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Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

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Case Study: Moody’s Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown Prepared by: TEN LI WEI CGA150007 TAN WAN TENG CGA150015 ANANTHAN VIJAYAKUMAR CGA150029 WONG GHAI YAN CGA150056 CSGB6102: Business Ethics & Corporate Governance Sem2 2015/2016 Tuesday 6.30 – 9.30pm (Group 1)
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Page 1: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Case Study:

Moody’s Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Prepared by:TEN LI WEI CGA150007TAN WAN TENG CGA150015ANANTHAN VIJAYAKUMAR CGA150029WONG GHAI YAN CGA150056

CSGB6102: Business Ethics & Corporate GovernanceSem2 2015/2016

Tuesday 6.30 – 9.30pm (Group 1)

Page 2: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Who is Moody’s?

Case Background

Discussion

Conclusion

CONTENTS

Page 3: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

WHO IS MOODY’S?

Page 4: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Moody’s CorporationFounded on 1909 by John Moody

Moody's Investors Service (MIS)

Credit ratingsRate debt/ securities based

on the debtor's repay ability

Research Debt

Instruments & securities

Moody's Analytics

Software & Analytic Tools

for credit and economic analysis, financial risk

management.

Who is Moody’s?

Moody’s Core Business

Page 5: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Moody’s Business – Government Relation

New rules: SEC decided to use the ratings on those bonds as the indicators of risk.

Nationally-recognized statistical ratings organizations (NRSRO)

Paid no fees for the research and analysis by publication of credit ratings.

Subscribed publications & Advisory from

$$$

Before 1975,

In 1975,

Securities & Exchange

Commission (SEC)

Investors

Require all bond issuer/bank to use NRSRO’s rating for certain regulatory purposes

Impacts on Credit Rating Agencies- Relationship with banks: Bank pay for rating, “shopping” for best rating- Higher pressure, Market Competition

Page 6: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

FEATURES OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITY (RMBS)HOW IT WORKS?

WHY IT GAINS POPULAR?DEVELOPMENT OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE

THE MARKET COLLAPSEHOW MOODY’S REACTED?

THE VICTIMS

CASE BACKGROUND

Page 7: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Features of RMBS

A type of mortgage-backed debt obligation whose cash flows come from residential debt.

Comprised of a pool of mortgage loans created by banks and can be purchased by investors.

RMBSpopular in early 2000s

Residential Mortgage-backed Security (RMBS) - a tradable financial asset. One of the famous structured finance rated by Moody’s

Home Loan

Home Loan

Home Loan

Tranches from

Low risk to

High risk

Very complexLack of transparency

Hard for investor to judge its risk=

Page 8: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Monthly Repayment Direction

RMBS: How it works?Investment / Loan Direction

From Rating Agencies

https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004

Individual Borrowers

Mortgage loan to buy house

Lenders

Bundle loans and sell to Investment bank

Global Investors

Make decision based on agency’s ratings on creditworthiness

Investment Bank

Funded loans with securities by risk levelEngage rating agencies (Moody’s)

Page 9: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Popularity Forces

early 2000s

Global investor Dot-com stock

bubble bursting

Increase of Investors demand

- higher rate of return & safe

Robust economic growth in US, increase inflow of global capital

Banks increased risk. Higher debt to equity ratios

Optimistic "AAA“ credit ratings on asset backed

securities

Speculation in real estate.

Mortgage brokers Incentive structures

RMBS: Why it gains popular?

Page 10: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Global demand of

RMSB increase

Stress lender to produce more loans

Policy encouraged minorities to own a

home

Weaken standard to

qualify borrowers by

adjustable rate loans

Subprime mortgage

a loan offered to borrowers with poor credit records

RMBS: Development of Subprime Mortgage

No income, no job, no assets

Low repayment capability

Didn’t understand loan’s terms

Believed able to sell/ refinance in future - worth more

What is main cause of Subprime Mortgage? poor government housing policy:

• Designed to expand home ownership• Help 1st time buyer with down payment & etc• Reduction in mortgage underwriting standard• Lead to poor housing finance system

Consistent with

Page 11: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

RMBS: The Market Collapse

• In 2006, interest rate rise, housing prices drop - housing bubble.

• 80% of subprime mortgages were adjustable-rate mortgages - reset at higher interest rates - causing higher monthly payments.

• Difficult for weak borrowers to make repayment or to refinance their loans as housing declining value.

• “Jingle mail” incident – dropped the key in mail & walk away.

• Leading to mortgage *delinquencies and foreclosures.

• Leading to the devaluation of housing-related securities.

By early 2008, 27% borrowers no longer paying loans.

Subprime mortgage crisis coincided with the US recession of December 2007 – June 2009.

*Delinquent is the failure to accomplish what is required by law or duty, such as the failure to make a required payment.

Page 12: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

How Moody’s reacted?

Adjusted their ratings for existing RMBS only shortly before market collapse.

Validated RMSB Underestimated risks Failed to figure out the loss ahead of the fact Led people into dangerous risk

Blame on Moody’s

In July 2007, Moody’s stopped rating new RMBS and began

“Express Train Downgrades”

Page 13: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Subprime mortgage crisis: The victims

Homeowners • Their homes lost value• Couldn’t sell or refinance their property due to high interest rate

Investors who hold RMBS directly• They relied on the quality of Moody’s ratings, received the information with

full belief that the ratings attributed to them were analytically sound and unbiased.

• Discovered that their investments were far less value than before.

Investors who didn’t hold RMBS directly • Stock and bond markets fell broadly in response to the financial crisis

After RMBS collapsed in value…

Page 14: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

SHOULD MOODY’S BE BLAMED?WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CRISIS?

WHY NOBODY TAKES IT SERIOUSLY BEFORE? WHAT CAUSED MOODY’S INACCURATE RATING?

INTRODUCTION OF DODD-FRANK

DISCUSSION

Page 15: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Should Moody’s be blamed?A CRA’s roles:

Provide rating based on the creditworthiness of debt securities Assess the credit risk of the securities Provides investors with unbiased review and opinion

Legally, didn’t commit a crime• Not to serve as the “gate-keeper” of

the securities market • Ratings are just their opinions, not an

recommendation on the stability of a particular financial products

Unethical - took advantages on profitable process• Inaccurate rating - Make the

investment packages look more attractive to investors

• Underestimate credit risk, Misleading information

Page 16: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Who should be responsible for this crisis?

Home Buyers

Lenders Investment bankers

Government Moody’s Investors

- All were irresponsible in their own duties- Each was pursuing its own self-interest in this ineffectively regulated system - Each party searched for benefit and passing the risks along to others

Who has the greatest responsibility? Moody’s/ NRSRO – Key Enabler, RMBS could not be sold without their ratings

Government regulators/policymakers – poor housing policy: reduction in mortgage underwriting standard, underestimate important role played by banks and NRSRO

Page 17: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Why nobody takes it seriously before?They are shortsighted, greedy and self-centered.

Homebuyers Supposedly they did

not qualified for a mortgage

Lenders Received sales

commissions for selling high rating of loans

Investors RMSBs typically paid

high interest rates than other investments

Moody’s Employees Top executives (CEO,

Chairman) and Managers earned good compensation

Investment Banks Earned high fees from selling,

packaging and marketing high rating of structured finance

Moody’s Shareholders In 5 years, Moody’s had

highest profit margin of any company (Microsoft, Exxon)

Enjoy total return which is rose 354%

Page 18: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

What caused Moody’s inaccurate rating?

Primary interestThe principal goals of the profession, such as the professional duties of rating

Secondary interest Not only financial gain but also such motives as the desire to increase market

share and the wish to do favors for clients

“A conflict of interest is a set of circumstances that creates a risk that professional judgement/actions regarding a primary interest will be

disproportionately influenced by a secondary interest”Bernard Lo and Marilyn J. Field, Committee on Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education, and Practice; Institute of Medicine

Page 19: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

How was conflicts of interest existed?

Investment bankers

Moody’s Investors

Pay $$$

The products were grouped and complicated, I didn’t know how to judge the safety / security of products

Need professional opinion on risk of products

Need “nice” ratings and tell investors how worthful to invest my products

Increase market share, keep my business, more revenue

professionally

unprofessionally

X choose Moody’s

Choose Moody’s

• Give clients the ratings they want, prevent clients take the business to other ratings agencies.

• Higher rating of debt = higher earning to bankers → increase Moody’s revenue

Might X invest

Might Invest

Page 20: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Introduction of Dodd-Frank

Main causes of Financial Crisis (2008)

• Government housing policies forced a reduction in mortgage underwriting standards

• Conflict of Interest in CRAs

To promote the US financial stability by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system

To protect consumers from abusive financial services practices

Categorized into 16 titles Requires that regulators create 243 rules, conduct 67

studies, and issue 22 periodic reports Signed into federal law by President Barack Obama on

July 21, 2010

Dodd-Frank Act

Aims:

Did it solved the problems?

Page 21: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

The Failure of Dodd-Frank Act

Dodd-Frank does nothing about government housing polices to fix a broken housing-finance system. The law comes out with unnecessary regulations on financial firms and unrelated matters to the crisis.

The regulations is very complex to be defined: Favor large banks that can afford lawyers to analyse themIt tighten the regulation on banks/bond issuers of complex securities Created a set of rules that hurt businesses like smaller banks and CRAs

Why?

Necessary to recognize the root causes: how, why it happened in order to prevent issues reoccur

Page 22: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

CONCLUSION

Page 23: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Conclusion

• Effective regulation to solve the root causes

• Enforcement efforts to improve accuracy and transparency of provided to investors

• Relationship with bond issuers• Government and agencies should realize

the costs beforehand

• Each involved party shared part of the blame for financial crisis

• Began with inappropriate government regulation and bad monetary policies

New economics regulation is needed to

correct the market failure

Conflicts of Interest by credit rating

agencies

Market failure of RMSBs couldn’t be blamed on Moody’s

only

Page 24: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

References1. https://prezi.com/zhmg9n9fphrr/moodys-credit-ratings-and-the-subprime-mortgage-meltdown/2. http://thecrisisofconscience.blogspot.my/2012/02/case-study-of-moodys-corp-and-subprime.html3. http://www.slideshare.net/echijc/case-study-moodys4. https://groundupct.wordpress.com/2011/08/08/case-study-shows-moodys-credit-rating-agency-at-the-heart-of-the-financial-crisis-starting-in-2004/5. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/magazine/27Credit-t.html?_r=06. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/aug/22/ratings-agencies-conflict-of-interest7. http://www.investopedia.com/articles/bonds/09/history-credit-rating-agencies.asp#ixzz46zAhSa7G 8. http://mercatus.org/publication/brief-history-credit-rating-agencies-how-financial-regulation-entrenched-industrys-role9. http://www.statepress.com/article/2015/04/dodd-frank-why-the-bills-regulations-only-create-bigger-banks

Page 25: Moody's Credit Ratings & the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

Additional ReferencesU.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) actions

On 11 June 2008, the SEC proposed far-reaching rules designed to address perceived conflicts of interest between rating agencies and issuers of structured securities.

1. The proposal would, among other things, • Prohibit a credit rating agency from issuing a rating on a structured product

unless information on assets underlying the product was available, • Prohibit credit rating agencies from structuring the same products that they rate,

and require the public disclosure of the information a credit rating agency uses to determine a rating on a structured product, including information on the underlying assets.

2. The last proposed requirement is designed to facilitate "unsolicited" ratings of structured securities by rating agencies not compensated by issuers.

On 3 December 2008, the SEC approved measures to strengthen oversight of credit rating agencies, following a ten-month investigation that found "significant weaknesses in ratings practices," including conflicts of interest.


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