Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policies

READING ASSIGNMENT: Oatley – Chapter 13

1

Plan for today1. Review electoral models. Especially…

2. The “Sectoral model” of voter-preferences: export-oriented prefers weak, fixed import-competing prefers weak, float non-tradable prefers strong, float finance prefers float (strength doesn’t matter

3. Commitment problem

4. Phillips curve

5. A solution: independent central banks

2

The saga continues…

• The story of the contemporary international monetary system is the story about the search for the elusive ideal balance between domestic economic autonomy and exchange rate stability

• So, how do governments make the decision?

• “Society-based” approach says it’s interest groups that pressure the government…

3

Trade & international capital flows lead to imbalances

How do governments deal with these imbalances?

Fixed exchange rate sacrifice monetary policy

OR:

Floating exchange rate sacrifice certainty in international exhanges

Trade-off between

exchange rate stability

versus

domestic price stability with monetary policy autonomy

4

What will governments choose?Society-based models of monetary & XR politics

1. Electoral models

2. Partisan models

3. Sectoral models

5

1. Electoral models• Prediction: Democracies choose floating XR

– monetary autonomy used to manipulate political-business cycles

• If there is a fixed XR – commitment may not be credible before elections

(elections like the Sirens!)

• Pocketbook voter model – people vote according to changes in their income

– http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=loBe0WXtts8

• Sociotropic model – voters consider macro performance (economic growth, unemployment, inflation)

– http://www.douglas-hibbs.com/HibbsArticles/Welt-am-Sonntag-2008-08-22.pdf 6

7

2. Partisan models

• Left-wing parties are “pro-employment”– Tied to organized labor

• Right-wing parties are “anti-inflation”– Tied to business interests

• Prediction:– Right-wing governments more likely than left-wing governments

to establish & maintain a fixed XR

• It is possible to connect this to the electoral model:– Voters choose left-wing parties during recessions & right-wing

parties under inflation

8

Consider, however,The Median Voter Model

• Maybe left and right parties will adopt the same policies!

9

Downs offers a “spatial” model of party competition.

• Based on Hotelling’s (1929) model– Where should PUMA locate if people shop at stores closest to their house?

NIKE PUMA

Employment concerns

Inflation concerns

Vote single-peaked preferences

In a 2-party system, where will the left & right parties locate?

Dems

민주당

Reps

한나라당

What happens when somebody decides not to vote?

Median preference shifts away from the absent voter10

Final thought on “partisan” models

• As we move into “sectoral models,”

• Consider that in the “partisan” model, we have – Left – labor-oriented – parties – VS– Right – business oriented – parties

• What does this “ontology” recall from our trade models?

• What model is based on labor & owners of capital?

• FACTOR MODEL

• So, you can think of the “partisan model” as analogous to the “factor model”

11

3. Sectoral models

• Interest groups have different preferences on the trade-off between domestic– economic autonomy & XR stability

• Some groups prefer XR stability

• Others groups prefer domestic economic autonomy

• Obviously (given the name of the model) the interest groups are based on *sector*

12

NIKE PUMA

Domestic economic autonomy

XR stability

13

Employment concerns

Inflation concerns

Domestic economic autonomy

XR stability

Weak currency

Strong currency

14

Four domestic interest groups

1. Export-oriented producers

2. Import-competing producers

3. Nontraded-goods producers

4. Financial services industry

15

Fixed or Float / Strong or Weak?

• Export-oriented producers prefer…– Fixed XR: stability for their international transactions– Weak XR: keeps the price of their products world markets low

(keeps demand high)

• Import-competing producers prefer…– Floating XR: prefers monetary policy to address

recessions/inflation– Weak XR: keeps the price of imports high! This spurs domestic

demand

• Nontraded-goods producers prefer…– Floating XR: prefers monetary policy to address

recessions/inflation– Strong XR: consume more traded goods, travel more, pay for

tuition

16

Fixed or Float / Strong or Weak?

• Financial services industry prefer…– XR stability leads to more international transactions…– But XR volatility leads to XR-risk business…– And monetary autonomy helps maintain a stable

domestic banking system, low inflation, and more stable interest rates

– So: A weak preference for Floating XR

– As for currency strength: buy foreign assets when XR is strong, repatriate returns when the XR is weak

– So: No preference on XR strength

17

Sectoral XR preferences summary

XR stability preference

High/fixedlow/float/ monetary

autonomy

XR strength preference

Strong currency

  Nontradable

Weak currency

Export-oriented Import-competing

Financial services

???Exporters in other countries – keep them out of our elections!

Imperialist colonial powers? Get them out of our countries!

18

Domestic economic autonomy

XR stability

Weak currency

Strong currency

19

Oatley’s “state centered” approach to Monetary and

XR politics

It’s all about commitment!

20

Show me the money!

21

Show me the money!

• It’s all about commitment

• Insulate policy-makers from short-term political pressures

• Time 1: beginning of your term in office

• Time 2: right before elections

• Option A: sound monetary policy

• Option B: drop interest rates

• Time 1: U(A2)>U(B2)

• Time 2: U(A2)<U(B2)

• The “sirens”: electoral pressures

• The commitment: Independent central banks22

First – the “sirens” policy mechanism:Monetary & Unemployment

• Assume there’s a “natural rate of unemployment”– New entrants, labor unions, minimum wages, hiring & firing

practices, unemployment compensation… (raise the wage, lower the demand for labor)

• Workers care about their REAL wage (purchasing power), but paid a NOMINAL wage

• An unanticipated reduction of the interest rate unexpected increase in inflation lower REAL wage reduce unemployment

• (An unanticipated increase of the interest rate unexpected decrease in inflation increase REAL wage increase unemployment )

• In the long-run, labor market adjusts and changes are reversed return to the “natural rate of unemployment”

23

But is there a cost???...

• If a government continually uses monetary policy to keep unemployment below the natural rate, it must continually increase the rate of inflation (accelerationist principle)

• The Phillips curve illustrates this

24

25

http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/course/88-301/phillips/phillips_curve.gif Courtesy of Peter Thompson Intermediate Macroeconomics, Carnegie Mellon. Also see Oatley, p289, fig 13.2

1. Over the past 40 years, the Phillips curve has shifted first out then in again, as changes in the natural rate of unemployment and in expected inflation have altered the terms of the short-run trade-off between inflation & unemployment

2. In the early 1960s, the Phillips curve trade-off was favorable: low unemployment with low inflation

3. The “new economics” of the 1960s led to an attempt to move to the upper right end of the Phillips curve, in the hope of exploiting a presumed permanent – not just a short-run – trade-off between inflation & unemployment

4. By 1971, the short-run Phillips curve had shifted out! Too many years of creeping inflation had destroyed the Federal Reserve’s credibility as an inflation fighter, and had raised expected inflation

5. The 1973 tripling of of world oil prices caused a further outward shift in the Phillips curve

6. By 1975, the short-term inflation-unemployment trade-off had become unfavorable – to keep unemployment down at 5% would require 12% inflation, to reduce inflation to 3% would require 10% unemployment

7. In the early 1980s, Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volker decided to attempt to reestablish the Federal Reserve’s inflation-fighting credibility by doing whatever was necessary to reduce inflation

8. By 1985, it was clear that Volcker disinflation had “succeeded.” At the price of a few years of high unemployment, Federal Reserve’s inflation-fighting credibility had been restored and the short-run Phillips curve had shifted inward

9. But even so, the Phillips curve of the late 1980s & early 1990s was not as favorable as that of the 1960s

10. The mid-1990s, however, saw a further inward shift of the Phillips curve: an apparent fall in the natural rate of unemployment (welfare reform?)

What is the real cost?• P290*** Oatley:

– Inflation raises uncertainty among firms & unions

– This uncertainty can *reduce* investment & *economic growth*

– This, in turn, raises the natural rate of unemployment

– Consider Oatley, p291***, fig 13.3

• How do we solve this problem?

• We “commit” to low inflation with independent central banks (more on that next slides…)

• However, also consider p298***:– Countries with more independent central banks have

experienced *lower* rates of *economic growth*

– Consider Oatley, p298***, fig 13.6

• Conclusion: Governments can impact/control inflation. Not so much influence on economic growth 27

Commitment mechanisms

• Argentine Currency Board (1991-2002)– Pegged the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar in an attempt to

eliminate hyperinflation

– Credibility? Required legislative vote to change the value of the currency (public discussion undermines the point of a devaluation!)

– Then current account deficit widens (after Brazil’s 1998/9 crisis)

– And deficit spending ultimately undermined confidence– Tied hands prevented the government from acting– Commitment was, perhaps, too strong…– Run on the currency in 2002 disaster!!

28

Commitment mechanisms• Central bank independence measured:

1. CB’s freedom to decide which economic objectives to pursue

2. CB’s freedom to decide how to set monetary policy (in pursuit of the above objective)

3. Whether CB decisions can be reversed by other branches of the government

• Examples:– Swiss National Bank – highly independent

• No provision whatsoever for the government to influence monetary policy

– Reserve Bank of Australia – highly subordinate• Secretary of the Treasure has final authority over monetary-policy

decisions & must approve any interest-rate changes proposed by the Reserve Bank

• Does it work? Consider Oatley p296*** fig 13.5 (where’s Switzerland?) 29

Time-inconsistent preference problem• Exams force students to study – solves their time-consistent

preference problem• But the prof has a time-consistency problem too!• The day of the exam, my optimal strategy is to cancel the exam

– I can use my time for other things– Students are also better off – they did their studying, but are

spared the exam-anxiety• But if I cancelled all my exams, my reputation would suffer• Imagine you had heard that I often cancel my mid-term, would you

have studied?• Then the exam would not have worked to solve your time-

consistency problem• So my “campus reputation” encourages me to be credible• Summer campus problem? A one-shot game! Forget grades!• KU Institutional solution to force me to give you a final exam?

– KU won’t pay me!– My commitment was credible after all… 30

Take aways1. Sectoral models:

export-oriented prefers weak, fixed import-competing prefers weak, float non-tradable prefers strong, float finance prefers float (strength doesn’t matter

2. Phillips curve

3. Commitment problem

4. A solution: independent central banks

31

Thank you

32