Artillerymen of the Seventh Army in France ready their 105 mm. howitzer for firing on the Germans. Emplacement is covered with light snowPhoto taken near St. Die, France, November 1944. U.S. Army photograph.

by Janice McKenneyU.S. Army Center of Military History

Representative Ross A. Collins: You are going to cling tothe 75-mms?

General C. M. Wesson [Chief of Ordnance]: Well, I supposeso, for the time being.

Mr. Collins: There are many people here in the Army whowant to cling to them?

General Wesson: Yes; and it may be observed that we havea lot of ammunition for the 75-mms.

Mr. Collins: And that would be the only reason?General Wesson: No. It has been greatly improved, and is a

splendid weapon. France has not abandoned it.1

12 March 194080

THROUGHOUT the history of the United States,Army officers have argued that Congress and ultimately the

American people have been at least partially responsible for theArmy's unpreparedness at the outset of our major wars. EmoryUpton and others have claimed that the Americans' fear of per-manent standing armies and their genuine regard for peace andantipathy for war influenced Congress to make parsimoniousappropriations to the Army during peacetime, thus rendering theArmy unprepared for war. The negligible danger of foreign inva-sion and the necessity for limiting expenses have also been put

MILITARY AFFAIRS

More Bang for the Buckin the Interwar Army:The 105-mm. Howitzer

Military Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 2. (Apr., 1978), pp. 80-86

forth as contributing factors. And yet, in one instance it was theArmy that was reluctant to adopt a new weapon. It was not untilafter the fall of France in June 1940 that the War Departmentmade a concerted effort to replace the obsolete 75-mm. gun withthe 105-mm. howitzer, the weapon that was to become the back-bone of the divisional artillery in World War II.

Because of conflicting views within the Army as to the properrole of the 105-mm. howitzer, its adoption as a replacement for the75-mm. gun was delayed until after World War II began inEurope. In the years immediately after World War I, most artil-lerists had seen the 105-mm. howitzer as a replacement for the155-mm. howitzer, the divisional general support weapon. But asthe years passed and the 75-mm. gun became more obsolete,many artillerymen wanted to adopt the 105-mm. howitzer as areplacement for the 75-mm. gun instead.

IN World War I the armament of the divisionalfield artillery brigade had consisted of two light 75-mm. gun

regiments (48 guns) and one 155-mm. howitzer regiment (24 how-itzers) , plus a trench mortar battery. In furnishing direct supportto the infantry, there were enough guns to provide one battalion(12 guns) for each infantry regiment. The 75-mm. gun was a lightweapon with a slightly longer range than the 105-mm. howitzer,but its projectile was small and not very powerful and its trajec-tory flat. The 155-mm. howitzer provided high-angle fire supportfor the division as a whole and counterbattery fire, but it washeavy and not as mobile as the 75-mm. gun and 105-mm. howitzer.Even during the war artillerymen saw the need for a weaponheavier than the 75-mm. gun and for a howitzer lighter and moremobile than the 155 to provide high-angle fire. Major Charles P.Summerall, who had commanded the 1st Division's artillery atCantigny and had risen to command the V Corps, recommendedthat the divisional artillery brigade be increased by one regimentof 105-mm. or 3.8-inch howitzers. Summerall felt that the lighthowitzer was indispensible in all classes of warfare and wasespecially suited for wooded areas and ravines. It was the bestweapon for giving depth to barrages, and it had the same mobilityas the 75-mm. gun.2

After World War I General John J. Pershing and others thoughtthat the Army should be organized into small, highly mobile,hard-hitting units, but throughout the twenty-year period beforeWorld War II, the divisions remained slow, large, not particu-larly hard-hitting, and not well adapted for maneuver. Modernequipment and improved means of transportation were neededbefore smaller units could be made as effective as large organi-zations, but during the interwar period the Regular Army wassmall, and the necessary funds were not available. For fieldartillery, as well as for the division as a whole, the main problemlay in trying to balance the two important requirements of powerand mobility. Writing in the years immediately after the war,theorists blamed the artillery for the positional warfare that haddeveloped and felt that the solution to breaking the stalemate layin surprise and forward movement with emphasis on the tank andmachine gun. In reacting against positional warfare, theystressed mobility, smaller units, and less artillery.3

Suggestions for changes needed in the field artillery of WorldWar I were incorporated in the report of the Hero Board, a boardof officers named after its chief, Brigadier General Andrew Hero,Jr. Appointed on 9 December 1918 by the Chief of Field Artillery,the board studied the experiences gained by the artillery of theAmerican Expeditionary Forces (AEF). The same month Chiefof Staff Peyton C. March, another former artillery officer, ap-pointed a board of artillery and ordnance officers headed byBrigadier General William I. Westervelt to study the armament,caliber, types of materiel, kinds and proportions of ammunition,and methods of transportation to be authorized for a field army.The reports, submitted in early 1919, became the basis for fieldartillery development for the next twenty years.4

APRIL 1978

The Westervelt (or Caliber) Board based its recommendationson recent war experiences, relying heavily on the Hero Board'ssuggestions, the stocks of materiel on hand, and probable post-war reductions in appropriations. It classified the recommendedmateriel into two types: practical types for immediate develop-ment and ideal types for future development. As a basic princi-ple, the board recommended that one of these types should ide-ally accomplish all the requirements of divisional artillery. Sincesuch a solution was impractical, the board suggested that inaddition to the 75-mm. gun, a light field howitzer such as the 105 besubstituted for the 155-mm. howitzer in the division. Field artil-lery was supposed to be sufficiently mobile to neutralize theinfantry of the opposing forces. The immediate targets werethose obstacles preventing the advance of the friendlyinfantry.Close contact with the supported infantry, forward dis-placement with reasonable facility, and sufficient ammunitionsupply were necessary to accomplish the task. For these re-quirements the 155-mm. howitzer was too heavy, even though itwas motorized. (Motorization had not yet reached the pointwhere the howitzers were sufficiently mobile for divisional sup-port in terrain where there were no good roads.)5

After each arm or branch of service had evaluated its organiza-tion, a general board (known as the Superior Board) met toincorporate the recommendations on organization and tactics. Inthe meantime, the Organizational Section of the General Staffwas preparing outlines for tables of typical divisions, corps, andarmies, based in part upon those recommended by the SuperiorBoard, but differing somewhat because of the growing belief thatthe AEF division (approximately 28,000 men) was much too largeand unwieldy.

General Pershing, one of the critics of the cumbersome AEFdivision, felt that much of the Superior Board's report was basedtoo heavily on the needs of positional warfare in Western Europeand not enough on a war of movement. Pershing thought the onlyway a mobile division could have its organic artillery with it at alltimes was to reduce the artillery permanently assigned to it. Hesuggested a division of 16,875 men that included one field artilleryregiment of 75-mm. guns rather than three regiments of 75-mm.guns and 155-mm. howitzers. This would have reduced thenumber of divisional artillery weapons from the 72 of the AEFdivision to 36, and placed the general support mission with thecorps rather than with the division. The division which the Or-ganizational Section of the General Staff contemplated, on theother hand, had an approximate strength of 24,000 men and in-cluded one field artillery brigade of two 75-mm. gun regiments(48 guns). This plan conformed to Pershing's idea that the155-mm. howitzer should be eliminated from the division, butdiffered in that it retained the artillery brigade structure.6

General John J. Pershing.U.S. Army photograph.

Lesley J. McNair, 1937.

81

Robert M. Danford, Chief ofField Artillery, 26 March 1938to 9 March 1942. U.S. Armyphotograph.

General George C. Marshall.Photo courtesy U.S. SignalCorps.

These and other points of disagreement seemed so importantthat the War Plans Division of the General Staff appointed aspecial committee (known as the Lassiter Committee after itshead, Colonel William Lassiter, also an artilleryman and formerAEF general) to resolve the differences and to plan the organiza-tion of the Army to conform to the recently passed NationalDefense Act of 1920. Meeting in June 1920, the Lassiter Committeediscussed the merits of the large AEF division and the smallerone recommended by General Pershing, taking into considera-tion that the increased range and mobility of artillery indicatedthat the forces of major foreign powers encountered in futurewarfare w<ould be organized in great depth. Although the commit-tee wanted a division that would insure mobility, the division'sfirepower and power of penetration were also important. A divi-sion of two infantry brigades and one artillery brigade was not asmobile as a division of one infantry brigade and one artilleryregiment, but its mobility could be improved if auxiliary andsmaller units were reduced, and it would have greater strikingand penetrating power.7

Copies of the report were forwarded to the chiefs of arms andservices with instructions to prepare tables of organization. Therecommended division had an approximate strength of 19,000.With regard to the field artillery brigade, the committee thoughtit could be reduced by eliminating the howitzer regiment withoutdisturbing the brigade structure. The committee decided to re-tain the brigade with two 75-mm. gun regiments; with the de-velopment of a light howitzer with the same mobility as the75-mm. gun, as had been recommended by the Westervelt Board,the howitzer regiment would be reinstated in the divisional artil-lery brigade.8

Although the improved plan of 1920 called for the eventualreplacement of the 155-mm. howitzer in the division by a new 105,there were those artillery officers who felt that the 75-mm. gunshould be the weapon replaced. They argued that the latter guncould not reach an enemy positioned behind a good-sized hillbecause of its flat trajectory. Nor, for the same reason, could theweapon be placed behind a hill. In addition, the 75-mm. projectilewas too small to be of sufficient power. During the war the UnitedStates and France had been the only major belligerents notequipped with a light field howitzer. Many artillery officers be-lieved that from the standpoint of mobility, ammunition supply,and rate of fire, there were many advantages in adopting the lighthowitzer to replace the light gun.9

IN order to provide the weapons recommended bythe Westervelt Board, the War Department launched an ord-

nance program. In field artillery development, the OrdnanceDepartment constructed new weapons after receiving instruc-tions from the Field Artillery branch. The department would

develop a pilot model, which would then be tested for technicalqualifications at the Ordnance Proving Ground in Aberdeen,Maryland, and for its utility by the Field Artillery Board.10 Iffound satisfactory, the model would be adopted as a standard; ifnot, the department could build a new model and attempt tocorrect the deficiencies of the original. Before or after standardi-zation, the weapon could be issued to the Field Artillery Schooland to tactical units for extended testing in the field to determineits serviceability under war conditions.

In the interwar period, however, insufficient funds causedmore effort to be placed on modernizing the large stocks of exist-ing weapons, especially their mobility, rather than on developingnew ones. Efforts were made throughout the 1920s to produce asatisfactory 105-mm. howitzer, but the economy made consider-able production of new materiel and equipment almost impossi-ble. Using captured German 105-mm. howitzers as models, theOrdnance Department built two prototypes before the end of 1921.Unfortunately, the Field Artillery Board found both weapons tooheavy (based on a six-horse draft), too clumsy to be easily man-euverable by hand with a normal gun crew, structurally weak,and generally unsuitable for adoption.11 Standardization of a105-mm. howitzer, Ml, designed primarily for draft by horses orslow tractors, was accomplished in 1927. The Field ArtilleryBoard found the weapon generally satisfactory, although the car-riage needed some improvements. In 1929 the possibility of man-ufacturing enough 105-mm. howitzers for use as divisional gen-eral support artillery seemed extremely remote, even though thenew models of the 155-mm. howitzer were more mobile than theold because of improvements in their carriages. Since there wasa small increase in the budget that year, the War Departmentdecided to reinstate the 155-mm. howitzer in the division, whilereducing the authorization for each corps artillery brigade by one155-mm. howitzer regiment.18

Although the War Department reinstated the 155-mm. howitzerin the infantry division, interest in developing the 105-mm. how-itzer did not wane. Its development was hampered, however, byan increased desire to have an all-purpose weapon for the infan-try division, a weapon that would also be capable of performingas antiaircraft artillery. In 1930 Chief of Field Artillery Harry G.Bishop reported that ten 105-mm. howitzers, M2 (only slightlydifferent from the Ml), were under manufacture, but not yetready for issue. In October of the following year four 105-mm.howitzers were delivered to Battery F, 1st Field Artillery, at theField Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, for testing. Al-though they expressed faith in the basic idea of the weapon, theField Artillery School staff found the M2 unsatisfactory for anumber of reasons. Nevertheless, after extended testing andsome modifications, the M2 model of the 105-mm. howitzer wasapproved as a standard on 23 May 1934. Because of reductions inallotments, however, its manufacture had to be eliminated fromthe program for fiscal year 1934. Again in 1935 redesign of the105-mm. howitzer's carriage was postponed to enable the moder-nization of the 75-mm. gun, the weapon that was fast becomingthe Army's idea of an all-purpose gun. The modernization pro-gram for that weapon had been so successful that plans weremade to equip all active divisional 75-mm. gun batteries with newcarriages by the end of fiscal year 1937. These modificationspermitted high-speed towing (motor-drawn) and wider traverse,but they did not really improve the firing capacity of the gun. Atthe same time the program for modernizing the 155-mm. how-itzer carriages continued.13

IN the 1930s the Army again made efforts to re-organize the division in light of war experiences and recent

developments in motorization, mechanization, air power, andfirepower. A grant from the Public Works Administration hadmade it possible to increase the motorized equipment in both theNational Guard and the Regular Army. The major western

82 MILITARY AFFAIRS

European nations and Japan had reorganized their troops intosmaller divisions, based on three infantry regiments rather thantwo brigades of two regiments each. In January 1936 Chief of StaffMalin Craig appointed a committee to study the modernization ofthe Army. The committee was to consider the recommendationsof the chiefs of arms and services, the service schools, and otherindividuals; the organization of foreign divisions; and modernimprovements in weapons and transportation. The tentative or-ganization of the proposed division included one completelymotorized field artillery regiment of one 105-mm. howitzer bat-talion for general support and three direct support battalions,each with two 75-mm. howitzer batteries and one 81-mm. trenchmortar battery. The light howitzer had recently been developedfor direct support in the cavalry division.

Most of the armament was not available, however, and thecommittee suggested substituting available older weapons. Ta-bles of organization were prepared and theoretically tested at theservice schools and by small units. By September 1937 the 2ndDivision at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, was directed to test the newdivisional structure in the field. A basic criticism of the proposeddivision was its lack of sufficient artillery support.14

Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair, commander of the 2ndField Artillery Brigade of the 2nd Division, pointed out that theWar Department reorganization committee had placed too greatan emphasis on artillery in close support of the infantry. Thisemphasis was reflected in the number and organization of the81-mm. mortars and the substitution of the 75-mm. howitzer forthe 75-mm. gun. He believed that modern artillery had greatpower in the individual projectile and that the key to success layin the massing of fires on decisive points. Rarely in war, hereasoned, would there be sufficient artillery to cover all pointsthoroughly and continuously; therefore, fire should be massed insuccession on the most important targets. The procedure re-quired centralized control, great flexibility in delivery, consider-able range, and good communications. Given improved methodsof fire direction and using firing charts upon which base pointscould be plotted with fair accuracy, McNair thought that the gainin close support in the proposed division was more than offset bythe loss in effectiveness of the artillery support as a whole. Ifartillery lost its power to mass fires over a wide front and wasdissipated in local combat, then it would no longer exert theinfluence that had given it such importance in the past. McNairurged that close support weapons (the light howitzers and mor-tars) be kept at a minimum and direct and general supportweapons at a maximum. The division needed more heavierweapons and fewer lighter ones.15

Others, too, had mixed reactions concerning the proper arma-ment of the proposed division's artillery. There was a generaltrend to have weapons of heavier calibers than the 75-mm. gun inforeign armies. The German army was rearming with a new

105-mm. howitzer, and other major powers were taking an in-terest in the weapon. Also, the modernized 155-mm. howitzer withits high-speed carriage was much more maneuverable than pre-vious models. Since many infantry officers still considered the75-mm. gun unsatisfactory for close infantry support because ofits flat trajectory and its small projectile, some hoped that if the105 were ever introduced, it would replace the 75-mm. gun insteadof the 155-mm. howitzer. Even though the United States showedincreased interest in the 105-mm. howitzer, there were still toomany 75-mm. guns (with ammunition) left from World War I. Asan economy measure, these weapons were being modernizedwith new carriages. The project for developing a satisfactorycarriage for the 105-mm. howitzer to match its already satisfac-tory tube was too low in priority to receive much attention whilethe 75-mm. guns and 155-mm. howitzers were being updated.16

By June 1938 new tables were prepared, and the 2nd Divisionwas selected for extended testing. Although the 1937 tests hadshown that a four-battalion field artillery regiment presented nomajor tactical problems, the shortage of experienced command-ing officers and the trend of foreign armies to increase artilleryresulted in the regiment's division into light and medium units.The light regiment consisted of nine 75-mm. gun batteries, or-ganized into three battalions. The medium regiment consisted ofone 105-mm. howitzer battalion and one 155-mm. howitzer battal-ion. The armament of the proposed division thus consisted ofthirty-six 75-mm. guns, eight 155-mm. howitzers, and eight105-mm. howitzers, for a total of fifty-two weapons. The 1937 testshad shown that the 155-mm. howitzer was superior to the 105because it had greater firepower and, most of all, availability.Still, the tests also pointed out that the 105-mm. howitzer was abetter weapon against personnel in the open. Despite the testresults, Chief of Staff Craig reported that the project of supplyingRegular Army divisional units with the modernized 75-mm. gunwas progressing and that of rearming the divisional units with the105-mm. howitzer had begun.17

Chief of Field Artillery Robert M. Danford had directed theField Artillery School in June 1938 to study the 105-mm. howitzerto determine what desirable characteristics the weapon shouldhave and what the weapon's proper role should be in the division.According to the directive, the school staff was to choose betweenusing the howitzer as the sole weapon in the division or as theaccompanying general support piece for the 75-mm gun. But thestaff instead suggested that a combination of 105-mm. and155-mm. howitzers be adopted. As a substitution for the 155-mm.howitzer, the 105, they felt, had little to recommend it exceptincreased mobility. The small gain in mobility, however, wouldbe more than offset by the sacrifice in firepower. Noting experi-ences in recent wars, especially the civil war in Spain, the stafffelt that any reduction in firepower was unacceptable.18

Although the school's report stated that the proposition to have

Type

75-mm. gun & carriage,M1897 (horsedrawn)

75-mm. gun, M1897 &carriage, M2

75-mm. howitzer &carriage, M3A1

105-mm. howitzer &carriage M2A1

155-mm. howitzer &carriage, M1918

APRIL 1978

WEAPONS CHARACTERISTICS AS OF APRIL 1940

Weight ofgun & carriage(pounds)

2,657

3,250 (withoutshield)

2,000

4,950

8,262

Muzzle velocity(Ft/sec)

1,805

1,805 (M1 shell)1,755 (shrapnel)1,950 (M48 shell)

1,250

1,550

1,479

Maximumtraverse

6°

85°

45°

45°

6°

Maximumelevation

19°

45°

50°

64.3°

42.33°

Maximumrange (yards)9,200 (6,930 maximumpermitted by carriage)

9,200 (M1 shell)9,760 (shrapnel)13,500 (M48 shell)9,200

12,200

12,530 (shell)10,835 (shrapnel)

83

the 105-mm. howitzer as the sole divisional weapon had much torecommend it, the report also asserted that there would be greatadvantages in retaining the 155-mm. howitzer as a general sup-port weapon for increased firepower and for counter-battery fire,considered one of the best means of infantry support. If the105-mm. howitzer were substituted for the 155, it seemed veryprobable that the need for more artillery support would be se-verely felt. In conclusion, the report assumed that the 105-mm.howitzer was the best and only substitution for the 75-mm. gun,but noted that "in regard to the economic aspect of the situation itis realized that the large stock of 75-mm. guns on hand cannot bescrapped at the present time. For any war in the near future theymust be used."19 The economic situation proved a deciding fac-tor, for in December 1938 Danford warned the school that if a warerupted, the field artillery should expect to use the 75-mm. gun,M1897 modified, since the project to equip the Regular Armyunits with the modernized weapon was near completion.20

The attempt to realize the ideals of the Westervelt Board hadresulted in the production and modernization of the 75-mm. gunas an "all-purpose" weapon. The gun was a remarkable accomp-lishment in design, but in reality it was inadequate for either of itsprimary purposes. It did not have the necessary characteristicsof a first-class antiaircraft gun, and it was too heavy and compli-cated for division-supporting missions. Its range had been im-proved by the modifications in its carriage, but its trajectory wasstill flat and its projectile was not as powerful as that of weaponswith higher calibers.21

IN the early months of 1939 Congress was planningits military appropriations for 1940. Noting threatening condi-

tions in Europe, it was anxious to be prepared for a possible war.After the Bureau of the Budget had approved the authorizationfor modernizing the 75-mm. gun, Congress tried to eliminate it.The report of the Senate subcommittee on appropriations con-tained the following statement:

The 75-millimeter gun is being supplanted in foreign ar-mies with the 105-millimeter weapon, which has greaterrange and fires a heavier missile. Our Ordnance Depart-ment is developing such a gun and, undoubtedly, will beready to go into production. If that is to be the weapon of thefuture, the committee questions the wisdom of continuingto spend large sums on the old 75's.22

The War Department objected strenuously, stating that therange of the 105-mm. howitzer was somewhat less than that of the75-mm. gun, that the 105 required a longer time to go into action,that the 105 had not been proven in battle, and that there were stillabout 3,500 French 75-mm. guns with ammunition left over fromWorld War I. Chief of Field Artillery Danford pointed out thatreplacing the 75-mm. gun with the 105-mm. howitzer would cost$87,500,000. This figure did not include manufacture of the 105'sammunition, of which there was none on hand.23 The moderniza-tion program was reinstated in the Appropriations Bill for 1940.

Tests by the 2nd Division were completed on 31 August 1939, andthe preliminary report showed that the organization of the divi-sional artillery was sound. The Chief of Staff recommended thereorganization of five Regular Army divisions at peace strengthunder the new triangular structure. This recommendation wasapproved on 19 September 1939, but the new tables were slow inbeing published and some of the equipment was not available. Asa result, the medium artillery was armed with the 155-mm. how-itzer rather than with the 105/155 combination that had originallybeen planned.24

The reorganization committee prompted the Chief of Field Ar-tillery in January 1940 to send questionnaires to each of the fivetriangularized divisions, in part to determine the policy for war-time production of the 75-mm. gun and the proper armament mixfor the division artillery. Of those answering the questionnaire,about 75 percent did not want the 75-mm. gun in the division, themost popular suggestion being a mixture of 105- and 155-mm.howitzers. Their reasons for desiring the 105/155 combinationwere much the same as those stated by the Field Artillery Schoolin 1938.25

The following month Chief of Staff George C. Marshall reportedthat progress had been made "in the important program formodernizing our field-artillery weapons." Appropriations per-mitted 1,439 of the 75-mm. guns to be modernized, and Marshallthought the modified piece especially suitable for fire againstmechanized targets and unsheltered personnel. Still thinking interms of a defensive war on this continent, Marshall noted that"concrete fortifications and masonry villages of Europeanbattlefields may dictate a need for a weapon firing a heavierprojectile than…the 75-mm. gun, but our forces would rarely beconfronted with such targets in this hemisphere."28 As for finan-cial considerations, Marshall continued the reasoning of the pre-vious year, stating that,

From a financial standpoint alone the virtual junking ofthe 75-mm. gun and ammunition and the expenditure ofvast sums to equip the Army with the 105-mm. howitzer,and with the necessary reserve ammunition would be dif-ficult to justify. The modernization of the 75-mm. carriagecosts $8,000 while the cost of the 105-mm. carriage is$25,000. To substitute the 105-mm. howitzer for the 75-mm.gun would involve an expenditure of $228,000,000.…Thereis no 105-mm. ammunition on hand, and we do have some6,000,000 rounds of 75-mm. ammunition valued at$60,000,000. To replace those 6,000,000 rounds by an equalnumber of 105-mm. rounds would cost $192,000,000.27

Crew of Battery B, 33rd Field Artillery, load and set a 105-mm. how-itzer for firing, in defense of the Kasserina Pass, North Africa, Feb-ruary 1943. Note gun set up in Arabic mud-block abode. U.S. Armyphotograph.

The War Department was aware, however, of the tendency inforeign armies to replace the light gun with a heavier caliberweapon, so in March 1940 the department adopted a standard105-mm. howitzer for production. Available funds provided for 48of these weapons to be manufactured, and the Army planned totest these in the infantry division alongside the modernized75-mm. guns to determine their proper role. Congress was stillnot pleased with the Army's attitude concerning the 75-mm. gun,and one representative stated that he thought it was time the gunswere shipped off to the Smithsonian. Because of the situation inEurope, the production schedule was increased. The program formodernizing the 75-mm. gun was to be completed by mid-1941,

84 MILITARY AFFAIRS

and the authorization for 105-mm. howitzers was increased from48 to 120.28

In May 1940 conditions in Europe worsened. The Allies, both inEurope and elsewhere in the world, were asking the United Statesto furnish weapons and supplies. The President and Congressincluded 75-mm. guns as surplus items that were available fordistribution, although the Army continued to protest, declaring .that if war were to come soon, the 75s were the only plentifulweapon available. By June, 1,095 of the 75-mm. guns had beensold as surplus (these, however, were not the modernized 75s),and orders were issued expediting the delivery of the 105-mm.howitzers. At this time only fourteen 105-mm. howitzers wereavailable, while all models of the 75-mm. gun totaled 4,236. Eventhough more 105s were authorized for production (one reasonbeing that more units were being activated) and many of the75-mm. guns were being declared surplus, the gun was stillscheduled for use as the principal divisional direct support artil-lery weapon while the 105-mm. howitzer was slated to accompanyit as the general support weapon.29

By June 1940 it became obvious that massive rearmamentwould be necessary. Manufacturing more 75-mm. guns, weaponsthat had been in use for over forty years and were only beingmodernized as an economy measure, was not the answer to therearmament problem. In addition, the real need for heavier artil-lery weapons in the infantry division became clearly evidentwhen reports prepared by field artillery officers during the man-euvers held in April and May became available for study. Almostunanimously, the officers recommended removing the 75-mm.gun from the division artillery and substituting the 105-mm. how-itzer. While the Field Artillery branch was studying the reports,the War Department was planning to reorganize the triangulardivision, hoping to have its final decisions made in July. On 27June 1940, two days after Germany concluded an armistice withFrance, the Organization and Training Division (G-3) of the Gen-eral Staff sent a memorandum to the Chief of Field Artillery,stating that the decision had been made to reorganize the divisionartillery with four battalions—three direct support battalions of105-mm. howitzers and one general support battalion of 155-mm.howitzers. The War Department issued the reorganization ordersfor nine triangular divisions on 10 September 1940, using tables oforganization and equipment that were to be published in October.Although the divisions were to continue using the 75-mm. gununtil the 105-mm. howitzers became available (which did notoccur on any large scale until 1943), the era of the long outmoded75-mm. gun in the division was over.30

ALTHOUGH some critics have claimed that theWar Department was too conservative in its approach to

defense planning, the reasons behind its delay in adopting the105-mm. howitzer as a replacement for the 75-mm. gun weremore complex. At the end of World War I, the consensus in theArmy was that the 105-mm. howitzer should be developed andadopted as the divisional general support weapon. As develop-ments were made in the mobility of the 155-mm. howitzer and inthe perfection of a new 105-mm. howitzer, the trend of thinkingchanged. Those who wanted the howitzer to be adopted wished tosee it used as a direct support weapon. The conflict helped toforestall any decisions on the howitzer's adoption and contributedto the basic conservatism of the Army, caused by severe con-straints in the budget. The large numbers of 75-mm. guns and thevast amount of 75-mm. ammunition on hand hindered the de-velopment of the howitzer. Because of prewar neglect in mattersof procurement and research and development, the design andmanufacture of the 105-mm. howitzer could not be carried outovernight. In fact, the delay in producing the howitzer was not aslong as it might have been because of the little progress that hadalready been made in developing the model adopted in March1940. But the War Department, realizing that mass productioncould only be accomplished in a period of eighteen months orlonger and believing that it should be prepared for immediatewar in the event of an attack, tried to plan for an army that wouldbe able to fight as soon as possible. After it was clearly evident,through the 1940 maneuvers and the German successes inEurope, that a weapon heavier than the 75-mm. gun would beneeded in the division and after the War Department was assuredby Congress that that body would do all in its power to achievemassive rearmament as rapidly as possible, the Army readilyadopted the 105-mm. howitzer as the basic divisional field artil-lery weapon, one of the most outstanding achievements of WorldWar II.

Janice E. McKenney is the Chief of theOrganizational History Branch at theU.S. Army Center of Military History. Agraduate of East Carolina College, shereceived her MA degree from Duke Uni-versity in 1974. Her special interests in-clude the organizational structure ofU.S. Army units. This paper was ac-cepted for publication in April 1977.

REFERENCES1. U.S. Cong., House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings

Before the Subcommittee.. .on the Military Establishment Ap-propriations Bill for 1941, 76th Cong., 3rd sess. (1940), 574.

2. Charles P. Summerall, report (26 Dec. 1918) in reply to letter,Hqs, AEF, G-3 (24 Dec. 1918), Summerall Papers, Box 16, Libraryof Congress. Also see E. S. Bectold, "Attack Experiences,"(typescript p. 4) in U.S. Army Field Artillery School Library,Fort Sill, OK.

3. See Fred K. Vigman, "The Theoretical Evaluation of Artil-lery After World War I," Military Affairs, 16 (Fall 1952), 115-118;reprinted in Field Artillery Journal, 44 (Jan.-Feb. 1976), 21-23+(hereafter cited as FA Journal).

4. Report of the Ch, FA, AEF, 1919, Folders 381-386, RG120, NA;WD Annual Reports, 1919, 5528-5538; "Proceedings of the Boardof Officers convened by…Office of the Ch, FA, 9 Dec. 1918" [HeroBoard Report], copy in U.S. Army FA School Library; WD GO 289(11 Dec. 1918); "Report of a Board of Officers, Appointedb y . . . ( ' A Study of the Armament , Calibers and Types ofMateriel.. . ' ) , 5 May 1919" [Westervelt or Caliber Board Report],copy in the U.S. Army FA School Library. The Caliber BoardReport was also published in FA Journal, 9 (July-Aug. 1919),289-347.

5. Westervelt Board Report, 7, 10-11; Harry G. Bishop, "TheTrend of Development of Field Artillery," lecture at AWC (19Dec. 1930), copy in the U.S. Army FA School Library; John P.Lucas, "The 105-mm. Howitzer," FA Journal, 31 (Feb. 1941),66-69; Report of the Ch, FA, AEF, 20; Hero Board Report, 9;Wrapper Ind. to Sec. of War (16 June 1920), Superior Board Re-port and AEF, GHQ, Board of Officers, "Report of SuperiorBoard on Organization and Tactics, Section II, Artillery," 46, Box2205, Files 80-82, RG 120, NA.

6. Wrapper Ind. to Superior Board Report; Superior BoardReport, 32-62; A. W. Lane, "Tables of Organization," InfantryJournal, 18 (May 1921), 486-503.

7. Ibid.; "Report of Special Committee Appointed by the Direc-tor, War Plans Div. to Define the General Plan of Organization tobe Adopted for the Army . . . " [Lassiter Committee Report], copyprinted in AWC Course Materials 52-29, pp. 2-7, U.S. MilitaryHistory Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

8. Ibid.9. Report of Summerall (26 Dec. 1918), Summerall Papers;

Statement of Lesley J. McNair, Subject: Armament of Arty, etc.(25 Jan. 1919), copy in the U.S. Army FA School Library; RileySunderland, History of the Field Artillery School, Vol.1: 1911-1942

APRIL 1978 85

(Fort Sill, 1942), 154-155; Lucas, "The 105-mm. Howitzer," 66.10. The Field Artillery Board had been established at Fort Sill,

OK, the site of the Field Artillery School, in 1915. In 1922 the boardmoved to Fort Bragg, N.C. in order to ease the burden of theschool commandant and to make use of the facilities at FortBragg. One of the board's functions was to test weapons in thefield.

11. Lucas, 'The 105-mm. Howitzer," 68; Sunderland, History ofthe FA School, 154-155; Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., "Weapons andEquipment Evolution and Its Influence Upon Organization andTact ics . . . , " monograph, U.S. Army Center of Military History,Washington, 72. For details concerning the development of a105-mm. howitzer using captured German models in the 1920s,see File 472.23B, Box 121, RG 177, NA.

12. WD Circular 21 (13 April 1929); WD Circular 29 (16 May1929); WD Circular 39 (29 June 1929); WD Circular 27 (26 May1930); WD GO 2 (1 March 1928); "Annual Report, Ch, FA, FY 26,"86, Box 1342, and Annual Report, Ch, FA, FY 29," 25,31, Box 1337,AG 319.12, RG 407, NA; Ordnance Committee Minutes 15639 (20Feb. 1940), Modern Rec. Div., RG 156, Washington National Re-cords Center, Suitland, Md.

13. Ibid.; "Report, Ch, FA, FY 30," 13-14, Box 1336; "Report,Ch, FA, FY31," 13-14, Bulky pkg. 7-20-31(1); "Report,Ch, FA, FY32," 13, Box 1332; "Report, Ch, FA, FY 33," 10, Box 1933; "Re-port, Ch, FA, FY 35," 1-2, Bulky file 8-3-35 (1), AG 319.12, RG 407,NA; Sunderland, History of the FA School, 130. One should notconfuse the all-purpose divisional gun with the infantry's desirefor an "accompanying battery." In 1921 a howitzer company wasadded to the infantry regiment, although "howitzer" did not re-ally describe the weapons in it. For a discussion of this companyand its successors, see John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh,Infantry, Part I; Regular Army (Washington: GPO, 1972), 53-54,63-64, 66-67.

14. Memo, Col. Wm. H. Dodds, Jr., to Actg. Cmdt, Subject:Reorganization of the Division and Higher Units (17 Dec. 1935);CL 400.12/7988-B C4-1, from Ch, Inf. to TAG, Subject: Reorgani-zation of Divisions (31 Dec. 1935); Memo for Ch, Staff, Subject:Initial Report of the Organization Committee on "Organization ofthe Army'' (30 July 1936), 21; Memo, Lesley J. McNair to CG, 2ndDiv. (8 April 1937). All the above are in U.S. Army MilitaryHistory Institute. Harry C. Ingles, "The New Division," InfantryJournal, 46 (Nov.-Dec. 1939), 521-529; "Infantry Division Test,"Army and Navy Register, 101 (18 Sept. 1938), 4.

15. Memo, McNair to CG, 2nd Division (8 April 1937).16. Ingles, 'The New Division," 521-529; CD. Roberts, "The

Infantry Division," Infantry Journal, 43 (March-April 1936),140-144; Ch, Inf. to TAG (31 Dec. 1935), 6.

17. AG 320.2 (3-20-37) Pub., Subject: Fld. Svc. Test of proposedInf. Div. (26 March 1937), from TAG to CG, Eighth Corps Area,Fort Sam Houston, Texas; AG 320.2 (19-3-38) Misc., (Ret) MC,Subject: Reorganization of the 2nd Inf. Div., to CG, Eighth CorpsArea (13 Oct. 1938); Highlights of Report of CG, 2nd Div. onProposed Inf. Div., Lesley J. McNair (31 March 1938); AG 320.2(9-3-38) Misc., (Ret)-M (15 Oct. 1938), Subject: Reorganization of2nd Inf. Div., to CG, Eighth Corps Area. Copies of these letters arein the U.S. Army Military History Institute. "The Infantry Divi-sion," 144; Ingles, "The New Division," 521-527; U.S., Depart-ment of War, Report of the Sec. of War, 1937, 35. It should be notedthat the 105-mm. howitzer was not distributed to units on a widescale until 1943.

18. Ch, FA to Cmdt. FA School (25 June 1938), File No.462.23/C-45; "A Study of the 105-mm. Howitzer," prepared bydirection of the Ch, FA, at the FA School (Sept. 1938), 1-2, filed inUL/303/A4 (105 mm) A5 1938/U.S.F.A.S./B32695, U.S. ArmyField Artillery School Library.

19. Ibid., 2, 17-19, 42.20. Sunderland, History of the FA School, 154-155; U.S. De-

partment of War, Report of the Sec. of War, 1938, 34.21. U.S. Army FA School, History of the Development of Field

Artillery Materiel (Fort Sill, 1940), 67.22. U.S. Cong., Senate Committee on Appropriations, Hearings

Before the Subcommittee…on HR 4630, 76th Cong., 1st sess.(1939), 4.

23. Ibid., 4-5, 40-41, 62-66.

24. Hqs, Prov. 2nd Div., Subject: The Test of New DivisionOrganization, to CG, Eighth Corps Area (7 Sept. 1939);G-3/33651-55, Memo for Ch, Staff, Subject: Reorganization of theInf.Div. (14 Sept. 1939); G-3/6541-Gen 597, Memo for the Ch, Staff,Subject: Organization of Regular Army, First Priority (17,000increase), (16 Sept. 1939), copies in the U.S. Army Military His-tory Institute and U.S. Army Center of Military History.

25. "Digest of Materiel Section Questionnaire of Maneuvers,"undated; "Questionnaire on FA Matters," undated; "Analysis ofQuestionnaire on FA Matters," undated; AG 320.2 (1-4-40) M-C-M(25 Jan. 1940), Subject: Questionnaire on FA Matters; "Notes forConference with Army and Corps Area Commanders" (30 Nov.39); AG 320.2 (12-5-39) M-C-M (18 Dec. 1939), to the five Triangu-lar divisions, Subject: Reports from Triangular Divisions, all inBox 17, RG 177, NA.

26. U.S. Cong., House, Hearings on the Military EstablishmentAppropriations Bill for 1941, 4-5.

27. Ibid.; Memo for Ch, Staff, from Ch, FA (13 Jan. 1940),Subject: Reasons for modernizing 75-mm. guns, Box 883, RG 165,NA.

28. U.S. Cong., House, Hearings on the Military EstablishmentAppropriations Bill for 1941, 573-574; U.S. Cong., Senate,Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Committee onAppropriations, …on HR 9209, 76th Cong., 3rd sess. (1940), 29-30,32, 221-224, 419, 421; U.S. Cong., House, Hearings Before the Sub-committee of the Committee on Appropriations, …on SenateAmendments to the Military Establishment Appropriations Billfor 1941, 76th Cong., 3rd sess. (1940), 2.

29. U.S. Cong., House, Hearings Before the Subcommittee ofthe Committee on Appropriations, …on the Supplemental Na-tional Defense Appropriations Bill for 1941, 76th Cong., 3rd sess.(1940), 64-65; U.S. Cong., Senate, Hearings Before the Subcom-mittee of the Committee on Appropriations, …on HR 10055 (Ap-propriations for 30 June 1941), 76th Cong., 3rd sess. (1940), 2-3;Memo, Ch, Ord to Ch, Staff (22 May 1940), Subject: Availability ofOrdnance Materiel for Release without Adversely Affecting Na-tional Defense; Memo for President from Sec. of War (17 June1940); Memo for Ch, Staff, from Asst. Ch, Staff (11 June 1940),Subject: Foreign purchase of 75-mm. guns, all in Box 883, RG 165,NA; C. M. Wesson [Ch, Ord], "Our Rearmament , " ArmyOrdnance, 20 (May-June 1940), 368; Harry C. Thompson and LidaMayo, The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply(Washington: G.P.O. 1960), 70, Table 8 (also printed in ConstanceMcLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thompson, and Peter C. Roots, TheOrdnance Department: Planning Munitions for War[Washington: G.P.O. 1955], 74).

30. Memo for Ch, FA from WDGS, O&T Div., G-3 (27 June 1940),Subject: Reorganization of the Inf. Div.; 320.2/AA-65/EA-3,Memo for Asst. Ch, Staff, G-3, WD GS, (9 July 1940), from Off, Ch,FA; 320.2/AA-65-7, Off, Ch, FA to FA School (16 July 1940);320.2/AA-65/EA-8, Off, Ch, FA to FA Board (16 July 1940);"Comments of FA Board on Letter 320.2/AA-65/EA-8, DCFA (16July 1940), Subject: FA Component of Inf. Div.," to President, FABoard, Proposed organization of FA component of TriangularDiv.," (forwarded 29 July 1940); Memo for Ch, Staff (13 Aug.1940), from the Ch, FA, Subject: FA Component of the TriangularDiv.; AG 320.2 (8-12-40)P (C), (23 Aug. 1940), Subject: Charts fororganizations of the triangular divisions, the type army corps,and army troops…all in Box 17, RG 177, NA. AG 320.2 (8-31-40) M(Ret) M-C, Subject: Reorganization of Triangular Divs. (10 Sept.1940), copy in the Organizational History Branch, U.S. ArmyCenter of Military History; Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff:Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington: G.P.O. 1950), 205;Thomas R. Phillips, "Traditionalism and Military Defeat,"Infantry Journal, 48 (March 1941), 26; "The King of Battles,"Fortune, 23 (Feb. 1941), 71. It may be noted that Danford stillwanted to use the 75-mm. gun in some capacity, one suggestionbeing as an anti-tank weapon. The Field Artillery Board andChief of Ordnance did not agree. See Ltr 472.12/BN-64, Off, Ch, FAto Pres, FA Board (3 April 1941) and 1st Ind, FA Board to Ch, FA(17 May 1941); Ltr 472.12/BN-66, Subject: Modifications of75-mm. Guns M1897A4 for Anti-Tank use, Ch, FA, to Ch, Ord (29April 1941), Box 115, RG 177, NA.

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