Mogadishu Conflict and Security Assessment Reportocvp.org/docs/201407/Waliyow Adde Zone CSA.pdf ·...

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Mogadishu Conflict and Security Assessment Report

Waliyow- Adde Zone

June, 2014

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Authors and Contributors

Ahmed Musa (Lead Researcher, OCVP)

Asiya Osman (Researcher, OCVP)

Kenneth Mutinda (Researcher, OCVP)

Omar Abshir (Data Analyst, OCVP)

Disclaimer

This report is not a legally binding document; it is an assessment document and does not necessarily reflect the views of the institution in all its contents. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.

©The Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention

All rights are reserved. Requests for permission to reproduce or translate OCVP’s publications – whether for sale or for non-commercial distribution – should be addressed to the OCVP via (email: [email protected]). Publications of OCVP can be obtained from our offices in Mogadishu, Somalia or could be downloaded from our website www.ocvp.org.

http://www.ocvp.org/�

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Acknowledgment

The Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) would like to thank the interviewees and survey participants who gave us their precious time and shared their thoughts on such sensitive issues.

We also thank the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom, for providing us with financial support needed to undertake this survey through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for Somalia

We are deeply indebted to the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) for their generous support of availing us Mogadishu’s districts household estimates without which designing of the study sample size would have been impractical.

Finally, we are grateful to the former Mayor and Governor of Banaadir region Mayor Mohamoud Ahmed Nur (Tarsan) whose office granted a letter of endorsement for the mission and directed all the District Commissioners (DCs) to support the mission despite the impending handover to his successor.

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Abbreviations

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

DCC District Court Commission

DCSA District Conflict and Security Assessment

DFID Department for International Development

FGD Focus Group Discussion

HIPS Heritage Institute for Policy Studies

IDP Internally Displaced Persons

KII Key Informant Interview

NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations

NISA National Intelligence and Security Agency

OCVP Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention

SRM Simple Random Sampling

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

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Contents Acknowledgment .................................................................................................................................................................................................. iv

Abbreviations ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... v

The Study Area Map ............................................................................................................................................................................................... x

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................................................................... xi

Divergences ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... xii

Conflict and Violence ........................................................................................................................................................................................ xii

Security ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... xiii

Justice ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. xiii

Governance ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... xiii

1. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 1

1.1. Overview................................................................................................................................................................................................ 1

1.2. Sampling Methodology .......................................................................................................................................................................... 1

1.3. Household Survey .................................................................................................................................................................................. 1

1.4. Focus Group Discussions ........................................................................................................................................................................ 3

1.5. Key Informant Interviews ....................................................................................................................................................................... 4

1.6. Limitations ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 4

2. PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS ..................................................................................................................................................................... 6

3. CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE, SECURITY, JUSTICE AND GOVERNANCE PROVIDERS .................................................................................................. 8

3.1. CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE............................................................................................................................................................................ 8

3.1.1 Dynamics of Conflict and Violence. ........................................................................................................................................................ 8

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3.1.2 Level of Conflict Experience................................................................................................................................................................... 9

3.2. SECURITY PROVIDERS.................................................................................................................................................................................12

3.2.1 Level of deployment .............................................................................................................................................................................12

3.2.2 Preference of the Security Providers ....................................................................................................................................................13

3.2.3 Military Security Actors ........................................................................................................................................................................16

3.2.4 Perception of Security Providers ..........................................................................................................................................................16

3.3. JUSTICE PROVIDERS ...................................................................................................................................................................................19

3.3.1 Level of Deployment ............................................................................................................................................................................19

3.3.2. Performance of Justice Providers ........................................................................................................................................................20

3.3.3. Perception of Justice Providers ............................................................................................................................................................23

3.4. GOVERNANCE PROVIDERS .........................................................................................................................................................................26

3.4.1 Level of Deployment ............................................................................................................................................................................26

3.4.2 Performance of the Governance Providers ...........................................................................................................................................27

3.4.3 Perception of the Governance Providers ..............................................................................................................................................28

4. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................................................................................33

5. ANNEXES ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................34

Annex 5.1: Sample size .....................................................................................................................................................................................34

ANNEX 5.2: GLOSSARY OF TERMS .....................................................................................................................................................................35

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Table of figures

Figure 1: Number of male and female respondents within districts........................................................................................................................ 3

Figure 2: Percentage of male and female respondents within districts (by gender) ................................................................................................ 3

Figure 3: Respondents by gender ........................................................................................................................................................................... 6

Figure 4: Respondents’ age groups ........................................................................................................................................................................ 6

Figure 5: Respondents’ marital status .................................................................................................................................................................... 7

Figure 6: Respondents’ level of education (by gender) ........................................................................................................................................... 7

Figure 7: Number of conflicts witnessed in the past 12 months ............................................................................................................................. 8

Figure 8: respondents’ account for the causes of conflict (by gender) .................................................................................................................... 9

Figure 9: Respondents’ account of witnessing a crime against someone outside the homad .................................................................................11

Figure 10: Respondents’ perception of safety in the area .....................................................................................................................................11

Figure 11: Respondents’ perception of safety in the area (year to year trend) ......................................................................................................12

Figure 12: Respondents’ estimation of the number of police stations ...................................................................................................................12

Figure 13: Respondents’ estimation of distance to police station ..........................................................................................................................13

Figure 14: Respondents’ preference in reporting civil cases: Land disputes, divorce etc. (by gender) ....................................................................14

Figure 15: Respondents’ preference in reporting petty crimes: robbery, household violence (by gender) .............................................................14

Figure 16: Respondents’ preference of reporting on serious crimes: Murder, rape, (by gender) ...........................................................................15

Figure 17: Most trusted security provider in responding to crime (by gender) ......................................................................................................16

Figure 18: Reason for choice of police as the most trusted security provider (by gender)......................................................................................17

Figure 19: Respondents’ level of confidence in the formal security provider (Police) ............................................................................................18

Figure 20: Perception of the performance of the police (by yearly trend) .............................................................................................................18

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Figure 21: Respondents’ estimation of the number of courts ................................................................................................................................19

Figure 22: Walking distance to the court...............................................................................................................................................................19

Figure 23: Respondents’ usage of Courts ..............................................................................................................................................................20

Figure 24: Respondents’ account of issues taken to court (by gender) ..................................................................................................................21

Figure 25: Respondents’ account on issuance of judgment ...................................................................................................................................21

Figure 26: Respondents’ account on the enforcement of judgments.....................................................................................................................22

Figure 27: Usage of traditional elders ...................................................................................................................................................................22

Figure 28: Respondents’ account of issues taken to traditional elders ..................................................................................................................23

Figure 29: Usage of Religious leaders ....................................................................................................................................................................23

Figure 30: Most trusted security provider in responding to crime and violence.....................................................................................................24

Figure 31: Respondents reason for choice of the most trusted Justice provider (Traditional elders) ......................................................................25

Figure 32: Perception of the formal justice system yearly trend (by gender) .........................................................................................................25

Figure 33: Respondents’ awareness of the presence of a local council ..................................................................................................................26

Figure 34: Respondents’ awareness of services provided by the District Administrations ......................................................................................26

Figure 35: Respondents awareness of communication channels between the community and the District Council ...............................................27

Figure 36: Respondents’ participation in local government consultations .............................................................................................................28

Figure 37: Respondents’ perception towards the importance of elected representatives .....................................................................................29

Figure 38: Respondents’ opinions about important services provided by the local council ....................................................................................29

Figure 39: Respondents’ opinions about the most pressing local issues ................................................................................................................30

Figure 40: Perception of the performance of the local council yearly trend (by gender) ........................................................................................31

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The Study Area Map

Map of Mogadishu: Adopted from UN OCHA 2009(Waliyow Adde zone districts)

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Executive Summary Mogadishu is the nation’s capital and the largest city in Somalia, known locally as Hamar; it is located in the costal Banadir Region. The Waliyow Adde Zone is one of the four zones in Mogadishu (delineation made by the security institutions) and consists of four districts1

Continual assessment of issues directly affecting community safety and security is critical to effective evidence based programming, informed decision making and measuring the impact of related programmatic interventions: it enables a better understanding of what works and doesn’t work at the community level. With this in mind district level assessments map out and provide a better understanding of issues that affect targeted communities across the Somali regions. By using key indicators for selected thematic areas, this report provides an assessment on the state of conflict, governance, justice as well as safety and security in the Waliyow Adde zone of Mogadishu. This assessment was conducted in the Waliyow Adde Zone from 6th to 13th March; the FGDs were conducted from 1st to 3rd March, while the key informant interviews were conducted from 14th to 24th March.

: Hamar-Jajab, Waaberi, Hawl-Wadaag and Hodan. Mogadishu has experienced an immense amount of political instability in the past three decades, the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991 plunged the country, and the capital city in particular, into a state of anarchy. In 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) seized control of Mogadishu from various warring clan militias; subsequently the ICU were then defeated by a combination of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Ethiopian troops and African Union peacekeepers in late 2006 – early 2007. The ICU splintered into various different factions after their defeat: with Al-Shabaab, the military wing of the ICU, the most prominent. From 2008 Al-Shabaab remained a prominent threat to the ruling powers of Mogadishu and engaged the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) allies in a prolonged period of conflict, however, in 2010 the TFG and its military allies succeeded in expelling Al-Shabaab forces from the city. Since that juncture Mogadishu has remained in the control of the government, however, Al-Shabaab has continued to target the newly formed Somali Federal Government and its allies with sporadic, but sustained, episodes of violence – notably - targeted suicide bombings and guerrilla-style attacks. Many of the national institutions are based in the Mogadishu with the three main government pillars: the executive, legislatives and judiciary all based in the city.

1 Mogadishu zones: provided by HIPS and later cross checked with the regional authorities

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Divergences

There is a possibility for qualitative and quantitative data to diverge in mixed method research approaches - combining methods cannot always be used for cross-validation purposes as they may not always produce one picture. Discrepancies were witnessed during both the data collection and analysis phase. According to the quantitative data, respondents were witnessing very little or no crimes and the level of confidence in the police was very high. The qualitative data, however, revealed a number of alarming incidents related to crime and violence; moreover, the focus group participants harshly criticized the police and disparaged their effectiveness.

The divergences were reconciled with the context of the study site, the unstable environment and fear of existing insurgencies had resulted in a climate of fear with people being very cautious to whom they give information to - research participants were reticent to speak of, or report, crimes for fear of being victimised themselves.

Researchers witnessed a sense of reluctance from the household survey respondents in answering questions due to the pervasive wariness of speaking to outsiders. The level of mistrust and fear apparent within the districts engendered superficial responses from respondents across a number of thematic areas, but were most notable in questions related to security, conflict and violence. Unfortunately this was to the detriment of the assessment and affected both accuracy and efficacy. Researchers also noticed that focus group participants tended to withhold information; however the moderator was able to engage with them and alleviate their mistrust, resulting in highly informative discussions.

The following summarises the key findings of the assessment:

Conflict and Violence Negligent security provision and easily accessible illegal firearms created an enabling environment for perpetrators of crime. The youth were said to have been emotionally impaired by the prolonged absence of governance and the lack of law and order, participants expressed the opinion that it was inevitable that youth develop violent behaviours in such an environment. There were cases of clan undercurrents [disputes] and power struggles within the districts of Waliyow-Adde: research witnessed animosity and bitterness between different clans and sub clans. The IDPs in Waliyow-Adde expressed a number of insecurities and disputes very common within their community: cases of eviction and a lingering fear of sexual harassment. Mugging, extortion, robbery and suicide attacks were also referenced in the research - revealing a pervasive fear among the participants.

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Security Research discovered a limited and inadequate police presence in comparison to the population and size of the zone. Moreover, respondents mentioned a lack of police effectiveness and scarcity of equipment. The security void, however, was somewhat augmented by the presence of other security actors: Somali National Army, AMISOM and officers from the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) were all cited as playing pivotal roles in providing security. Additionally, researchers discovered informal security providers functioning at the community level: private security guards, traditional elders, the religious leaders and informal clan militias all played some role in security provision. The communities had also formed a neighbourhood watch in order to protect and secure the wellbeing of their locality. The investigation witnessed a lack of effective coordination between the different securities providers, institutions were standalone and made no efforts in reconciliation amid a myriad of security challenges. There was also a mounting discontent over AMISOMs role at the community level.

Justice Various courts at different levels were apparent in Waliyow-Adde: district courts, regional court, Supreme Court and the court of appeal were all functional at the time of the study; however respondents’ usage of courts, especially the poor, was very infrequent in comparison to alternate justice providers. Participants opted for traditional elders and religious leaders for their relatively fair and low cost judgments and ease of access. Generally, however, courts were perceived to be open to corruption, illegal practices and bribery. District courts were functional but at the district administration, they were ill-equipped with one or two rooms containing threadbare furniture. Litigants were said to often bypass the district courts and take their cases to the regional court.

Governance An absence of viable governance was evident in the zone; the scarce social services were not distributed proportionally throughout the district. A significant number of the participants highlighted imposed leadership and unequal representation of the clans – district commissioners were appointed and mainly drawn from the more prestigious clan groups. Unemployment and education were identified as the most pressing issues within the zone; the local authorities were aware of the predominant concerns but remained incapacitated: insecurities, unskilled staff, poor salaries, and low or no regular revenues were cited as factors that have impeded the performance of these institutions. The districts’ administrative infrastructure: District, division, sub-division, neighbourhood (Degmo, Waax, Laan, Tabeele) could offer better opportunity for service distribution, equal representation and strengthened security if well utilised.

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1. METHODOLOGY

1.1. Overview

As part of its continual assessment of issues directly affecting community security and safety, OCVP conducted an extensive primary data collection in several districts of Mogadishu: Hamar-Jajab, Waaberi, Hawl-Wadaag, and Hodan districts which comprise the WALIYOW-ADDE ZONE.

In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the thematic areas under investigation a mixed method approach was employed in order to allow the research team to triangulate information uncovered in both the data collection phase and subsequent analysis. The household surveys aimed to obtain a representative picture of the thematic areas under study and Key Informant Interviews were used to probe deeper into, and cross-validate, issues that emerged from the Focus Group Discussions.

The quantitative data was analysed by the OCVP Research and Analysis team using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 21, after the data had been collated and cleaned by Swiss Peaks - an independent quality control firm. The qualitative data was subjected to thematic analysis, using a largely inductive approach. The main themes of coding were developed before the mission in line with the hypothesis but further coding was inductively included during analysis.

1.2. Sampling Methodology

A district household survey provided by Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) and later cross-checked with the regional authorities enabled the application of a sampling formula2

The p-value of 0.3 in the formula assumes security correlation above a random normal distribution of 0.5 within the district clusters. This is a reasonable assumption based on the topic of the survey – respondents within the districts of Mogadishu are likely to possess a correlating relationship between their perceptions based of the surrounding security environment. This is further backed on OCVP’s past experience in which those from the same area tend to exhibit similar perceptions on security, justice, governance and conflict and violence.

to determine a representative sample size for each district. Taking into account certain statistical parameters such as the level of confidence desired (95%), sample design effect (1.5), margin of error (+ or – 5%) and the assumption that some security correlation of (0.3) existed within the sub-divisions.

Finally a total of 483 household questionnaires were calculated for the zone (although not all responses were collected, see qualitative limitations at section 1.6), and then a calculated ratio (number of households in the district over the total number of households in

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the zone multiplied by the calculated sample size for the zone) was employed to come up with the number of households that should represent each district.

1.3. Household Survey

A face-to-face quantitative survey was conducted in which questions relating to personal demographics, security, justice and governance provision, and conflict and violence were asked. OCVP researchers trained eight data enumerators (4 male and 4 female) on the questionnaire methodology and the use of smart-phones for data collection from February 24th to 25th 2014. During the training the enumerators and OCVP researchers discussed the use of smart-phones for data collection and the potential risks involved and finally agreed on measures to mitigate the identified risks (including an explanation on the use of the device and the request for the respondent’s prior consent).

Waliyow-Adde Zone is located at the heart of Mogadishu and is one the first areas liberated from Al-Shabaab and was observed to be relatively peaceful at the time of data collection. Based on previous experience and data collection exercises in the other zones of Mogadishu, researchers were nonetheless aware of the possible existence of ‘hot spots’ with the potential vulnerability to victimization. Adhering to the Systematic Random principle (SRM) employed in the central zone would have been impractical and potentially dangerous; therefore researchers were obliged to recruit local facilitators from the district to avoid hot spots and potentially violent elements of the community. These facilitators possessed a profound knowledge of the district and a pre-existing relationship

with the local population. The local facilitators advised on the enumerators’ movements and personal security. In addition to that, they facilitate the collection of some household questionnaires based on their personal connections and acquaintances. This has resulted, however, in the random systematic selection of the households being compromised and somewhat undermined the validity of the data collected.

The eight trained enumerators supported by the two local facilitators (recruited from the district administrations) under the supervision of two OCVP researchers were able to identify the divisions, subdivisions and neighbourhoods in each of the districts and then agreed on a starting point for each of the enumerators. The local facilitators were also able to identify boundaries between the subdivisions and neighbourhoods. Where appropriate, enumerators randomly selected any 5th household and interviewed one respondent above the age of 18 or would interview the household respondents based on the local facilitator’s identification and/or advice. A gender balance was emphasised across the entire survey. The data collection was carried out until the pre-calculated numbers of households in the district were. Compromising the sampling probability method was seen as a necessary trade-off for successful data collection and the safety of the enumerators.

The 8 enumerators collected 476 household observations in four districts: Hamar-Jajab, Waaberi, Hawl-Wadaag and Hodan which together form the Waliyow-Adde zone from 6th to 13th March 2014. Each district had a pre-calculated sample size (see Fig 1: sampled respondents in the districts). The data was collected in Somali language with the use of smart-phones, and an OCVP

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researcher uploaded all data collected in the surveys to the online SwissPeaks database when able to connect to the internet.

Figure 1: Number of male and female respondents within districts

1.4. Focus Group Discussions The second research tool utilized was a series of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) aimed at capturing participants’ perception on security and justice providers (formal and informal), governance providers and the dynamics and experiences of conflict and violence. The FGDs were conducted from the 3rd to 5th March at the OCVP’s office in Mogadishu and Ramaada Hotel; each discussion group lasted for about an hour.

A total of eight groups were involved in the FGDs: Women, Men, Youth, Business Persons, Internally Displaced Persons, Religious Leaders, Traditional Elders and District Peace Committees with each group roughly consisting of 10 participants

Four group discussions were moderated per day by 2 OCVP researchers over the course of 2 days. The moderators used FGD questionnaires to guide, but not limit, the scope of the discussion with the help of trained note takers who recorded both consensus and dissenting views in order to increase understanding of the subject under discussion.

OCVP’s Mogadishu office recruited local organisers to assist in the recruitment of the participants, using criteria based on clan-lines, geographic coverage, social class, gender and age group.

Figure 2: Percentage of male and female respondents within districts (by gender)

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1.5. Key Informant Interviews

The third tool utilised for data collection was personal interviews with key informants who possessed experiential knowledge about the themes under investigation. The aim was to go deeper into the subject areas and cross-validate the issues raised in the FGDs.

The interviews were conducted from 14th to 24th March 2014 at the respective offices of the interviewees, Ramaada hotel and OCVP offices in Mogadishu. Each interview lasted for about half an hour, although some interviews with the local authorities were shortened due to their busy schedules. Nine key informants were interviewed including District Commissioners, Deputy District Commissioners, District Administration Secretaries, District Court Commissioners, Religious leaders, Key business persons, Traditional Elders and legal experts. No police officers were interviewed, Hamar-Jajab, Waaberi and Hawl-wadag police commissioners declined to be interviewed, while Hodan District and the zone Police Commissioners were not available.

The local organiser assisted in the scheduling of the interviews which were conducted by OCVP researchers beginning with questions that were tailored to the interviewee and then generally cut-across the thematic areas of governance, justice, security and conflict and violence. Police officers declined to be interviewed.

1.6. Limitations

Collecting data from conflict-zones is problematic, and collecting data from Mogadishu was no different despite it being in a nascent, albeit fragile, post-conflict stage of recovery. There were numerous

limitations and challenges faced during the data collection with a general misgiving and distrust of any data collection reflected in the participants.

Below are the most notable limitations that could affect the value of the findings.

Sample Size

With the lack of accurate population statistics, it was difficult to calculate a representative sample size for each zone with the use of conventional sampling formulas. To manage this, OCVP employed a sample size formula that is not heavily dependent on accurate population statistics and leant on the data provided by HIPS. Secondly, it was difficult to spread the required number of questionnaires according to the different possible sampling locations. This in turn could possibly have compromised the representativeness of the data, and despite mitigating measures to address this being limited the OCVP tried to ensure data was as geographically representative as possible.

Quantitative limitations

Though a representative sample 483 households size was calculated for the Eastern Zone, the research team managed to collect 476 household observations in the zone. Across all the districts in the Waliyow Adde Zone many of the research participants gave superficial answers to security, conflict and violence related questions that did not seem to reflect the reality on the ground – as previously mentioned many respondents were cautious of providing a truer picture of the district. Researchers have emphasised the

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qualitative data in the analysis phases to mitigate potentially inaccurate findings in the quantitative data collection.

Additionally the presence of local supporters from the district administration had influenced the responses given by some of the subjects, though, enumerators tried to minimize this by requesting the local supporters to keep their distance during the interviews for confidentiality purposes.

Lastly, most household respondents could not easily understand or differentiate roles played by different public institutions such as the courts, police, military, regional authority and district authority and most of the respondents were speculating on roles and responsibilities - adversely impacting on the accuracy of the information being provided.

Qualitative Limitations

Most of the local authorities did not have enough time to be interviewed due to their busy schedules and the researchers could not probe deeper into issues raised. Secondly, Police Commissioners in the Waliyow Adde districts declined to be interviewed resulting in an inability to cross-validate findings with the concerned security authorities.

Finally, researchers used a mixed method approach in order for the qualitative and quantitative data to allow for research complementarity. The two datasets were not captured without some challenges, especially inconsistencies between the data provided by the survey respondents and the information captured

during focus group discussions and key informant interviews - particularly the questions related to safety.

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2. PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTSThe household survey involved a slightly high number of female respondents than males. The 267 females who participated represented 56% of the total number of respondents compared to the 209 male respondents who formed 44% of the total.

Figure 3: Respondents by gender

Figure 4: Respondents’ age groups (be gender)

The respondents were all above the age of 18 with a majority falling into the 20-29 age brackets (33% of the sample population). The second most frequent age of respondents was between 30 and 39 (27%) followed by 40-49 (20%) (Fig 4).

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Figure 5: Respondents’ marital status

Almost all of the respondents in Waliyow-Adde were married or had been married once before. 79% of respondents identified as married, 14% were either widowed or divorced while only 7% were single (Fig 5).

Figure 6: Respondents’ level of education (by gender)

Regarding respondents’ level of education, 45% said they have never been educated (with a markedly greater proportion of females comprising that figure), 30% received their education at a Quranic school and only 23% of the sampled survey respondents had received primary, secondary, intermediate or tertiary education (Fig 6).

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3. CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE, SECURITY, JUSTICE AND GOVERNANCE PROVIDERS

3.1. CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE 3.1.1 Dynamics of Conflict and Violence

Research participants reported an observable decrease in clan conflicts for which Mogadishu had been notorious in the past. Similarly 97% of the survey respondents had not witnessed a clan or group conflicts in the past 12 months (Fig 7). The re-emergence of peace is very fragile however, the qualitative participants mentioned how prolonged insecurity in Mogadishu has bred fear among people and researchers discovered that residents in the districts were reluctant to open up to acquaintances and strangers “If someone comes towards your direction, you get scared because you are not sure if he has bad intentions or not” said a religious leader.

The qualitative respondents highlighted that the existing dynamics of conflict and violence within their districts were a possible result of the prolonged absence of a viable governance system. Many youth grew up exposed to violence in an environment that lacked law and order and where there was an absence of a functional judicial system; in turn they developed violent behaviours and mostly took the law into their own hands. “The majority of the youth are illiterate, unemployed and deeply depressed and violence

is the only language they understand”3 reported religious leaders’ FGD participants. Additionally, traditional elders hypothesised a relationship between drugs (Khat) and crimes “most of those who commit crimes are unemployed youth addicted to drugs”4

Figure 7: Respondents’ awareness of conflict occurrence

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3 Religious leaders, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 2 March 2014 4 Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 2 March 2014

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3.1.2 Level of Experience

During the prolonged absence of a central government in the country, Mogadishu had witnessed a proliferation in clan conflicts. The city was once deeply divided into clan-based, war-lord-controlled zones. Since the war-lords fell from power there has been no all-encompassing reconciliation process and different clans and sub-clans in Mogadishu still bear animosity towards each other which manifests itself in divisive undercurrents, under-ground power struggles and lack of trust. “If one clan stays in power, other clans or sub-clans will do whatever it takes to weaken the system,” said a business person5. Every peace model that the international community introduces in their attempt to restore peace to the country manages to empower a specific group or clan; therefore other actors feel a sense of injustice and either covertly or overtly attempt to topple the whole system according to an interview with a business person6

An analysis of the respondents’ accounts of the causes of conflict disaggregated by gender identified family disputes as the common cause of conflicts, 3 respondents out of the 17 who had witnessed a conflict said resources (land) as being the cause of conflict. Lack of justice, revenge and power struggles were only mentioned once (Fig 8). Recently, land and asset related disputes have been on the rise which occurred under different circumstances according to the focus group participants. After the collapse of the former regime

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5 Business person, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 9 March 2014 6 Business person, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 9 March 2014

many people fled their houses and only managed to return once the country had witnessed relative peace, however, many owners were returning to their land and finding their houses occupied. Conflicts and disputes would then occur between the owners and the occupants, the occupants demanded money from owners claiming they had renovated and protected the property for several years. There were other instances of land disputes where both claimants had documents showing ownership7

Poor standards of living and absolute poverty played a considerable role in family disputes: failure to settle loans or pay rent and inability of family bread-winners (fathers) to feed their children were cited as some triggers of disputes

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Figure 8: respondents’ account for the causes of conflict (by gender)

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7 Men’s Group, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 2 March 2014 8 IDPs, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 3 March 2014

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When respondents were asked whether or not they had witnessed a crime or violence outside of the homestead 92% of respondents said no, 5% said yes and 3% responded they were unsure (Fig 9). The qualitative respondents, however, elaborated on a number of violent incidents that occur outside the homestead alongside some underlying reasons for their occurrence. For example disputes within the community stemmed from the existing power struggles: the IDP participants reported that a number of individuals from the dominant clans harass those from the less dominants clans; they boast that they have impunity since they are related to key people in positions of power and considered those from less dominant clans to being defenceless against oppression. “There are those who provoke you saying that no one could punish them since they had connections at the police stations”.9

There were reports of men with government uniforms committing mobile phone mugging and other crimes - such as extortion. Easily accessible illegal firearms and insufficient security encouraged perpetrators to commit crimes knowing that they would go unpunished.

It was noted that poor standards of living conditions and poverty played a considerable role in community disputes within the IDP camps. The IDP participants mentioned that failure to settle loans or pay rent and the inability of family bread-winners to put food on the table triggered disputes in the camps. Thugs and drug addicted men tended to harass women in the IDP camps who predominantly lived in unsecured shanty- type houses. IDP camps were notorious for incidents of rape in the past but participants commented on a perceived decrease; “We do not see armed men coming to rape or

9 IDPs, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 3 March 2014

rob us.”10 There were, however, reports of rape cases committed by men in government uniforms “we recently registered at least 3 complaints of rape by men in government uniforms”11 reported one deputy district commissioner. Though there were several IDP camps in Mogadishu, many of the IDPs lived in privately owned land or derelict government buildings and disputes occurred between the IDPs and the claimants of the land IDPs were reported as being reluctant to vacate the land - arguing that they have no other options and could not afford to rent houses, participants also mentioned cases of involuntary eviction12

10 Bandheere IDPs Chairlady, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 22 March 2014

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11 Deputy District Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 15 March 2014 12 IDPs, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 3 March 2014

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Figure 9: Respondents’ account of witnessing a crime against someone outside the homestead

Figure 10: Respondents’ perception of safety in the area

With regard to the respondents’ perception of safety in Waliyow- Adde, research found that participants felt either safe or very safe (Fig 10). The IDP focus group participants, however, expressed insecurity within their area of residence. Female IDPs were afraid to go outside at night time; living in rudimentary shanty-type housing containing very few facilities means they have to leave their residence to use the he latrines where the female participants expressed fear of becoming victims of rape and other violations13

. Evidently the perception of safety has increased from the previous year as 72% of the respondents said they feel safer. 20% reported no change and only 7% indicated that the level of safety had decreased (Fig 11).


12

Figure 11: Respondents’ perception of safety in the area (year to year trend)

Qualitative data painted a different picture - suicide attacks and killings were a pervasive fear among FGD participants. Respondents argued that the common occurrence of night-time robbery, phone mugging and extortion of small business owners had affected their perception of safety. There were cases reported of indiscriminate shootings by security providers (police and military) after suicide or road-side bomb attacks in order to disperse crowds or as result of confusion. Additionally there were general fears surrounding IDP families once members had left the homestead: “parents live with constant fear of what will happen to their children who have gone to school or went out for other commitments”14

.


3.2. SECURITY PROVIDERS 3.2.1 Level of deployment

At the time of study each of the districts in Waliyow-Adde Zone had a police station led by a District Police Commissioner; there was also a Zone Police Commission tasked with the overall coordination of the security efforts in the zone. Additionally, 84% of survey respondents were aware of at least one police station (Fig 12), however, the qualitative respondents reported that the district police stations were understaffed; all the FGDs and KIIs participants were of a consensus regarding the insufficiency of police officers: “there are not enough police officers who could ensure our safety in the district”15

Figure 12: Respondents’ estimation of the number of police stations

.

15 Religious leaders, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 2 March 2014

13

Figure 13: Respondents’ estimation of distance to police station

Survey findings had shown that police stations were evenly distributed within the zone with 90% of respondents reporting that a police station was under an hour away by walk (Fig 13). Qualitative research findings discovered the presence of other formal security providers in the districts: plain-clothes officers from the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) locally known as Nabbad-Sugidda, Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM officers all played different roles in supporting the police and providing security16

Furthermore, the study observed the existence of informal security providers - including lucrative private security companies and loose clan-based militias, participants also mentioned traditional elders

.


and peace committees when discussing security provision. Each of the districts had a District Peace Committee whose members included traditional elders, religious leaders, youth, women, IDPs, district authorities and whose main function was to settle lower scale disputes in the district and support the district administrations on security issues. These committees however, received little or no financial support and their performance varied across districts17

.

3.2.2 Preference of the Security Providers

The traditional elders were identified to be the first choice when reporting civil matters whereas only 18% (Fig 14) of respondents said they would report civil cases to the police. It was noted, however, that the preferred security provider depended on the matter: civil cases were sometimes deemed better settled by traditional elders as these individuals are very familiar with the community and its common affairs18

The FGD participants were quite conscious of the poor coordination between the different security providers and district administrations. This lack of coordination was said to create mistrust between the two sets of actors: “the biggest challenge is lack of coordination… sometimes security providers’ suspect that the district administration purposely overlooks insecurity within the

.

17District Peace Committees, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 12 March 2014 18 Elders and Men, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 2-3 March 2014

14

districts.”19 Moreover a businessperson participant argued that the government was quite conscious that civilian – police relations were of paramount importance for the on-going security efforts but in reality there was a lot to do to restore the trust citizens had for the police: “government asks people to report suspects, but once reported the perpetrator manages to be freed due to the corrupt system, the person who has reported the crime then finds themselves being victimised by the perpetrator for cooperating with the police or intelligence institutions”20

The qualitative respondents preferred alternative security providers over the police, they identified the police as corrupt and insufficient; the youth group discussion participants reported lack of police response to crime and violence at night-time and a delayed police-response during the day-time

.

21. The youth and IDP participants also stated that the Police arrested innocent individuals, mainly youth, for insurgency-related and asked the parents for payments for their release - though this claim needs to be verified22

19 Deputy District Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 15 March 2014

.

20 Business person, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 9 March 2014 21 Youth Group, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 2 March 2014 22 Youth, IDPs, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 1st March – 3rd March 2014

Figure 14: Respondents’ preference in reporting civil cases: Land disputes, divorce etc. (by gender)

Figure 15: Respondents’ preference in reporting petty crimes: robbery, household violence (by gender)

15

Evidently the traditional elders remained the preferred choice when reporting petty crimes. There was an increase in police preference to 21% of the respondents who stated they would report petty crimes to the police (Fig 15). The FGD participants, however, criticised police efforts, they mentioned scenarios where police officers took bribes. They also claimed that formal security providers were respectful to acquaintances and individuals they have connections with and harassed suspects who they did not know to solicit money from them. One respondent claimed that “if the victim is from the IDPs or is deemed a powerless community member, the police take the initiative to mediate the parties and convince the victim to accept [Faataxo] apologies rather than open a criminal investigation.” The police made no efforts in pursuing cases further if they were not paid23

23 IDPs, Men, Business People, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 1st March - 3rd March 2014

.

Figure 16: Respondents’ preference of reporting on serious crimes: Murder, rape, (by gender)

There was a significant increase in police preference when respondents were asked about more serious crimes. The preferences had shifted from traditional elders to the police with a cumulative 38% of respondents favouring the police as their first choice (Fig 16). The qualitative findings, however, revealed a widespread discontent with the formal security providers’ performance in regards to serious crime. The FGD participants argued that the insufficient number and low motivation of the police officers in the district could have affected timely police response to incidents of insecurity “police officers at the district police stations are very small in number and do not get enough

16

salary which poses the greatest challenge to their performance”24

. Other respondents surmised that poor logistics, scarcity of police cars and lack of proper coordination have impeded police capacity.

3.2.3 Military Security Actors

As noted, research found military security providers present within Waliyow Adde Zone of Mogadishu; these military actors supported the police. AMISOM troops and the Somali National Army were deployed to augment the insufficient number and poor capacity of the police. A significant number of the qualitative discussion participants expressed discontent with AMISOM peace keepers, arguing that despite a strong peace keeping presence security was still very fragile and deteriorated.

3.2.4 Perception of Security Providers

It was noted that the police and traditional elders were the most common choice for the most trusted security provider in responding to crime and violence. 29% of respondents said they trusted the police whereas 27% selected traditional elders. There was no difference in preference when the findings where disaggregated into male and female, although the male respondents ranked the police slightly higher than the female respondents.

24 IDPs, Men, Business people, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 1st March - 3rd March 2014

Figure 17: Most trusted security provider in responding to crime (by gender)

17

Figure 18: Reason for choice of police as the most trusted security provider (by gender)

When survey respondents were asked why they trusted the police as opposed to alternative security providers, ease of access and their fast response were commonly offered reasons (Fig 18). The FGD participants however expressed a lack of trust with the police. There were reports of police officers who fled for their lives or at least did not intervene, when crimes were being committed25


. The Male FGD participants reiterated that most of the police officers had the mind-set that government neither valued nor supported

their efforts “so why would one bother to die in an attempt to protect someone else”26

FGD discussion participants held the view that police stations released suspects after payments had been made and it was only those suspects that have failed to pay for their release who remained behind bars

.

27. IDPs’ discussion group participants emphasized that police stations solicit money from the suspects for their release but justified this because they receive poor and delayed payment of wages28

26 Men’s Group, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 2 March 2014

. Despite such criticism the survey respondents had fairly high or high confidence in the police. When respondents were asked about their level of confidence in the police 73% answered either fairly or very high (Fig 19) – although the accuracy of this reporting has to be questioned in the context – as mentioned earlier in the report.

27 Men’s Group, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 2 March 2014 28 IDPs, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 3 March 2014

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Figure 19: Respondents’ level of confidence in the formal security provider (Police)

The qualitative participants’ perception on security providers did not vary markedly; most of the respondents described the formal security providers as ’reactive’ “Security providers only wake up after the incident took place”29 said religious group’s discussion participants. None of the qualitative research participants hesitated to affirm insufficiency of police officers at their respective district stations “officers at the police station are 3-5 in number, but more officers are on the station’s pay role”30


. It was noted, however, that the perception of police performance had increased from last year:

30 Men’s Group, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 2 March 2014

48% said police performance had increased, 28% said no change and only 7% said it declined (Fig 20).

Figure 20: Perception of the performance of the police (by yearly trend)

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3.3. JUSTICE PROVIDERS 3.3.1 Level of Deployment

Research found that each of the districts in Waliyow Adde Zone had a functioning court; similarly, 83% of the survey respondents were aware of at least one of those courts (Fig 21). These courts, however, were hosted by the District Administrations, who allocated one or two rooms for the court, some of these courts used their offices as trial rooms, while others used the respective district administration halls. Researchers observed the district courts’ offices were ill-equipped: shelves, desks, files, and seats were all in poor condition. Court officers had to pay for stationeries out of their own pocket31

Figure 21: Respondents’ estimation of the number of courts

.

31 District Court Commissioners, Key Informant Interviews, Waliyow Adde Zone, 16 and 17 March 2014

Figure 22: Walking distance to the court

84% of respondents were under an hour away from a court by foot. Participants, however, perceived the courts as weak due to insufficient and inexperienced staff. A Chairperson, deputy chairperson, two assistants and a process-server were among the districts’ court staff. The court staff were sometimes victimized or targeted by perpetrators or by those whom they summoned: “the court staffs sometimes ask the district administration authorities for a ride home when they fear being victimised”32

32 Regional Court Chairperson, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone,, 16 March 2014

. Despite such insecurities the district court staff did not have security escorts and experienced salary arrears, the participants explained that most government controlled institutions were notorious for low wages and overdue salary payments.

20

3.3.2. Performance of Justice Providers

Figure 23: Respondents’ usage of Courts

During the investigation researchers found the Regional Court, Supreme Court and Court of Appeal functional in Mogadishu at both regional and national level although a cumulative 95% of respondents said they had not used a court in the past 12 months (Fig 23). Research revealed that litigants preferred to bypass the District Court and take their civil cases to the Regional Court, especially if the case was a land dispute “most of the civil cases brought to the Regional Court are land related disputes” remarked the Regional Court Chairperson33


.

Of the 20 respondents who said they had used the courts the majority identified household violence as the issue (40%), 20% reported they were youth related and 20% reported usage for land disputes (Fig24). Family disputes also topped the list of cases brought to the District Courts in the last twelve months during the focus group discussions; they continued to state that poor living conditions, unemployment and Khat have incited disputes between many families34. Theft and robbery were the most common cases filed by the Regional Court, followed by rape and assaults - although there was a decrease of rape cases since the court had issued severe punishments for rapists - according to the Regional Court Chairperson35

34 Men’s Group, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone,, 2 March 2014

.


21

Figure 24: Respondents’ account of issues taken to court (by gender)

70% (14) of the 20 respondents who had used the courts said their judgments were issued and they all said that their judgments where enforced (Fig 25, 26).

Figure 25: Respondents’ account on issuance of judgment

The key informant participants noted that the legal enforcement authority of the formal justice providers (courts) seemed to have influenced their usage, though there were still many judgments yet to be enforced “many of the judgments were enforced, but there were a considerable number of judgments which awaited enforcement” noted a Regional Court Chairperson.

22

Figure 26: Respondents’ account on the enforcement of judgments

The qualitative participants reflected dissatisfaction with the performance of the courts. They also cited low morale, salary arrears, fear of harm, lack of proper training and un-conducive legal environment as factors that impeded the performance of the courts36: “How can you expect justice from a judge who has outstanding water, electricity and rent bills” remarked a District Court Assistant37

Research found that 15% of respondents had used a traditional elder for justice purposes in the last 12 months (Fig 27) which was

.

36 Regional Court Chairperson, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 16 March 2014 37 District Court Assistant, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 16 March 2014

markedly higher than the reported use of courts. Informal justice providers were alternative sources for those who needed justice but could not afford the cost of the courts, though elders mainly dealt with less serious disputes38

Figure 27: Usage of traditional elders

.

Many participants opted for traditional elders for their perceived low costs and quick judgments although they noted that not all elders served justice equitably. Elders’ access to all parts of the community gave them an added advantage of establishing the facts

38 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 3 March 2014

23

before they adjudicate on the case39

. The informal justice providers, however, did not have the power of legal enforcement and hence cases that required enforcement could not be taken to a traditional elder.

Figure 28: Respondents’ account of issues taken to traditional elders

When the 15% of respondents, who used elders for justice, were asked what the issues they had taken to the elders were, the majority (67%) cited household violence (Fig 28).

39 Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 2 March 2014

The usage of religious leaders for justice was not common as there were no existing registered Shari’ah offices in Mogadishu40

Figure 29: Usage of Religious leaders

. Only 5% of respondents said they had used religious leaders for justice in the past 12 months (Fig 29).

3.3.3. Perception of Justice Providers

The Waliyow Adde respondents identified Traditional Elders as the most trusted in resolving cases, followed by the Religious Leaders, and finally the Courts (Fig 30). Qualitative research participants viewed the formal justice system to have been fraudulent, a person’s access to justice depended on their financial capabilities, and issues were not adjudicated in the courts unless they received

40 Religious Leader, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 22 March 2014

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bribes, according to the participants41. Participants argued that corruption and unfair judgments rendered the court system a total failure “these are pay-as-you-go courts; one has to buy justice expensively” according to one male focus group discussion participant42. Furthermore a significant number of the research participants believed that suspects paid for their release at the police stations whilst the rest of the participants stated that perpetrators were freed by the courts after payments were made43

41 IDPs, Women, Men, Religious leaders, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 1st March to 3rd March 2014

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42 Men’s Group, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 2 March 2014 43 Religious Leader, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 22 March 2014

Figure 30: Most trusted justice provider in responding to crime and violence

Among the 34% of respondents who said they trust traditional elders most, fair judgment was cited as the most common reason for this. The second most mentioned reason was ease of access followed by independence from politics. The perceived corruption in the formal justice system had discouraged the poor, including IDPs, to use the formal justice system: “IDPs do not go the courts for justice, knowing that justice will not be served since they cannot afford to buy it” said a business group discussion participant. Courts were the least trusted formal justice provider according to the

25

religious group discussion participants44

The research analysed participants’ perception of the formal justice system on a yearly trend. The majority of respondents were unable to identify whether improvements were made or not, 45% said they did not know, 27% said it had improved and 24% said there was no change (Fig 32).

, the prolonged nature of cases might have also contributed to the perceived costs of the formal justice providers.

Figure 31: Respondents reason for choice of the most trusted Justice provider (Traditional elders)

44 Religious Leader, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 22 March 2014

Figure 32: Perception of the formal justice system yearly trend (by gender)

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3.4. GOVERNANCE PROVIDERS 3.4.1 Level of Deployment

The mayor of Mogadishu, who is also the governor of Banaadir Region, is appointed by a presidential decree. The current Mayor Mr Hassan Mohamed aka ‘Mungab’ was appointed in February 2014 by the incumbent president. Since the collapse of the former regime, Mogadishu has not had an elected local administration. Moreover, Mogadishu’s districts did not have an elected local council, but rather appointed District Commissioners. The majority of the research participants were lacking awareness of the role of local administrations and whether these administrations were appointed or elected. Furthermore 79% of respondents reported that they were not aware of a local council (Fig 33).

Figure 33: Respondents’ awareness of the presence of a local council

Figure 34: Respondents’ awareness of services provided by the District Administrations

Each of the districts in Mogadishu has four divisions (waax), each Waax has four sub-divisions (laan) and each Laan is divided into neighbourhoods, with such a structure an effective district level governance system could be set in place with each (waax) being equally represented.45

45 Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 1st March to 3rd March 2014

There was a higher level of familiarity with the services provided by the district administrations, although the majority of respondents were unaware of their presence, 39% did report they were aware of services provided (Fig 34). Research discovered that governmental efforts were not deployed proportionally throughout Waliyow-Adde Zone Districts. Some of the districts, such as Waberi, did not have a functional hospital and

27

health centres (MCH) were the only health services available in several districts meaning patients had to travel to other districts for medical and health care.

The unequal deployment of services and government effort was also evident within the IDP settlements – where IDPs reported of feeling marginalised. Though thousands IDPs live in Mogadishu, most of them do not live in IDP camps46, many live in derelict public buildings, privately owned land or land owned by the government but claimed by individuals. These landlords were locally dubbed as ‘Gooflayaal’ and they restricted construction in the camps fearing that IDPs may claim ownership of the land if they constructed dwellings (iron sheet houses)47

3.4.2 Performance of the Governance Providers

. There were reports of scenarios where local authorities collaborated with the Gooflayaal forbidding IDPs to construct iron sheet houses, unless they paid - ‘Bowdo-jebis’ - an amount of money which ranges from $1,000 to $ 2,000- according to an interview with one of the IDP chairpersons.

Household respondents were generally unaware of the communication channels between the community and the District Administration (Fig 35). Evidently only 10% of the respondents had participated in local governance consultations and research participants reflected an amount of displeasure with the provision of governance within their region.

46 Rajo and Badbaado are the largest IDPs 47 IDP Chairperson, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 22 March 2014

Figure 35: Respondents awareness of communication channels between the community and the District Council

28

Figure 36: Respondents’ participation in local government consultations

Participants, however, also mentioned that their dissatisfaction cannot be blamed on the government entirely; the political context and insecure post-conflict environment impact on the performance of the governance providers. The need for qualified human resources was among the factors cited to have impeded the performance of the district administration48; security and unattractive salaries were among other factors that had deterred local administrations in attracting trained staff49

48 District Commissioners, Key Informant Interviews, Waliyow Adde Zone, 10 and 12 March 2014

. The local administrations were conscious of the measures to be taken in


order to improve the standards of living but were incapacitated by limited funds: “the district needs revenues, to improve hygiene and sanitation and to have access to clean water - households drink from water wells which are unhygienic” reported the Waberi DC50

3.4.3 Perception of the Governance Providers

.

Although the majority of the respondents were unaware of District Administrations, a large number identified the importance of having elected officials: 88% of respondents affirming this (Fig 37). When the qualititaive participants were encouraged to discuss their perception of governance providers, researchers discovered a sense of despair and a negative attitude towards government institutions such as the police, the district administrations, the parliament and the military (national, regional and district), though they sympathised with the military more than any other institution. “None of the government institutions represent the people, they are all mercenaries”51


commented one religious leaders’ focus group discussion participant.


29

Figure 37: Respondents’ perception towards the importance of elected representatives

Figure 38: Respondents’ opinions about important services provided by the local council

Security was cited as the most important service provided by the local government (district administration). With regards to the recent statements on the lack of awareness of district administrations, it did not come as a surprise when ‘don’t know’ was the second most frequent answer given to services offered by the district administration (Fig 38). Despite the security efforts, the government provided little to no services in Waliyow-Adde as shown by the findings: health, sanitation, justice and infrastructure were each only mentioned once out of the 476 respondents: “social services such as education and health have become a luxury, 60% of children in Mogadishu do not attend schools, and only those born

30

with silver spoons in their mouths get access to education and health” according to a key businessperson52

Participants revealed the only, and the most promising, government initiative they had witnessed was the universal free primary education programme: “Aada-Skoolada” - a project aiming to send 1 million children to school. Research investigations, however, revealed that the project has made slow progress: few beneficiary schools had been renovated or made free-to-attend. “Aada Skoolada did not function fully and most of the schools are still administered by private individuals, mostly supported by charity organisations, but still remain too expensive for the poor families” reported the Waaberi District Commissioner

.

53

52 Business person, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 9 March 2014

.

53 Waaberi District Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 10 March 2014

Figure 39: Respondents’ opinions about the most pressing local issues

Unemployment, poor education, poor health, weak economy and inadequate sanitation were mentioned most frequently when household respondents were asked about the most pressing issues in their district (Fig 39). These issues were reiterated by many of the qualitative research participants; notably security topped the most significant and pressing need cited by participants in all focus group discussions54: “The government does nothing remarkable in security and provision of social services”55

54 Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 1st march – 3rd March 2014

. The acute rate of unemployment and desperate poverty troubled many of the research participants “there is a need to establish vocational centres for youth and the


31

elderly people so that they can learn skills that can help them to manage their lives.”56 Food shortage, poor living conditions and unemployment were the most pressing issues facing the IDPs “no one has sympathy for the poor people these days, many neighbours throw food away when their next door neighbour needs it most.”57

Figure 40: Perception of the performance of the local council yearly trend (by gender)

56 Waaberi District Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 10 March 2014 57 IDPs, Focus Group Discussion, Waliyow Adde Zone, 3 March 2014

Survey findings had shown that almost half (46%) (Fig 40) of those who were aware of the existence of local councils viewed a slight improvement in the district administration performance compared to last year. Donor projects had made a positive contribution to local communities - researchers noted that district administration offices had been recently renovated. The construction work was part of “Danguud” a USAID funded project with the aim of strengthening citizen’s relationships with the local authorities by equipping the authorities in order to provide effective and efficient services.

Danguud had constructed a number of offices and provided each district with a garbage truck. The Waaberi District Commissioner, however, stated that one garbage truck was not enough for the whole district; a minimum of 4 trucks would be required to manage the garbage produced. Though there were efforts to manage the garbage in the districts, heaps of garbage and litter could be seen in public places “people dump their garbage in public places which is a health hazard, especially during the rainy seasons”58 and “people do not have the self-discipline on how to dispose of rubbish59

58 Business person, Key Informant Interview, Waliyow Adde Zone, 9 March 2014

”. IDPs came up with initiatives to manage garbage where they dug holes and buried the garbage according to the Bondheere IDP camp chairperson; she further added that “6-7 IDP households shared one latrine.” Although measures of improvement were noted, local authorities remained impaired in their delivery of required services.


32

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4. CONCLUSION

The quantitative data provided on crime and violence seemed to reflect a positive outlook amongst the research participants. Focus Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews painted a different picture with insurgency related violence, clan-related disputes, exploitation of minority groups and incidences of personalised crime affecting the district in an adverse manner. There were a number of formal security providers identified in the district, and although there had been some gains made, they were not doing enough to combat the various manifestations of crime and violence.

The police were generally deemed to be motivated, however, a lack of discipline, poor equipment, mishandling suspects, reported arbitrary arrests (mainly targeting youth), delayed or no response to crimes were factors that negatively influenced people’s perception could explain why people preferred to use their traditional elder over the police as a security provider (in all cases apart from serious crime). Additionally, the peace keeping mission (AMISOM) was disparaged by the community for the missions’ failure to protect civilians and the perceived protection of only senior government officers. The mission was also observed to be restricted to strategic areas and already peaceful districts.

Mogadishu is still in an early post-conflict developmental stage and there is a need for governance providers in Waliyow Adde district to respond to social demands effectively. The absence of a viable governance system: clear authoritative structures and specialisation

of governmental organisations restricted the delivery of social services such as education, health, sanitation and, most importantly for research participants, security. Overall inter-institutional coordination was weak and, notably, the perceived absence of effective coordination was reflected in the interaction of security and justice institutions. The lack of effective and professional service delivery has potentially influenced respondents’ perception of poor government performance although they were mindful of the formidable obstacles faced by these institutions.

The formal justice system seemed flawed and tenuous in Waliyow Adde where the impact of a protracted conflict and decades without a functioning central government is apparent. The judiciary officers are sometimes faced with violence if defendants disagreed with a verdict; they earn meagre and belated salaries and lack professional training. Furthermore it is deemed justice is only available for those that can afford it and the actual usage of courts were very low and the formal courts were also ranked lower other justice providers (traditional elders and religious leaders) in regards to trust of respondents. Complementary institutions (police, district administrations) faced the same capacity and delivery challenges as the courts and comprehensive strengthening of the judicial institutions is necessary.

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5. ANNEXES

Annex 5.1: Sample size

z2 (P) (1-P) (f)

e2

Where:

z= confidence interval (95%)

P= P-Value which assumed some security correlation within the cluster (0.3)

f= is the sample design effect (1.5)

e= the margin of error to be attained (+ or – 5%)

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ANNEX 5.2: GLOSSARY OF TERMS Access to Justice People’s ability to solve disputes and reach adequate remedies for grievances, using formal or

traditional justice systems. The justice process has qualitative dimensions, and it should be in accordance with human rights principles and standards.

Civil case Non-criminal cases relating to civil wrongs and disputes between individuals, including generally property, business, personal domestic problems, divorces and such types where ones constitutional and personal rights are breached

Clan The clan is a system characterized by a chain of paternal ancestors reaching back to a perceived founding ancestor whose name all members of the clan share for identity

Conflict State of disharmony between incompatible persons, ideas, or interests

Criminal case An action, suit, or cause instituted to punish an infraction of the criminal laws of a country

District Peace Committee A representative body comprised of a broad cross section of civil society that acts in an advisory capacity to the local government in issues of community security and safety

Enforcement

Relates to the implementation of orders, decisions and settlements emerging from formal or informal adjudication. Enforcement bodies include police and prisons, and administrative bodies in particular cases.

Traditional systems may also have specific mechanisms of enforcement. Enforcement systems are the key to ensuring accountability and minimize impunity, thus preventing further injustices.

Formal Justice System A codified system of laws and court proceedings enforced by recognized actors of lawyers, police and justice officials

The formal justice system involves civil and criminal justice and includes formal state-based justice institutions and procedures, such as police, prosecution, courts (religious and secular) and custodial measures.

Gender "Gender" refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women.

Governance provider Formal institutions or Individuals that act, process, or possess the authority of governing

Informal Justice System Dispute resolution mechanisms falling outside the scope of the formal justice system. The term

http://thelawdictionary.org/infraction/�

36

informal justice system is used here to draw a distinction between state-administered formal justice systems and non-state administered informal justice systems.

Justice Provider Formal or Informal Institutions or individuals that are responsible to provide fair and equitable treatment of all individuals under the law (customary, formal or Sharia)

Justice System Includes formal justice institutions and procedures, such as police, prosecution, courts and prisons, as well as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), and other informal and traditional systems (e.g. a council of elders)

The justice system includes coordination and other arrangements among its different components that influence overall outcomes on access to justice

Land disputes A state of debate or quarrel between/among persons, groups or communities over the property, the use, etc. of plots or swathes of land

Local Authority Those invested with formal power, especially a government or body of government officials at district level

Petty Crimes Criminal offense that is less serious than a serious crime and generally punishable by a monetary fine, forfeiture or a jail term of up to a year, or a combination of both.

Security Provider Formal or informal Institutions or individuals that are responsible for the protection of persons, dwellings, communities or the nation from harm

Serious Crimes Criminal offense that is more serious than a petty crime and which can be punished by one or more years in prison

Violence The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, or deprivation

Xeer A customary law system that has evolved from a basis of clan relations, with some influence of Islamic law (Sharia), that employs mediation and negotiation through the use of traditional elders.

Youth Men and Women between the age of 15 and 30

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