Municipal Court of Everett Washington County of Snohomish In re: ( No. CRP-3735 City of Everett (PetitionforDismissal V. (of all Charges & Return Brandia Taamu (of all Seized Property û Brandia Taamu moves the court for an order dismissing this action City ofEverett V. Brandia Taamu for these reasons: 1) It will be shown that my affirmative defense is in fact credible & that my animals did NOT suffer unjustifiable pain. I got evicted, my husband ran off with everything & I was out of work16.52.207 Animal cruelty in the second degree. (2) An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if, under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the owner knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence: (a) Fails to provide the animal with necessary shelter, rest, sanitation, space, or medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain as a result of the failure (4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree under subsection (1) or (2)(a) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense, ifestablished by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
Brandia Taamu moves the court for an order dismissing this action City of Everett V. Brandia Taamu for these reasons:
1) It will be shown that my affirmative defense is in fact credible &that my animals did NOT suffer unjustifiable pain. I got evicted, myhusband ran off with everything & I was out of work
16.52.207 Animal cruelty in the second degree.
(2) An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if,under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the ownerknowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence:
(a) Fails to provide the animal with necessary shelter, rest, sanitation, space,or medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiablephysical pain as a result of the failure
(4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree undersubsection (1) or (2)(a) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant's failure was due to economic distress beyond the defendant'scontrol.
2) It will be shown that Officer Weaver & Officer Trask conspired tomake false allegations attirbuting statements to a party who did notmake them, taking photos that CLEARLY left out one side of my
vehicle that in particular contained the dog's food & supplies. My vetis supposed to beconsulting a lawyer as well because of thestatements Officer Weaver made that were untrue. It is also amazingto me that Prosecutor Fisher even believed he could file a case thatwould have any merit, with all the conflicting evidence. He also letme present my whole case in front of the Commissioner in SuperiorCourt & neither one let me know I had the right to invoke my 5thAmendment rights in order not to incriminate myself or give awaymy case. If you honestly take a look at my dogs intitial vet examrecords you will see all but George (who was terminally ill)were"Bright, Alert, & Responsive" all had clean fecals, except for non-motile bacteria on 2 of them, then the next statement from the same
day they were all "dying", had bloodshot eyes, even their teeth gotworse, oh but most precious of all is my GRAY dog supposedly hadurine stains on her fur, impossible, & my Tri-Colored dog with BLACK feet also had urine stains supposedly. You will aslo note that Soffiethe dog who had a bladder stone removed... They never even calledthe vet in Shelton to confirm she had been seen there & tested, notdid they request her records from our current vet. Shelton said shehad cancer, our new vet said she was just fat (because I thought shewas dying so I spoiled her but after a year of her doing well & justgetting fat I took her to our new vet & he didn't catch anythingabout a bladder stone)
RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause;
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been givenreasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important
pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the
defense and to the tribunal all mitigating information known to the
prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by
a protective order of the tribunal;
(f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of thenature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate lawenforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that havea substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accusedand exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcementpersonnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with theprosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that theprosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule.
Comment
[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific
obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and
that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how
far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate
and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the
ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function,
which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by
lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law
may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those
obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could
constitute a violation of Rule 8.4.
[2] In some jurisdictions, a defendant may waive a preliminary hearing and
thereby lose a valuable opportunity to challenge probable cause.
Accordingly, prosecutors should not seek to obtain waivers of preliminary
and supported by the state government, and those courts that are parts of state government.
(2) "Head of agency" means the chief executive officer of an agency. In thecase of an agency headed by a commission, board, committee, or other body
consisting of more than one natural person, agency head means the personor board authorized to appoint agency employees and regulate their conduct.
(3) "Assist" means to act, or offer or agree to act, in such a way as to help,aid, advise, furnish
information to, or otherwise provide assistance to another person, believingthat the action is of help, aid, advice, or assistance to the person and withintent so to assist such person.
(6) "Confidential information" means (a) specific information, rather thangeneralized knowledge, that is not available to the general public on request
or (b) information made confidential by law.
(8) "Ethics boards" means the commission on judicial conduct, the legislativeethics board, and the executive ethics board.
(9) "Family" has the same meaning as "immediate family" in RCW 42.17.020.
(12) "Official duty" means those duties within the specific scope of employment of the state officer or state employee as defined by the officer'sor employee's agency or by statute or the state Constitution.
(13) "Participate" means to participate in state action or a proceedingpersonally and substantially as a state officer or state employee, throughapproval, disapproval, decision, recommendation, the rendering of advice,investigation, or otherwise but does not include preparation, consideration, orenactment of legislation or the performance of legislative duties.
(14) "Person" means any individual, partnership, association, corporation,firm, institution, or other entity, whether or not operated for profit.
(15) "Regulatory agency" means any state board, commission, department,or officer, except those in the legislative or judicial branches, authorized bylaw to conduct adjudicative proceedings, issue permits or licenses, or tocontrol or affect interests of identified persons.
(16) "Responsibility" in connection with a transaction involving the state,means the direct administrative or operating authority, whether intermediateor final, and either exercisable alone or through subordinates, effectively toapprove, disapprove, or otherwise direct state action in respect of suchtransaction.
(17) "State action" means any action on the part of an agency, including, but
(a) A decision, determination, finding, ruling, or order; and (b) A grant,payment, award, license, contract, transaction, sanction, or approval, or thedenial thereof, or failure to act with respect to a decision, determination,finding, ruling, or order.
(18) "State officer" means every person holding a position of public trust in orunder an executive, legislative, or judicial office of the state. "State officer"includes judges of the superior court, judges of the court of appeals, justicesof the supreme court, members of the legislature together with the secretaryof the senate and the chief clerk of the house of representatives, holders of elective offices in the executive branch of state government, chief executiveofficers of state agencies, members of boards, commissions, or committeeswith authority over one or more state agencies or institutions, and employeesof the state who are engaged in supervisory, policy-making, or policy-enforcing work. For the purposes of this chapter, "state officer" also includesany person exercising or undertaking to exercise the powers or functions of a
state officer.
(19) "State employee" means an individual who is employed by an agency inany branch of state government. For purposes of this chapter, employees of the superior courts are not state officers or state employees.
(21)(a) "Transaction involving the state" means a proceeding, application,submission, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, case,or other similar matter that the state officer, state employee, or former stateofficer or state employee in question believes, or has reason to believe:(i) Is,or will be, the subject of state action; or (ii) Is one to which the state is or willbe a party; or (iii) Is one in which the state has a direct and substantialproprietary interest.
RCW 42.52.040 Assisting in transactions. (1) Except in the course of officialduties or incident to official duties, no state officer or state employee mayassist another person, directly or indirectly, whether or not for compensation,in a transaction involving the state:
(4) This chapter does not prevent a state officer or state employee fromassisting, in a transaction involving the state:
RCW 42.52.050 Confidential information--Improperly concealed records. (1)No state officer or state employee may accept employment or engage in anybusiness or professional activity that the officer or employee mightreasonably expect would require or induce him or her to make anunauthorized disclosure of confidential information acquired by the official oremployee by reason of the official's or employee's official position.
(2) No state officer or state employee may make a disclosure of confidentialinformation gained by reason of the officer's or employee's official position orotherwise use the information for his or her personal gain or benefit or thegain or benefit of another, unless the disclosure has been authorized bystatute or by the terms of a contract involving (a) the state officer's or state
employee's agency and (b) the person or persons who have authority towaive the confidentiality of the information.
(3) No state officer or state employee may disclose confidential informationto any person not entitled or authorized to receive the information.
(4) No state officer or state employee may intentionally conceal a record if the officer or employee knew the record was required to be released underchapter 42.17 RCW, was under a personal obligation to release the record,and failed to do so. This subsection does not apply where the decision towithhold the record was made in good faith. [1996 c 213 § 4; 1994 c 154 §105.]
RCW 42.52.060 Testimony of state officers and state employees. This chapterdoes not prevent a state officer or state employee from giving testimonyunder oath or from making statements required to be made under penalty of perjury or contempt. [1994 c 154 § 106.]
RCW 42.52.100 Conditions on appearance before state agencies or doingbusiness with the state-Hearing-Judicial review. (1) The head of an agency,upon finding that any former state officer or state employee of such agencyor any other person has violated any provision of this chapter or rulesadopted under it, may, in addition to any other powers the head of suchagency may have, bar or impose reasonable conditions upon:
(a) The appearance before such agency of such former state officer or stateemployee or other person; and
(b) The conduct of, or negotiation or competition for, business with suchagency by such former state officer or state employee or other person, suchperiod of time as may reasonably be necessary or appropriate to effectuatethe purposes of this chapter.
(2) Findings of violations referred to in subsection (1)(b) of this section shallbe made on record after notice and hearing, conducted in accordance withthe Washington Administrative Procedure
Act, chapter 34.05 RCW. Such findings and orders are subject to judicialreview.
(3) This section does not apply to the legislative or judicial branches of government.
[1994 c 154 § 110; 1969 ex.s. c 234 § 27. Formerly RCW 42.18.270.]
RCW 42.52.160 Use of persons, money, or property for private gain. (1) Nostate officer or state employee may employ or use any person, money, orproperty under the officer's or employee's official control or direction, or inhis or her official custody, for the private benefit or gain of the officer,employee, or another.
(2) This section does not prohibit the use of public resources to benefit othersas part of a state officer's or state employee's official duties.
(3) The appropriate ethics boards may adopt rules providing exceptions tothis section for occasional use of the state officer or state employee, of deminimis cost and value, if the activity does not result in interference with theproper performance of public duties.
[1996 c 213 § 7; 1994 c 154 § 116; 1987 c 426 § 3. Formerly RCW 42.18.217.]
RCW 42.52.360 Authority of executive ethics board. (1) The executive ethics
board shall enforce this chapter and rules adopted under it with respect tostate-wide elected officers and all other officers and employees in theexecutive branch, boards and commissions, and institutions of highereducation.
(2) The executive ethics board shall:
(a) Develop educational materials and training;
(b) Adopt rules and policies governing the conduct of business by the board,and adopt rules defining working hours for purposes of RCW 42.52.180 andwhere otherwise authorized under chapter 154,
Laws of 1994;
(c) Issue advisory opinions;
(d) Investigate, hear, and determine complaints by any person or on its ownmotion;
(e) Impose sanctions including reprimands and monetary penalties;
(f) Recommend to the appropriate authorities suspension, removal fromposition, prosecution, or
other appropriate remedy; and
(g) Establish criteria regarding the levels of civil penalties appropriate forviolations of this chapter and rules adopted under it.
(a) Issue subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and theproduction of documentary
evidence relating to any matter under examination by the board or involvedin any hearing;
(b) Administer oaths and affirmations;
(c) Examine witnesses; and
(d) Receive evidence.
(4) The executive ethics board may review and approve agency policies asprovided for in this chapter.
(5) This section does not apply to state officers and state employees of the judicial branch.
[1994 c 154 § 206.]
RCW 42.52.370 Authority of commission on judicial conduct. The commissionon judicial conduct shall enforce this chapter and rules adopted under it withrespect to state officers and employees of the judicial branch and may do soaccording to procedures prescribed in Article IV, section 31 of the stateConstitution. In addition to the sanctions authorized in Article IV, section 31 of the state Constitution, the commission may impose sanctions authorized bythis chapter. [1994 c 154 § 207.]
RCW 42.52.410 Filing complaint. (1) A person may, personally or by his or herattorney, make, sign, and file with the appropriate ethics board a complainton a form provided by the appropriate ethics board. The complaint shall statethe name of the person alleged to have violated this chapter or rules adoptedunder it and the particulars thereof, and contain such other information asmay be required by the appropriate ethics board.
(2) If it has reason to believe that any person has been engaged or isengaging in a violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it, an ethicsboard may issue a complaint. [1994 c 154 § 211.]
RCW 42.52.420 Investigation. After the filing of any complaint, except asprovided in RCW 42.52.450, the staff of the appropriate ethics board shallinvestigate the complaint. The investigation shall be limited to the allegedfacts contained in the complaint. The results of the investigation shall bereduced to writing and a determination shall be made that there is or thatthere is not reasonable cause to believe that a violation of this chapter orrules adopted under it has been or is being committed. A copy of the writtendetermination shall be provided to the complainant and to the person namedin such complaint. [1994 c 154 § 212.]
RCW 42.52.430 Public hearing-Findings. (1) If the ethics board determines
there is reasonable cause under RCW 42.52.420 that a violation of thischapter or rules adopted under it occurred, a public hearing on the merits of the complaint shall be held.
(2) The ethics board shall designate the location of the hearing. The case insupport of the complaint shall be presented at the hearing by staff of the
ethics board.
(3) The respondent shall file a written answer to the complaint and appear atthe hearing in person or otherwise, with or without counsel, and submittestimony and be fully heard. The respondent has the right to cross-examinewitnesses.
(4) Testimony taken at the hearing shall be under oath and recorded.
(5) If, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the ethics board findsthat the respondent has violated this chapter or rules adopted under it, theboard shall file an order stating findings of fact and enforcement action as
authorized under this chapter.
(6) If, upon all the evidence, the ethics board finds that the respondent hasnot engaged in an alleged violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it,the ethics board shall state findings of fact and shall similarly issue and filean order dismissing the complaint.
(7) If the board makes a determination that there is not reasonable cause tobelieve that a violation has been or is being committed or has made a findingunder subsection (6) of this section, the attorney general shall represent theofficer or employee in any action subsequently commenced based on thealleged facts in the complaint. [1994 c 154 § 213.]
RCW 42.52.440 Review of order. Except as otherwise provided by law,reconsideration or judicial review of an ethics board's order that a violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it has occurred shall be governed by theprovisions of chapter 34.05 RCW applicable to review of adjudicativeproceedings. [1994 c 154 § 214.]
RCW 42.52.450 Complaint against legislator or state-wide elected official. (1)If a complaint alleges a violation of RCW 42.52.180 by a legislator or state-wide elected official other than the attorney general, the attorney generalshall conduct the investigation under RCW 42.52.420 and recommend actionto the appropriate ethics board.
(2) If a complaint alleges a violation of RCW 42.52.180 by the attorneygeneral, the state auditor shall conduct the investigation under RCW42.52.420 and recommend action to the appropriate
ethics board. [1994 c 154 § 215.]
RCW 42.52.460 Citizen actions. Any person who has notified the appropriate
ethics board and the attorney general in writing that there is reason tobelieve that RCW 42.52.180 is being or has been violated may, in the nameof the state, bring a citizen action for any of the actions authorized under thischapter. A citizen action may be brought only if the appropriate ethics boardor the attorney general have failed to commence an action under this chapterwithin forty-five days after notice from the person, the person has thereafter
notified the appropriate ethics board and the attorney general that theperson will commence a citizen's action within ten days upon their failure tocommence an action, and the appropriate ethics board and the attorneygeneral have in fact failed to bring an action within ten days of receipt of thesecond notice.
If the person who brings the citizen's action prevails, the judgment awardedshall escheat to the state, but the person shall be entitled to be reimbursedby the state of Washington for costs and attorneys' fees incurred. If acitizen's action that the court finds was brought without reasonable cause isdismissed, the court may order the person commencing the action to pay allcosts of trial and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by the defendant. Upon
commencement of a citizen action under this section, at the request of astate officer or state employee who is a defendant, the office of the attorneygeneral shall represent the defendant if the attorney general finds that thedefendant's conduct complied with this chapter and was within the scope of employment. [1994 c 154 § 216.]
RCW 42.52.470 Referral for enforcement. As appropriate, an ethics boardmay refer a complaint:
(1) To an agency for initial investigation and proposed resolution which shallbe referred back to the appropriate ethics board for action; or
(2) To the attorney general's office or prosecutor for appropriate action.[1994 c 154 § 217.]
RCW 42.52.480 Action by boards. (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, anethics board may order payment of the following amounts if it finds aviolation of this chapter or rules adopted under it after a hearing under RCW42.52.370 or other applicable law:
(a) Any damages sustained by the state that are caused by the conductconstituting the violation;
(b) From each such person, a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars perviolation or three times the economic value of any thing received or sought inviolation of this chapter or rules adopted under it, whichever is greater; and
(c) Costs, including reasonable investigative costs, which shall be included aspart of the limit under
(b) of this subsection. The costs may not exceed the penalty imposed. Thepayment owed on the penalty shall be reduced by the amount of the costs
(2) Damages under this section may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment in a civil case. [1994 c 154 § 218.]
RCW 42.52.490 Action by attorney general. (1) Upon a written determination
by the attorney general that the action of an ethics board was clearlyerroneous or if requested by an ethics board, the attorney general may bringa civil action in the superior court of the county in which the violation isalleged to have occurred against a state officer, state employee, former stateofficer, former state employee, or other person who has violated or knowinglyassisted another person in violating any of the provisions of this chapter orthe rules adopted under it. In such action the attorney general may recoverthe following amounts on behalf of the state of Washington:
(a) Any damages sustained by the state that are caused by the conductconstituting the violation;
(b) From each such person, a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars perviolation or three times the economic value of any thing received or sought inviolation of this chapter or the rules adopted under it, whichever is greater;and
(c) Costs, including reasonable investigative costs, which shall be included aspart of the limit under
(b) of this subsection. The costs may not exceed the penalty imposed. Thepayment owed on the penalty shall be reduced by the amount of the costspaid.
(2) In any civil action brought by the attorney general upon the basis that theattorney general has determined that the board's action was clearlyerroneous, the court shall not proceed with the action unless the attorneygeneral has first shown, and the court has found, that the action of the boardwas clearly erroneous. [1994 c 154 § 219.]
RCW 42.52.520 Disciplinary action. (1) A violation of this chapter or rulesadopted under it is grounds for disciplinary action.
(2) The procedures for any such action shall correspond to those applicablefor disciplinary action for employee misconduct generally; for those stateofficers and state employees not specifically exempted in chapter 41.06RCW, the rules set forth in chapter 41.06 RCW shall apply. Any action againstthe state officer or state employee shall be subject to judicial review to theextent provided by law for disciplinary action for misconduct of state officersand state employees of the same category and grade. [1994 c 154 § 222;1969 ex.s. c 234 § 26. Formerly RCW 42.18.260.]
RCW 42.52.530 Additional investigative authority. In addition to otherauthority under this chapter, the attorney general may investigate persons
not under the jurisdiction of an ethics board whom the attorney general hasreason to believe were involved in transactions in violation of this chapter orrules adopted under it. [1994 c 154 § 223.]
RCW 42.52.540 Limitations period. Any action taken under this chapter mustbe commenced within five years from the date of the violation. However, if it
is shown that the violation was not discovered because of concealment bythe person charged, then the action must be commenced within two yearsfrom the date the violation was discovered or reasonably should have beendiscovered:
(1) By any person with direct or indirect supervisory responsibilities over theperson who allegedly committed the violation; or (2) if no person has director indirect supervisory authority over the person who committed theviolation, by the appropriate ethics board. [1994 c 154 § 224.]
RCW 42.52.900 Legislative declaration. Government derives its powers fromthe people. Ethics in government are the foundation on which the structure of government rests. State officials and employees of government hold a publictrust that obligates them, in a special way, to honesty and integrity infulfilling the responsibilities to which they are elected and appointed.Paramount in that trust is the principle that public office, whether elected orappointed, may not be used for personal gain or private advantage.Thecitizens of the state expect all state officials and employees to perform theirpublic responsibilities in accordance with the highest ethical and moralstandards and to conduct the business of the state only in a manner thatadvances the public's interest. State officials and employees are subject tothe sanctions of law and scrutiny of the media; ultimately, however, they areaccountable to the people and must consider this public accountability as aparticular obligation of the public service. Only when affairs of governmentare conducted, at all levels, with openness as provided by law and anunswerving commitment to the public good does government work as itshould.
The obligations of government rest equally on the state's citizenry. Theeffectiveness of government depends, fundamentally, on the confidencecitizens can have in the judgments and decisions of their electedrepresentatives. Citizens, therefore, should honor and respect the principlesand the spirit of representative democracy,recognizing that both elected andappointed officials, together with state employees, seek to carry out theirpublic duties with professional skill and dedication to the public interest. Suchservice merits public recognition and support. All who have the privilege of working for the people of Washington state can have but one aim: To give thehighest public service to its citizens. [1994 c 154 § 1.]
3) It can be clearly shown that Officer Trask made NO attempt tocheck out the credibility of the witnesses, as evidenced by the factthat the Landlord made the complaint thinking they were RoseAdams dogs, & the fact that right in the Washington state courtsystem is a termination of parental rights for Rose Adams that
clearly states she is mentally deficient& has been for quite sometime, the "nieghbor" staking the complaint did so at the request of Rose Adams & it should be noted that she is also living with 2 sexualpredators who are currently under supervision & trying to conceive achild with her current boyfriend who repeatedly raped a 3 yr oldchild & stalked a 13 yr old child as well & who by court order is noteven supposed to be around children Just a precusory look at RoseAdams criminal record should've been enough to give anyone pause.
SNOHOMISH
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div 165176 02-16-1993
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Snohomish Superior 93-2-04928-3 08-31-1993
Adams, Rose M Respondent Snohomish Superior 95-2-05009-1 07-05-1995
Adams, Rose M. Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A95-00268 09-28-1995
Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A96-00260 10-16-1996
Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A96-00258 10-16-1996
Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A96-00261 10-16-1996
Adams, Rose Respondent Sno Co-everett Div 97-311AH 08-26-1997
Adams, Rose Respondent Sno Co-everett Div 97-171AH 05-22-1997
Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-everett Div 97-207AH 06-16-1997
Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 98-2-09032-2 12-02-1998
Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A99-00063 03-31-1999
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00036999 12-29-1999
Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 00-2-09388-6 12-06-2000
Adams, Rose M Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 00-9-03737-0 06-15-2000
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00039284 11-07-2000
Jennifer L. Coombs 2828 Colby Ave Ste 402 Everett, WA 98201
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN RE THE DEPENDENCY OF: No. 50636-6-I
J.A.B., consol. with Cause Nos. DOB: 08/20/92, 50637-4-I, 50739-7-I
C.A., DOB: 05/31/86, DIVISION ONE
Minor Children.
ROSE ADAMS and GEORGE BEUTLER,
Appellants,
v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND
HEALTH SERVICES,
Respondent. FILED
Per Curiam. In this consolidated appeal, Rose Adams and George Beutlerchallenge the order terminating their parental rights in their son, J.B. Adamsalso challenges the termination of her parental rights in C.A., J.B.'s half-sister.Because the State has satisfied its burden of proving the statutory elementsset forth in RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190, we affirm.
Facts
Adams and Beutler are the biological parents of J.B., who was born on August20, 1992. Adams is also the biological mother of C.A., who was born on May31, 1986. Both C.A. and J.B. were removed from the home following the filingof a dependency petition in February 2000. The dependency petition reciteda lengthy history of referrals and concerns about neglect, anger
management, domestic violence, parenting skills, and mental health issues.In particular, the petition alleged that Adams had physically and verballyassaulted both children and expressed concerns about Beutler's ability toprotect the children.
1 In June 2000, C.A. and J.B. were found dependent as to Adams; J.B. was
found dependent as to Beutler. Under the terms of the agreed dependencyorder, Adams and Beutler acknowledged that there had been "extreme familyconflict" in the home, including "inappropriate discipline" of the children. Theparents also acknowledged that there had been indications of substanceabuse, including the fact that Beutler had tested positive in February 2000 foramphetamine/methamphetamine and THC. The agreed disposition planprovided that both Adams and Beutler were to complete approved substanceabuse evaluations and follow any recommendations for treatment. Bothparents were also required to complete a psychological assessment with aparenting component and follow all treatment recommendations. Anassessment of Adams found no indication of substance dependency or abuse;she completed a drug education class in September 2000. After an evaluation
at Pacific Treatment Alternatives, Beutler was diagnosed with a cannabisdependency and directed to complete outpatient treatment. He testedpositive for marijuana or THC in September 2000. Beutler submitted anotherUA specimen in October 2000 that was found to be "adulterated." Dr. Jolynn-Marie Wagner, a licensed psychologist, completed the court-orderedpsychological assessments of both parents in late 2000. The assessmentswere delayed for several months while Dr. Wagner waited for Adams andBeutler to return questionnaires. Dr. Wagner never received thequestionnaires and issued her report in January 2001. As part of theevaluation, Dr. Wagner interviewed Adams and Beutler separately andtogether and observed Beutler interacting with J.B. and Adamsinteractingwith J.B. and C.A. Dr. Wagner diagnosed Adams with antisocialpersonality disorder, finding her to be hostile and with little insight into theevents involving her children. Adams also displayed features of narcissisticpersonality disorder and borderline personality disorder. Adams generallyblamed "the system" for her children's behavior and emotional difficulties.According to Dr. Wagner, it is difficult to treat individualswith a similar profilebecause they tend to blame others. Dr. Wagner observed little evidence of bonding between Adams and C.A. or Adams and J.B. and concluded that anattempt at reunification with their mother was not in the children's bestinterest Dr. Wagner diagnosed Beutler with dependent personality disorder,noting his difficulty in expressing disagreement with others, his excessiveneed for others to assume responsibility for most major areas in his life, andhis difficulty in making everyday decisions without advice and reassurance.Dr. Wagner found Beutler's dependency reflected in his commitment to therelationship with Adams, which was generally controlled by Adams and inwhich Beutler was demoralized and verbally abused. Dr. Wagner observed arelatively strong bond between Beutler and J.B. Based on Dr. Wagner'sevaluation, the court eventually ordered both Adams and Beutler toparticipate in psychotherapy and parenting training. Beutler, who completeda recommended drug treatment program in March 2001,was directed toparticipate in any recommended after-care. In November 2001, both Adams
and Beutler were ordered to undergo a domestic violence assessment.Beutler was directed to provide a UA sample on November 15, 2001, but itappeared to be adulterated. Following a review hearing on November 21,2001, Beutler was ordered to have "hands-on experiential parenting training"after he completed an approved parenting class and established andmaintained a separate residence. Beutler was also ordered to attend regular
NA or AA meetings and provide documentation to the court and parties.Beutler moved out of Adams' house shortly after the hearing and obtained aseparate residence. But he went to Adams' house on December 16, 2001, inviolation of a restraining order. After January 2002, Beutler had no furthercontact with Theresa Espana, his social worker. No visitation occurredbetween Adams and C.A. during the two-year dependency. Visitation wouldhave been permitted at C.A.'s request, but she never expressed a desire tosee her mother. Adams' visitation with J.B. was suspended in February 2001,because she was not in compliance with services and was not makingprogress. Visitation was never restored. Beutler participated in visitation with
J.B. for most of the dependency period, although the frequency was reducedAfter a fact-finding hearing in May 2002, the trial court terminated Adams'
parental rights in C.A. and J.B. Among other things, the trial court found thatdespite participating in extensive services for many years, Adams had madeonly minimal progress and that no amount of services could correct herparental deficiencies. The court also terminated Beutler's parental rights in
J.B, finding that he had failed to complete certain court-ordered services,failed to stay in contact with his social worker, and that he had been unableto sever his relationship with Adams. The court concluded that even thoughthere was evidence of a bond between Beutler and J.B., termination was in
J.B.'s best interest.
Decision
Standard of Review An order of permanent termination of the parent-childrelationship may be entered when the statutory elements set forth in RCW13.34.180(1) through (6)2 are established by clear, cogent and convincingevidence and the court finds that termination is in the best interests of thechild.3 Deference to the trial court is particularly important in review of termination decisions.4 An appellate court will not disturb the trial court'sfindings "unless clear, cogent and convincing evidence does not exist in therecord."5 Rose Adams Adams first contends that the trial court erroneouslyconsidered the children's hearsay allegations as substantive evidence of physical abuse. Prior to trial, Adams moved to exclude statements that C.A.and J.B. had made to various persons alleging that she had physically abusedthem. The allegations were then repeated in reports that witnesses preparedduring the course of the dependency. At the termination hearing, Adamsflatly denied ever abusing J.B. or C.A. Beutler denied that he ever saw Adamsabusing the children, but acknowledged that he suspected physical abusewhen he heard yelling and something that sounded like slapping. Severaltimes during the hearing, the trial court ruled that the hearsay statementswould not be considered as substantive evidence; rather "{w}hatever thechild is reported to have said will not be accepted for the purpose - for thetruth of the matter asserted, simply as information that was gathered by the
witness for the purpose of reaching a conclusion."6 The trial court reiteratedits ruling during the presentation of findings: And I want the Court of Appealsto understand that I did not take any of that stuff as substantive fact. I wassustaining - I was in a constant state of sustaining the hearsay.
7 The trial court then entered the following findings of fact: 1.28 J.B. and C.A.
consistently reported ongoing emotional and physical abuse by the biologicalmother to the evaluators in this case, the therapists, school personal {sic},social worker, and guardian ad litem. Any hearsay statements were not proof of abuse but the fact that J.B. and C.A. made consistent repeated statementsis evidence of abuse. 1.29 The totality of the trial evidence confirms, and thiscourt finds that the children were physically abused by the mother. The trialcourt also found that Beutler's testimony denying knowledge of abuse wasnot credible. Adams argues that by considering the hearsay statementscumulatively, the trial court effectively reversed the ruling that it would notconsider the statements as substantive evidence of abuse. She maintainsthat without the hearsay evidence of physical abuse, the evidence of parentalunfitness was insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights.
The State does not assert that the trial court's reasoning is supported byauthority, but argues that the children's statements were nonethelessadmissible as statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatmentunder ER 803(a)(4), an argument that the trial court rejected in conjunctionwith Dr. Wagner's testimony. Because the trial court repeatedly ruled that thechildren's statements would not be considered as substantive evidence of abuse, the parties never fully identified the relevant hearsay statements oraddressed the specific circumstances surrounding the statements. Thefindings themselves do not identify the specific nature of the "physicalabuse." Under the circumstances, we decline the State's invitation to reviewthe record in order to find an alternative basis upon which to sustain the trialcourt's finding of physical abuse. But even without the finding of physicalabuse, the record supports the trial court's termination of Adams' parentalrights. Adams does not challenge the trial court's finding that she has beenoffered all necessary and reasonable services, and the record demonstratesthat Adams has participated in numerous services, including parentingclasses, anger management classes, domestic violence classes, counseling,and in-home therapy services. But the State's witnesses clearly establishedthat Adams had made no significant progress in her ability to parent J.B. orC.A. Dr. Wagner, who diagnosed Adams with an antisocial personalitydisorder, noted that during the psychological evaluation, Adams frequentlybecame angry and raised her voice, cursing and going off on tangentialtopics. Adams dominated the conversation whenever Beutler was presentand frequently abused him verbally. Despite her acknowledgement at thetime of the agreed dependency order that there had been extreme familyconflict and inappropriate discipline, Adams blamed C.A., Beutler, and "thesystem" for the family's difficulties, and characterized C.A. as manipulativeand dishonest. The record was also undisputed that J.B. and C.A. suffer fromsevere emotional or behavioral problems. J.B. had gone through extensivecounseling, with the recognition that he needed continued social andemotional development in a structured and safe environment. C.A. told Dr.Wagner that her greatest fear was that her mother was correct and that she
was a bad child. No evidence indicated that Adams had any insight into theseverity of the children's problems, whatever their source, or that she couldacquire any meaningful ability to respond to the children's needs in theforeseeable future. Dr. Wagner also observed little evidence of apsychological bond in the interaction between Adams and J.B. and C.A. J.B.remained unresponsive to Adams' attempts at affection, and Adams
exhibited little eye contact, smiling, or verbal give and take in her interactionwith both children. Adams did not respond to C.A.'s rudeness and the twomaintained a wide distance between one another. Based on her evaluation,Adams' inability to control her anger, lack of insight, poor prognosis fortreatment, and failure to benefit from many years of services, C.A.'s strongdesire to remain in her father's home, and J.B.'s expressed fear of Adams, Dr.Wagner concluded that reunification with their mother was not in thechildren's best interest. Other State witnesses reached similar conclusions.Ellis Amdur, a child mental health specialist, interviewed Adams inconjunction with an assessment of C.A.'s placement with her father. Duringthe interview, Adams asserted that all of C.A.'s allegations were false andblamed C.A. for many of the things that had happened during the
dependency. Adams denied any personal responsibility. Dr. Bramhalldiagnosed Adams with a bipolar II disorder, "characterized by alternatingcycles of hypomania and depression and recently mixed states." During theinterview, Adams insisted that prior CPS referrals had all been based ondeliberate lies. Dr. Bramhall concluded that Adams' inability to control heranger prevented her from forming significant attachments with her childrenand setting appropriate limits.
Leila Copeland testified that she provided in-home parenting services forAdams for approximately 18 months. Copeland felt that Adams wanted tomake changes in her behavior patterns, that she was resourceful in seekingout assistance in the community, and that there was improvement in Adams'ability to control her anger as to the child that remained in her home. ButCopeland also observed that Adams frequently reverted to old habits.Copeland characterized Adams' overall progress with parenting, angermanagement, and communication skills as "minimal." At the end of theintervention, Copeland c oncluded that Adams had "minimal" insight into theeffect of her actions on others. Clear, cogent, and convincing evidencesupports the trial court's findings that all necessary and reasonably availableservices capable of correcting parental deficiencies have been offered orprovided, that no amount of services will be capable of correcting Adams'parental deficiencies, and that there is little likelihood that conditions will beremedied within the foreseeable future. Continuation of the parent-childrelationship clearlydiminishes C.A.'s and J.B.'s prospects for integration into astable andpermanent home.8 Substantial evidence also established thattermination of Adams' parental rights is in the best interests of C.A. and J.B.Even without the finding of physical abuse, the State satisfied its burdenunder RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190; substantial evidence supports thetrial court's termination order as to Adams.
Beutler contends that the State failed to prove that all necessaryandreasonably available services were expressly and understandablyoffered.9 He argues that Theresa Espana, his social worker, failed to provideupdated and meaningful referral lists and that certain services were eithernot available or not provided. Beutler acknowledged that he had a substanceabuse problem and that treatment was instrumental to maintaining his
parental rights. Although he completed ane treatment program in March2001, the record shows that Beutler delayed significantly in pursuingrecommended self-help meetings. In November 2001, the court ordered himto attended AA or NA meetings and provide documentation to the court andparties. At the termination hearing in May 2002, Beutler testified that he hadbeen attending NA meetings regularly, but acknowledged that he had neversubmitted any documentation and that he had stopped all contact with hissocial worker after January 2002. Dr. Wagner recommended that Beutlerparticipate in domestic violence treatment and psychotherapy. In November2001, the court specifically ordered Beutler to participate in domesticviolence treatment. Beutler apparently contacted Catholic CommunityServices, an agency that he was familiar with, but maintained that he could
not afford the $75 assessment fee. Noting the evidence to the contrary, thetrial court rejected this explanation and found that Beutler could afford theassessment fee. The record supports the trial court's finding. Beutler did notbegin individual counseling until August 2001, and he ended these sessionsin January 2002 when his medical coupons ran out. Beutler testified that hecontacted the social worker once about additional funding, but he admittedthat he never followed up. At the time of the termination hearing, Beutler wasparticipating only in a monthly group parenting session. He testified that hedid not believe that he had an anger management problem or needed toparticipate in domestic violence treatment. The record establishes that theprimary issue was Beutler's apparent unwillingness to participate in or followthrough with the necessary services that were reasonably available. Beutleralso rejected all contact with the social worker after January 2002 and failedto provide information releases or supply updated contact information. Aparent's unwillingness or inability to use the treatment and evaluationservices provided excuses the State from offering extra services that mighthave been helpful.10 Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence established thatall necessary and reasonably available services were expressly andunderstandably offered. Beutler next contends that the State failed to provethat there was little likelihood that conditions would be remedied so that J.B.could be returned in the future.11 He maintains that he had successfullyparticipated in nearly all of the required services. But for the reasons set forthabove, we disagree. Moreover, contrary to Beutler's assertion, his separationfrom Adams does not suggest that he is now able to provide a safeenvironment for J.B. Beutler conceded that his relationship with Adams washostile, violent, abusive, and extremely harmful to J.B. and that separationwas necessary to insure J.B.'s safety. Beutler did not establish a separateresidence until the court ordered him to do so in November 2001. Less thanone month later, he violated a court order by going to Adams' residence.Several witnesses testified that Adams and Beutler were continuing to seeone another shortly before the termination hearing. Substantial evidencesupports the trial court's finding that there is little likelihood Beutler's
deficiencies will be remedied so that J.B. can be returned in the near future.Continuation of Beutler's parental relationship clearly diminished J.B.'sprospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.12 J.B. hadmoved to a pre-adoptive home several months before the terminationhearing and had bonded with the new family. He has severe emotionalproblems that must be addressed in a secure and nurturing environment.
Beutler's inability to leave his destructive relationship with Adams makes itunlikely that he will be able to offer the stable environment that is necessaryfor J.B.'s well being in the foreseeable future. Under the circumstances, theState has established by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence thatcontinuation of Beutler's parental relationship diminishes J.B.'s prospects forearly integration into a stable and permanent home. Finally, Beutler contendsthat termination was not in J.B.'s best interests. This argument rests primarilyon testimony by several witnesses that there was an obvious bond betweenBeutler and J.B. In addition, Beutler's testimony reflected a great affection forhis son. But the evidence also established that termination is necessary if J.B.is to obtain the stability and permanence that he requires. Where the needsof child and the rights of a parent conflict, the needs of the child must
prevail.13 The record supports the trial court's determination thattermination was in J.B.'s best interests.
Affirmed.
For the court: 1C.A. had been found dependent in 1991 and removed fromthe home until1994, when the dependency was dismissed. 2RCW13.34.180(1) provides in part: (a) That the child has been found to be adependent child; (b) That the court has entered a dispositional orderpursuant to RCW 13.34.130; (c) That the child has been removed or will, atthe time of the hearing,have been removed from the custody of the parentfor a period of at least six months pursuant to a finding of dependency; (d)
That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly andunderstandably offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonablyavailable, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within theforeseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered orprovided; (e) That there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied sothat the child can be returned to the parent in the near future. A parent'sfailure to substantially improve parental deficiencies within twelve monthsfollowing entry of the dispositional order shall give rise to a rebuttablepresumption that there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied sothat the child can be returned to the parent in the near future. Thepresumption shall not arise unless the petitioner makes a showing that allnecessary services reasonably capable of correcting the parental deficiencieswithin the foreseeable future have been clearly offered or provided. . . . (f)
That continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes thechild's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.3RCW 13.34.190(2). 4In re Dependency of K.R., 128 Wn. 2d 129, 144, 904P.2d 1132 (1995). 5In re K.R., 128 Wn.2d at 144.6Report of Proceedings (May7, 2002), at 84. 7RP (June 6, 2002), at 9. 8See RCW 13.34.180(1)(d), (e), (f).9RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). 10In re Ramquist, 52 Wn. App. 854, 861, 765 P.2d 30(1988). 11RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). 12RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). 13In re Aschauer, 93
Wn.2d 689, 695, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980). 50636-6-I - In RE the Dependency Of: J.A.B. (dob 8/20/92) v. Rose Adams and George Beutler, App. V. Dshs, Resp.
Spinelli v.United States 393 U.S. 410 (1969)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Spinelli (D) argued that the evidence gatheredwas inadmissible having been obtained pursuant to a search warrantimproperly issued on the basis of a confidential informant's tip, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The warrant lacked probable cause.
PROCEDURE BELOW: The D was convicted of traveling in interstatecommerce with the intention of conducting illegal gambling activities. TheDistrict Court refused to suppress evidence obtained through a search of anapartment. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed andremanded the case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: The D was convicted for traveling to Missourifrom Illinois with the intention of gambling. D appealed, challenging thesearch warrant obtained by the FBI to obtain evidence. The application onwhich the warrant was based included four main parts: 1. The FBI hadtracked D for five days, during four of which he traveled from Illinois to acertain apartment house in Missouri, and on one day he was further trackedto a specific apartment in the building; 2. Two phone numbers are associatedwith the specific apartment; 3. The government officials stated that thisperson was a known bookie; and 4. A reliable informant told the FBI that Dwas a bookie and used the two phone numbers associated with theapartment in Missouri.
LEGAL ISSUE: Does an informant's tip provide probable cause for the issuanceof a search warrant if the tip does not state reasons why the informant isreliable and does not include specifics regarding the facts known by theinformant?
HOLDING: An informant's tip does not provide probable cause for theissuance of a search warrant if the tip does not state reasons why theinformant is reliable and does not include specifics regarding the facts knownby the informant.
OVERVIEW: Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the warrant thatauthorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) search, which uncoveredthe evidence necessary for his conviction. The warrant was granted by amagistrate judge upon an affidavit stating that the FBI had observeddefendant's travels to and from an apartment and that a confidential reliableinformant had informed the authorities that defendant was operating agambling operation. On certiorari, the court found that the application for thewarrant was inadequate because it failed to set forth the underlyingcircumstances necessary to enable the magistrate to independently judgethe validity of the informant's information. Also the affiant-officers failed to
support their claim that their informant was "credible" or his information"reliable." The bald assertion that defendant was "known" as a gambler wasentitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision and the Courtrejected as imprecise the "totality of circumstances" approach embraced bythe court of appeals. Thus, the affidavit fell short of providing probable
REASONING: (Harlan, J.) An informant's tip does not provide probable causefor the issuance of a search warrant if the tip does not state reasons why theinformant is reliable and does not include specifics regarding the facts knownby the informant IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL SO THAT THE MAGISTRATE MAYKNOW HE IS RELYING ON SOMETHING MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN A CASUALRUMOR. The Aguilar two part test is used: 1. Is the information reliable? 2. Isthe informant reliable? In this case, there are no facts provided in theinformant's tip to explain why the informant thought D was involved ingambling. The FBI also did not provide any reasons why they thought thisparticular informant was reliable. Therefore, there was no probable cause toissue the warrant. The conviction should be overturned. Reversed, for D.
CONCURRENCE: (White, J.) The Draper approach would justify the issuance of a warrant in this case; nonetheless, pending a full reconsideration of thatcase and the Aguilar-Nathanson cases, a vote to affirm would produce anequally divided court.
CRITICAL SUMMARY: I agree with the decision; otherwise, the authoritiescould fabricate their own tips and have almost unlimited access to ourhomes.
AGULARA TEST: [1] RELIABILITY--- IN THIS CASE WE NEED TO KNOW
WHY THE INFORMATN IS RELIABLE, A TRACK RECORD WOULD HELP,
(can be coroberated (helps w/ great details), track reckord, veracity) [2]BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE ---IN THIS CASE WE DON’T KNOW HOW THE INFORMATGOT THE INFO
At no point in her request for a warrant does Officer trask say how or
why she knows the rose adams is a credible witness she just says
she know her to live there
4) It is evident that Officer Trask has an ongoing personal issue withmy body wieght & ethnicity as evidenced in her REPEATED mentionof both in any report she makes about me from the court report, thewarrant report & the incident report, yet the other animal controlofficers & the Everett Police Officer can describe me without havingto use those identifiers. In her warrant request, in her statement tothe court & in her incedent report she repeatedly refers to me as a
"Thin Native American Woman" if it was once, I could get that but itis crystal clear that there is an underlying personal theme in this.The ACLU & the Department of Justice both, give this merit as well. Ihaven't figured it out yet but somewhere in law there has to besomething to do with being a "whistleblower" in regards to mycomplaints against the injured dogs I was puling from the shelter,
but don't worry I will figure it out. I would also like to point out nomatter how much good stuff I find I always check for an appellateruling on it to make sure I am not just making pointless claims orstatements
9.91.010
Denial of civil rights — Terms defined.
Terms used in this section shall have the following definitions:
(1)(a) "Every person" shall be construed to include any owner, lessee,
proprietor, manager, agent or employee whether one or more naturalpersons, partnerships, associations, organizations, corporations,cooperatives, legal representatives, trustees, receivers, of this state and itspolitical subdivisions, boards and commissions, engaged in or exercisingcontrol over the operation of any place of public resort, accommodation,assemblage or amusement.
(b) "Deny" is hereby defined to include any act which directly or indirectly, orby subterfuge, by a person or his agent or employee, results or is intended orcalculated to result in whole or in part in any discrimination, distinction,restriction, or unequal treatment, or the requiring of any person to pay alarger sum than the uniform rates charged other persons, or the refusing orwithholding from any person the admission, patronage, custom, presence,frequenting, dwelling, staying, or lodging in any place of public resort,accommodation, assemblage, or amusement except for conditions andlimitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons, regardlessof race, creed or color.
(c) "Full enjoyment of" shall be construed to include the right to purchase anyservice, commodity or article of personal property offered or sold on, or by,any establishment to the public, and the admission of any person toaccommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of any place of publicresort, accommodation, assemblage or amusement, without acts directly orindirectly causing persons of any particular race, creed or color, to be treatedas not welcome, accepted, desired or solicited.
(d) "Any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage or amusement"is hereby defined to include, but not to be limited to, any public place,licensed or unlicensed, kept for gain, hire or reward, or where charges aremade for admission, service, occupancy or use of any property or facilities,whether conducted for the entertainment, housing or lodging of transientguests, or for the benefit, use or accommodation of those seeking health,
recreation or rest, or for the sale of goods and merchandise, or for therendering of personal services, or for public conveyance or transportation onland, water or in the air, including the stations and terminals thereof and thegaraging of vehicles, or where food or beverages of any kind are sold forconsumption on the premises, or where public amusement, entertainment,sports or recreation of any kind is offered with or without charge, or where
medical service or care is made available, or where the public gathers,congregates, or assembles for amusement, recreation or public purposes, orpublic halls, public elevators and public washrooms of buildings andstructures occupied by two or more tenants, or by the owner and one or moretenants, or any public library or any educational institution wholly or partiallysupported by public funds, or schools of special instruction, or nurseryschools, or day care centers or children's camps; nothing herein containedshall be construed to include, or apply to, any institute, bona fide club, orplace of accommodation, which is by its nature distinctly private providedthat where public use is permitted that use shall be covered by this section;nor shall anything herein contained apply to any educational facility operatedor maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution; and the right of
a natural parent in loco parentis to direct the education and upbringing of achild under his control is hereby affirmed.
(2) Every person who denies to any other person because of race, creed, orcolor, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilitiesor privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, oramusement, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.[1953 c 87 § 1; 1909 c 249 §434; RRS § 2686.]
49.74.005
Legislative findings — Purpose.
Discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, age, sex, maritalstatus, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap iscontrary to the findings of the legislature and public policy. The legislaturefinds and declares that racial minorities, women, persons in protected agegroups, persons with disabilities, Vietnam-era veterans, and disabledveterans are underrepresented in Washington state governmentemployment.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide for enforcement measures foraffirmative action within Washington state government employment andinstitutions of higher education in order to eliminate suchunderrepresentation.[1985 c 365 § 7.]
Freedom from discrimination — Declaration of civil rights.
(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color,national origin, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexualorientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability orthe use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability
is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, butnot be limited to:
(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations,advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort,accommodation, assemblage, or amusement;
(f) The right to engage in commerce free from any discriminatory boycotts orblacklists. Discriminatory boycotts or blacklists for purposes of this sectionshall be defined as the formation or execution of any express or impliedagreement, understanding, policy or contractual arrangement for economicbenefit between any persons which is not specifically authorized by the laws
of the United States and which is required or imposed, either directly orindirectly, overtly or covertly, by a foreign government or foreign person inorder to restrict, condition, prohibit, or interfere with or in order to excludeany person or persons from any business relationship on the basis of race,color, creed, religion, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status,sexual orientation, the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability,or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with adisability, or national origin or lawful business relationship: PROVIDEDHOWEVER, That nothing herein contained shall prohibit the use of boycotts asauthorized by law pertaining to labor disputes and unfair labor practices; and
(2) Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction toenjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by theperson, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys'fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or theUnited States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal FairHousing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).
RCW 9.62.010
Malicious prosecution.
Every person who shall, maliciously and without probable cause therefor,cause or attempt to cause another to be arrested or proceeded against forany crime of which he or she is innocent:
(1) If such crime be a felony, is guilty of a class C felony and shall be
punished by imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not more thanfive years; and
(2) If such crime be a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
[2003 c 53 § 40; 1992 c 7 § 15; 1909 c 249 § 117; Code 1881 § 899; 1873 p203 § 98; 1854 p 92 § 89; RRS § 2369.]
RCW 9A.36.080
Malicious harassment — Definition and criminal penalty.
(1) A person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she maliciously andintentionally commits one of the following acts because of his or herperception of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap:
(b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of the victim oranother person; or
(2) In any prosecution for malicious harassment, unless evidence exists whichexplains to the trier of fact's satisfaction that the person did not intend tothreaten the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the personintended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of theperson's perception of the victim's or victims' race, color, religion, ancestry,national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensoryhandicap if the person commits one of the following acts:
This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference forevidentiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state's ability toprosecute a person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of aparticular case do not fall within (a) or (b) of this subsection.
(3) It is not a defense that the accused was mistaken that the victim was amember of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, orsexual orientation, or had a mental, physical, or sensory handicap.
(4) Evidence of expressions or associations of the accused may not beintroduced as substantive evidence at trial unless the evidence specificallyrelates to the crime charged. Nothing in this chapter shall affect the rules of evidence governing impeachment of a witness.
(b) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to:
(i) Cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatenedor to any other person; or
(ii) Cause physical damage immediately or in the future to the property of aperson threatened or that of any other person.
(7) Malicious harassment is a class C felony.
(8) The penalties provided in this section for malicious harassment do not
preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise availableunder law.
(9) Nothing in this section confers or expands any civil rights or protections toany group or class identified under this section, beyond those rights orprotections that exist under the federal or state Constitution or the civil lawsof the state of Washington.
[2010 c 119 § 1; 2009 c 180 § 1; 1993 c 127 § 2; 1989 c 95 § 1; 1984 c 268 §1; 1981 c 267 § 1.]
Notes: Severability -- 1993 c 127: See note following RCW 9A.36.078.
Construction -- 1989 c 95: "The provisions of this act shall be liberallyconstrued in order to effectuate its purpose." [1989 c 95 § 3.]
Severability -- 1989 c 95: "If any provision of this act or its application to anyperson or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or theapplication of the provision to other persons or circumstances is notaffected." [1989 c 95 § 4.]
Harassment: Chapters 9A.46 and 10.14 RCW.
5) It is also clearly evident that someone from the Everett AnimalShelter has been sharing some true & some false information withRose Adams in regards to my private personal information.
6) The person responsible for this personal attack on me has beengiven other personal information in regards to my case BY THECOURTS THEMSELVES, Judge Odell sent them to HER house eventhough they knew my address & it was CLEARLY NOT her addressthey sent it there anyway, even if it was not malicious in intent itwas lazy & damaging to my own personal safety & reputation.
7) Everett Municipal Code is CLEARLY in conflict with Washingtonstate's RCW's & contrary to Prosecutor Fisher's assertions thatEverett is a "First Class City" & does not answer to the Constitutionof Washington State or The Constitution of the United States he isincorrect in his assumptions, Municipal Courts are only granted thiervery right to EXIST by Washington state laws, Constitiions & RCW's.His statements were recorded in an open Superior court room on mypetition matter, he honestly believes that he is NOTaccountable to
the state of Washington & that the City has free will to make up lawsas they see fit, which is a very dangerous & wreckless attitiude,leaving the City itself open to many lawsuits
RCW 16.52.085
Removal of animals for feeding — Examination — Notice — Euthanasia.
(3) Any owner whose domestic animal is removed pursuant to this chaptershall be given written notice of the circumstances of the removal and noticeof legal remedies available to the owner. The notice shall be given by postingat the place of seizure, by delivery to a person residing at the place of seizure, or by registered mail if the owner is known. In making the decision toremove an animal pursuant to this chapter, the officer shall make a goodfaith effort to contact the animal's owner before removal.
***I was NEVER given any notice of any legal remedies available to me, I hadto read pretty much the entire state's RCW's WAC's & Everett Municipal
Codes on my own to find out
(4) The agency having custody of the animal may euthanize the animal ormay find a responsible person to adopt the animal not less than fifteenbusiness days after the animal is taken into custody. A custodial agency mayeuthanize severely injured, diseased, or suffering animals at any time. Anowner may prevent the animal's destruction or adoption
by: (a) Petitioning the district court of the county where the animal wasseized for the animal's immediate return subject to court-imposed conditions,or (b) posting a bond or security in an amount sufficient to provide for theanimal's care for a minimum of thirty days from the seizure date. If thecustodial agency still has custody of the animal when the bond or securityexpires, the animal shall become the agency's property unless the courtorders an alternative disposition. If a court order prevents the agency fromassuming ownership and the agency continues to care for the animal, thecourt shall order the owner to renew a bond or security for the agency'scontinuing costs for the animal's care. When a court has prohibited the ownerfrom owning or possessing a similar animal under RCW 16.52.200(3), theagency having custody of the animal may assume ownership upon seizureand the owner may not prevent the animal's destruction or adoption bypetitioning the court or posting a bond.
*** I am willing to do whatever the court requests to get my babies back
(5) If no criminal case is filed within fourteen business days of the animal'sremoval, the owner may petition the district court of the county where theanimal was removed for the animal's return. The petition shall be filed withthe court, with copies served to the law enforcement or animal care andcontrol agency responsible for removing the animal and to the prosecutingattorney. if the court grants the petition, the agency which seized the animalmust deliver the animal to the owner at no cost to the owner. If a criminal
action is filed after the petition is filed but before the animal is returned, thepetition shall be joined with the criminal matter.
*** My dogs & cat were seized on January,6th, 2011...
(6) In a motion or petition for the animal's return before a trial, the burden is
on the owner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the animalwill not suffer future neglect or abuse and is not in need of being restored tohealth.
***We now have a studio apt & are no longer homeless, all of my own dogs &foster dogs have vet records & are all fully immunized
[2009 c 287 § 2; 1994 c 261 § 6; 1987 c 335 § 1; 1974 ex.s. c 12 § 2.]
RCW 16.52.207
Animal cruelty in the second degree.
(1) A person is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if, undercircumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the personknowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence inflicts unnecessarysuffering or pain upon an animal.
(2) An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if,under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the ownerknowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence:
(a) Fails to provide the animal with necessary shelter, rest, sanitation, space,or medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiablephysical pain as a result of the failure;
(4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree undersubsection (1) or (2)(a) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that thedefendant's failure was due to economic distress beyond the defendant'scontrol.
***I believe it was establshed that I was homeless & was doing the best Icould for the animals at that time. Although I realize full well that living in acar is not a good situation it was only a temporary situation & I would gladlylive under a bridge if it meant keeping my animals with me. They are alifetime commitment not something to be taken lightly, I guarentee thoseanimals would die for me, I was trying to show them the same love & loyaltythat they would freely give to me. It was not their fault we were homeless, itwas mine but I atleast tried to keep up with my responsibility to them to thebest of my abilites
Finding -- Intent -- 1994 c 261: See note following RCW 16.52.011.
Everett Municipal Codes
6.04.070 Prohibited conduct.
C. Offenses Relating to Cruelty. It shall be unlawful for any person to:
2. Under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty asdefined in RCW 16.52.205, fail to provide an animal with sufficient good andwholesome food and a constant source of clear potable water, proper shelterand protection from the weather, veterinary care when needed to preventsuffering, and with humanecare and treatment;
RCW 16.52.310 Definition
(d) Provide dogs with easy and convenient access to adequate amounts of clean food and water. Food and water receptacles must be regularly cleanedand sanitized. All enclosures must contain potable water that is not frozen, issubstantially free from debris, and is readily accessible to all dogs in theenclosure at all times.
*** The revised code of Washington states the animals must be given accessto ADEQUATE amounts of clear potable water. I was following Washingtonstate law & common sense in regards to giving them water. I had just giventhem water before we all went to bed, several hours earlier, there was awater container on the hood of my car & if you can view the pictures theytook of a big black pan you could still see a little water at the bottom of thepan so it didn't have time to dehydrate.
Snohomish County, Washington, Code of Ordinances >> Title 9 - ANIMALSChapter 9.12 - 9.12.080 - Cruelty to animals.
The following, singly or together, are deemed to constitute cruel treatment toanimals. Therefore, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to:
(3) Neglect to provide adequate daily rations of food or water to any animalwithin his care, custody or control;
West's Revised Code of Washington Annotated Currentness.
Title 35. Cities and Towns. Chapter 35.27. Towns. 35.27.370.
Specific powers enumerated Citation: WA ST 35.27.370
Citation: West's RCWA 35.27.370 Last Checked by Web Center Staff: 09/2010
Summary:
This Washington statute provides that the council of said town shall havepower to pass ordinances NOT IN CONFLICT with the Constitution and laws of
this state, or of the United States. Specifically, the council may regulate,restrain, or prohibit the running at large of any and all domestic animalswithin the city limits, or any part or parts thereof, and to regulate the keepingof such animals within any part of the city; to establish, maintain andregulate a common pound for estrays, and to appoint a poundkeeper, whoshall be paid out of the fines and fees imposed on, and collected from, theowners of any impounded stock.
Statute in Full:
The council of said town shall have power:
(1) To pass ordinances NOT IN CONFLICT with the Constitution and laws of this state, or of the United States;
(7) To impose and collect an annual license on every dog within the limits of the town, to prohibit dogs running at large, and to provide for the killing of alldogs found at large and not duly licensed;
(14) To impose fines, penalties and forfeitures for any and all violations of ordinances, and for any breach or violation of any ordinance, to fix thepenalty by fine or imprisonment, or both; but no such fine shall exceed fivethousand dollars, nor the term of imprisonment exceed one year, except thatthe punishment for any criminal ordinance shall be the same as thepunishment provided in state law for the same crime; or to provide thatviolations of ordinances constitute a civil violation subject to a monetarypenalty, but no act which is a state crime may be made a civil violation;
(16) To make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and resolutionsnot inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the state of Washington, asmay be deemed expedient to maintain the peace, good government andwelfare of the town and its trade, commerce and manufacturers, and to doand perform any and all other acts and things necessary or proper to carryout the provisions of this chapter.
CREDIT(S)
[2008 c 129 § 3, eff. June 12, 2008; 1993 c 83 § 7; 1986 c 278 § 6; 1984 c 258§ 805; 1977 ex.s. c 316 § 25; 1965 ex.s. c 116 § 15; 1965 c 127 § 1; 1965 c 7§ 35.27.370. Prior: 1955 c 378 § 4; 1949 c 151 § 1; 1945 c 214 § 1; 1941 c 74§ 1; 1927 c 207 § 1; 1925 ex.s. c 159 § 1; 1895 c 32 § 1; 1890 p 201 § 154;Rem. Supp. 1949 § 9175.]
8) I was never given a copy of my legal remedies, nor was I given acopy of the warrant, the warrant was handed to me by Officer Trask who is NOT a lawenforcement officer. The warrant disappeared when
everyone left & I had NO pockets in which to put the warrant in asasserted by Officer Harmer.
9) I was not given competent counsel, who had ANY experience inAnimal Law or Civil Rightslaw. As a matter of fact I was given anattorney who had just passed her bar exam 2 yrs ago who could not& would not produce any experience in my type of criminal case. Imight add that she was a graduate of the Cooley Law School a 4thtier law school & an online schol at that, where the SAT & GPAqualifications make it the bottom of the 4th tier plus to makematters worse the rest of her training was at Gonzaga. I called over
30 law firms & got the same response many times over: When theysee those credentials on an applicant the "can" the resume. I evenhad one of them tell to go it alone because it was better to have afool for a client (myself) then an idiot for a lawyer. She may turn outto be an incredible lawyer but I don't want her "practicing" on mewhen my dogs lives are at stake. Animal law is a newly emergingpractice which is mixed with procedural, civil & even admiralty lawsregardingsearch & seizure, best left to someone with experiencewith all or part of these areas of law.
10) I have already been deprived of my due process & my personalproperty permanantly without even being convicted yet, so I wouldrespectfully request that the court redeem themselves to the extentthey are able & dismiss all charges, expunge this records & allproceedings within,return my personal property, & refrain fromharassing me any further
Additionally, the practice of seizing the personal property of owners withoutfollowing statutory notice requirements, as occurred in this case, is a denialof procedural due process. No proper notice procedures have been followedby the City of Everett/animal care and control authorities under animalseizure statutes, or property forfeiture statutes, to the owners of the petssetting forth the reason for the seizure and the process whereby thepetitioners may reacquire possession of their property in their pets.Petitioners have been denied procedural due process by theCity of Everettand/or (AC) authorities. The pets were seized unlawfully as they were NOT ina life threatening condition pursuant to RCW 16.52.085. Property ownershave the right to challenge such seizures and, if they "substantially prevail,"recover their costs and reaasonable attorney fees. RCW 69.50.505(6). (1) Thefollowing are subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right exists inthem (6) In any proceeding to forfeit property under this title, where the
claimant substantially prevails, the claimant is entitled to reasonableattorneys' fees reasonably incurred by the claimant. In addition, in a courthearing between two or more claimants to the article or articles involved, theprevailing party is entitled to a judgment for costs and reasonable attorneys'fees. Washington state's civil forfeiture act was adopted to protect peoplefrom having their property wrongfully seized by the government. In Guillen v.
Contreras (Sup. Ct. En Banc. No. 82531-9 (9/2010), amicus notes that "anowner has the right to resist the taking of any of his property regardless of market value." Amicus Br. At 8, cf Guillen v. Contreras, Sup. Ct. En Banc, No.82531-9 (9/9/2010). A citizen has the right to object to seizure, even if temporary, of his personal property no matter the market value. Id.Forfeitures of personal and real property are not favored in the law and veryspecific procedures must be followed.by government officials and its agentswhen seizing property, including animals. If statutory procedures are notfollowed, the property was illegally seized and a person is lawfully entitled topossession thereof. Unless the seized property is needed for evidence, thepetitioners are not the rightful owners, the property is contraband, or theproperty is subject to forfeiture pursuant to statute, the seized property must
be returned. Id. The petitioner is the rightful owners of their dogs and cats,their property in dogs and cats is not "contraband", statutory procedures forseizure of property have not been followed, and the seized property in petsmust be returned to the petitioners. If the state argues that the pets are"derivative contraband" and that petitioner is somehow guilty of a crime, thegovernment must follow property forfeiture procedures to divest petitionersof their interest in their property in dogs and cats. One 1958 Plymouth Sedanv. Pennsylvannia, 380 U.S. At 699; Cooper, 904 F.2d at 305; Farrell, 606 F. 2dat 1344; David v. Fowler, 504 F. Supp. At 505, cf from State v. Alaway, 64Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). Washington courts often look tofederal law to determine lawful forfeiture procedures. The State cannotconfiscate property merely because it is "derivative contraband". Instead itmust forfeit it using property forfeiture procedures. Washington has astatutory forfeiture procedure. . . RCW 69.50.505(a)(2). Notice must be givenwithin 15 days of seizure. RCW 69.50.505(c). If the property is personalproperty, one claming an interest in it then has 45 days to respond, and if aresponse is made, a hearing must be held. RCW 69.50.505(d), (e).Washington State's forfeiture statutes are exclusive. Unless statutoryprocedure are followed, a Washington court cannot order forfeiture and mustrelease the petitioners' property. A court does not have inherent authority toforfeit property. See, State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3(4/2/92). The government gave no notice, so petitioners are not bound by anytime frame to reclaim their property which is still in impound in Everett Wa. Inthe case of the seizure of an owner's property in pets for feeding and care, asin this matter, the seizure and forfeiture provisions in RCW 16.52.085 appearto track Washington State's civil forfeiture statute RCW 69.50 et seq. andfederal law notice procedures. RCW 16.52.100 provides that if an animal isconfined without necessary food or water for more than 36 hours, and theofficer finds it extremely difficult to provide the animal with food or water, theofficer may remove the animals to protective custody for that purpose. RCW16.52.085 sets forth the method whereby an animal may be seized forprotective custody for feeding and care. An animal may be seized by an
officer only with a warrant UNLESS the animal is in an immediate life-threatening condition. If the officer decides that an animal is in an immediatelife threatening condition to justify summary seizure of the animals, propernotice must be given to the owner of the animal by (1) posting at the place of seizure, and (2) personal service to a person residing at the place of seizure,OR by registered mail to the owner. The Notice must be written notice to the
owner of the circumstances of the removal of the animals (without a warrant)and the legal remedies available under this chapter to the owner of theanimal(s). The proper procedures by statute are enumerated below.Petitioners received no lawful notice and their due process rights wereviolated.
I have not seen my animals in 80 days, i have not been allowed tovisit them, to call to check on them, I did not even find out the onewas dead til the prosecutor just casually said oh they put that one tosleep. This is more than cruel & unusal punishment for a crime Ihave not even been convicted of yet, I was not even a resident of thecity of Everett, nor would I ever be even if I was paid to be. It should
also be noted that I used to rescue dogs from the Everett Shelter til Istarted to realize that EVERY dog I pulled from there was eitherinjured or maced, sometimes both so it is very evident because of the prior harassment of Officer trask when I was an Everett citizenyears ago, & the complaints I made about the injured dogs I waspulling out of there. It is crystal clear that this is malicious, in intent,& motivated by revenge & prejudice I pray that you & your courtswill no longer be a party to this action. Please also let it be notedthat if you deny this motion that I am willing ready & able toproceded with the court hearing as it stands. I have 32 reams of evidence, 42lbs of vet records & I have a witness list of over 148people so far, still waiting on word from another 78 people. Two of the 148 are going to fly up from California so I would like to go onrecord stating that I will not waive my rights to a speedy trial norwill I accept any continuances in this matter. I have not recieved fulldiscovery, nor have I recieved competent counsel, the last attorneydidn't even understand about the concept of Affidavit of Prejudice &why Judge Odell could not rule on her motion to withdraw the sameday. I also have 14 motions ready for consideration, & want to havea jury trial of my peers including "Thin Native American Women" thereal kind, not the blond blue eyed ones who's grandmother was aCherokee "Princess" or still believe that Pocahontas & John Smithfell in love & got married & lived happily ever after, the one's whoare college educated, & I would like atleast 1 or 2 people who havehigh functioning autism like myself. I am not trying to make youcrazy I just want to make sure that I present every scrap of evidenceas I can so I have something to appeal in case I were to lose. Plusthe prosecutor ATTACKED my character by stating that I kept mydog with cancer alive to garner donations when I never have asked adime for him, he was my boy. I was just trying to get the last fewprecious moments with him that I could. The day Mr fisher told mehe was dead I wanted to die myself, to think he died alone, afraid &
thinking I had abandoned him is more than either one of usdeserved. The prosecutor has the responsibility to prove beyond areasonable doubt that I am guilty, I have the Constitutional right toprove beyond a doubt that I am not & to defend myself & mycharacter, this charge could destroy my ability to rescue, my abilityto own my own animals, it could ruin my life which is exactly what it
was intended to do. By taking my animals from me all I have to do isread & learn for 18 to 20 hours a day, I can't sleep because I havenightmares that they are killing my animals, they won't even giveme back my dead dog's body because he is "evidence" he WAS aiving breathing loving sentient being, with feelings, who could love,feel fear, feel pain, & feel sorrow, & now I don't know where he is orall of his parts are. He spent 12 yrs in a puppy mill before he wasrescued, I only got less than 2 years of his life to prove to him allhumans weren't bad, I was wrong. Meanwhile my dogs are living inglass cages barely twice the size of my car, having to eat, sleep, pee& poop in the same area, they are left alone from 6p.m. to 10a.m. &their cages are hosed down to be cleaned out. In a shelter that can
not guarantee that they will even be safe from disease or harm asevidenced by all the cats they killed several months ago becausethey have no clear cut methods for quarantining animals. They arebeing separated from eachother in a shelter that animals are abusedin, when they are used to sleeping with me, eating with me & beingtogether. Soffie(my schnauzer)Hoki (my Kelpie) & Taz (my cat) havenever been away from me for more than 46hrs. Dogs are pack animals by nature, & my poor cat thinks he's a dog because heactually was nursed by a wolf mother, he fetches, walks on a leash &the doofus even lifts his leg to pee, he just doesn't know any better.They are giving my Kelpie 4 times higher doses of Phenobarbitolthen is required, They are seniors dogs & a black cat, they stand nochance of being adopted. I know for legal purposes they are definedas "property" & I am going to change that law, but they are not justproperty they are my babies, everyone has a story, I found Hoki in aditch in Lewis county with his mother & father & most of hislittermates heads bashed in only 3 of them lived, his head was cavedin & I put him in the back of my van with his parents & siblingsbodies til I heard a scream from the back, his sister & brother gotadopted but no one wanted a spaztic siezure dog except for me, & Iwas glad, Soffie I got her from the Everett Police Dept she wascovered over 75% of her body in cigarette burns, she was terrified of everything, pop bottles, cans, lighters, cigarette packs, plastic bags,grooming, nail clips, the vet estimated that all of her ribs had beenfractured multiple times, she had also been bred atleast 10 times bythe time I got her maybe 11, she had a hernia & an exploded uterusfrom giving birth so much, which may be why she had the bladderstone as well. Taz was no bigger than my hand when he ran out infront of my van almost 6 yrs ago, on Broadway, I tried to take him tothe Everett Shelter but they were just going to euthanize him so Ibecame the mother of a snot nosed, bloody eared, green goopy eyedmonster who was nursed by a wolf mother & got a lttle screwy in life
as a result but he a good guy. Misty was taken from a puppy mill,guarding the skeletal remains of 6 of her puppies, she was taken byanother rescue, adopted out & I got her back pregnant when it turnsout the rescue was breeding those dogs. Libby was literally rottingaway when I pulled her from an Eastern Washington shelter, I kidyou not she was mostly bald & rotting flesh, she had maggots under
the patch of scabs & skin she had left, the shelter manager justshook her head when I pulled her & put her in my car, she said "Youknow that one is going to die too right?" I told her she would die athome being loved then, those are the kind I take, the kind that break my heart, but the ones I love the most, Libby didn't die, she thrived,now she is once again abandoned for all she knows.The people whobrought her in said she was old & they dumped her there to be putto sleep & adopted another puppy that day, she is only 2 or 3 yrsold. This is my life's work, my heart & my soul. I have a beat up littleToyota that stinks to high Heavens because in the little over 15mnths I have owned it I have put 40,000 miles on it & havetransported, rescued, & pulled somewhere around 1200 dogs, cats,
even a 400lb pig, ferretts, rabbits, birds, raccoons, possoms, a fewold ladies & numerous college kids stranded on old lonely roads inthat car. I am the one who sits up in the woods for days on endtrying to catch an injured feral dog, getting jumped by stupidbobcats, & the crud kicked out of me by deers, not to mention beingfollowed around by cougars & bears, or drives over 2 mountianpasses in freezing rain storms & white out blizzards by just letting alittle air out of my bald tires & driving slow,no chains, no snow tiresI'm the one who chases vagrants around uder bridges & over passesto give their dogs, shots, wormers, dog food & flea meds. When yousee the ads on craigslist offering free flea meds, wormer & shots,that's me too.This whole fiasco has caused the lives of over 180animals at last count & I quit counting 3 weeks ago because it hurttoo bad. I'm pretty sure, or atleast I was til this, that is how I'mgonna die, saving some animal, but that was okay with me. I will goto court, I will fight & win, even if I have to take this to the SupremeCourt of the United States of America. I don't know what line of Mitchell's you decend from but I come from West Virginia line & wedon't quit fighting til we're dead & there's even a few folk legends of us fighting after that. True story, you can look it up onWVCuture.org just type in Mitchell when you have a couple few freedays I don't know if I did this right or not, I'm pretty sure I have laidout my whole case here, along with my defense, but it is the best Ican do with what I know so far. Not to mention I have been sleepdeprived for 80 days because i keep having nightmares that thatlady is drowning mydogs & I keep running towards them but they
just keep getting further away no matter how fast i run & I can hearthem screaming for me & she just keeps holding them under & thenbrings them up to revive them & then drowns them some moreIwould also like you to take a look at my web pagethe 3rd link is todo with my court case, it was private but since the prosecutoralready tricked me into presenting my case in front of him at the
Superior Court hearing it's kind of pointless to hide itanyway.Doesn't seem fair since i oly got some vet reports, & thewarrant request,even though I asked for discovery weeks ago, but if we go to court I can fie a motion for that too I guess.
