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SecureWorks My Neighbor Runs a Crack House: Aggregate Risk Model for the Cloud
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Page 1: My Neighbor Runs a Crack House: Aggregate Risk Model for the …itm.iit.edu/netsecure11/RudyRistich_CloudRisks.pdf · My Neighbor Runs a Crack House: Aggregate Risk Model for the

SecureWorks

My Neighbor Runs a Crack House: Aggregate Risk Model for the Cloud

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Crack Houses Attract Criminals

Overall crime rate is higher in the regions which have a higher drug crime rate

The size of the dots is proportional to the drug related arrests normalized by population, and the darkness of the dots is proportional to the total arrests normalized by population

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In the Cloud, Anyone Can Move in Next Door

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The Neighborhood – IP Reputation

• Public IPs are routinely being re-used by Cloud Providers

• Customer assumes reputation of IP they are assigned– But a security researcher just burned that IP probing a botnet…– …and it now under DDoS as retaliation, so we released it back into pool ;)– Or we hosted research bots at that IP, and reputation providers noticed

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Neighbors Drawing Attention

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Risks in Virtualized & Cloud Environments

• Based on Threat Intelligence data and IDS data collected over last year– vulnerabilities reported in virtualized technologies nearly doubled.– IDS events detecting these attacks increased by more than 500%

• Risk due to vulnerabilities in virtualization-related tech is amplified within the Cloud

6

VulnsAlerts

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Security is the Major Issue

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Adversaries Target the Cloud: Data & Privacy

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Statistics of Adoption of Virtualization & Cloud

• 96% of respondents had virtualized at some portion of their infrastructure.

• 52% had moved data and applications into a Cloud environment, and of those that had not, 46% planned to within 12 months.

• 58% believed their Cloud environment was not adequately secured.

9

*****Results based on customer survey at SecureWorks Enterprise Security Summit 2010

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Open Kitchen Dining Experience Analogy

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Open Kitchen Dining Experience Analogy

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Simple Model of IT Stack

Users

Applications

Platform

Infrastructure

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NIST Working Definition of Cloud Computing – Visual Model

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Your Neighbors and You:IaaS, PaaS and SaaS

Your Org’s App 1

Your Org’s App 2

Neighbor’s

App 1

Neighbor’s

App 2

Hypervisor

Hardware Network Storage

IaaS Provider Platform

Your Org’s App Stack

Neighbor’s App Stack

Your Org’sUserbase

Neighbor’s Userbase

Your Org’s Platform Stack

Neighbor’s Platform Stack

What You Share w/ Your Neighbor

Your Organization

Your Neighbor

Your Org’s Guest OS

Neighbor’s Guest OS

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Your Neighbors and You:IaaS, PaaS and SaaS

Your Org’s App 1

Your Org’s App 2

Neighbor’s

App 1

Neighbor’s

App 2

Platform Stack

Guest OS

Hardware Network Storage

PaaS Provider Platform

Your Org’s App Stack

Neighbor’s App Stack

Your Org’s Userbase

Neighbor’s Userbase

Your Org’s App 1

Your Org’s App 2

Neighbor’s

App 1

Neighbor’s

App 2

Hypervisor

Hardware Network Storage

IaaS Provider Platform

Your Org’s App Stack

Neighbor’s App Stack

Your Org’sUserbase

Neighbor’s Userbase

Your Org’s Platform Stack

Neighbor’s Platform Stack

What You Share w/ Your Neighbor

Your Organization

Your Neighbor

Hypervisor

Your Org’s Guest OS

Neighbor’s Guest OS

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Your Neighbors and You:IaaS, PaaS and SaaS

Your Org’s Userbase

Neighbor’s Userbase

Software Application Stack

Hardware Network Storage

SaaS Provider Platform

Software Application

Platform Stack

Guest OS

Your Org’s App 1

Your Org’s App 2

Neighbor’s

App 1

Neighbor’s

App 2

Platform Stack

Guest OS

Hardware Network Storage

PaaS Provider Platform

Your Org’s App Stack

Neighbor’s App Stack

Your Org’s Userbase

Neighbor’s Userbase

Your Org’s App 1

Your Org’s App 2

Neighbor’s

App 1

Neighbor’s

App 2

Hypervisor

Hardware Network Storage

IaaS Provider Platform

Your Org’s App Stack

Neighbor’s App Stack

Your Org’sUserbase

Neighbor’s Userbase

Your Org’s Platform Stack

Neighbor’s Platform Stack

What You Share w/ Your Neighbor

Your Organization

Your Neighbor

Hypervisor Hypervisor

Your Org’s Guest OS

Neighbor’s Guest OS

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Your Neighbors and You: SaaS

Your Org’s Userbase

Neighbor’s Userbase

Software Application Stack

Hardware Network Storage

SaaS Provider Platform

Software Application

Platform Stack

Guest OS

Hypervisor

• In addition to shared virtualized infrastructure,shared Guest OS, and shared Platform Stack, Software Application Stack and Software Application are shared with Neighbor

• Potential for exploitation of vulnerabilities in Software Application Stack and Software Application expose Organizations using SaaS to some risk from Neighbor

What You Share w/ Your Neighbor

Your Organization

Your Neighbor

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Loss of Governance: Malicious Insiders

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Your Neighbors and You: PaaS

Your Org’s App 1

Your Org’s App 2

Neighbor’s

App 1

Neighbor’s

App 2

Platform Stack

Guest OS

Hardware Network Storage

PaaS Provider Platform

Your Org’s App Stack

Neighbor’s App Stack

Your Org’s Userbase

Neighbor’s Userbase

What You Share w/ Your Neighbor

Your Organization

Your Neighbor

Hypervisor

• In addition to shared virtualized infrastructure, Guest OS and Platform Stack are shared with Neighbor

• Potential for exploitation of vulnerabilities in Platform and Guest OS expose Organizations using PaaS to some risk from Neighbor

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Social Graph API

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Adversaries Target the Cloud: Web APIs

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API vulnerability that allowed open posting of status messages to fan pages.

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Your Neighbors and You: IaaS

Your Org’s App 1

Your Org’s App 2

Neighbor’s

App 1

Neighbor’s

App 2

Hypervisor

Hardware Network Storage

IaaS Provider Platform

Your Org’s App Stack

Neighbor’s App Stack

Your Org’sUserbase

Neighbor’s Userbase

Your Org’s Platform Stack

Neighbor’s Platform Stack

What You Share w/ Your Neighbor

Your Organization

Your Neighbor

Your Org’s Guest OS

Neighbor’s Guest OS

• Virtualized infrastructure shared with Neighbor

– “from concrete to Hypervisor”

• Potential for exploitation of vulnerabilities in the shared virtual infrastructure expose Organizations using IaaS to some level of risk from Neighbor

• Exploitation of shared physical infrastructure also a consideration

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PCI Goes to the (IaaS) Cloud

• Challenge of migrating data and applications to Cloud while maintaining significant investments in regulatory compliance– Can Cloud provider provide evidence of compliance with relevant

requirements?– Does Cloud provider permit audits by relevant certifying bodies?

• Dec 5, Amazon Web Service (AWS) announces Level 1 PCI DSS certification– AWS certified from “concrete to hypervisor”– AWS customer must certify their in-scope elements on top of IaaS

› Guest OS, Application Stack, Apps, Controls, Operational Processes

– “Merchants and other service providers can now run their applications on AWS PCI-compliant technology infrastructure to store, process and transmit credit card information in the cloud.

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Simple Model of Cloud Stack

SaaS

PaaS

IaaSCustomer Has

Less Shared Exposure

Customer Has Less Direct

Operational Control

Customer Has More Direct Operational

Control

Customer Has More Shared

Exposure

27

L

E

S

S

L

E

S

S

M

O

R

E

M

O

R

E

ExposureControl

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Multi-Tenancy

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Multitenancy: Shared Technology

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Multitenancy: Unfriendly Neighbors

Confidential30 3/7/2011

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House With Poor Foundation

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Thought On Going to the Cloud

• “…what one gives up in terms of direct operational control, one must gain back in terms of visibility and transparency.”

– Christopher “beaker” Hoff

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“2-Step Verification” for Google Accounts

33 Source: Official Google Blog

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MitB-Resistant Authentication DevicesImage sources are the respective vendors public websites.

Offline Cryptographic Transaction Verification

Visual Cryptogram

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Prediction: Malware Targets the Cloud

• Target and steal credentials related to Cloud providers– AWS

› Amazon username/password› Certificate and private key› SSH key pairs› “Access Secret Key”

• Automate exploitation of Cloud provider APIs

• MitB compromise of Cloud provider credentials– spin up malicious Hypervisors (e.g. Worm)– Manipulate Data

• New, advanced malware capabilities– Attack multi-tenancy– Bypass processor-level isolation and/or hyper escalation– Exploit vulnerabilities in Virtual OS controls

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Other Predictions

• Phishing targets Cloud provider credentials

• Incident Response is slowed by involvement of 3rd parties

• Post-compromise forensic analysis made more difficult in Cloud

• Time to Remediate vulnerabilities may increase– Lower priority for Cloud provider?– Use of canned VM Images impact to vulnerability management

• Insider Threat– e.g., Amazon has their own Pfc. Bradley Manning employed as sysadmin

• Physical breach / loss of device may be more damaging– Lose laptop w/ cloud creds vs. laptop with creds to corp. servers (behind

FW)

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SecureWorks

My Neighbor Runs a Crack House: Aggregate Risk Model for the Cloud


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