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Move Cyber Threats On To Another Target Encrypt Everything ...ISC)2_eSymposium_S… · HACKERS...

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Move Cyber Threats On To Another Target Encrypt Everything, Everywhere Imam Sheikh Director, Product Management Vormetric
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Page 1: Move Cyber Threats On To Another Target Encrypt Everything ...ISC)2_eSymposium_S… · HACKERS ACTIVELY TARGETING INSIDER ACCOUNTS BIG DATASTATES CLOUD/SAAS NATION CRIMINAL HACKERS

Move Cyber Threats On To Another Target

Encrypt Everything, Everywhere

Imam Sheikh Director, Product Management Vormetric

Page 2: Move Cyber Threats On To Another Target Encrypt Everything ...ISC)2_eSymposium_S… · HACKERS ACTIVELY TARGETING INSIDER ACCOUNTS BIG DATASTATES CLOUD/SAAS NATION CRIMINAL HACKERS

State of the Market

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Evolving Threats

Today’s spectrum of Insider Threats

TRADITIONAL INSIDERS

POROUS PERIMETERS

HACKERS ACTIVELY TARGETING INSIDER ACCOUNTS

BIG DATA

CLOUD/SAAS

NATION STATES

CRIMINAL HACKERS

PRIVILEGED USERS

IN THE PAST COMPANY EMPLOYEES WITH KNOWLEDGE-REQUIRED ACCESS

TODAY WE MUST ADD

IT PERSONNEL, CONTRACTORS SERVICE PROVIDER EMPLOYEES COMPROMISE OF INSIDER ACCOUNTS BY OUTSIDERS

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 3

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Failing to Secure Their Data

X ARE PROTECTING DATA BECAUSE OF A PARTNER OR COMPETITOR’S BREACH

EXPERIENCED A DATA BREACH OR FAILED A COMPLIANCE AUDIT

48% 44% 40% 29% 26%

United States UK Japan ASEAN Germany

38% 33% 27% 25% 7%

GLOBAL- 40%

United States UK Japan ASEAN Germany

GLOBAL- 29%

Japan

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 4

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Targets of Sensitive Data Acquisition Hackers target where the data resides

49%

DATABASES

39%

FILE SERVERS

36%

CLOUD

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 5

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Industry and Security Experts Alike: “Encrypt Everything”

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 6

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Sensitive Data Protection Technologies

• SSL, SSH,

HTTPS, IPSEC

(ISC)2 e-Symposium

Data in Motion Data at Rest

• ENCRYPTION,

TOKENIZATION, MASKING

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Practical Encrypt Everything

Page 9: Move Cyber Threats On To Another Target Encrypt Everything ...ISC)2_eSymposium_S… · HACKERS ACTIVELY TARGETING INSIDER ACCOUNTS BIG DATASTATES CLOUD/SAAS NATION CRIMINAL HACKERS

Where is Sensitive Data? If you’re not sure… You are at risk

Enterprise / Hosted / Outsourced Data Centers

Big Data Environments

Users

Remote Servers

SaaS, PaaS, IaaS

Clouds

App Servers

Database Servers

Storage Servers

Web Servers

Remote? On Servers?

On Different Environments?

Windows Linux Unix

On Varying Storage?

SAN

NAS

Cloud Storage

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 9

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Feb 2014

Good News Widening adoption of encryption

15%

35%

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 10

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Bad News A disjointed, expensive collection of point products

Each use case requires individual infrastructure,

management consoles and training.

Complex – Inefficient - Expensive

Expense Reports

File Encryption

+ + + + + +

Customer Records

Database Encryption

PII Compliance

App Encryption

Cloud Migration

Cloud Encryption

Physical Security

Full Disk Encryption

Tape Archives

Key Management

Privileged User Control

Access Policies

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 11

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No Magic Bullet

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 12

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The Encrypt Everything Three Step Program

1. Set Vision Statement

2. Develop Policy

3. Develop Implementation Strategy

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 13

Page 14: Move Cyber Threats On To Another Target Encrypt Everything ...ISC)2_eSymposium_S… · HACKERS ACTIVELY TARGETING INSIDER ACCOUNTS BIG DATASTATES CLOUD/SAAS NATION CRIMINAL HACKERS

Set Vision Statement

• Protect all sensitive data to keep my

organization out of the data breach

news section.

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 14

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Develop Policy

Analyze & State your corporate, organizational and security requirements/needs

Analyze & State the drivers for your strategy

Understand the security and compliance requirements from business units

Classify sensitive data further

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 15

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Develop Implementation Strategy Recommended by Ovum

Concentrate on protecting data at the source

Make encryption with access controls the default

Monitor and analyze data access patterns

Replace point solutions with data security platforms

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 16

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Realizing the Vision Within Budget

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Types Of Encryption

(ISC)2 e-Symposium

App Level Encryption, Tokenization, TDE, Data Masking

File Encryption with access control

Disk Encryption (FDE)

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Databases & Big Data Considerations

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 19

• Data sources/Nodes, Configuration, Logs, Reports, Targets

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File Servers Considerations

Data

Access Policy #1 User: AccountsPayable App: ERP Opp: Read Only Time: Any Resources: Any

HR ERP Directory User: AccountsPayable App: ERP What: Read File Time: 2PM 11/14/2013 Where: ERP Directory

User: SystemAdmin-Group Process: Cat command What: Read File Time: 2PM 11/14/2013 Where: HR ERP Directory Block access and log attempt

File Level Encryption Accounts Payable Directory

• Auditing

• Separation of duties

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 20

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Secure VPN

Key Manager (virtual or hosted physical appliances)

Deployed in cloud

Key Manager (virtual or physical appliances)

Deployed on premise

Key management:

• Appliance on premise

• Virtual appliance on premise

• Virtual appliance in cloud

• Appliance hosted by provider

Cloud Considerations

• Key Management

• Auditing

• Hybrid Cloud

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 21

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Vormetric Data Security Platform Ready for the next use case

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 22

Page 23: Move Cyber Threats On To Another Target Encrypt Everything ...ISC)2_eSymposium_S… · HACKERS ACTIVELY TARGETING INSIDER ACCOUNTS BIG DATASTATES CLOUD/SAAS NATION CRIMINAL HACKERS

Vormetric Data Security Platform Enabling an “Encrypt Everything” strategy

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 23

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Example Use Cases

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McKesson Healthcare Company

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 25

Challenge

• Had to meet many compliance requirements

• Business Groups deploying many encryption solutions

• Level of solution “quality” varied

• Very expensive

Action

• Vormetric Data Security Platform

• Leveraged multi-domain management

• Available enterprise-wide

Result

• Higher availability

• Consistency

• Significant TCO reduction

Page 26: Move Cyber Threats On To Another Target Encrypt Everything ...ISC)2_eSymposium_S… · HACKERS ACTIVELY TARGETING INSIDER ACCOUNTS BIG DATASTATES CLOUD/SAAS NATION CRIMINAL HACKERS

Fortune 100 Finance Company

(ISC)2 e-Symposium 26

Challenge

• Faced with a customer mandate, traditional encryption approaches were sized at a 24 month engineering effort

Action

• Vendor bake-off

• Deployed Vormetric Transparent Encryption

Result

• Protected 160 servers in less than 3 months

• Have easily expanded solution to meet many more use cases

Page 27: Move Cyber Threats On To Another Target Encrypt Everything ...ISC)2_eSymposium_S… · HACKERS ACTIVELY TARGETING INSIDER ACCOUNTS BIG DATASTATES CLOUD/SAAS NATION CRIMINAL HACKERS

www.vormetric.com

Questions


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