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MOBILE NETWORK SECURITY ALEXANDER R. ORTIZ UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA COP4910
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  • MOBILE NETWORK SECURITYALEXANDER R. ORTIZ

    UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

    COP4910

  • BODY WORN IMSI CATCHER(AND THEYRE GETTING EVEN SMALLER)

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS

    OVERVIEW

    HISTORY

    TECHNICAL ASPECTS

    PROFESSIONAL IMPACT

    SOCIAL AND ETHICAL IMPACT

    CAREERS AND MARKETING

    CONCLUSION

    REFERENCES

    QUESTIONS

  • OVERVIEW

    WHICH MOBILE NETWORKS ARE COVERED?

    WHAT ASPECTS OF THEIR SECURITY WILL BE DISCUSSED?

    WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NETWORK AND DATA STANDARDS?

    WHAT ARE SOME SECURITY THREATS THAT EXIST?

    HOW WILL THESE ISSUES BE ADDRESSED?

  • HISTORY THIRD GENERATION NETWORKS

    PACKET BASED MOBILE NETWORKS.

    DEVELOPED BEGINNING __________ .

    COMPETITIVE RESEARCH BETWEEN _____ & _______ .

    UMTS/CDMA AND CDMA2000/EV-DO

    (EVOLUTION DATA OPTIMIZED)

  • HISTORY THIRD GENERATION TRANSITIONAL NETWORKS

    FASTER PACKET BASED NETWORKS.

    HSPA (HIGH SPEED PACKET ACCESS). EV-DO REV-A/B

  • THE INTERNET

  • BASE STATION CONTROLLER

  • HISTORY

    FOURTH GENERATION NETWORKS

    3GPP LTE ADVANCED (LONG TERM EVOLUTION)

    QUALCOMM DISCONTINUED 3GPP2 ULTRA MOBILE BROADBAND

    IEEE STANDARD WIMAX REL2 IS THE CONTENDER THIS TIME

    PACKET SWITCHING ONLY, NO CIRCUIT SWITCHING!

  • TECHNICAL ASPECTS

    MULTIPLE LAYERS OF NETWORK

    THE POSSIBILITY OF FALLBACK MODES OF OPERATION

    ALLOWS FOR GREATER CELLULAR NETWORK COVERAGE.

    DIFFERENCES IN PROTOCOL ARE OF IMPORTANCE.

  • TECHNICAL ASPECTS

    A5/1

    STREAM CIPHER

    USED BY 1G/2G/3G NETWORKS IN

    FALLBACK MODES.

    NUMEROUS PRACTICAL ATTACKS

    PUBLISHED.

    ROUTINELY DECRYPTED BY NSA.

    64 BIT KEY.

    A5/2

    STREAM CIPHER

    A WEAKER VERSION OF A5/1 MADE

    FOR EXPORT.

    REAL-TIME DECRYPTION.

    ESSENTIALLY A 16 BIT KEY ONLY

    NEEDED TO GUESS CORRECTLY.

    MISTY1 AND A5/3

    KASUMI

    BASED ON MITSUBISHI DEVELOPED

    CIPHER.

    PRACTICAL ATTACKS SINCE 2010.

    GPRS/EDGE

    128 BIT KEY

  • TECHNICAL ASPECTS

    ATTACK:

    DETERMINE YOUR TARGET IMSI (INTERNATIONAL MOBILE SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY)

    FOOL IT INTO CONNECTING TO A VIRTUAL BASE TRANSCEIVER STATION. (IMSI CATCHER)

    FORCE LOW LEVEL ENCRYPTION/NO ENCRYPTION

    DECRYPT IF NECESSARY

  • TECHNICAL ASPECTS

    REAL TIME ATTACKS AGAINST ACTIVELY ENCRYPTED CALLS ARE POSSIBLE WHEN?

    HAVE YOU EVER SEEN YOUR PHONE SWITCH FROM 4G->3G/EDGE/EV-DO?

    FALLBACKS OCCUR TO PROVIDE CONTINUED CELL SERVICE IN AREAS WITH POOR SIGNAL.

    MOBILE 4G NETWORKS ONLY REAL WEAKNESS: _______________ .

  • PROFESSIONAL IMPACT

    THIS AFFECTS COMPANY DEVICE

    POLICIES MOVING FORWARD.

    SETTING A PREFERRED NETWORK MODE:

    WHICH OPTION SHOULD BE CHOSEN TO

    BEST SECURE THE DEVICE?

  • SOCIAL AND ETHICAL IMPACT

    WIRETAPPING AND PRIVACY LAWS CONCERN CORPORATE, GOVERNMENT, AND PRIVATE

    INTERESTS AT ALL LEVELS OF OUR SOCIETY.

    SHOULD THE PUBLIC SECTOR BE ABLE TO WIRETAP?

    IF THE PUBLIC SECTOR CAN EASILY WIRETAP, WHAT PREVENTS FOREIGN ENTITIES?

    WHO OFFERS A PRODUCT/SERVICE THAT IS FREE FROM EAVESDROPPING?

  • CAREERS AND MARKETING

    INFORMATION SECURITY ANALYSTS:

    +36.5% TO 22. WOW!!!

    COMPUTER HARDWARE ENGINEERS: +7.4%

    TO 22.

    SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS, APPLICATIONS:

    +22.8% TO 22.

  • CONCLUSION

    CELLULAR PRIVACY IS IMPORTANT.

    UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERLYING ISSUES CAUSING THE LACK OF SECURITY CAN AID THOSE

    INTERESTED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE SYSTEMS.

    IT AFFECTS CORPORATE, GOVERNMENT, AND PRIVATE INTERESTS AROUND THE WORLD.

    INFORMATION SECURITY IS ONE OF THE HOTTEST JOB OPPORTUNITIES PROJECTED FOR AT

    LEAST THE NEXT EIGHT YEARS.

  • REFERENCES

    ABOUT 3GPP. (N.D). RETRIEVED NOVEMBER 10, 2014, FROM HTTP://WWW.3GPP.ORG/ABOUT-3GPP/ABOUT-3GPP

    ABOUT 3GPP2. (N.D). RETRIEVED NOVEMBER 10, 2014, FROM HTTP://WWW.3GPP2.ORG/PUBLIC_HTML/MISC/ABOUTHOME.CFM

    PACKET DATA SERVING NODE. (N.D.). RETRIEVED NOVEMBER 10, 2014, FROM HTTP://WWW.CISCO.COM/EN/US/TECH/TK722/TK721/TK488/TSD_TECHNOLOGY_SUPPORT_SUB-

    PROTOCOL_HOME.HTML

    SHAMIR, A. (2010, JANUARY 10). CRYPTOLOGY EPRINT ARCHIVE: REPORT 2010/013. RETRIEVED NOVEMBER 10, 2014, FROM HTTP://EPRINT.IACR.ORG/2010/013

    TIMBERG, C., & SOLTANI, A. (2013, DECEMBER 13). HOW THE NSA PINPOINTS A MOBILE DEVICE. RETRIEVED NOVEMBER 10, 2014, FROM HTTP://WWW.WASHINGTONPOST.COM/BUSINESS/TECHNOLOGY/BY-CRACKING-CELLPHONE-CODE-NSA-HAS-

    CAPACITY-FOR-DECODING-PRIVATE-CONVERSATIONS/2013/12/13/E119B598-612F-11E3-BF45-61F69F54FC5F_STORY.HTML

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS.OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS. 2014. WEB. .

  • MOBILE NETWORK SECURITYALEXANDER R. ORTIZ

    UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

    COP4910


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