Marcio Rocha

Mnemosyne, Metaphor and Theory of MindAn Imaginative Visual Essayof Computionalism

Transtechnology Research • Reader 2011Plymouth UniversityPortland Square, Drake CircusPlymouth PL4 8AAUnited Kingdom

© 2012 Transtechnology ResearchISBN 978-0-9538332-2-1

Rocha • Mnemosyne, Metaphor and Theory of Mind | 1

Mnemosyne, Metaphor and Theory of MindAn Imaginative Visual Essay of Computionalism

Marcio RochaMarcio.rocha@plymouth.ac.uk

This essay will explore historic principles of a Computational Theory of Mind and metaphor as a cognitive process. The conceptual metaphor developed by Lakoff and Johnson states that “our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of how we both think and act, is fundamentally meta-phorical in nature” (1980, p. 3) to define our representational system and understand the natural world. Computational Theory of Mind is a historical view in philosophy in which the human mind ought to be conceived as an information processing system, considering that thought is a form of computation. Externalist theory versions are explored in this essay also, highlighting the tension between central dilemmas and different notions on the subject. Informed by the way that Warburg proposed to represent part of the history of art through juxtaposed images, this essay seeks to open up the possibility to reflect on the history of Computational Theory of Mind, using metaphors and juxtaposed images and will result in visual insights in to the detri-ment of exclusively textual as evidenced by Warburg in his Mnemosyne Atlas.

One of Warburg’s contributions to the history of art through the Mnemosyne Atlas, a contribution which later became more explicit in a science of images, was based on diametrically opposed criteria rather than a pure formalism, and broke with the continuum of art history’s traditionally established chronological and hermetic hierarchy. Warburg positioned images to uncover the polarity of the form within incidental ephemera, such as postage stamps and printed materials, constructing imaginative metaphors and uncovering the interpretative energy within them, making metaphor underlying for the work that he proposed. Through his unfinished Mnemosyne Atlas, Warburg practised a polarised iconography through images meticulously juxtaposed, reconfiguring the production of human knowledge and understanding, and questioning the meaning of images, as evidenced by the emotive potential each project gathered in his unfin-ished Atlas (Grau, 2004).

This essay will deal with the following key topics: Computationalism, Functionalism, Behaviourism, Connectionism, Embodiment and Enactivism.

Although the function of the essay is to explore aspects of Computational Theory of Mind it will not be completely detached from the personal/authorial view of the author.

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Computationalism is a specific form of cognitivism which argues that mental activity is computational, that is, that the mind operates by performing purely formal operations on symbols, like a Turing machine. Functionalism/Behavior-ism - Functionalism says mental states are constituted by their causal relations to one another and to sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. While computers are physical devices with electronic substrate that perform computations on inputs to give outputs, so brains are physical devices with neural substrate that perform computations on inputs which produce behaviors. // This image essentially represents a visual metaphor of computationalism, functionalism and behaviorism emphasis-ing through visual representations, an old notion of the cognitive sciences, it draws a parallel between the way the brain supposedly works and

how machines process information.

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Connectionism is the view that mental models or behavioural phenomena act as the emergent processes of interconnected networks of simple units. The most common forms use neural network models. The central connectionist principle is that mental phenomena can be described by interconnected networks of simple, and often uniform, units. Units in the network could represent neurons and the connections could represent synapses. // This image essentially represents connec-tions through graphical representation and artistic images flowing through the use of watercolours. The idea was to counteract fluid and organic images with the rigidity of the graphical representation of neural networks. This representation is emphasised with the use of the human body,

formed essentially by binary codes.

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Embodiment - The idea of Embodiment is based on the concept that the body is linked directly to thought and subse-quently to understanding, and that cognitive processes are intrinsically connected to the body. // In this image there was an attempt to build aspects of the human body, represented by elements like bones, flesh and blood using imagery to draw a parallel with computer codes (HTML). The code is a metaphor for real world experience for the body, which put together body, mind and environment to build a

imagery relationship where these elements are indivisibly connected, representing the embodied experience.

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Enaction - Enaction is the idea that organisms create their own experience through their actions. The core idea is that organisms are not passive receivers of input from the environment, but are actors in the environment in such a way that what they experience is shaped by how they act. // The picture was constructed metaphorically, trying to show the connection between humans, their bodies and the action of eating an apple, which in this case represents the technolog y and how the human adapts and incorporates

it. They are represented together, through the action of human biolog y and its connection with the artificial world built for ourselves.

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