Money, Religion, and Politics: The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903Author(s): Meir LitvakReviewed work(s):Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Feb., 2001), pp. 1-21Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/259477 .Accessed: 03/12/2011 08:47

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 33 (2001), 1-21. Printed in the United States of America

Meir Litvak

MONEY, RELIGION, AND POLITICS:

THE OUDH BEQUEST IN NAJAF AND

KARBALA', 1850-1903

"Money was the life blood of Najaf." Thus observed the Shi'i author, 'Ali Khaqani.1 The story of the Oudh Bequest, which channeled more than 6 million rupees from the Shi'i kingdom of Awadh2 in India to the two Shi'i shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala' in Iraq during the second half of the 19th century is a fine example of Khaqani's assessment. These Atabat-i 'aliyat ("sublime thresholds") were the most important centers of learning in Shicism during the 19th century. For this reason, a study of the bequest provides important insights into the internal workings of a leading community of ulama during a period of change, as well as into the role of European players in the life of such communities.

It should be stressed that unlike Ottoman and Iranian centers of learning, the 'Ata- bat's main source of income was not landed awqaf (endowments) but contributions from lay believers. Although networks of patronage extending to Iran during the 1830s and 1840s channeled growing amounts to the 'Atabat, these sums proved insufficient, and many of the ulama and students lived in poverty.3

The interaction between money and social power raises the question of the role of the Oudh Bequest in the formation of socio-communal bonds, particularly the system of patronage and social networks, which served as the backbone of the social system in the 'Atabat. We will also address the role of financial resources in the acquisition of leadership status, while making a distinction between its religious and social as- pects. The impact of the bequest on the finances of the entire community of learning in the 'Atabat also merits consideration.

Integrating society and culture, the Oudh Bequest demonstrates the role ethnicity played in the formation of social alliances and rivalries during a pre-nationalist era and the manner in which it was articulated. Finally, as the bequest was established as a trust of cash funds carrying perpetual interest and was operated by non-Muslims, this study sheds light on the ways in which financial necessities forced traditional legal conventions to adapt to changing circumstances.

Meir Litvak is Senior Lecturer, Department of Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel; e-mail: litvak@post.tau.ac.il.

? 2001 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/01 $9.50

2 Meir Litvak

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND EARLY OPERATION

OF THE OUDH BEQUEST

Financial donations from the rulers, ministers, and notables of the Shi'i kingdom of Awadh amounting to more than 1 million rupees flowed to the 'Atabat during the years 1786-1844. The larger share of these funds was spent on public projects, such as the construction of the Hindiyya canal in the Middle Euphrates to bring water to Najaf and Karbala'i.

The Oudh Bequest originated in the Third Oudh Loan, which the East India Com- pany (EIC) extracted in 1825 from Ghazi al-Din Haydar, king of Awadh, in order to finance its war in Nepal.5 The principal of 10 million rupees (about ?1,000,000) was never to be repaid; the interest, fixed at 5 percent a year (i.e., Rs500,000), was to be applied by the government of India in perpetuity to specific purposes. Among other things, the agreement stipulated monthly allowances for life of Rs10,000, Rs2,500, Rs1,100, and Rs1,000 to four women: Nawwab Mubarak Mahal Sahiba and Sultan Miriam Begum Sahiba (both wives of Ghazi al-Din), Mumtaz Mahal, and Sarfaraz Mahal. Each was empowered to bequeath one-third of her allowance to any purpose she desired. The remaining two-thirds, together with any portion of the one-third not bequeathed by will, were to be divided equally and transferred to the mujtahids resi- dent in Najaf and Karbala' for distribution "to deserving persons ... for the acquire- ment of religious merit." If any of the women's designated beneficiaries died without heirs, their allowance was to go to the 'Atabat, as well.6 The bequest became operative when the two widows of Ghazi al-Din Haydar died in April and June 1849 and monthly installments of Rs8,664 began to accumulate in the EIC's treasury.7

In October 1850, the British resident in Baghdad, Henry Rawlinson, informed Shaykh Murtaza Ansari, the leader of the ulama community in Najaf, of the funds due to the 'Atabat advising him to appoint an agent in Bombay to withdraw the money. After repeated appeals by the resident, Ansari informed him that Hajji Muhammad Mahdi al-Kuba, of the wealthiest Shi'i merchant family in Baghdad, would serve as his agent-a manifestation of the long-established links between merchants and ulama, in which merchants managed and transferred funds for the ulama.8 Rawlinson concurred; funds were transferred to Ansari and to Sayyid 'Ali Naqi Tabataba'i of Karbala', who had established contacts with Awadh as early as 1843.9 Apparently, Ansari accepted the funds in view of the dire economic conditions in the 'Atabat, where, in his words, many distinguished ulama families "had been reduced to destitu- tion," and of the need to enhance the traditional Shi'i schooling in view of the Babi challenge, which had emerged during the 1840s.10

However, in view of Ottoman uneasiness over the flow of such large amounts to the Shi'is via the British, Rawlinson recommended to his superiors that disbursements be placed at the hands of the resident, who would see that the funds were spent according to the donor's intentions. Distribution of the money in Bombay, he argued, precluded British efforts to prevent misuse of the funds for political subversion. More- over, he claimed that "considerable sums" had already been "diverted from charitable purposes to objects of personal ambition." At the behest of the Foreign Office, which wanted to allay Ottoman fears, Rawlinson's proposals were adopted and implemented in October 1852.1

The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903 3

TABLE 1 Monthly distribution of the Oudh Bequest in Najaf

Rs. a. P.

Chief distributor 545 8 7 Junior mujtahids 674 0 0 Indigent mujtahids 848 0 0 Persian students 595 0 0 Arab students 674 0 0 Custodian and attendants of the Imam 'Ali Shrine 278 0 0 Pauper Indian and Kashmiri residents in Najaf 590 0 0 0.5% deducted by the Wathiqa Office at Lucknow 21 0 1

Total 4,225 8 8

After negotiations, the two mujtahids accepted Rawlinson's "suggestions," which sought to "secularize the distribution rather than tie it up for exclusively religious purposes."'2 Overall, British fears of misuse of the funds to foment anti-Ottoman rebellion did not materialize. In view of their historical experience, the ulama were more interested in building up the 'Atabat as centers of learning and in consolidating personal power bases than in fomenting rebellions whose outcome would be either defeat or semi-anarchy under the rule of urban gangs."

DISTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN THE CATABAT

The allocation of funds was based on Rawlinson's agreements with the two distribu- tors. Shown in Tables 1 and 2, it illuminates the structure of the community of ulama in both towns.'4

The distribution scheme reflects Najaf's superiority over Karbala' as a center of learning indicated by the allocation of greater amounts to scholars and students and smaller sums to paupers and lay residents. In addition, funds were divided according to broad social categories rather than to specified individuals and families, befitting the smaller community of Karbala'. Ansari's proposal for distribution in Najaf, submit- ted to Rawlinson in 1854, mentioned 600 students from each group, Iranians and Arabs, while the distribution scheme for Karbala' spoke of 600 students all together.15 The division of the mujtahids in Najaf into two ranks also indicates the swelling among the elite, which led to internal gradations. The term "junior mujtahids" proba- bly referred to the growing number of mujtahids who had received the diploma (ijazat ijtihad) but had yet to acquire a sufficient following among lay believers, who would send donations to them.16

The division of the students into Arabs and Iranians reflected the growing impor- tance of ethnic divisions within the community of ulama, which had existed in the 'Atabat since the late 18th century. Whereas Karbala' was predominantly Iranian, Na- jaf retained a mixed character. The ethnic factor became more significant as the num- bers of ulama grew, particularly due to the immigration of new students from Iran. The Turkish-speaking students were lumped together with the Persians, although they

4 Meir Litvak

TABLE 2 Monthly distribution of the Oudh Bequest in Karbala' in early 1867

Rs. a. p

Mirza 'Ali Naqi Tabataba'i 365 8 7 Ditto, for repairs of mosques and schools 161 0 0 Ditto, for private charity to paupers and sayyids 160 0 0 Ditto, for scribes, accountants, etc. 63 0 0 Ditto, for repairs to the Husayniyya Canal 190 0 0 Total 939 8 7

Other Beneficiaries: Mirza Zayn al-'Abidin Tabataba'i (for Aqa Sayyid Muhammad, Aqa Sayyid

Mahdi, and Sayyid Hasan Damad) 129 0 0 Mulla Hashim (for four, later six, mujtahids: Zayn al-'Abidin Tabataba'i, Hasan

Ardakani, Zayn al-'Abidin Mazandarani, Muhammad Riza Najafi, Muhammad Husayn Shahristani, and Mirza Aqa Qazvini) 192 0 0

Married students 319 0 0 Unmarried students 319 0 0 Custodian and attendants of the Imam Husayn Shrine 159 0 0 Custodian and attendants of the 'Abbas Shrine 159 0 0 Descendants of Sayyid Ibrahim Qazvini 80 0 0 Descendants of Mir Sayyid 'Ali Buzurg and Mir Sayyid 'Ali Kuchuk 64 0 0 Descendants of the Shahristani family 69 0 0 Descendants of Shaykh Khalaf ibn 'Askar al-Ha'iri 64 0 0 Descendants of Muhammad Husayn Isfahani 48 0 0 Descendants of Sayyid Kazim Rashti and Hasan Gauhar 40 0 0 Descendants of Shaykh Husayn Sultan 32 0 0 Shaykh Muhammad (for distribution among the imams)' 160 0 0 Municipal elders (wujah, shuyfikh mahalla, ikhtiydrf-ye balad) 32 0 0 Resident devotees (mutadabidan) 48 0 0 Paupers and sayyids of six mahallas 477 0 0 Pauper Indian and Kashmiri residents in Karbala' 810 0 0 0.5% deducted by the Wathiqa Office at Lucknow 21 0 1

Total 4,225 8 8

aPresumably prayer leaders.

would later emerge as a distinct faction in the course of the struggle for religious leadership that followed Ansari's death in 1864. The importance of ethnicity was often manifested in increased competition over funds, as Iranian donors, who were the major contributors to the 'Atabat, often restricted the beneficiaries to members from their own region or ethnic group. 7

Although Arab students numbered fewer than the Persians did, they received a larger amount. This reflected Ansari's mode of leadership: he sought a balance among all groups and bore in mind that the Arab ulama had less access to the donations that flowed into the 'Atabat, mostly from Iran."8 As the ethnic issue was less significant in the predominantly Iranian Karbala, distribution there kept to the traditional payments for students in Shi'i centers of learning, according to which married students were eligible for higher allowances.

The distribution scheme for Karbala' divided the ulama into three categories, mainly

The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903 5

along family lines reflecting a smaller community and a lower number of newcomer ulama. Seven (later nine) mujtahids, who were regarded as luminaries of equal stand- ing, were divided into two groups. The first consisted of Hasan Ardakani and Zayn al-'Abidin Mazandarani, who were considered greater scholars than Sayyid 'Ali Taba- taba'i and had a larger following in Iran and India. Both, and particularly Mazandarani (see later) were rivals of the Tabataba'i family, and the British resident probably im- posed their inclusion on the distributors'9

The second category consisted of descendants of deceased mujtahids, who rivaled neither their fathers' greatness nor the Tabataba'i family. Their initial allocations were reckoned according to the number of recipients.' Noteworthy in this context were the grants allocated to the descendants of the former leaders of the Shaykhi community in Karbala', Sayyid Kazim Rashti and Hasan Gauhar, in view of the enmity of the Usuli majority toward the Shaykhi minority from the late 1820s to the early 1840s. These grants point to a certain rapprochement between Usuli and Shaykhi ulama following the emergence of the Babi-Baha'i challenge to both communities. Yet the relatively small amounts awarded to them suggest that the differences between the two sects had not totally disappeared.

The third and largest group of ulama comprised prayer leaders as well as Qur'an and ta'ziya (mourning on Imam Husayn) readers and muta'abidan (worshippers), who probably served the large pilgrim population in the shrines and numerous mosques in both shrine cities.

The British resident and the two distributors took care to reward lay notables, the custodians of the shrines, who had been the wealthiest and often the most powerful figures in both towns. The other lay recipients were neighborhood shaykhs and nota- bles, who were supposed to distribute some of the money among the poor in their neighborhoods. The allocation of specific amounts to Indian and Kashmiri paupers reflected the Iranian mujtahids' long-standing discrimination against them. The Brit- ish, who were aware of such problems and who did not want to spend their own money to sustain Indian paupers, made sure that they would get their share from the bequest. The higher amount allocated to Karbala' reflected its greater popularity as a pilgrimage site than Najaf.22

Only scanty information exists on Ansari's tenure as a chief distributor of the Oudh Bequest. Shi'i sources and various petitions submitted to the British after his death universally acclaim him as a just distributor, whereas his successors were constantly accused of favoritism and corruption.23 Some dissatisfaction was inevitable, but An- sari's reputation as an ascetic and his generally undisputed leadership kept it from coming out in public. Nor do the British files contain any complaints against him.

As they signed receipts with their first names only, it is impossible to verify the identity of the sub-distributors. Shici sources report that Ansari made Shaykh Mahdi al-Kashif al-Ghita' responsible for the distribution, probably meaning as sub-distribu-

24 tor among the Arab students. Shaykh Mahdi, whose family had been somewhat overshadowed by Iranian mujtahids, never abandoned his claim for leadership. His appointments probably came in recognition of his senior status among the Arab ulama and in order to court his acceptance of Ansari's leadership.25

In March 1860, Ansari "declined any longer to receive his portion of the Oudh benefaction alleging as a reason the bad state of his health."26 Several modern Iranian

6 Meir Litvak

writers, projecting later developments to the past, assert that when Ansari realized that the bequest was a British ploy to buy influence among the ulama, he withdrew from the distribution, resisting British exhortations to remain in his post.27 Such a fear was unjustified at the time, but a withdrawal for such a reason conforms with Ansari's aversion to politics and contacts with temporal powers.28 Ansari's withdrawal had no impact on other mujtahids, for despite his recognition as the supreme marja taqlrd (source of emulation), his decisions were not binding upon other mujtahids and, at best, could serve as an example to follow at will.

After Ansari's withdrawal, the British chose Sayyid 'Ali ibn Riza Bahr al-'Ulum as the distributor for Najaf, a post he held until his demise in 1881. As a reputed mujtahid of a prominent Iranian family, he was a suitable candidate. His family's contacts with the mujtahids of Awadh may have helped his appointment, as there is no evidence that Ansari recommended him for the post. Because he was not Ansari's disciple, Sayyid 'Ali probably did not feel bound to follow Ansari's example and assumed the distributorship.29

NAWWAB IQBAL AL-DAWLA AND THE OUDH BEQUEST

The Oudh Bequest underwent a significant change in 1867 with the establishment of the Indian sub-bequest under the control of Nawwab Iqbal al-Dawla, a grandson of Nawwab Sa'adat 'Ali Khan, ruler of Awadh and a resident of Kazimayn. Iqbal had rendered important services to the British during the 1856 British annexation of Awadh and in the course of the 1857 Indian Revolt. Though he received Rs1,250 a month from the interest of the Awadh loans, Iqbal felt financially constrained.30 Hence, during his visit to London in 1865-66, he submitted a memorandum to the British in which he criticized the control of the bequest by Arab and Iranian mujtahids, charging that the funds were spent "in debauchery and unlawful things" while the Indian resi- dents of the 'Atabat live in "starving poverty" and "are shut out from participating in this money." Moreover, he wrote, although the Arabs and Iranians benefit from Indian money, they "return ingratitude" to the Indians.

Iqbal proposed, therefore, to restrict the distribution to Indians in the 'Atabat or, alternatively, to India, preferably among the poor members of the former ruling family of Awadh. If that was not possible, the resident should appoint a distributor, having himself in mind, who "would have absolute discretion" over the distribution and would not favor members of any ethnic group or pay "respect to the length or breadth of their beards or their turbans." Appealing to British self-interest, Iqbal stressed that "the Arabs and Persians are neither friends nor subjects of the English Government, whereas the natives of India are." Therefore, by complying with his proposals, the British government "would be blessed" in the eyes of its subjects.31

After some hesitation, the government of India accepted some of Iqbal's proposals, in contradiction to the original deed. The two distributors were prevailed upon to divert the funds originally allotted to the Indian and Kashmiri paupers to an Indian sub-bequest, which was distributed in three equal shares among the Indians residing in Karbala', Najaf, and Kazimayn. Iqbal himself exercised overall supervision over the sub-bequest. The reputation of the Indian fund attracted a growing number of Indian paupers to the shrine cities throughout the century.

The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903 7

Taking advantage of the residents' ignorance of the inner dynamics of the ulama world, Iqbal gradually acquired considerable influence over the British and the ulama until his death in 1887. Thus, when Sayyid 'Ali Naqi died in 1872-73, a bitter struggle for the post broke out between his brother, Abu al-Qasim, and his son Muhammad Ja'far. Iqbal's recommendation tilted the scale in the former's favor. According to Colonel Tweedie, the resident in 1890, "no mujtahid or other person for whom the door of acquisition had been opened by him durst displease him."33

OPPOSITION WITHIN THE ULAMA COMMUNITY

Control of large funds was essential in the struggle for leadership in the 'Atabat, because the individual mujtahids, rather than the endowments of the madrasa, pro- vided the students with stipends. The more stipends a teacher could pay, the more students he could attract. In return, once the students returned to their hometown or settled in other communities, they would play a crucial role in consolidating the teach- er's leadership status among the lay believers.

Consequently, the Oudh Bequest became a focus of competition and recriminations in the 'Atabat as soon as Sayyid 'Ali assumed the distributorship. Unlike Ansari, he did not enjoy universal acclaim in Najaf, and his opponents did not fear coming out against him. In addition, Sayyid 'Ali sought to distribute the funds two or three times a year instead of once a month, as hitherto practiced. The change, which would have made it easier for him to evade British scrutiny of the details of the distribution, aroused many complaints among recipients of losses incurred in the course of the exchange.34

In a series of letters, Sayyid 'Ali urged the resident not to heed the complaints against him by "restless" and "bad people ... who are about to create mischief." Those who used to get two Krans a year are now getting ten, he complained, "and are still dissatisfied," while he himself was concerned only with the fate of the poor and with complying with British wishes. In reply, the Residency's official advised Sayyid 'Ali to lodge a complaint with the local Ottoman Qd'imaqam, and to be con- cerned only with the poor.35

Sayyid 'Ali did turn to the Ottomans, but, as will be discussed later, the "bad peo- ple" to whom he referred were probably members of the urban gangs who used to extort money from the ulama. It is very unlikely that he would have turned ulama over to the Ottomans, but he did have his opponents arrested.36 As he explained to the British, however, if they were brought to Baghdad, he would intercede on their behalf and have them released later, and "it will be greatly beneficial to the distribu- tion work." In other words, he sought to deter his opponents, but also to earn a reputation for benevolence within the Shi'i population and deflect possible charges of serving the Ottomans against fellow Shi'is.

Complaints against the two distributors poured into the British Residency as the two tended to regard their posts as their personal domain and as an instrument to solidify their social position. Unfortunately, no details on the actual distribution are available, and the only sources on the bequest are the recurring complaints.

Protests against Abu al-Qasim Tabataba'i, the distributor at Karbala', came primar- ily from individual members of families, who had originally been assigned a share in

8 Meir Litvak

the bequest, and some students. Sayyid Abu al-Qasim responds to appeals, one writer stated, with the claim that funds coming to Karbala' are "exclusively his own property (mulk) to do with it as he wishes."37

By contrast, the opposition in late 1875 against Sayyid 'Ali in the larger ulama community of Najaf was wide in scope. It followed upon disappointment with the new British resident who, like his predecessors, backed the two distributors. The oppo- sition cut across ethnic lines but was organized in two major groups, one predomi- nantly but not exclusively Arab, and the second predominantly Persian. It is unclear whether they acted in concert.

The Arab group, led by Shaykh Muhsin ibn Muhammad, turned first to the Ottoman government in August 1875. Its members presented themselves as "weak poor sub- jects of the Ottoman government [who] have no place of resort but God and the compassionate aid of that government," in view of the misuse of the bequest's funds. The petitioners sought to appeal to Ottoman sensitivities by stressing the role of for- eigners that is, Indian-British subjects-who meddled in the bequest's affairs. Fi- nally, while flattering the sultan for always seeking justice, they gave the Ottomans an opportunity to enhance their influence in the 'Atabat by calling upon the Vdlf (governor) to select a group of ulama to examine Sayyid 'Ali's conduct and ensure

38 proper distribution. The appeal to the Ottomans was quite significant in view of Ottoman-Shi'i tensions

following the suppression of the 1843 Karbala' rebellion and subsequent anti-Shi'i measures. It could point to the high stakes involved, as previous appeals took place only in extreme circumstances, such as the struggle against perceived heretics. These appeals and the language they used, as well as the conduct of Sayyid 'Ali himself as a mediator between the Ottomans and local gangs in Najaf, may suggest that some of the ulama operated as urban notables in the Ottoman system.39

Two other groups of ulama, led by Sayyid Mirza Ja'far and one 'Abd al-Khaliq, petitioned the government of India through the intercession of the Isma'ili leader Aqa Khan Mahallati, again an exceptional move in view of the ulama's great hostility to heterodox Shi'is. The large sums and social influence involved with the bequest prob- ably prompted the move. They complained that the resident dismissed all their griev- ances against Sayyid 'Ali owing to the intervention by Iqbal al-Dawla and his follow- ers. This group tried to woo the British by accusing the Indians of willfully undermining British prestige in Iraq in revenge for the loss of the kingdom of Awadh by presenting Britain as supporting injustice. The petitioners, for their part, expressed their confidence that the British were the only government that "cannot bear any one suffering hardship and oppression," and therefore urged it to remove Sayyid 'Ali as distributor.40

All the petitions reiterated the same accusations against Sayyid 'Ali namely, of appropriating about two-thirds of the bequest to himself and his dependents, of using the funds to purchase land, and of assuming excessive power over the inhabitants of Najaf and treating them high-handedly. The overall similarity of the accusations sug- gests a factual basis for the complaints, coordination among the various groups, con- ventional modes of expression regarding social norms and conduct, or some combina- tion of these.41

The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903 9

The leading figure in the petition sent to the Ottomans, Shaykh Muhsin ibn Muham- mad, was described by the British resident as a wealthy landowner who was not "a sojourner at the Shrine." He was probably Shaykh Muhsin ibn Muhammad Kashif al- Ghita', a communal-religious leader in Najaf during that period who owned land, but whom the Shi'i sources did not mention as a great scholar. The Residency's surgeon, Bowman, who visited Najaf in 1890, mentioned the rivalry between the Bahr al-'Ulum family and the family of Shaykh Ja'far and Shaykh Mahdi ibn Shaykh Ja'far. He added that conflicts between the parties had often resulted in bloodshed. In subsequent let- ters, he sometimes added the title al-Ja'far to the name, further enhancing the likeli- hood that they had belonged to the important Kashif al-Ghita' clan.42 Biographical dictionaries cannot identify positively the other leaders, 'Abd al-Khaliq, Sayyid Mirza Jacfar, and 'Abd al-Husayn.43

Even though the mid-1870s were characterized by fierce competition for religious leadership in Najaf and the Shi'i world, none of the leading Iranian contenders for marja'iyyat al-taqlfd (being a source of emulation) at the time can be openly associ- ated with the opposition movement, and there are no data on their stand. Sayyid 'Ali's opponents, however, cannot be dismissed, because their movement comprised several hundred people. The Aqa Khan's intercession on their behalf also attests to their popularity and strength.44

British control over the bequest prevented the Ottomans from using the petitions to deepen their influence in Najaf. The acting Valf merely sent them to Resident Nixon, expressing hope that he would set things right. In his reply, Nixon explained that the bequest was a Muslim trust "in which it is not becoming for Christian gentlemen to interfere too minutely."45 Nevertheless, Nixon confronted the two distributors and their opponents in an effort to resolve the issue. Although he agreed that the distributors had complete discretion in the distribution, Nixon admonished them to make all pay- ments in public so as "to prevent any cavil or complaints."46

The Indian government, for its part, refused "to sanction any interference with the distribution of the funds" once they had been transferred to the mujtahids.47 Unde- terred by failure, Shaykh Muhsin dispatched a series of petitions to the British ambas- sador in Istanbul, the Nizam Minister of Haidarabad, the British Foreign Office in London, and Queen Victoria in which he reiterated his complaints and demands. He asked the British to appoint another distributor, "elected by the people of Najaf," or some other reliable agent who would distribute the money justly. Should that happen, he promised, all the ulama would be "content and propagators" of Britain.48

The two distributors, fearing for their posts, moved to solidify their alliance with Iqbal al-Dawla and, through him, with the British. Both simultaneously "discovered" the numerous Indian "holy sojourners" living in a "state of utter poverty" in the 'Atabat and decided, therefore, to allocate a third of their monthly allotment-that is, the amount already deducted-to those Indians.40 Their act finally formalized the Indian sub-bequest, which operated until 1902. The major beneficiary of the entire episode was Iqbal al-Dawla, who enhanced his position as the one person on whom the distributors and the British grew more dependent.

When Sayyid 'Ali died in the 1881 plague, the struggle over the distribution re- sumed with full vigor. The contenders were Sayyid 'Ali's nephew and son-in-law,

10 Meir Litvak

Sayyid Muhammad; Sayyid 'Ali's brother, Sayyid Husayn; and Shaykh Muhsin ibn Muhammad. The resident received scores of petitions supporting each candidate and denigrating the others.50

The submissions of petitions in Arabic and Persian shows a preference to organize along ethnic lines, even in joint public activities. In addition, the hundreds of signator- ies supporting Sayyid Muhammad-particularly among well-established local fami- lies-attest to the scope of the network of patronage and support that the Bahr al-'Ulums had forged, thanks to their financial resources. Interestingly, both the Bahr al-'Ulum and Kashif al-Ghita' families had "renegades" who supported the rival candi- date.

Plowden, then the British resident, appointed Sayyid Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum as the new distributor in September 1881, either because he was impressed by the breadth of support that Sayyid Muhammad enjoyed or because the British preferred to work with a familiar family. They probably realized that any distributor would face opposition from other mujtahids. Like his uncle before him, Sayyid Muhammad appointed sub-distributors only after the resident prodded him, choosing the same people who had served his predecessor. He also announced his plan to carry out the distribution only once every three months, probably to hamper British efforts to super- vise his activities.51

In March 1889, Major Talbot of the British Residency visited Karbala' and Najaf to inquire about the upsurge of complaints against Abu al-Qasim Tabataba'i for using the bequest to pay his personal debts. As for Najaf, Talbot reported that Sayyid Mu- hammad Bahr al-'Ulum, rather than accumulating debts, "had gone to the other ex- treme of making himself a rich man out of the bequest," and complaints against him were pouring into the Residency.52

Talbot demanded that both distributors prepare new lists of recipients, as the old ones had not been updated for years, and submit to the Residency monthly receipts for the various grants, certified by the Honorary British-Indian Agents of their respec- tive towns. Each agent was to serve thereafter as a supervisor over the distributors. Although the distributor of Karbala' produced lists of payees to the Residency, their reliability and effectiveness in preventing abuses were negligible.53

The Indian supervisor failed to carry out his supervisory role, and then Resident Tweedie complained that the distributors procrastinated in submitting receipts then pressed for additional allotments on the grounds that "the poor are suffering" and the money was urgently needed to make them "happy and contented."54 Consequently, Tweedie set up a three-man committee comprising the distributor, Honorary Agent Nawwab Muhammad Taqi Khan, and a third "disinterested party" in each town to prepare the lists of payees and distribute the funds in public.55 The experiment ended in failure, as the Baghdad notable serving as the independent member and the Indian agent did not dare challenge Sayyid Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum. The latter, com- plained Tweedie, "remained as unruffled, as his ways of distribution remained un- straightened." In Karbala', on the other hand, the independent member, Sayyid Hasan Hakimzade, tried to introduce some order, thereby "exciting in the highest degree the animosity" of Abu al-Qasim and his party. Tweedie, for his part, admitted later that it had been unrealistic to expect a layman to defy a prominent mujtahid and risk

56 excommunication.

The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903 11

THE OUDH BEQUEST AND RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP IN THE CATABAT

The Oudh Bequest, like all other financial resources, was instrumental in acquiring the status of religious leadership in the 'Atabat but only in addition to scholarship. As mentioned earlier, the Bahr al-'Ulum family obtained social leadership thanks to its control of the Oudh funds. Sayyid cAli Bahr al-'Ulum, who had become a wealthy landowner, mediated the capitulation of the Zukurt gang to the Ottoman army troops following its revolt in July-August 1877. His wealth must have played an important role in determining his preference for Ottoman administration over gang rule. Yet he did not enjoy the same status of a marja' taqlfd as of many Ansari's disciples.57

Sayyid Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum, the distributor who followed, was recognized by the Ottomans as the "head teacher" of Najaf for administrative purposes, and whoever carried his signed approval that he was a student was exempted from conscription.58 Yet he owed his position as a mujtahid primarily to his important book, Bulghat al-faqih, as much as to his role of distributor. Moreover, he had a fairly small following in Iran as a marja' taqlrd. Excessive financial dealings related to the bequest implied a worldly nature, which the ulama never regarded as commendable-hence, the constant stresses in Shici sources on the asceticism of various mujtahids. During a visit to the 'Atabat in 1883, Acting Resident Tweedie acquired the impression that "the acceptance by them of this mundane care and duty, formed in the eyes of many, a lamentable defection from the type of character proper to them," leading to a loss of donations from followers.59

A similar situation existed in Karbala'. Sayyid Abu al-Qasim Tabataba'i attained the title of Hujjat al-Islam, the highest title at the time. But both Hasan Ardakani and Zayn al-'Abidin Mazandarani outranked him as scholars and maraji' taqlfd. Abu al- Qasim's involvement in the distribution earned him the title dunyadar ("this-worldly person") and allegedly contributed to the decline of his status late in his life.

When Abu al-Qasim Tabataba'i died in January 1892, his son Muhammad Baqir used his role as de facto distributor during his father's last years to mobilize wide- spread support for his appointment as the new distributor. Concurrently, Mazandarani sent the viceroy in Delhi a telegram warning that Muhammad Baqir's appointment would be "the cause of disturbances," because he was not a mujtahid at all.60 As a rival of the Tabataba'i family, he seized the opportunity to lay his hands on so important a source of money and patronage as was the Oudh Bequest.

Following Mazandarani's telegram, British Resident Mockler sent Major Jennings to Karbala' to review the matter with him and to inquire about the general attitude in Karbala' toward the distributors. He instructed Jennings to convey to Mazandarani the message that Mirza Hasan Shirazi, the leading marja' taqlzd of the time, had "ex- pressed his approval of Muhammad Baqir's appointment."61

Previous cases contained nothing to suggest that the successful appointment of a distributor required the support of a particular mujtahid. Now, however, when Shirazi had attained unprecedented authority among the ulama and when Muhammad Baqir's scholarly credentials were in question, the former's support was deemed essential. Presumably, Shirazi sought to draw Muhammad Baqir closer to himself against Ma- zandarani, who regarded himself as his equal and did not accept his authority.

During the meeting with Jennings, Mazandarani insisted that he alone was fit to be

12 Meir Litvak

a distributor, as he was the only universally accepted mujtahid in Karbala'. He angrily rejected Jennings's comment that Shirazi supported Muhammad Baqir's appointment, stating that Shirazi had "nothing whatever to do with Karbala'," thereby denying Shir- azi's supreme authority over his own turf. 2

Prior to the meeting, Jennings discussed the relative status of mujtahids in Karbala' and the distribution issue with local mujtahids, notables, and ordinary people. All of them ranked Muhammad Baqir Tabataba'i lower than Mazandarani as a mujtahid, but most of them supported him as a distributor.63 The British, therefore, decided to nomi- nate Muhammad Baqir as distributor because of the popular support he had for that post and because of the notoriety of Mazandarani's sons, who were likely to succeed him. In other words, the British acknowledged and solidified Muhammad Baqir's status as a social leader, but as in Najaf, social leadership was not tantamount to marjaciyya status.

REFORMS AND POLITICS

The most important change in execution of the Oudh Bequest took place in 1903, when the British bypassed the two distributors and delegated in their stead several mujtahids in Najaf and Karbala'. Though corruption was cited as the immediate cause of the change, it was an insufficient incentive in itself. Growing British awareness of the importance of the ulama of the 'Atabat in Iranian politics, and the need to exert some influence on them, had been equally important factors.

By 1902, the quarterly yields of the bequest had reached Rs29,706-4 (i.e., Rs4,951 per month) for each distributor. Of this sum, RslO,000 per quarter was deducted for the Indian sub-bequest. The mujtahids did not receive the remaining funds directly; these went through the Jewish sarraf (banker) of the Residency, Eliahu Ezekiel Danus. Apparently, the two had mortgaged the bequest, or a large portion of it, to the sarraf as interest on their debts to him.64

Scrutiny of the accounts submitted by the two distributors revealed that large amounts were allotted to members of their respective households, including children and servants. Many fictitious persons or names of deceased persons appeared on the lists, and their grants were "deposited" with the distributor's secretary. Several wit- nesses asserted that many of the poor had received smaller amounts than those re- corded but were threatened with forfeiture of their entire grant should they disclose the fact. The supervision system, set up by previous residents, failed completely as the Indian supervisors collaborated with the mujtahids.65

In view of such abuses, Newmarch concluded that the funds should be distributed among several mujtahids in order to avoid excessive accumulation in the hands of two persons. Anticipating approval for his recommendations, Newmarch set about compiling lists of eligible mujtahids. In April 1902, he sent letters to them offering them a share of the bequest, but the letters were not well received. He sent the Resi- dency dragoman, Marine, to the 'Atabat to gather information on prospective mujta- hids and convey offers of participation in the new distribution scheme.66 Of the thir- teen mujtahids asked (twelve Iranians and one Arab), only three (two of them bitter personal rivals of the distributors) immediately favored the change and expressed their willingness to take part in the distribution.

The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903 13

Six other mujtahids refused to have anything to do with the bequest. Significantly, these were leading, first-rank mujtahids at the time: Fazil Sharabiyani, Mirza Husayn Khalili, Muhammad Tah Najaf, Hasan Mamaqani, and Kazim Yazdi Tabataba'i in Najaf, as well as Isma'il Sadr al-Din in Karbala'." Because some of them were also active in Iran against Muzaffar al-Din Shah's growing acquiescence to foreign influ- ence, they were probably reluctant to be associated with the British at such a time. Thanks to their elevated status, these mujtahids received substantial donations from their followers and could, therefore, dispense with the British Oudh funds.68

The third group consisted of those mujtahids who opposed the proposed change but eventually received the money. Most of them argued that the two distributors were the best men for the post, as they belonged to respectable families-an interesting point in that it omits any reference to their personal qualities or scholarly status. Akhund Khorasani and 'Abdallah Mazandarani, for instance, acknowledged the prob- lems of distribution, but added that any change would only multiply the quarrels over the grants. One unnamed mujtahid, who subsequently renounced his allowance, explained that "a lion and a fly cannot be placed on the same level together, and [it] is still more unjust to give the respective food of the one to the other."69

The opposition of the mujtahids from this group to changing the mode of distribu- tion in view of the numerous complaints against the distributors stemmed from several possible causes. At least some of the mujtahids might have benefited from the bequest and saw no need for change. The degree of nepotism, which appeared excessive to the British, probably seemed reasonable to many mujtahids, in view of the importance of the family and the requirements of the patronage system. Genuine fears of intensi- fied scrambling for the money and resistance to increased British leverage on the ulama at a time of political turmoil were also likely motives. Once the change was implemented, such reasons no longer obtained, and the mujtahids saw no reason not to avail themselves. The wide range of responses to the proposed change illustrates once again the diffuse nature of leadership in the 'Atabat. No mujtahid was sufficiently prominent to impose his view, or even to serve as a model for others.

Based on Marine's report and on his own investigations, Newmarch compiled a list of fifteen mujtahids, ten of them Iranians, who had agreed to accept the funds. Most of them, except for Khorasani and Mazandarani, belonged to the second tier of leader- ship in Najaf and therefore welcomed the opportunity to bolster their financial re- sources. Newmarch explained that initially it had been difficult to get mujtahids to accept the money, "owing to the intimidation of the old recipients." It was necessary, therefore, to give the funds to any mujtahid who was willing to take them, and so "break the ring of the old hands."70 This explains the large presence of Indians, who did not enjoy high prestige among the Iranians and had not been mentioned as mujta- hids in the "poll" conducted by Marine. A conscious measure by Newmarch to favor Indians might have been another reason.71 Arab mujtahids were not included, indicat- ing that they did not enjoy widespread recognition among their Iranian colleagues. Ironically, some of the recipients had previously declared their adamant refusal to participate in the bequest "even if the money was put inside [their] pocket."72 In addition, Newmarch eliminated the Indian sub-bequest, except for a reduced sum al- lotted to the Nawwabs in Karbala' and Kazimayn to carry out their duties as consular agents. The funds thus saved were diverted for the ulama.73

14 Meir Litvak

The two displaced distributors and their supporters did not procrastinate when it came to protecting their privileges and wealth. Upon implementation of the new mea- sures, they sent a series of letters, some with crudely forged signatures of senior mujtahids, criticizing Newmarch's reform for violating the original deed and for caus- ing "disorder and waste of money."74

Muhammad Baqir Tabataba'i's supporters raised substantive arguments, as well, against the change in the mode of distribution. Challenging Newmarch's interpretation of the 1825 deed, they argued that if the term "mujtahid" applied to full-fledged mujtahids (mujtahid mutlaq), then only the two former distributors fit that definition. However, if the term applied to any holder of ijazat ijtihad, then more than 2,000 people in Najaf and 200 in Karbala' were eligible for the funds.75 The denial of the ijtihad of so many leading mujtahids reveals the intensity of the pursuit of money and leadership. The distributors' supporters also resorted to open intimidation against those who were willing to take funds. The petitions, however, failed to convince the British.

Overall, the change deprived the two distributors of access to considerable financial resources, thereby weakening their social position in the 'Atabat. Others who lost under the new system were the custodians of the shrines and several lay notable families who no longer received shares.76 Although nearly all the new distributors kept the money for themselves and their families, investing it mainly in real estate, the change probably brought about a more equitable distribution of funds in the 'Atabat. Writing in 1904, Newmarch concluded with satisfaction, "I seldom now receive any complaint."77

THE BEQUEST'S ECONOMIC IMPACT

During the first fifty years of its operation, the Oudh Bequest channeled more than 6 million rupees (?400,000-?600,000). True, Murtaza Ansari, the first recipient of the bequest in Najaf, reputedly received about 150,000 to 200,000 toman a year (f60,000-?80,000) from lay believers, but he was the exception. Nor is it clear whether these amounts excluded the Oudh funds.78 Most other mujtahids fared less well at the time. The best example is the Bahr al-'Ulum family, which was impover- ished until the 1840s but grew wealthy thanks to its control of the distribution.79

It is impossible to determine how many ulama benefited from the bequest during each period of its operation, because the money was not distributed evenly. The 1854 distribution agreement for Karbala' mentioned some 1,000 members of established ulama families and 600 students, in addition to several hundred shrine attendants and prayer imams and a thousand sayyids. In Najaf, it spoke of 1,200 students, in addition to hundreds of other ulama. If the distribution actually encompassed these people, then the bequest sustained the vast majority of ulama in both shrine cities. Another indication of the importance of the bequest, even if exaggerated, was the petition to the Nizam Minister of Haidarabad in 1876, which contended that formerly the money had reached "all the ulama in Najaf, and everyone was content since they had all been poor and these funds had been their major source of living" (emphasis added). In the early 1890s, the British mentioned 600 persons in Najaf and 500 in Karbala' as direct beneficiaries. Undoubtedly, some of those recipients sustained others, as well, thereby

The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903 15

multiplying the number of beneficiaries.80 As the flow of donations to the 'Atabat increased toward the end of the century, the share of the Oudh Bequest in the overall finances of the community of ulama declined. Sharabiyani, the leading mujtahid at the beginning of the 20th century, reportedly distributed 4,000 Turkish pounds (about ?3,240) a year among his students, slightly less than the annual amount (about ?3,300) each of the two distributors received. Still, the poverty suffered by many students and low-level ulama indicates that the flow of funds was insufficient to cover the needs of the ever-growing population of the 'Atabat.8 Concurrently, even though the yearly amounts each mujtahid received after the 1903 change declined to Rs6,000 (or ?400), it still constituted a considerable income.82

Moreover, in that it provided a steady source of income free from the whims of the donors and immune to economic and political fluctuations, the bequest compared favorably with other financial resources. Thus, in 1908, when donations from Iran declined, the Oudh Bequest remained the chief source of income for both teachers and students.83 The flow of such large amounts to the 'Atabat was very helpful in consolidating their status as the leading centers of learning for the Shi'i during the 19th century.

THE OUDH BEQUEST IN PERSPECTIVE

The operation of the Oudh Bequest influenced, and was influenced by, several broader historical currents that marked the region. Chief among them was Europe's increasing political and financial intervention in the internal functioning of the community of ulama and the ulama's adaptation to new economic and political circumstances. The bequest created a certain dependence of the ulama on the British. This was evident in the language they used in appealing to the British, such as the recurrent emphasis on the unrivaled British commitment to justice. Deepening British involvement in the internal politics of the community of ulama correlated directly to the broader process of their increasing interest in Iraq and involvement in Iranian politics.

Growing British intervention did not necessarily lead to greater cultural understand- ing. Considering that most mujtahids voiced disapproval with a change in the distribu- tion system, it is conceivable that British complaints of corruption were exaggerated. What the British may have construed as gross nepotism in sustaining members of the distributor's entourage was part and parcel of the patronage system among the ulama. As outsiders, the British could not help but receive a distorted view. However, the flow of complaints and petitions to the British during the 19th century somewhat rectified that problem.

The attitudes of the ulama toward the Oudh Bequest reflect the adaptation of Shi'i legal norms to changing economic and political circumstances. The establishment of the bequest as a trust of cash funds carrying perpetual interest contrasted sharply with the classical waqf, which pertains to a permanent endowment of property, taxable under Islamic law, the usufruct to which is dedicated to charitable end. Yet Hanafi jurists in the Ottoman Empire legitimized the use of cash waqf (waqf al-nuqad), provided the endowment was invested through a mudaraba (a profit-sharing commer- cial association between an investor and an agent) and the proceeds used for the benefit of the community.84 Although the Oudh Bequest did not employ a mudaraba,

16 Meir Litvak

Ghazi al-Din's designation of funds was that of a mixed waqf (waqf mushtarak), in which part of the proceeds went to family members, while the other part was ear- marked for communal purposes specifically, for "the acquirement of religious merit." However, unlike regular awqaf, non-Muslims administered the Oudh Bequest. Apparently this is what legitimized it in the eyes of the Shi'i ulama, based on the notion, formulated earlier by Indian mujtahids in Awadh, that taking interest from infidels was permissible.85

The Shi'i ulama referred to the bequest in terms that suggested its ambiguous legal status: al-wathfqa al-hindiyya ("the Indian deed"), al-khayriyya al-hindiyya ("the In- dian charity"), al-wathiqa al-khayriyya al-hindiyya ("the Indian charity deed"), or khayrat 'Uwda ("the Awadh charity"). A waqf is administered by an administrator (mutawallr) who is bound by the provisions laid down by the donor, unless these were of a general nature. In the Oudh Bequest, the British shared the role of administrator with the distributors, both in stipulating the initial beneficiaries of the funds and subse- quently in the actual distribution thereof. Indeed, the mujtahids responsible for the distribution were called muqassims (distributors), not mutawallfs, indicating that the bequest was not regarded as a genuine waqf. However, toward the latter part of the 19th century, various Shi'i ulama came to the see the bequest practically as a waqf, referring to it as endowed (mawqafa) or as a waqf, reflecting in this way the adapta- tion of Shi'i legal norms to practical needs.

The unifying Shi'i ethos did not eliminate ethnic divisions among the ulama of the 'Atabat. Not only were the funds allotted according to ethnic criteria, corresponding to the ethnic separation of classes and living quarters, but opposition to the distributor was largely organized along ethnic lines. Iranian domination of the shrine cities and a certain sense of superiority vis-a-vis the other groups was all too evident. In 1867, Iqbal al-Dawla complained of discrimination against the Indians by the Arab and Iranian mujtahids. Likewise, British Resident Newmarch, reflecting his own ethnocen- tric biases, argued that selection of eligible mujtahids for distributors could not be left to them because they would choose only Iranians. The latter had dominated both towns, "and were prone to think themselves superior to all other Orientals." Indeed, when the Residency's dragomans asked about the mujtahids in the shrine cities, the Iranians did not mention Arabs or Indians. 6

The petitions to the British reveal the level of self-awareness of such divisions. Thus, in a petition that joined together members of both groups, the authors stress the fact that they are both "Arabs and Persians" (al-ddciyyin min 'arab wa-'ajam). That they stressed their coming from both ethnic groups demonstrates the unusual nature of this joint action. The recruitment of hundreds of Arab ulama behind the attempt of the Kashif al-Ghita' family to replace the distributor was a product of these ethnic tensions and divisions. Yet these were never articulated as such. The petitioners com- plained about the personal conduct of the distributor, not about discrimination on an ethnic basis. Further, the use of the traditional Arab term `cajam" to mean Persians, rather than the modem term "Iranians," reflects the persistence of the traditional Is- lamic discourse prior to the advent of nationalism. 7

Traditional perceptions are also evident in the praise and criticism of various mujta- hids. Sayyid Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum's opponents maintained that his relative youth disqualified him for the post. Likewise, when Marine asked the mujtahids about their

The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903 17

colleagues, they acknowledged only those older than themselves. On the other hand, supporters of various mujtahids, or sometimes the claimants themselves, used the term "universally recognized mujtahid' (mujtahid musallam) as proof of their eligibility for the post, probably based on the prerequisite of justice (addla) for the attainment of ijtihad. The emphasis of this attribute of mujtahid musallam and the accusations that some persons were not mujtahids at all attest to the problematic nature of the attain- ment of this rank. It depended partly on peer recognition and was, therefore, highly subjective and the root of endless struggles among the ulama throughout the century.

Although the acquisition of financial resources was essential for the consolidation of leadership status, it did not guarantee primacy. Despite their prolonged control of the Oudh Bequest, both the Bahr al-cUlum and Tabataba'i families remained in the second tier of leadership for most of the period, their authority barely extending be- yond the shrine cities.

The hereditary nature of the bequest led to the situation in which not all distributors were first-rank scholars. In addition, excessive financial dealings undermined the repu- tation of the distributors as scholars and spiritual leaders. Association with the increas- ingly unpopular British further enhanced one's worldly image, entailing a certain loss of prestige for the distributors. This explains why some mujtahids refrained from taking part in the bequest, although the scramble for funds somewhat belies this point.

Although it was insufficient to ensure spiritual leadership, the bequest was instru- mental in transforming the distributor families into communal-religious leaders (rads; pI., ru'asa'), as evidenced by conduct of the two distributors of the Bahr al-'Ulum family and the title of ra:'s al-tacifa ("head of the community") they earned from their supporters.

The lack of consensus over the bequest reflects the diffuse nature of the leadership in the cAtabat. During all fifty years of bickering, no attempts were made to form a unified stand among the mujtahids on the bequest or to resolve the issue by establish- ing a collective body to supervise the distribution. This was due to the traditional individualistic administration of awqaf and the lack of a unified organization of the madrasa, and to the prevalence of interpersonal and patronage relations that permeated most aspects of life in the community of ulama. That opponents of the distributors turned outward to the Ottomans and the British is another manifestation of the lack of unity or organized hierarchy, and of the bitter rivalries aroused by the struggle for funds, in view of the tense background of Shici-Ottoman relations.

Various ulama opposed the bequest as a matter of principle. Aversion to the British role and to the corruption associated with the bequest were the main reasons. Such opposition was not confined to any particular ethnic group, family, or faction; it was an individual rather than a collective stand.88 It is possible, though by no means cer- tain, that this opposition increased through the years along with the rising hostility toward the British. Overall, however, it seems to have been a minority position. For the majority of ulama, the lure of money was irresistible.

NOTES

Author s note: I thank the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Needless to say, all mistakes are mine alone.

18 Meir Litvak

"Ali Khaqani, Shu'ara' al-Ghari, 12 vols. (Qom, 1988), 12:478. 2Oudh is the British name for the kingdom of Awadh. It is used here because British documents constitute

the major source for this study. 3For an analysis of the economics of the communities of ulama in the 'Atabat, see Meir Litvak, "The

Finances of the 'Ulama' Communities of Najaf and Karbala', 1796-1904," Die Welt des Islams 40 (2000): 41-66; Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 205 ff.

4For a detailed discussion of the remittances from Awadh, see Juan R. I. Cole, "'Indian Money' and the Shi'i Shrine Cities of Iraq, 1786-1850," Middle Eastern Studies 22 (1986): 461-80.

5The first and second loans of 10 million rupees each were extracted by the EIC in 1816 to finance the cost of the war: see Juan R. I. Cole, Roots of North Indian Shi'ism in Iran and Iraq: Religion and State in Awadh, 1722-1859 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 260.

6Deed of arrangement between H. M. the King of Oudh and the Rt. Hon. Company, 17 August 1825, Government of India Foreign Department (hereafter, GIFD) Political Consultations (hereafter, PC), no. 35-36, 16 September 1825, IOL P/124/25; John G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, 2 vols. (Calcutta, 1908-15, repr. London, 1970), 1, 1B:1409-11.

7Sarfaraz Mahal died in 1878, and Rs335-5-4 were added to each town: Resident to Abu al-Qasim, 6 March 1882, National Archives of India (hereafter, NAI) Baghdad Residency (hereafter, BR) 176 (Pay- ments). The three volumes dealing with the Oudh Bequest at the NAI are all numbered 176, but each has a different addition.

8Colonel Rawlinson to Shaykh Mortaza, mujtehid of Nejjef (sic), 10 October, 1850, BR 176 (1850- 1900); Shaykh Mortaza at Nejef (sic) to the Political Agent, 1852 (precise date is not given) BR 176 (1850-1990).

9Rawlinson to Palmerston, 2 February 1852, Baghdad, no. 2, FO 195/367, enclosed in Rawlinson to Canning, 11 February 1852, Baghdad, no. 5, FO 195/367.

"Ansari's proposal for distribution of the Oudh Bequest, 1854 (no exact date given), BR 176 (1850- 1900). For Ansari's educational activities, see Meir Litvak, Shi'i Scholars of Nineteenth Century Iraq: The 'Ulama' of Najaf and Karbala' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 74.

"Extracts from letter no. 8 from the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia to the Secretary of State to the Government of India in the Financial Department, dated 2 February 1852, enclosed in Rawlinson to Can- ning, 11 February 1852, Baghdad, no. 5, FO 195/367; Allen to Rawlinson, 8 October 1852, Fort William, no. 260, GIFD, PC no. 5, 22 December 1852. For a detailed discussion of British policy regarding the Oudh Bequest, see Meir Litvak, "A Failed Manipulation: The British, the Oudh Bequest and the Shi'i 'Ulama' of Najaf and Karbala'," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 27 (2000): 69-89.

12Lorimer, Gazetteer, 1, 1B:1414-1415; file BR 176 (1850-1900) contains an undated proposal by Ansari for distribution.

3For the political conduct of the ulama in the 'Atabat during the 19th century, see Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, pt. 2.

'4The tables are enumerated in many receipts found in the BR 176 files. 15Ansari's proposal for distribution, 1854, BR 176 (1850-1900); Quarterly Distribution at Karbala', 1854

(no exact date is given), BR 176 (1850-1900). For an analysis of the ulama population in both towns, see Meir Litvak, "Continuity and Change in the 'Ulama' Population of Najaf and Karbala', 1791-1904: A Socio-Demographic Study," Iranian Studies 23 (1990): 31-60.

16Ansari's proposal for distribution, 1854, BR 176 (1850-1900). 7For a more detailed discussion of ethnic relations in the 'Atabat, see Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, 30-35; and

Nakash, The Shi'is, 84-88, 100-108, 257-58. 8For Ansari's mode of leadership, see Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, 70-79. '9"Mazbata," 21 June 1872, BR 176 (1850-1900). 20The distribution proposal for 1854 in BR 176 (1850-1900) and the distribution summary for 1872 in

BR 176A (1868-77) both show the correlation between the number of recipients and the amount given. 2'For the origins and development of the Shaykhi-Usuli rivalry in Karbala', see Denis MacEoin, From

Shaykhism to Babism (Ph.D diss., Cambridge University, 1979). For Ahmad Rashti, see 'Abd al-Razzaq al- Kammuna, Mawarid al-Athaf fi Nuqaba' al-Ashraf, 2 vols. (Najaf, 1968), 2:61-2.

22On the discrimination against Indians, see Litvak, "Finances." 23GIFD general proceedings for September 1876, no. 47-48, P/1026. Muhammad Hirz al-Din, Ma'arif

al-rijal fi tarajim al-'ulama' wal-'udaba', 3 vols. (Najaf, 1964-65), 2:108-109.

The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903 19

24Ja'far Al Mahbuba, Madi al-Najaf wa-hadiruha, 3 vols. (Najaf, 1955-58), 3:206; Muhsin al-Amin, A'yan al-Shi'a, 60 vols. (Sidon, 1957), 48:152.

25For Shaykh Mahdi's bid for leadership, see Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, 76-77. 26Kemball to GIFD, 3 March 1860, Baghdad, no. 11, BR 176B. 27Mahmud Mahmud, Ta'rikh-i ravabit-i siyasi-yi iran va inglis dar qarn-i nuzdahum miladi, 7 vols.

(Tehran, 1949-50), 7:1343-44; Isma'il Ra'in, Huquq-i bigiran-i inglis dar iran (Tehran, 1347/1968), 104; Khan Malik Sasani, Dast-i pinhan-i siyasat-i inglis dar iran (Tehran, n.d.), 104; Amin, A'yan, 44:47.

28On British policy toward the political use of the Oudh Bequest, see Litvak, "A Failed Manipulation." On Ansari's attitude toward politics, see Abbas Amanat, "In Between the Madrasa and the Marketplace: The Designation of Clerical Leadership in Modern Shi'ism," in Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism, ed. Sa'id Amir Arjomand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 112.

29Kemball to Sayyid 'Ali Bahr al-'Ulum 1 Sha'ban, 23 February 1860, BR 176 (1850-1900). For Sayyid 'Ali's status, see Muhammad Hasan Khan I'timad al-Saltana. Kitab al-ma'athir wal-athar (Tehran, 1306/ 1888), 152; Hirz al-Din, Ma'arif, 2:107-9. Kemball stressed the importance of the distributors' Iranian origin: see Kemball to Under-Secretary of State, India Office, 7 April 1867, GIFD political proceedings, Baghdad, no. 122, June 1867, P1437/71. Kemball never mentions whether Ansari recommended Sayyid 'Ali.

30Lorimer, Gazetteer, 1, 1B:1475-76. 3'Merivale to Kemball, 7 January 1867, GIFD political proceedings for June 1867, no. 122, P/437/71. 32Government of India to Northcote, no. 131, 3 August 1867; Simla, L/P85/6/93; Tweedie to Thornton,

Secretary of State to the Government of India Foreign Department, 12 March 1890, GIFD external proceed- ings, Baghdad, no. 123, P/3742; Kemball to Iqbal al-Dawla, 3 November 1867, GIFD, P/3743, 355 (Appen- dix A in Tweedie to Secretary of the Government of India Foreign Department, no. 376, 3 July 1890). Until 1877, Rs590 a month were deducted from Najaf to the sub-bequest and Rsl,437 from Karbala', due to the greater number of Indians residing in this town: see receipts in BR 176A (1868-77).

33Tweedie to Thornton, GIFD, P/3742; Tweedie to Thornton, 3 July 1890, GIFD external proceedings, no. 177, P/3743.

34Sayyid 'Ali to Resident, 16 Ramadan 1276/23 March 1860, BR 176 (1850-1900); idem to Resident, April 1860 (no exact date is given), BR 176 (1850-1900).

35Sayyid 'Ali to Resident, 1860 (no exact date is given), BR 176 (1850-1900); Heystop to Sayyid 'Ali, March 15, 1860.

16For the relations between the ulama and urban gangs, see Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, 122-23, 136-42; Juan R. I. Cole and Moojan Momen, "Mafia, Mob and Shi'ism in Iraq: The Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala', 1824-1843," Past and Present 112 (1986): 112-43.

37Telegrams to the Residency dated 27 March 1875, April 1875, 14 and 26 March 1876, 15 April 1876, 4 May 1876, BR 176 (1850-1900); Petition in Arabic, no. 36, 1879; Petition, no. 41 (no dates); Petition, November 1880, from former students of Sayyid 'Ali Naqi.

38Translations of petitions from people of Najaf to the Ottoman government, 21 Rajab 1292/22 August 1875, GIFD general proceedings for September 1876, no. 49-50, P/1026.

390n the ulama's relationships with the Ottomans see Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, pt. 2. 40"A petition signed by the learned men, students, and fakirs residing at Najaf to the Chief Secretary to

Government Political Department," received 1 December 1875, GIFD general proceedings, no. 40. P/1026; Petition, enclosed in Nixon to Thornton, 14 February 1876, Baghdad, no. 9, GIFD general proceedings, no. 36, P/1026.

4"Petitions, enclosed in GIFD general proceedings, no. 41, 47-48, P/1026. 42 Nixon to Thornton, 14 February 1876; "Report by Brigade Surgeon Bowman on a visit to Najaf, 23

January 1890," GIFD internal proceedings, P/3742 (Appendix E to Tweedie to Thornton, 12 March 1890). 43'Abd al-Khaliq does not appear in Aga Buzurg Tehrani's Tabaqat A'lam al-Shi'a (Najaf, 1954-68):

Amin, A'yan; Hirz al-Din, Ma'arif, and Mahbuba, Madi al-Najaf. The other names are too common to reach any definite conclusion.

440ne petition alone claimed more than 700 signatures, and another, 318. Several others contained several dozen signatories each. On the other hand, hundreds of signatures were manufactured or written several times in similar petitions submitted in 1893: see later.

45Hasan Fawzi, Acting Governor General Baghdad to Nixon, 25 Sha'ban 1292/26 September 1875, GIFD general proceedings, no. 46, P/1026; Nixon to the Acting Governor General, 2 October 1875, Baghdad, no. 71, GIFD general proceedings, no. 49, P/1026.

20 Meir Litvak

46Nixon to Thornton, 14 February 1876. 47Viceroy's Council to Salisbury, Secretary of State for India, 4 September 1876, Simla, L/P&sn7/10. 4'GIFD general proceedings, no. 54-56, 62-67, 71-73, P/1026; Petition in Arabic, 12 September 1876,

BR 176B. 49The mujtahids of Karbala' and Najaf to Colonel Nixon, 1 May 1877, GIFD external proceedings, no.

119, P/3743 (Appendix B of the Political Agent letter to Thornton 3 July 1890, no. 376). 50Register of letters, BR 176 (Payments), mentions seven petitions in favor of Sayyid Muhammad. Most

of the petitions carry only the year, or sometimes the month of April or June. Petition dated 1881; Zayn al-'Abidin to Resident, n.d., trans. 17 April 1881; Petition dated 18 Jumada 1 1298/17 April 1881; Shaykh Muhsin to Residency, 18 Jumada I 1298/17 April 1881; Petition dated May 1881. All in BR 176 (Pay- ments).

5'Resident to Sayyid Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum, 29 September 1881; Sayyid Muhammad to Resident, 2 and 3 Dhi Qa'da 1298/26 and 27 September 1881. Both in BR 176 (Payments).

52 Memorandum by Major Talbot, 2 May 1889, letter no. 6 (Appendix D to Tweedie to Thornton, 12 March 1890, Baghdad, no. 123, GIFD external proceedings, P/3966).

53Tweedie to Thornton, 12 February 1891, GIFD internal proceedings for May 1891, no. 185, P/3966. On the dubious reliability and effectiveness of these lists, see Mockler to Secretary to the Government of India at the Foreign Department, 18 August 1893, Baghdad, no. 579, GIFD internal proceedings, no. 292, and below 40 ff.

54Tweedie to Thornton, 11 March 1891, GIFD general proceedings for May 1891, no. 187, P/3966. 55Major Talbot memorandum, 2 May 1889. 56Tweedie to Thornton, 12 March 1890; Tweedie to Thornton, 12 February 1891. 57'Ali al-Wardi, Lamahat ijtima'iyya min ta'rikh al-'iraq al-hadith, 6 vols. (Baghdad, 1969), 2:258-59;

Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, 162, 229 n. 58Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, 161-62. 59Tweedie to Thornton, 12 March 1890; Tweedie to Barnes, 12 February 1891, Baghdad, no. 82, GIFD

internal proceedings for May 1891, no. 185, P/3996. 60Mockler to Secretary to the Government India at the Foreign Department, 12 March 1892, Appendix

C, GIFD internal proceedings, no. 210, P/3996. 6,Ibid. 62The entire report is recorded in Jennings to Mockler, 16 March 1892, GIFD internal proceedings, no.

208, P/4187 (Appendix A of Mockler to Secretary to the Government India at the Foreign Department, 23 March 1892, Baghdad, GIFD internal proceedings, no. 207).

63Ibid.

64The following account, unless stated otherwise, is based on Newmarch to Barnes, 20 September 1902, Baghdad, no. 390, GIFD internal proceedings, no. 70, P/6652.

65Ibid.

66Ibid. (Appendix C, Instructions to Marine, 6 May 1902). 67Ibid., Marine Report; Hirz al-Din, Ma'arif, 2:108 n. 68Ibid., Newmarch to Dane, 15 June 1903, Baghdad, no. 313, GIFD proceedings, no. 80. For a discussion

on the status of these mujtahids, see Litvak, Shi'i Scholars 91-92, and the references detailed therein. 69Ibid., Lorimer to McMahon, 11 August 1911, Baghdad, no. 689, FO 195/2368. 70Ibid., Newmarch to Dane, 15 June 1903, Baghdad, no. 313, GIFD proceedings, no. 80. "In enclosure no. 8 to his letter (no. 390), Newmarch praised the two Indian mujtahids for voluntarily

distributing among the poor all the funds they had received. Apparently, in contrast to their Iranian col- leagues, the Indian mujtahids felt no need to spend money on building patronage networks, as they were never serious contenders for supreme marja'iyya. They could, therefore, be more generous to the poor.

72Marine Report, enclosure to no. 390, 20 September 1902. 73Newmarch to Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, 24 September 1903,

Baghdad, no. 590, GIFD external proceedings for February 1904, no. 27, P/6887. 74Constantinople O'Conor to Newmarch, 20 September 1902, FO 195/2120; Hamilton to the Viceroy

London, no. 35, GIFD political proceedings, P/6652; Newmarch to O'Conor, 21 January 1903, Baghdad, no. 37/5, FO 195/2138.

75GIFD internal proceedings, no. 81 (enclosure to Newmarch to Dane, 17 June 1903, Baghdad, no. 315), P/6652.

The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903 21

76Newmarch to Secretary of State to the Government of India Foreign Department, 15 June 1905, Bagh- dad, no. 432, L/PS/10/77.

77Wilson to Secretary to GOI, 29-30 August 1919 FO 371/4198/167721; Newmarch to Dane, 30 May 1904, Baghdad, no. 422, L/PS/10.

7I 'timad al-Saltana, Ma'athir, 136. 79Amin, A'yan, 42:46; Muhammad Tunkabuni, Qisas al-'ulama', 36. 80Petition in Arabic, 12 September 1876, BR 176B; Quarterly distribution for Karbala', 1854, BR 176

(1850-1900); Ansari's proposal for distribution, 1854. 8"For descriptions of the poverty of the students, see Hasan Quchani Najafi, Siyahat-i Sharq ya Zindigani-

namah-yi Aqa Najafi Quchani (Mashhad, 1351/1972), 297, 315; and Amin, A'yan, 40:54, 64. 82Hirz al-Din, Ma'arif, 2:374. A measure of the value of Rs400 may be given by the monthly pension

of Rs40 given to the English widow of the Residency's surgeon: see BR 278C, IV, 2 November 1907. 83Nakash, The Shi'is, 217-18. 84Jon E. Mandaville, "Usurious Piety: The Cash Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire," International

Journal of Middle East Studies 10 (1979): 289-308. 85Cole, Roots of North Indian Shi'ism, 263. 16Newmarch to Barnes, 20 September 1902, Baghdad, no. 390, GIFD internal proceedings, no. 70,

P/6652. See also Yahya Dawlatabadi's condescending remarks on Arab mujtahids in his Hayat-e Yahya, 4 vols. (Tehran, 1341s/1963), 1:25.

87Petition in Arabic, 12 September 1876, BR 176 B. "See the cases of Sayyid Husayn Bahr al-'Ulum in Amin, A'yan, 26:58; Shaykh Ja'far ibn 'Ali Kashif al-

Ghita', in 'Ali Khaqani, Shu'ara' al-Ghari, 10 vols. (Najaf, 1954), 2:47; and Amin himself in A'yan, 40:55.