Morality and Realpolitik in the Athenian Speech at the...

Morality and Realpolitik in the Athenian Speech at the Peloponnesian Congress in Thucydides’

History of the Peloponnesian War

In partial fulfillment of Bachelor of Arts Degree in the Department of Classics

The School of Arts & Sciences Honors Program

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey The School of Arts & Sciences

Written Under the Direction of:

Thomas J. Figueira Classics

By:

Benjamin V. Bhamdeo

CCAHILL

Typewritten Text

2012-2013

Abbreviations

Adkins = A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values. Chicago: 1960.

Bétant = E.A. Bétant, Lexicon Thucydideum. vol. 1-2. Hildesheim: 1961.

Dover = K.J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality: In the Time of Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: 1974.

Gomme = A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol.1. Oxford: 1945.

Hobbes = T. Hobbes. Trans. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War. London: 1843.

Hornblower = S. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides. vol. 1. Oxford: 1991.

Jowett = B. Jowett. Trans. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War. Oxford: 1881.

LSJ = H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: 1996.

Meiggs = R. Meiggs, Athenian Empire. Oxford: 1972.

Raubitschek = A.E. Raubitschek, “The Speech of the Athenians.” P. Stadter, The Speeches of

Thucydides. Chapel Hill: 1973.

de Romilly = J. de Romilly, Thucydides and Athenians Imperialism. Trans., P. Thody. Oxford:

1963.

Smith = C.F. Smith. Trans. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War. vol. 1-4.

Cambridge: 1919.

Whitlock Blundell = R. Whitlock Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in

Sophocles and Greek Ethics. Cambridge, UK: 1989.

Morality and Realpolitik in the Athenian Speech at the Peloponnesian Congress Bhamdeo

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Introduction

The historian Thucydides recorded the history of the Peloponnesian War having hoped

the conflict would be ‘µέγαν’1 and ‘ἀξιολογώτατον’2 (1.1), and as time has shown, he was

certainly correct in his assessment. So great was this war that it encompassed almost the entirety

of the Mediterranean, from Sicily to Persian territory. In fact, the conflict between the

Peloponnesian League and the Athenian hegemony can be considered a tremendous turning point

– an event that also helped lead to the eventual growth of Macedonia, and so set much of Greece

in a position to be eventually conquered. Indeed, if Greek power politics comprised a chessboard

and the city-states were the pieces, the Peloponnesian War undoubtedly coerced the Greeks into

moving closer and closer to stalemate, followed by an eventual checkmate at Macedonian hands.

So great and worthy of description was this war that today, many scholars, even among a

wide array of disciplines, make extensive use of Thucydides’ Histories. This is not surprising

given that the History of the Peloponnesian War offers more than a simple and straightforward

historical narrative concerning one of the most momentous wars in history. In the account of this

conflict, Thucydides’ work is further imbued with conceptual material that is germane to

historiography, linguistics, political science, cultural studies, economic studies, military history,

military tactics, and diplomacy and foreign affairs. In fact, not only do historians and academics

study Thucydides, but the Histories’ are also prominent in the curricula of military academies

like West Point, for their value regarding battlefield tactics and wartime policy. This led former

United States Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of State, George Marshall, to say in 1947, ‘I

doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding

certain of the basic international issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the 1 ‘Great’. Please note that translations are provided in the interest of accommodating readers who may not be trained in ancient Greek. All Greek translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. 2 ‘Most worthy of mention’.


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period of the Peloponnesian War and the fall of Athens,’ a short time after what has been

regarded by many as the greatest war of the modern world.3 In fact, it is unsurprising that we

should find the Histories on the reading lists of elite military academies around the world

because one of the areas in which Thucydides’ work undoubtedly shines brightest is in its

documenting the behaviors of different actors during a time of war, the motivations of those

actors, how those motivations led them to take actions in the way that they did, and the

consequences of those actions thereupon.

However, intermingled with this documentation of seemingly cold and hard facts, meant

to ‘exclude the fantastic’ (µὴ µυθῶδες ... φανεῖται (1.22)), are indications that Thucydides never

ignored the moral dimensions of policy. This is not unsurprising, as it is recognized that the

Greeks had a well-understood and elaborate tapestry of moral values and practices that pertained

to all aspects of life, including their warfare and diplomacy. By extension, then, although he was

documenting the history of a war, Thucydides composed a moral history of sorts, too – showing

his readers the dispositions of the actors he portrays through their actions. To that end, there are

many different Thucydidean themes that consider morality within the Histories. To master each

of them might take a lifetime – and to write a treatment might take volumes. Yet, this realization

does not mean that there are no meaningful discussions about morality and amorality to be held

within a specific smaller context in Thucydidean thought.

Let it suffice to say that the issue of Athenian attitudes concerning the dictates of ‘might’

versus the directives of ‘right’ provides, perhaps, the most potential for insightful analysis.

Indeed, while Thucydides considers, at one point or another, almost all of the city-states involved

in that conflict in some way, one might conclude that of the major city-states that receive

3 Thucydides: Reception, Reinterpretation, and Influence; About the Project. University of Bristol, Feb 16, 2011.

http://www.bris.ac.uk/classics/thucydides/project/#uobcms-content.


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Thucydidean attention, such as Sparta, Corinth, Thebes, Syracuse, and Argos, Athens receives

the most attention, as befits the work of an Athenian stratēgos4 – naturally followed by Sparta.

One might even argue that Athens is the main focus of the entire work, with specific

consideration of its actions, successes and failures, political ‘personality’, and convictions

throughout the war, as being core features of the narrative.

In the Histories, and indeed throughout the war, Athens, through its envoys, politicians,

and generals, gives an impression of being morally conflicted – at times, even, in contradictory

ways. In the Mytilenian debate, for example, the Athenians decide that it would be both morally

wrong and impractical for them to kill all of the men of that city and sell the women and children

as captives, but later, we see them dismiss these moral considerations almost entirely and impose

on the Melians the very fate that they had spared the people of Mytilene. Obviously, the debates

that dramatized these respective actions and the philosophies that informed them are much more

complicated and intricate, rendering any one labeling an oversimplification, but this

generalization is, nevertheless, demonstrative of the Athenian difficulty in Thucydides. That

difficulty is such that it is confusing, at times, to identify Athens as basing its dispositions on

normative values (traditional morality), realpolitik (practical, expedient, opportunistic

considerations), or a combination of both.

It is well established that the Athenians, and indeed the Greeks as a whole, used polarity

in thought to express important concepts in their understanding of morality and amorality.5

Generally speaking, it is not uncommon for Greek authors to use the contrast between polarized 4 Often, ‘general’. Also, and more appropriately, according to LSJ, s.v. στρατηγός, 749: at Athens, the title of 10 officers elected yearly to command the army and navy and conduct the war-department. 5 The space that would be required in order to treat this concept thoroughly is substantial. For such a treatment, see G.E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought. Cambridge, UK: 1966, especially at ‘Part One: Polarity’,15-172. For a general survey and introduction to the concept of polarity and Greek thought, see his first section of part one, chapter 1, ‘Preliminary Survey of Speculative Theories Based On Opposites’ at 15-26. For a more specific survey, focusing on polarity in Greek philosophical and medical thought, see the introduction and first section of part one, chapter 2, at 86-94.


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forces and concepts in didactic ways. Homer might compare the καλός6 and/or ἀγαθός7 man

with the αἰσχρός8 and/or κακός9 man in order to make a point not only about the characteristics

that define each sort of man, but also, about what sort of man the listener should emulate.10

Plato’s Socrates might use different terms in a similar polar way of thinking.11 Indeed,

throughout Greek moral thought, it is not uncommon to find one adjectival quality juxtaposed

with its polar opposite adjectival quality. The general concepts of ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ ἀγαθός καί

κακός, for example, are two illustrations of this point and their currency speaks eloquently about

the sway of polarity, as in Theognis or the pseudo-Xenophontic Constitution of the Athenians.

Poverty and wealth, ugliness and beauty, and right and wrong are further embodiments of the

way in which the Greeks used antithetical concepts to express deep thought systems. The exact

terms that are used to indicate polarity vary depending on author, date of composition, and

overall context, of course, but still, those terms that are used often stem from and are subsidiary

to accepted Greek standard polarized generalizations, like good and bad, right and wrong, or

might and right.

In keeping with this theme of Greek moral thinking that often sees the world through the

moral lenses of polarization, whenever the Athenians are on stage in Thucydides, and in

6 ‘Beautiful’, ‘noble’, ‘good’. 7 ‘Good’. 8 ‘Shameful’, ‘dishonorable’, ‘reproachful’. 9 ‘Bad’. 10 See, Adkins 1960, particularly chapters, 1-5, 8-9. See 30-31, for a general summary of Homeric use of positive vocabulary versus negative vocabulary. Further, see 32-36 where Adkins discusses the Homeric use of ἀγαθός as representative of the positive virtues of the warrior-chieftain and αἰσχρός for the failed warrior/warrior-chieftain. At 30-31, Adkins also touches upon those usages as corresponding to social classification. Again, see 40, where Adkins demonstrates the use of ἀγαθός by Achilles at Iliad 9.341 so as to expound on what a good man should do in contrast to what Agamemnon had done. Furthermore, see 41, where Adkins points out Athena’s remark to Telemachus at Odyssey 1.228 that a prudent man would be angry at seeing so many shameful things. See also, 43-46, where Adkins discusses the Homeric use of the ‘good thing’ versus the thing that is not good and the moral distinction between the two. 11 For example, in Plato, Republic, the topic of what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are prominent themes, especially in book 1 at 1.331e-1.336a, where Socrates and Polemarchus puzzle over what is justice. More specifically, in the process of defining justice, they examine what a good man might do in certain situations and what a bad man might do in other situations, and whether or not it is better to take certain ‘good’ actions over other ‘bad’ ones.


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particular, when they are speaking, there tends to be a notable undercurrent of either morality or

amorality that is highlighted. The degree to which one shading prevails over the other can be

quite difficult to discern in one speech alone. To determine that there is a perfect consistency of

any one paradigm of motivation or causation that is applied across different speeches is a greater

challenge. Indeed, from the debate at Athens between Corcyra and Corinth in book 1 to the

eventual dissolution of the democratic government in book 8, almost every individual Athenian

speech provides some sort of implicit paradigm for using arguments of ‘might’ and ‘right’ that

appears to be unique and interesting.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the paradigm of ‘might versus right’ within the

context of the Athenian speech at the first meeting of the Peloponnesian League at Sparta, at

1.73–78 of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. At that congress, the Athenian

envoys, who, we are told, are at Sparta concerning different matters, nevertheless, make a speech

in defense of Athens’ hegemony, when provoked by the allegations and complaints of Corinth.

The Corinthians had said to the Spartans that the Athenians had behaved unjustly and that the

Spartans should, thus, go to war. In identifying the specific paradigm shifting between ‘might’

and ‘right’ that the Athenians demonstrate at the congress, we shall find that the Athenian

response to Corinthian accusations is that they have not acquired their empire unjustly in that its

acquisition is justified by two arguments. First, they are justified because of the normative-based

aid that they rendered to Sparta, as well as to all of Greece, during the Persian Wars. Second,

they are justified because of the nature of mankind – an Athenian understanding of human nature

that, although partly normative, is more so based in practicality. In the end, we will find that the

argument of normative worthiness is weightier than the argument based on the Athenians’

understanding of human nature and thus, we are left with an illumination of Athens’


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understanding of might and right that is more normative than not. But, nevertheless, as a result of

the plethora of amoral considerations that the Athenians also demonstrate, that paradigm is much

less categorical than we might imagine.

Before we begin, however, it is necessary to explain certain semantics that are germane to

the paper. Consider, first, the concepts of ‘might’ and ‘right’ – the two fundamental

philosophical principles on which analysis of this paper relies. When speaking of the concept of

‘might,’ I shall be using terms like ‘realpolitik,’ ‘practicality,’ ‘expediency,’ and ‘pragmatic.’

When speaking of the concept of ‘right,’ I shall be using terms like ‘normative values,’ ‘norms,’

and ‘morality,’ as well as qualifying those three terms as, at times, ‘traditional’ and/or

‘established.’ Note, further, that I will be using the term ‘real-political’ as the adjectival form of

realpolitik and ‘real-politically’ as the adverbial form.12

When discussing normative values, I am referring to the concept of an accepted, often

times traditional understanding of Greek moral thinking, including traditional religious beliefs

and customs as well as traditionally accepted social and political practices that are enshrined in

archaic and early classical poetry and prose. The concept of realpolitik is a more modern

concept, although, quite aptly, Thucydides is often considered to be one of its more ancient

forefathers.13 To that end, while this concept has only been defined and examined under the label

of ‘realpolitik’ since the nineteenth century – note the rather recent year of 185314 – the concept

itself is an ancient one inasmuch as Thucydidean pragmatism, although predating the modern

definition of realpolitik, is, nevertheless, a foundation upon which the modern concept of

12 Greek terms that are relevant to this concept of ‘might’ will be explored below along with terms that are relevant to the concept of ‘right.’ 13 A. Moseley. ‘Political Realism.’ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 27, Apr. 2005. http://www.iep.utm.edu/polreal/. 14 J. Haslam. No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli. New Haven: 2002. 168.


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realpolitik would be built, and as such, also incorporates the general practical nature of

realpolitik. The idea of realpolitik is subject to a plethora of interpretations and definitions. For

our purposes, I shall abide by a general definition of realpolitik, such as, according to The

Oxford English Dictionary, ‘a system of politics or principles based on practical rather than

moral or ideological considerations: commercial realpolitik had won the day’15 and Merriam

Webster, ‘politics based on practical and material factors rather than on theoretical or ethical

objectives.’16

The Greek terminology will be an important focus, and we shall investigate, therefore,

those words that are representative of these themes. Various words in their adjectival (including

both comparative and superlative), noun, and verbal forms come to mind. The terms ἀγαθός,

καλός, δίκαιος, δίκη, ἐσθλός, ἀρετή, χρηστός, δικαιοσύνη,17 αἰσχρός, δυσµενής, δειλός, ἐχθρός,

κακός, ἄδικος, and πονηρός,18 for example, are manifest keywords at which we shall be looking.

In addition, other words are closely linked within a general moral lexicon of the sort as might be

representative of some concept of traditionally accepted morality and immorality. It is worth

mentioning, however, that the speech of the Athenians at the Peloponnesian League is not

saturated with such direct keywords, although concepts invoked by the Athenians are dependent

on the same sort of traditional moral thinking that is connected to those keywords. Some of these

specific words that are evocative of the moral themes that we shall be examining are τιµή

‘honor’, and προθυµός ‘eager for', for example.

15 ‘Realpolitik.’ Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford University Press. 23 Oct. 2012. http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/realpolitik. 16 ‘Realpolitik.’ Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster. 23 Oct. 2012. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/realpolitik. 17 ἀγαθός ‘good’; καλός ‘beautiful’, ‘noble’, ‘good’; δίκαιος ‘observant of custom’, ‘lawful’; δίκη ‘custom’, ‘legal judgment’’, ‘justice’; ἐσθλός ‘good’, ‘brave’, ‘morally good’; ἀρετή ‘goodness’, ‘excellence’; χρηστός ‘useful’, ‘serviceable’; δικαιοσύνη ‘righteousness’, ‘justice’. 18 αἰσχρός ‘shameful’, ‘dishonorable’, ‘reproachful’; δυσµενής ‘hostile’; δειλός ‘cowardly’; ἐχθρός ‘hated’, ‘hateful’, ‘enemy’; κακός ‘bad’; ἄδικος ‘wrongdoer’, ‘unrighteous’, ‘unjust’; πονηρός ‘useless’, ‘base’, ‘cowardly’.


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Words that are representative of amoral real-political sentiment are more difficult to

pinpoint because it is context that defines those words as representative of real-political

impulses. Thus, words representative of realpolitik are often times more neutral than their

normative counterparts, which are supported by a moral lexicon that spans years of writing and

oratory. Indeed, while those ‘moral’ keywords are also dependent upon the context in which they

are provided, dissecting their contexts might be considered easier than determining the context of

the word, ὠφέλεια, ‘advantage’ or ‘profit’, for example, which is one of the specific words to

which we will be paying attention, along with δέος, ‘fear,’ to name another.

Note the distinction, however, between ‘amorality,’ as ‘lacking a moral sense;

unconcerned with the rightness or wrongness of something,’19 according to the Oxford English

Dictionary, and immorality, ‘not conforming to accepted standards of morality,’20 once again

according to the Oxford English Dictionary. The concept of immorality and those keywords

indicative of immorality might be of use to us in identifying its polar opposite, ‘morality,’ where

a citation of one pole of the moral spectrum might actually serve as to identify the polar opposite

moral quality. This type of usage is not uncommon, as Dover points out.21 Nevertheless, we

should not forget that we are examining the Athenian speech at the Peloponnesian League for

instances of real-political, and possibly amoral, thought, and not immoral thinking. This

distinction is important insomuch as by determining that the Athenians do consider realpolitik as

according to the speech, we are determining that they are acting amorally without making any

judgments as to whether they are acting immorally as well – the connections between amorality

and immorality in the public realm of fifth-century inter-polis affairs is quite another task.

19 ‘Amoral’. Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford University Press. 08 Dec. 2012. http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/amoral. 20 ‘Immoral’. Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford University Press. 08 Dec. 2012. <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/immoral?q=immoral>. 21 Dover 1974, 50-51.


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Furthermore, it is worth considering my approach toward the speeches in Thucydides.

There is a general consensus among scholars that one should be on guard when examining city-

states’ political dispositions in the speeches. This is because Thucydides may have reformulated

speeches in order to make his points and not the speaker’s points as actually presented. However,

my identification of the Athenian dichotomy of realpolitik and normative values in this particular

speech accepts the speech on the premise that Thucydides has accurately recorded it without

drastic or truly problematic alteration. Our main commentators in English, Gomme and

Hornblower, do not make any mention of truly problematic additions or subtractions by

Thucydides, and, although de Romilly discusses the issue of the speech as a later addition to the

Histories, to tackle that issue would require a separate paper.22 While keeping our minds open to

this skepticism let us put off the issue authenticity for the sake of our exercise. For our purposes,

then, I shall accept Thucydides’ recording of the Athenian speech at the congress of the

Peloponnesian League as reliable and accurate.

Furthermore, against this background, a discussion of the forensic nature of the speech is

in order. It could be said that, regardless how normatively based the speech might be, the

purpose of the Athenian speech at the congress of the Peloponnesian League is obviously real-

political given the observation that their use of the speech is meant to serve the diplomatically

real-political purpose of persuading the Spartans that they should not go to war. As a result of

this observation, the argument of human nature and the argument of, as we shall see, normative

worthiness, are, in some ways, rendered less substantial than we might want to construe them.

This is because the Athenian arguments, whether normative or not, are, in fact, self-interested by

the nature of their being arguments with the pragmatic aim of appealing to the Spartans’ own

sense of justice to their claims. This observation is true, of course, in keeping with the real- 22 For that treatment, see de Romilly, 262-273, ‘The Date at which the Speech was Composed’.


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political diplomatic purpose of the speech as defending Athens’ possession of arkhē.23 However,

this overarching and natural real-political purpose does not necessarily inform an identification

of the speech as a whole because the fundamentally pragmatic nature of argument as necessary

to win a debate should not determine the entire character of the speech.

It is only logical for the Athenians to want to be victorious over the arguments being

made against them. Dover points to this obvious facet of forensic oratory and says that it is

neither bizarre nor abnormal for us to accept this pragmatic foundation for what it is.24 I concur

with this sentiment and as a result, therefore, do not believe that we should be so ready to

pronounce this surface facet of self-interest in forensic oratory as determinative for the entire

moral or amoral classification of the speech. Rather, the purpose of this paper is to examine more

underlying moral and/or amoral reasoning used to fulfill that logical aspiration to be victorious

by exploring ‘might versus right’ within the context of the Athenian speech. Were it so simple to

conclude that the main arguments of the speech were real-political tools needed to win and thus

indicative of an Athens that is steeped in real-political ideation, our analysis would be rather

curtailed. Indeed, we should then accept this intention in forensic oratory as innate and

fundamental, and look past it for the purpose of this examination.

Again, in summary, before we begin detailed analysis, let it be said that through

exploring normative values and realpolitik in the Athenian speech at the Peloponnesian League, I

will show that, although the body of their speech can be characterized by a cohabitation of

normative and real-political concepts, where, at times, it may even seem as if realpolitik has been

pushed into the foreground, it is the case that the speech of the Athenians at the first meeting of

the Peloponnesian League was meant to rely upon a normative argument. To that end, however,

23 ‘Position of command’, ‘position of authority’, ‘position of office’, ‘position of power’, ‘position of sovereignty’. 24 Dover 1974, 3-7.


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the speech also resonates with material that supports a real-politically minded Athenian

community.

The Athenian Argument of Worthiness

The overarching purpose of the Athenian argument is to show that, contrary to the

accusations against them, the Athenians did not acquire their hegemony inappropriately,25 nor by

force.26 The first half of that overarching argument, at 1.73.1-1.75.3, can be characterized by

their citing their actions in the Persian Wars as justification. These actions, although presented as

partly normative and partly real-political, are used to reinforce the running theme that the reason

why they are not acting improperly is because they are normatively worthy (ἀξιά) of the

hegemony upon which they have happened. In the process these arguments convey an

impression of an Athens that has more of a normative disposition than a real-political one.

The Athenians plainly state the idea that they consider themselves worthy in several

places, such as 1.73.1-3, when they tell the congress that they are worthy of esteem,27 at 1.75.1-2,

where they ask if they are really to be treated with jealousy,28 and also at 1.76.2, when they state

that they think that they are worthy to rule.29 Every other point of evidence between the

introduction at 1.73.1 and the discussion of human nature beginning at 1.75.1 is offered as

justification for this claim.

25 1.73.1: …οὔτε ἀπεικότως… ‘…not unreasonably…’ 26 1.75.2: καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε ἐλάβοµεν οὐ βιασάµενοι... ‘For not using force have we taken this …’ 27 …ἥ τε πόλις ἡµῶν ἀξία λόγου ἐστίν; …τοῦ δὲ λόγου µὴ παντός … στερισκώµεθα. ‘…our city-state is worthy… we should not be deprived… of all repute.’ 28 Ἆρ’ ἄξιοί ἐσµεν, ὦ Λακεδαιµόνιοι, καὶ προθυµίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώµης ξυνέσεως ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχοµεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι µὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι; ‘Considering, then Lacedaemonians, the zeal and sagacity of judgment which we displayed at that time, do we deserve to be regarded with this excessive jealousy by the Hellenes on account of the empire we possess?’ [Trans. Smith] Note that ‘do we deserve’ is another way of stating the question, ‘are we worthy of being regarded with this excessive jealousy by the Hellenes on account of the empire we possess?’ 29 …ἄξιοί τε ἅµα νοµίζοντες εἶναι… ‘…at the same time, we recognize ourselves to be worthy…’


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They earned this state of worthiness through the advantage (ὠφέλεια) that they gave to

Greece and, specifically, to Sparta. The Athenians repeatedly mention their actions in the war as

aiding the Spartans and the Greeks as a whole. At 1.73.2, they note that they were fighting for

the common benefit and that Sparta had a share in this benefit,30 a claim that they also repeat at

1.74.3.31 The rest of passage following this statement puts forward examples of the great cost at

which the Athenians were able to assist Greece as well as instances of their refusing to give up

the common cause despite dire blows delivered to their community. The question, then, becomes

to what extent is their argument of worthiness and each of its supporting points either more real-

political or normatively based.

LSJ defines the verb, ώφελέω, as i) ‘aid’ or ‘succor’ especially in war, and ii) ‘to be

helped, to receive help, to derive profit,’ citing Thucydides for such use – the adjective and noun

are explained similarly.32 Bétant, supports this same definition.33 This identification seems, at

first, to be exclusively practical in nature, but it is not unreasonable to think that it can also be

used to convey a normative sense of aiding as well. There does not seem to be any reason why

the verb, noun, and adjectival forms related to ὠφέλεια ought not to be considered neutral in

character – after all, aiding one’s friends was, customarily, an important aspect of ethical

behavior and not exclusively representative of actions motivated strictly by pragmatism. In those

definitions, LSJ and Bétant do not hint at the exclusivity of ὠφέλεια as tending to demonstrate

one behavioral disposition, either normative or real-political (especially in preference over the

other).

30 …καὶ γὰρ ὅτε ἐδρῶµεν, ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ ἐκινδυνεύετο, ἧς τοῦ µὲν ἔργου µέρος µετέσχετε… ‘…for when we were performing those deeds, the risk was taken for the common benefit, and since you got a share of the actual results of that benefit…’ [Trans. Smith]. 31 ὥστε φαµὲν οὐχ ἧσσον αὐτοὶ ὠφελῆσαι ὑµᾶς ἢ τυχεῖν τούτου… ‘We therefore maintain that we on our part conferred upon you a benefit at least as great as we received…’ [Trans. Smith]. 32 s.v. ὠφέλεια, 909; s.v. ώφελέω, 909. 33 LT, 2. s.v. ὠφέλεια, 520; s.v. ὠφελεῖν, 521-522.


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Further, LSJ defines ἀξιά, and ἄξιος similarly, as ‘worth, value’ ‘dignity,’ or

‘reputation.’ Bétant, LT, has ‘dignus’ or ‘meritus’, citing 1.76.2 as a use connoting meritus.34 As

with ώφελέω, we might be more inclined to prefer a more normative connotation for ἄξιος and

its relatives, but just as with ώφελέω we must also realize that neither lexicon is absolutely

supportive of one usage over another.35 To gauge the shadings of this vocabulary, we must rely

on the context for the aid rendered in the uses ὠφέλεια and ἀξιά in the Athenian argument of

worthiness. We also want to identify how the two operative concepts of advantage and worth

interact with one another.

It is quite clear that the idea of helping allies and harming enemies is a well-established

principle that can be applied to any situation or process in ancient Greek life.36 It would not be

surprising, therefore, that the Athenians would apply such a principle to the efforts that they gave

in the Persian Wars. And indeed the idea that the Athenians are most likely attempting to put

forward to the Peloponnesian League is that, through their ὠφέλεια, they were aiding Greece in

the normatively archaic manner of helping friends and harming enemies and as a result, have

earned worthiness.

The aid (ὠφέλεια) that the Athenians rendered to Sparta in the form of driving back the

Persians is representative of one of the sorts of assistance that a friend would confer upon a

friend as contingent on the principle of helping friends and harming enemies. Whitlock Blundell

points out that providing material benefit to one’s friends and upholding reciprocity are aspects

34 LT, 1. s.v. ἄξιος , 104-106. 35 Hornblower and Gomme are silent on the particular moral or amoral interpretation of both ἀξιά and ὠφέλεια. 36 Dover 1974, 180-184, 276-278; Pearson, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece 1966, 15-17; Whitlock Blundell 1989, 26-60. The chapter referenced is taken from her book devoted to examining the concept of helping friends and harming enemies in the context of Sophoclean thought. Nevertheless, the chapter cited is a preface to this specific examination and serves as an excellent survey of the concept, in and of itself.


14

of applying the normative principle of helping friends and harming enemies.37 It is logical to

deduce that the Spartans and the Greeks had a material benefit in not being overrun by the

Persians – after all, as Dover points out, every city-state had a commonsensible material interest

in preserving itself.38 Because the Athenians fought off the Persians and prevented them from

invading the rest of Greece – and to be specific, the Peloponnesus39 – at Marathon and Salamis,

they secured this material benefit for their friends and created a condition of reciprocity between

Athens and Sparta. This reciprocity, which they make sure to point out to the Spartans directly,

should create worthiness, and acts as further justification for their obtaining the hegemony in an

appropriate manner. Dover supports this by pointing out that those who do help their friends and

harm their enemies are worthy of commendation as according to traditional norms.40

In the same way, Athens considers itself ἄξιος of commendation, thus coloring the

argument, ‘we are worthy,’ as normatively based because it was motivated by traditional

attitudes of morality – specifically, by the traditional prerogatives of helping friends and harming

enemies which call for reciprocation. De Romilly agrees with this conclusion that the argument

of worthiness is normatively based.41 Because the argument of worthiness is the overarching

claim from which subsidiary supporting limbs of self-justification branch out, we can, therefore,

conclude that the Athenians’ first contention against the claims made against them was grounded

in the normative justification of the hegemony because they were worthy in a moral sense, given

the aid that they gave to the Greeks according to customary moral expectations.

37 Whitlock Blundell 1989, 32-36. 38 Dover 1974, 161. 39 1.73.4: …ὅπερ ἔσχε µὴ κατὰ πόλεις αὐτὸν ἐπιπλέοντα τὴν Πελοπόννησον πορθεῖν… ‘…this prevented his sailing against you city by city and ravaging the Peloponnesus… ‘ [Trans. Smith]. 40 Dover 1974, 276-278. 41 De Romilly 1963, 248-249.


15

Yet, while this aid rendered to Greece by Athens fulfills a normative process (through

the archaic normative principle of helping friends and harming enemies), and thus demonstrates,

to this point, a normatively focused Athens, the means used to bring about that aiding are more

difficult to label, as they are not strictly normative. In fact, for the most part, they are real-

political. The resulting classification does not change the fact that the Athenians were focusing

on normative justification of worth for the brunt of their argument at Sparta, but it does diversify

the Athenians’ disposition so that it is clear that they are less strictly focused on normative values

and are also shown to consider realpolitik as credible, in its own way. After claiming that they

are normatively worthy of the hegemony because of conventional aid, they explain that they

were able to secure this benefit by supplying three ὠφελιµώτατα42 – ships, Themistocles as

general, and unfaltering zeal43 – that were the deciding factors in the Greek victory.44

Hornblower and Gomme are silent on each item’s moral classification, but, on the basis

of a logical examination of the three ὠφελιµώτατα, it is not difficult to pinpoint what sort of

service each one is, whether real-political or normative. Firstly, the ships that the Athenians

provided are clearly a demonstration of Athenian real-political resources. Naval strength in

numbers is not a moral consideration here. The force of ‘ships’ is not being used as

demonstrative of a moral tool, but a practical one used to do practical things, i.e., to win a battle.

It is worth noting that winning a battle (and further, a war) is an action that can only take place in

the real-political realm; this is only logical. Nevertheless, I believe the Athenians’ selecting to

focus on their contribution of ships to be telling about Athenian attitudes. If we consider the

42 ‘Most serviceable things’. 43 1.74.1: …τρία τὰ ὠφελιµώτατα ἐς αὐτὸ παρεσχόµεθα, ἀριθµόν τε νεῶν πλεῖστον καὶ ἄνδρα στρατηγὸν ξυνετώτατον καὶ προθυµίαν ἀοκνοτάτην… ‘…to this, we contributed the three most serviceable things, the greatest number of ships, the shrewdest man as general, and unfaltering zeal...’ 44 1.74.1: τοιούτου µέντοι τούτου ξυµβάντος, καὶ σαφῶς δηλωθέντος ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ πράγµατα ἐγένετο… ‘Such then was the issue of the battle, and clear proof was given thereby that the salvation of the Hellenes depended upon their ships...’ [Trans. Smith].


16

three ὠφελιµώτατα as purposely selected, then it makes sense to conclude that the Athenians

have certain preconceived notions about the worth of each most serviceable thing. The

Athenians’ attitudes, therefore, reflect each serviceable thing’s moral or amoral quality, given

each thing’s purposeful selective incorporation for the Athenian argument. As such, the mention

of their contribution of ships is meant to emphasize for the Spartans the practical contribution

that Athens made to the Greek contingency at the time, and thus we can conclude that the

mention of ships is grounded in an acknowledgement of realpolitik.

Secondly, the citation of the Athenian general Themistocles is also a demonstration of

real-political understanding, because the act of his commanding the navy to victory is meant,

undoubtedly, to reinforce the principle of strategic and practical leadership in battle, not a moral

and normative leadership. This is further supported by my interpretation of the adjective used to

describe Themistocles, συνετός,45 as ‘intelligent’ in the same sense of ‘shrewd,’ in a real-

politically strategic sense and not a moral sense – a reading which Bétant supports by defining

συνετός as ‘prudens,’ citing particularly this passage.46 De Romilly also believes that

Themistocles’ wit was what made him remarkable in this case, citing Lysias Epitaphios 42, and

Isocrates Panathenaicus 51, as supportive of the idea that his strategic leadership was generally

emphasized.47 Because of this general understanding of Themistocles’ real-political qualities, it

would then be unsurprising to think that the Athenian envoys would see him in the same light.

To that end, we can also conclude that this second most serviceable thing is also grounded in

realpolitik.

45 1.74.1: … ἄνδρα στρατηγὸν ξυνετώτατον… ‘…shrewdest man as general…’ For an interesting article on this term, see further, Battisti, Daniela. “Sunetos as Aristocratic Self-Description.” 1990. Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 31: 5–25. 46 LT, 2. s.v. ξυνετός, 207. 47 De Romilly 1963, 245-246, 246 fn 2.


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But in the Athenians’ claim to zeal, we see a normative means of reinforcement among

the real-political ὠφελιµώτατα. Manliness and virtue are a result of good fighting and courage as

well as the uncomplaining bearing of misfortune.48 Adkins, who examines many aspects of

Greek normative principles from the Archaic period to the Hellenistic period in Merit and

Responsibility (1960), adduces further support, showing that to be courageous and brave

(especially in the sense of a soldier or warrior) was a quality that belongs to a traditionally

archaic understanding of normative values.49 The man who claims to act courageously is also

acting normatively. Adkins also shows that this principle is one of the many that were sustained

throughout the 5th century and beyond.50 The Athenians’ zeal is here undoubtedly a reference to

their fighting the enemy despite the many disadvantages facing them, a demeanor that is based

on the archaic normative principle of having the courage to fight. It is possible that, in opposition

to this conclusion, courage might be cited in a practical application as a real-political necessity

needed in order to win battles, but such a reading overcomplicates the image of what we are told.

And, because courage is such a common value for the Greeks, it is not radical to conclude that

the Athenians could, as they are in fact doing, cite their zeal in accordance with its traditionally

normative nature, especially once it is noted how clearly this particular ‘zeal’ resembles that

principle in its presented form. The remainder of 1.74, after the Athenians mention their zeal, can

be read as a reinforcement and exaltation of their moral courage by further recounting the

disadvantages that they faced for emphatic purposes.

Therefore, after examining the three ὠφελιµώτατα, we can conclude that the Athenians

do, in fact, consider the real-political as substantive and auxiliary to the normative: the provision

48 Dover 1974, 161-170. 49 See Adkins 1960, ch. 1-5, esp. ch. 3, Mistake and Moral Error, 30-60, esp. at 32-33, 34, 46-48, 55, and further at, 73. 50 See Adkins 1960, ch. 8-9; and at 156-167, where he states that even Thucydides discusses courage.


18

of ships during the war is a reference to the Athenians consideration of naval numbers as

practically important in conjunction with the provision of Themistocles’ leadership as general.

Athenian zeal, however, is clearly normative and, when taken in conjunction with their claim to

moral worth based on the morally grounded aid that they rendered, further demonstrates a

normatively-minded Athens.

Furthermore, while each individual item of the ὠφελιµώτατα (ships, Themistocles, and

zeal) belongs to its own unique category of normative and realpolitik, it is worth realizing that

the ὠφελιµώτατα could constitute a singular concept and as such, be also amorally

demonstrative, in and of itself. Here, we have a real-political usage of the root ὠφελ-, whereas

above, we saw it used in a normative sense. The aid rendered was based on a normative principle

(helping allies and harming enemies) but the means of rendering that aid (the ὠφελιµώτατα as a

whole), in the form of defeating the Persians, especially at Salamis (although also at Marathon)

should be analyzed as a practical and strategic service. To that end, the ὠφελιµώτατα as a

singular concept that embodies the normative aid that Athens gave to Greece is, itself, real-

political, even if a part of those three services, namely Athenian zeal, is also normative in nature.

This is because the weight of the singular concept of the ὠφελιµώτατα lies in the consequence of

the real-political action of winning the Persian War.

However, it should be noted that in archaic Greek normative thought, the idea that aid

rendered as according to the custom of helping friends and harming enemies could and would

come in the form of some pragmatic service was not absurd. This phenomenon was referenced

above in Whitlock Blundell51 and Dover.52 Dover elaborates on this general principle of helping

your allies and/or friends through pragmatic means in several other places, citing, furthermore,

51 Whitlock Blundell 1989, 32-36. 52 Dover 1974, 161 and 180-184.


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the payment of money to the state and performance of duties prescribed by the state (pragmatic

tasks) as the means of earning the title of philanthrōpos53 from the state as in Demosthenes

21.101 and 21.105.54 He elaborates further on the implicit nature of pragmatic aid as fulfilling

normative ends at Greek Popular Morality (1974), 276-278, where he uses several authors

including Euripides, Demosthenes, Aristophanes, and Menander in a longer more expository

section. A.R. Hands provides a general survey of this principle as well, in Charities and Social

Aid in Greece and Rome (1968), in his chapters ‘Giving for a Return’ and ‘The Nature of the

Return.’55 Adkins offers further support at Merit and Responsibility (1960), 46-60, when

discussing the practical nature of Homeric deeds.56 Bolkestein, Wohltigkeit und Armenpflege im

vorchistlichen Altertum (1939), offers yet more support in explaining that, although they are

relationships that can be identified as traditionally normative in many ways, both the relationship

between elder and child and that of friend and friend are still dependent on pragmatic services

and returns.57 Indeed, archaic normative thought takes this logical practicality as implicit, even

while it contributes to a normative cause.

To that end, then, it is not unsurprising that we should find the Athenians’ practical

contributions as contributing to the principled service of helping their allies because those

pragmatic and strategic contributions are understood as necessary in order to bring about the

normatively motivated aid that has been discussed above. If those ὠφελιµώτατα are accepted as

necessary in the traditional paradigm of helping allies and harming enemies, the weight of the

53 ‘Benefactor’, ‘courteous’, ‘loving mankind’. 54 Dover 1974, 177. 55 A.R. Hands, Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome. Ithaca: 1968, at chapters 2-3, ‘Giving for a Return’ and ‘The Nature of the Return’, 26-62. 56 See also, A.W. Adkins, ‘“Friendship” and “Self-Sufficiency” in Homer and Aristotle”’ Classical Quarterly 13.1 (1963): 30-45. 57 H. Bolkestein, Wohltigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchistlichen Altertum. Utrecht: 1939. 119-121.


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ὠφελιµώτατα, itself, and each individual serviceable thing carried is somewhat lessened

inasmuch as their presence in the overall paradigm of the traditional custom of helping allies and

harming enemies is granted as un-extraordinary and negligible. Thus, we could see them merely

as accepted means towards achieving a normative end, thereby stripping them of their

moral/amoral weight as rendered above. Because of the accepted nature of pragmatic services

within the normative context of helping allies, the three ὠφελιµώτατα should not shape the

overall character of the Athenian attitudes because, according to the speech, they are simply

understood as fundamental within the paradigm of helping friends and harming enemies.

None of our commentators mention how the ὠφελιµώτατα, whether as a singular concept

or as individual concepts (ships, Themistocles, and zeal), should be construed in the context of

classical ethics. Nevertheless, I do not believe that we should be so stubborn as to accept the

conclusion just made, in entirety. First, in keeping with that conclusion, the pragmatic nature of

the ὠφελιµώτατα as a singular concept should not be taken as particularly illustrative of a more

real-political Athenian disposition because it is the accepted commonsensical and fundamental

part of achieving an end that affects material circumstance. The real-political identification of the

ὠφελιµώτατα is important in the overall progression of the Athenian argument of worthiness

inasmuch as it helps us identify and understand the placement of the implicit pragmatic means

with which a normative service is brought about. However, because it is an implicit concept, we

should not let it color both the argument of worthiness and also, the overall character of the

speech.58 In the same way that we established that the pragmatic forensic nature of the speech

did not implicitly color the overall speech as being motivated by realpolitik above, we should not

allow the fundamentally implicit pragmatic nature of the ὠφελιµώτατα in their totality, to alter

58 We shall explore the overall character of the speech, below.


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our general opinion of the speech, because it is also a fundamentally implicit real-political part of

helping allies that must naturally occur and should be accepted as such.

Secondly, however, we should see each individual one of the ὠφελιµώτατα as still

carrying its own moral or amoral weight. Unlike the nature of the ὠφελιµώτατα as a singular

concept, whose use is an implicit part of the argument that the Athenians are making, each

individual service is not strictly implicit and thus is chosen and elaborated upon with such care

and intent that I believe they are, in fact, representative of Athenian attitudes, as briefly

mentioned above. After all, the need to keep a city-state from being conquered might truly be a

real-political necessity based in real-political concepts, as Dover has already told us, but he

further observes that normative actions used to fulfill that real-political goal can still be

normative in nature.59 This shows us that even the things used to fulfill that implicit pragmatic

service (here, those things being each of the individual ὠφελιµώτατα) can have their own

moral/amoral identities.

Indeed, the Athenians make a rather extensive effort in justifying the three ὠφελιµώτατα,

beginning at 1.73.4 and spanning also the entire length of 1.74. If the Athenians had anticipated

that the real-political tools with which they brought about the salvation of the Greeks would be

understood under the tradition of helping allies and harming enemies, I do not believe that they

would have dedicated so much time and effort to their recounting, emphasizing, and defending

them. Perhaps they might have offered some reinforcement of the claim of aid to Sparta and

Greece in customary terms, but their treatment of the three most serviceable things seems to go

beyond that degree of justification. The effect of their citation and elaboration on the

ὠφελιµώτατα should then be seen, I believe, as an invocation of those three things – ships,

59 Dover 1974, 161.


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Themistocles, and zeal – as significant. In other words, we can consider the Athenian digression

on and acknowledgment of the three ὠφελιµώτατα as, in fact, substantive and thus, further

representative of the Athenians’ disposition.

Consider the argument of the Athenians to this point as if it were a Matryoshka doll60

with the largest doll being the overarching argument of normative worth, and each subordinate

argument thereafter being a smaller doll; helping allies and harming enemies is the second

biggest doll and fits within the largest doll; the ὠφελιµώτατα being the next doll to fit within the

former; and the last three dolls being equally small enough to fit into its superior doll, the

ὠφελιµώτατα doll. Each doll, however, even if it is not the one that is presently visible as the

outermost doll, still has its own unique identity within the set while still contributing to the entire

set’s identity. In a similar way, it is possible for each subsection of the Athenian’s first argument

to be positioned in the order that they are placed without each subsection losing its moral or

amoral nature. It is possible for an overall normative proffer of worth by the Athenians to be

followed and justified by a normative secondary point of aid, which is in turn followed and

justified by an implicit real-political collection of services, that are finally followed and justified

by each of those three services in which two of the three are real-political and the third is

normative, without each individual subsection’s moral or amoral identity being redefined by

those subsections around it. Each subsection, then, no matter how minor or major, does have a

role to play in the overall identity of the entire set (with the exception of that implicit

ὠφελιµώτατα subsection, as discussed above).

To that end, each of these individual parts of the overarching claim contributes to an

understanding of the Athenian paradigm of motivation. At the point in the speech where the

60 More colloquially known as ‘Russian nesting dolls’.


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Athenians put forward their first major argument, between 1.73.1 and 1.75.3, we see a more

normative focus. Indeed, it is the case that the Athenians show themselves to be primarily

concerned with traditional normative values as a result of the arguments that they make before

the Peloponnesian League. The two strongest pillars of their argument (worthiness and helping

friends and harming enemies) are normative in nature. Furthermore, the extensive discussion of

Athenian zeal during the Persian Wars among the subtended arguments is also normative in

nature. These pillars, however, are also held up by real-political supports in the form of naval

provisions and the provision of Themistocles. Thus, we also have a self-professed

acknowledgment of real-political usefulness of Athenian actions as well. This self-profession,

however, is secondary. As a result, Athens, although not entirely committed, so to speak, to

realpolitik, shows itself willing to acknowledge realpolitik’s presence as a vital part of its affairs.

After all, without ships and Themistocles’ leadership, they would not have won at Salamis, and

without the victory at Salamis, the Greeks might not have repelled the Persians.

The Athenians even seem to acknowledge this amalgam at 1.75 where they ask ‘are we

worthy, Lacedaemonians, given the zeal and judgment that we showed…’61 Zeal is obviously a

normative value, in the same sense as it is presented above, but I interpret judgment (γνώµη) as a

more so real-political one, following Dover. The use of γνώµη62 can be either real-political or

normative, as he notes. That real-political usage is meant to convey the sense of intelligent and

rational thinking, which Dover asserts was not an uncommon classical sense of the word. He

cites Demosthenes 41.23, which speaks about the distinction between intelligent γνώµη and

courageous spirit and contributes the summation that ‘when an issue was discussed in the

assembly and the question to be answered was the practical one… the proposal which a speaker

61 ‘Ἆρ’ ἄξιοί ἐσµεν, ὦ Λακεδαιµόνιοι, καὶ προθυµίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώµης ξυνέσεως… 62 ‘Reason’, ‘judgment’.


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made and supported by argument was his gnōmē.’63 Bétant also lends support to this judgment

through his defining γνώµη as ‘animus.’64

Here I see the use of gnōmē as a mix of both the normative and the real-political, while

still leaning more on the side of the real-political, however. In keeping with Dover’s qualitative

interpretation, it makes sense to see it as more real-political than normative. Indeed, gnōmē

seems to be a logical counter-balance to the citation of zeal. However, while I ascribe to this

view, I think that we would be mistaken to read this particular use of gnōmē as absolutely real-

political in a strictly polarized manner. Rather, the use of gnōmē coordinates with the citation of

zeal and thus meditates between a normative adduction and its more antithetical concept of

realpolitik. As a result, although not strictly real-political, I do believe that gnōmē is meant to

convey a more real-political attitude than a normative one in opposition to (although not direct

opposition to) the aforementioned zeal. Therefore, although not wholly real-political, the

Athenian use of gnōmē still stands apart from that zeal as more of a check point for realpolitik.

This statement then makes it clear that the Athenians speak as if normative values and

realpolitik are both important to their case, as they highlight the two factors as headnotes (and in

fact both do matter in a prudent understanding of the past events at issue). Normative values and

morality are foremost in the Athenians minds in the speech as far as the end of 1.75.3.

Realpolitik and practicality are present as well, albeit as a secondary motivation.

The Athenian Argument of Human Nature

At 1.75, the speech takes a somewhat different turn from arguing that the Athenians are

worthy of their empire in a normative sense to arguing that they have achieved what they have

accomplished in a manner based on human nature. They begin by saying that, when they had

63 Dover 1974, 123. Note that gnōmē is γνώµη, transliterated. 64 LT, 1. s.v. γνώµη, 212.


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taken control of their hegemony, three things influenced them to behave in the way they did; first

they were motivated by fear; then by honor; and lastly, by self-interest.65

As a preliminary note, however, it should be realized that the argument of human nature

can also be seen as a strategic tactic to chastise the Spartans for being duplicitous in making a

real-political argument and calling it normative. As such, we might be inclined to read the

digression on human nature as imbued with real-political force given its use in a tactical manner.

However, this motivation is highly reflective, again, of a necessarily forensic aspect of the

speech, as was discussed, above. In a similar way, then, we should not allow the implicitness of

the Athenians’ criticism of Sparta’s spurious argument to dictate the overall identity of the

digression on human nature. And indeed the ways in which the Athenians go about describing

and elaborating on human nature is still illustrative of ways in which they see certain concepts of

morality and amorality. As a result, the second half of the speech has its own identity in the same

way that the first half of the speech does.

In keeping with the theme of a more normatively-minded politics in the first half of the

speech, we see the Athenians taking ethical principles into consideration through the adduction

of honor, as we can understand τιµή66 in its traditional sense as being that reputation that is not

connected so much with practical considerations, but with a sort of personal virtue and its

outward recognition. However, the Athenians also make it rather clear that fear (δέος) and self-

interest (ὠφέλεια) are grounded here in real-political value by virtue of their tangible

practicality. Thus, we are left with an image of human nature that is shaped somewhat more by

realpolitik than normative values.

65 1.75.3-4: …µάλιστα µὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα καὶ τιµῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελίας. ‘…chiefly by fear, then by fear, and lastly, by self-interest…’ 66 ‘Honor’, ‘glory’, ‘reputation’.


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First, consider ‘µάλιστα µὲν ὑπὸ δέους.’67 LSJ defines δέος predictably, as ‘fear’ or

‘alarm’;68 Bétant gives ‘metus.’69 There is no specific mention of any particular nuances in

standard semantic studies on this speech that might shade these connotations qualitatively. For

example, Bétant lists the use of δέος both at 1.75 and at 1.76 under the general definition of

metus.70 Once more, then, we are driven to examine the context surrounding the word in

question.

It might be possible that ‘fear’ can be associated with the normative. One might cite as

support Thucydides’ belief that the ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν71 of the war was Spartan φόβος72 at

the Athenians’ growing power (1.23.6). A case can be made that ‘fear’ as an emotion, itself, is

quite visceral and seems almost antithetical to realpolitik. This φόβος at 1.23.6 is not so much

real-political as it is attached to a psychological fear in keeping with that more visceral

perception of fear as an instinctive reaction. If the δέος73 that the Athenians offer as one of the

chief motivations of human nature is similar to that Spartan φόβος as psychologically normative

as opposed to pragmatically real-political fear, then the Athenian δέος, as presented here, should

be interpreted as also representative of a more normative fear. This observation is not

unreasonable, and, as a result, I do concede that there might be a slight similarity in the

psychological nature of δέος at 1.75.3 and φόβος at 1.23.6. However, I do not believe that this

normative aspect of fear is significantly present so as to outweigh contextual evidence that the

δέος as cited by the Athenians is more so real-political than normative.

67 ‘Chiefly by fear’. 68 s.v δέος, 179. 69 s.v. LT, 1. δέος, 227. 70 Ibid. 71 ‘Truest cause’. 72 ‘Fear’. 73 Also, ‘fear’.


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When we consider what it is that the Athens might have to fear, it becomes clear that the

force of δέος is, in fact, real-political in nature. Gomme, Hornblower, and de Romilly believe

that Athens would have ample reason to fear attack from, foremost, the Persians.74 But in

reference to the Athenians’ obvious adversary, Hornblower and de Romilly also think that

Athens is expressing an, albeit shrouded, fear of Sparta.75 This is a logical deduction from the

Athenians’ statement at 1.75.4, where they note that Sparta was no longer friendly with Athens

and had now become suspicious and hostile. Indeed, it is this passage that Hornblower will cite

specifically as indicative of a fear of Sparta.76 Raubitschek reads these fears as credible as well.77

It is difficult to imagine that the Athenians were afraid of the moral aspects of being at war (at

least, in this setting), but rather, the context reveals that they were focused on the strategic

ramifications of warfare. This fear of Persian retaliation coupled with Spartan alienation can be

seen as real-political, therefore, because of the Athenians’ fear of potential military conflict,

especially inasmuch as the powers that Athens feared were those with which it had been in

conflict in the recent past during the Persian Wars and the First Peloponnesian War.

In addition to fearing direct attack, the Athenians would have also had to fear rebellion

and revolts from their allies as well as attacks on their food and resource supply lines around the

Aegean, as de Romilly and Raubitschek point out.78 Gomme helpfully introduces the scholiast’s

gloss that the Athenians were fearful τοῦ βαρβάρου ἤ τῶν κακῶς παθόντων ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ

74 Gomme 1945, HCT 1.235, who cites, further, Steup J. Classen and J. Steup, Thukydides35, Berlin, 1900-22, and E.F. Poppo and J.M. Stahl, Thucydidis libri octo2, Leipzig, 1882-8; Hornblower 1991, CT 1.120; de Romilly 1963, 253. 75 Hornblower 1991, CT, 1.120-121; de Romilly 1963, 253. 76 Ibid. 77 Raubitschek 1973, 40-43. This particular excerpt finds Raubitschek arguing that the three motivations are meant to be taken as chronological. While interesting, a decision on that argument is not particularly useful for our purposes. However, he supports his claims with similar conclusions to those that Hornblower, Gomme, and de Romilly uphold. 78 De Romilly 1963, 253; Raubitschek 1973, 41-43.


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ὑπηκόων.79 Gomme reads the former fear as more likely, but the gloss lends support to the

commonsensical idea that suffering at the hands of the allies who had grievances was also a

concern to Athens. This is reasonable since the Athenians relied on their allies for tribute and

various other resources that, in turn, contributed to Athenian political and military advantages.

Thus, now consider ‘ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελίας’.80 According to Meiggs, that which we know

regarding specific financial information concerning Athens and its reliance on its allies is rather

paltry, although we can generalize about that relationship based on what data we do have.81 In

fact, regardless of Thucydides’ reticence, many aspects of the Athenians’ reliance on their allies’

phoros82 are well known and generally accepted as significant. Athens had relied on tribute as a

benefit (ὠφέλεια) to the city. Examples of this include funding the building projects on the

Acropolis out of the reserve fund, use of tribute revenue as payment for juries, payment for

archons abroad, and especially expenditure on the navy and fleet maintenance.83 Meiggs also

says that the tribute from Athens’ allies directly or indirectly affected most citizens’ living

conditions as well, both citizens among the wealthier classes and the less prosperous.84

Hornblower thinks that this idea is expressed here, even if Thucydides does not directly make it

clear that this is the case.85 In conjunction, the control over the sea that was sustained through the

tribute’s subsidization of the Athenian fleet allowed Athens to maintain excellent trade routes

and, as a result, naval power would help make the Piraeus a booming economic hub.86

79 ‘[Fearful] of the barbarian or of being treated evilly in their authority over their subjects.’ For the scholiast, see Hude, Scholia in Thucydidem ad optimos codices collata (1927), at chapter 1.75.3. 80 ‘Lastly, by self-interest’. 81 Meiggs 1972, 255-258. 82 LSJ s.v. φόρος, 870: that which is brought in by way of payment, tribute. 83 Meiggs 1972, 258-259. 84 Meiggs 1972, 260. 85 Hornblower, 1991, CT, 1.120. 86 Meiggs 1972, 262-265.


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The advantage by which Athens is motivated is thus a significant one. Yet to what extent

could this advantage be normative? One assumes that it cannot be, because such an advantage

seems to be grounded in the tangible value of practical resources that are received. Indeed, to

make the case that food, money, and various other resources such as timber, for one, are also

normative assets would be difficult. Those advantages are practical tools, that, although they

might support a non-material sense of pride, perhaps, as we shall discuss below, and might be

considered as deserved returns for favors, as we saw in the former argument, are still practical in

their application.

Given this advantage that the Athenians possessed as a result of their hegemony, it is no

surprise that they would be still further fearful (δέος) of losing its benefit. One would find it

difficult to justify the belief that this fear of losing their resources is a normative motivation.

Clearly the Athenians are focused not on the normative aspects of losing those advantages that

they possess (such as demoralization), but on the practical situation of being without the

advantages to which they are so used to from their hegemony. All we need to remember are the

real-political motivations behind Athens’ putting down the revolt of Thasos, for example.87 The

material worth of resources like resin and precious metals as well as further control of the

Thracian region allows us to see that their fear was motivated by profit. The settlement at the

Ennea Hodoi and its eventual metamorphosis into Amphipolis might be another example, thus

reinforcing the conclusion that Athens feared the loss of its resources based on their practical

value, as their reaction to its seizure by Brasidas at 4.108 illustrates. This is no more apparent

87 1.100.2: χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον ξυνέβη Θασίους αὐτῶν ἀποστῆναι, διενεχθέντας περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας Θρᾴκῃ ἐμπορίων καὶ τοῦ μετάλλου ἃ ἐνέμοντο. καὶ ναυσὶ μὲν ἐπὶ Θάσον πλεύσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ναυμαχίᾳ ἐκράτησαν καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀπέβησαν… ‘And some time afterwards it came to pass that the Thrasians revolted from them, a quarrel having arisen about the trading posts and the mine on the opposite coast of Thrace, of which the Thasians enjoyed the profits. Thereupon the Athenians sailed with their fleet upon Thasos, and, after winning a battle at sea, disembarked on the island.’ [Trans. Smith].


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than in Pericles’ first speech at 2.63 where he says that the hegemony is like a tyranny, but a

necessary one – one that the Athenians should be fearful of losing.88 Both de Romilly and

Gomme also see Pericles’ first speech as reflective of both the advantage that Athens gained

from its hegemony and also the fear of losing it.89 Consequently, we can confidently conclude

that the focus of both fear and advantage are real-political in nature.

Then we have honor ‘ἔπειτα καὶ τιµῆς’.90 Contrary to fear and advantage, which are

representative of real-political motivations, in honor, we see a clearly normative motivation in

Athens’ understanding of human nature. Again, LSJ and Bétant give us definitions of τιµή that

are neutral to the term’s potentially inherent normative use and/or real-political use, and thus we

must examine context. LSJ gives us ‘honor’ or ‘dignity.’91 Bétant gives us honor, citing 1.75 and

1.76 as instances of this particular use.92 De Romilly sees τιµή, here, as representative of

patriotism.93 Woodhead, Thucydides on the Nature of Power (1970) offers a similar thought,

noting that the Athenian navy provides self-fulfillment to the Athenians on a personal level.94

These observations are astute and it is very likely that in honor, we see the Athenians act on a

motivation of self-satisfaction and not on a real-political calculation.

It is well known that honor is an established moral virtue and normative value within

Greek cultural thought. Indeed, it would be difficult to try and label honor as real-political. One

might perhaps label honor as a real-political asset, obtained, not according to normative

88 2.63.2-3: ἧς οὐδ’ ἐκστῆναι ἔτι ὑµῖν ἔστιν, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιὼς ἀπραγµοσύνῃ ἀνδραγαθίζεται· ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν µὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον. ‘From this empire, however, it is too late for you even to withdraw, if any one at the present crisis, through fear and shrinking from action does seek thus to play the honest man; for by this time the empire you hold is like a tyranny, which it may seem wrong to have assumed, but which certainly it is dangerous to let go.’ [Adapted from Smith]. 89 De Romilly 1963, 250-252; Gomme 1945, HCT, 1.235. 90 ‘Then, also [by] honor’. 91 s.v. τιµή, 807. 92 LT, 2, s.v. τιµή, 451. 93 De Romilly 1963, 254. 94 Woodhead 1970, 14-30.


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motivation but according to a practical impulse, where the honor, glory, or reputation of an

individual is acquired for use as a tool in obtaining some sort of real-political power. However,

there seems to be no evidence to suggest that the Athenians were motivated by honor within

human nature as real-political social currency, so to speak. Rather they seem to be concerned

with the non-pragmatic value that they have acquired for themselves in τιµή. Therefore, τιµή can

be read as an aspect of the glorification of the polis, which, although supported by real-political

assets like the advantages that the Athenians garner from their hegemony, is not meant to rely on

or be understood as real-political asset itself, so much as a normative one given that we should

see honor as self-satisfaction.

To that end, the three motivations of human nature to which the Athenians succumbed

are primarily, although not wholly, real-political in nature. Fear and advantage both ground their

force in real-political consequences and motivations; honor, however, is normative. The

Athenians’ need to hold onto their hegemony is real-political – they are dependent on their

hegemony and the danger of losing it warrants action. They say this themselves at 1.75.5 – ‘No

man is to be blamed for making the most of his advantages when it is a question of the gravest

dangers.’95 Nevertheless, however, the Athenians do still consider normative values like honor

(τιµή) in their situation of leadership and thus demonstrate that, when concerning the motivations

of human nature, they see a place for morality as well and a traditional morality at that.

Proceeding, I shall also note that the Athenians make several more statements that are

germane to a classification of Athens as seeing human nature as accommodating a more real-

political motivation while still allowing normative values to characterize human nature. The

Athenians say that the strong constrain the weaker according to this paradigm, by means of one

95 trans. Smith; 1.75: πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ξυµφέροντα τῶν µεγίστων πέρι κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι.


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party’s strength and the other’s lack thereof.96 Hornblower, Gomme, and de Romilly are silent on

this matter, but it is logical to deduce that ‘strength’ refers to real-political means. This is further

supported by their telling the Spartans that they too would ‘rule forcefully’ (ἄρχειν ἐγκρατῶς)

and behave similarly.97 This is especially so in light of the LSJ definition of ἐγκρατής as ‘with a

strong hand, by force,’ within this context in Thucydides98 and Bétant’s definition as firme.99

Therefore, it is logical to take ἄρχειν ἐγκρατῶς as representative of real-political means.

Moreover, the Athenians also say that even the weaker would agree with their claims,100

especially because this is an aspect of human nature understood by all. In fact, at 1.76.2 the

Athenians say that they have done nothing remarkable or inconsistent with human nature.101 To

them, they were not the first to act this way – it is an established principle.102 This presentation of

established beliefs conforms to normative considerations inasmuch as it is the moral system to

which people actually conform that resulted in human nature as the Athenians see it. To that end,

then, as with the citation of honor as one of the three most powerful motivations, the

establishment of this sort of behavior as traditional shows that morality does still shape human

nature. This might be difficult to grasp, as it seems quite paradoxical that one could justify the

use of power as moral and normative. But, it is merely another way for the Athenians to say that,

when considering the actions that they have taken as according to human nature, the

96 1.76.2: …αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι… ‘… it has always been established that the lesser are kept down by the greater….’ 97 1.76.1. 98 s.v. ἐγκρατής , 222. 99 s.v. vol. 1, ἐγκρατῶς, 288. 100 1.77.3-4: …ἐκείνως δὲ οὐδ’ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἀντέλεγον ὡς οὐ χρεὼν τὸν ἥσσω τῷ κρατοῦντι ὑποχωρεῖν. ‘In that case, not even they would dispute for the lesser to give way to those who have power.’ 101 οὕτως οὐδ’ ἡµεῖς θαυµαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαµεν οὐδ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου... ‘In this way, we have not done anything extraordinary nor inconsistent with human nature…’ 102 1.76.2: …οὐδ’ αὖ πρῶτοι τοῦ τοιούτου ὑπάρξαντες, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος… ‘…once more, we are not the first to do such a thing, it has always been established…’


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Peloponnesians must realize that panhellenic moral thought considers both the moral and the

real-political because true moral behavior conforms to nature.

Therefore, because, as we have seen, the three motivations of human nature are mainly

real-political and the overarching character of human nature seems to be leaning toward a more

power-political disposition where the stronger stand above the less strong by means of pragmatic

strength, we can conclude that the Athenians are saying that they believe that human nature is

such that the real-political is the dispositive motivator according to human nature, and,

furthermore, that using real-political means to achieve results is also consistent with human

nature. Human nature, therefore, is conditioned by and accepting of the real-political. However,

there are normative values at work too, as we see through honor and the establishment of human

nature on some moral grounds. The question then becomes, to what extent is human nature itself

more or less real-political than normative, or vice versa. Both value systems condition the

Athenian perception of human nature, but we are not told explicitly about whether or not one has

more weight over the other until 1.76.

At the beginning of 1.76, we are given a strong impression of an Athens that sees the

world from a perspective colored by perceptions of power and weakness, contrary to the rather

normative first half of the speech. Might trumps all and those who do not have the power to

establish circumstances otherwise are left to suffer the wishes of those who do. This is only

human, they say. We can then deduce that, unless this idea of human nature that is more inclined

to make real-political power plays is normative (and as a result, it is normative to be real-

political), the Athenians must see realpolitik as being separate from normative values like the

concept of right; in fact, this is the case.

‘We recognized ourselves to be worthy and you did too, until, calculating your interests, you now

proclaim an argument of justice –which nobody, ever, when they happen to be able to take


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something by strength, considers as being greater than strength. Men are commended and worthy,

who, having yielded to human nature and rule others, do so more justly than they need to, because

of their power. We believe, then, that others, should they take what we received, would show how

moderate we are; but in our case, our reasonableness contributes more to our poor reputation

rather than to what should be our approval.’103

We can observe that both realpolitik and normative values have independent and

autonomous spheres of influence and are incapable of overwriting each other in a very

Thrasymachian manner or Calliclean manner.104 The Athenians criticize the Spartans’ failure to

recognize this.105 This might seem bizarre given that, just above, we clarified that moral

traditions inform a human nature that is affected by both morality and realpolitik, and that this

traditional establishment is used to justify the use of real-political force. As a result, we might be

provoked into seeing that human nature as overriding morality. But, the Athenians never say that

the use of force colors the normative as real-political or that the real-political use of force is

considered to be moral because of its traditional roots, only that the traditional helps to inform

the classification of human nature by which the Athenians abide by. Hornblower provides

support for this conclusion.106

However, we can also observe that realpolitik cannot be overshadowed by normative

values if the party in question meets the condition of being able to acquire something by

strength. Normative motivations may have a share of influence with real-political ones, as the

103 1.76.2-4: ἄξιοί τε ἅµα νοµίζοντες εἶναι καὶ ὑµῖν δοκοῦντες µέχρι οὗ τὰ ξυµφέροντα λογιζόµενοι τῷ δικαίῳ λόγῳ νῦν χρῆσθε, ὃν οὐδείς πω παρατυχὸν ἰσχύι τι κτήσασθαι προθεὶς τοῦ µὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀπετράπετο. ἐπαινεῖσθαί τε ἄξιοι οἵτινες χρησάµενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει ὥστε ἑτέρων ἄρχειν δικαιότεροι ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναµιν γένωνται. ἄλλους γ’ ἂν οὖν οἰόµεθα τὰ ἡµέτερα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν µάλιστα εἴ τι µετριάζοµεν· ἡµῖν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἀδοξία τὸ πλέον ἢ ἔπαινος οὐκ εἰκότως περιέστη. 104 See Plato, Republic 1.336b-354c, particularly at 1.338c, 1.340d-340e, and 1.344c. See, also, Plato, Gorgias, 483b-492a where Callicles claims that the strong man has the means to bring about that which he desires and that it is the weak man who values normative concepts like temperance and justice. 105 1.76.2: ἄξιοί τε ἅµα νοµίζοντες εἶναι καὶ ὑµῖν δοκοῦντες µέχρι οὗ τὰ ξυµφέροντα λογιζόµενοι τῷ δικαίῳ λόγῳ νῦν χρῆσθε… ‘We recognized ourselves to be worthy and you did too, until, calculating your interests, you now proclaim an argument of justice…’ 106 Hornblower 1991, CT, 1.121.


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Athenians point out in the second sentence, but the second sentence’s condition of normative

motivation must operate within the context of the first sentence’s condition as well, and thus,

while it might be possible for normative values to be, perhaps, equal to the force of real-political

‘strength,’ they cannot supersede it.

Consider the relationship in the following way, where X is a state, R is realpolitik, and N

is normative value. If X = powerful then R > N but N can be equal to R; otherwise N must be

less than R. Therefore, If X = powerful than R > N. It is possible for the two forces to be equal

in terms of how they motivate an actor – one might seek to achieve a reputation for justice in the

conventional normative sense – but, according to this paradigm, if an actor is powerful enough,

in keeping with human nature, realpolitik will always be greater than or equal to normative

motivations. The exact proportion of realpolitik and morality, however, is left up to the actor to

define.107

The Athenians go on to cite their offer of legal equality in the law courts instead of

forceful subjugation of each ally’s existing legal rights as an example of how the normative

value of moderation, through their extension of equal laws, has limited the use of their power

(control over allies’ legal rights), however. This is an example of one of the ways in which

normative values have modified the particular actions of the Athenians, even though, as a

powerful state having the strength to take what they will, they would, presumably, not assent to

the idea that justice can supersede realpolitik.108 In keeping with this idea, Hornblower reads

107 This sort of proportion can be seen again in the Melian Dialogue. A.B. Bosworth, ‘The Humanitarian Aspect of The Melian Dialogue.’ The Journal of Hellenic Studies 133 (1993): 30-44, explores the manner in which a then powerful Athens uses its dispositive proportion of realpolitik and morality against a weaker Melos. This examination is relevant inasmuch as it also shows how a strong party acts in accordance to human nature. More importantly, however, Bosworth also explores the thought that a stronger party would do away with certain principles of right because of its strength, and the Athenian thought that certain weaker parties should do away with certain moral imperatives because of its lack of strength, especially at 34-36 and 39-42. 108 1.77.


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1.77.3, οἱ δὲ εἰθισµένοι πρὸς ἡµᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὁµιλεῖν…,109 as perhaps representative of

Athens being even more moderate to allies in ways beyond the law courts, which only heightens

their claim to normative acknowledgment.110

We should read this policy of the Athenians’ normative moderation triumphing over

exuberance, as substantive, in conjunction to the motivations of human nature already

demonstrated –fear, honor, and advantage. First, the introduction of moderation within the

logical structure of the human nature argument naturally includes that citation as, indeed, a part

of human nature. Second, because that exuberance might be rightly justifiable according the very

paradigm of human nature that the Athenians have just outlined, the issue of legal restraint as

being concordant with the normative value of moderation is obviously meant to carry weight

within the context of that argument and paradigm. Therefore, although not directly linked to the

three strongest motivations of fear, honor, and advantage by its structural placement within the

speech, we should still see the mention of judicial restraint as also indicative of the Athenians

considering moderation as a reflection of their moral/amoral identity when discussing human

nature because its citation carries the same sort of weight as those three motivations do.

Where in the first half of the speech, we are treated to an argument centered very much

on morality, here we observe an argument that is seemingly opposite in character. By estimating

this ‘might as greater than or equal to right’ and considering the concept basic within human

nature, the Athenians are saying that their concept of human nature does not necessarily need

109 ‘But those [allies] accustomed to associate with us on the basis of equality…’ 110 Hornblower 1991, CT, 1.123. Hornblower speculates that in keeping with a more general application of moderation, Athens might have treated its allies from a position of equality in the synod of the Delian League, for example. I accept this speculation as not unbelievable. I, myself, might also speculate as to the general attitude of Athens towards enforcing certain policies as hēgemōn (‘leader’). Perhaps we might be inclined to see Athens as moderate when collecting tribute, establishing pro-Athenian figures and governing bodies in allied city-states, and establishing garrisons in allied city-states, for example, in conjunction to its moderation in the law courts.


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normative values if the actor is powerful, as they are.111 This is further represented by their

statement that ‘whoever has the use of force does not need to appeal to justice’ at 1.77.2-3.112

The repeated references to a power’s ability to avoid the reach of normative values shows the

Athenians as inherently more real-politically minded, as regarding human nature. This is further

supported by their statement at 1.76 that says that the real-political is greater than or equal to the

normative, and also on account of the importance of the real-political motivations of fear and

advantage, which represent one half of Athens’ motivations pursuant to human nature, even after

considering moderation in the law courts as another example of normative motivation in

conjunction to the three that are listed together. It is possible, however, for normative values to

have an impact on the exercise of power, and, indeed, honor and moderation are examples of

such values.

Therefore, when considering human nature according to the Athenian paradigm, while it

is the case that the normative cannot be greater than the real-political for powerful actors,

Athens, nevertheless, through its citation of honor and moderation, is defining its particular

proportion of realpolitik to normative values as closer than necessary, even if we still do take

away a notion that real-political values are superior to normative values given the inherent

limitations on the specific cases that support them.

Establishing the Character of the Speech

Having concluded the speech, then, and having considered both arguments of worthiness

and human nature, we are left with an impression of Athens’ motivation that is far more

variegated than we might have initially gleaned from looking at the surface. The line between an

111 Again, this sort of system is most visible on an international level in the Melian Dialogue. See the conclusion of this paper for a brief discussion on the nature of this speech versus the Melian Dialogue. 112 1.77.2-3: …βιάζεσθαι γὰρ οἷς ἂν ἐξῇ, δικάζεσθαι οὐδὲν προσδέονται...


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Athenian commitment to normative values as opposed to real-political ones is much less easy to

envision than one might imagine.

In summary, Athens justifies its hegemony with two arguments and each of them paints a

different picture of its attitude toward realpolitik and normative values. On the one hand, Athens

is normatively worthy of its hegemony because of its morally grounded aid rendered to Greece.

On the other hand, Athens should not be blamed for possessing its hegemony because its

acquisition and retention took place according to universally understood concepts of human

nature that are shaped by both normative values and real-political ones, even though the real-

political will almost always outweigh the normative in direct juxtaposition. Furthermore, beyond

the main points of each of these arguments, there are supporting factors that diffuse the impact of

both the normative force of the argument of worthiness and the real-political force of the

argument of human nature. Two of the three ὠφελιµώτατα (ships and Themistocles, themselves

being real-political in nature) are examples of real-political aid layered underneath a normative

factor. The demonstration of Athenian zeal, however, exploits the major theme of extolling

Athenian normative value in keeping with the main normative force of the argument of

worthiness. In the same way, on the other hand, the three motivations to which the Athenians

yielded under human nature, honor, fear, and self- interest, while mostly real-political in the form

of fear and self-interest, coexist with normative honor in conjunction to normative moderation.

The Athenians’ first argument (worthiness) is normatively based, although it also rings

with real-political acknowledgment, and their second argument (human nature) is primarily real-

political, but also rings with normative acknowledgment. The task that remains to be done in

order to discern the Athenian disposition relative to the characterization of their speech at the

meeting of the Peloponnesian League is to examine how the two arguments interact with one


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another and which one, being preponderant, best characterizes the speech. We can read the

worthiness argument as, on the one hand, subsidiary to the argument of human nature or, on the

other hand, the overarching theme to which the argument of human nature is subsidiary. After

considering the manner in which the second half of the speech (that is based on human nature)

operates within the context of the speech alongside the first argument of worthiness, however,

we shall conclude that the resulting characterization of the speech is such that the Athenians

clearly put normative values above the real-political, but, also, that the real-political is by no

means overshadowed, nor shunned. Rather, there is a mix of the two at work within the Athenian

mindset.

In order to read the argument of worthiness as subsidiary to the argument of human

nature, we need to assume that the paradigm of human nature as described by the Athenians in

the second half of their speech envelopes the argument of worthiness and thus, that the argument

of worthiness is conditioned by the restraints of human nature. If this were the case, then

normative motivations could not supersede real-political ones, as according to the Athenian

classification of human nature, as set out above. While de Romilly asserts that both arguments

are, indeed, based on human nature, she does not adhere to the opinion that the Athenians’

paradigm of human nature relegates all other aspects of the speech to a subsidiary position in

accordance to it.113 Indeed, it happens to be the case that we can interpret ‘human nature’ as not

so binding as to present itself as a key mechanism for all human behavior, but rather as a concept

that, although establishing a paradigm for the way in which humans behave, is not necessarily

attempting to establish the definite paradigm for the way in which humans behave.

113 De Romilly 1963, 255-262.


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Therefore, unsurprisingly, scholars differ on how to approach the phrase, ‘τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ

φύσει’ at 1.76.2. Jowett reads ‘human nature.’114 Smith reads ‘human nature’ as well.115

Hornblower finds ‘human nature’ insufficient and instead reads ‘acting in the way that human

beings will.’116 Similarly, Hobbes reads, ‘the manner of men.’117 Gomme is silent on the matter. I

have tailored my translation, above, according to Smith and Jowett. However, when we consider

Hornblower’s comment and Hobbes’ interpretation, the force that we should ascribe to human

nature becomes clearer, such that the concept of human nature in the speech should not be read

as a thoroughly explicit philosophical concept, similar to perhaps, a sophistic, Platonic, or even

an Aristotelian assertion. Rather, we should see the concept of human nature about which the

Athenians are speaking as indeed representative of the way humans with power will behave, but

not absolutely superior so that it must dominate the other aspects of behavior in the Athenian

speech.

This is especially so given that the Athenians never actually say whether or not they

consider all actions liable to the dictates of human nature as they present it. Recall that when the

Athenians are discussing human nature, they never overtly proclaim the superiority of ‘might’

over ‘right’ but, instead, insist that ‘right’ motivations always work in conformity with nature, as

was briefly mentioned above. As a result, we have no hard evidence from the words of the

Athenians, themselves, that claims that realpolitik (and as an extension, a more real-political

human nature) should undoubtedly be considered to outweigh morality. Although it might be a

logical deduction to think that all actions are subsidiary to human nature, we are not explicitly

114 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War. Trans. B. Jowett. Oxford: (1881) at 1.76.2. 115 Trans. Smith, 1.76.2. 116 Hornblower 1991, CT, 1.121. 117 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War. Trans. T. Hobbes. London: (1843) at 1.76.2.


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told that this is the case by the Athenians themselves, and thus one should not jump to

conclusions that human nature subverts the argument of worthiness so readily.

After all, to see human nature in a strictly philosophical sense would also seem to

invalidate and contradict the normative tone of the speech and ignore the historiographical

context. Yes, we must remember that the speech is diplomatic, being delivered before foreign

powers, and not a philosophical talk overheard at the agora or presented at a symposium – even

if this speech may be atypical of more generally accepted modes of diplomatic discourse.118 Yet,

since it is a diplomatic speech, it must be the case, therefore, that there is a point that the

Athenians are trying to make to the leaders of Peloponnesian League. Is it more realistic to

believe that the Athenians suppose that the Peloponnesian League would forgo aggression based

on the assertion that human nature is such that normative motivations are less than or equal to

human nature in importance, or is it that the Athenians are worthy based on their traditionally

motivated actions during the Persian Wars, where the first argument seems to be more

appropriate for diplomatic means and the latter argument seems to more suited for more

existential discussions?

After consideration, it is clear that the argument of Athenians’ worthiness is the

foreground issue of the Athenian message to Sparta and its allies and, furthermore, that the

discussion of human nature is, in fact, secondary and supportive of this message. This conclusion

is in keeping with the general view among scholars. De Romilly, for one offers support in the

118 It might be worth noting that the Athenians make this speech when more ordinary means of diplomatic discourse were failing. As a result, we might want to discredit the conclusion that this sort of philosophical talk is uncharacteristic of diplomatic discourse. However, I feel as if that would be a strong conclusion. Although it is worth noting that this speech is not as atypical as it might have been at another point in Greek history, I think that to use this contextual fact to conclude that the Athenian speech at the Peloponnesian congress is not in any way atypical is unwarranted.


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phrase, ‘we can thus appreciate why the second excuse, which belongs to a different type of

consideration, should be presented only as a confirmation and an additional proof.’119

The emphasis that is put on Athenian actions during the Persian Wars is first among other

key points that allow for understanding a more normatively focused Athens. This emphasis,

which is clearly demonstrated by several statements made by the Athenians, makes it obvious

that the Athenians want their discussion of the Persian Wars to be taken most seriously. First, the

Athenians open with an apology, saying that they are sorry for bringing up their actions during

the Persian Wars as a defense against the claims made against them by Sparta and its allies

because recounting these events is tedious.120 Gomme reads προβαλλοµένοις as, ‘boring to

us.’121 Hornblower sees this reading as possible, but also finds ‘boring to you’ as possible as

well.122 In either case, the apology is ironic in that, while seemingly apologetic for bringing up

the Persian Wars, Athens, nonetheless, proceeds by doing just that through apophasis, and at

some length as well. Why would they do this? As de Romilly astutely observes, by apologizing

for bringing forward Athenian actions during the Persian Wars, the Athenians thereby emphasize

the Persian Wars as a headnote by cleverly and indirectly calling direct attention to them so that

the audience might focus on the arguments that rely on Athenian actions in those conflicts; this

also shows an Athenian attention and dedication to those arguments.123 This is not the only case,

however, of Athens placing emphasis on their actions during the Persian Wars. The Athenians

also misrepresent the battle of Marathon, where, as Hornblower and de Romilly point out, they

119 De Romilly 1963, 254-255. 120 1.73.2-3, Καὶ τὰ µὲν πάνυ παλαιὰ τί δεῖ λέγειν, ὧν ἀκοαὶ µᾶλλον λόγων µάρτυρες ἢ ὄψις τῶν ἀκουσοµένων; τὰ δὲ Μηδικὰ καὶ ὅσα αὐτοὶ ξύνιστε, εἰ καὶ δι’ ὄχλου µᾶλλον ἔσται αἰεὶ προβαλλοµένοις, ἀνάγκη λέγειν. ‘Now what need is there to speak of matters quite remote, whose only witnesses are the stories men hear rather than the eyes of those who will them told? But concerning the Persian War and all the other events of which you have personal knowledge, we needs must speak, even though it will be rather irksome to mention them, since they are always being paraded.’ [Trans. Smith]. 121 Gomme 1945, HCT, 1.234. 122 Hornblower 1991, CT, 1.118. 123 De Romilly 1963, 245.


43

have excluded the Plataean force that was present at 1.73.4.124 De Romilly does not find this

problematic and sees such oversimplification as common, citing Herodotus, 7.10 and 9.27 as

examples.125 Nevertheless, the exclusion allows the Athenians to focus on themselves, alone,

within the context of defending Greece from invasion, again in an emphatic manner.

The apology itself is enough to make it clear that the Athenians want to ensure that their

actions concerning the Persian Wars and the normative arguments relying on them are

emphasized in their speech to the Spartans and their allies. In conjunction with that ironic

apology, their distorting certain aspects of those deeds in order to glorify themselves further

demonstrates this impression. That conclusion contributes to the view of the first half of the

speech (the half based on normative arguments) as important to the Athenians. Therefore, it

additionally shows that this aspect of their overall speech should carry weight in the justification

of their hegemony.

Moreover, we should consider the first argument of worthiness as weightier than the

second argument of human nature because when the speech turns to considering human nature,

we are given no explicit sign directing us that the Athenians want that argument of human nature

to be equal to or supersede the normatively based motivations that the first half of the speech

emphatically focused on. In fact, even within the context of the more real-politically based

argument of human nature, we can see indications of the first argument’s primacy. First, it

should be noted that the argument of human nature seems to fall under the overarching parasol of

the argument of worthiness based on the logical structure of the speech. At 1.75.1-2, the

Athenians say, Ἆρ’ ἄξιοί ἐσµεν, ὦ Λακεδαιµόνιοι, καὶ προθυµίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώµης

124 1.73.4, φαµὲν γὰρ Μαραθῶνί τε µόνοι προκινδυνεῦσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ… ‘For we say that we, alone, ran the risk against the Persians at Marathon…; Hornblower, CT, 1.118 (1991); de Romilly 1963, 245. 125 De Romilly 1963, 245.


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ξυνέσεως ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχοµεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι µὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι;126 As

mentioned above, this particular pronouncement of worthiness127 is one of the several phrases

which are indicative that this argument of worthiness is a primary part of their first argument.

However, given that this particular sentence is also the point at which the speech transitions from

an overt discussion about Athens’ justification of its hegemony that is based on normative

worthiness as a result of its actions during the Persian Wars to Athens’ justification of its

hegemony that is based on their more real-political perspective of human nature, we can also see

this sentence as a defining the relationship between the two arguments and how they are to

cohabit in the overall speech.

Because the digression on human nature falls under the headnote of Ἆρ’ ἄξιοί ἐσµεν,128

the natural progression of the speech onwards indicates that those arguments following the

former argument of normative worthiness are subsidiary, even if that argument and its discussion

of human nature is, indeed, lengthy and substantial. That is not to say, however, that the

argument and identification of a more real-political human nature, according to the Athenians,

loses that designation or becomes normative because it follows the more prominent display of

normative worth. In the same way that two of the three ὠφελιµώτατα, can be real-political in

nature but still support a normative argument of worth, the weighty exposition on human nature,

although still indicative of Athens’ real-political understanding, can also be seen as supporting

that normative worthiness that the Athenians established in the speech prior to this point. Indeed,

the speech naturally progresses from this point onward as a digression on human nature, a

126 ‘Considering, then Lacedaemonians, the zeal and sagacity of judgment which we displayed at that time, do we deserve to be regarded with this excessive jealousy by the Hellenes on account of the empire we possess?’ [Trans. Smith]. 127 Here, obviously presented in the negative, such that, in essence, they are saying that they are unworthy to be called unworthy, as according to my interpretation. 128 ‘Are we worthy…’


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digression that is still illustrative of the Athenian disposition, if not representative of the speech’s

main focus. It is as though the Athenians were saying that, in conjunction, to our main point, we

are also justified because of our secondary point of contention. This is especially visible when

one considers the Athenian criticism of the Spartans for being duplicitous. In order to make such

a judgment, the Athenians must, themselves, realize that there is a distinction between the two

concepts of realpolitik and the normative code, but at the same time, also realize that both are

weighty and relevant.

The weight of the Athenian argument of human nature can further be diminished after

realizing that the citation of Athenian legal restraint as a result of their considering the normative

value of moderation is meant to condition that entire picture of an Athens that sees itself in the

light of a more real-political human nature. This is because, structurally, the citation of

moderation is placed in the speech so as to counter the paradigm that the Athenians had just

finished laying out. As a result, the mention of Athens’ moderate practices after the main

excursus on human nature and separately from the former motivations serves the purpose of

emphasizing that normative influence of moderation.

This has the effect of contradicting the weight that the former classification of human

nature carried up to that point. De Romilly supports this conclusion, especially where she

envisages the Athenian citation of moderation as an emphatic statement meant to show that,

contrary to the heavy real-political tone of the material leading up to its demonstration of

moderation, Athens is not characterizing itself as real-political, but as an exception to real-

political concepts they had just expressed.129 As a result, then, when we look at the Athenian

argument from human nature, our attention is brought to the force of moderation (and morality)

and not strictly to the force of the Athenian conception of might. This observation, then, 129 De Romilly 1963, 248-249, 255-262.


46

subtracts from the weight that the more real-political argument based around human nature

possesses, and allows, furthermore, for the normative first half of the speech to outweigh it.

To that end, then, considering that the relationship between Athens’ arguments of

worthiness by virtue of their actions during the Persian Wars and human nature is such that the

former supersedes the latter, we can, accordingly, characterize the speech as a whole as being

more normatively based than real-political. This is because the primarily normative

characterization of Athenian worthiness, given the aid that they rendered to Greece and Sparta,

which was, in turn, based on the traditional archaic principle of helping friends and harming

enemies, shines through the speech as the brighter of the two major arguments made. Indeed, the

Athenians’ argument with a normative profile is greater than its argument with a more real-

political one. Therefore, we can then conclude that the speech by the Athenians at the congress

of the Peloponnesian League is more reliant on normative values (on ‘right’) than it is on

realpolitik (on ‘might’) as a matter of simple measurement. Raubitschek and de Romilly both

ascribe to this more normative identification of the speech, as well.130

Now that we can confidently say that the overall argument of the speech is such that it is

more normatively based than real-politically based, we can use the supporting points of those

arguments of worthiness and human nature to elaborate on just how much more normative the

Athenian speech at the Peloponnesian league is than it is real-political. We shall find that,

although not dramatically unaltered by the smaller demonstrations of normative and real-political

acknowledgements, that proportion is, nonetheless, affected by them.

As discussed, in the Athenians’ citation of zeal as one of the three most useful services

with which they were able to go about aiding Greece, we see Athens further acknowledging

normative values, in addition to the overarching normative claims under which zeal falls. 130 Raubitschek 1973, 37-38, 43-44; de Romilly 1963, 242-262.


47

Furthermore, although a part of the secondary major contributor to the Athenians’ overall

argument (the argument of human nature), the Athenians’ invocation of honor (τιµή) and

moderation are also examples of an Athenian moral disposition, especially since the Athenians

insist that, despite amoral aspects of human nature, they have in fact behaved morally. As a

result of these smaller, more subsidiary normative acknowledgments, in conjunction to the more

weighty acknowledgments in normative worth based on the traditional activity of helping allies

and harming enemies, we can observe a shift in the character of the Athenian speech as more

normative than it might have been had we simply weighed the major variables of moral worth

based on the normative act of helping allies and harming enemies against a more real-political

view of human nature.

The use of realpolitik, in both major arguments of worthiness and human nature is

significant, nevertheless, and, although the Athenians might have characterized the entire speech

as more normatively based given the frequent mention and use of realpolitik, it suffices to say

that Athens also sees realpolitik as valuable, even if, in this case, it is a secondary motivator. We

ought to still recall that the Athenian mention of two individual real-political ὠφελιµώτατα –

ships and Themistocles’ leadership – also lends support to an Athens that sees real-political tools

as important to their communal identity. We can further observe that real-political motivators of

fear and advantage are indicative of an Athens that looks, at times, towards the pragmatic when

conducting its affairs. Indeed, the overall character of human nature as tending to be more

opportunistic, and thus real-political than normative also demonstrates that the Athenians are

capable seeing practicality as superseding morality in international affairs – even if the present

speech is not one of those occasions. As a result, the overall Athenian disposition shifts from the


48

more normative than real-political end of the spectrum closer to –although not precisely at –

equilibrium where realpolitik and normative values coexist.

Therefore, I believe that the Athenian speech at the Peloponnesian League can be seen as

a close mixing of realpolitik and normative values. As de Romilly correctly puts forward, the

characterization is more of a middle ground between Athenian ‘imperialism’ (realpolitik) and an

Athens that is glorified (exalted for its traditional glory) for the aid that it has rendered to

Greece.131 The normative motivators, however, are first among the two considerations, although

realpolitik is still important, persuasive, and necessary. While Athens is not persuaded to follow

such motivations in preference, it certainly does invoke realpolitik in characterizations of its

disposition.

Conclusion

It is no wonder that philosophical thought of the late classical and Hellenistic periods

would return, at times, to these issues of morality and realpolitik – especially to explore their

origins, value, and the relationship between not only one another, but especially between the two

dispositions and the polis. Indeed, having been influenced by a time of war that would test so

many city-states’ resolve regarding traditional morality, it is not surprising that philosophers like

Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, among others, would choose to examine normative issues and real-

political issues in their contemplative exercises.

Furthermore, given the influence of those Greek philosophers and Thucydides himself, to

be sure, it is no surprise that these examinations of normative values and realpolitik would so

widely infiltrate the discussions of the learned century after century – from the Greeks through

the Romans to the Enlightenment and thence to today. In many ways, it is only natural that we

are fascinated by this relationship because of the importance that both of these broad spheres of 131 De Romilly 1963, 246-248.


49

affect have on our lives and the way we live them. And we today have clearly inherited our

interest in these two spheres and it is likely that we will pass it down even further. In fact,

motivations of conscience and self-interest will constantly evolve and as such, we will most

likely always be finding different paradigms to explore while also remaining interested in

previous relationships of ‘might’ and ‘right.’

The Athenians’ speech at the Peloponnesian League reveals an Athenian disposition that

represents a dense tapestry, a tapestry that is intricate with many different colored normative and

real-political threads. As historians, we might use insights into Athens’ disposition towards

realpolitik and morality as a filter through which to view Athenian interstate relations and

diplomatic affairs during the period of time between the end of the First Peloponnesian War and

the breakdown of the 30 years’ peace. This is especially so because the speech presents Athens at

an interesting point in its moral, political, and social history. In many ways, the speech allows us

to appreciate how the traditional archaic values of the pre-democratic polis – and, specifically,

of the pre-Periclean democracy – assumed newer forms as a result of changing social and

political structures and panhellenic politics. Indeed, at a point of transition where traditional

moral imperatives begin to incorporate or even recede before certain real-political influences, the

Athenians before the Peloponnesian League at Sparta present their city at the cusp of change.

Concomitantly, the speech with its blended paradigm of ‘might’ and ‘right’ allows us to

see Athens in a different light in the later Thucydidean treatment of the Peloponnesian War.

Consider the Mytilenean debate, for example. There, we see Kleon and Diodotos argue with

fervor about what might be the most advantageous action to take against the Mytileneans. Yes,

morality makes its way into the discussion as well, and, as it should be noted, has a hand in

winning the day for Diodotos’ argument for not executing the Mytileneans, while exposing the


50

cruelty of Kleon’s proposal to proceed with the executions. However, morality is somewhat

secondary when one considers that the crux of the issue between Kleon and Diodotos is what

would be more profitable to the Athenians. This sort of real-political focus is seen even further in

the Melian dialogue, where the Athenians seem to denounce the importance of, not only

traditional moral and religious values, but also the same sort of worthiness that they utilize at the

Peloponnesian League,132 thus allowing them to thwart the arguments of the Melians and feel

empowered to proceed with conquering them.133

However, at the congress of Sparta and its allies, we see the Athenians take a less harsh

stance, putting normative motivations over practical ones. When placed alongside several other

major passages such as the Mytilenean debate, Pericles’ several speeches (including the Funeral

Oration), the Melian dialogue, and the debate concerning the Sicilian expedition, the Athenian

speech at the congress of the Peloponnesian League allows us to appreciate the normative

position that Athens once occupied. We are able to see an Athens that exhibits normative

motivations and upholds certain traditional moral customs, even when facing the looming reality

of dire conflict that might compel it to begin altering those traditions. In Thucydides, the

Athenian speech at the Peloponnesian congress is a starting point from which Athens will

diverge as the narrative plays out – an image of Athens to juxtapose against future actions that

sets up a sort of character arc, in a way. However, it is also evident that the Athenian speech at

the Peloponnesian League foreshadows these very changes.

132 5.89.1: ἡµεῖς τοίνυν οὔτε αὐτοὶ µετ᾽ ὀνοµάτων καλῶν, ὡς ἢ δικαίως τὸν Μῆδον καταλύσαντες ἄρχοµεν ἢ ἀδικούµενοι νῦν ἐπεξερχόµεθα, λόγων µῆκος ἄπιστον παρέξοµεν… ‘Well then, we on our part will make no use of fair phrases, saying either that we hold sway justly because we overthrew the Persians, or that we now come against you because we are injured, offering a lengthy speech that would not be believed…’ [Trans. Smith]. 133 Again, see A.B. Bosworth, ‘The Humanitarian Aspect of The Melian Dialogue.’ The Journal of Hellenic Studies 133 (1993): 30-44, for a discussion on how a powerful Athens uses power politics and morality against a weaker Melos.


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As we can see from this speech, Athens sees both morality and amorality in behavioral

terms as important in their own different ways. We should not be surprised that at one point the

Athenians might be more morally inclined and then, at another point, be more real-politically

inclined. In many ways, because of the identification of the Athenians disposition and the

complicated nature of Athenian motivations, we should actually be prepared for them to shift

from one disposition to the next. The aforementioned Athenian ‘difficulty’134 in Thucydides is

that it is difficult to identify Athens as basing its disposition on normative values, realpolitik, or a

combination of both; indeed, challenging, but also a boon. While complex and, at times,

convoluted, the speech at Sparta, nonetheless, paints an enlightening image of Athens during the

Peloponnesian War; an image that allows us to understand Athenian actions, even though those

actions might, at first, surprise and confuse us.

Ancient Works Referenced

Demosthenes, 21, Prosecution of Meidias, 101; 105.

Demosthenes, 41, Against Spudias, 23

Demosthenes, 61, The Erotic Essay, 23.

Herodotus, Histories, 7.10; 9.27.

Isocrates, Panathenaicus, 51.

Lysias, Epitaphios, 42.

Plato, Gorgias, 483b-492a.

Plato, Republic, book 1, 336b-354c.

Pseudo-Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians

Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War.

134 As mentioned at page 3, above.


52

Contemporary Works Referenced:

A.W. Adkins, ‘“Friendship” and “Self-Sufficiency” in Homer and Aristotle”’ Classical

Quarterly 13.1 (1963): 30-45.

A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values. Chicago: 1960.

E.A. Bétant, Lexicon Thucydideum. vol. 1-2. Hildesheim: 1961.

H. Boulkesteikn, Wohltigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchistlichen Altertum. Utrecht: 1939. 119-

121.

A.B. Bosworth, ‘The Humanitarian Aspect of The Melian Dialogue.’ The Journal of Hellenic

Studies 133 (1993): 30-44.

K.J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality: In the Time of Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: 1974.

A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides. vol.1. Oxford: 1945.

A.R. Hands, Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome. Ithaca: 1968. 26-62.

J. Haslam. No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since

Machiavelli. New Haven: 2002. p.168.

T. Hobbes. Trans. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War. London: 1843.

S. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides. vol. 1. Oxford: 1991.

K. Hude, Scholia in Thucydidem ad optimos codices collata. Leipzig: 1927.

B. Jowett. Trans. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War. Oxford: 1881.

H.G.Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones. A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: 1996.

G.E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought.

Cambridge, UK: 1966.

R. Meiggs, Athenian Empire. Oxford: Clarendon, 1972.

A. Moseley, "Political Realism." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 27, Apr. 2005.

L. Pearson, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece. Stanford: 1966.

A.E. Raubitschek, “The Speech of the Athenians.” P. Stadter, The Speeches of Thucydides.

Chapel Hill: 1973.

J. de Romilly, Thucydides and Athenians Imperialism. Trans. P. Thody. Oxford: 1963.

C.F. Smith. Trans. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War. vol. 1-4. Cambridge:

1919.


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Thucydides: Reception, Reinterpretation, and Influence; About the Project. University of Bristol,

Feb 16, 2011. http://www.bris.ac.uk/classics/thucydides/project/#uobcms-content.

R. Whitlock Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek

Ethics. Cambridge, UK: 1989.

A.G. Woodhead, Thucydides on the Nature of Power. Cambridge: 1970.

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