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Morality Toolbox

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Morality Toolbox Spartan Debate Institute 2005 Carson/Hardy/Mahoney ConsequentialismPUtilitarianism Good Consequentialist utilitarianism good frontline Ext I : Government vs. individual Ext 3: Morality based on consequences Ext 5: Moral purity = immol-a1 No solvency, no obligation No obligation if self-preservation threatened No obligation because of nukes Nuclear war = genocide Nuclear war olw's all (Kateb) AT: Intentions key AT: Consequentialism fails due to uncertainty AT: Intervening actors (Gewirth) AT: Rescher (probability) AT: Callahan (tyranny of survival) AT: Watson (starvation right) AT: Kant (categorical imperative) AT: Aiken (right to be saved) Threshold deontology best Absolutism 3 rights violations Topic Specific Neg National security trumps civil liberties Violations now - separation of powers Violations now - privacy Violations now - due process Exceptions for separation of powers Exceptions for privacy Exceptions for due process AT: Rights violations snowball Moral AbsolutismlDeontolo~ Good Best Rights outweigh all (certainty, fi~ture intervention) Intervening actors (Gewirth) Consequentialism justifies13 mutually assured destrxn Utilitarianism destroys value to life Rest Consequentialism 3 paralysis UtiVConseq'ism 3 tyranny of survival, atrocities Consequentialism fails: can't compare goods AT: Governments vs. individuals Topic Specific Aff Rights violations snowball Starvation outweighs all
Transcript
  • Morality Toolbox Spartan Debate Institute 2005

    Carson/Hardy/Mahoney

    ConsequentialismPUtilitarianism Good Consequentialist utilitarianism good frontline

    Ext I : Government vs. individual Ext 3: Morality based on consequences Ext 5: Moral purity = immol-a1

    No solvency, no obligation No obligation if self-preservation threatened No obligation because of nukes

    Nuclear war = genocide Nuclear war olw's all (Kateb)

    AT: Intentions key AT: Consequentialism fails due to uncertainty AT: Intervening actors (Gewirth) AT: Rescher (probability) AT: Callahan (tyranny of survival) AT: Watson (starvation right) AT: Kant (categorical imperative) AT: Aiken (right to be saved)

    Threshold deontology best Absolutism 3 rights violations

    Topic Specific Neg National security trumps civil liberties Violations now - separation of powers Violations now - privacy Violations now - due process Exceptions for separation of powers Exceptions for privacy Exceptions for due process AT: Rights violations snowball

    Moral AbsolutismlDeontolo~ Good Best

    Rights outweigh all (certainty, fi~ture intervention) Intervening actors (Gewirth) Consequentialism justifies13 mutually assured destrxn Utilitarianism destroys value to life

    Rest Consequentialism 3 paralysis UtiVConseq'ism 3 tyranny of survival, atrocities Consequentialism fails: can't compare goods AT: Governments vs. individuals

    Topic Specific Aff Rights violations snowball Starvation outweighs all

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    Consequentialist Utilitarianism Good F/L

    ( ) Consequences come first for governments - only our evidence draws the distinction between moral theories for individuals and governments Harries, editor of National Interest, 1994 (Owen, The National Interest, Spring, p. 11)

    Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, "In principle, d o you believe in one standard of human rights and free expression?", Lee immediately answers, "Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice." This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in politics. it is "the ethic of responsibility" rather than "the ethic of absolute ends" that is appropriate. While an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost. governments must weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. S o once the enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the promotion o f prosperity.

    ( ) Absolutism causes paralysis because of conflicting obligations; only consequences can break the tie Nielsen 1993 (Kai, Phil. Prof @ U. Calgary, Absolutism and It Consequentialist Critics, ed. Joram Graf Haber, p. 170-2)

    In so treating the fat man-not just to further the public good but to prevent the certain death o f a whole group of people (that is to prevent an even greater evil than his being killed in this way)-the claims of justice are not overriden either, for each individual involved, if he is reasonably correct, should realize that if he were so stuck rather than the fat man, he should in such situations be blasted out. Thus, there is no question of being unfair. Surely we must choose between evils here, but is there anything more reasonable, more morally appropriate, than choosing the lesser evil when doing or allowing some evil cannot be avoided? That is, where there is n o avoiding both and where our actions can determine whether a greater or lesser evil obtains, should we not plainly always opt for the lesser evil? And is it not obviously a greater evil that all those other innocent people should suffer and die than that the fat man should suffer and die? Blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group drowns is still more monstrous. The consequentialist is on strong moral ground here, and, if his reflective moral convictions do not square either with certain unrehearsed or with certain reflective particular moral convictions of human beings, so much the worse for such commonsense moral convictions. One could even usefully and relevantly adapt here-though for a quite different purpose-an argument of Donagan's. Conse~uentialism of the kind I have been arguing for provides so persuasive "a theoretical basis for common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural to suspect that intuition, not theory, is corrupt." Given the comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of consequentialism, it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square with such a theory, though, if it made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our considered moral convictions that would be another matter indeed Anticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity of people who will sanction such killing o f the innocent but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and far greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and misery but merely forbore to prevent it? In such a context, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to me to constitute a moral evasion. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to d o what in normal circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this circumstance is a harsh moral necessity he [it] allows, when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. He tries to keep his 'moral purity' and [to] avoid 'dirty hands' at the price of utter moral failure and what Kierkegaard called 'double-mindedness.' It is understandable that people should act in this morally evasive way but this does not make it right. ***Gender modified***

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    Consequentialist Utilitarianism Good F/L

    Johnson, '85 (Conrad D. Johnson, 'The Authority of the Moral Agent', Journal of Philosophy 82, N o 8 (August 1985), pp. 391)

    If we follow the usual deontological conception, there are also well-known difficulties. If it is simply wrong to kill the innocent, the wrongness must in some wav be connected to the consequences. That an innocent person is killed must be a consequence that has some important bearing on the wrongness of the action; else why be so concerned about the killing of an innocent? Further, if it is wrong in certain cases for the agent to weigh the consequences in deciding whether to kill or to break a promise, it is hard to deny that this has some connection to the conseauences. Following one line of thought, it is consequentialist considerations of mistrust that stand behind such restrictions on what the agent may take into account.3 But then again it is hard to deal with that rare case in which the agent can truly claim that his judgement about the consequences is accurate, or, in that last resort of the philosophical thought experiment, has been verified by the Infallible Optimizer.

    PTpe fact of ng mnkes a morit claim on not only from IC udLtnn:tn or onsequcntialist point of - view. but on common-sense moral grounds as well. E 3 t from nnv responsibilitv we mav h : ~ ? Fnr_havincrmadc less fortunate other peov1e less wctl off r ~ c o u l d huve been/ &he sornmon-sense rnordity ofbenevolent a&- eqrd

    . it as in general wron never to do u n v t h i n P . f o r v l e s s t e peopIc whom one is in a position to help end as mbrallv petlcr to do more for such people rather than less. LO sacrifice- of one's own well-being rither than less in order to give aid to thc

    - - -

    to dive aid to thosc wursc off than snesclf (when onc can easily do so. rtc.1.: [email protected] ma- (when 111 CIC.) to r1vu d l ype has to thc less lortunate. or. at least. to reduce tmcscb to thc (prcsumabiy rising) kvcl of wcll-being of lhosc anc

    - - ;re. in that spectrum. k(mugh) Jividine lihc'hetwfcen over duties and su6ereropiti- hnevolence should be drcrwvn kavc 6alurccl time and time again in ed~icil discussions. I

  • SDI 2005 Moralitv Toolbox

    ( ) Ignoring consequences is immoral - they sacrifice others to preserve moral purity. It is most moral to act to produce the best end regardless of the moral cleanliness of the means Ailinsky 1971 (Saul D., Activist, Prof, Social Organizer with Int'l Fame, Founder of Industrial Areas Foundation, Rules for Radicals, p. 24-7) "Does this particular end justify this particular means?" Life and how you live it is the story of means and

    ends. The end is what you want, and the means is how you get it. Whenever we think about social change, the question of means and ends arises. The person [man] of action views the issue of means and ends in pragmatic and strategic terms. He has no other problem; he thinks only of his actual resources and the possibilities of various choices of action. He asks of ends only whether they are achievable and worth the cost; of means, only whether they will work. To say that cormpt means corrupt the ends is to believe in the immaculate conception of ends and principles. The real arena is corrupt and bloody. Life is a corrupting process from the time a child learns to play his mother off against his father in the politics of when to go to bed; he who fears corruption fears life. The practical revolutionary will understand Geothe's "conscience is the virtue of observers and not of agents of action in action one does not always enioy the luxury of a decision that is consistent both with one s individual conscience and the pood of [hulmankind. The choice must always be for the latter. Action is for mass salvation and not for the individual's personal salvation. He [or she1 who sacrifices the mass good for his personal conscience has peculiar conception of "personal salvation"; he doesn't care enough for people to be "cormvted" for them. The people [men] who pile up the heaps of discussion and literature on the ethics o f means and ends-which with rare exception is conspicuous for its sterility-rarely write about their won experiences in the perpetual struggle of life and change. They are strangers, moreover, to the burdens and problems of operational responsibility and the unceasing pressure for immediate decisions. They are passionately committed to a mystical objectivity where passions are suspect. They assume a nonexistent situation where men dispassionately and with reason draw and devise means and ends as if studying a navigational chart on land. They can be recognized by one of two verbal brands; "We agree with the ends but not the means," or "This is not the time." The means-and- end moralists or non-doers always wind up on their ends without any means. The means-and- 'ends moralists, constantly obsessed with the ethics of the means used by the Have-Nots against the Haves, should search themselves as t o their real political position. In fact, they are passive-but real-allies of the Haves. They are the ones Jacques Maritain referred to in his statement, "The fear of soiling ourselves by entering the context of history is not virtue, but a way o f escaping virtue." These non-doers were the ones who chose not to fight the Nazis in the only way they could have been fought; they were the ones who drew their window blinds to shut out the shameful spectacle of Jews and political prisoners being dragged through the streets; they were the ones who privately deplored the horror of it all-and did nothing. This is the nadir of immorality. The most unethical o f all means is the nonuse of any means. It is this species of man who so vehemently and militantly participated in that classically idealistic debate at the old League of Nations on the ethical differences between defensive and offensive weapons. Their fears of action drive them to refuge in an ethics so divorced from the politics of life that it can apply only to angels, not to men. The standards ofjudgment must be rooted in the whys and wherefores of life as it is lived, the world as it is, not our wished-for fantasy of the world as it should be. 1 present here a series of rules pertaining to the ethics of means and ends: first, that one's concern with the ethics of means and ends varies inversely with one's personal interest in the issue. When we are not directly concerned our morality overflows; as La Rochefoucauld put it, "We all have strength enough to endure the misfortunes of others." ***Gender Modified***

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    Governments = conseq'ist

    (

    Finn

    (J The government must always act in a consequentialist framework Alexander, Prof @ University of San Diego, 1987 (Larry Alexander, The Journal of Philosophy, Scheffler on Angent-Centered Perogatives, 1987 May p. 282)

    An equally important reason why Scheffler cannot plausibly posit conflicting moral permissions across the board, rather than as limited to discrete spheres such as athletic and business competition and (more problematically) self-defense, is that, without agent-centered restrictions, there is on important actor that is always obligated to produce an optimal set of consequences. That actor is the government. The government is not that kind of moral agent which can possess an agent centered prerogative with resvect to its own acts. It must always act as a thoroughgoing consequentialist, giving only impartial consideration to individuals weightings of their own proiects.

    Persoqal morality isn't analogous to political morality-states aren't people

    (Senior editor of Freedom Review) 93 James, M i ~ h t & Riaht After the Cold War: Can Foreian 9oticv Be M W . Ed. Michael Cromartie, p. 44-6

    , _ . . .

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    *

    (J Consequences must be evaluated - moral rights and wrongs are based on consequences themselves Johnson, prof philosophy @ Cambridge, 1985 (Conrad D Johnson, The Journal of Philosophy, The Authority of the Moral Agent, 1985 August p. 391-2)

    Recent moral philosophy shows much interest in the problem of how deontological constraints are to be reconciled with consequentialism. On the one hand there is the intuition that there are certain things it is simply wrong for an individual to do, even if violating the prohibitions would produce better consequences. On the other hand, moral prohibitions themselves are not above critical scrutiny and when we turn to this enterprise, consequentialism broadly conceived has a powerful claim; for how else are we to evaluate and possibly revise our conception of morally right behavior if not by reflecting on the consequences. Trouble develops when we try to reconcile deontological intuitions with consequentialist insights. Some versions of rule utilitarianism have seemed promising at first, but dissatisfaction returns when we try to give a careful explanation of the relationship between the rules that are utilitarianly justified and the particular actions that one is called upon to do. When it is absolutely clear to the agent in a particular case that following the rule will have worse consequences than breaking it, even though the rule is in general the best, is it morally right to break the rule? If the rule is conceived as merely cautionary and simplifying, then there is no argument against bypassing it in a particular case in which the situation is wholly clear and the calculation has already taken place or was unnecessary. On the other hand if the rule is conceived as having some independent authority, that what is the nature of this independent authority? The rule-bound or superstitious person might adhere to the rule for its own sake, but the rational person would not. If we follow the usual deontological conception, there are also well-known difficulties. If it simply wrona to kill the innocent the wrongness must in some way be connected to the consequences. That an innocent person is killed must be a consequence that has some important bearing on the wrongness of the action; else why be so concerned about the killing o f an innocent. Further if it is wrong in certain cases for the agent to weigh the consequences in deciding whether to kill or to break a promise, it is hard to deny that this has some connection to the consequences. Following one link of though, it is consequentialist considerations of mistrust that stand behind such restrictions on what the agent may take into account. But then again it is hard to deal with that rare case which the agent can truly claim'that his judgement about the consequences is accurate, or, in that last resort of the philosophical thought experiment, has been verified by the Infallible Optimizer. These counterexamples are a challenge, not because they are at all likely, but because they test our intuitions. The deontological conviction in even the more hard-bittern consequentialist among us seeks a deeper foundation than any prevailing and sufficiently consequentialist account is able to give.

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    Moral absolutism bad: clean hands, dirty results

    Their form of moral absolutism prioritizes clean moral hands over moral results: they are more concerned with not acting directly immoral than preventing much larger immoral consequences Nielsen 1993 (Kai, Phil. Prof @ U. Calgary, Absolutism and It Consequentialist Critics, ed. Joram Graf Haber, p. 170-2) Blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group drowns is still more monstrous. The consequentialist is on strong moral ground here, and, if his reflective moral convictions do not square either with certain unrehearsed or with certain reflective particular moral convictions of human beings, so much the worse for such commonsense moral convictions. One could even usefully and relevantly adapt here-though for a quite different purpose-an argument of Donagan's. Consequentialism of the kind I have been arguing for provides so persuasive "a theoretical basis for common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural t o suspect that intuition, not theory, is corrupt." Given the comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of consequentialism, it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square with such a theory, though, if it made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our considered moral convictions that would be another matter indeed Anticonsequentialisfs often point to the inhumanity of people who will sanction such killing o f the innocent but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and far greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and misery but merely forbore to prevent it? In such a context, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to me to constitute a moral evasion. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this circumstance is a harsh moral necessity he [fl allows. when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. He tries to keep his 'moral purity' and [to] avoid 'dirty hands' at the price of utter moral failure and what Kierkegaard called 'double-mindedness.' It is understandable that people should act in this morally evasive way but this does not make it right. ***Gender modified** *

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    C 1 No try or die scenario--mitigated solvency nulfifies the moral obligation to help others

    -

    Aikea, prof of philosophy @ Chatham College, 1977 (William, I Obligation, ed: Aiken and La Follette, p. 9 1-2) -

    The second minimal condition is the 'ought implies can' condition. & vrder to-be obligated to save the sufferer one must, have the means to remedv his condition, that is, have the ~oods or the capability to render the services reauhd to deviate the condition of the sufferer. I can o d be obligated m save you if I can save you. ? hus, if you are d y i n g 4 cf a blood transfusion of a very rare type of blood and I am available for a transfusion, but my blood type is incompatible with your blood type and thus of no use to vop, then no matter how severe your need is, I have no duty to save you because I cannot provide you with the goods you need. However, any person of the right blood type who knows of your condition and who is available to provide a transfusion has a mord duty to save you.

    -

    Government intervention in food distribution excuses us from our moral obligation to save the stamng people . .. Aiken, profof philosophy @ Chatham College, 1977 (William, World Hunger and Moral

    Oblisarion. ed: Aiken and La Follette, p. 96-7) - There is another excusing condition to the obligation to save persons from preventable death due to deprivation. If one has no access to an effective method of makina the ~ o o d s and services available to the stEferer,

    . ..

    then one is excued from the obligation to save the s&erer. For example, i$ a government intentionally prevents the delivery ot toarelief to starv- ing persons within that nation, then one possible methOd of delivering the load wodd be to destroy that government by ddaring war on it. h t h & wodd be to smuggle the food in with the knowledne that most of It would be confiscated. Another would be to drop packages from high flying air- craft wifih the hope that at least some of them reached the ground undam- -and were then received by those who need them. Each of these methods is a pmrible means of deliverinp the Food but none OF them is particularly rffkfiw. In this case, where no effective m e a i n 4 the food is available, we would b&xcu$edJ?om the obligation to save the starving persons in that nation. Of course, it might be that we have other moral responsibilities to find or to establish an effective method. We might evenbe required to coerce that government into permitting us to distribute the food necessary for the lives of persons within that nation; but this would be another type of moral responsibility, and justification of i t would require a separate argument. 410-3f

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    No moral obligation exists if you must risk sacrificing yourself to fulfill the obligation Aiken, prof ofphilosophy @ Chatham College, 1977 (William, Wodd Hun- and Moral Obligation, ed: Aiken and La Follette, p. 92-51

    , It states that 5 t render the M c e or

    tion of equivalent or . , . . -. &e servick and

    --

    own death by dehydration, then obviously I have no dutv to save v a . ariy, if to save you from feeezing to death I must

    've you my only coat and thus freeze to death mvself, then 1 have no' :oral duty to save you. This mndltion prevents the appeal to lifeboat situations of u k scam& from s w i n g as counterewmples to the right to be saved from death due to deprivation. The ethics of extreme scar& is perhaps different from the ethics of moderate scarcity or moderate abundance. Be that as it may, there are wry few situations in which the scarcity is so extreme as to warrant appeal to "lifeboat ethics" (which is, in my opinion, the same as prudent self-interest). One situation of such scarcity might be the case of the dotting factor for hemophiliacs. Another might be the use of a dialysis machine for those with kidney Failure. But very few cases demonstrate this extreme scarcity. The world hunger situa- tion is oot yet-pzcc the opinion of atany-a lifeboat: situation. It is more . of a problem of distribution, use, and waste of food than it is of scarcity OF food. -

    Self-defense necessitates immoral acts at times O'Keefe 2002 (Michael O'Keefe, Research Fellow at the ARC Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics., Terrorism and justice : moral argument in a threatened world, , 2002 p. 119) Bomb-throwing Russian anarchists of the nineteenth century, who gave themselves up for execution after they had murdered, arguably showed a kind of respect for human life even when they deliberately killed civilians. The 'softening up' operations that bombed tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers into the desert sands of Iraq and Kuwait, and which apparently provoked contempt for the United States in much of the Arab world, showed a brutal lack of regard for human life. It is hard to see how one could show such contempt for the humanity of combatants and at the same time show respect for the humanity o f civilians by carehl (and much publicised) attempts to minimise 'collateral damage'. Respect for the humanity of others is not so easily divisible. The frequent attempt to make it so is one of the reasons why George Orwell was scornful of the sometimes hypocritical importance we attach to the distinction between combatants and civilians.6 'Do you think our enemy will lay down its arms just because we insist on being nice!' That is how one former US general put his objection to what he regarded as the childish constraints moralists would place on the conduct of war. Crude though his expression of it was, the thought he expressed was not crude. Ever since Socrates claimed that it is better to suffer evil than to do it, the same thought has been invoked to remind us that in politics one has sometimes to decide whether one will adopt the only means available for one's defence or renounce them because thev are uniust. Nothing in morality can save us from the ~ossibility that we will face an enemy who is cunning enough to ensure that the only available means for our self-defence are evil. It is mere whistling in the dark to believe, as a distinguished Catholic moral- ist put it, that though morality may lead us to tragedy, it can never lead us to disaster.

  • SDI 2005

    In a nuclear world we have to weigh consequences. Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy, Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi, 1988

    The same argument can be made for Kant's other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: "So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means"; and "So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends." No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to- in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends& the icake ofjustice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one's conscience would be, as Rawls said, "irrational, crazy." And to say that one did not ,htefid Such a cafastro~he. but that one merelv failed to stop other Dersons from bringing it about would be beside the doint when the end of the world was atNbiake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit. the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously-perhaps td the ~ o i n t of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

    Nuclear war requires the evaluation of consequences Michael Moore, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law, 1997, Placing Blame, p. 7 19-72 1

    3. Non-Absolute Moral Norms: Threshold Deontology Apart from the exceptions that the content of moral norms must have for them to be plausible, a third modification of absolutism is the softening of the 'whatever the consequences' aspect mentioned earlier. This aspect of absolutism is often attributed to Kant, who held that though the heavens may fall, justice must be done. Despite my nonconsequentialist views on morality, I cannot accept the Kantian line. It just is not true that one should allow a nuclear war rather than killing or torturing an innocent person. It is not even true that one should allow the destruction of a sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill or torture an innocent person. To prevent such extraordinary harms extreme actions seem to me to bejustified. There is a story in the Talmudic sources that may appear to appeal to a contrary intuition. 122 It is said that where the city is surrounded and threatened with destruction if it does not send out one of its inhabitants to be killed, it is better that the whole city should perish rather than become an accomplice to the killing of one of its inhabitants. Benjamin Cardozo expressed the same intuition in rejecting the idea that those in a lifeboat about to sink and drown may jettison enough of their number to allow the remainder to stay afloat. As Cardozo put it: Where two or more are overtaken by a common disaster, there is no right on the part of one to save the lives of some by the killing of another. There is no rule of human jettison. Men there will often be who, when told that their going will be the salvation of the remnant, will choose the nobler part and make the plunge into the waters. In that supreme moment the dark- ness for them will be illumined by the thought that those behind wili ride to safety. If none of such mold are found aboard the boat, or too few to save the others, the human freight must be left to meet the chances of the waters. 123 There is admittedly a nobility when those who are threatened with destruction choose on their own to suffer that destruction rather than participate in a prima facie immoral act. But what happens when we eliminate the choice of all concerned to sacrifice themselves? Alter the Talmudic example slightly by making it the ruler of the city who alone must decide whether to send one out in order to prevent destruction of the city. Or take the actual facts of the lifeboat case'24 to which Cardozo was adverting, where it was a seaman who took charge of the sinking lifeboat and jettisoned enough of its passengers to save the rest. Or consider Bernard Williams's example, where you come across a large group of villagers about to be shot by the army as an example to others, and you can save most of them if you will but shoot one; far fiom choosing to 'sink or swim' together, the villagers beg you to shoot one of their number so that the rest may be saved.125 In all such cases it no longer seems virtuous to refuse to do an act that you abhor. On the contrary, it seems a narcissistic preoccu~ation with your own 'virtue'-that is, the 'virtue' you could have if the world were ideal and did not present you with such awful choices-if you choose to allow the meater number to perish. In such cases, I prefer Sartre's version of the Orestes legend to the Talmud: the ruler should take the guilt upon himself rather than allow his people to perish.'26 One should feel guilty in such cases, but it is nobler to undertake such milt than to shut one's eves to the horrendous consequences of not acting.

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    e o b ~ f h : uw ;$

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    ( ) Nuclear use is genocidal and escalates to further genocide - bi ions could die

    Weeramantry '96 (Christopher Gregory, Law Pf - Monash U & International Court of Justice Judge, "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons," July 8, http:/iwww.dfat.gov.au/intorgs/icj-nuc/w)

    Nuclear weapons used in reswnse to a nuclear attack, especially in the event of an all-out nuclear response, would be likelv to cause genocide by trignerine off an all-out nuclear exchange, as visualized in Section IV (inh.). Even a single "small" nuclear weamn, such as those used in Japan, could be instruments of~enocide, judging &om the number of deaths they are known to have caused. If cities are targeted, a single bomb could cause a death toll exceeding a million. Ifthe retaliatorv weawns are more numerous, on WHO'S estimates of the effects of nuclear war, even a billion ~eople , both of the attacking state and of others, could be killed. This is ~lainlv genocide and, whatever the circumstances, cannot be within the law.

    When a nuclear weapon is used, those using it must know that it will have the effect of causing deaths on a scale so massive as to wive out entire ~o~u la t ions . Genocide, as defined in the Genocide Convention (Art. 11), means any act committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. Acts included in the definition are killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental hann to members of the group, and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.

    In discussions on the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention, much play is made upon the words "as such". The areument offered is that there must be an intention to tareet a varticular national. ethnical. racial or reli~ious moup qua such group, and not incidentally to some other act. However, having regard to the abilitv of nuclear weapons to wipe out blocks of uo~ulation ranging from hundreds of thousands to millions, there can be no doubt that the weapon tarD;ets. in whole or in Dart. the national m o u ~ of the State at which it is directed.

    Nurember~ held that the extermination of the civilian ~ouulation in whole or in part is a crime aeainst humanity. This is preciselv what a nuclear weapon achieves.

    ( ) Nuclear war IS genocide - our disads operate within their own framework

    Lang'86 . (Beret, Professor of philosophy and hu~nanistic studies - SUNY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY: THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS, Eds: Avner Cohen & Steven Lee, p. 122-123)

    < ~ h c qucstion still remains whether genocide and omnicide are related to each other other than by elements of a common origin and chronology. Here it stems to me important to note features of a more direct connection between them. The main anc is thc fact that the thmt of omnicidepresuppo~ the phenomenon of genocide; that is, that omnicide itself implies genocide. is possible only by raking genmidc for granted. I mean by this claim somelhing mora than the vacuws logical relation that to risk the death of everyone is also to risk the death of the "kinds" of which individ- uals are members as well as of the singk kind to which the individuals taken togcOlet belong. The point I would stress is more substantive. namely, that the

    e as it is now evident is based on the willi ess of those who S E E E ! i i o y a noun ~u~ a nation) wi. m &on made or eve% w i b l c between ambarants and nonqmbatanb, bchucen adults and children, etc., and with no limits on the numbers or extent of extermination. It may be objected that this is not an inevitable feature of thc thnat of nuclear war; it is possi- ble to plan a more limited "action." and it is even possible that such limitations might work in practice. But the actual planning of nuclear deterrence is invariably of a different order than this. The idea of a nuclear strike (fim or counter-) is to prevent a response in kind, indeed, m y significant mponse, and the most obvious way to assure this is by preparation that, if implemented, would result in the virtual annihilation of a populace. Certainly no safeguards, not even any professions of safeguards, are offered by the nuclear planners against such an outcome. (And this says nothing, of course, about the distinct possibility of a global chain-reaction that might be triggered by severe, even "limited" nuclear explosions.) The logic of this planning suggests that if a single bomb could be built that would by ifseljdestroy an entire populace, this too would be readily sought (many of them, of course) as part of the arsenal of preparedness. Genocide has, in fact, been so much taken for ranted as a feature of nuclear war that it has nol, to my knowledge, Hen been

    kenboned as one of its presuppositions.

    [AT: NO INTENT]

    Undoubndly, one reason for such avoidance is the common place assumption chat nuclear war is like any other war, only Iarger in scale; because wars ofthe past have charactuisfically pursued the conquest, not the annihilation, of an enemy, this is also the ostensive ;&pose of nudearewar: any other outcome becomes an excep tional or chance occurrence. In any war, it could be argued along the same lines, and certainly in went, n o ~ ~ ~ c l e a r conflicts, attacks have occurred which, notwith- standing the generally limfed goals of those wars, have blurred any distinction between combatants and non-combatants; in this sense, again, nuclear war might seem no different in principle from no~uclear war. a t h e response to this objec- tion is no lus obvious: that in none of these other instances, devastating as they have been, hns it been imagin:ble that an attack would,ei&er by itself or in conjunc- tion with the response it evoked, result in the virtual destruction of a people, thus, that this destruction might follow necessarily-not as the result of an independern decision-from a first, purportedly limited decision It may well be that had such a possibility been an option in the past, it would in fact have been chosen; but I am not asserting that individual w corporate agents in the past were more morally enliehtened than their successors. onlv that the choices available to the latter have chanchanged radically. that the proskt oigenoci& as well as that of omnicide is noy enfailed in the willed consideration of nuclear war. > \=-

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    ..(Nuclear d i i r s e w r t vividly register that Giinc~ivcnas. It k _d no moral account that extinction may be onk r slinht m&$ty. No one can say & g m t the possibiiitv is. but na one has yet,

    C a-

    - flm of probbili~v sr . . k t-

    ( ) Any nuclear use risks human extinction Ka teb 1 986 coisscnt. p. I 64)

    Abnractly put, the connections betwecn my useof nuckar weapons and human and natural extinction arc scveral{~ac obviously, a sir- able ucbangc of strategic nuclnr weapom crus by a chain of cvents In nature, lead to the canh's uninhabitability. to *nuclear wintcr," or to Schell's %pubtic of i m t s and grass." But thc consideration of extinction cannot rest with the pasibility of a sizable cxchange of strategic weapons. It cannot mr with xhc im peratire t h t a sizable exchasp must not takc p'?4

    ( 1 Limited nuclear use promotes escalation and extinction Kateb 1986 Q, la)

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    ( ) They are responsible for the &ads and turns--foresigB makes them mmpHdt evm if they do not intend to muse harm

    our responsibility to aur successors is to avoid Mi foresmaNs ban on @em, Sad to act: *re w can in ways which we can foresee will or r ~ a y wxk to their benefit.. ('Could have foreseenr here pans 'could reasonably have been 3P==' to fareseerr and the thingr; that are foreseeable i n s s8nse aze not just Utoea which the kncwledge we b p p n to ham oharld bavs amhled ua to foresee, M also those cmwpurmcc~uhichwacutldhmtaoomctobeinawsitirnta

    ( ) Focusing on intentions gives us no guidance about the moral worth of policy-should look at consequences

    . . Hinman, profofphIlosophy, 1998 ~Lan-teticc. E t h i c s . P- 186) rLrnagurc a g a n h t the government u debattrig propoxd legislation to change hcalthsare benetiu foe the cldcrly. We could tumine the modvcr of thc i n d i v i d ~ ~ t o n and lobbvisa who support or. %pox the [email protected]$ttion. but lbrr miuht be of lidc king . . - .

    e h u the b ~tsclf M a goad one or not, We- fa example, that z 1- pcrcenraac of rhc DKID~C ?%o cithtr su 01 opporc them are mourntat bv a concern with mlicilidcrl admK2rnt or linancial q n . S m bc acting our of~rin- bmthc [email protected] mv & roughlv cvcnlv cpli~bcovccn the two camps. Laalcing a t rhex individual rnotivadonr, u2rnav decide that such nrotiwdons arc jwr a matar of pcrsond roncsn. -1 w whether h u t o r X u qonlrllv wcil rnodvjrcd in suppordna this Iceisladon. but thcv us

    lcalcing ac what results or conscaucnccs would hUow from ldqpting ihr Icdsl&on. We then srws these canscqucncu in t e r n of mme

    tbr cxmpic, in tcrm or' the mount oi plcvurc =dmp* t h e may causc. or in tcrm ot' the amounr of happincu and unbppi- ncu they m q causc. This is rou~hIg what rhc rule ucilidul scck to do: to sscss chc mom1 worth ol'a policy or rulc ill r c m oida consc. oucnces tlut it wiil probably have.

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    CHM I

    AT: Intent key

    ( ) Intent is impossible to determine in government policymaking: they vote for the plan for different reasons than the 1AC advantages Hinman, Prof of Philosophy, '98 (Lawrence, Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory, p. 186)

    When, for example, we want to assess the moral correctness of proposed governmental legislation, we may well wish to set aside any question of the intentions of the legislators. After all good laws may be passed for the most venal of political motives, and bad legislation may be the outcome of quite good intentions. Instead, we can concentrate solely on the question of what effects the legislation may have on the people. When we make this shift, we are not necessarily denying that individual intentions are important on some level, but rather confining our attention to a level on which those intentions become largely irrelevant. This is particularly appropriate in the case of policy decisions by governments, corporations, or other groups. In such cases there may be a diversity of different intentions that one may want to treat as essentially private matters hwen assessing the moral worth of the proposed law, policy, or action. Therefore, rule utilitarianism's neglect of intentions intuitively makes the most sense when we are assessing the moral worth of some large-scale policy proposed by an entity consisting of more than one individual.

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    ( ) Their obsession with certainty is misplaced-a less certain Ask of n much h r ~ r impact is moral reason to vote negative

    Problems with predictability don't justify rejection of utilitarianism- uncertainty is an inevitable part of the human condition

    endless comparisons. 1-cc far many of us. the nrast i d u e n d hctors- su& Y the hdividuds ls me& the Kcnds we dcvdoped, chc pcoptc we fdl in low dlh-wcrc ona rvc could ncvcr have prcdictcd.

    Mast ax utiliari3nt arc willing m agree wlrh uirics about &c lim- its of our prcdicdve powm. but th-* . . - a way that it no tonau c o u n t s d n ocr utilitarianism. Our o x d i e c

    -

    Uncertainty about future predictions doesn't warrant rejection of utilitarianism

    W v act in the social world if we did not bdcvt that thcre& p- cnl predimbiitv ro human behaor. This ~ c n b i i w d o a not hrve to uc cmplcre. Wc cyUnaJrc &in and be arr.

  • SD12005 Morality Toolbox

    Cuinmiskey (Asst. Philosophy M Bares C O I I C ~ ~ ) 99 @..id, aewirth: Critical Essavs on Action. Rationalitv. and Community, Ed. Michael Boylan, p. 134-5

    I would call i t -~oncre te c o n x q u c n t i d ~ ~ - B u t ~ w h a t e v c r wc call this ps i - tion, Kantian deonrologists arc ncrer satisfied when consequrntialists chanec lhr:

    subject in this way. Thcy always ss on and rule out by stipulation all the other \- dM1alivcs that a i r t i n 14 lilt* rirnihrll pic. Oswinh. his ibsolutism ':a* rn-vc way to his con

    . To be bricf, hc p r r c n l L o ugume& k*' $";~?zuphining h~:=~le of the intervening r m n fo~owr -L'

    trec y rn the Principle of Generic Consisknc~ Indccd. at this ctucial point In the acvcIopmcnt ot his normative thcory, mcrc assertion add t k intuitive appeal of the principle =places his more charac~nstrc carci l1rXrp3-0. Pet quite clearly much argument is wl lcd for. -

    shown. As Gcwirtlr cmphasizcs. all iiscnki have u righr not lo be killed. The qua- lion at issue i s whether il i s sor~tcliti~cs obligiltclry tcr kil l to prcvcnr morc killinjp.

    -

    Ilene rcvpnnds that i t is no1 kcausc i~nuthcr agenr is doing the killing. then om i s simply ssun~ing that the dury i r r qucstion is or! a p t - d a t i v e r~t r ic t ion. This unnqucd assumption. howvevcr, conllicts with rhr buic PGC nquircrncnt 10

    the rcmrists. As we have seen above. all orher lhings equal, the rights of all wil l be morc secure i f we accept u principle where the righu of a few give way to the rights of thc many,Thc consyucntialist criterion ofthe degneof needfulness for

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    ( ) Their intervening actors principle# is morally hollow-3 reasons -Diverts responsibility -Justifies inaction in tough circumstancm - -Ignores foresight of harms which makes us complicit regardless of intent

    -

    Gasper '99 @s, ~nstitote of social ~ t a d i e ~ , s he ~agae, ~ e d m h j ~ , . Bummu Jownal of Development Rseacb. vll, n2, Dcamber, p. 98-99)

    Qke & awseintending the cform~~] one but not rbc otha' [P& 19791. handy tool could & su non-supp to the Rwandese camps, mq bann to the r~m-canb&t ~ l & m & % M b&d& I? Pushed hard, as a way of living with the d e o n t o l o g i ~ t i o n s in

    - - -

    Roim Calholicism, tbe- dectrine ah ~enerated mnchlc89u i s~ &uch as+ Y h k w p i v e slot. machines Labelled "Par the. provention 'of disease onlc [bidu and corresponarng criticism Far if some cffectr of one's actions are the teactions of other actors, and some of tfieir d o n s are consided f o d or natmd, one is at l e a s C ~ y ~ n s i b 1 c ) f o r them. Mackie went f u d m and * rejected the doctrine as foIIows: 'if B's actiorq though neitha dcfensfile nor excusable, w ~ d bc confidcntl&tici& a response to A'S. @kc some responsiiility for the dt, and the more automatic B's response could be foreseen as being, the more of tfie responsibility for the result must

    ( ) Moral responsibility extends to foreseeble conseqences, even if not intended

    Gewi rt h (Department of Philosophy, Univ. d Chicago) 8 2 . .. Alan. Human Riohts: Essavs on Justification and Amlications, p. 183

    &his criterion is distinct from the crikrion of inrentionali~y. To be re- sponsible f0.r inflicting I eBd harms. a Wrson need not intend 07 desiso pro;i'ucc such harms, either- as an cnd o; as a mca . is suthcicnt 11 1% harms comc about as an uritnlcnaea oucnoreseccs lle nd c o n t i o ~ c ' efliicl of whs-or smEch. hOGs . ~ ~ v c th% actions or oolic?es undcr his control will lead to thc harms in qucs-

    4 a s tion. he can c o r k whether the harms will occur. so that it is within his power to prevcnt or at ]cast lessen Oic pmbabiliry of their occurrence by ceasing to engage in these actions. Thus. just as al l persons haw a right to informed control. so far as possible. over the conditions rclevanr to their incurring cancer and othcr serio~ls harms, so the causal and moral rc- sponsibility for inflicting cancer can be atfributcd to persons who have inforrncd control over other persons. sumering the lc thal harms of cancer.>

  • SDI 2005

    - Their Martin Luther King, Jr. example doesn't apply-- In that circumstance the consequential good outweighed the bad of his actions. MLK was in fact partly responsible

    - for riots and civil disturbances. The reason we look highly upon him is not because of intervenlng actors, but because his overall effort produced far more good than evil.

    P B p p a s (Managhg editor, Chmnides A Magazine of ~mwicdn Culture) 9 8 Theodore, Chicaao Tribune, July 5. 1998 p. lexis

    But how m order and the rghl to rebel coexist? As always. his example is the civil rlghts movement as led by Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. Carter

    "nonviolent protest is not passive. . . . 11 is intended, o btiw to the surface tensions that the s m l m Is desianed

    'to oascwe." But, Carter assures us, "all the noise' resulting from this form of pfotest was 'civil."

    But is this true? Certainly the noise of "Bull" Conno& attack dogs was anything but clvil, and the && of th

    enter his worlq,!aoe?-Can the praklers. bon'tius Pilate-like, abklve tiiernsehres Of responsibility for the b W y consequences of their acf~ns? And if one justides the consequences on grounds of a higher law, what Is to stop, say, the anti-abo~ofl lobby from killing more doctors, bombing more dhics, all in the name of greater civility? Carter's fine anafysls here comes up dm. Like it or mt, one of ?he Leff s pet strategies is cornlng home to roost, leaving a bloody-and uncivit-trail behind it.

  • Feldman 92 (Stephen, Associate Professor @ University of Tulsa College of Law, Georgetown Law Journal, June pp. 1874-6)

    I(ines #rsonal&xpriences of social iniustice and radsm urevmted him 60m being naive in his auest fot the belovcd community. 02.28 He undemood ttre complexity of human nature, and hc d i z c d that the *ad usually [*I8751 ~ d s t threats to thelr DO-. 11229 He remained etanally wary of

    the human propensities for depravity md for greedy pursuit of self-interest, and qmseaucntfy. ~s a matter of uofitieal tactics. he was not above advertin* to convcmenci~s benvecn the intcre~~ of whitesand African American$. For example. King argued tha! thc economic growth of the South r q u i d the aadication of racial dism'mination and that discrimination ddated tbc nation in world opinion. n230 But King emphasized. "These are practical wnsiderations all dictating one road. Yet above it all, a greater imperative demands fulfillment Throughout our histary, the moral decision has alwtys k m the correct decision." n231

    Thus, thc constitutional and political theory that emerges from King strongly membles the realistic civic republicanism of the framers. The framers atways rcmained committed to a government that pursues the cpmmon good, despite their recognilion that factions w u l d inevitabIy arise in a democracy. Lblvise; Kine always remained cammiaed to the beloved_ gmmunitv. des~itc recomizinp thc human oenchant for evil. 0232 The fraznas believed that through political dialogue, the community can arrive at the common good, while Kin! believed that Ihrough various forms of political dialogue, fie mmunitv can bush itself towards the ideal of the beloved community. The fiamess wcrc not above using factionalism to preserve h e republic: they s(ructurcd the govcmment so that thc tva-present potential fbr factionatism wuld d l y emourage govcmmmtal officials a pwsue the common good Illrr&l rnanwkile. was not &ove occasionallv u 4 n ~ white self-interest if it would hdo build the beloved communiw but he mlizcd that pure self-firtarsc ultimately is corrupt and therefore must be suborciTnattd to morality and love. 6 3 3

    King not only cch& the hmers, howvu, but also elaborated theit civic rcpublic8o vision. He understood the diviskencss of mism as well ss the need to take special stcps lo eradicatb it He recognized thc ncce~ity of empowering all individuals and groups throughout Arnwican society so that thtv could oarticiaate in thc political didome that is the lifeblood of the~comrn~nity. Pind be rmli;rd bat socfaiiustioc and wlrtjcal cau- demand [*1876] profound economic dm not &or or medies. In sum Kin& m n a l exDerlmcts of racism and ommion imbued his civic mublicanlsrn with a &ism fiy m e ha^^ mv known

  • SDI 2005

    ( ) f mba biIity assessment can not be used when examining catastrophes. The catastrophe should be avoided no matter what thR probability. Rescher, prof of philosophy @ U of Pittdwpk 1983 (JML p. 70-1) ' Camtropha are extraordinary ncgativities of particular d e v h t ~ - defiied as such in relation to hazards iylns wl- diary" range. A ca that that "inwrnparably worse" than any negativity within the ordinary range - an wen- -won &at is altogether unacceptable in relation to these minor negativities. As Figure 4 i~usuates, t a a whose neaativitv lies e n o n n o l b 2 i v m n d f hegativities of the ordinary range (that is, accordiilg to our earlier undmtanding, urceeding this range by more than thrtc of magnitude). Thus, catastrophic neeatidties are not dtoggthg:

    @commensurable withprdinary ones, it k just chat they cannot . '1'0 be sure, fhc

    fundarnentaly fluid situation. The question of what constituw a catastrophe - of just when dative intolerability and unaccgp tability begins - is once again an evaluative issue that hgeIy lia in the eyes of the beholder. With such drelative) catasmphe c it transpires that. in relation to any ordinary negativity H, cven the W t y of H is preferable to chancing a realization of the caIastrophic C. B r is is x,~at a ncm tivity that a "diopatit~ of risks" obtains between it and my neaatiyity of the 0- -

    Certain ~ k s that are extremely large are unacceptable no matter how the ematl the probability

    Rescher 83 m k . Prof Phil U of Pitt, p67) In such situations we are dealing with hazards that are just not

    in the same Ieague. Certain hazards are simply unacceptable_ because they involve a (relativdy) unacaptabIe threat - things may go wrong so badly that, relative to the altCinatIvcs, it's just ( not wolhwhilc to "run the nsk": even tn me face of a 6 -e rational man is not willing to trade / , off against one another by juggling probabiiites such outcomes as the loss of one hair and the loss of his health or hi freedom. The' @balance or dis~arity between the &kt is lust too great c o x restored k~~mbabi l i s t i c readJusLmenta They are (probabilis- tidy] incommensurable: soniontcd with such **hcomparablc'* h8zards. we do not bother to weigh this "balance of probabilities" afall. but simply dismiss one alternative as involving risks that are,, :n th

    - --

    .- ...e circumstances, "unacceptable." , -

    J

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    J ( ) Callahan concedes that genuine threats to survival cause tyranny Callahan, Director of International Program, PhD on philosophy in Harvard, 1985 (Daniel, The Tyranny ofSuwiva1 and Other Pathologies of Civilized Life, p. 91-93 Kim)

    The first requirement is that a way be found to respond to the need for survival without, at the same time, allowing that need to become a tyranny. The Wrannv can result either because of a panic in the face of a genuine threat to survival, because survival is invoked for self-interested or totalitarian political purposes or because of an unnecessarily or unrealisticallv high standard of acceptable survival. Perhaps it is possible to d o no more in the face of the last two possibilities than to be aware of their potential force, and by political and cultural debate to neutralize or overcome their baneful effect. The panic which can result from a real threat to survival will be more difficult to coue with. a uanic which can lead to draconian measures in the

    , .

    name of self-preservation. At that point, the question must be faced whether there can be such a thing as too high a price to pay for survival. I believe there can be, particularly when the proposed price would involve the wholesale killing of the weak and innocent, the sacrifice to an extreme degree of the values and traditions which give people their sense of meaning and identity, and the bequeath- ing to f h r e generations of a condition of life which would be degrading and dehumanizing. The price would be too high when the evil of the means chosen would be such as to create an intolerable life both for the winners and for the losers. While it might be possible to conceive of individuals willing to have their lives sacrificed for the sake of group survival, it becomes more difficult to imagine whoIe groups being willing to make such a sacrifice. And there is a very serious moral question whether that kind of sacrifice should ever be asked for or accepted, even on a voluntary basis.

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    AT: Absolute right to starvation (Watson '77)

    Uearlb the concept of pure justice produce$ an-e enturfw ago, wise men invented statutes or '

    lusllfy the rejection of such pure justice, in the interest of preventing ;ont&ual disdrder. The law zealously defcnds property rights, but an13

    relatively recent property rights. ~rawing a line after an arbitrary time has elapsed may be unjust, but the alternatives are worse.

    We are all the descendants of thieves, and the world's resources arp inecluitably distributed. But b a ,must begin the j&rney to tomorrow fmm he point where we are today, We-cannot remake the past. We cannot safcly divide the wealth equitably among all peoples so bng as people reproduce at different rdtcs. TO do so would guarantee that our grandchil- dren, and everyone else's grandchildren. would have only aruincd ivorld to ~nhabit. 4

    To' be generous with one's own possessions is quite differ- - nenerous with thosepf posterity. We should call this point to the attention

    of thosc who, from a commendable love of justice and equality, would institute a system of the commons, cither in the form of a world food bank, or of unrestricted immigration. We must convince them if we wish to save at teast some parts of the world from environmental ruin.

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox -- ( 4 Ar: k 4 t ( I

    ( ) Even Kantians can allow innocents to suffer for a greater good

    C m is key (P~D. UMich.. Fellowship WI Natml Endowment for the Humanities) 9 6 -

    David, )(antfan Conseuuentialisrn, p. (I . THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTIKC DUTIES

    What must a Kan~fan do when faced with the horrible choii between killing same p e o p o r Letting many more people dic?=if, for exanlple, the only way - ta end an otherwise lony: and brawn-out war *-ere bc to attack a populaiion cente>?Such an act wrdy constitutes aggrecdfon against many noncombatants tchildmn. the elderlv, dtizenr of tho opposing country who

    human suffering and opprerrionTnd that ft will save many lives. thest Is not ai d! &r why a bntian should not sacrifice come to swemy.1 The formula of --in-itsclf muire that me ~t UK anotherbldvb a means to a subjcctfve end. &ct in thk type of case. thr! cnds of the action areoblective. not Subiative tChId 427). Thc objmtiw end in qucstion is first to p m the l i w ,,, , and lib& that would bc lost by a prolonged conflict and, sceond, to promote. ' ' ' according to one's means, thc fvndarnentd and bash needsof 0 t h (MM 45a-r

    ( ) Sacrificing innocents for a greater good isn't anti-Kantiqh

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    (Michael D., Westmhtm lnstikrte for Ethics and Human Values, Wastminstcr College, Ontario, M _oralttv, p. 122-3)

    dlredty related to aid. WilJiam ~i l ren con&nds that people have a rbhtto-h wved fmm preventable due to deprivetion.'r 0ecelrse starvation is e form of deprivatlan, s right to be saved from sulwatlon Is a bpecim of the more general One. The right to besaved. &ken argues. is a moral fn rwn fight basedon a h ~ m ~ need. walnst sl persons.

    AP Alken specH~es thls right he avoids many of the above crfticisms of 0;Nefll's ergument" Rrst he does not clafm that people in devebped axlntrles diw c ~ ~ s e the deaths pf people In less devebped ones. but onty that they could h e prevented them. Second, he recognizes that people cannot claim the right If they

    ' have vokmnQriC aaumed risks of death by deprivation, Third, as 'wghf implies ' 'can', the right & not Impose a dvty on peaple unless they a n prevent the deaths. This establishes the "causal" connection. because s fanure to save when one can will be the cause of the person not having his right fuffilled. (Because this r!&t requlres one to act, the requirement of a causal conkctlon is satisfied if the failure to act is necessary for the deprivation.) Foud~. Aiken also limits the correlative duty to those people who are aware of pwsons' needs to be saved. The,central defect In Aiken's argument is that he nowhere dim argues for

    the right to be saved. Unfike the right not to be Wlled, thls right has not been widely reaxmized. The usual understanding of a right to Life is as a negative right &to be k i l l e d . ~ a s a positive right to be saved. Aiken states that the r iahk be

    " - - - --

    is W e d by an a m . k a mosl p r i e that .,p ro m~es mag mat I d u a l wehare for all."" This prindole rasembles the ufiliirien one, but it may dafer h requtdng that the wgffare of each indnridual. tamer fEKfl% total or w e W . be promored (Pareto q3timality). Unfortunatety. Aiken heither clarifies nor defends the principle. Nor does he show how the right to be saved is derived

    . from it. Alken suggests another argument for the tight to be w e d . namehr. that its

    recognit[on encapsulates and clarifies moral in&ons and argumentsw in particu- lar. hr claims that k recognkbnwifl be beneficial forthe world hunaef issue bv I11

    that it is 1101 one of pnxlence %what one mere ought-to do but of a ~ f l M o f &b, and [2) shifting the burden of prod trom those who need food to those who could prwlde it TMs ergomfmt begs the question. for Ohe issue preddy is whether the fallurn to provide food aid is wrong or simply the fallurn tb &something one o u g h t 7 I z t - 3

    -

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    Our alternative is threshold deontology-nuclear war requires a temporary suspension of Kantian rules-this doesn't collapse into total consequentalism Michael Moore, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law, 1997, Placing Blame, p. 7 19-722 Non-Absolute Moral Norms: Threshold Deontolorzy Apart from the exceptions that the content of moral norms must have for them to be plausible, a thud modification of absolutism is the softening of the 'whatever the consequences' aspect mentioned earlier. This aspect of absolutism is oAen attributed to Kant, who held that though the heavens may fall, justice must be done. Despite mv nonconseauentialist views on moralitv. I cannot accept the Kantian line. It iust is not true that one should allow a nuclear war rather than killing or torturing an innocent person. It is not even true that one should allow the destruction of a sizable city bv a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill or torture innocent verson. To urevent such extraordinary harms extreme actions seem to me to be iustified. There is a story in the Talmudic sources that may appear to appeal to a contrary intuition.122 It is said that where the city is surrounded and threatened with destruction if it does not send out one of its inhabitants to be killed, it is better that the whole city should perish rather than become an accomplice to the killing of one of its inhabitants. Benjamin Cardozo expressed the same intuition in rejecting the idea that those in a lifeboat about to sink and drown may jettison enough of their number to allow the remainder to stay afloat. As Cardozo put it: Where two or more are overtaken by a common disaster, there is no right on the part of one to save the lives of some by the killing of another. There is no rule of human jettison. Men there will often be who, when told that their going will be the salvation of the remnant, will choose the nobler part and make the plunge into the waters. In that supreme moment the darkness for them will be illumined by the thought that those behind will ride to safety. If none of such mold are found aboard the boat, or too few to save the others, the human freight must be left to meet the chances of the waters. 123 There is admittedly a nobility when those who are threatened with destruction choose on their own to suffer that destruction rather than participate in a prima facie immoral act. But what happens when we eliminate the choice of all concerned to sacrifice them- selves? Alter the Talmudic example slightly by making it the ruler of the city who alone must decide whether to send one out in order to prevent destruction of the city. Or take the actual facts of the lifeboat case'24 to which Cardozo was adverting, where it was a seaman who took charge of the sinking lifeboat and jettisoned enough of its passengers to save the rest. Or consider Bernard Williams's example, where you come across a large group of villagers about to be shot by the army as an example to others, and you can save most of them if you will but shoot one; far from choosing to 'sink or swim' together, the villagers beg you to shoot one of their number so that the rest may be saved. 125 In all such cases it no longer seems virtuous to refuse to do an act that you abhor. On the contrary, it seems a narcissistic preoccuvation with your own 'virtue'--that is, the 'virtue' you could have if the world were ideal and did not present vou with such awful choices-if you choose to allow the ~rea te r number to ~ e r i s h . In such cases, I prefer Sartre's version of the Orestes legend to the Talmud: the ruler should take the guilt upon himself rather than allow his people to perish.'26 One should feel rmiltv in such cases, k t it is nobler to undertake such milt than to shut one's eyes to the horrendous consecluences of not acting. I thus have some sympathy for the Landau Commission's conclusion that 'actual torture . . . would perhaps be justified in order to uncover a bomb about to explode in a building full of people'. If one does not know which building is going to explode, one does not have the consent of all concerned to 'sink or swim' together. On the contrary, one suspects that like Williams's villagers, the occupants of the building, if they knew of their danger, would choose that one of their number (to say nothing of one of the terrorist group) be tortured or die to prevent the loss of all. In any case, the GSS interrogator must choose for others who will pay the costs for his decision if he decides not to act, a cost he does not have to bear; this situation is thus more like mv variation of the Talmudic example than the original. any think that the agent-relative vikwjust sketched, allowing as it do& consequences to override moral absolutes when those consequences are horrendous enough, collauses into a consequentialist morality after all. Glanville Williams, for example, in his discussion of the legal defence ofn&essi&, recognizes the ggent-relative view that 'certain actions are right or wrong irrespective of their consequences' and that 'a good end never justifies bad means'. Williams nonetheless concludes that 'in the last resort moral decisions must be made with reference to results'. Williams reaches this conclusion because, as Williams sees if the agent-relative slogans just quoted reduce to the claim 'that we ought to do what is right regardless of the consequences, as long as the consequences are not serious'. Contrary to Williams, there is no collapse of agent-relative views into consequentialism iust because morality's norms can be ovemdden bv horrendous consauences.13' A consequentialist is committed by her moral theory to saying that torture of one person is justified whenever it is necessary to prevent the t o m r e of two or more. The agent-relative view, even as here modified, is not committed to this proposition. To iustifv torturing one innocent person requires that there be horrendous consequences attached to not torturing that person-the destruction of an entire city, or, perhaps, of a lifeboat or building full of people. On this view, in other words, there i s a verv hinh threshold of bad conseauences that must be threatened before something as a f i l as torturing an innocent person can be justified. Almost all real- life decisions a GSS interrogator will face-and perhaps all decisions-will not reach that threshold of horrendous consequences justifying torture of the innocent. Short of such a threshold. the anent-relative view just sketched will operate as absolutely as absolutism in its ban on torturina the innocent.

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    Threshold deontology maintains personal dignity but requires temporary suspension of Kantian rules at the threshold of nuclear war Larry Alexander, Warren Distinguished Professor of law, Fall 2000, San Diego Law Review

    In his 1989 law review article, Torture and the Balance of Evils, nl later republished as Chapter Seventeen in Placing Blame, n2 Michael Moore declares himself to be a "threshold deontolonist. " n3 What he means is this: There are some acts that are morallv wrone desoite uroducine a net uositive balance of conseauences; but if the positive balance of consesuences becomes sufficiently great - esueciallv if it does so by averting horrible conseauences as opposed to merely making people quite well off - then one is morally permitted, and perhaps reauired, to enRage in those acts that are otherwise morallv ~rohibited. Thus, one may not kill or torture an innocent person in order to save two or thee other innocent veoule from death or torture - even though purely consequentialist considerations might dictate otherwise. However, if the number of innocent people who can be saved from death or torture gets sufficiently lar~e . then what was morallv uroscribed - the killing or torture of an innocent person - becomes morallv uermissible or mandatory. At a certain number of lives at risk - the Threshold - consequentialist moral principles ovemde deontological ones. Says Moore: just is not true that one should allow a nuclear war rather than killinn or torturing an innocent Person. It is not even true that one should allow the destruction of a sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill torture an innocent person. To prevent such extraordinary harms extreme actions seem to me to be justified.

    Exceptions to moral precepts don't collapse into absolute consequentialism Michael Moore, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law, 1997, Placing Blame. u. 707

    SO& second complexity that must be introduced into any plausible agent-relative view is the possibility that norms like 'never torture' have implicit exceptions clauses to them It may seem that such 'possibility of an indefinitely large number of exceptions' renders this into a consequentialist view of morality,92 but this would be a mistake. We must distineuish exce~tions to norms-excedions which are s i m ~ l v a further filling out of the content of norms- from overriding norms on occasion even when we admit that they are by their terms a~vlicable.93 The distinction is as familiar as the common law lawyers distinction between distinguishing a precedent case's holding (by showing how an unstated exception to the holding exempts the present case from its true reach) and overruling a precedent case's holding (where we admit its applicability but refuse to follow it in the case at hand). With this distinction in mind, we can see that consequentialism is the view that we should ovemde moral norms like, 'don't torture', whenever the balance of good over bad consequences say we should. A non-consequentialist view of the complex kind here considered does not allow such ovemdings of moral norms; it does allow moral norms to be quite complex in their content because of its allowance of exceptions to norms like, 'don't torture'. The only way the complex anent- relative view would collapse into a consequentialist view of morality would be if one counted as 'exce~tions' items like, 'unless good consesuences dictate otherwise'. Such 'exceptions' would of course be nothing more than an invitation for a general consequentialist override of the norm in question.

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    ( ) CIqims of moral responsibility crush individual liberty 3

    Waller (Prof. at Youngstown State Univ.) 90 Bruce N., Freedom Without Resoonsibflitv, p. 203-4

    1 T ~ E OR~CINAL CLAIM was that moral responsibility must be dis- tinguishcd from individual freedom: h e no-fault naturalist d a

    . . . . .. .'

    of moral responsibility does not -ua[ free- dom, and evidcnce of (naturalist-c~rn~atibilist) individual freedom docs not count in favor of moral responsibility. This chapter has brought the argument full circle: instead of mutual s u ~ p o r t b -

    inquiries into the c- (both autonomous and het- eronomous) behavior, promotes punitive rather than positive social

    .pro~rams. and enmuraga i inegalitarian social policies. Withqut tbc - hobbles of spurious moral r c s I ~ ~ ~ ~ ccc 01 inor r -c to u ' $ ' T i

    I freedom. -J z o 7 /Cj'

    -.-- -

    IS the optimum environn~ent-fir individual

    ( ) Notions of moral responsibility quash freedom-only rejecting moral responsibility can preserve freedom and avoid absolutism

    Waller (Prof. at Youngstown State Univ.) 90 Bruce N., Freedom Wllhout Re~g~t)sibilitv, p. 186

    Moral res risibility, "just dacrts," and retributive punishment L&ans of ~r,crvint in$vid4 frsdoy and d i g nity; instead,thc no-fault naturalist dental ot moral responsibility is more likely to promote and protcct genuine jndividual frcdom. In particular, the notior: of no-fault naturalist's opposing frccJorn

    - - -

    a.pd imposing narrow "mind control" on anyone who dcviates is a grossly mistaken one. Nothing in determinism-naturalism or in the no-fault naturalist denial of moral responsibility implies such rcprcs- sivencss, and in fact (as wit1 be argued in the final chapter) no-fault naturalism is more naturally supportive of the broadat dn&leest m m c s p o n - =ity have ~ndeed championed autlioritarim intdcrancc; Irowcvcr, tbwc authoritatinti and absolutist vicws st& from the rcligiow- as in "one truen religion-and not from tlic denial of moral re- sponsibitiry. That type of Absolutism is indeed a threat to tolerance aid openness and individuality. But such absolutisr~intoknnn is m& likciy to be found in a system of motaf r_eswnsibiliru and just deserts and r e ~ u t i o n ; i t is not && rn floy&h in aa enviro~~~itent of no-ICeuIt rtatrcralisnr.) - 3 ~ 4 b

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    ( ) F4eje&ing moral responsibility is the only way to work towards both morality and freedom

    Wailer (Prof. at Youngstown State Univ.) 90 Bruce N., Freedom Without Peswonsibility. p. 200-1

    ... ,..... 8 , . ..... -..- - # * r & n moral ruponsibility;s dcnicf, - thc fundamental 'ustification bipunirhrnenr is undcrhiiicd: no one will e v a dc3crvr *rn the other direction, effective dtenmtivcs to punishnlent arc opencd 9 Rather than relymg hcavily on punishment (because it is "justly deserved"), a more effective alternative is to encouraxe behavioral patterns that arc incompattble~with the u n d e s i r a b l e M r . f i c s- who~aplaatxsin f r w fear qLOunishmerlt isnot acting freely; thc studenr who is not temvtcd to bccause s F E Z & d to c n i o y r h c I a t i o - n g and wrltmg and thinking for hecseif-and because shc valucs the spirit of lnte~rcctual community that plagiarism b e t r a y s - n e l y acts freely, but is also less likely to engage in p l a e i a r e than is thestudent who rcfrains from fear of punishment. But (as noted in Chapter Ten) optimal use of nonpunitive measures rcquires aban- doning the traditional conception of just descns.

    (bchavior incompatible with the bchavior to the individual who behaves detrimentally or

    special treatmgnt-more benefits (through a pattern of stretched interval reinforcerncnt, for example) lhan are

    -7

    a&ded the individual who bchayes hvell. Such a "violation" of ' ' j ~ s t descrts" cannot b c used cffectively so long as the myth of moral respons~bility remains. Without m&al responsibility, there is gkater scope for morc positive and frecr (noncocrc~ve ano nonponi- tive) methods to shape free and "responsible" behavior-behavior performed bccausc the person wants to do it, behavior h a t ulti-

    mately is sustained and strengthened by natural sources of positive reinforcement: ( -LE~G .-(

    . I

    ) Denying moral responsibility maximizes Individual freedom Waller (prof. at Youngstown State Univ.) 90 Bruce N.. Fr eedorn Without Res~onsibilltv~ p. 195

    i . ! .- Tftn NO-FAUI:~ N A T U M ~ ~ ~ C O ~ moral r- . ,. .

    \cnt w i l l ~ valuian and prcsccw individual freedom. In particular, dcnyiilg word responsibility does not Iicensc assaults on individ~l freedonl under ihc guise o i ..therapy." But thc claim to bc agucd i z h p t e r is stronger: individual freedom is nor thrtatcncd by iro-fault naturalism; ro t l~ccontrar~, tlle_no-Caul naturalist denial of moral rcspsnsibilitv lish - t i for preserving, koadcning, and stten- . . .- . (4

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    CHM 1 --

    National security should trump civil liberties

    Civil liberties should be curtailed during times of emergency, like the war on terrorism --The public supports it --The past has many examples of measured restrictions --And, we always re-balance rights after a period of reflection Kubler, 2004 (Joseph, St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary, Spring, I8 St. John's J.L. Comm. 63 1)

    We expect some constitutional protections to erode in the face of danger. 1121 Indeed, using the classic economics of law approach, Judge Richard A. Posner argues that "[civil liberties] should be curtailed to the extent that the benefit of greater security outweighs the cost in reduced liberty." n22 "In wartime one can expect "protections will be ratcheted down to the constitutional minimum,"' said Justice Scalia. n23 Certainly the public sentiment is not ovenvhelminglv against many of these restrictions, as a survey of Harvard law students shows overwhelming support of racial profiling at airports. n24 Judge Posner correctly points out that our government's exaggerated responses in the past were considered reasonable at the time; only after a period of calm reflection could what was excessive be separated from what was necessary. n25 However, after the period of calm and with the benefit of hindsight we have separated out what was proper and exaggerated and then put up procedural safeguards to protect against repeating our indiscretions. n26 The real question should be, do these safeguards hold up when we are faced with the next [*636] threat? Under what force will the levee break? Will we revert back to McCarthyism or detention followed by a period of apology or are we witnessing the slow judicial and political evolution of constitutional protections and civil liberties our forefathers contemplated?

  • SD12005 Morality Toolbox

    CHM 1 --

    Separation of Powers violated now Congress violating separation of powers in religion vs. state area Walston, Deputy Attorney General California, 2001 (Gregory, University of Hawaii Law Rev, Summer, LN) Separation of powers principles prohibit Congress from interfering with the core functions of another branch. n54 In Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Chadha, 11.55 the Supreme Court defined core functions as duties that are central to a branch's ability to perform its constitutionally-assigned responsibilities. n56 In that case, the Court was faced with whether Congress could maintain a "legislative veto" over deportation decisions. n57 The Court invalidated Congress's unilateral deportation decisions, holding, inter aha, that deportation decisions were a core executive function because they were essential to the executive branch's ability to perform its constitutionally-assigned responsibilities. n58 Therefore, these deportation decisions were core functions of the executive, and separation of powers principles precluded Congress from abrogating executive authority to make such decisions. 1159

    Under the delicate balance of power between the legislature and the judiciary, "the power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary." n60 Where Congress enacts a statute that re-intemrets a constitutional provision by changing the requisite standard of showing a constitutional violation, the statute is an impermissible usurpation of the [*487] powers of the judiciary in violation of separation of powers principles. n61 In RLUIPA, however, Congress has, once again, reinterpreted the Constitution by shifting the burden of proof in constitutional claims: RLUIPA states, "if a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a claim alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause . . . the government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim . . . ." n62 RLUIPA thus creates constitutional rights in violation of the Supreme Court's explicit holdings in City of Boerne and Chadha that separation of powers principles preclude Congress from doing so. n63 RLUIPA's transparent re-interpretation of the judicial burden of proof in a constitutional claim under the First Amendment is a patent infringement on the powers of the judiciary under City of Boerne and Chadha.

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    Privacy violations now

    CHM 1 --

    Privacy violations are inevitable - Privacy Act proves government has no incentive to protect privacy and will eventually erode it Hong, 2005 (Haeji, Akron Law Review, "Dismantling the Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act of 1974: Doe V. Chao", LN)

    The government's illegal or careless disclosure of the social security number to third parties, for any reason, is similar to leaving one's front door wide open - inviting thieves to steal. Because of limited resources and the difficulty in tracing identity thieves, law enforcement rarely catches identity thieves. n284 This problem is compounded because most identity theft victims do not find out that their identities have been stolen until long after the theft has begun. n285 [* 1091 Thus, at the present time, safeguarding the social security number and other identifying information to prevent identity theft is more effective than relying on law enforcement to catch identity thieves. Therefore, government agencies must take stringent proactive measures, now more than ever, to protect the privacy of individuals' personal information. 3. The Importance of Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act To do so, government agencies should follow the Privacy Act and the guidelines of the Privacy Act more vigorously. Unfortunately, given the government's lack of incentives and the low priority on protecting the right of privacy, the Privacy Act is onlv effective if government agencies are compelled to follow it. To prevent substantial harm, such as identity theft, individuals must be able to bring actions to enforce the government's protection of individuals' informational privacy before substantial damages arise. By swiftly bringing actions when illegal disclosures initially occur and forcing the government to pay the statutory minimum damage amount, individuals can compel government agencies to protect privacy more effectively and proactively.

    Recent Supreme Court decision has upheld violations of Privacy Act Hong, 2005 (Haeji, Akron Law Review, "Dismantling the Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act of 1974: Doe V. Chao", LN)

    The Supreme Court's narrow construction of the Privacy Act will force individuals to overcome unrealistic hurdles. The majority contorted the statute and the legislative history to reach a result that restricts individuals from effectively enforcing the Privacy Act. n206 On the other hand, the dissent's straightforward statutory construction is consistent with the purpose of the Privacy Act: n207 The Court's restrictive interpretation is especially disturbing because the Court, in effect, held that individuals have no remedy for the government's unlawful disclosure of a person's social security number. n208 But if individuals have no effective remedy, who will enforce the Privacy Act? Historically, the government has proven itself to be a poor enforcer of the Privacy Act. n209 Thus, the Court's ruling in Doe v. Chao decimates the likelihood of future enforcement of the Privacy Act.

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    Due Process violated now

    CHM 1 --

    School districts violate due process rights of students New York Law Journal, 2005 (April 7, 2005, "School District Is Not Entitled to Immunity, Under Eleventh Amendment, in Gun Case", Lexis-Nexis)

    The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the state from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, A$1. In Plaintiffs first claim, he contends that Defendant Deny's consideration of B.G.'s written statements in his April 25, 2001 decision without providing Plaintiff an opportunitv to cross-examine B.G., especially in light of the fact that B.G.'s statements constit~~ted the only evidence directly implicating Plaintiff, denied him a fair hearing and violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) at An3 1; Plaintiffs Memo. (Dkt. No. 15) at 22. In Plaintiffs second claim, he contends that the School District violated his due process rights by adopting Defendant Deny's decision in its June 1, 2001 resolution without sufficient evidence. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) at ,4733. In any procedural due process claim, the initial inquiry should always be whether a property interest or right exists. The Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), held that property interests derive from state law. Article XI, Section 1 of the New York Constitution declares that the State shall provide children with a fi-ee public education. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, ,481 ; see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW Atj3202(1). Thus, in New York, a student such as Plaintiff has a protected property interest in his education. meaning that he could not have been deprived of that right without due process of law. Pollnow v. Glennon, 594 F. Supp. 220, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

    Due Process violations occurring in schools New York Law Journal, 2005 (April 7, 2005, "School District Is Not Entitled to Immunity, Under Eleventh Amendment, in Gun Case", Lexis-Nexis)

    Constitutionally, due process "I-equires that individuals have 'notice and opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' prior to a deprivation of life. liberty, or property." Rosa R. v. Connelly, 889 F.2d 435,438 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 3 13 ( 1 950)). "Notice must be 'reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to appraise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their obiections."' Id. at 439 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 3 14).

    Defendants also contend that it is well established in the context of disciplinary proceedings that post- discipline due process provides sufficient due process to satisfv the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Def. Memo. (Dkt. No. 8) at 18. In Giglio v. Dunn 732 F.2d 1133, 1135 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit noted that "due process requires only that a hearing be held at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," and that "[wlhere a predeprivation hearing is impractical and a post-deprivation hearing is meaningful, the state satisfies its constitutional obligations by providing the latter." Id. at 1135. The court found that an Article 78 proceeding is such a meaningfd opportunity. Id.; See also Richardson v. Capt. Van Dusen, 833 F. Supp. 146, 153 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (McAvoy, C.J.) ("[Elven when assuming that the Superintendent's Hearing was conducted in [a] manner that deprived plaintiff of his due process rights, the process afforded the plaintiff in the Article 78 proceeding cured any defect in the original hearing."); Monroe v. Schenectady County, 1 F. Supp. 2d 168, 172 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (McAvoy, C.J.) (finding that an Article 78 proceeding provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy and constituted "all the process plaintiff was due."); Gudema v. Nassau County, 163 F.3d 717, 724 (2d Cir. 1998).

  • SDI 2005 Morality Toolbox

    Separation of powers has exceptions

    There are exceptions to the separation of powers principle Lononwski, '96 (Susan, Brandeis Law J, Spring, 34 U. of Louisville J. of Fam. L. 421)

    n48 Id. at 701. In Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla. 1972), Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous court, stated: We think it is approvriate to observe that one of the exceptions to the separation-of-powers doctrine is in the a


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