Myanmar’s Evolving Relations - Institute for Security...

ASIA PAPEROctober 2016

Myanmar’s Evolving Relations:The NLD in Government

Kyaw Sein and Nicholas Farrelly

Myanmar’s Evolving Relations:

The NLD in Government

Kyaw Sein

Nicholas Farrelly

Institute for Security and Development Policy

Västra Finnbodavägen 2, 131 30 Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden

www.isdp.eu

Evolving Relations in Myanmar: The NLD in Government is an Asia Paper published by

the Institute for Security and Development Policy. The Asia Paper Series is the Occasional

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© European Union and ISDP, 2016

ISBN: 978-91-86635-96-1

Printed in Singapore by Stallion Press

Cover photo: Aung Khant, Myanmar Times. This photo was taken on Day 1 of the Panglong

Conference on August 31, 2016, at the conference center in Nay Pyi Taw. The photo fea-

tures from right to left: President Htin Kyaw; State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi; Vice

President Henry Van Thio; Speaker of the Amyotha Huttaw/House of Nationalities Mahn

Win Khaing Than; and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services, Senior General Min

Aung Hlaing.

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Institute for Security and Development Policy

Västra Finnbodavägen 2, 131 30 Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden

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Editorial correspondence should be directed to the address provided above (preferably by

email).

Contents

Acronyms ..................................................................................................................................... 4

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 6

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 9

Outline of Paper ...................................................................................................... 12

Methodology ............................................................................................................ 14

The Path to Change ................................................................................................................. 15

Transition from Military Rule .............................................................................. 15

The USDP Government ......................................................................................... 17

2015 General Election ............................................................................................. 19

The NLD Takes Office ........................................................................................................... 22

Transfer of Power and Testing Boundaries ....................................................... 22

The NLD Government ........................................................................................... 24

The Changing Role of the Legislature ................................................................ 31

100-day Action Plans for Reform ......................................................................... 35

Achieving Peace: A Primary Goal ...................................................................................... 40

A Brief History of Myanmar’s Peace Processes ................................................. 40

Peace Process under the NLD ............................................................................... 43

Hard Negotiations ................................................................................................... 48

Cooperation between the Military and NLD..................................................... 49

Challenges Faced ..................................................................................................... 51

Rakhine State Situation ......................................................................................... 55

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 61

Appendices ................................................................................................................................ 65

Appendix-1: The NLD government on 30 August 2016 ................................... 65

Appendix-2: Sub-Cabinet Committees ............................................................... 67

Appendix-3: Summaries of Government Agencies’ 100-day Plans .............. 70

Appendix-4: Timeline of Events (30 March – 30 August 2016) ....................... 79

Author Bios ................................................................................................................................ 83

Acronyms

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

BGF Border Guard Force

EAO Ethnic Armed Organisation

JICM Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting

JMC Joint Monitoring Committee

MPC Myanmar Peace Centre

MPF Myanmar Police Force

NCA Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

NDSC National Defence and Security Council

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NLD National League for Democracy

NRPC National Reconciliation and Peace Centre

SPDC State Peace and Development Council

UPC-21 CP Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong

UPDJC Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee

USDP Union Solidarity and Development Party

Armed Groups in Myanmar

AA Arakan Army

ABSDF All Burma Students’ Democratic Front

ALP Arakan Liberation Party

ANC Arakan National Council

Evolving Relations in Myanmar: The NLD in Government

5

ANP Arakan National Party

CNF Chin National Front

DKBA Democratic Karen Benevolent Army

KIO Kachin Independence Organisation

KNPP Karenni National People’s Party

KNU Karen National Union

KNU-PC Karen National Union – Peace Council

MNDAA Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army

LDU Lahu Democratic Union

NDAA National Democratic Alliance Army

NDA-K New Democratic Army – Kachin

NMSP New Mon State Party

NSCN-K National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplang

PNLO Pa’o National Liberation Organisation

RCSS/SSA-S Restoration Council of Shan State – Shan State Army

South

SSPP / SSA-N Shan State Progressive Party / Shan State Army - North

TNLA Ta'ang National Liberation Army

UWSA United Wa State Army

WNO Wa National Organisation

Executive Summary

After a long and difficult struggle for more participatory and open politics, the

National League for Democracy’s (NLD) landslide victory in Myanmar’s No-

vember 2015 general election prompted celebrations around the world. Follow-

ing a nervous, but successful, transition to ensure the transfer of power, the first

five months in office of the NLD government were an opportunity for Myan-

mar’s democratically elected administration to reinforce its legitimacy and set a

foundation for long-term policy success.

This paper charts developments from the transfer of power up until the eve of

the Union Peace Conference - 21st Century Panglong—a significant step in the

peace process—on August 30, 2016. It describes the formation of the NLD gov-

ernment, the changing role of the legislature, the institutionalizing of Aung San

Suu Kyi’s position, as well as accords specific attention to the peace process (in-

cluding Rakhine state affairs) as a top policy priority for the NLD as it sought to

revitalize efforts initiated under the previous administration.

In doing so, analysis focuses primarily on the changing relations between key

stakeholders as they adapted to Myanmar’s historic new situation. Indeed estab-

lishing constructive relations between the NLD, USDP, the Defense Services,

and ethnic armed actors, among others, is instrumental not only to internal

peace and national reconciliation, but is also key to the country’s democratic

consolidation. During its first five months in government, there were useful ini-

tial indications of how the NLD will seek to manage this complex process in the

years ahead. This paper finds that there have been four key areas of relationship

change under the new government.

First, relations between the NLD government and the military have been estab-

lished and improved. The Defence Services and other security sector actors are a

significant part of the political landscape in Myanmar, enjoying privileges from

their long-term dominance of Myanmar politics. The NLD has so far experi-


7

enced a helpful level of cooperation from the military, even though there are

still key points of friction, especially around proposed amendment of the 2008

constitution. Nonetheless, the level of understanding between military and

democratic forces is arguably at an all-time high, with the prospect of further

positive interaction in the legislature where the Defence Services continues to

hold 25 percent of seats. The military has to date been willing to play by the es-

tablished, constitutional rules, for now, and to work with the new government

in its implementation of its legislative and executive mandates.

Second, the NLD government has prioritized achieving internal peace and na-

tional reconciliation through a reinvigorated peace process and adherence to the

Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). During its first five months in power,

it has significantly shifted the day-to-day administration and composition of the

peace process to an increasingly joint structure including parties to the conflict

in various configurations—the government, the armed forces, ethnic armed or-

ganisations and political parties, representatives of the legislatures and civil so-

ciety. The new peace bodies have been established or restructured, and those

mandated by the NCA to be convened have assembled already. The new gov-

ernment has also spent significant effort trying to overcome challenges of inclu-

sivity and divisions between signatories and non-signatories to the NCA. The

record of the first five months make it clear that addressing Myanmar’s decades-

long conflicts will remain a long-term test of the management style of Aung San

Suu Kyi as well as the capacity of the government and their continued political

will to address the underlying causes.

As it sought to create a functional administration, the NLD, which has needed to

quickly adjust from its previous role as a defiant opposition movement, also

faced inevitable capacity constraints. In the third key area of relationship

change, it now works closely with the bureaucracy it inherited from the previ-

ous semi-civilian government, which also retains many of the features of official

culture prevalent under the pre-2010 military regime. Our research indicates

that there is goodwill and a willingness to cooperate on all sides. This in and of

itself is a significant change and an accomplishment that deserves recognition.


8

Fourth, the new government has successfully taken control of large sections of

the prevailing power structures and built working relations with other key

stakeholders to enable further reform. Understandably, consolidating control of

the state apparatus remains a work in progress, especially with key security

ministries still under the control of serving military officers. The NLD govern-

ment was able, however, to consolidate power around Aung San Suu Kyi. In her

roles as state counsellor, foreign minister, and minister in the president’s office,

she can effectively control most of the government. Furthermore, the four sub-

cabinet committees responsible for the day-to-day administration of the gov-

ernment have been strengthened and have become more active. Additionally,

the Rakhine Commission has been restructured, and another domestic-

international advisory body established.

In sum, the NLD carries a resounding popular mandate that provides it with the

legitimacy to further change the power and political structures in Myanmar. To

be successful in achieving this, the government will need to maintain function-

ing relationships and continue to build trust with all key stakeholders, consoli-

dating its early accomplishments but also learning from inevitable missteps as it

took over the difficult responsibilities of office.

Introduction

The National League for Democracy’s (NLD) triumphant victory in the Novem-

ber 2015 general election prompted celebrations in Myanmar and around the

world. After a long and difficult struggle for more participatory and open poli-

tics, the hope was that an elected government could work to right the wrongs of

recent political history. With the NLD’s resounding mandate for change, taking

almost 80 percent of elected seats, the Union Solidarity and Development Party

(USDP) government conceded defeat, and the military cooperated in the trans-

fer of power. The NLD subsequently selected Htin Kyaw—a close aide of Aung

San Suu Kyi and veteran of the pro-democracy struggle—as “proxy” president.

Barred by the 2008 constitution from becoming president, Aung San Suu Kyi

was nevertheless adamant that she would remain “above the president.”1 Fol-

lowing his nomination, Htin Kyaw endorsed her for the positions of foreign

minister, minister in the president’s office, and later as state counsellor follow-

ing the creation of this position and its passing into law. In his inaugural speech

on March 30, 2016, President Htin Kyaw further took pains to highlight the cen-

tral role of Aung San Suu Kyi in the new administration: “the government [was]

… formed to be in accordance with the policies of the NLD, and its leader.”2

Htin Kyaw then identified four policy priorities for the government’s current

five-year term: national reconciliation,3 internal peace, constitutional amend-

1 May Wong, "Appointed president will take instructions from me if NLD wins: Suu Kyi," Channel

News Asia 10 November 2015. 2 Thin Lei Win and Htet Khaung Linn, “Myanmar’s first elected civilian president sworn in,” Myan-

mar Now 30 March 2016. 3 According to the NLD’s 2015 election manifesto, national reconciliation is a requirement of ethnic

affairs. There are six relevant objectives under the ethnic affairs policy: (i) A Union through solidari-

ty with all ethnic groups; (ii) Political dialogue based on the “Panglong spirit”; (iii) A federal demo-

cratic union; (iv) Balanced development between States and Regions; (v) Fair distribution of natural

resources; and (vi) Peaceful resolution of differences between ethnic groups. See: The National

League for Democracy NLD, "2015 Election Manifesto," (2015), 5.


10

ment and socio-economic development.4 The achievement of each of these prior-

ities requires significant political, economic, and strategic imagination.

The country’s difficult history of conflict and socio-economic underdevelopment

ensures that governing Myanmar is an onerous task. The new NLD government

faces challenges in all sectors and has sought a cautious and sequenced ap-

proach to further reform. There is no escaping the fact, however, that it is faced

with exceedingly high expectations, both among the population of Myanmar

and the international community. As such, the NLD’s first few months in gov-

ernment have been crucial for announcing priority areas, being seen to begin

addressing them, and finding areas for quick wins; but perhaps most important-

ly for building new relationships with the military,5 ethnic actors, civil servants,

and other key stakeholders to be able to deliver on long-term reform. The NLD

government’s capacity to reconcile with the military, and others, will directly

determine the chances of success for its four stated policy priorities.

At this early stage, the government’s assertiveness on corruption, the release of

political prisoners and its enthusiastic revival of the peace process, as well as

increasing the value of agricultural loans and returning confiscated land to

farmers, are all policies that have received widespread popular support. How-

ever, domestic media outlets have also criticised the NLD leadership and its ap-

proaches to governance. The discovery that two proposed cabinet ministers in

key economic portfolios held fake university degrees provoked public discon-

tent,6 while particular attention has been accorded to the party’s initially erratic

approach to policy implementation. A case-in-point was restrictions an-

nounced—and then withdrawn—on the sale and consumption of betel nut, a

popular stimulant in Myanmar. Further, the government has been slow to an-

nounce its full economic package, raising questions among investors anxious to

understand the new business climate. At the same time, there were misgivings

4 President's Office, "The constitution to be in accord with democratic norms: President U Htin Ky-

aw" (Nay Pyi Taw: President's Office, 30 March 2016).

5 Please note that this paper uses the terms military, Defense Services, and Tatmadaw interchangea-

bly to refer to the same actors. 6 See: Ye Mon, "NLD looks into two ministers' qualifications," Myanmar Times 24 March 2016.


11

when Aung San Suu Kyi took multiple roles in the new administration.7

Concerns have also continued to be raised about the inadequate government

response to human rights violations against Muslim minorities, especially those

who self-identify as Rohingya in Rakhine state.8 Despite these criticisms, Aung

San Suu Kyi’s legitimacy and personal popularity remains high in the country

and her government faces no immediate prospect of a voter backlash.

How the NLD government confronts its challenges is of significant analytical

concern. At the first international Myanmar academic conference since the elec-

tion, held in Singapore in May 2016, analysts identified four key challenges for

the country: “democratization, ethnic peace, civil-military relations, and devel-

opment (poverty reduction).”9 The scholars convened at the conference also ex-

pressed concern that Myanmar could slide from “illiberal pluralism” to “liberal

authoritarianism” due to the consolidation and centralization of power around

Aung San Suu Kyi. It was stressed how all key challenges and concerns rely on a

fundamental shift in relations and the ability of the new government to unite

disparate groups for common purposes. They also highlighted the importance

of the first few months for making progress in this regard and which could pave

the way to a more liberal democratic path.10

Former Minister of Information Ye Htut, who was interviewed for this paper,

noted that the “initial success of the NLD government was based on the way

that it continued the peace process with renewed vigour.”11 However, he

identifies a primary weakness to be the overdependence on Aung San Suu Kyi

for leadership, with little systemic role for state institutions.12 In response to

these criticisms, senior NLD strategist Win Htein explained to us that the “gov-

ernment is clean and committed and therefore can overcome any inexperience

7 "Myanmar's New Government: Finding Its Feet," in Asia Report No. 282 (Yangon/Brussels:

International Crisis Group, 29 July 2016), 5. Henceforth referred to as ICG. 8 It should be noted that these complaints had been raised for years against the former USDP

government. For example see: The Editorial Board, "Aung San Suu Kyi’s Cowardly Stance on the

Rohingya," The New York Times 9 May 2016. 9 "Summary Report of Myanmar Forum 2016" (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 20 May

2016), 2. 10 Ibid., 4. 11 Interview in Yangon with Ye Htut, former Minister of Information, on 21 June 2016. 12 Win Nanda, "The new government first 100-day report card," Seven Day Daily 13 July 2016.


12

and weaknesses.” According to him, “fear and mistrust of the government ap-

paratus have reduced significantly among the general public since the NLD took

power.”13 This is a point echoed by a senior government officer in Nay Pyi Taw,

who interpreted the NLD’s performance from the perspective of what has not

occurred.14 Therefore, the lack of a civil uprising, constitutional deadlock, or

confrontation between the NLD and the military, are all important signals of co-

operation, changing relations between key stakeholders, and progress. Accord-

ing to this senior official, people tend to overlook the government’s success in

avoiding confrontation with other powerful institutions and individuals simply

because of the lofty expectations placed on the NLD’s performance.

Appraising the first five months of the NLD government, this paper accordingly

illustrates its adeptness in reshaping primary relations between key players to

achieve its stated policy goals. Notably, too, the military has demonstrated its

willingness to play by the established, constitutional rules, for now, and to work

with the NLD in its implementation of its legislative and executive mandates.

This is not to say the process of establishing trust and constructive relations has

been entirely smooth: indeed, it has been a steep learning curve for the NLD and

other actors. Nevertheless, it would appear that an early foundation of accom-

modation and cooperation has been achieved that bodes well for Myanmar’s

still-difficult path ahead.

Outline of Paper

This paper analyzes developments in Myanmar up until August 30, 2016, the

eve of the convening of the Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong.

Events after this date have not been considered. Furthermore, while the econo-

my and foreign relations have also been important dimensions of the NLD’s

policy agenda, these fall largely outside the scope of this study, except where

noted in the NLD’s 100-day plans. Rather the focus lies primarily on the for-

mation of the new government, the institutionalization of Aung San Suu Kyi’s

13 Interview in Yangon with member of the NLD Central Executive Committee, Win Htein, on 23

June 2016. 14 Discussion with a senior official from the Myanmar legislature on 6 July 2016. The individual pre-

ferred to remain anonymous due to their official role.


13

role, and the NLD’s handling of the peace process as well as management of

communal tensions in Rakhine State. Running through all these is an emphasis

on the changing relations between domestic stakeholders.

Prior to discussing the NLD’s arrival to government, however, this paper pro-

ceeds by first providing needed context with a brief recent history of Myanmar

politics. In doing so, it gives an overview of Myanmar’s reform process since the

2010 elections and subsequent formal transition from military rule, through

President Thein Sein’s administration, up to the 2015 general election.

The next section focuses on the NLD in government. It starts by illustrating the

tense five-month transition period between the election result and the transfer of

executive power from the USDP to the NLD at the end of March 2016. We exam-

ine the NLD’s efforts to establish a new administration, analyse the logic of the

cabinet formation, as well as examine the changing role of the legislature. We

argue that institutionalizing the role of Aung San Suu Kyi was a central focus

and concern of the NLD in this early period. Additionally, acknowledging the

high public expectations placed on the NLD government’s initial policy perfor-

mance, we consider the 100-day plans the government initiated as what it hoped

would be “quick wins.”

We then focus specifically on the peace process as a central priority for the new

government. First tracing a brief history of the peace process, we then proceed

to show how the initial months proved a steep learning curve for the NLD as it

sought to reinvigorate the process inherited from former President Thein Sein’s

USDP-led government. Notable developments include the transformation of the

Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) into a new body called the National Reconcilia-

tion and Peace Centre (NRPC) as well as the series of negotiations with Ethnic

Armed Organisations (EAOs) leading up towards the Union Peace Conference -

21st Century Panglong Conference held at the end of August. We emphasize the

centrality of civil-military relations in the peace process as well as consider some

of the key challenges faced. Furthermore, against a backdrop of intercommunal

violence between Buddhist and Muslim communities, armed conflict between

the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw, and relative socio-economic underdevel-


14

opment, the NLD government’s approach to Rakhine State affairs is also exam-

ined.

Finally, the conclusion provides a summary analysis of the key developments of

the first five months of the NLD government and its relations with other key

actors.

Methodology

The paper draws on a broad range of primary and secondary sources. In

addition to analysis of legislative records and media reports, interviews were

conducted by the authors in Myanmar in June and July 2016. These interviews

helped to ensure that the analysis benefits from the research team’s extensive

contacts among Myanmar political, economic, and social actors. In particular,

the interviews targeted specific individuals and institutions crucial to the suc-

cess of the NLD government’s unfolding reform agenda.

The research involved the following elements: (i) examination of the major

activities of the government in its first five months, drawing on written sources

including legislative records and media reports; (ii) interviews with senior and

mid-ranking government officials (comprising ethnic minority group

administrators) to understand their responses to the NLD government’s key

initiatives, especially related to the peace process and national reconciliation;

(iii) meetings with lawmakers from a range of political parties (including ethnic

parties) to clarify their legislative agendas and to understand how they are

engaging with the bureaucracy, military, and other stakeholders; (iv)

discussions with military officers in order to understand their position on

engaging with the NLD-led government, as well as ethnic political parties and

EAOs; (v) interaction with other stakeholders such as diplomats, development

partners, and community-based organisations to understand their positions on

the government’s early performance; and (vi) triangulation with media sources

where necessary. In so doing, we hope the paper presents unique insights for

specialist audiences and offers accessible context for non-Myanmar specialists.

The Path to Change

Transition from Military Rule

For much of Myanmar’s recent history, military influence in politics was official-

ly justified by the need for national cohesion in the face of long-running armed

conflicts.15 The most recent period of direct military rule was sustained from

1988 to 2011—decades in which Myanmar struggled with its status as an inter-

national pariah amid economic sanctions imposed by the international commu-

nity led by the United States and European Union (EU).

The seeds for a democratic transition were laid in 2003, however, when the State

Peace and Development Council (SPDC), as the then military government was

known, announced a seven-stage roadmap to democracy. This stipulated steps

for a top-down managed political transition. As part of the roadmap, the SPDC

conceived of the 2008 constitution to institutionalize, and thereby safeguard, the

role of the military (see Table 1).

With the constitution in place, the SPDC created the USDP as a political party to

contest the elections and to govern the country at the behest of the military lead-

ership. The SPDC then held a general election in November 2010. The NLD boy-

cotted the process.16 With no serious competition, the USDP became the ruling

party taking over 80 percent of the vote, and Thein Sein, who had previously

served as prime minister and as a senior army general, became president of My-

anmar’s government.

15 Ashley South, Ethnic politics in Burma: states of conflict, Routledge contemporary Southeast Asia

series (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 13; Nicholas Farrelly, "Discipline without democracy:

military dominance in post-colonial Burma," Australian Journal of International Affairs 67, no. 3 (2013):

313. 16 ICG, "The Myanmar Elections," Asia Briefing No. 105, 27 May 2010; Neil A. Englehart, "Two Cheers

for Burma's Rigged Election," Asian Survey 52, no. 4 (2012): 667-72.


16

Table 1. Institutionalization of the Military’s Role under the 2008

Constitution

Defense Services: 2008 Constitution

(key provisions)

is autonomous in managing its own af-

fairs.

Section 20 (b) and 291

can play a leadership role in politics. Section 6 (f)

is the guardian of the Constitution. Section 20 (f)

can influence the executive. Section 60 (b) (iii), 201, 232 (b)

(ii)17

can influence the legislature. Section 109 (b), 141 (b) and 161

(d)18

has its own judicial system. Section 31919

can take executive and judicial powers in

case of a state emergency by presidential

decree.

Section 419

has a veto on constitutional amendments. Section 43620

While the Defence Services linked their surrender of absolute political control to

the pursuit of “disciplined democracy,” scholars offered different views, such as

a failing economy, Western sanctions, Chinese influence, and fear of social un-

rest as witnessed during the so-called Arab Spring.21 One of the more convinc-

ing arguments is that the military moved from its “position of strength” when it

had sufficiently contained “ethnic-minority insurgencies and pro-democracy

17 2008 Constitution, Section 60 (b) (iii) enables the military to appoint one of three vice presidents,

one of whom becomes the president; Section 201 forms the powerful 11-member National Defence

and Security Council (NDSC) which consists of five active duty military personnel; Section 232 (b)

(ii) requires the president to appoint active military service personnel as Union Ministers for De-

fence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs at the advice of the commander-in-chief. 18 These sections enable the commander-in-chief to nominate military representation taking 25 per-

cent of seats in all legislatures. 19 This section reinforces the status of court-martial provisions for military personnel. 20 Constitutional amendment requires more than 75 percent approval in the legislature, which, un-

der current arrangements, grants the military veto power. 21 See: Min Zin and Brian Joseph, "The Democrats' Opportunity," Journal of Democracy 23, no. 4 (2012);

Ko Ko Gyi, "Making Sense of "Change" in Myanmar," in Belarus-Burma round table (Prague 2012).


17

forces and found trustworthy civilian organisations to take over, in the form of

[the] USDP.” 22

The USDP Government

When Thein Sein assumed the presidency on March 30, 2011, there were con-

cerns that Myanmar would lurch towards an electoral authoritarian style of

government where the pro-military party would control the administration and

present no opportunities for opposition voices.23 Observers regarded the USDP

government as quasi-civilian because the majority of its executive leadership

were drawn from the ranks of former senior military officers. It was largely

male dominated and accustomed to the hierarchical culture of SPDC military

rule. To the surprise of some critics, however, the president initiated a far-

reaching, top-down executive transition. A hallmark of the new dispensation

was the USDP speaker Thura Shwe Mann’s management of the new legislative

machinery. Under his stewardship, the legislature functioned as a genuine insti-

tution, and despite public suspicion that it was established to rubber stamp leg-

islation, it became increasingly robust as a check on executive power.24

President Thein Sein also implemented a wide-ranging reform agenda focused

on political and economic liberalization. Human Rights Watch reported the re-

lease of key political prisoners on January 13, 2012, as a crucial development for

human rights.25 The press censorship board was abolished and press and inter-

net freedoms were expanded. A modicum of decentralization was also

introduced in sub-national administration. Moreover, a by-election was held in

April 2012, which saw members of the NLD elected to the legislatures, illustrat-

ing further integration of opposition voices, including that of Aung San Suu

22 See, for example, Dan Slater and Joseph Wong, "The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and

Democratization in Developmental Asia," Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 3 (2013): 722. Lee Jones,

"Explaining Myanmar's regime transition: the periphery is central," Democratization 21, no. 5 (2014):

16. 23 Adam P. Macdonald, "From Military Rule to Electoral Authoritarianism: The Reconfiguration of

Power in Myanmar and its Future," Asian Affairs: An American Review 40, no. 1 (2013): 21. 24 Thomas Kean, "Myanmar's Parliament: From Scorn to Significance," in Debating Democratization in

Myanmar, ed. Nick Cheesman, Nicholas Farrelly, and Trevor Wilson (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing,

2014). 25 See: “Burma: Political Prisoners Released” 13 January 2012.


18

Kyi.26 On the economic front, the currency was moved from an official exchange

rate to a managed float, and foreign telecommunication operators were given

licenses after a relatively transparent bid process. Investor-friendly laws were

also introduced. Signalling greater responsiveness to public concern, the contro-

versial Chinese-backed Myitsone dam project in Kachin State was suspended in

September 2011.27 Arguably the most significant development, however, was the

initiation of a nationwide peace process seeking to address more than six dec-

ades of conflict. This came to involve numerous stakeholders previously exclud-

ed from high-level discussions, such as civil society organizations, ethnic politi-

cal parties, and EAOs.

To support its work and provide policy guidance, the government approved a

number of agencies and think tanks such as the Myanmar Development Re-

source Institute (MDRI) and the quasi-governmental Myanmar Peace Centre

(MPC), both made up of internationally educated academics and former exiled

activists. In so doing, the government could circumvent its own ossified bureau-

cracy and seek advice from specialists from outside the system, notably on is-

sues of economy and peace. These organisations worked closely with reform-

minded government ministers, bringing contemporary international policy ide-

as and advice on addressing differences in opinion between opposition groups

and the government. Furthermore, a number of power centres evolved such as

the legislature, independent media, formal and informal advisory bodies, reli-

gious groups, and local governments.28

After decades of limited diplomatic engagement, Myanmar also proudly started

to regain its standing in the international community.29 In 2014, Myanmar for

26 See: ICG, “Reform in Myanmar: One Year On,” Report No. 136, 11 April 2012. 27 Thomas Fuller, “Myanmar Backs Down, Suspending Dam Project,” The New York Times, 30 Sep-

tember 2011. 28 Gwen Robinson, "Myanmar's Transition: Economics or Politics? Which came first and why it

matters," in Transitions Forum (London: Legatum Institute, 2014), 16-20. 29 Prior to economic sanctions, Myanmar was a respected member of the international community. It

was well-known at the United Nations for its active contribution in the Trusteeship Council. Moreo-

ver, it was a founding member of the Non Aligned Movement and also produced one of the most

important twenty-first century statesmen: U Thant, the third Secretary-General of the UN. Former

Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard referred to this reputation during a joint press conference

with President Thein Sein in 2013, that President Thein Sein had played an important role in reform-


19

the first time assumed the rotating chairmanship of the Association of South

East Asian Nations (ASEAN), with the ASEAN Summit being held in Nay Pyi

Taw in August of the same year. Many of the residual international economic

and travel sanctions imposed by Western countries were gradually lifted or

suspended.30 Additionally, an increasing number of international dignitaries

came to meet the new administration, establishing strengthened diplomatic rela-

tions as well as economic and strategic agreements.

Despite such achievements, infighting among USDP powerbrokers undermined

the Thein Sein administration. Major difficulties emerged with persistent ten-

sions between the executive and the legislature, a destabilizing situation that

was amplified by mistrust between President Thein Sein and Speaker of the Un-

ion Assembly Thura Shwe Mann.31 His own ambition to take the presidency af-

ter the 2015 election antagonized his rivals in the USDP, including those in the

president’s camp. At the same time, communal violence in Rakhine, Kachin and

Shan States dented the government’s claims to be bringing about social inclu-

sion and political harmony. Elsewhere, contentious politics erupted on a daily

basis in the form of labor disputes, land grabbing, the rise of Buddhist national-

ism, student demonstrations, and resource-based and ethnic armed conflicts.

Often stoked by the relatively free press and the new dynamics of social media,

such tensions and challenges put serious pressure on Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian

administration.

2015 General Election

During the campaign for the November 2015 general election, the USDP por-

trayed itself as the vehicle for further national reform and as the guardian of

amyo barthar tharthanar (race and religion), which appealed to the nationalist sen-

ing the country and “[i]n doing so … Myanmar takes its rightful place in our region.” Department of

the Prime Minister and Cabinet of the Australian Government PM&C, "Transcript of Joint Press

Conference," news release, 18 March 2013. 30 Due to Myanmar’s failure to address human rights issues, economic sanctions were imposed by

the US and EU in 1996 and 1997, respectively. After 2012, sanctions were largely dismantled with

some residual sanctions from the US remaining in place. See James Hookway and Myo Myo, “My-

anmar set to reap benefits from lifted sanctions,” The Wall Street Journal, 15 September 2016. 31 For executive and legislative relations, see: Gwen Robinson, "The contenders: In Burma, the

struggle for power is entering a risky new phase," Foreign Policy, 13 July 2013.


20

timent of the Burman majority.32 Its electioneering was buttressed by local de-

velopment funding and upgrades and donations to Buddhist religious projects

in constituencies around the country. For its part the NLD, participating in a

general election for the first time since 1990, sought to mobilize the population

with a simple slogan: “it’s time to change.” Drawing on her unrivalled domestic

popularity, Aung San Suu Kyi urged the people not to look at the individual

party candidates but to regard a vote for an NLD candidate as a vote for her.33

Ethnic parties presented themselves as chiefly preoccupied with the concerns of

their respective constituents in the various ethnic areas of the country; this

proved to be an ineffective strategy considering most later failed to win seats.34

Other minor parties proclaimed the need for a “third force” to manage interac-

tions between the NLD and the former military regime.35

For the first time, Myanmar invited more than 12,000 domestic and 1,000 inter-

national observers to monitor the election.36 It also welcomed technical assis-

tance from international organisations (financial support was comparably lim-

ited by Western donors, however, due to concern about supporting a potentially

rigged election). Even with this extra support and the legitimacy gained by it,

the months prior to the election were marred by technical constraints and ineffi-

ciencies, for example technical difficulties in revising electoral rolls, and, during

the election, by missing ballot papers for overseas voting and public concerns

about fraudulent advanced voting.37

In spite of concerns about irregularities, it was widely anticipated—including by

key USDP, ethnic and minor party strategists—that the NLD would gain the

most seats. A key question, however, was whether the NLD would be able to

gain a legislative majority in the upper and lower houses. Given the 25 percent

32 The slogan “amyo barthar tharthanar” implies the Burman “race” or ethnicity, and the Theravada

Buddhist religion practiced by the majority of Burmans. 33 Ardeth Thawnghmung, "The Myanmar Elections 2015: Why the National League for Democracy

Won a Landslide Victory," Critical Asian Studies 48, no. 1 (2016): 135. 34 Ibid., 136. 35 ICG, "The Myanmar Elections: Results and Implications," Asia Briefing No. 147, 9 December 2015,

9. 36 Richard Horsey, “Myanmar’s Election Success,” In Pursuit of Peace [ICG Blog], 10 November 2015. 37 Advice and support is currently being given to the new elections commission to remedy these

issues for future elections.


21

block of unelected seats reserved for military appointees under the constitution,

all the USDP needed was 25 percent of seats in the legislature (or 33 percent of

elected seats). The NLD, on the other hand, needed to win 66 percent of elected

seats (translating to 50 percent of total seats in the legislature) in order to win a

majority.

In the end, in what was deemed to be a largely free and fair election,38 the NLD

secured a landslide victory, thus representing a watershed moment in Myan-

mar’s electoral history. Winning 887 seats or 77.1 percent of the 1150 seats con-

tested nationwide, the scale of its victory took many by surprise.39 The result

ushered in a large batch of new lawmakers, over one hundred of whom were

former political prisoners, most having no legislative experience.40 Meanwhile,

arguments broke out and splits occurred among USDP powerbrokers as its

elected seats in the bicameral legislature were reduced from almost 70 percent to

a mere 8 percent, in what constituted a humiliating defeat.41 Conceding that the

USDP had decisively lost, President Thein Sein established a transition team. As

specified by the constitution, a five-month transition period followed for the

transfer of executive power.

38 See: Carter Center, “Carter Center Election Observation Mission Preliminary Statement,” Yangon,

10 November 2015; EU, “European Union Election Observation Mission Preliminary Statement,”

Yangon, 10 November 2015; and People’s Alliance for Credible Elections, “Preliminary Report on

Election Day,” Yangon, 9 November 2015. 39 As 25 percent of seats are allocated to the Defence Services, and given that there are seven vacant

seats in the lower house, the NLD holds 390 seats, or 58.7 percent, of all seats in the combined hous-

es of the national legislature, known locally as the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. ICG, "The Myanmar

Elections: Results and Implications." 40 The 43 NLD MPs who won seats in the by-elections in 2012 had by 2015 around three years of

parliamentary experience. 41 In terms of the total number of seats, the USDP majority went from 52 percent to a 6 percent mi-

nority.

The NLD Takes Office

Transfer of Power and Testing Boundaries

After the November 2015 election, the NLD had almost five months to prepare

to take office. While the NLD-controlled legislature convened for the first time

on February 1, 2016, it was not until March 30 that the new executive admin-

istration took power. Prior to this, the NLD had to assemble its executive team,

declare political and economic policies, and discuss transitional arrangements.

Its immediate priorities, however, appear to have been ensuring the actual

transfer of power and testing the viability of Aung San Suu Kyi becoming presi-

dent.

On November 10, two days after the election, Aung San Suu Kyi wrote letters to

the president, the Union Assembly speaker, and the commander-in-chief calling

for meetings in the spirit of national reconciliation.42 Thura Shwe Mann prompt-

ly responded in the affirmative while President Thein Sein and Senior General

Min Aung Hlaing waited until the formal election result was announced on No-

vember 22 before stating their willingness to meet. The president then formed a

transition team to support the transfer of power, while the military “agreed to

cooperate for stability, the rule of law, unity and the development of the state.”43

Haunted by the military’s refusal to hand over power after the 1990 general

election, however, mistrust defined high-level interactions between Aung San

Suu Kyi, Min Aung Hlaing, and Thein Sein.44 Nevertheless, these meetings rep-

resented a significant step forward for national reconciliation in Myanmar, par-

ticularly as prior to the formal election results being announced Min Aung

Hlaing had never met Aung San Suu Kyi in person.

42 Lun Min Maung, "Daw Aung San Suu Kyi invites military, president to 'national reconciliation'

talks," Myanmar Times 11 November 2015. 43 Swan Ye Htut and Ei Ei Toe Lwin, "We can work together," ibid. 3 December 2015. 44 “Myanmar: the challenge of power,” Strategic Comments, International Institute for Strategic Stud-

ies (IISS), Volume 2015, Edition 38, 11 December 2015.


23

Even though Aung San Suu Kyi indicated, prior to the election, that she would

occupy a position “above the president,”45 it seems that the NLD still tried to

test the potential for her to assume the presidency by attempting to overcome

constitutional barriers.46 In the three meetings held between Aung San Suu Kyi

and Min Aung Hlaing between December 2015 and February 2016, it was wide-

ly speculated that the presidency issue was on the agenda, although the con-

tents of the discussion were kept secret.47 There was also conjecture that she

would not take the presidency immediately,48 while other alternative ideas

emerged about circumventing constitutional provisions by suspending them.

This occurred after a surprise meeting between former military leader Senior

General Than Shwe and Aung San Suu Kyi on December 4, 2015.49 Despite the

importance of these meetings and negotiations, by late February there appeared

to be signals from the military that constitutional suspension would not be pos-

sible,50 as well as signs of increasing military resistance to various NLD maneu-

vers inside the legislature. These included responses to NLD motions criticizing

the USDP government.51 Less than two weeks after the third meeting between

Aung San Suu Kyi and the Min Aung Hlaing, the Presidential Electoral Col-

lege52 put forward its presidential nominations on March 1, 2016. With the legis-

45 Andrew C. Marshall and Timothy McLaughlin, "Myanmar's Suu Kyi says will be above president

in new government," Reuters 5 November 2015. 46 The NLD would need the consent of the military to amend the constitution to enable Aung San

Suu Kyi to become president. Article 59(f) of the 2008 constitution prohibits anyone whose children

are foreign subjects from becoming president. Since the two sons of Aung San Suu Kyi are foreign

citizens, she remains disqualified from this top executive position. 47 Citing the delay of the presidential nomination, political analysts speculated that the NLD was

seeking a type of power sharing arrangement or constitutional amendment with the military. See: Ei

Ei Toe Lwin, "Union parliament sets March 17 as deadline for presidential nominations," Myanmar

Times 8 February 2016. 48 Ei Ei Toe Lwin, "General and NLD leader talk transition," Myanmar Times 26 January 2016. 49 Htoo Thant, "New idea floated to allow NLD leader to assume presidency," ibid. 10 December

2015. 50 Ei Ei Toe Lwin, "Military MP rules out deal on constitution change, suspension," ibid. 9 February

2016. 51 Htoo Thant, "Govt and military clash with NLD over "fire-sale" motion," ibid. 29 February 2016. 52 The College is comprised of a body of members of parliament who formally cast votes for the elec-

tion of the president. The representatives to the legislatures are drawn from three separate commit-

tees: representatives the proportions of representatives from each state and region from the upper

house/Amyotha Hluttaw; representatives of each township from the lower house/Pyithu Hluttaw;

and representatives appointed by the military and nominated by the commander-in-chief from the


24

lature realizing the Defence Services would not consent to a constitutional

change at this point, Aung San Suu Kyi’s presidential ambition was put on hold.

In examining the transition period, it would seem that establishing relationships

between the leadership of the NLD, USDP, and the military were put at the top

of a shared agenda to ensure the transfer of power in a relatively smooth and

cooperative manner. As such, issues such as cabinet formation and policy for-

mulation were deprioritized by the NLD relatively speaking. According to Win

Htein, who is one of the key leaders of the NLD, it was important for the party

not to focus on the minutiae of the transition but to ensure the actual transfer of

power since it could better compose itself after taking power.53 Ye Htut, a mem-

ber of the USDP transition team and former Minister of Information, explained

how discussions within the NLD at the time focused rather on the ceremonial

aspects of the power transfer and not the substantive matters of the transition.54

The importance of changing relations notwithstanding, the fact that there was

no major electoral fraud and no major obstacles prior to the handover in March

2016 also suggests that the military was confident it had sufficient power and

constitutional prerogatives to ensure stability and to protect its essential inter-

ests: a “legitimate and firm stance” on safeguarding the “independence, sover-

eignty and national interests” of the country.55

The NLD Government

It was not until March 10, a full four months after the election, that the NLD fi-

nally decided to nominate Htin Kyaw, a long-time aide of Aung San Suu Kyi,

and Henry Van Thio, a Chin lawmaker and former army officer, to be president

military representatives in both parliament houses. Each of the three committees nominate a presi-

dential candidate. Then, all the representatives from the combined houses of parliament (the

Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) vote for one of three candidates. The candidate with the highest number of

votes is elected president, while the other two are elected as vice-presidents. 53 Interview in Yangon with Win Htein on 23 June 2016. 54 Interview in Yangon with Ye Htut on 21 June 2016. 55 Maung Aung Myoe, “Myanmar Military’s White Paper Highlights Growing Openness,” Commen-

tary, Nikkei Asian Review, March 28, 2016.


25

and vice-president, respectively.56 This furthermore left only a matter of weeks

until the formal transition date to make more than a hundred nominations for

appointments, including cabinet ministers, chief ministers, regional and state

ministers, and a raft of other union-level appointees such as election commis-

sioners and constitutional tribunal members. Acting in haste to make such ap-

pointments meant that the NLD was poorly prepared for taking over the reins

of government. As argued above, it had hitherto been squarely focused on en-

suring that the transition would take place as well as testing the waters for

Aung San Suu Kyi assuming the presidency.

Two major setbacks soon appeared in choosing appropriate personnel. First, the

NLD wanted to appoint ethnic party leaders as a mechanism for national recon-

ciliation. However, ethnic parties resisted such appointments, unhappy that the

NLD did not seek their consent first.57 The NLD asserted that nominees for gov-

ernment positions themselves needed to seek permission from their own politi-

cal parties.58 Furthermore, Shan and Rakhine ethnic parties were displeased

with the appointment of NLD chief ministers in Shan and Rakhine States, where

the NLD did not hold a majority in the state legislature.59 Second, some of the

NLD’s cabinet nominees were immediately problematic. Two of them were ex-

posed for having falsified educational qualifications; that they were nonetheless

retained after having admitted their mistakes indicates how few high-level can-

didates the NLD had at its disposal for ministerial positions.60 Appointments

were of mixed with appointees from different backgrounds and varying levels

56 On 10 March, 2016, Htin Kyaw was nominated as a vice president by MPs from the NLD-

dominated Lower House/Pyithu Hluttaw. The following day, he was elected as one of the two vice

presidents together with Myint Swe who had been nominated by the Defense Services. On 15

March, Htin Kyaw was elected as president by representatives from the combined houses of parlia-

ment or Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, and the Chin NLD representative, Henry Van Thio, who received the

second highest number of votes, was elected as one of the vice presidents. 57 Aye Thar Aung from Arakan National Party and Naing Thet Lwin from Mon National Party were

appointed as Deputy Speaker of the Amyotha Hluttaw and Union Minister for National Races Af-

fairs respectively. See: Lun Min Maung, "Choice of deputy Speaker stokes ANP dispute," Myanmar

Times 1 February 2016. 58 Interview with Win Htein on 23 June 2016. 59 Ei Ei Toe Lwin and Wa Lone, "NLD control over chief ministers riles ethnic parties," Myanmar

Times 29 March 2016. 60 Ye Mon, "NLD looks into two ministers' qualifications," ibid. 24 March 2016.


26

of experience, with some proving to be technically weak or inexperienced in

governance.61 Meanwhile, the cabinet was criticized for its lack of women and

preponderance of old men; this disappointed some observers who had expected

the new government to be more gender inclusive.62

However, the most important question of all concerned Aung San Suu Kyi’s ex-

act role in the new NLD administration that assumed power on March 30. The

NLD moved quickly to institutionalize her role once the executive transition had

been completed. She was tasked with four ministerial positions: foreign affairs,

minister of the president’s office,63 electricity and energy, and education. She

subsequently relinquished the latter two posts.64 On April 6, moreover, the State

Counsellor Bill was approved by the president, which created a preeminent post

for Aung San Suu Kyi. This occurred despite objections and a “protest” of sorts

when the military bloc stood up to indicate their disagreement when the bill had

been debated in the lower house the day previously.65 The position of state

counsellor gives Aung San Suu Kyi an advisory role in both the executive and

legislature in wide-ranging matters including democracy, the economy, federal-

ism, and the peace and development of Myanmar. As such, the new position

supports her stated intention to be “above the president.” A month later, a new

ministry was also created to support the state counsellor. With her new super-

portfolio, the whole administration is effectively under her control (aside from

the three ministries—defence, home affairs and border affairs—which remain

61 Few of the new government appointees had experience in public administration. Although Aung

San Suu Kyi arranged training workshops on the constitution and parliamentary practice for law-

makers, and enforced strict party discipline, there existed a steep learning curve for the legislature

and executive. 62 Fiona Macgregor, "Myanmar's new cabinet: national reconciliation without equality," ibid. 25

March 2016. 63 Under former President Thein Sein there were six ministerial positions in his office assigned to

manage presidential affairs, to communicate with the legislature, to coordinate economic develop-

ment matters, to look after ethnic affairs, to formulate policies for national projects, and to coordi-

nate with sub-national governments. Under the NLD-led government, there are no longer several

ministers in the president’s office, only the president and Aung San Suu Kyi as minister of the presi-

dent’s office. See: Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, "Report of the 12th Day of the Fourth Plenary Session of the

First Pyidaungsu Hluttaw" (Nay Pyi Taw, 4 September 2012). 64 See: "Suu Kyi Gives Up Two of Four Ministerial Posts," The Irrawaddy 4 April 2016. 65 Timothy Mclaughlin, “Suu Kyi's state counsellor bill passes vote despite military protest,” Reuters,

5 April 2016. The bill came into force on 6 April.


27

under the control of serving military officers nominated by the commander-in-

chief, and answer questions from the legislature).66 A longtime analyst, Andrew

Selth drew attention to this centralization of power around Aung San Suu Kyi

when he wrote, “some foreign commentators have even labelled her a ‘demo-

cratic dictator’ in the making, who may precipitate the very crises she is trying

to avoid.”67

Four sub-cabinet committees meanwhile are responsible for the day-to-day ad-

ministration of the government. While these committees existed under the pre-

vious government, they were relatively inactive and have been strengthened to

be increasingly accountable across government ministries and active in enacting

government policy. Aung San Suu Kyi chairs the first two committees below,

while the two vice-presidents chair the other two. The sub-cabinet committess

are:

(i) Security, Tranquility and Rule of Law Committee68

(ii) Economic Affairs Committee69

(iii) Education, Health and Human Resources Development Committee70

(iv) National Races, Public Administration and Services Committee71 (see

Appendix 2 for more details).

The Security, Tranquility and Rule of Law Committee in particular started to

gain prominence covering a range of security issues, thus becoming an im-

portant venue for civil-military relations as discussed further below.

Even during this early period, the NLD administration evolved significantly.

Calling for a “lean and efficient government,”72 it re-organized the government

66 Note that the presidency is the highest position according to the constitution; however, Aung San

Suu Kyi in her control of the two ministry posts and as state counsellor gives her de facto most of the

powers of the president. 67 Andrew Selth, "Andrew Selth: The Lady and authoritarianism in Myanmar," Nikkei Asian Review

29 March 2016. 68 Formed under government executive order no. 2/2016 on 8 April 2016 See: Myanmar Gazette,

"Gazette of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar" (Nay Pyi Taw20 May 2016), 977. 69 Formed under government executive order no. 3/2016 on 8 April 2016 See: ibid., 978. 70 Formed under government executive order no. 4/2016 on 8 April 2016 See: ibid., 979. 71 Formed under government executive order no. 5/2016 on 8 April 2016 See: ibid., 980-81.


28

apparatus, reducing the number of ministries from 36 to 23. For example, the

Ministry of Mines was joined with the Ministry of Forestry and Environmental

Conservation to form the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental

Conservation (see Appendix 3 for a list of government ministries). It also re-

duced lavish spending on entertainment by government officials,73 and an-

nounced a policy to restrict opportunities for corruption by limiting the value of

gifts and hospitality civil servants could accept.74

Significantly, the NLD government received cooperation from civil servants in-

cluding from the Myanmar Police Force. After the election, Andrew Selth had

speculated that “[e]ven under an NLD government, many positions of authority

will be under the influence of former military officers with a strong institutional

loyalty to their old employer.”75 He was particularly skeptical of the 33 perma-

nent secretaries recruited under the Thein Sein administration, of whom 22 had

military backgrounds.76 However, according to a source inside the NLD, these

civil servants “quickly became the backbone of the bureaucracy, and there was

no visible resistance or sabotage against the government.”77 Instead, some of

them were even promoted to ministerial positions.78 A senior officer from the

old president’s office who oversaw public relations during the previous gov-

ernment became spokesperson of the new president’s office.79 Furthermore, in a

reconciliatory move, Police Brigadier-General Win Naing Tun, who had earlier

been tasked with monitoring the movements of Aung San Suu Kyi, was even

appointed as her chief security officer.80

72 Clare Hammond, "Revealed: NLD's economic plan," Myanmar Times 18 August 2015. 73 The government issued an instruction in April 2016 to spend “entertainment funds” only when

necessary, and to organize modest state functions and receptions when possible. 74 Lun Min Maung, "Daw Suu lowers limit on civil servant 'gifts'," Myanmar Times 5 April 2016. 75 Andrew Selth, "The realities of power in Myanmar," New Mandala 16 November 2015. 76 Ibid. 77 Personal communication with an NLD lawmaker in Nay Pyi Taw on 22 June 2016. 78 Permanent secretaries from the Ministry of Electricity and Energy and the Ministry of Planning

and Finance were promoted to Union Minister and Deputy Minister respectively. 79 "Meet Myanmar's New Presidential Spokesman, Same as the Old Presidential Spokesman,"

Coconuts Yangon 7 April 2016. 80 "Police Brigadier Win Naing Tun appointed as Chief Security Officer of the President's Office,"

Danya Wadi 22 April 2016.


29

There were other important changes that tended to be overlooked, such as alle-

viating stress and strain on coordination between government agencies that re-

mained from the former administration.81 According to a mid-career civil serv-

ant who refused public attribution, “horizontal bureaucratic coordination has

been encouraged while the vertical relationships have been streamlined.”82 A

university academic with whom we discussed the issue was of the view that the

NLD administration is more assertive when dealing with foreign partners com-

pared to the USDP-led government. We were told that, “memoranda of under-

standing with foreign organisations now undergo more rigorous scrutiny.” It

was also noted that the “bureaucracy between Nay Pyi Taw and other centres is

more efficient requiring fewer formalities.”83 One mid-career civil servant ex-

pressed the view that the greatest change between the new and old administra-

tion is that, “most current cabinet ministers take more serious note of policy im-

plementation recommendations from bureaucrats.”84 At the sub-national level,

coordination between government agencies appeared to have become more

transparent. In discussions and interviews with local-level civil servants it ap-

pears that they have started to speak up more, verbalise their constraints, and

that they have expressed a willingness to coordinate more between depart-

ments.85

In spite of this, there were nonetheless frustrations among bureaucrats inter-

viewed for this research about the administration’s lack of clear vision and poli-

cy formulation. During one meeting with a senior lawmaker from the USDP, he

complained to the authors that he saw no significant progress in the way the

new administration worked. To him, it was more like “business as usual.”86 Win

81 Personal communication with an official from the Ministry of Home Affairs on 19 June 2016. 82 Ibid. Yet, at the same time, written request and permission from managers is required for civil

servants to meet with their counterparts from other ministries, and even inter-departmental meet-

ings within the same ministry require verbal approval in advance. 83 Personal communication with an academic staff member from one of the universities in Yangon

on 28 June 2016. 84 Personal communication with a mid-career official from the Ministry of Planning and Finance on

11 July 2016. 85 Personal observation during a town hall meeting at Maubin township and personal communica-

tion with the local government officials from Maubin and Pathein township on 2 July 2016. 86 Interview on 23 June 2016.


30

Htein from the NLD acknowledged capacity constraints in the administration,

but explained how its intolerance of corruption and the motivation of the cabi-

net ministers and chief ministers could fix any perceived failings. He gave an

example of a house: “only when the rooftop ridges are strong; the house will be

rainproof.”87

The lack of military interference in the NLD government has been significant,

and yet it has received little attention from the media and other observers. It is

noteworthy that from April to August 2016, not a single meeting of the National

Defence and Security Council (NDSC) was held despite the fact that the 2008

constitution invested extraordinary power in the body, which represents the

highest-level forum where the executive interacts with the military in security-

related matters.88 In the absence of its convening, which appears to have been an

explicit policy decision of Aung San Suu Kyi,89 it could be argued that the Secu-

rity, Tranquility and Rule of Law Committee indirectly (and perhaps temporari-

ly) replaces the role of the NDSC as a venue for civilian-military discussion of

security issues at the Committee’s weekly meetings. While current arrange-

ments deliberately exclude direct engagement of the military in the meetings of

the Committee, the Defense Services are de facto represented by the ministries

under its control: that is, the defence minister is the vice-chair and the home af-

fairs and border affairs ministers are members.90

The use of the Committee as a security forum rather than the NDSC can be in-

terpreted as a way for the NLD to avoid confrontation with the military, as well

as a way of disassociating the military as an institution from direct involvement

in policy-level discussion in the security sector. In theory, the goal is to encour-

87 Interview on 23 June 2016. 88 According to section 201 of the 2008 constitution, this eleven-member body is empowered by the

constitution to devise policy on certain military and security issues, including the right to petition

the president to declare a nationwide state of emergency. During President Thein Sein’s tenure,

NDSC meetings were held fairly regularly on a weekly basis. Currently, the NLD has five members

(the president, a vice president, foreign minister, and the two Hluttaw speakers) on the NSDC, and

the military has six (the commander-in-chief, his deputy, the vice president, and three from the mili-

tary-controlled ministries of defence, home and border affairs). 89 Note that it is the president who chairs and convenes the NDSC. 90 The Ministry of Defence serves as an avenue for Tatmadaw to indirectly engage in civil-military

relations.


31

age the military to engage more with civilian institutions and improve relations

between the sectors, as well as signal its retreat from governance responsibili-

ties. Indeed, a source from the military regional command explained that rela-

tions between the government and the military have been defined by the need

to “play by the rules and not cross each other’s red lines.”91 It is plausible that,

for now, the military is willing to engage the NLD without pushing for the

NDSC to take on its full constitutional role. It should be noted that the military

still has authority over its own affairs but no constitutional options for political

intervention (see Table 1).

The NLD government seems to be well aware of the balancing act that is re-

quired to maintain improved relations with the Tatmadaw while moving for-

ward with its agenda. In fact, the NLD only made one “serious” move that

could be seen as threatening to the military by appointing Aung San Suu Kyi as

state counsellor. As previously mentioned, this was the only time during the

first five months of the new government that the bloc of uniformed military

lawmakers stood up in silent protest as this bill was passed. This aside, the NLD

has made efforts not to do anything that would (or would be perceived to) pose

threats to the military or the constitution that it has sworn to defend. If thus

their relationship was not defined by genuine co-operation, but rather by more

hesitant arrangements of cohabitation and segregation, this was still a signifi-

cant step forward given the politics of the last decade.

The Changing Role of the Legislature

Since the NLD took power, it has de-emphasized the previously important role

of the Union Assembly or Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Under the USDP, conflicts be-

tween the executive and legislature widened partly because of the personal rift

between President Thein Sein and Speaker Thura Shwe Mann. Nonetheless, the

legislature remained an active political presence offering assertive oversight of

the executive. The new legislature began on February 1, 2016, with the NLD

controlling a majority in both the House of Representatives or Pyithu Hluttaw

91 Personal communication with a senior military officer on 27 June 2016.


32

(59 percent) and House of Nationalities or Amyotha Hluttaw (60 percent).92 The

military holds the de facto second largest bloc of seats with its constitutionally

defined allocation of 25 percent of seats in both houses. The USDP has 7 and 5

percent of seats in the two legislatures. Ethnic and other minor parties make up

9 and 10 percent respectively.

Under the USDP speakership of Thura Shwe Mann (from 2011-2016), non-

partisanship was the hallmark of the legislature paving the way for the active

participation of both USDP and non-USDP parties.93 However, witnessing the

internal party squabbling from the USDP that characterized the first legislature

resulting in a factional infight within the USDP, the NLD imposed strict party

discipline and non-partisanship quickly disappeared. As such, the NLD formed

a leading committee on legislative affairs which serves as a “whip’s office” in

order to control its lawmakers and maintain party discipline.94 This committee

scrutinizes questions and motions from lawmakers before they are formally

submitted to the legislature. By seeking to dampen the potential for conflict be-

tween the executive and the legislature, some of the more active NLD lawmak-

ers expressed frustration that they did not have the kind of freedom enjoyed by

former USDP lawmakers.95 In sub-national legislatures, at the state and region

level, there is hardly any viable opposition to the NLD apart from the military

representatives.96 The exceptions are Shan and Rakhine States where in the state

92 Myanmar’s legislature consists of the 440-seat Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives), with

constituencies based on townships irrespective of population size, and the 224-seat Amyotha Hlut-

taw (House of Nationalities), which has equal representation of States and Regions. A combined

session of the legislature is called the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Assembly). This joint house has

authority for important legislation such as taxation and the budget, and resolving differences of

opinion between the two houses on draft legislation. 93 Thomas Kean, "Myanmar's Parliament: From Scorn to Significance," in Nick Cheeseman, Nicholas

Farrelly and Trevor Wilson, "Debating Democratization in Myanmar" (Institute for South East Asian

Studies, Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, October 2015), 54-55. 94 Ei Ei Toe Lwin, "NLD sets up committee for Hluttaw," Myanmar Times 28 January2016. 95 Personal communication with a senior lawmaker from the USDP on 23 June 2016. 96 In the seven Bamar-dominated regions, the NLD has overwhelming control of the legislatures

with only a small number of USDP representatives. In the seven ethnic states, the NLD has a majori-

ty in five states.


33

legislatures, or Pyineh Hluttaw, the NLD does not control a majority and ethnic

parties challenge the NLD on local issues.97

Even with its weight of numbers, during its first five months in power the NLD-

led legislature did not address any of the pressing reform legislation inherited

from the previous government.98 This was partly because the legislature had to

take some time forming its committees and building the capacity of its new

members who were mostly from the NLD. At the same time, the USDP had nei-

ther the experience nor a clear plan on how to perform in opposition.99 It ap-

pears that the USDP membership has lost motivation after the humiliating de-

feat in the 2015 general election. Many of those inside the legislature are no

longer interested in active engagement because most were not given leadership

positions in the committees, and some were pressured by the USDP to contest

the election against their wishes.100

There are also some noticeable changes in the institutional structure. Previously,

the legislature appointed standing and ad hoc committees based on equal

(roughly proportional) representation from across the political spectrum.101 Sen-

ior ethnic lawmakers were also appointed as committee chairs. In the second

legislature, these practices were abandoned and such appointments have be-

come highly partisan.102

To support the inexperienced and new lawmakers in the second legislature, the

Legal Affairs and Special Cases Assessment Commission, which used to be a

think tank-type arm of the first Pyithu Hluttaw, was given new status and au-

97 Hein Ko Soe and Thomas Kean, "Regional parliaments rising to the challenge," Frontier Myanmar

22 July 2016. 98 According to the Legal Affairs and Special Cases Assessment Commission, there were 142 pieces

of legislation that needed to be annulled, modified or redrafted because they were out of date. See:

Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, "Assessment and recommendations," ed. Legal Affairs and Special Cases

Assessment Commission (Nay Pyi Taw, 31 March 2016), 2. 99 Personal communication with a senior lawmaker from the USDP on 23 June 2016. 100 Ibid. 101 This was an institutional inheritance following the practice of the predecessor legislature during

the socialist regime (1974-1988), although such inclusion was not required by law. 102 Apart from the two non-NLD deputy speakers who are the ex officio chairs of the Rights Commit-

tee, and the one ethnic lawmaker who chairs the Peace Committee in the Pyithu Hluttaw, all the

committee chairs are from the NLD. Moreover, legislative committees are no longer inclusive in

terms of States and Regions.


34

thority. The legislature appointed former Speaker Thura Shwe Mann as the

commission chair and upgraded the commission to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw

level. This means it can provide advice and make recommendations on all legis-

lative matters. Serving as commission chair can perceived as a consolation prize

for Thura Shwe Mann and those of his loyalists who mostly lost in the 2015 elec-

tion, but who are considered to be seasoned lawmakers offering value to the

new government.103 This appointment also appears to be part of the NLD strate-

gy to reward Thura Shwe Mann’s loyalty to the NLD in his role as speaker in

the former assembly, and to co-opt him so he does not pose an immediate threat

to their new supremacy.104 Having supporters in a wide range of sectors, his

family has amassed large amounts of wealth. This is a risky alliance, however,

as the relationship with Thura Shwe Mann risks upsetting his former subordi-

nates in the Defense Services, with whom relations have soured.

Another important development is that the legislature has become a crucial

mechanism for managing civil-military relations. Prior to the formation of the

NLD government, the military had occasionally flexed its muscles, for example

when the NLD experienced resistance from the military representatives over its

picks for vice-president and constitutional tribunal members. A military repre-

sentative questioned two of the NLD nominee’s eligibility and credentials as

Tribunal representatives, but the objection was rejected.105 In another case, when

NLD contender Henry Van Thio was proposed as vice president, a military

lawmaker queried the fact that he had spent years living out of the country,

claiming it was in contravention of an electoral law. This complaint was also

discarded. Furthermore and as previously stated, in an unprecedented move the

military demonstrated its dissatisfaction by standing up during the legislative

session during the debate on the State Counsellor Bill. In both cases, the military

could have taken these issues to the constitutional tribunal to attempt to under-

mine the new government. However, as the NLD effectively controls the tribu-

103 Most of the members of the commission used to be members of the four permanent legislative

committees such as the Bills Committee, the Public Accounts Committee, the Rights Committee, and

the Government Pledges, Undertaking and Vetting Committee. 104 Personal communication with a senior USDP lawmaker on 23 June 2016. 105 Swan Ye Htut, "NLD silences military concerns on tribunal," Myanmar Times 29 March 2016.


35

nal, a decision would most likely have been taken against the Defence Services

and this is presumably a major reason why they did not take this approach.106 In

a sense, the military has shown restraint, a level of cooperation, and an aware-

ness of the NLD’s resounding mandate to govern. The NLD and ethnic parties

have raised a number of motions and questions targeting the military; and yet,

they appear to have backed away from direct confrontation if it appeared they

had crossed a military red line pushing for constitutional change.107 All parties

seem to recognize the importance of managing relations in the legislature, or at

least not allowing it to deteriorate.

100-day Action Plans for Reform

To manage high public expectations as it took power, the NLD government ini-

tiated what it hoped would be a series of “quick win” projects. Consequently, on

March 26, soon after announcing the cabinet, Aung San Suu Kyi told her new

ministers to come up with 100-day policy implementation plans (see Appendix

3 for summary of plans) for their ministries, which had been pared down from

36 to 23.108 Despite indicating it would, the government did not formally an-

nounce its overall 100-day plan objectives. Instead, various ministries, except the

Ministry of Defence, had TV pieces on their plans and actions broadcast through

state-owned media during the 100-day period.109 Although less well publicized,

state and regional governments also implemented their own plans.

106 The tribunal consists of nine members where the president and the two speakers pick their own

three candidates. While its members have to be non-partisan, it is difficult to be impartial in sensi-

tive cases. 107 For example, A Rakhine lawmaker proposed the Tatmadaw for a ceasefire with the Arakan Army

in May 2016. It was a predicament for both the Hluttaw and the Tatmadaw—a confrontation with

the Tatmadaw if the proposal was approved or an undermining of the Hluttaw if it was rejected.

Instead, the Hluttaw decided to put the proposal on record avoiding tensions. See: Sithu Aung

Myint, "A lesson in defusing tensions," Frontier Myanmar 22 May 2016. 108 "Suu Kyi tells ministers to draw 100-day plans," The Daily Eleven Newspaper 26 March 2016. 109 The starting date of the 100 days was contentious as there were different ideas about the com-

mencement of the plans. Although not made public, the government started its countdown from

May 1, 2016, a month after it took office. Major media outlets, however, had already reported sum-

mary assessments of their major findings on the 100-day plans after July 8, instead of the official end

date of August 9. Amid confusion over the start date, the program received more publicity when

state-owned newspapers published the 100-day plans of 23 government ministries in mid-May 2016.


36

Rather than setting out clear medium-term or long-term policies or strategies,

the NLD generally sought more easily achievable goals and sped up on-going

projects started by the former USDP government. As a result, there was little

new content in these schemes. For example, as part of the 100-day plans, the

government sought to address issues facing farmers by increasing existing state-

sponsored agricultural loans to farmers. The government also sped up the re-

turn of confiscated land to farmers in some states and regions.110 In a project

started under the former government, the Yangon-Mandalay highway—a major

national thoroughfare in need of maintenance and prone to fatal road acci-

dents—was upgraded.111 In Yangon, the installation of new electricity cables and

transformers was made possible because the previous administration had al-

ready allocated funding and had completed procurement for the project.

Notably, the economic sector arguably received the least attention from the gov-

ernment. While prior to the election the NLD had announced five pillars—fiscal

prudence, lean and efficient government, revitalizing agriculture, monetary and

fiscal stability, and better functioning infrastructure—economic targets in the

100-day plans of various government ministries were vague with no concrete

policy announcements. According to the NLD’s economic advisory team, get-

ting reliable data on the state of the economy was a challenge.112 Only at the end

of July was the government able to announce the skeleton of its economic policy

outlining a 12-point policy. While media outlets criticized it for its lack of de-

tails, it was nonetheless an overarching statement exhibiting the government’s

main focus on business transparency, sustainability of natural resources, and

infrastructure development.113

A main challenge with the 100-day plans more generally lay in the translation of

policy into implementation. Several instances of policy implementation by dif-

110 Su Phyo Win, “Struggling agriculture sector looks to government to solve land-use woes,” Myan-

mar Times 3 May 2016. 111 Swan Ye Tut, “Ministry of Construction rehashes plan to widen ‘death highway’,” Myanmar Times

8 June 2016. 112 See: Kyaw Phone Kyaw and Thomas Kean, “NLD set to reveal economic policy details,” Frontier

Myanmar, 25 July 2016. 113 Aye Thida Kyaw and Clare Hammond, “Government reveals 12-point economic policy,” Myan-

mar Times, 29 July 2016


37

ferent administrative levels went beyond the national government’s mandate or

intention. For example, the government issued an executive order to reduce the

consumption of betel nut.114 In response, the Yangon region government started

cracking down on betel nut shops creating a situation where betel-nut growers,

traders, sellers, and consumers were immediately affected financially and were

at risk of prosecution.115 It proved embarrassing for the NLD, which then had to

instruct the region government to refrain from overzealously implementing the

order. At the same time, at the local administrative level, the Myanmar Police

Force (MPF) organized its own 100-day plan including the enforcement of an

11pm closing time on Yangon nightlife without proper coordination with other

authorities, causing confusion between the region government and the MPF.116

The business community in Myanmar was especially critical of the new gov-

ernment. For instance, in Yangon, the region government asked construction

companies to reduce the height of their high-rise buildings almost by half be-

cause they were not in accordance with the law, even though they had already

received permission to build according to their plans. After some pressure from

the local legislature and lobbying from the business community, the order was

again revoked.117 The initial move to suspend the projects for a limited period

seemed to make sense to the public; however, the revoking of the order several

times created confusion. Moreover, long-established “beer stations” were told

not to serve draught beer without proper licenses, yet new ways to obtain re-

newals and licenses were unclear, even for government staff.118 Therefore, many

had to choose to either forego business revenues and in many cases livelihoods,

or act illegally. These were examples of how the NLD inherited other economic

114 Chewing betel nut, a stimulant, is a common tradition in Myanmar. The usual package consists of

small pieces of betel nut wrapped in a betel leaf along with lime and mint paste. Many people add

tobacco leaf. Once chewed, it needs to be spat out and it creates red stains in the street. Moreover,

depending on the ingredients added, its usage has been attributed to cancers and other health is-

sues. 115 Nick Baker, "Govt takes aim at betel chewing," Myanmar Times 7 June 2016. 116 Mratt Kyaw Thu and Gleeson Sean, "Confusion reigns over Yangon curfew crackdown," Frontier

Myanmar 13 May 2016. 117 Myat Nyein Aye, "Yangon backtracks on high-rise adjustments," Myanmar Times 22 August 2016. 118 Mrat Kyaw Thu and Sean Gleeson, "Confusion reigns over Yangon curfew crackdown," Frontier

Myanmar 13 May 2016


38

and bureaucratic problems from the previous administration resulting in confu-

sion and misunderstanding. It also demonstrated the new government’s empha-

sis on betel nut and beer, rather than a focus on areas where there is identified

revenue leakage.

This is not to say that there were no successes in the 100-day policy plans. The

release of remaining political prisoners119 as well as the enhanced focus on the

rights of migrant workers abroad were popularly received.120 Notwithstanding,

unrealistically high expectations, tempered by confusion, marred the 100-day

plans as they quickly became a yardstick for measuring the NLD government’s

performance. The media made use of the government’s 100th day in power in

July by offering their assessments. Local media tended to look more closely at

each of the 100-day plans. While their assessments reflected positively on the

progress of political liberalization, they were rather negative about everyday

problems faced by the urban population, such as the 11pm curfew on night time

entertainment and the initial crackdowns on betel-nut shops, as well as electrici-

ty disruptions and clogged drains in Yangon.121 International media put empha-

sis on the 100-day performance rather than fulfilment of the plans. For instance,

the BBC reported the government’s approach to the peace process and slow

pace on the treatment of Muslims in Rakhine State as the defining features of the

first “Hundred days of Myanmar’s democracy.”122 Veteran Myanmar scholar

Robert Taylor surmised that, “in terms of policy, not much has happened … all

are works in progress.”123 Myanmar analyst Khin Maung Zaw argued that the

administration could have made better use of its first months in office to articu-

late a clear direction for the country. He explained how during the 100-day pe-

119 Aung Hla Tun,“New Myanmar government frees scores of jailed activists,” Reuters 8 April 2016. 120 A key goal in the foreign ministry’s 100-day plan was the better protection of these workers

(many of whom reside in Thailand), with Aung San Suu Kyi instructing embassy staff abroad that

the protection of their fellow citizens was now to be one of their main priorities. See: "Serve the

interests of your country: Foreign Minister Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to Ambassadors," The Global New

Light of Myanmar 15 June 2016. 121 See: Nanda, "The new government first 100-day report card"; Vogt, "100 days later: What has

changed?" Myanmar Times, 15 July 2016. 122 Fisher, "Hundred days of Myanmar's democracy," BBC News, 8 July 2006. 123 Ebbighausen, "100 days of Myanmar's new government - What has changed?" Deutsche Welle 8

July 2016.


39

riod it was important for a new government to give people an impression of

confidence and reliability in terms of leading and governing the country—and

how the NLD missed this opportunity.124

Ye Htut, a former cabinet minister from the USDP government, acknowledged

that it was natural for a new government to take some time to comprehend the

true situation of the country and how the bureaucracy worked. He pointed out

that even President Thein Sein had had to spend a lot of time reorganizing gov-

ernment agencies in accordance with his policies. Only after about six months

was he able to introduce his bold ideas on reforms. 125 Ye Htut offered sympathy

for the NLD’s lack of clear policy objectives, but stated that the NLD transition

team could have done more homework prior to taking office. From his perspec-

tive, it did not help that they announced ambitious 100-day initiatives without

making proper preparations.126

124 Wong, "Mixed reviews on Myanmar government's first 100 days," Channel NewsAsia, 8 July 2016. 125 The Irrawaddy to Dateline Irrawaddy: Interview with U Ye Htut, Former Minister of Information,

2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqtxloSzPJ0&feature=youtu.be. 126 Interview with Ye Htut, former Minister of Information, on 21 June 2016.

Achieving Peace: A Primary Goal

As it took power, there were high hopes as well as fears from EAOs about the

NLD-led government’s implementation plan for the peace process inherited

from the previous Thein Sein administration. The peace process matters not on-

ly for ending ethnic conflict, but is also a pre-requisite for constitutional reform,

socio-economic development, and national reconciliation.127 Moreover, the peace

process has quickly become the main domain in which the NLD and the military

cooperate and is thus also somewhat of a bellwether for civil-military relations.

This section first provides a brief history of Myanmar’s peace processes before

going on to examine the progress made and challenges faced in the first five

months of the new government. Finally, consideration is also given to Rakhine

State and the NLD’s efforts to address the situation there.

A Brief History of Myanmar’s Peace Processes

Since independence in 1948, Myanmar has been home to some of the most sus-

tained and diverse insurgencies in the world.128 Successive governments have

publicly stated the need for peace even though it has remained an elusive goal.

During the Revolutionary Council (1962-1974) and Socialist (1974-1988) periods

there were several rounds of peace talks with ethnic and ideologically-based

armed groups that did not produce successful results, mainly due to the central

government’s condition that the groups surrender arms, as well as its refusal to

grant further autonomy to them.129 Under the period of military rule (1988-

2011), the government was able to sign bilateral ceasefire agreements with 17

127 The NLD interprets “national reconciliation” as a political process involving a dialogue between

all the armed ethnic groups, political parties, the government and the Tatmadaw. The objective is to

resolve the nation’s internal conflicts. For some in the NLD leadership, the party’s concept assumes

the building of a federal democratic union. See: Lun Min Maung, "National reconciliation top

priority and toughest challenge " Myanmar Times 16 November 2015. See also: footnote 3. 128 Martin Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma, Policy Studies (Washington

D.C.: East-West Center Washington, 2007), 1-2. 129 Zaw Oo and Win Min, "Asessing Burma's Ceasefire Accords," in Policy Studies 39 (Southeast Asia)

(Singapore: East-West Center Washington, 2007), 7-10.


41

armed groups.130 The strategy of the military government appeared to be to neu-

tralize certain ethnic resistance groups and to weaken their armed movements

over time to gain further control over the border areas occupied by these

groups.131 A political settlement was not prioritized or offered by the military.

The suspension of hostilities did, however, bring peace to areas that had barely

experienced it. On the other hand, the ceasefires gave many ceasefire groups the

opportunity to maintain or even increase their strength in terms of troop re-

cruitment and weapons procurement. Corruption also surrounded some ethnic

leaders with elites amassing profits from natural resource extraction.132 Some of

the ceasefires were unstable, especially those with groups that refused to join

the former military government’s Border Guard Force (BGF) configurations. 133

The most notable of these conflicts erupted in June 2011 when the 17-year-old

ceasefire with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) broke down.134

The Thein Sein administration subsequently sought to reinvigorate the peace

process. In a marked and crucial difference to previous negotiations, EAOs were

allowed to keep their arms while negotiating for political dialogue. Formal bi-

lateral ceasefires were separately agreed with 14 armed groups within the space

of three years while a “cessation of hostilities” agreement was signed with the

KIO. After this initial success as a result of over a thousand informal “talks

about talks,” the Thein Sein government decided to begin negotiations for an

ambitious multilateral Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2014. This

130 Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma, 90. 131 The ceasefires of the 1990s were mostly verbal “gentlemen’s agreements” and did not feature

comprehensive political dialogue, an omission that is often blamed for their breakdown. They also

did not involve disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of EAOs. From one perspective, the

agreements placed a greater emphasis on state building than on peacebuilding: see Zaw Oo and Win

Min, "Asessing Burma's Ceasefire Accords," 32-41. 132 David Brenner, "Ashes of co-optation: from armed group fragmentation to the rebuilding of

popular insurgency in Myanmar," Conflict, Security and Development 15, no. 4 (2015). 133 The Border Guard Force (BGF) scheme was commenced in 2009 and BGFs were formed following

ceasefires with some EAOs. These were to function as regular military forces and were designed to

align with government military forces. In theory, a BGF battalion has a total of 326 personnel.

Among them, 30 soldiers from the Tatmadaw including officers work together with former EAO

soldiers in the battalion and take important administrative positions in the BGF. 134 This occurred after the Tatmadaw applied pressure on the KIO to convert to a BGF, which the

KIO disagreed with leading to the resumption of armed conflict. Other EAOs such as the New Dem-

ocratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) agreed to the plan and were transformed into BGFs.


42

was the first time that a government in Myanmar had negotiated simultaneous-

ly with a collective of EAOs.

In 2014 and 2015, nine formal rounds of negotiations for the NCA were held. A

draft text of the NCA was agreed by 16 armed groups on March 31, 2015. Con-

sisting of seven chapters, the NCA stipulates the terms of the ceasefires, their

implementation and monitoring, and the roadmap for political dialogue and

peace ahead.135 Despite this achievement, its formal signing encountered a num-

ber of obstacles, not least the government’s rushed schedule136 and the percep-

tion that this was so as to burnish President Thein Sein’s credentials as a peace-

maker and support his re-election bid in the forthcoming general election.

On October 15, 2015, just three weeks before the elections, only 8 of the groups

invited by the government agreed to sign the NCA at a ceremony held in the

capital, Nay Pyi Taw. The NCA was ratified by the legislature on December 8,

2015.137 Excluded from signing the NCA were also those groups that the gov-

ernment refused to allow to sign, including three smaller parties with few com-

batants, and three others to which the Tatmadaw applied a condition that they

disarm, which they continuously refused.138 Furthermore, the “Northern Alli-

135 See ISDP Backgrounder, “Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” (Stockholm: Institute for

Security and Development Policy, October 2015). 136 The government had encouraged political parties and EAOs to sign a “deed of commitment” to

the NCA on Union Day, February 12, 2015 (the anniversary of the first Panglong Agreement in 1947)

at a time when all the EAOs had not yet committed to the government’s rushed schedule. Moreover,

the negotiation team signed the draft text of the NCA on March 31, 2015, on the fourth anniversary

of the Thein Sein administration, without getting the final green light from some ethnic leaders. Fi-

nally, the government desperately pushed for the signing of the NCA before the general election. 137 There are altogether 21 armed groups recognised by the government for engagement in the NCA

negotiations. The eight signatories to the NCA include: All-Burma Students’ Democratic Front (AB-

SDF), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Chin National Front (CNF), Democratic Karen Benevolent

Army (DKBA), Karen National Union (KNU), Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council

(KNU-PC), Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO), and the Restoration Council of Shan

State/Shan State Army – South (RCSS/SSA-S). The seven non-signatories include: Kachin Independ-

ent Organisation (KIO), Karenni National People’s Party (KNPP), National Democratic Alliance

Army (NDAA), New Mon State Party (NMSP), National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang

(NSCN-K), Shan State Progressive Party / Shan State Army – North (SSPP/SSA-N) and United Wa

State Army (UWSA). 138 Three of them are larger groups: Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance

Army (MNDAA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). Three smaller groups are the: Ara-

kan National Council (ANC), the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), and Wa National Organisation

(WNO).


43

ance,” including the UWSA and NDAA, continued to negotiate directly with the

government and not as part of the NCA process. This resulted in divisions be-

tween signatories and non-signatories to the NCA, making it only a partial suc-

cess.

Peace Process under the NLD

On Myanmar’s Independence Day on January 4, 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi an-

nounced that the peace process would be the first priority of the new govern-

ment and that they would work to achieve an all-inclusive ceasefire agreement.

She argued that “we can do nothing without peace in our country,” highlighting

its interconnectedness to all key goals of the new government.139 It was also reit-

erated in the inaugural address of President Htin Kyaw on March 30, 2016,

when he outlined that internal peace was one of the government’s main priori-

ties.

With a resounding electoral mandate, the NLD enjoys an unprecedented level of

legitimacy, which is crucial as it seeks to negotiate such an ambitious national

peace agreement.140 At the same time, the NLD’s precise position on the peace

process was initially unclear, causing frustrations to be expressed by EAOs.141

Thus, despite being a key priority of the NLD-led government, its relative inex-

perience with the process and lack of a clear policy, as well as divisions between

signatories and non-signatories to the Thein Sein government’s NCA, saw the

peace process get off to a shaky start.

139 Hnin Yadana Zaw, "Myanmar's Suu Kyi says peace process will be government's priority," 4

January 2016. 140 Interview with a Myanmar scholar on 27 June 2016. 141 Tim McLaughlin, "Myanmar ethnic leader calls on Suu Kyi to clarify stance on peace process,"

Reuters 15 January 2016.


44

Table 2. Peace process under the NLD government (March – August 2016)

27 April - Aung San Suu Kyi met with the Union Joint Monitoring Committee

(JMC-U), meets EAOs for first time, and called for 21st Century

Panglong Conference.

16 May - Announcement that the MPC would be transformed into a new body

to be called the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC)

27 May - Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) established under the

Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) for political dia-

logue to be conducted in line with the NCA.

31 May - Two preparatory teams formed to organise the UPC-21CP, and to

communicate with non-signatory EAOs to the NCA.

28 June - Aung San Suu Kyi met with leaders of Ethnic Armed Organisations

Peace Process Steering Team (EAOs PPST) and called for 21st Century

Panglong Peace Conference to be held before the end of August.

6 July - Aung San Suu Kyi called for inclusion of all groups in Peace Confer-

ence at the 21st Century Panglong Preparatory Committee meeting.

11 July - National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC) and Peace Commis-

sion established.

17 July - Aung San Suu Kyi met with the non-signatory alliance, the United

Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), and peace process gained mo-

mentum with non-signatories’ involvement in the process.

26 – 30 July - Ethnic armed groups summit in Mai Ja Yang, Kachin State, for EAOs

to prepare positions for the UPC-21CP.

29 July - Aung San Suu Kyi met with NDAA and UWSA ethnic leaders for their

participation in the 21st Century Panglong Conference in Nay Pyi Taw.

8 August - Announcement of the 21st Century Panglong Conference to be held on

31 August.

15 August - Aung San Suu Kyi chaired the UPDJC meeting in Nay Pyi Taw.

31 August - Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong held in Nay Pyi Taw.


45

It took time for the new NLD peace team, several of whom are administrative

staff transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to familiarize themselves

with the details of the peace process.142 Some NLD members assigned to the

process such as Dr. Tin Myo Win had participated in some meetings at the MPC

around the peace process under the previous administration, but mostly they

had no prior experience of peacemaking and this made the learning curve even

steeper.

This period of learning in April and May 2016 led to frustration among ethnic

representatives who were worried about increasing divisions between signato-

ries and non-signatories to the NCA and the lack of progression in the peace

process since the start of 2016.143 Furthermore, these ethnic representatives were

concerned about an increase in the armed conflict in Kachin and Shan States be-

tween non-signatory EAOs and the Defence Services; armed conflict for the first

time in decades in Rakhine State with the Arakan Army; and, the breakout of

fighting between signatories and non-signatory ethnic groups to the NCA (the

RCSS-SSA and the TNLA).

There were also tensions between the NLD and elected ethnic political parties

when negotiating for the inclusion of ethnic party candidates in the cabinet as

well as the allocation of chief ministerial positions in ethnic states.144 The combi-

nation of these factors created tensions between the government and EAOs, but

interestingly helped create a stronger united front on decisions around peace

matters between the NLD-led government and the Defence Services. However,

the situation did seem to be putting the peace process itself at risk.

Thus, a lengthy period of time had passed between the first Union Peace Con-

ference in January 2016 under the Thein Sein administration,145 and the new

government beginning to directly address the peace process at the end of April

2016. It was notably not until April 27 that Aung San Suu Kyi attended the Joint

142 Interview with international organization staff in Yangon on 20 June 2016. 143 Stephen Gray, "Myanmar's new government: Intentions still unclear," The Interpreter 26 April

2016. 144 Ei Ei Toe Lwin and Wa Lone, "NLD control over chief ministers riles ethnic parties." 145 The Union Peace Conference held in January 2016 was conducted in a hasty manner because it

was mandated by the NCA to be held within 90 days of signature of the Agreement.


46

Monitoring Committee Union-Level (JMC-U) meeting,146 the first time that she

officially met the EAOs and military involved in the peace process together. De-

spite this positive development, this was seen as an inappropriate venue for her

announcement that she would host a “21st Century Panglong Conference.” Ra-

ther it was believed by many that the NLD should have first convened the Joint

Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM), which is the body responsible for

the implementation of the NCA and was regarded as a more fitting venue. 147

Not only this, but the publicizing of the Conference had not been previously

communicated to or discussed with EAO representatives and was thus not seen

as a joint decision. Furthermore, the NCA stipulates that political dialogue

through Union Peace Conferences must take place, so there were tensions be-

tween the military (that preferred the UPC title according to the NCA) and

Aung San Suu Kyi (who preferred the “21st Century Panglong” title so as to

draw on the legacy of her father who had hosted the original Conference in

1947).148 It illustrates that enthusiastic first steps to work for “internal peace” by

the new government were viewed as not adhering closely enough to the NCA

text, which is the premise for and cornerstone of negotiations and relations be-

tween the EAOs and Defence Services as well as with the government on peace

process-related topics.

This premature call aside, the peace process started to gain momentum after the

JMC-U meeting. However, there remained great uncertainty about how it

would be implemented and which institution would be the secretariat for the

peace process under the NLD government.149 The MPC, which had acted as a

secretariat for the USDP government, had been dissolved in March 2016 as a

146 The JMC-U consists of the government and eight EAOs that signed the NCA and it was formed a

month after the signing of the NCA in October 2015. It is led by Lt-General Yar Pyae from the

Tatmadaw that is tasked with monitoring and implementing the military aspects of the NCA. 147 “The first meeting should be JICM: Hkun Okker,” Shan Herald Agency for News 28 April 2016 148 The Panglong Agreement of 1947 was between the government and three key ethnic groups. It

specified a level of autonomy for regions where ethnic groups were based and is one of the lasting

legacies of independence hero General Aung San. 149 Burma Partnership, "MPC Future Unknown, Peace Continues to Be Taken Hostage," Burma

Partnership 6 April 2016.


47

result of one of President Thein Sein’s final presidential decrees.150 The NLD

government moved quickly and announced on May 16 that the MPC would be

transformed into a new body to be called the National Reconciliation and Peace

Centre (NRPC),151 and on July 11, 2016, the formation of an 11-member NRPC

and Peace Commission was officially announced ushering new leadership to

navigate the peace process on behalf of the government.152

On May 27, 2016, the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), also es-

tablished under the JICM to implement the political dialogue components of the

NCA, was convened. In what was seen as a progressive move by many, Aung

San Suu Kyi reconstituted the UPDJC as a tripartite body and was appointed

Chair. After some quick consultations in the weeks prior, and after gaining a

better understanding of what was stipulated in the NCA, she once again called

for what she then described as a 21st Century Panglong or the Union Peace Con-

ference, in accordance with the NCA, and the compromise name Union Peace

Conference – 21st Century Panglong was given.153 Thus, on May 31, 2016, the

president’s office announced the establishment of two preparatory teams to or-

ganize the upcoming Conference and negotiate with NCA non-signatory

EAOs.154

It was not until August 24, just days before the Union Peace Conference – 21st

Century Panglong (UPC-21CP), that the JICM was finally convened, almost five

months after the NLD government had assumed power.155 This was a significant

step because the JICM is the key body mandated under the NCA to serve as a

deadlock-breaking mechanism for issues that cannot be resolved by either the

UPDJC or JMC. The JICM makes final decisions on cases in dispute and is sup-

150 Myanmar Gazette, "Gazette of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar," (Nay Pyi Taw, 11 March

2016), 482; Guy Dinmore, "Govt dissolves MPC, transfers assets," Myanmar Times 25 March 2016. 151 Lun Min Maung, "Peace conference organisers told to hurry up," Myanmar Times 17 May 2016. 152 The NRPC became a full-fledged government body under the office of the state counselor. The

lower level Peace Commission, under the NRPC, was also formed with high-profile figures from the

government to set policy and facilitate the peace process. 153 "Limited inclusion: NCA to guide 21st Century Panglong Conference," The Global New Light of

Myanmar 28 May 2016. 154 BNI, "UNFC representatives to meet with UPDJC leaders," Mizzima 9 June 2016. 155 "Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting on NCA held in Nay Pyi Taw," The Global New Light

of Myanmar 24 August 2016.


48

posed to meet every 90 days. Its belated convening reveals that the establish-

ment of the new peace architecture and institutions had been the government’s

initial priority.

These bureaucratic complexities are emblematic of the learning process that the

new government went through. Yet it also adapted relatively quickly to being

sensitive to the need to follow the protocols established under the NCA, such as

the convening of the JIMC meetings, and the adoption of a name for the confer-

ence that included the name stated in the NCA—the Union Peace Conference—

as well as the new 21st Century Panglong title. Thus, from May onward, the

NLD scheduled the Conference and its key preparatory meetings to be in line

with the political roadmap stated in the NCA, and the process is underway to

review the framework for political dialogue.

Hard Negotiations

Although the peace architecture outlined above is important, the peace process

is fundamentally about resolving decades of armed conflict and uniting all key

stakeholders. The EAOs have long called for the peace process to be inclusive

and to include all armed groups, including non-signatories to the NCA.

Throughout the first months of the NLD-led government, there were significant

negotiations undertaken with these parties to try to bring them into the peace

process and to find solutions for their attendance at the Conference. In this re-

gard, the peace process gained momentum with ethnic representatives when

Aung San Suu Kyi met with the non-signatory alliance, the United Nationalities

Federal Council (UNFC), on July 17, in order to try to bring these groups into

the process. The authors were informed that prior to this date, the NLD had

struggled during informal encounters with the non-signatory EAOs.156 Yet de-

spite remaining sensitivities, negotiations with EAOs fared better after the for-

mal establishment of the NRPC and the appointment of peace negotiators.

As a confidence-building measure and as a clear symbol of the NLD’s prefer-

ence for inclusivity, the government supported the holding of a plenary meeting

156 Interview in Yangon on 22 June with a member of the Peace Commission before its establishment.


49

involving both signatory and non-signatory EAOs in a town called Mai Ja Yang,

located in KIO controlled territory, on July 26-30, 2016. The meeting was called

to prepare EAOs for the Union Peace Conference and to coordinate and harmo-

nize key decisions and messages. Notably, the military allowed delegates and

the media to travel from government-controlled areas into this EAO-controlled

zone, in spite of the 1908 Unlawful Associations Act, which prohibits contact

with illegal organisations.157 Therefore, non-signatory groups were able to join

the meeting and have their views and positions tabled. This was seen as a fur-

ther positive sign in terms of cooperation between the government and the mili-

tary, and with EAOs around the peace process, as these stakeholders had to co-

ordinate to enable participation in the meeting, and for the meeting to take place

at relatively short notice.

Separate negotiations also made significant progress with the TNLA, MNDAA,

and AA, involving compromise over the wording required by the military that

they “show their political willingness to abandon their weapons” at a time to be

defined through negotiation and dialogue (i.e. not immediately).158 However,

these groups ultimately disagreed with the proposed wording and did not issue

such a statement. They therefore were not invited to participate in the Union

Peace Conference scheduled for August 31. Nevertheless, the other non-

signatories agreed to attend the Conference and were invited to present their

views and demands in a series of ten-minute speeches.

Cooperation between the Military and NLD

The peace process has required the cooperation of the military and NLD-led

government. Significantly, the reconfiguration of the UPDJC on May 27–28,

2016, placed the NLD-led government and military in a position where they

157 Most EAOs are designated as illegal organizations under the “Unlawful Associations Act” (1908),

criminalizing contact with EAOs, unless suspended by special agreement of the government (for

example, when these organizations attend peace talks in government-controlled areas). EAOs that

signed the NCA were removed from the list of illegal organizations. 158 Previously the military had demanded that these groups disarm before being allowed to enter

into peace negotiations or sign a ceasefire. However, in early August 2016, the military relaxed its

demand and subsequently requested that the three groups release the above statement before being

allowed to join peace negotiations. See: Wa Lone, "Myanmar military relaxes stance on rebels barred

from peace talks," Reuters 4 August 2016.


50

were jointly represented as “the government.” Indeed, as demonstrated, there

have been positive signs that the government and military have increasingly

aligned policies and actions.159 The NLD’s willingness to listen to advice from

the military, and to cooperate during its initial months in government, has

served to build a level of trust between them. Retired Lieutenant General Khin

Zaw Oo, Secretary of the Peace Commission, explained to us that, from his per-

spective, the NLD is willing to listen to the military’s position and senior officers

have provided inputs that have led to progression in the peace process.160

Also significant in the context of the peace process, and civil-military relations

more generally, was the commander-in-chief’s attendance of Martyrs’ Day on

July 19, 2016, the 69th anniversary of the assassination of the independence hero

and founder of the Defence Services, General Aung San, and his colleagues, for

the first time in almost three decades.161 The visit to the memorial was followed

by General Min Aung Hlaing’s attendance at the religious ceremony held at

Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence, where she was kept under house arrest by the

military for more than 15 years. The commander-in-chief’s participation was

symbolically important as it indicated that the military could potentially work

with the NLD on the peace process with the daughter of Aung San, convener of

the first Panglong conference, and on political transition. It was thus interpreted

as a demonstration of improved relations between the NLD administration and

the military.162

It is hoped that further momentum in the peace process will enhance civil-

military relations. In fact, the fundamental importance of the successful imple-

mentation of the peace process to Myanmar’s transition to democracy was reit-

erated in a press conference of the Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min

159 Motokazu Matsui, "Suu Kyi, Myanmar army learn to live with each other," Nikkei Asian Review 27

July 2016. 160 Interview with Lt. General (retired) Khin Zaw Oo in Yangon on 20 June 2016. 161 The Tatmadaw had stopped sending representatives to the event after North Korean agents

planted bombs that killed South Korean politicians. After Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD won the 1990

election, General Aung San’s role in the history of the country was greatly reduced: for example

school textbooks omitted his role in Myanmar’s independence and his image was replaced on bank

notes. 162 Aung Zaw, "The Lady and the Generals," The Irrawaddy 25 July 2016.


51

Aung Hlaing on May 13, 2016, when he said that the military would give up its

25 percent seat allocation in the legislature if Myanmar achieves internal

peace.163 Effectively this means that if the peace process is successful, the mili-

tary plans to relinquish its veto power over changes to the constitution. He also

stated that this may take up to a decade or more. It seems therefore that if the

NLD wants to change the constitution, or take the military out of politics, the

only way to bypass the formal constitutional amendment process is to achieve

peace and to negotiate for a new political arrangement. This depends on func-

tioning civil-military coordination in the peace process and the sustainability of

improved civilian-military relations more generally.

One question that remains, however, is whether the military will back all the

decisions made by Aung San Suu Kyi and the government in regards to the

peace process. Under retired general and former minister in the president’s of-

fice Aung Min, the MPC had the backing of the president who coordinated with

the military on its activities. The Defence Services obviously had more trust in

the USDP-led executive and in a president who was a former general chosen by

the former commander-in-chief. Thein Sein, it appears, trusted Aung Min and

his MPC to negotiate with the EAOs, a job in which he took considerable initia-

tive.164 It will inevitably take time for the military to establish the same level of

trust in the government and new peace architecture in the handling of the peace

process.

Challenges Faced

In spite of achievements made in the first five months, there inevitably exist a

number of other challenges with regard to the peace process, some larger than

others.

First, by the time the NRPC was formed and became a government body, most

of the former MPC staff had left the organisation after its dissolution and had

163 "Myanmar military chief voices support for constitution amendment if stable," Shanghai Daily 13

May 2016. 164 Aung Min also relied on information and contacts with the EAOs through a handful of Western-

educated former EAO members and political activists who came back to Myanmar to participate in

the transition after 2011, and who were recruited by the MPC.


52

found other jobs, meaning that competences that had been built up have been

lost. Furthermore, as a government body, NRPC staff will have to be recruited

through civil service procedures and paid on the same salary scale as other civil

servants, making it less attractive to some staff who had previously enjoyed

higher wages as staff of the MPC.165 Furthermore, the new NRPC leadership did

not seem to undertake any major moves to show they were pro-active and did

not appear to take action unless an instruction came from the state counsellor.

This was partly due to the lack of experience in the peace process, as well as the

elite level of relationship-building during this period (i.e. between Aung San Su

Kyi and Min Aung Hlaing). Yet it also appeared to be due to concerns among

the decision-making and working level staff of the Ministry of the State Coun-

sellor and the NRPC that they might potentially face being reprimanded: this in

case they made unintended mistakes as a result of not having clear direction

from Aung San Suu Kyi or other NLD leaders. Another issue is that the signato-

ries to the NCA have taken on a role in facilitating communications and ensur-

ing that informal discussions between the government and non-signatory EAOs

took place. During the period under study, the NRPC had not yet taken on a

pro-active role in hosting informal discussions with EAOs nor scheduled a se-

ries of talks with EAOs. Rather all focus was on preparing for the UPC-21CP at

the end of August.

A further major challenge is that now that the peace architecture and meeting

timeframes are largely established, e.g. that the Union Peace Conference is to be

held bi-annually, there is naturally less flexibility to respond to changes and

hurdles within the peace process. At the same time, it also gives greater assur-

ances to EAOs that political dialogue will continue. Tractability is also required

to engage responsively in informal talks with the EAOs to deal with issues aris-

ing between the parties to the conflict, as well as talks on positions and points

relevant to the overall political dialogue. It will take tough negotiations on the

part of the government and military to persuade the other 10 non-signatory

EAOs to sign the NCA, which is mandatory for participation in future Union

165 Interview in Yangon with a former senior MPC staff member on 20 June 2016.


53

Peace Conferences and the political dialogue process.166 Currently, only 8 EAOs

have signed the NCA.

Moreover, the process itself is complex, time consuming, and fragile. As men-

tioned earlier, Aung San Suu Kyi’s initial call for a 21st Century Panglong Con-

ference was a sensitive move given that there were differing interpretations of

the term “Panglong.” For the military, it may mean “unity in diversity,” ethnic

political parties may equate it with “equality and self-determination,” while for

EAOs it can mean “the right to secession is guaranteed.” Indeed, there is very

little concerning Panglong on which all sides agree, but for many the “spirit of

Panglong” remains important. 167 In fact, such divergent interpretations are

common in Myanmar, which is indicative of the importance of political dia-

logue. As a further example of how much division still exists, despite positive

steps forwards, at the EAO plenary meeting in Mai Ja Yang there were calls for a

diverse range of types of federalism by the various EAOs. This was in spite of

widespread expectations among Myanmar analysts that a common position

would be presented by the EAOs on federalism.168

Aside from EAOs and the military, the peace process also depends on the per-

formance of ethnic political parties. In the 2010 election, they were able to secure

dissenting votes from their constituents against the USDP and formed a sizeable

force inside the national and sub-national legislatures. However, they were

largely eclipsed by the NLD through the latter’s landslide win in the 2015 elec-

tion, not least due to the unforgiving first-past-the-post electoral system.169 This

166 Richard Horsey, “Reality bites for Aung San Suu Kyi amid surging violence,” Nikkei Asian Review,

Commentary, 14 October 2016. 167 The “Spirit of Panglong” is used to invoke the 1947 Panglong conference and is regularly used by

Aung San Suu Kyi. Her father was assassinated on July 19, 1947, only months after the conference

and some use the term to describe his intentions in the design of the agreement about the division of

power between the ethnic majority and the country’s ethnic minorities. For further context see:

Amrita Dey, "Will Panglong II end the ethnic conflict?," Myanmar Times 30 August 2016. 168 During the EAO plenary meeting in Mai Ja Yang, EAOs drafted a new form of federal union cre-

ating a Bamar state by merging several regions and a state of nationalities for regions with mixed

ethnic residency. See: Lunn Min Maung, "Structure of federal Union debated on second day of Mai

Ja Yang summit," ibid. 28 July 2016. 169 These parties could have achieved better results if proportional representation had been imple-

mented, something they did not support, however, and which may have required constitutional

change in any case. It seems they rejected such change based on a calculation by the major parties in


54

has a number of consequences. For instance, until ethnic parties show strong

performances at the ballot box, well-armed EAOs are reluctant to transform

themselves into political entities. Therefore, in order to encourage EAOs to par-

ticipate in future elections, it may be necessary to consider a change or changes

in the electoral system in order to boost the perceived political dividend.

The five-year term of the NLD-led government may also pose a potential chal-

lenge for implementation of the peace process. According to retired Lieutenant

General Khin Zaw Oo, “the peace process gained strategic momentum during

the first three years of Thein Sein’s presidency but the last two years were dis-

rupted by tactical preparations for the election.”170 He thus also predicted that it

is equally important for the NLD to actively engage the peace process during its

first three years and achieve concrete results before election fever will distract its

focus. The government also potentially faces the problem of financially support-

ing the peace process alone. This, for the time being at least, would appear to

have been off-set by international donors, who have maintained interest in con-

tinuing to support the nationally-led peace process, and commitments of fund-

ing have already been made by the EU and other countries.171 A new multi-

donor trust fund, the Joint Peace Fund, has also been created to support the pro-

cess and to enhance coordination between donors.172 In the coming months, fol-

the states that they would have gained a little more in terms of votes at the national level, but would

have had to share more power with sub-minorities at the state level. Furthermore, the NLD firmly

opposed the adoption of a new system of plurality voting as the current “first-past-the-post” system

benefitted them in their sweep of the 2015 elections. See: Hunter Marston, "A Make or Break Year for

Myanmar," The Diplomat 8 December 2014. Ardeth Thawnghmung, "The Myanmar Elections 2015:

Why the National League for Democracy Won a Landslide Victory," Critical Asian Studies, Volume

48/Issue 1, February 2016: 132-142. 170 Interview on 20 June 2016. 171 European Union, "Elements for an EU strategy vis-à-vis Myanmar/Burma: a special partnership

for democracy, peace and prosperity," Brussels, Belgium, 20 June 2016. The document lays out a

plan for a coherent, ambitious and forward-looking EU engagement and intensified cooperation

with the country in its transition process. It includes six key areas: (1) Democracy, Rule of Law, and

Good Governance; (2) Peace Process; (3) Protection and Promotion of Human Rights; (4) Poverty

Reduction and Sustainable Development; (5) Economic Engagement and Trade; and (6) Myanmar in

the Region. New proposals to Myanmar include military-military cooperation, except for arms sales

which remain on the EU's sanctions list, and budgetary support to the Myanmar government. 172 The Joint Peace Fund, formed in 2015, is a platform for coordinated international financial, tech-

nical and advisory assistance. It seeks to support a peace process that ends ethnic armed conflict in

Myanmar and results in a sustainable peace from which all the people of the country benefit. With


55

lowing the government’s re-structuring of the peace architecture, proposals for

support of peace-making activities will be funded and donor coordination struc-

tures are being developed by the donors and government.

Across this complex terrain, the NLD-led implementation of the peace process

has made concrete steps forward in the first five months of the new govern-

ment, with reform of the peace architecture, negotiation and cooperation with

the military, and through initial negotiations with EAOs, both signatories and

non-signatories. It also showed adaptability in being sensitive to the protocols of

the NCA, which is important for both EAOs and the military. However, the lim-

ited experience of the NRPC as an institution has created a situation where val-

uable momentum has been lost and the process has been affected by a lack of

decision-making in some cases and micromanagement in others. Furthermore,

the relationships between signatories and non-signatories remain tentative and

the NLD-led government will need to keep attention and focus on the peace

process by negotiating a shared vision for further technical implementation of

the ceasefire, and for hosting an inclusive political dialogue with the EAOs. This

will undoubtedly require the NRPC (and Peace Commission) to continue to

build trust with the military, EAOs and civil society to consolidate its legitimacy

and capacity, which in turn demands improvements in technically capable hu-

man resources.

Rakhine State Situation

While not technically part of the peace process, the tense situation in Rakhine

state173 is also an urgent priority for the NLD to address. Despite its rich natural

resources, the state is the poorest in Myanmar with an estimated poverty rate of

78 percent, according to the World Bank.174 Inter-communal tensions between

many donors pooling their funding, the JPF hopes to offer a coherent and efficient approach to

providing financial, technical and advisory assistance to the parties in the peace process, as well as

other Myanmar organisations. See: http://www.jointpeacefund.org/. 173 Rakhine State or Rakhine people were formerly known as Arakan State or Arakanese during the

colonial period. The official term is “Rakhine,” and political activists have used the term Arakan to

eschew name changes made by the military government in 1989, but both usages are common. 174 World Bank Report, “Myanmar: Ending poverty and boosting shared prosperity in a time of tran-

sition,” November 2014.


56

Rakhine Buddhist and Muslim communities, in addition to perceived central

government discrimination and neglect of the state, have long undermined the

development of this area.175 For many years, the Myanmar government has

come under scrutiny from human rights bodies for the situation in the state.

Underlying tensions erupted in June and October 2012 when two waves of vio-

lence resulted in scores of deaths, many injuries, destroyed property and hous-

ing, and the displacement of almost 150,000 people.176

The treatment of minority Muslim communities is a particularly important, and

sensitive, issue. There are deep divisions between Rakhine Buddhists and self-

identified Rohingya Muslims. Local Rakhine Buddhists and the government

tend to regard the latter as illegal immigrants from neighbouring Bangladesh

and refer to them as Bengalis.177 On the other hand, these people claim that their

ancestors have lived in Rakhine state for centuries, or at least were “descended

from persons who had made Myanmar their permanent home for two genera-

tions” prior to 1982, which enables people to qualify as full citizens under the

1982 citizenship law.178 International human rights bodies regard them as one of

the world’s most persecuted people, due to human rights abuses including re-

strictions applied to them such as on their freedom of movement, as well as the

state’s refusal to recognise the citizenship of much of the population and the on-

erous restrictions on obtaining citizenship.179

175 It is commonly stated that Myanmar officially defines 135 “national race” categories. These are

grouped together into eight macro-categories: Bamar, Mon, Kayin, Kayah, Shan, Kachin, Chin and

Rakhine. Divisions within each of these categories can be significant, especially along linguistic,

ethnic, and class fault lines. “Rohingya” are not recognised as one of the official national races of

Myanmar. 176 The violence was initially sparked by the rape and murder of a Buddhist woman by three Muslim

men in Ramree Township, Rakhine State in late May 2012, and the retaliation killing of 10 Muslim

men by a mob in Toungup in early June 2012. The Thein Sein administration established an Inquiry

Commission into the violence in August 2012 to look into the root causes and provide recommenda-

tions for preventing future violence. 177 Rakhine Inquiry Commission, "Final Report of Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in

Rakhine State" (Nay Pyi Taw: Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State, 2012), 92-

96. 178 1982 Myanmar Citizenship Law, section 6 read together with 1948 Union Citizenship Act, section

4(2). 179 Amie Hamling, "Rohingya people: the most persecuted refugees in the world," Amnesty

International 7 October 2015.


57

Consequently, improving the situation in Rakhine State is a stated priority of the

NLD government and prioritizing stability and development there formed part

of the 100-day plan of the state counsellor’s office (see Appendix 3). The post-

election political context has not necessarily been conducive. In an early step,

the NLD decided not to appoint an MP from Arakan National Party (ANP)—

which represents the Rakhine Buddhist majority—as the chief minister of the

state, despite the ANP winning the most seats in the State legislature in the 2015

election. This decision was strenuously protested against by the ANP, and it has

adopted a more hardline oppositional stance as a result.

Signaling the new government’s high level of attention to the issue, on May 31,

2016, it formed a “Central Committee on Implementation of Peace, Stability and

Development of Rakhine state,” chaired by Aung San Suu Kyi and including all

cabinet members plus the Rakhine chief minister and the state secretary. Sub-

committees were also formed on security, citizenship, development and rela-

tions with aid agencies. Given its broad membership and the many demands on

ministers’ time, the committee has met infrequently, although it has identified

142 priority action points.180

In terms of practical actions, the Immigration and National Registration De-

partment under the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population reactivat-

ed efforts to assess the citizenship status of undocumented Muslims. The previ-

ous government had launched a pilot project to issue citizenship cards to those

Muslims who qualify under the 1982 law, but with no real efforts to obtain buy-

in from Rakhine and Muslim communities—and in particular a requirement for

Muslims to identify as “Bengali”—it failed to gain much traction and there were

demonstrations by Rakhine nationalists against the process. In May, the immi-

gration department recognized the challenges by reverting to a more modest

process of replacing the Temporary Registration Certificates (“white cards”) that

many Muslims had held until their cancellation in March 2015 with National

Verification Cards (NVCs or “green cards”) that will be the basis for future citi-

180 “Rakhine committee establishes 142-point agenda,” Myanmar Times, 15 July 2016.


58

zenship scrutiny.181 However, with limited outreach efforts, only around 2000

new NCVs have been issued under the new government, compared with some

500,000 white cards that were held prior to their cancellation.182 In the future, it

will be important for the government to conduct more detailed consultations

with local communities to ensure that government initiatives to address the sit-

uation have more acceptance.

A polarized political context continues to hamper progress. Even terminology

remains a sensitive issue. There were protests when the US ambassador contin-

ued to use the term Rohingya despite the foreign ministry’s request to refrain

from doing so. Aung San Suu Kyi tried to solve the nomenclature dilemma by

introducing a supposedly neutral term, “Muslim communities in Rakhine

State,” which again faced resistance from both sides. She finally requested the

public – and instructed government staff – to refrain from using either “Rohing-

ya” or “Bengali.”183

Managing the situation in Rakhine State is important more broadly, as fear-

mongering around the numbers of Muslims in Rakhine State and the alleged

threat that they pose is used as justification for the existence and action of na-

tionalist movements, including “Ma Ba Tha.”184 The NLD had in the past been

reluctant to directly challenge Ma Ba Tha because of its perceived public sup-

port among the Buddhist majority. However, on several occasions since coming

to power, the NLD has now tested Ma Ba Tha’s resilience by questioning its le-

gitimacy as an organization.185 In the meantime, there were several incidents

181 Nyan Hlaing Lynn and Thomas Kean, "Untangling the Rakhine citizenship mess," Frontier

Myanmar 3 June 2016. 182 ISDP interview with individual working closely on the issue, August 2016. 183 Peter Lloyd, "Burma leader Aung San Suu Kyi bans use of Rohingya name for oppressed

Muslims," ABC News, 22 June 2016. 184 Ma Ba Tha is the Myanmar-language acronym for Amyo-Batha-Thathana (Race, Language, Reli-

gion) and is sometimes referred to in English as the Committee/Association for the Protection of

Nationality and Religion. See: Thusitha Perera, "Ma Ba Tha and the vote," New Mandala, 4 November

2015. 185 There were two major encounters. First, a nationalist was arrested for making provocative posts

about Htin Kyaw, Aung San Suu Kyi and the commander-in-chief. In that case, Ma Ba Tha did not

directly challenge the government. Second, when Ma Ba Tha did challenge the Chief Minister of

Yangon for his remarks, the government was able to sideline it with the support of the chief monks.


59

outside of Rakhine State where mobs attacked Muslim properties in Bago Re-

gion, and Kachin and Shan States.186 While the violence in these cases remained

contained, there is a risk that these types of incidents can escalate and spread to

other places, including Rakhine State, especially given the recently expanded

usage of social media in Myanmar.

These challenges, together with considerable international criticism187 of the sit-

uation in Rakhine State and the dire human rights situation of the Muslim

population there, led to further the NLD’s efforts to address the situation. On

August 23, Aung San Suu Kyi announced the establishment of a hybrid nation-

al-international Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, chaired by former UN

Secretary-General Kofi Annan.188 The mandate of the Advisory Commission is

to “undertake meetings with all relevant stakeholders” and “analyze relevant

issues with a view to finding the best possible solutions to prevailing problems.”

The Commission will consider humanitarian and development issues, access to

basic services, the assurance of basic rights, and the security of the people of

Rakhine.189

While the timing of the Commission’s establishment may have been useful in

deflecting criticism ahead of Aung San Suu Kyi’s September meetings with

Prime Minister May in London, President Obama in Washington DC and her

speech to the UN General Assembly in New York, the appointment of someone

with the stature of Kofi Annan as its head suggests the government has the po-

litical will to take concrete action on the issue and once again reiterates the im-

See: Aung Kyaw Min, "Could this be the end of Ma Ba Tha," Myanmar Times 12 July 2016; Myanmar

Now, "Ma Ba Tha reluctant to pressure govt over defamation case," Frontier Myanmar 10 May 2016. 186 Ye Mon, "No arrests to be made after Bago mob violence, chief minister says," Myanmar Times 30

June 2016; "Mob burns down Muslim prayer hall in Hpakant," Myanmar Times 4 July 2016. 187 The UN Special Rapporteur, Yanghee Lee, in her June 2016 visit to Myanmar pressured the gov-

ernment on the need to ease restrictions on the population of Muslims in northern Rakhine State.

International media and human rights organisations have also criticized Aung San Suu Kyi for not

doing enough to resolve this situation. See: Fisher, "Hundred days of Myanmar's democracy," BBC

News 8 July 2006. 188 Ministry of the Office of the State Counsellor, Press Release, 23 August 2016. Reproduced in Glob-

al New Light of Myanmar, 24 August 2016, pp. 1, 3. 189 Ibid.


60

portance of relationships across divergent groups for solving such longstanding

and complicated matters of conflict.

Conclusion

With its impressive electoral victory in November 2015, the NLD government

has the legitimacy that only a resounding nation-wide, popular mandate can

offer. Aung San Suu Kyi’s stature—at home and abroad—has helped to ensure a

profound change in the tone of discussions about Myanmar politics.

However, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD can only deliver on their four stated

aims—national reconciliation, internal peace, constitutional amendment and

socio-economic development—if she finds a balance in relations between her

democratically endorsed government, the Defence Services, and the elected and

non-elected leaders of the country’s many different ethnic political groups, in-

cluding those who maintain militias and armies. So far, she has been able to bal-

ance them relatively successfully through the peace process. At this early stage,

therefore, the NLD has avoided unduly antagonizing its former foe. The mili-

tary still enjoys its powerful institutional role under the 2008 constitution, which

preserves many of its privileges as an incumbent political player.

The NLD has also been successful in institutionalizing its role, controlling large

sections of the governance structure for the first time. But, at the same time, its

first five months in office also demonstrated the NLD’s relative lack of prepara-

tion to govern. Prior to assuming office, it appeared to spend a significant

amount of time ensuring the transfer of power and working out the potential

role of Aung San Suu Kyi. For the NLD’s top leaders this was the overwhelming

priority; she is, after all, unmatched as a political figure. By the time it became

apparent that she would not become president, there was less time to prepare

for the actual transition of power. This situation affected the 100-day plans, for

instance, and helps to explain why parts of the government’s early activities

could not be carefully planned. To compensate, the NLD sped up existing pro-

jects to claim quick-wins as their own, instead of announcing longer term major


62

political and socio-economic reforms. Furthermore, her team generally lacked

day-to-day administrative experience; several skilled and experienced candi-

dates deemed disloyal to the NLD were even excluded. In assembling the new

government line-up, she also relied on incumbent bureaucrats.

After decades of direct military rule, its first few months, or even the next few

years of its mandate, do not provide enough time to “fix” all of Myanmar’s mul-

tifaceted problems. Nevertheless, the NLD government now has an historic op-

portunity to shape Myanmar’s political, economic and cultural trajectory for the

next generation. Looking closely at what has already happened, it is clear that

there were several important opportunities for democratic consolidation during

the NLD’s first few months in government. In seeking to summarize changing

relations and events over the first five months of NLD government, these are

briefly explained in four parts:

(i) Improved relations between the NLD-led government and the Myanmar De-

fence Services

During this early phase of learning to work together, there has been

no major rift between the government and the military. Both sides are

exercising restraint. The military’s willingness to abide by the existing

rules shows that it can accept the current arrangements as specified by

the 2008 constitution. The military is recovering from its own tar-

nished image and it can benefit from improved civil-military relations.

Some of that benefit will flow directly to military personnel who can

now enjoy much greater interaction with foreign counterparts, and

with civilians at home and abroad. With this foundation, there is a ra-

re opportunity to build broad-based trust in civil-military relations.

The legislature, with its mandated military representation, is currently

one of the most appropriate forums to foster such engagement, along-

side the peace process.

(ii) Structured dialogue and negotiation with EAOs and the military through a

reinvigorated peace process and adherence to the NCA


63

The government has put significant effort into the peace process and,

building on past achievements, there is a genuine opportunity for a

start to a national reconciliation process. The undertakings of the

NLD-led government and constituent bodies such as the NRPC, bring-

ing all the NCA signatory and non-signatory EAOs to one table at the

Panglong Conference, was a significant achievement for the new gov-

ernment. The next few years will be crucial and will shape the course

of the peace process as well as the future of Myanmar’s fragile union.

(iii) Cooperation with existing bureaucratic apparatus

The NLD was quick to cooperate with the existing bureaucratic appa-

ratus. No senior government officials were dismissed. Instead, some of

them were even co-opted to the inner circle of the NLD government.

Both the NLD and civil servants, including those from the MPF, were

able to accommodate each other. Apart from military matters, the

NLD government, both at the national and sub-national levels, took

full control of the day-to-day administration of the country.

(iv) Consolidation of administrative power and strengthened committees

The NLD government was able to consolidate power around Aung

San Suu Kyi. In her roles as state counsellor, foreign minister, and

minister in the president’s office, she effectively controls the entire

government. As time has passed, the government has become more

assertive dealing with contentious topics, especially related to the

peace process. Furthermore, the four sub-cabinet committees have

been bolstered, and a cabinet-level committee created to deal with

Rakhine State issues.

To conclude, the first five months of the NLD government has shown just how

much has already been achieved during Myanmar’s recent years of political and

economic reform. The evolving culture of cooperation between pro-democratic,

ethnic, and military forces will require time and patience before it is properly


64

consolidated. Much could still go wrong. Yet the NLD has shown that it is pre-

pared to learn along the way, taking heed of its own constraints, with a view

towards the long-term transformation of Myanmar politics and society.

Appendices

Appendix-1: The NLD government on 30 August 2016

1. Htin Kyaw President

2. Aung San Suu Kyi State Counsellor, Union Minister for Foreign Affairs

and Union Minister at the Office of the President

3. Myint Swe Vice-President (1)

4. Henry Van Thio Vice-President (2)

5. Lt-Gen. Kyaw Swe Union Minister for Home Affairs

6. Lt-Gen. Sein Win Union Minister for Defence

7. Lt-Gen. Ye Aung Union Minister for Border Affairs

8. Kyaw Tint Swe Union Minister at the Office of the State Counsellor

9. Dr Pe Myint Union Minister for Information

10. Thura Aung Ko Union Minister for Religious Affairs and Culture

11. Dr Aung Thu Union Minister for Agriculture, Livestock and Irriga-

tion

12. Thant Sin Maung Union Minister for Transport and Communications

13. Ohn Win Union Minister for Natural Resources and Environ-

mental Conservation

14. Pe Zin Tun Union Minister for Electricity and Energy

15. Thein Swe Union Minister for Labor, Immigration and Popula-

tion

16. Khin Maung Cho Union Minister for Industry

17. Than Myint Union Minister for Commerce

18. Dr Myo Thein Gyi Union Minister for Education

19. Dr Myint Htwe Union Minister for Health and Sports

20. Kyaw Win Union Minister for Planning and Finance


66

21. Win Khaing Union Minister for Construction

22. Dr Win Myat Aye Union Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Reset-

tlement

23. Ohn Maung Union Minister for Hotels and Tourism

24. Naing Thet Lwin Union Minister for National Races Affairs

25. Tun Tun Oo Union Attorney-General

Building New Relations in Myanmar: The NLD in Government

67

Appendix-2: Sub-Cabinet Committees

Security, Tranquility and Rule of Law Committee

1. Union Minister at the Office of the President Chair

2. Union Minister for Home Affairs Vice Chairman

3. Union Minister for Defence Member

4. Union Minister for Border Affairs Member

5. Union Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Member

Resettlement

6. Union Attorney-General Member

7. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Information Member

8. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Labor, Member

Immigration and Population

9. Chief of Myanmar Police Force Secretary

Economic Affairs Committee

1. Union Minister at the Office of the President Chair

2. Union Minister for Agriculture, Livestock and Member

Irrigation

3. Union Minister for Transport and Communication Member

4. Union Minister for Natural Resources and Member

Environmental Conservation

5. Union Minister for Electricity and Energy Member

6. Union Minister for Industry Member

7. Union Minister for Commerce Member

8. Union Minister for Construction Member

9. Union Minister for Hotels and Tourism Member


68

10. Union Auditor-General Member

11. Union Minister for Planning and Finance Secretary

Education, Health and Human Resources Development Committee

1. Vice President (1) Chairman

2. Union Minister for Information Member

3. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Member

Religious and Cultural Affairs


Transport and Communications

5. Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Member

Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation


Electricity and Energy


Labor, Immigration and Population

8. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Industry Member

9. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce Member

10. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Planning Member

and Finance

11. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Social Member

Welfare, Relief and Resettlement

12. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Education Secretary

13. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Health Joint-Secretary


69

National Races, Public Administration and Services Committee

1. Vice President (2) Chairman

2. Union Minister for Religious and Culture Affairs Member

3. Union Minister for National Races Affairs Member


Home Affairs

5. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Information Member

6. Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, Member

Livestock and Irrigation

7. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Transport Member

and Communications

8. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Education Member

9. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Health Member


Construction

11. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Social Member

Welfare, Relief and Resettlement

12. Director-General, Ministry of Labor, Immigration Member

and Population

13. Permanent-Secretary, Ministry of Hotels and Secretary

Tourism

14. Permanent-Secretary, Ministry of Border Affairs Joint Secretary


70

Appendix-3: Summaries of Government Agencies’ 100-day Plans190

Ministry of Foreign Affairs191

a. Assigning labour attachés to Myanmar embassies and instructing

them to provide assistance and protection for Myanmar migrant

workers overseas in accordance with the host country’s laws;

b. Removing Myanmar citizens who were members of outlawed political

organisations (with no criminal records) from a blacklist in place since

before the 2010 elections;

c. Streamlining entry visa formalities, standardising of visa costs and

ensuring alignment with international standards, including relaxing

visa rules for former citizens who left the country for political reasons.

d. Establish more cooperative approach on human rights issues with the

international community;

e. Prepare to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to

ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the

Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict;

f. Establishing a Diplomatic Academy to train Myanmar diplomats and

better prepare them for foreign postings and work with the ministry.

Ministry of Home Affairs192

a. Crime reduction in major cities such as Yangon and Mandalay;

b. Elimination of the illicit drug trade and usage through conducting

special operations;

c. Release of political activists currently facing charges;

d. Issuing land lease grants in 283 villages;

e. Reduction of national NGO registration fees;

190 These edited summaries are a selection based on what was available on the website of the state-

owned media outlet, The Mirror. 191 Han Ni Win, "Protecting overseas Myanmar and inviting ex-Myanmar during 100 days," The

Mirror 28 May 2016. 192 Min Min Zaw, "100-day plan of the Ministry of Home Affairs to mainly target crime reduction,

illicit drug elimination," ibid. 29 May 2016.


71

f. Increasing visitors’ time with inmates in prisons from 20 to 25 minutes

per visit.

Ministry of Border Affairs193

a. Drilling artesian wells to serve remote villages;

b. Restoration of roads, bridges and buildings destroyed by natural dis-

asters;

c. Assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Rakhine State;

d. Study tours for ethnic minorities to Nay Pyi Taw, Yangon and Manda-

lay;

e. Opening sewing courses for women from ethnic minority areas.

Office of the State Counsellor194

a. Release of remaining political prisoners;

b. Stability and development in Rakhine State;

c. National reconciliation and peace;

d. Convening of the Union Peace Conference (21st Century Panglong

Conference);

e. Balancing people’s democratic rights and the rule of law.

Ministry of Information195

a. Changes to the state-owned newspapers and television to ensure a

new approach to the state media is publicised;

b. Appointment of 67 spokespersons in 21 government ministries;

c. Development of television broadcasting services;

d. Informing the public about the government’s 100-day plans.

193 "Ministry of Border Affairs and 9 activities in the 100-Day Plan," The Mirror 21 May 2016. 194 U Nyi Nyi Tun and Han Ni Win, "Interview with the Union Minister U Kyaw Tint Swe on the

new State Counsellor Office and its 100-day plans," ibid. 27 June 2016. 195 Maw Si, "Ministry of Information to bridge the government and the people," ibid. 2 June 2016.


72

Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture196

a. Organising systems of funding support to give assistance to teachers

of monastic education which provide education for children from

poorer backgrounds;

b. Enhanced supervision of pagoda trustees who manage the running

and maintenance of Buddhist pagodas around the country. Corrupt

and incompetent officials to be removed from trustee committees;

c. The Fine Arts Department to host an academic paper presentation, fol-

lowed by the production and publishing and sales of a book on My-

anmar stringed instruments;

d. Nominating the ancient King Bayintnaung bell at the Shwezigon Pa-

goda in Bagan for World Heritage listing;

e. Renovation of Independence Hero General Aung San’s residence.

Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation197

a. 28 rural development projects focused on agriculture, irrigation, live-

stock and fisheries;

b. Agriculture loans of about 3.5 billion Kyat to be given to 489 farmers

for the purchase of farming and fishing equipment, and about 18.2 bil-

lion Kyat to members of agriculture and livestock cooperative societies

for the purchasing of agricultural products;

c. Planned mechanisation of agriculture for over 193,490 acres of farm-

land in 140 townships;

d. Drilling 602 artesian wells in 584 villages to provide water in remote

areas;

e. A small loans scheme amounting to 18.2 billion Kyat for 150,304

farmers in 99 townships;

196 Ahlin Thit, "100-day plan of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture to include Bayintnaung

Bell as the world's heritage," ibid. 26 May 2016. 197 Shin Min, "Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation to prioritise rural centered services,"

ibid. 20 May 2016.


73

Ministry of Transport and Communications198

a. Transport

i. Improved maintenance plans for Myanmar engineers in charge

of airplanes operating domestically for safety reasons;

ii. Restoration of 38 waterways and river embankments;

iii. Education sessions produced and disseminated to reduce road

accidents;

iv. Issuance of micro-chip embedded driving licenses;

v. Reduction of Myanmar Railways services that are not economi-

cally feasible.

b. Communications

i. Hosting public auctions for bandwith from the 2600 MHz

broadband network;

ii. Preparation of a plan to lease the use of Intelsat Satellite;

iii. Construction of approximately 500 mobile telephone towers to

widen telephone connectivity in-country.

Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry199

a. Mining

i. Introduction of a mining cadastre to enable better manage-

ment and sharing of mining information;

ii. Research to be conducted on the viability of extracting chro-

mite minerals in Chin State;

iii. Managing the collapse of tailings or mine dumps in in Kachin

State.

b. Forestry

i. Reduction of forest wood extraction;

ii. Support for the production of finished forest products;

198 Theint Theint Moe, "Ministry of Transport and Communications and 100-Day Plans," ibid. 22 May

2016. 199 Han Ni Win, "100 day plan to bring sustainable mining, forestry and environment," ibid. 19 May

2016.


74

iii. Plans to reduce illegal logging and smuggling of wildlife

products.

c. Environmental conservation

i. Support for the planting of trees under a green environment

campaign;

ii. Measurement of air and water quality in populated areas to

inform planning on these issues.

Ministry of Electricity and Energy200

a. Electricity

i. Support planning for the reduction of electricity power trans-

mission and distribution losses; installation of 150 electrical

transformers in four districts of Yangon region in a move

aimed to satisfy an increase in demand.

b. Energy

i. Increase use of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to reduce de-

pendency on firewood;

ii. Increasing the supply of compressed natural gas (CNG) to city

buses in Yangon region;

iii. Introducing formal regulations for the management of private

gas stations.

Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population201

a. Labor

i. The opening of two Migrant Workers’ Resources Centres in

Ayeyarwaddy region and Rakhine State to encourage respon-

sible and informed labor migration;

ii. Drafting legislation to support the safety of migrant workers’

occupational health and safety;

200 Khin Yadanar, "Increasing electricity supply and gasoline distrubution: What will the new

government do?," ibid. 16 May 2016. 201 Thi Thi Min, "13 services of the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population during its 100-

day plan," ibid. 1 June 2016.


75

iii. Sign a bilateral agreement with the Thai government on the

protection and standards for migrant workers in Thailand.

b. Immigration

i. Ensure that migrant workers have completed household regis-

tration and have citizenship scrutiny cards, to ensure their

protection in the host country.

c. Population

i. Prepare for the release of national census data on religion.

Ministry of Industry202

a. Review on the profitability of state-owned enterprises and explore

ways of privatising those posing a financial burden to the government;

b. Create a coordination plan to distribute emergency supplies produced

by factories operated by the Ministry of Industry, in case of natural

disasters;

c. Install large cement factories (5,000 Tonnage each) in cooperation with

the private sector, under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) system, to en-

able further construction in-country.203

Ministry of Commerce204

a. Increasing imports of machinery from a total of ten items per year per

company, to ten types of machinery on a single import permit;

b. Removing selected agricultural products from the export-restricted

list, enabling the export of a wider range of items.

Ministry of Education205

a. Providing free education for primary school students;

202 Nay Lin, "100-day industrial development plan to directly benefit the people," ibid. 25 May 2016. 203 “Build-operate-transfer” (BOT) is a form of project financing, wherein a private entity receives a

concession from the private or public sector to finance, design, construct, and operate a facility stat-

ed in the concession contract. 204 Khin Zar Li, "More import for machineries and liberalising restricted goods during the 100-day

plan of the Ministry of Commerce," ibid. 24 May 2016. 205 Khin Yadanar, "100-day plan of the Ministry of Education begins with education for all children,"

ibid. 30 May 2016.


76

b. Providing refresher courses for basic education teachers;

c. Enable teachers to withdraw their salary from private banks;

d. Implementing alternative education plans for those whose education

has been interrupted.

Ministry of Health and Sports206

a. Compiling and utilizing inputs for health policy and implementation

plans from chief medical officers across 14 regions and states;

b. Drafting necessary legislation and promulgating rules to support

health policy;

c. Appointment of more medical doctors to better meet public demand;

d. Appointing a further 1,000 general practitioners and 42 dentists coun-

trywide to better meet the needs of the population;

e. Plan for the reduction of fatal road accidents;

f. Establishment of eleven 24-hour emergency service stations along the

Yangon – Mandalay highway.

Ministry of Planning and Finance207

a. Planning

i. Reduce company registration fees by half, to 500,000 Kyat

(approximately USD 420);

ii. Switching planning practices from a top-down to a bottom-up

approach.

b. Finance

i. Switching from a manual to an automatic customs clearance

system at Yangon international airport and main seaports;

ii. Improve and establish systematic management of air cargo

storage;

206 Maw Si, "Ministry of Health to prioritise emergency service at the expressway and appointment

of new doctors," ibid. 18 May 2016. 207 Su Hnin Lei, "100-day plan of the Ministry of Planning and Finance to include changes to the

company registration fee and extending the Aung Bar Lay lottery system up to a prize of 100 million

Kyat," ibid. 23 May 2016.


77

iii. Use of commercial tax collected from mobile telephone credit

top-up card sales for education and health projects.

Ministry of Construction208

a. Upgrading six percent of the Yangon – Mandalay highway in need of

urgent repairs.209

b. Closure of 161 out of 302 toll gates for smoother transportation;

c. Building 2,200 low-cost housing at a price of 10 million Kyat per room

in Yangon and Mandalay.

Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement210

a. Implementation of landslide and dams management in Chin State;211

b. Assisting unemployed and homeless youth with access to service de-

livery, as well as education and employment.

Ministry of Hotels and Tourism212

a. Creating more travel routes and events to develop community-based

tourism in selected areas of ethnic states such as Kayah, Kayin, Shan

States, and Magwe and Mandalay Regions.

Ministry of National Races Affairs213

a. Establishment of and staffing of the Ministry;

b. Safeguarding the privileges of the national races;

c. Promoting literature, culture and customs of the national races.

208 Naing Lin Kyi and Phyo Sandar Myint, "100-day plan to upgrade Yangon-Mandalay expressway

and to build low cost housing," ibid. 17 May 2016. 209 The highway, built in 2009, is missing many of the safety features found on international-standard

highways, such as roadside reflectors, warning signs and rumble strips to alert drivers when their

vehicles are leaving the road. 210 Shin Min, "100-day plan of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Ressttlement," ibid. 15 May

2016. 211 Chin State is prone to landslides and floods, and has an under-developed transport system and a

challenging mountainous topography with remote villages spread over a relatively large area. 212 Theint Theint Moe, "When tourism reaches rural under 100-day plan," ibid. 27 May 2016. 213 Phyo Sandar Myint, "100-day plan of the Ministry of National Races Affairs to safeguard national

races affairs," ibid. 31 May 2016.


78

Union Attorney-General Office214

a. Expediting court cases by avoiding unnecessary delays caused by

scheduling of cases by public prosecutors.

Union Civil Service Board215

a. Changing the nature of examinations for new civil servants;

b. Opening two Civil Services Academies (currently there is one main

training institution – the Union Civil Service Board);

c. Arrange exemptions for academic staff from universities from

attending several civil service courses, so that they can work for

government and their university education is considered as a

qualification for civil servant work.

Union Auditor-General’s Office216

a. Focus auditing efforts on government agencies that are more vulnera-

ble to malpractice.

214 Min Min Zaw, "100-days of the Union Attorney-General Office," ibid. 3 June 2016. 215 Ye Khaung Nyunt, "100-day plan of the Union Civil Service Board to upgrade public servants

through fundamental changes," ibid. 4 June 2016. 216 Thuya Zaw, "100-day plan of the Union Auditor-General Office to audit for the interest of the

people," ibid. 5 June 2016.


79

Appendix-4: Timeline of Events (30 March – 30 August 2016)

30 March - President Htin Kyaw sworn in as the President of the Republic of

the Union of Myanmar at the National Legislature or

Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.

1 April - In an act viewed as targeting corruption, an executive order was

issued by Aung San Suu Kyi in her capacity as minister of the

president’s office forbidding civil servants accepting gifts worth

over approximately USD20.

1 April - Closure of 161 highway tollgates operated by the Ministry of

Construction, making travel on long highways less interrupted

and cheaper.

3 April - Yangon region Chief Minister Phyo Min Thein called for a mod-

est Myanmar New Year Water Festival or Thingyan but received

a mixed response from the public.

5-6 April - The Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with President Htin

Kyaw and Aung San Suu Kyi.

6 April - The State Counsellor Act was promulgated, giving Aung San

Suu Kyi an advisory role in both the executive and legislatures in

wide-ranging matters including democracy, the economy, feder-

alism, and the peace and development of Myanmar.

6 April Aung San Suu Kyi met with Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gen-

tiloni.

9 April - 199 political prisoners were released under a program initiated

by Aung San Suu Kyi.

11-20 April - Myanmar New Year Thingyan public holiday.

16 April - President Htin Kyaw pardoned 83 political prisoners.


80

27 April - Aung San Suu Kyi met with the Union Joint Monitoring Com-

mittee (JMC-U) and called for the 21st Century Panglong Confer-

ence.

1 May - The government’s first 100-day plan begins.

11 May - Yangon region government holds a press conference to suppress

rumours and confusion after the police enforced 11pm shut-

downs for restaurants, karaoke bars and nightclubs as part of the

100-day plan.

14 May The Yangon chief minister issued an executive order to halt

high-rise construction and review all projects of nine floors or

higher to determine if they will go ahead, even those under con-

struction.

22 May - US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Myanmar.

24 May - The legislature approved a proposal for a 500 billion Kyat loan

from the Central Bank to provide agricultural loans to farmers.

27 May - The government issued a ban on chewing, spitting or selling be-

tel nut near government offices, schools and hospitals.

30 May - The Rakhine State Peace, Stability and Development Committee

established and led by Aung San Suu Kyi to tackle communal

violence and improve development in the state.

6 June - Aung San Suu Kyi received General Mikhail Kostarakos, Chair-

man of the EU Military Committee.

7 June - The Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong, visited My-

anmar.

8 June - The Myanmar Investment Commission was re-constituted under

the new government.

14 June - Aung San Suu Kyi ordered chief ministers to avoid misusing

power following a crackdown on betel nut vendors.


81

16 June - During a visit by UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar Yanghee

Lee, the government instructed the state-run media not to use

the disputed term “Rohingya” for the Muslim minority group in

Rakhine State and instead to refer to them as the “Muslim com-

munity in Rakhine state.”

17 June - Aung San Suu Kyi met with French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc

Ayrault. She also met with German Federal Minister for Eco-

nomic Co-operation and Development Dr. Gerd Muller.

23 June - Aung San Suu Kyi visited Thailand and met with Myanmar mi-

grant workers as part of the foreign policy focus on the issue.

23 June - Buddhist mob destroyed a mosque in Waw township in Bago

region.

25 June - Vice President Henry Van Thio returned over 6,000 acres of

seized land to farmers in Ayeyarwaddy region.

28 June - Aung San Suu Kyi met with leaders of Ethnic Armed Organisa-

tions Peace Process Steering Team (EAOs PPST) and called for

21st Century Panglong Peace Conference or Union Peace Confer-

ence to be held before the end of August.

30 June - The US State Department’s Office to Combat the Trafficking of

Persons downgraded Myanmar to Tier 3 status, with potential to

trigger US trade and economic sanctions.

1 July - Mob burned down Muslim prayer hall in Hpakant, Kachin state.

6 July - Aung San Suu Kyi called for inclusion of all ethnic armed organ-

isations in Peace Conference at the 21st Century Panglong Pre-

paratory Committee meeting.

7 July - The Central Committee to Protect Race and Religion also known

as Ma Ba Tha demanded an explanation from the government af-

ter the Yangon chief minister criticised Ma Ba Tha’s role.

11 July - National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC) and Peace

Commission established.


82

13 July - The State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (the government-

appointed body of the leadership of Buddhist monks that over-

sees and regulates them) discredited Ma Ba Tha and distanced

itself from the group.

19 July - The commander-in-chief attended the Martyrs’ Day for the first

time in almost three decades.

23 – 26 July - Aung San Suu Kyi attended 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meet-

ing in Vientiane, Laos.

26 – 29 July - Ethnic armed groups summit in Mai Ja Yang, Kachin State

29 July - Twelve-point economic policy of the government to support na-

tional reconciliation announced.

29 July - Aung San Suu Kyi met with NDAA and UWSA ethnic leaders to

invite their participation in the 21st Century Panglong Confer-

ence in Nay Pyi Taw.

8 August - Announcement of the 21st Century Panglong Conference to be

held on 31 August.

15 August - Aung San Suu Kyi chaired the UPDJC meeting in Nay Pyi Taw.

17 August - Aung San Suu Kyi made a state visit to China.

23 August - Establishment of the nine-member Advisory Commission on

Rakhine State led by former UN Secretary General Dr. Kofi An-

nan.

24 August - A magnitude 6.8 earthquake hit Bagan damaging 187 pagodas.

27 August - President Htin Kyaw made a state visit to India.

30 August - Aung San Suu Kyi met with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon

in Nay Pyi Taw.

31 August - Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong held in Nay Pyi

Taw.

Author Bios

Kyaw Sein is a home-grown Myanmar research scholar affiliated to the ANU

Myanmar Research Centre. He is currently based in Australia and working as a

researcher with interests in democratic transitions, ethnic conflicts and economic

governance in Myanmar. Kyaw Sein has contributed to a number of recent re-

search projects on Myanmar’s political and social changes.

He can be contacted at: [email protected]

Nicholas Farrelly is Director of the Australian National University Myanmar

Research Centre. His research stretches across the Southeast Asian region and

focuses on relationships between government control, spatial organisation and

political conflict. He is the co-founder of New Mandala, a prominent website on

mainland Southeast Asia, and writes a weekly column for The Myanmar Times.

He can be contacted at: [email protected]

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