnoncognitivestatesofmind,itisnotclearthat'true'properlyappliestothem,andso

theyneedatheoryaboutwhat'true'means,whichpredictsthatthewordappliestosomemoral

sentences.Theschema(MT)seemstogiveExpressiviststheminimalistsemanticclaimtheyare

lookingforinthiscase(where'p'canbereplacedanyEnglishindicativesentence).

(MT)'itistruethatp'meanswhatever'p'means.

(MT)tellsusthatthesentencethatisnotobviouslyconsistentwithExpressivism'itis

truethatp'incaseswhere'p'isamoralsentencereallymeansnothingmorethanasentencethat

clearlyisconsistentwithExpressivismthatis,thesentence'p'.Wecancallthesentencewe

needaminimalistreadingfor(inthiscase,'itistruethatp')thetargetsentence.Andwecancall

thesecondsentence,whichgivesthemeaningofthetargetsentence,theequivalencesentence

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(here,'p').

Tobeclear,Expressivistscanapply(MT)byreasoningasfollows.Supposetheyaccept

themoralsentence'tellingliesiswrong'(anyothermoralsentencecanbesubstitutedhere,

withoutlossofgenerality).Thisisourequivalencesentence;anditisconsistentwith

Expressivism;thebasicideabehindExpressivismasametaethicaltheoryisanideaaboutwhat

itistoacceptthiskindoffirstorderatomicmoralsentences.Then,theycanapply(MT),

yieldingthesemanticclaimthat'itistruethattellingliesiswrong'meanswhatever'tellingliesis

wrong'means.Butif'tellingliesiswrong'isconsistentwithExpressivism,and'itistruethat

tellingliesiswrong'meansthesame(by(MT)),itcannotbeinconsistentwiththeirview,since

twosentencesthataresynonymouscannotdifferinwhattheyareconsistentwith.(Forshort:

synonymypreservesconsistency).So'itistruethattellingliesiswrong'isconsistentwith

Expressivism.

Thisapproachgeneralizes.Whatwewant,foranytargetsentencethatRealistsacceptbut

isnotobviouslyconsistentwithExpressivism,istofindanequivalencesentenceExpressivists

alreadyaccept,andtoclaimthatthetargetsentencemeanswhatevertheequivalencesentence

means.Ofcourse,therearelimitsonwhattheequivalencesentencecanbehereitmust,for

instance,sharethesamemodalprofileasthetargetsentence.(Thisisbecauseweneedtoclaim

thatthetargetsentencemeansthesameastheequivalencesentence,anditmustturnoutthatif

'a'and'b'meanthesame,then'aiffb'isnecessary.)

Nowthatwehaveageneralmethodfordevelopingminimalistreadings,wewantto

returntoassessing(CM).Ifitistrue,weshouldbeabletodevelop,aspartofaglobalminimalist

semantictheory,minimalistreadingsfor(1)and(2).

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II.Minimalismabout(1)

Mattersareabitmorecomplicatedhere,since(1)isaconditional,composedoutofthe

atomicsentences'TedbelievesthatS'and'Tedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthat

S'.AndbothsentencesarenotobviouslyconsistentwithExpressivism.Soreally,therearethree

taskshere:togiveaminimalistreadingoftheantecedent,giveaminimalistreadingofthe

consequent,andthentoshowthatthesereadingshavethefollowingfeature:wheneverthefirstis

true,thenthesecondisalsotrue.

Iwillfocusonlyonthesecondtask,whichwillturnouttobemostimportantforour

purposeshere.Note,however,that(CM)requiresthatExpressivistscansolvetheotherstoo,but

Iwillmaketheassumptionthattheycandothis,withoutgoingintothedetails.Soourtaskhere

isthatofgivingasuitableinterpretationoftheconsequentof(1),'Tedstandsinthebelief

relationtothepropositionthatS'.Sinceweareusingminimalismabouttruthasatemplate,this

ourtargetsentence.Weneedtofindanequivalencesentenceforit,whichExpressivistsalready

accept,andwhichisaplausiblecandidateforthemeaningofthetargetsentence.Thenwecan

makeaminimalistclaimanalogousto(MT),andreasonwithittoshowthatExpressivistscan

acceptthetargetsentence.

TheequivalencesentenceIwillusehereis'Tedisinthementalstateactuallyexpressed

by'S''.GiventheExpressivist'stheory,itisanaturalsuggestion,althoughtherearesome

problemswiththechoicewhichIwon'tgointohere.10Nothingessentialtothemainargument

10 Notethattheindexical'actually'isnecessaryfortheinterpretationoftheequivalencesentencetobecorrectifJohnpossiblybelievesthatmurderiswrong,itisbecausethereisapossibleworldwinwhichJohnisinthementalstatethat'murderiswrong'expresseshere,intheactualworld.Itdoesnotmatterwhatthewords'murderiswrong'meaninw.But'actually'isalsoproblematic:ifJohnpossiblybelievesthatSallybelievesthatmurderiswrong,thenatsomepossibleworldw*,JohnbelievesthatSallyisinthementalstateactuallyexpressedby'murderiswrong.'ButthenJohnmusthaveabelief,atw*,aboutourworld(theworldwhichactuallyobtains,whichmightbedistinct

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hangsontheseproblemsforthischoiceofanequivalencesentence.And,insectionVII,Igive

anargumentforwhywecouldhavechosenadifferentinterpretation,and,withafewminimal

differences,thesameargumentwouldstillgothrough.

Withthisequivalencesentencefortheconsequentof(1),wecandojustwhatwedidfor

'true':wemakeaminimalistsemanticclaim,analogousto(MT).Thisis(MB).

(MB)'TedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatS'meanswhatever'Tedisinthementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S''means.

(MB)worksjustlike(MT)did.WewantedtoknowwhetherExpressivistscouldacceptthe

targetsentence,theconsequentof(1).But,iftheyaccept(MB),thentheycanreasonasfollows:

'Tedisinthementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S''isconsistentwithExpressivism.(MB)says

that'TedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatS'meansthesamething.So,since

synonymypreservesconsistency,'TedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatS'is

consistentwithExpressivism.

Expressivistscanuseminimalismtoaccepttheconsequentof(1)inthisway.Giventhe

assumptionswegrantedatthebeginningofthissectionthatExpressivistscangivethesame

kindofminimalistinterpretationfortheantecedent,'TedbelievesthatS',andthatthis

interpretationwillguaranteethatwhenevertheantecedentof(1)istrue,theconsequentisalso

(MB)guaranteesthatExpressivistscanaccept(1).

III.Minimalismabout(2),plussomeconsequences

fromw*)inordertohave,inw*,abeliefaboutSally'smentalstate.Surelythisisnotright,butwewillletthatpasshere.Formoreon'actually'rigidification,seeSoames(2002)pp,3950;foranExpressivistsolutiontothisproblem,seeSchroeder(2008),ch.11.ThanksalsotoScottSoamesfordiscussionhere.

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WhatwehavedonesofarisshowhowExpressivistscanmakeminimalistsemantic

claimsthattheycanusetoaccept(1)withoutinconsistency.Thisisjustasthingsshouldbe,if

(CM)istrue.But,aswenotedabove,(2)isalsoasentenceRealistscanaccept.SoExpressivists

shouldbeabletoacceptit,also.

Inordertodothis,wehavetomakeclaimsaboutthestructureorsyntaxofthe

interpretationExpressivistshaveofferedfortheconsequentof(1).ThisisthemovethatIwill

arguecommitsExpressivistsnotonlytothemeaningofsentencesthattheRealistaccepts,but

alsotothemeaningofthepartsofthosesentences.Andthisfactwillplayanimportantrolein

showingthatExpressivistswhoaccept(1)and(2)mustreject(3)or(4).

Itwillbehelpfultohavesomeabbreviationsonhand.Recall(MB),whichweusedto

showthatExpressivistscanaccepttheconsequentof(1).Thefirstsentencein(MB),ourtarget

sentence,wastheanalysisofbeliefascriptionsavailabletotheRealist.Iwillcallit(RB).

(RB)TedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatS.

ThesecondsentencewastheExpressivistinterpretation(orequivalencesentence)for(RB),

whichIwillcall(EB).

(EB)Tedisinthementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S'.

ToseewhatminimalistclaimsExpressivistsneedtomakeabout(2),considerwhat

Realistscansayaboutit:itisnecessary,forthefollowingreason.Theantecedent,whichis(RB),

hasastructurewithatwoplacepredicateandtwoarguments.Schematically,itisoftheform

aRb.(2)isnecessary,then,becauseitsconsequentislogicallyentailedbyitsantecedent;the

consequentisexactlythesameas(RB),exceptthatwehavequantifiedintoitssecondargument

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place.Schematically,itisoftheformx:aRx.

Tobemoreexplicit,theRealistcandivide(RB)intowhatIwillcallitsargument

structure,whichshowswherethepredicatesandargumentsarein(RB).Calltheargument

structureof(RB)RAS(forRealistargumentstructure).

RAS: 2placepredicate Argument1 Argument2

standsinthebeliefrelationto Ted thepropositionthatS

Thus,wecanseethattheconsequentof(2)isjusttheantecedent,withArgument2replacedbya

boundvariable.Sincethisisaninstanceofalogicallyvalidinference,(2)isnecessarilytrue.

SoRealistscansaythat(2)isnecessarybecauseofthelogicalrelationshipbetweenits

antecedentanditsconsequent.ButExpressivistshaveofferedusaninterpretationofthe

antecedentof(2).Theyshouldthenbeabletoexplainwhy,onthebasisoftheirinterpretationof

itsantecedent,(2)isanecessarytruthinthesameway.Inotherwords,theyshouldgivetothe

consequentaninterpretationthatisalogicalconsequenceoftheinterpretationtheygavetothe

antecedent.Butinordertodothis,wehavetoknowwhattheargumentstructureofthe

interpretationis.

Theinterpretationweassignedtotheantecedentof(2)was(EB),but,asitturnsout,

therearetwooptionsfordividing(EB)intoanargumentstructureinordertocomeupwithan

interpretationoftheconsequentwhichprovidesasuitableexplanationofthenecessityof(2).I

willdiscussthefirstwaytogiveanargumentstructurefor(EB),anddrawouttheconsequences

thatfollowfromdoingthingsthisway.Then(inthenextsection),Iwillreturntotheotherway

Expressivistscanassign(EB)anargumentstructure,andshowwhygoingthiswayhassimilar

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consequences.Tosummarize:thereasonwhyweareconcernedwiththestructureof(EB),is

thatwewanttogiveaminimalistinterpretationof(2)thatexplainsitslogicalfeatures.Butin

ordertodothis,weneedtoknowwhatthepredicateandargumentsin(EB)are.

Hereisthefirstwaywecouldassignanargumentstructureto(EB).Wecouldsaythat

thetwoplacepredicatein(EB)is'isin',andthat'Ted'and'thementalstateactuallyexpressedby

'S''arethearguments.Then,EAS.1representstheargumentstructurefor(EB).

EAS.1:2placepredicate Argument1 Argument2

isin Ted thementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S'

IfEAS.1representstheargumentstructurefor(EB),thenweknowhowtogivetheright

minimalistinterpretationoftheconsequentof(2),ournewtargetsentence.Sincetheconsequent

of(2)justis(RB),withitssecondargumentreplacedbyaboundvariable,andwealreadyknow

what(RB)meansitmeanswhat(EB)means,accordingto(MB)thentheonlyminimalist

interpretationof(2)thatcanexplainwhyitisnecessarilytrueisoneonwhichweinterpretits

consequenttomeanwhat(EB)means,withitssecondargumentreplacedbyaboundvariable.11

Thatis,inordertoaccept(2),ExpressivistswhoacceptthatEAS.1givestheargumentstructure

of(EB)mustaccepttheminimalistclaim(MC.1).

(MC.1)'ThereissomethingwhichissuchthatTedstandsinthebeliefrelationtoit'meanswhatever'thereissomethingwhichissuchthatTedisinit'means.

ThisallowsExpressiviststoaccept(2).First,theycanaccepttheantecedent,becauseit

11Forachallengetotheassumptionthatthisistheonlywaytoexplainthenecessityof(2),seeSectionV.

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meanswhat(EB)means(accordingto(MB)).Then,itfollowsfrom(EB)thatsomethingissuch

thatTedisinit(fromlogicandEAS.1),sotheycanacceptthesentence'thereissomething

whichissuchthatTedisinit'.But(MC.1)tellsusthattheconsequentof(2)meansthesameas

thissentence,andsonotonlyisitconsistentwithExpressivism(sincesynonymypreserves

consistency),butExpressivistscanalsoderiveitfrom(RB),usingonlyclaimsaboutmeaning

((MB)and(MC.1)),syntax(EAS.1),andlogic.SoExpressivistscanacceptthattheconsequent

of(2)isanecessaryconsequenceof(RB).Thus,theycanexplainwhytheconditionalholds

necessarily,andcanaccept(2).

Sofar,thisisgoodfor(CM):wehavebeenabletodowhataglobalminimalistsemantics

requires,namely,toshowthatthereareminimalistinterpretationsonwhich(1)and(2)are

consistentwithRealism.Butthestepswehavetakensofarimplythatsomeothersentences,

whichRealistscanaccept,arenotconsistentwithExpressivism.OnceImakethecaseforthis,I

willgobackandshowthatwegetasimilarresult,evenifweassumeadifferentargument

structurefor(EB).

ThecentralclaimofthisargumentisthatExpressivistswhogoinfortheseminimalist

claimstoaccept(1)and(2)arecommittedtothepartsofEAS.1givingthemeaningofthe

correspondingpartsofRAS.Thisisanintuitiveideaafterall,wealreadyneededtoacceptthat

thesentencecomposedoutofthepartsofEAS.1(thatis,(EB)),givesthemeaningofthe

sentencecomposedoutofthepartsofRAS(thatis,(RB)).Sincewehavealsohadtoassumethat

theyhavethesamestructure,itseemsasmallsteptotheconclusionthatthepartsdomeanthe

same,andsothattheargumentsinRASmeanwhattheargumentsinEAS.1mean.Eventhough

thisisintuitive,Iwillprovideanargumentherefortheclaimthat,ifExpressivistsaccept(MB)

and(MC.1),whichwereusedtoaccept(1)and(2),thentheyarecommittedtotheclaimthat'the

16

propositionthatS'(thesecondargumentinRAS)meanswhatever'thementalstateactually

expressedby'S''(thesecondargumentinEAS.1)means.ItfollowsfromthisthatExpressivists

mustreject(3).

Tomakethisargumentmoretransparent,Iwillborrowapieceofnotationfrom

semanticists,called"meaningbrackets."Howtoreadthemisstraightforward:''reads'the

meaningof,'foranyexpression.And' ='reads'andmeanthesame,'forany

expressionsand.Soitisn'tstrictlynecessarythatweusethenotationhere;itwouldbe

straightforwardtotranslateeverythingintoordinaryEnglish.ButIwillusethebrackets,since

theymakethecentralfeaturesoftheargumentmoretransparent.

Expressivistsneededtoaccept(MB)inordertoaccept(1).Inourbracketsnotation,they

acceptP1.

P1.TedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatS=Tedisinthementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S' .

Expressivistsalsoneededtoaccept(MC.1)inordertoaccept(2)(assuming,asweare

throughoutthissection,thatEAS.1givestheargumentstructureof(EB)).Giventhisassumption,

wealsohaveP2,whichjustis(MC.1)inbracketsnotation(andwiththequantifierswritten

formally).

P2.x:Tedstandsinthebeliefrelationtox= y:Tedisiny.

OurthirdpremiseisaconsequenceofP2:sincethequantifiersinP2meanthesame,it

shouldfollowthatwhentheyareremovedfromthesentencesinP2,theresultingformulasmean

17

thesame.(ThefactthatthevariablesinP2aredifferentdoesn'tmeanthatthequantifiersmake

differentsemanticcontributions.)Thatis,P3shouldhold.

P3.Tedstandsinthebeliefrelationtox=Tedisiny.

Butnowweshouldnoticethat,ifwetakeP3andsubstitutetheexpressions'the

propositionthatS'and'thementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S''forthefreevariables'x'and

'y',respectively,intheformulasinP3,thenweobtainthesentencesinP1.ThesentencesinP1

aresynonymous.Soweknowthattheseexpressionsaresuchthat,whentheyaresubstitutedinto

synonymousformulas(theformulasinP3),theygiveussynonymoussentences(thesentencesin

P1).Buton(almost)anycompositionalsemantictheory,theseexpressionsmustthemselvesbe

synonymous.12Thatis,wehave:

C.thepropositionthatS=thementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S'.

Thisisaclaimaboutthemeaningofapartof(RB)whichExpressivistsarecommittedto,

iftheygoinforminimalistreadingsof(1)and(2).AndifExpressivistsarecommittedtothis,

thentheyarealsocommittedtorejecting(3).Csaysthattheexpressions'thepropositionthatS'

and'thementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S''meanthesame.Itfollowsthatthesentence(3)

meansthesameas(3*).

12 Therearesomesemantictheoriesforwhichthispointdoesnothold.ForconsideratheoryonwhichthesemanticcontentofasentenceSisthesetofpossibleworldsinwhichSistrue.Onsuchatheory,itwouldbetruethattheformulas'xishuman'and'yishuman'aresynonymous.Substitutingthenames'Bob'and'Bill'forthefreevariablesintheformulasresultsin'Bobishuman'and'Billishuman,'which(ontheassumptionthatBobandBillbothexist)expressnecessarytruths.Hencethesemanticcontentofeachisthesetofallpossibleworlds,andsothesentencesaresynonymous.Butitdoesnotfollowthat'Bob'and'Bill'aresynonymous.Butthisresultdependsonanimplausiblefeatureofthesemanticcontentofsentences,thatallnecessarilytruesentencesaresynonymous,andsotherearegoodreasonstobeskepticalofthisconclusion.ThankstoScottSoamesforhelpfuldiscussiononthispoint.

18

(3)ThepropositionthatSisamindindependententity.

(3*)Thementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S'isamindindependententity.

Butweknowwhat(3*)means,andRealistscan.andlikelywill,holdthatitisfalse.13If(3)

meansthesameas(3*),thentheyshouldreject(3)aswell.Hence,Expressivistswhoaccept

(MB)and(MC.1)toprovideminimalistreadingsof(1)and(2)arecommittedtorejectingsome

Realistclaim,namely(3).Sothiscan'tbethewaytoaccept(1)and(2),ifitistruethataglobal

minimalistsemanticsisavailabletoExpressivists,as(CM)requires.14

IV.Anotherwaytominimalismabout(2),plussomeconsequences

Butwehavenotshownthat(CM)isfalseyet.Expressivistsdonotneedtoassumethat

(EB)hastheargumentstructuregivenbyEAS.1.AndiftheyrejectthatEAS.1givesthecorrect

argumentstructurefor(EB),thensincethepremiseP2reliesontheassumptionthatEAS.1does

givetheargumentstructurefor(EB),theyarenotcommittedtolineofreasoningwhichentails

13Itshouldalsobenotedherethat,strictlyspeaking,someRealistcould,forindependentreasons,reject(3).Thiswouldnotthreatentheconclusionthat,sinceExpressivistsmustreject(3),theirviewisinconsistentwithRealism,evenifweconsideronlythedeviantversionofRealismwhichalsorejects(3).ThisisbecausethedeviantRealistcouldstill,withoutchangingherviewonfundamentalmetaethicalissues,accept(3).Shehaschosentoreject(3),butthisresultisnotentailedbyhermetaethicaltheory;theresultmustbeaconsequenceofatheorysheacceptsaboutsomeotherdomain.Expressivistscannotsaythesamething.Thisissufficientforadifferencebetweentheviews.Ananalogueofthispointappliestotheconclusionofthenextsection.SeealsosectionVI.14IthasbeensuggestedtomebyananonymousrefereethattheExpressivistmightbecommittedtoacceptingthat(3*)and(3)aresynonymous,yetnotbecommittedtodenying(3),forthefollowingreason:shemightholdthattheexpression'thementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S''in(3*)referstoamentalstatetype,inwhichcaseitisplausibletosupposethatitsreferentisbothnonlinguisticandmindindependent.ThustheExpressivistiscommittedtothesynonymybetween(3)and(3*),butisnotcommittedtodenyingeither.

IthinkthattheExpressivistcouldmakethismoveandavoidbeingcommittedtodenying(3).ButtherewillbeotherRealistsentencesshemustrejectinvirtueofthefactthatsheaccepts(C),construedinthisway.Forinstance,take(RB),andsubstitutefor'thepropositionthatS'theexpression'thementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S''.Accordingto(C),(RB)issynonymouswiththisnewexpression,sothesentence'Tedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S''isasentencetheExpressivistiscommittedtoaccepting,sinceitissynonymouswith(RB).ButthisisasentencetheRealistlikelywilldeny:shemightholdthattheonlythingsagentsstandinthebeliefrelationtoarenotmentalstates,ormentalstatetypes.

19

that(3)and(3*)meanthesamething.

Thissectionisconcernedwiththestatusof(CM)ifwedorejecttheassumptionthat(EB)

hastheargumentstructuregivenbyEAS.1.Itwillturnoutthatmakingthismovewillnot

requirethatExpressivistsreject(3).ButitwillrequirethatExpressivistsreject(4).Theargument

forwhythisissohasexactlythesamestructureasbefore,althoughthecontentofourpremises

mustbeslightlydifferent.Butthegeneralideaisthesame:bygoinginforminimalistreadings

of(1)and(2),Expressivistsarecommittedtoclaimsaboutthemeaningofpartsofthose

sentences,andthiscommitsthemtorejectingothersentencesRealistscanaccept.

IfwerejectthatEAS.1givesthecorrectargumentstructurefor(EB),westillneedtogive

anadequateinterpretationofourtargetsentence(2).Wecandothis,becausethereisanother

waytodivide(EB)intoatwoplacepredicateandtwoarguments.Thisalternativeargument

structuretakes'isinthementalstateactuallyexpressedby'asitstwoplacepredicate,and''S''

asitssecondargument.(Thefirstargumentis'Ted,'asbefore.)Hence,wecouldhaveEAS.2as

theargumentstructurefor(EB).

EAS.2: 2placepredicate Argument1 Argument2

isinthementalstateactuallyexpressedby Ted 'S'

Nowthatwehaveadifferentargumentstructure,thestrategyforcomingupwithan

equivalencesentencefortheconsequentof(2)mustbeapplieddifferentlythanbefore.Whatwe

wantisfortheminimalistinterpretationof(RB)toexplainwhy(2)isnecessarilytrue;andwe

candothisonlyiftheconsequentof(2)meanswhatever(EB),withitssecondargument

replacedbyaboundvariable,means.Butnow,accordingtoEAS.2,thesecondargumentof(EB)

20

is''S''andsotheminimalistclaimthatsatisfiestheserequirementsis(MC.2)insteadof

(MC.1).

(MC.2)'ThereissomethingwhichissuchthatTedstandsinthebeliefrelationtoit'meanswhatever'thereissomethingwhichissuchthatTedisinthementalstateactuallyexpressedbyit'means.

Thereasonwhy(MC.2)allowsExpressiviststoaccept(2)isexactlythesameasbeforetheycan

reasonfromtheantecedentof(2)totheconsequentof(2)usingonlyclaimsaboutmeaning,

syntaxandlogicsoIwillnotrepeatthedetailshere.

ButifExpressivistsaccept(MC.2),wecangiveanargumentwithexactlythesame

structureasbefore,whichshowsthattheyarealsocommittedtospecificclaimsaboutthe

meaningsofthepartsof(RB).First,theyarestillcommittedto(MB),becauseitisneededto

showthat(1)isconsistentwithExpressivism.Inourmeaningbracketsnotation,thismeansthat

westillhaveP1.

P1.TedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatS=Tedisinthementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S'.

Butsincewenolongerhave(MC.1),wedon'thaveP2asapremise.Instead,wehavethe

analogousP2*,whichis(MC.2),writteninthemeaningbracketsnotation.

P2*.x:Tedstandsinthebeliefrelationtox=y:Tedisinthementalstateactuallyexpressedbyy.

P2*impliesP3*forthesamereasonthatP2impliesP3:becausethequantifiersinthe

sentencesinP2*don'tdifferinmeaning,removingthemfromsentenceswhicharesynonymous

21

shouldgiveussynonymousformulas.

P3*.Tedstandsinthebeliefrelationtox=Tedisinthementalstateactuallyexpressedbyy.

ButnownoticehowP1isrelatedtoP3*:ifwesubstitute'thepropositionthatS'and

''S'',respectively,forthefreevariablesinP3*,wegetP1.Soweknowthatsubstitutingthese

expressionsintosynonymousformulasgivesussynonymoussentences.Theseexpressions

themselvesshouldbesynonymous.Thatis,wehaveC*,whichisaclaimaboutthemeaningofa

partof(RB).

C*.thepropositionthatS='S'.

SoExpressivistswhoaccept(MB)and(MC.2)toaccept(1)and(2)arecommittedtoC*.

Thisdoesnotcommitthemtorejecting(3).But,itdoescommitthemtothefollowing:sincewe

alreadyknowwhat''S''meansitpicksoutasentencethenC*entailsthat'thepropositionthat

S'mustdothesame.Then,Expressivistsarecommittedtoholdingthat(4)issynonymouswith

(4*),whichRealistscanreject.

(4)ThepropositionthatSisanonlinguisticentity.

(4*)'S'isanonlinguisticentity.

ThiscompletesmyargumentthatExpressivistswhogoinforminimalistinterpretations

of(1)and(2)mustreject(3)or(4).Sinceaglobalminimalistsemanticswouldrequirethat

Expressivistscanacceptallofthesesentences,Ithinkthatthisshowsthatnoglobalminimalist

semanticsisavailabletoExpressivists,andtheissuesassociatedwith(CM),whichIoutlinedin

22

thefirstsection,donotarise.Thenexttwosectionsconsidertwoapparentstrategiesforavoiding

thisconclusion.Ifirstconsideraproposalaboutthesemanticsofquantifiersthatappearstoshow

awayaroundmyargument.ThesectionafterthatconsidersawaytodeveloptheProblemof

CreepingMinimalismwithoutfollowingthebasicminimaliststrategy.Ithenclosebysaying

whyItakemymainargumenttobesuccessful,andwhysimilarargumentsshouldbeavailableto

showthatsetsofsentencesotherthan(1)(4)areinconsistentwithExpressivismcoupledwitha

minimalistsemantics.

V.Thedisjunctivequantifier:awayaround?

WemightconsiderwhatIwillcallthedisjunctivereadingofthequantifier:thatEnglish

expressionsinvolvinganexistentialquantifier,whichtaketheform'thereissomethingwhichis

suchthatit',meanthesameasalongdisjunction,withonedisjunctforeachterminour

language.Inotherwords,ifourlanguagecontainedtheterms,'a,''b,''c,'...thesentence'x:Fx'

wouldbydefinitionbeequivalenttothedisjunction'FaFbFc...'.Ifthedisjunctivereading

iscorrect,thenitseemsthatExpressivistscanaccept(2)withoutgoinginforeitherof(MC.1)or

(MC.2),theclaimsaboutmeaningoftheconsequentof(2)whicharecrucialtotheargumentsof

theprevioustwosections.Hereiswhy.

Statedmoreprecisely,thedisjunctivereadingoftheexistentialquantifieristhe

following:

D1.Anysentencecontaininganexistentialquantifier,'x...x...'meansthesameas'...a1......a2......a3...',andsoon,foreachtermaiinourlanguage.

23

Next,sinceourgoalistoshowhowwecanuseD1toaccept(2),weapplythisdefinitiontothe

consequentof(2),whichcontainsanexistentialquantifier.ThisgivesusD2.

D2.'thereissomethingsuchthatTedstandsinthebeliefrelationtoit'meansthesameas'Tedstandsinthebeliefrelationtoa1Tedstandsinthebeliefrelationtoa2 ...'andsoon,foreachtermaiinourlanguage.

Now,ifweallowthat'thepropositionthatS'isaterminourlanguage,thenweknowthatoneof

thedisjunctsinD2is'TedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatS'thatis,wecan

bemorespecificaboutwhatthecontentD2isbywritingD2*.

D2*.'thereissomethingsuchthatTedstandsinthebeliefrelationtoit'meansthesameas'TedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatSTedstandsinthebeliefrelationtoa1Tedstandsinthebeliefrelationtoa2...'andsoon,foreachtermaiinourlanguage.

Last,D3isanindependent(andextremelyplausible)claimasitisaninstanceofthelogicaltruth

thatanysentenceentailsadisjunctionwiththatsentenceasoneofitsdisjuncts:

D3.'TedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatS'entails'Tedstandsinthebeliefrelationtoa1Tedstandsinthebeliefrelationtoa2...TedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatS...'andsoon,foreachtermaiinourlanguage.

D2*tellsuswhatthesecondsentenceinD3means.SowecansubstitutethesentencesD2*says

meanthesameintoD3,whichyieldstheclaimthat'Tedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothe

propositionthatS'entails'thereissomethingsuchthatTedstandsinthebeliefrelationtoit'.It

thenseemsthatExpressivistscanaccept(2),withnoclaimsaboutthemeaningoftheparts

required!

Butthisargumentismistaken,evenifweassumethedisjunctivereadingastheproper

24

semanticsfortheexistentialquantifier.InordertomakethetransitionfromD2toD2*,we

neededtomaketheassumptionthat'thepropositionthatS'isaterminourlanguage:ifwedon't

makethisassumption,thenwedon'tknowthatD2containsthedisjunctcontaining'the

propositionthatS',asD2*claimsitdoes.Butthisisnotalegitimateassumptionforthe

Expressivisttomake:theyhavenotshownthattheexpression'thepropositionthatS'isaterm.

TheycoulddothisbytakinganexpressionwhichExpressivistscanalreadyacceptasdesignating

something(whichiswhatatermdoes)andtellingusthat'thepropositionthatS'meansthesame

asthatexpression.Butatthispoint,theyhaven'tdonethistheyhaveonlyshownusthatthey

canacceptthesentence(RB)whichcontains'thepropositionthatS'.AccordingtotheRealist's

theorytheexpression'thepropositionthatS'in(RB)isaterm,butitdoesn'tfollowfromthisthat

ontheExpressivist'stheory,thesameexpressionin(RB)isaterm.Expressivistsneedtosay

whatitmeansfirst.InDreier'slanguage,theymustfirst"earntheright"tousetheexpression(or,

atleast,therighttouseitasaterm).15

ThetwoExpressivistproposalsconsideredinsectionsIIIandIVtellusthat'the

propositionthatS'isatermbecausetheytelluswhatitmeans.Itmeanswhatever'themental

stateactuallyexpressedby'S''(inthefirstcase),or''S''means(inthesecond).Sincewe

alreadyknowthatExpressivistscanaccepttheseexpressionsareterms,eachproposalentailsthat

'thepropositionthatS'isalsoaterm.Byacceptingproposalswiththesecommitments,

Expressivistscanlegitimatelyclaimthat'thepropositionthatS'isaterm.Butacceptingthem

alsocommitsExpressiviststorejectingeither(3)or(4).

Tosummarize:thedisjunctivereadingbyitselfdoesnotallowExpressiviststoaccept(2).

Theycanmakeadditionalclaimsaboutmeaningwhich,togetherwiththedisjunctivereading,

15 SeeDreier(1996),pp.478forarelateddiscussion.

25

entailthat(2)isconsistentwithExpressivism.Buttheseadditionalclaimshavebeenshowntobe

inconsistentwithotherclaimsRealistsacceptinsectionsIIIandIV.

VI.Themetaphysicalstrategy:adifferentwayaround?

Thereisadifferentwayaroundwhichmightseempromising.ConsideranExpressivist

whogivesanaccountofwhatpropositionsare;thatis,shearticulatesatheoryaboutwhat

propositionshaveforconstituents,andhowpropositionsareassignedtoEnglishsentences.One

simpleaccountareavailabletotheExpressivististhefollowing:thepropositionasentenceS

expressesisthesetofsentencessynonymouswithS.16SinceExpressivistscanacceptthatsome

sentencesaresynonymouswitheachother,theycanacceptthateverysentenceexpressesa

proposition,ifthisiswhatpropositionsare.SuchExpressivistmightaddanaccountofwhatitis

tostandinthebeliefrelationtopropositions,whichholdsthatsomeonecountsasstandinginthe

beliefrelationtoapropositionjustincaseshesincerelyandcompetentlyacceptsasentencethat

isamemberofthatproposition.

SuchanExpressivistwouldhaveaneasywaytoexplainwhy(1)and(2)areconsistent

withExpressivism:theyaretruejustincaseTedacceptsthesentence'S',anditisconsistent

withExpressivismthatTedaccepts'S'.So,ifpropositionsareconstruedinthisway,thenitis

consistentwithExpressivismthatTedstandsinthebeliefrelationtothepropositionthatS.

Whethertheparticulartheoryisplausibleinotherrespectsisnotimportantforourpurposes.

Whatdoesmatteristhatitdoesnotobviouslyentailthedenialofanyof(1)(4),anditdoesso

withoutmakinganyclaimsaboutwhatthesesentencesmean.

16BoththegeneralideaandillustrativeexampleweresuggestedtomebyananonymousrefereeforPhilosophical Studies.

26

InsomerespectsthisproposalisverydifferentfromBlackburn'soriginalproject,which

generatestheCreepingMinimalismworrybymakingclaimsaboutmeaning.Instead,itmakes

twometaphysicalclaims:oneaboutthenatureofpropositions,andoneaboutthenatureofthe

beliefrelation.ExpressivistsmightbeabletoacceptthesentencesaRealistacceptsbymaking

thesekindsofclaims,eventhoughtheyarenotBlackburnstyleclaimsaboutmeaning,andsoit

threatenstogeneratetheProblemofCreepingMinimalism.Letussaythatproposalsofthiskind

followthemetaphysicalstrategy.

Thereisprecedentforpursuingthistypeofprogramintheliterature.Amore

sophisticatedversionofthemetaphysicalstrategyiscarriedoutinSchroeder(2008),although

notwiththeaimofgeneratingtheProblemofCreepingMinimalism.InthetheorySchroeder

develops,propositionsareidentifiedwithpairsofpropertiesthatanagentmighthave.Andto

believeapropositionistohavetherightkindofnoncognitiveattitudetowardeachofthe

propertiesintheproposition.17Atafirstpass,themetaphysicalstrategydoesseemtobeamore

promisingapproachtodevelopinganExpressivisttheorythatcanacceptRealistsentences.But

ifitispossibletofollowthestrategytothepointwherealloftheRealist'ssentencesturnedoutto

beconsistentwithExpressivism,thiswouldnotconstituteavindicationofBlackburn's

minimalistproject.Allthiswouldshowisthatthereisadistinctwaytoachievethesameresult.

Eventhoughthesuccessofthemetaphysicalstrategywouldnotdirectlythreatenthe

mainthesisofthispaperthatacertainkindofsemantictheoryisunavailabletoExpressivistsit

isworthnotingonegeneralreasonforthinkingthatthemetaphysicalstrategywillnotintheend

besuccessful.Irequiresmakingoneassumption,whichIwillnotargueforhere:thatthereare

17SeeSchroeder(2008)ch.7,especiallypp.89100.Forexample,thepropositionthatlyingiswrongisthepairofthepropertyofblamingforlying,twiceover(otherpropositionsarenonredundantpropertypairsinthetheory,butareotherwisesimilar).AllthereistostandinginthebeliefrelationtothispropositionisbearingtheFORattitudetowardeachpropertyinthepair.

27

someconstraintsonwhattheoryofpropositionsanyExpressivisttheoryofthiskindcanaccept.

Justlikethebasicminimaliststrategy,themetaphysicalstrategymustbedevelopedbystarting

withthebasicresourcesofExpressivism.Noteverytheoryofpropositionscanbestatedby

appealingtoonlythesebasicresources.Sometheoriescan:thetheorySchroederdevelopsuses

onlynonmoraltermsdesignatingactiontypesandrelationsonecanbeartothem,andthe

exampleweusedatthebeginningofthissectiontoillustratethemetaphysicalstrategy,onwhich

propositionsaresetsofsentences,appealstoonlysentencesandsynonymyrelations.

LetussaythatatheoryofpropositionsisExpressivistfriendlyjustincaseforany

sentenceS,thetheorygivesanaccountofthepropositionassociatedwithSbyappealingtoonly

thebasicresourcesofExpressivism,usingonlynonmorallanguagetodescribeit.Thesetwo

theoriesareExpressivistfriendly.And,Iamassuminghere,itisaconstraintonanyversionof

Expressivismwhichfollowsthemetaphysicalstrategythatwhatevertheoryofpropositionsit

adoptsmustbeExpressivistfriendly.

Giventhisconstraintonhowthemetaphysicalstrategycanbedeveloped,whenthe

Expressivistgoesinforatheoryofpropositions,shewillacceptatheorythataRealistwilllikely

denyRealistswilllikelynotacceptExpressivistfriendlytheoriesofpropositions,sincethere

areothertheoriesofpropositionswhicharenotExpressivistfriendlyandaremuchmorenatural

forRealiststoaccept.18SomostRealistswillbeabletostateaveryspecificwayinwhichan

18Forexample,astandardRusselliantheoryonwhichpropositionsarestructuredcomplexeswithobjects,propertiesandlogicaloperationsforconstituentswillnotbeExpressivistfriendly.Whythisissoisaninterestingquestion,since,byfollowingthebasicminimaliststrategy,Expressivistsmightbeabletoacceptsomesentencesaboutmoralproperties,suchasthesentence'xhasthepropertygoodness',onthegroundsthattheycanacceptthat'xisgood'plusaminimalistsemanticsfortheformersentenceintermsofthelatter.Butthisdoesnotentailthattheycanhaveanaccountofwhatpropositionswhichhavegoodnessasaconstituentare.Thisbecausetheminimalistclaimaboutmoralpropertiesallowsthemtoacceptsentenceswiththeexpression'thepropertygoodness'thatareequivalenttosentenceswhichpredicategoodnessofsomething,suchasthesentence'xisgood'.Minimalismaboutthepropertygoodnessisreallyminimalismabouthavingthepropertygoodness.Butasentenceaboutapropositionwiththepropertygoodnessasaconstituentisnotequivalenttoanysentencethatpredicatesgoodnessofanything.Theminimalistreadingofsentencesaboutmoralpropertiesactuallydoesnotcapturealltheusesofmoralproperty

28

Expressivisttheorydevelopedwiththemetaphysicalstrategyisinconsistentwiththeirview.

ButofcourseaRealistcouldacceptanExpressivistfriendlytheoryofpropositions.She

mighthaveindependentreasonsforrejectingeverynonExpressivistfriendly.Inthiscase,she

willnotbeabletopointtoaspecificclaimaboutthenatureofpropositionsthatsheaccepts,and

theExpressivistiscommittedtorejecting.However,theseRealistscanstillsayhowtheirview

differsfromExpressivism,becausetheExpressivistiscommittedtoacceptingsometheorythat

isExpressivistfriendly,whiletheRealistisnot.AsaRealist,itisverynaturaltoacceptanon

Expressivistfriendlytheory,andshecouldhaveacceptedonewithoutchangingherviewabout

anyfundamentalissuesinmetaethics.Andthisisallthatisneededtoavoid(CM):aclaim

whichisconsistentwiththeRealist'sview,butnottheExpressivist's.

Itisimportanttonoteherethatifthisresponseiscorrect,itdoesnotrequiremakingany

moreconcessionsthanwhatwehadtomake,inordertoshowinsectionsIIIVthatthe

minimaliststrategycannotsucceed.JustasRealistscouldacceptanExpressivistfriendlytheory

ofpropositions,Realistscouldalsorejectthatpropositionsaremindindependentornon

linguistic(seenote13).Thatis,inprinciple,theycouldrejectthesentences(3)or(4).Butthis

concessiondoesnotamounttoanadmissionthatBlackburn'sminimaliststrategycouldsucceed

afterall.ThereisstillasubstantivedifferencebetweenRealismandExpressivism,evenwhenwe

considerthedeviantRealistwhorejects(3)or(4):itisverynaturalforaRealisttoacceptthese

sentences,andnothinginhermetaethicaltheoryitselfcommitshertorejectingthem.Shecould

withconsistencychangeherviewabout(3)or(4)totheorthodoxpositionandleavehermeta

ethicalviewsunchanged.ThesameisnottrueoftheExpressivist.So,ifthemetaphysical

strategyiscommittedtosomeExpressivistfriendlytheoryofpropositions,itfailstogeneratethe

terms.

29

CreepingMinimalismworryforthesamereasontheoriginalminimaliststrategyfailed.

VII.Thegenerallesson

Toclose,IwanttomakeclearwhatItaketobethebasiceasonwhymycentralargument

insectionsIIIVissuccessful.ThereasonisthatwhenExpressivistsacceptaminimalist

semanticclaimaboutaRealistsentenceforinstance,aclaimaboutwhat(RB)meanstheytake

oncommitmentsthattheRealistdoesn'ttakeonwhensheacceptsthesentence.Onewayof

thinkingabouttheargumentintheprevioussectionsistothinkofitasshowingthatbygoingin

foraminimalistclaimabout(RB),Expressiviststransferthecommitmentsof(EB)totheRealist

sentencetheyclaimitprovidesaninterpretationof.Thatis,sinceoneofthecommitmentsof

(EB)isthatitssecondargumentreferstoamentalstate(orasentence),onecommitmentoftheir

minimalistsemanticclaimabout(RB)isthatthesecondargumentof(RB)alsoreferstoamental

state(orasentence).ButRealistsdon'thavethesamecommitmentsover(RB);theycanacceptit

withoutalsoacceptingthatitssecondargumentreferstoamentalstate(orasentence).

Thinkingabouttheargumentinthiswayindicatesthat,eventhoughwhattheargument

fromsectionsIIIVshowsthatExpressivistscannotsayeverythingRealistswillsayaboutwhat

propositionsare,theproblemfortheExpressivistismuchmoregeneralthanthis.That

Expressivistsarecommittedtosayingthingsabouttheexpression'thepropositionthatS'which

Realistsaren'tcommittedtoisjustaninstanceofamoregeneralphenomenon:thatbygoingin

forminimalistclaimsaboutmeaning,ExpressiviststakeonlotsofcommitmentsthatRealists

don'tshare.

Wecanseethattheyarecommittedtolotsofthingsthataren'taboutpropositionsby

consideringanotherpartofthesentence(RB).Wesawthat(RB)alsocontainsatwoplace

30

predicate,'standsinthebeliefrelationto'.JustasExpressivistswerecommittedtosayingthings

aboutthesecondargumentof(RB)thatRealistsaren'tcommittedtosaying,theyarealso

committedtomorethingsaboutthetwoplacepredicatein(RB)thanRealistsare.Considerthe

firstwayofdividing(EB)intoanargumentstructure(ananalogouspointcanbemadeaboutthe

secondwayofdividingitintoanargumentstructure):justasExpressivistswerecommittedto

acceptingthat(RB)'ssecondargument'thepropositionthatS'meansthesameas(EB)'ssecond

argument,'thementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S'',thisalsocommitsthemtoacceptingthat

(RB)'stwoplacepredicate,'standsinthebeliefrelationto',meansthesameas(EB)'stwoplace

predicate,'isin'.19

ButthenExpressivistsarecommittedsayingthingsabouttherelation'standsinthe

beliefrelationto'picksoutthatRealistsaren'tcommittedtosaying.Forinstance,Realistsmight

holdthatthe'standsinthebeliefrelationto'relationisoneagentscanneverbeartowardscertain

kindsofentities,suchthementalstateofbeinginpain.ButExpressivistshavecommitted

themselvestorejectingthis:since'isin'picksoutarelationthatdoesholdbetweenagentsand

thementalstateofbeinginpain,andtheyarecommittedtoholdingthat'standsinthebelief

relationto'picksoutthesamerelation,theyarecommittedtoholdingthat'standsinthebelief

relationto'picksoutthesamerelationthatholdsbetweenagentsandthementalstateofbeingin

pain.Sincethisalsoforcesustoreject(CM),wecanthenseethatthequestionofwhetheritis

truedoesn'tsimplyamounttothequestionofwhetherExpressivistscancapturetheRealist'stalk

19Thedetailsoftheargumentforwhythisissoisthesameasbefore.Wefirstneedtonotethatthesecondordersentence'R:TedR'sthepropositionthatS'(whichreads'TedissomehowrelatedtothepropositionthatS')isalsoanecessaryconsequenceof(RB).Expressivistscancapturethisnecessaryconsequenceof(RB)byholdingthatthesecondordersentencemeansthesameas'R:TedR'sthementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S''(whichreads'Tedissomehowrelatedtothementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S'').Then,thereareclaimsexactlyparalleltoP1andP2,differingonlyinthattheyinvolvethepredicate'standsinthebeliefrelationto'insteadoftheterm'thepropositionthatS'.Theargumentthatthepredicatemeanswhat'isin'meansisstructurallyidenticaltotheargumentwegavethat'thepropositionthatS'meanswhat'thementalstateactuallyexpressedby'S''means.

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aboutpropositions.

Thisshouldgiveanideaofwhymyargumentisgeneral,andwhattherecipeforcooking

upsetsofsentencesthatarejointlyinconsistentwithExpressivismis.First,wefindsome

sentencethat(CM)requiresExpressiviststogominimalistaboutatargetsentence.Second,we

lookatanoptionExpressivistshaveforgivingitsequivalencesentence(thatis,asentencewhich

isbothmodallyequivalenttothesentencetheRealistcanacceptandobviouslyconsistentwith

Expressivism).Finally,wefindthecommitmentsthattheequivalencesentencecarries.

Expressivistsarecommittedtoholdingthatthetargetsentencecarriesthesamecommitments,if

theyaccepttheminimalistsemanticclaimthatthetwosentencesmeanthesame.Sobymaking

minimalistclaimsaboutmeaning,Expressivistsarecommittedtothetargetsentencehaving

someveryspecificfeatures:whateverfeaturestheequivalencesentenceshas.20ButRealists

won'thavetofindallthesamecommitmentsinthetargetsentence,sincetheydon'thavea

theorywhichrequiresthattheysayanythinginterestingatallaboutwhatthetargetsentence

means.ThesentencestatingthenegationofthesecommitmentsonlytheExpressivisttakeson

willthenbeasentencethattheRealistcanaccept,butnottheExpressivist.

Themetaphysicalstrategyfailsforthesamekindofreason.Inpursuingitasawayto

accept(RB),Expressivistsmusttakeonsomecommitmentaboutthenatureofpropositionsand

thebeliefrelation,andthisisacommitmentthatRealistswilllikelyreject.Theonlydifference

is,themetaphysicalstrategytakesonthesecommitmentstransparently,whereasBlackburn's

originalminimaliststrategyisnotsotransparentaboutthecommitmentsittakesonweneeded

anargumenttoshowthattheviewhadcommitmentsaboutpropositionstheRealistdoesn'tshare.

20Somethingstrongercanbesaid:bymakingminimalistclaimsaboutmeaning,Expressivistsarecommittedtothepartsofthetargetsentencehavingwhateverfeaturesthecorrespondingpartsoftheequivalencesentencehave.Realists,ofcourse,willnotbecommittedtothepartsofthetargetsentencehavingallofthesamefeatures.

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Intheend,eitherapproachfailstovindicate(CM)because,inordertoacceptsomeRealist

sentence,ittakesoncommitmentsthatareinconsistentwithotherRealistsentences.Either

approachamountstosmoothingoutabumpinthecarpet,onlytohaveitpopupelsewhere.21,22

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Blackburn,Simon(1984),SpreadingtheWord.Oxford:ClarendonPress.

Blackburn,Simon(1993),EssaysinQuasiRealism.OxfordUniversityPress.

Blackburn,Simon(2007),"AntirealistExpressivismandQuasiRealism".OxfordHandbookofEthicalTheory,DavidCopp(ed.).OxfordUniversityPress,pp.146162.

Chrisman,Matthew(2008),"Expressivism,Inferentialism,andSavingtheDebate".PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch,vol.77,pp.334358.

Dreier,James(1996)"ExpressivistEmbeddingsandMinimalistTruth".PhilosophicalStudies,vol.83,pp.2951.

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Rosen,Gideon(1998)"Blackburn'sEssaysinQuasiRealism".Nous,vol.32,pp.386405.

Schroeder,Mark(2005)"RealismandReduction:TheQuestforRobustness".Philosopher's Imprintvol.V,no.1,pp.118.

Schroeder,Mark(2008)BeingFor:EvaluatingtheSemanticProgramofExpressivism.OxfordUniversityPress.

21ThemetaphorisfoundinSchroeder(2005).22SpecialthanksgotoMarkSchroederforinvaluablecommentsanddiscussionaboutthispaper.ThanksalsotoScottSoames,SteveFinley,DavidManley,DanielFogalandananonymousrefereeforPhilosophicalStudiesforcommentsonearlierdrafts,andaudiencesatthe2008BritishSocietyforEthicalTheoryconferenceattheUniversityofEdinburgh,the200711thAnnualSouthernCaliforniaPhilosophyConference,andthe2008WesternCanadianPhilosophicalAssociationconferenceforfurtherhelpfulcommentsanddiscussion.

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Soames,Scott(2002)BeyondRigidity:TheUnfinishedSemanticAgendaofNamingandNecessity.OxfordUniversityPress.

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