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Modern Approaches to Wi-Fi Attacks: Attacker View
BY KONRAD JĘDRZEJCZYK
3
Whoami• Certified Offensive Security Wireless Professional (OSWP)
• Information Security Incident Response Analyst
Previously:
• Infrastructure Risk Analyst
• Security Incident Manager
• Information Security Forensic Expert
WHOAMI
Agenda 4
Agenda• WPA/WPA2 – is the hashing algorithm so insecure as we are led to believe?
• WPS – Weakest Possible Security approach
• OpenWRT = Wormhole attack + MitM +3G
• We're in! What next?
WPA/WPA2 – is the hashing algorithm so insecure as we are led to believe?
5
WPA/WPA2 ConnectionSupplicant (Client) Authenticator
Supplicant Random number (Snonce nonce generated by supplicant),
Message Integrity Code (MIC)Security parameters (RSN)
Authenticator Random Number (Anonce nonce generated by authenticator),
Authenticator MAC
Resend Random number,Encrypted by PTK
Confirm both PTK and GTK are installed
Pairwise Master Key (PMK)
Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)
WPA/WPA2 – is the hashing algorithm so insecure as we are led to believe?
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WPA/WPA2 ConnectionU na ut he nti cat e d
U na ss oc iate d
A ut he nti cat e dU na ss oc iate d
A ut he nti cat e dA ss oc iat ed
D e au the n ti cati on
A ut he n tica tio n
(R e )as so ciati on
D e au the n ti cati on
D is as so cia tio n
WPA/WPA2 – is the hashing algorithm so insecure as we are led to believe?
7
Basic Package
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Airodump-ng
OPENWRT WILL TURN CHEAP HARDWARE TO YOUR BEST WIFI CARD
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Airgraph-ng
WPA/WPA2 – is the hashing algorithm so insecure as we are led to believe?
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X = Cn
Where:
X - Number of combinations
C - Number of characters in a charset
n - Password range (>=8)
Example:
8 char lowercase alpha
[a-z or (not and) A-Z] = 268 = 208827064576
Example for Radeon HD6850 OC (49 kH/sek)
WPA/WPA2 Password Entropyn Charset Time
Single R290 (~140 kH/s) 8 [0-9] = 10 12 minutes 8 [a-z] or [A-Z] = 26 17 days 8 [a-z + 0-9] or [A-Z + 0-9] = 36 233 days 9 [a-z] or [A-Z] = 26 1 year and 83 days 9 [a-z + 0-9] or [A-Z + 0-9] = 36 23 years 8 a-z + A-Z + 0-9 = 62 50 years
12 x R270 (12 x ~100 kH/s)8 [a-z] or [A-Z] = 26 2 days 8 [a-z + 0-9] or [A-Z + 0-9] = 36 27 days 9 [a-z] or [A-Z] = 26 52 days
Single i5 CPU (~3,3 kH/s) depending on version8 [a-z] or [A-Z] = 26 2 years and 1 month
WPA/WPA2 – is the hashing algorithm so insecure as we are led to believe?
12
WPA/WPA2 Entropy in Practice
WPA/WPA2 – is the hashing algorithm so insecure as we are led to believe?
13
WPA/WPA2 Entropy in Practicepaulina Paulina paulina! Paulina! Paulina!@# ,(15011,
'andziulka19994',PaulinA!@# ,(15024, 'mariusz22',
paulina0 Paulina0 paulina0! Paulina0! PaUliNa0! ,(15003, 'demiano7'paulina1 Paulina1 paulina1! Paulina1! P@ulin@1! ,(15004, 'Lampka',
(...) (...) (...) (...) Paulina2o15! ,(15005, 'paradyne',paulina9 Paulina9 paulina9! Paulina9! paulinA1989! ,(15006, 'darek1054',
paulina!-! ,(15007, 'bandzior2911'
paulina10 Paulina10 paulina10! Paulina10! paulina19890101
,(15008, 'Ruthless blade',
paulina11 Paulina11 paulina11! Paulina11! 89Paulina! ,(15009, 'SzYbKi',(...) (...) (...) (...) 1paulina1 ,(15023, 'aramil23',
paulina99 Paulina99 paulina99! Paulina99! PaUlInA ,(15012, 'kasiq10',
.paulina ,(15013, 'diabelskapam'
paulina1970 Paulina1970 paulina1970
!Paulina197
0! paulinapaulina ,(15014, 'Janosik_13',
paulina1971 Paulina1971 paulina1971
!Paulina197
1! KonradPaulina ,(15015, 'Sztukens',
(...) (...) (...) (...) !!!PAULINA!!! ,(15016, 'superrolnik',paulina201
6 Paulina2016 paulina2016!
Paulina2016! PaulinaDefCamp ,(15017, 'Henry102',
Real passwords from stolen and publicly available sql file: www.pobieramy24.pl.sql
WPA/WPA2 – is the hashing algorithm so insecure as we are led to believe?
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Any Help?
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Don’t Underestimate the “Luck Factor”
http://zaufanatrzeciastrona.pl/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/superbowl.jpg
WPA/WPA2 – is the hashing algorithm so insecure as we are led to believe?
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Possible Safeguards• Use non-standard passwords that are not present in password lists
– force them to a brute-force
• Think before creating a password
WPA/WPA2 – is the hashing algorithm so insecure as we are led to believe?
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First described by Stefan Viehbock.
“When poor design meets poor implementation.”
Still, there is only 11,000 possible combinations.
reaver -i mon0 -b 0A:0B:0C:0D:0E:0F
44443338 checksum
PIN part 2 – 1000 possibilitiesPIN part 1 – 10000 possibilities
802.11 Auth802.11 AssocEAP initiation
Receive
Send M4
Increment 1st half of PIN
802.11 Deauth
Send M6
Increment 2nd half of PIN/fix checksum
Dump APConfiguration (M7)
M5
NACK
NACKReceive
M7
WPS – WiFi Protected Setup
WPA/WPA2 – is the hashing algorithm so insecure as we are led to believe?
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Currently Implemented Safeguards• Limiting the number of attempts that can be made in a given timeframe
• Using a different PIN for every pairing attempt
• Limiting the pairing time
• Disabling WPS …however, there is a good chance that it will be disabled only in web api…
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OpenWrt – Tool for Attacker
OPENWRT = WORMHOLE ATTACK + MITM +3G
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OpenWrt – Tool for Attacker
http://wiki.openwrt.org/toh/startOPENWRT = WORMHOLE ATTACK + MITM +3G
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Call to Arms
OPENWRT = WORMHOLE ATTACK + MITM +3G
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Post-Analysis
OPENWRT = WORMHOLE ATTACK + MITM +3G
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Post-Analysis
OPENWRT = WORMHOLE ATTACK + MITM +3G
24
• airodump-ng
• airbase-ng
• airdecap-ng
• airmon-ng
• aireplay-ng
• airserv-ng
• tkiptun-ng
• sslstrip
• tcpdump
• ettercap
• … screen
AP
OpenWRT
You
FTP server
Comm-link
Wireless access point
Database server
Mail server
Switch
Laptop
Smart phone
Symbol Description
Legend Subtitle
Legend
OpenWrt – Everything You Need
OPENWRT = WORMHOLE ATTACK + MITM +3G
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AP
OpenWRT
Attacker
Victim
Internet Data
Classic MitM Attack
OPENWRT = WORMHOLE ATTACK + MITM +3G
We're in! What next? 26
Social Engineering Toolkit
We're in! What next? 27
When We Want More: Hydra
We're in! What next? 28
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/
…or…
We're in! What next? 29
AP/RouterVictim Online BankingLegitimate DNS
AP/RouterVictim Online BankingLegitimate DNS
Attacker DNSFake Online Banking
MitM Session Data Feed
...and then:
We're in! What next? 30
What Can We Do about This?
We're in! What next? 31
What Can We Do about This?
http://www.aliexpress.com/item-img/Wi-Fi-Rm-Pro-Smart-home-Automation-Intelligent-Controller-Wireless-Smart-Remote-Controller-For-iPhone-6/32270548754.html
We're in! What next? 32
33
Thank You
• Q&A