NAIIC Report Lo Res

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MembersK Ib

Seismlgist; Prfessr Emeritus f Kbe University

Kz OAdvisr t the President f Japan Internatinal CperatinAgency; Frmer Ambassadr f Japan t the United Natins

H SyMedical Dctr; Frmer Chief f the Natinal Institute f

Radilgical Sciences

M SLawyer; Frmer Chief Prsecutr f the Nagya High Public

Prsecutrs Office; Frmer Inspectr General fr LegalCmpliance, Inspectr Generals Office, Defense Ministry

K TChemist; Fellw, Shimadzu Crpratin

M TScience jurnalist

Sy N

Prfessr, Chu Law Schl, Chu University; lawyer

R HChair, Sciety f Cmmerce and Industry, Okuma Twn,

Fukushima Prefecture

Y YyScial System Designer; Directr, University f Tky Executive

Management Prgram (Tdai EMP)

ChairmanKy Kw

Medical Dctr; Academic Fellw, Natinal Graduate Institute fr Plicy Studies;Frmer President f the Science Cuncil f Japan

Advisors to the CommissionI K

T K

T H

ReviewersT I

M S

J S

I Nj

T M

Office of AdministrationT Aj

Directr General

S UManaging Directr f Investigatin

The National Diet of JapanFukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

l

l


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T N D JT F N A I Ig C 2012, T N D JA g .


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Contents

Message from the Chairman 9

Overview

The Commission's mandate 10The accident 12

Conclusions and Recommendations 16

Summary of Findings 25

1: Was the accident preventable? 262: Escalation of the accident 293: Emergency response to the accident 324: Spread of the damage 375: Organizational issues in accident prevention

and response 426: The legal system 45

Appendices 49

Survey of the evacuees 50Survey of the workers 62Commission meeting reports 71Glossary of terms 84


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7NAIIC

To:Mr. Takahiro Yokomichi, Speaker of the House of RepresentativesMr. Kenji Hirata, President of the House of CouncillorsThe National Diet of Japan

THE UNPRECEDENTED NUCLEAR ACCIDENT g M 11, 2011

g , N D J . W A Rgg FN A I Ig C.

O g , x C M D 2011.

T g g g . A D J g, , J .

The National Diet of JapanFukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

(NAIIC)

Kiyoshi Kurokawa

Members:

Chairman:

Kenzo Oshima

Yoshinori Yokoyama

Katsuhiko Ishibashi

Hisako Sakiyama

Mitsuhiko Tanaka

Reiko Hachisuka

Masafumi Sakurai

Koichi Tanaka

Shuya Nomura


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9NAIIC

Message from the Chairman

THE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI M 11, 2011 g . Ag gg , -q F D N P P g . I . A g .

H J, g g x gg g? T C J g , q.

O g gg F M 11. A x TEPCO, g g.

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M , J .

T q gg F , J. I gg , .

A g g , J .

A , g . T F, J g g .

Kiyoshi Kurokawa

Chairman:


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10 N A I Ig C

Sendai

Mito

NaritaInternationalAirport

Nihonmatsu

FUKUSHIMA

PREFECTURE

Niigata

Iwaki

Tokyo

Fukushima

Fukushima Daiichi

Nuclear Power Plant

30 km20 km

Fukushima Daiichi

Nuclear Power Plant

Sendai

Iwaki

Tokyo

Fukushima

Overview

The Commissions Mandate

O O 30, 2011, NAIIC A (, A gg F N A- I Ig C) , g - g F q q g g q. T J g.

O D 8, 2011, , g

S P N D g , - A 10 NAIIC A:

1. T g T E P CF M 11, 2011 - G E J Eq.

2. T g g .

3. T g g -q g; q ; g .

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5. T qg g g. T g.

6. T g .

Expectations of the CommissionB C g g, g J C C R A B H A F N P P T E P C:

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g g


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11NAIIC

.l A g ,

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What we didO g 900 g 1,167 .

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g (x ), J Eg, 800,000 . W , F , g 170,000 -. T g g , , - g x U.S, F, R, U B.

I Eg x , Eg.

W g, TEPCO g.

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What we did not doT g , .

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12 N A I Ig C

The accident

O M 11, 2011, G E J Eq gg x F D N P P, TE P C (TEPCO). T g L 7 (S A) I N E S (INES).

W q , U 1 F D g ; U 2 3 ; U 4 6 gg . T g - , SCRAM, U 1, 2 3 - .

T g TEPCOS T S F D N P

P, g - . T - 66V - T E P C, - U 1 - (M/C) U 1 - .

T q g g, g , g DC U 1, 2 4, g x x U 6 - g g. I , U 1, 2 4 ; U 3 AC , DC M 13, 2012. U 5 AC .

T g . T , , , g. I g,

q . S g x g g U 3 4, (C P Bg).A , g ,

Layout of the Fukushima Daiichi

Nuclear Power Plant

Adapted from: INPO Special Report on

the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima

Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

Turbine buildings

Cooling water discharge

Cooling water discharge

Turbine buildings

Reactor 4

Reactor 3

Reactor 2

Reactor 1

Radiationwastetreatmentfacility

Extra-highvoltage switching yard

Extra-high voltage

switching yard

Admin oce

Anti-Earthquake building

Common Pool Building

South breakwater

North breakwater

500K

vtrans

miss

ionlin

e

275K

vtrans

miss

ionlin

e

275K

vtrans

miss

ionline

Service hall

Eastbreakwater

Reactor 5

Reactor 6

Emergency response center

Intake canals


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Timeline following the earthquake and tsunami

3.11

3.12

3.13

3.14

3.15

Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4

approx. 18:10 Start of reactor core

exposure (analysis)


damage

15:36 Hydogen explosion at

reactor building


exposure


damage

11:01 Hydrogen explosion

at reactor building

approx. 6:00 Hydrogen explosion

at reactor building


exposure


damage

approx. 6:00 Damage to

Suppression Chamber (S/C)

Mass discharge of radioactive

material

Operated at rated output

Loss of all electricity

Loss of external AC electricity

Automatic activation of emergency diesel generators

Under periodical inspection

5:46 Start of freshwater injection

approx. 14:30 Venting

19:04 Start of seawater injection

Interference with the recoveryoperation

Start of core cooling by isolation

condenser (IC)

Start of core cooling by Reactor Core

Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)

Start of core cooling by Reactor Core

Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)

Repetition of opening and closing

of IC valve

Station blackout (SBO)

11:36 Shutdown of RCIC

2:42 Shutdown of HPCI

9:25 Start of freshwater injection

approx. 9:20 Venting

Backward flow of hydrogen from

Unit 3 via Standby Gas

Treatment System (SGTS)

12:35 Start of high-pressure coolant

injection (HPCI)


13:25 Diagnosis of RCIC shutdown

Interference with recovery operation


SCRAM

Loss of all electricity

14:46 Earthquake

15:37 Tsunami (peak of waves)

*Start of reactor core exposure and start of reactor core damage times are both from TEPCO's MAAP analysis results.


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g . M , g gg g. I , q , , g , x . R g - . T g q- , . Lgg . T , .

T . Cg g g- , g , , g g -. T , , g , - , g .

T - . T -g .

14 meters: inundation level

10 meters

4 meters

sea level

emergency dieselgenerator room

main

control

room

Cross section of the plant

showing the inundation level


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Conclusions and

recommendations


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Conclusions

After a six-month investigation, the Commission has concluded the following:

In order to prevent future disasters, fundamental reforms must take place. These

reforms must cover both the structure of the electric power industry and the struc-ture of the related government and regulatory agencies as well as the operation

processes. They must cover both normal and emergency situations.

A manmade disasterThe TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of collusionbetween the government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said

parties. They ef fectively betrayed the nations right to be safe from nuclear accidents.Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly manmade. We believe that theroot causes were the organizational and regulatory systems that supported faultyrationales for decisions and actions, rather than issues relating to the competency of

any specific individual. (see Recommendation 1)

T M 11, 2011. B F D N P P g q . T (TEPCO), g (NISA NSC) g g (METI), - q g g, g g g , g .

TEPCO N I S Ag (NISA) g, g , NISA -

. T C q U 1 g 3 . T NISA g g .I , g NISA g , g , TEPCO g .

S 2006, g TEPCO g - F D g . T g g J S C Eg. NISA TEPCO , .

W g g x

g . F x, NISA (SBO) . I g . I g , C x g g NISA, NISA q.

T g g g g . I NISA TEPCO B.5. U.S. 9/11 , TEPCO , .

T g M 11. T

TEPCO , NISA NS C (NSC) g. T g , g , .


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F TEPCO , g . T g TEPCO gg g g g F E P C (FEPC). T g g , . A , g. F xg NISA - M E, T & I (METI), g g .

Earthquake damageWe conclude that TEPCO was too quick to cite the tsunami as the cause of the nuclearaccident and deny that the earthquake caused any damage. We believe there is a pos-sibility that the earthquake damaged equipment necessary for ensuring safety, andthat there is also a possibility that a small-scale LOCA occured in Unit 1. We hope these

points will be examined further by a third party. (see Recommendation 7)

Ag q q

, g . T q , . A x .

TEPCO q, , g , q g q (g , x , TEPCO g IAEA). H, . T C g x ( ), , q.

Tg g,

q . F, g U 1 q, g : 1) g (SCRAM); 2) JNES - LOCA ( ); 3) U 1 g , 4) (SR) g.

A, x , q-: q- x , S-F q . (S S 2 S Fg)

.

Evaluation of operational problemsThe Commission concludes that there were organizational problems within TEPCO.

Had there been a higher level of knowledge, training, and equipment inspection relatedto severe accidents, and had there been specific instructions given to the on-site work-ers concerning the state of emergency within the necessary time frame, a more effec-tive accident response would have been possible. (see Recommendation 4)

T - g . E , - . R, g (IC) U 1, DC , . TEPCO IC , g g, g . Rgg , g

g g x g. O , g g. W g , , g -


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g g . T K (P M O) TEPCOg x , g x .

M , . H RCIC U 2 g , - g g , gU 2 3 . W g - g , g , g .

Emergency response issuesThe Commission concludes that the situation continued to deteriorate because thecrisis management system of the Kantei, the regulators and other responsible agenciesdid not function correctly. The boundaries defining the roles and responsibilities of the

parties involved were problematic, due to their ambiguity. (see Recommendation 2)

T g, g, TEPCO g, K -

g . N, , g g q g.

NISA x g A S MCg N Eg P, - JCO T, I P 1999. H-, NISA , .

I , K g. T g g K , g K g. I, K TEPCO q F- , . A TEPCO-K TEPCO q M 15, g .

T K, g TEPCO U 1. TEPCO g NISA, , g.B g METI, K. T NISA TEPCO q K g TEPCO.

T P M g g . T K - - . WTEPCO q , K, g K . T TEPCO , , P S K - .

A , P M g TEPCO, , -: 1) TEPCO g g ; 2) T g TEPCO q; 3) T M. S K g g (g ); 4) T -g NISA S , ; 5) T - , g , - . C g g g g .

Evacuation issuesThe Commission concludes that the residents confusion over the evacuation stemmed

from the regulators negligence and failure over the years to implement adequate mea-


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19NAIIC

sures against a nuclear disaster, as well as a lack of action by previous governmentsand regulators focused on crisis management. The crisis management system thatexisted for the Kantei and the regulators should protect the health and safety of the

public, but it failed in this function. (see Recommendation 2)

T g g g , .S, g -g . S, 20 g 3 21:23 g M 11. M 10 5:44 M 12, 12 A 15 x . M g .T g , g -- . S g g g . S -

g g, g A.

T C g gg g - x , g g- g g xg g .

Continuing public health and welfare issuesThe Commission recognizes that the residents in the affected area are still struggling

from the ef fects of the ac cident. They continue to face grave concerns, including thehealth effects of radiation exposure, displacement, the dissolution of families, disrup-tion of their lives and lifestyles and the contamination of vast areas of the environ-ment. There is no foreseeable end to the decontamination and restoration activities

that are essential for rebuilding communities. The Commission concludes that thegovernment and the regulators are not fully committed to protecting public health andsafety; that they have not acted to protect the health of the residents and to restoretheir welfare. (see Recommendation 3)

Ax 150,000 . A 167 x 100 g . I 1,800 q FP 5 g . I g g - x. O , g g g .

T g

q . T g , , , gg . I . T 10,000 , C M g g g .

W x g , g- g . T - , , . T g g, - , . A , g g gg

, g q : W x- g g- ? H ?H ?

T g g -


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g g. T x, x-, x g , , xg , .

Reforming the regulatorsThe Commission has concluded that the safety of nuclear energy in Japan and the pub-

lic cannot be assured unless the regulators go through an essential transformationprocess. The entire organization needs to be transformed, not as a formality but in asubstantial way. Japans regulators need to shed the insular attitude of ignoring inter-national safety standards and transform themselves into a globally trusted entity. (seeRecommendation 5)

T g . T x g , g-. T g g . T , g g, . T , x . M, g-

. W g C, g g, g g g .

Reforming the operatorTEPCO did not fulfil its responsibilities as a private corporation, instead obeying andrelying upon the government bureaucracy of METI, the government agency drivingnuclear policy. At the same time, through the auspices of the FEPC, it manipulated thecozy relationship with the regulators to take the teeth out of regulations. (see Recom-mendation 4)

T g TEPCO . I

, x, TEPCO , xg -. T g . (S S 5)

P TEPCO g , g g , x g . I K g . TEPCO , g g x . (S S 3)

A , TEPCO g .I , . S x g g g , -- .

Reforming laws and regulationsThe Commission concludes that it is necessary to realign existing laws and regula-tions concerning nuclear energy. Mechanisms must be established to ensure that thelatest technological f indings from international sources are reflected in all existinglaws and regulations. (see Recommendation 6)

L g g g -, . T gg .A , .

T xg g g

, , . T g - . T g g. T -- .


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Cosmetic solutionsReplacing people or changing the names of institutions will not solve the problems.Unless these root causes are resolved, preventive measures against future similar acci-dents will never be complete. (see Recommendations 4, 5 and 6)

T C g . T g g , g, , g , , . A , C g- g g g . W g g g . W , g g. W g- - g x .


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Recommendations

B g, C g . W g N D J g .

Recmmendatin 1:Monitoring of the nuclear regulatory body by the National DietA gg N D g . I :

1. T g g x g g g, - .

2. T , g x g -, g g g.

3. T g .4. T g -

.

Recmmendatin 2:Reform the crisis management systemA x g . T - g g . T :

1. A x g g. A g .

2. N g - . T .

3. T - , g g , g .

Recmmendatin 3:Government responsibility for public health and welfareRgg , g :

1. A g- , g- . M g g. I -, g . T , .

2. C g

. M .

3. T g g - , -g .

Recmmendatin 4:Monitoring the operatorsTEPCO g g, g gg g-, g g g , gg , g . I F E P C (FEPC) g

gg g g, g , .1. T g gg

.


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2. O -g g g .

3. TEPCO g , g g -g .

4. A g N D g , g g, g , g - g.

Recmmendatin 5:Criteria for the new regulatory bodyT g g g . I :

1. I: T , : () I g g () I () I .

2. T: () T -g x - . () D -g N D . () T g- g g,

g . () T N D g - .

3. P: () T g . Exg g g , xg . () A g g -g . () T - x.

4. C: T g, g -, -g , .

5. P: T g g -g, g D.

Recmmendatin 6:R w yL g g .

1. Exg g , .

2. T g g g .

3. Rg g , g g g .

4. N , .

Recmmendatin 7:

Develop a system of independent investigation commissionsA g g , g x g , , g, , g , g , g .


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Summary of findings


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1

The Commission has verified that on March 11, 2011, the structure of the

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant was not capable of withstanding the effectsof the earthquake and the tsunami. Nor was the Fukushima Daiichi NuclearPlant prepared to respond to a severe accident. In spite of the fact that TEPCOand the regulators were aware of the risk from such natural disasters, neitherhad taken steps to put preventive measures in place. It was this lack of

preparation that led to the severity of this accident.

Was the accident preventable?


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The yield strength of the Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1T F D U 1 g q M 11, 2011. T q -q - g : 1) g - g U 1 g 3 1960, 2) g x q g. B , x - g 265 g (.. g ), q .

I 1981, G A- Dg Rgg N R F E G NSC. I 2006, NSC - g. NISA q - g g - - . I M2008, TEPCO - U 5 FD, g - , g x 600 g. I 2009, NISA , g -

g q. IJ 2009, U 1 g 4 6 - .

N - TEPCO, g- . W J 2009,TEPCO J2016. TEPCO g - q g, g - TEPCO U 1 g 3 M 11 q. Ag NISA g , g g TEPCO g.

I , TEPCO NISA

g U 5 - q. TEPCO g , C g q g , , g -- , . T C U 1g 3, U 5. S 2 g F D x g. I - M 11 q.

The lack of tsunami countermeasuresT F D P g 1967 g g . A ,

g g - , g . TEPCO g, g x q g .

S 2006, g TEPCO - g g F D . T g g g g J S C Eg.

T g g . F,NISA - gg . N

NISA . A , .T g J S C Eg-

g . E g g


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, ,NISA xg .

A .TEPCO , g g .TEPCO g g g g g , g- g .

A g g, NISA TEPCO g , . N - g.

T TEPCO g g g. I g , g - , . R g q- g , TEPCO g , g g.

Countermeasures not up to international standardsA g (SA) J - . T SA , , x q , g J q .

F , SA . I1991, C I D P NSC x -g, g x x g q , x, q g .

T - g g. I , q- g q g g q. C, g q q - g . A q g, SA J , g .

Ag SA g g F E P C (FEPC).T 2010, g g g g-g SA g , , FEPC, g gg g . T g

g : 1) 2) g g q xg. Ag, g - gg M 11 , g, .


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2

The Commission closely investigated the development of the accident.

We studied whether the accident could have been contained, and whetherit could have become even more serious. We also examined the role of theearthquake as a cause of the accident, and the validity of TEPCOs claim thatthe tsunami was the sole direct cause.

Escalation of the accident


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How the accident developedT F D N P . T - , , .

Ag x , , q, g x . T g q,g , , . T (SBO) DC , x .

I g g , g . T , gg -, gg q g - , . T .

R - , g g g -g. E g g . T TEPCO .

U 1, 3 4 x, U 2. C -g U 5 6, . T C , , U 2 3, U 5 6 . I g , g .Dg U 4 , g -g . T gg .

Verification of eventsT : q g. Y g

, q g .

I , TEPCO g q -g g q, . I g x . T g I A Eg Ag (IAEA).

W g g , g - . T C g g TEPCO g g :

1. Sg g 30 SCRAM,

50 . T , , - g . I g g q g g g , g q g - .

2. T (LOCA) q .H J N Eg S Og(JNES) T Fg NISA LOCA, g q - , g . I LOCA 10 ,

g .3. T g- g , NISA TFg, TEPCO , g AC g


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31NAIIC

g . TEPCO 15:27 15:35. H, gg 1.5 , . T gg g A U 1 g g. B ,

q g x g g .

4. S TEPCO g g U 1 q , g (IC) -g IC. T C g . H, g - , .

5. T (A B2 ) U 1 14:52, U 1 IC 11 -. TEPCO x - g - x

55 g (C), . T g- g , g IAEA, . H, g IC g-, IC g IC g . W x , TEPCO x .

6. T (SR) U 1, g . (S U 2 3.) W SR g U 2 C C R U 2, g U 1 U 1 SR g. I SR g U 1. I , LOCA

U 1.

Reactor 4 Reactor 3

Reactor 2

Reactor 1

Views of the reactor buildings

following the explosions


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3

The Commission investigated the accident response of TEPCO, the regulatoryagencies, the government and the Kantei (Prime Ministers office)includingthe early stages of the response, the development of the accident, theemergency response system and the crisis management system.

Emergency response tothe accident


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TEPCOs accident responseA , C P TEPCO , . T C- P g g -, TEPCO .

TEPCO g , . T g , g F, g.

T g g. I ,TEPCO g N I S Ag (NISA) g - Eg R C (ERC), g - , - q g. T - U 1 NISA P M , TEPCO - g, g g PM . T P M q g g - ,

, g g, P M . H TEPCO - , x , .

N TEPCO . A U 2 , M Y, g g F , CEO VP S M , - , . TEPCO q Y qg K, NSC C M, g , .

F, TEPCO g

. T P S K . R g g g, TEPCO g g g. I P M g , , : 1) g ; 2) TEPCO , 3) , M.S K, g g ;4) D-G NISA, M. S , ; 5) - , g - , . I g K,

TEPCO g , , - .

The governments emergency response organizationsA , g . T - q. T g g K .

T g g PM N Eg R Hq, S N E-

g R Hq NISA Rg N Eg R. O, g .T P M N Eg R Hq S

g ,

Former TEPCO president

Masataka Shimizu at the

18th Commission meeting

Former prime minister

Naoto Kan at the 16th

Commission meeting


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34 N A I Ig C

g , .

Ag K g , S N Eg R Hq g g g . A, Rg N Eg R T , g .T q, g , g, .

T C Mg C, K g, q , . T N S C g g. T M E .

A g , - . Ag g K g, , - g K g. TEPCO

g - F. H TEPCO g g, .

The Kanteis emergency responseA g , g K, P M- K g , NISA.T g x q g - .

T K . A g TEPCO

A 15 A S M Cg N E-g P, D N Eg S-, g g . I , P M K g D Eg S , .

T K g C Mg C, - , g q .T NISA NSC g .T , , q q, g . T U 1 x. F , P M- K .

Ag TEPCO g g

, K , , g . I g M 15, g g , P M K . I TEPCO g g U 2, P M- K P S , . S, g g-TEPCO q - TEPCO.

Tg , P M gg . Cg - -q g , g S N Eg R Hq - q . T x ;

S N Eg R Hq , K . T g: 1) , - g g; 2)


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; 3) x . T g.

Evaluating the government and Kantei emergency responseW g g x g , -q x g- . T

, q g g g g .B . F , g K

K . T g K TEPCO TEPCO . H, TEPCO . I , K , .

I K TEPCO g, , g P S . I -

, g g-TEPCO q TEPCO, q .A K, g P M

K F D , g . Sg P M F D , K F D TEPCO. T F D TEPCO NISA K ( P M N Eg RHq). T q TEPCO NISA K, g TEPCO - .

A , g -

. B K gg g . T K g TEPCO .

Kantei (Prime Ministers Oce) O-site Center

Cabinet Oce

Secretariat of the

Emergency Response HQ

NISA Emergency

Response Center

Secretariat of the Nuclear


Prime Ministers Emergency

Response HQ

Prime Ministers Nuclear


Crisis ManagementCenter

Nuclear Safety Commission Operators Related Institutions

Prefectural Emergency

Response HQ

Town Emergency

Response HQ

Council on

Nuclear Emergency

Measures

Local Government

Emergency Response Team

Regional Nuclear

Emergency Response Team

supports supports

reports

reports

delegates

authority

instructs

advises

instructs

commands

supervises

advises

dispatches sta

dispatches

sta

dispatches

Commission members

advises

Diagram of the emergency

communication protocol


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36 N A I Ig C

Ag g , NISA - g N- Eg R Hq -g. H, K TEPCO, . T - g. I g , g x- , g g g g.

Fukushima Prefectures accident responseF P g q . A , .

T F P FP Rg D P P, . D g - , F

g g . Fg , F g - , g -g. T 30 g g - . H, q g g , .

F P g g. O 24 x g g; g . M g M 15 - . T q gq, .

Information disclosure by the central governmentD , x q gg . M. E, , , gg . I , , g q x , g- . T g x g . L , g - , g .


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37NAIIC

4

The Commission made a number of findings regarding the spread of damages

from the accident at the nuclear plant. We studied how decisions weremade, and how the policies and defensive measures were communicated tothe public. We also investigated these matters from the perspective of theresidents affected by the accident damage.

Spread of the damage


38/88

38 N A I Ig C

Damage from the nuclear power plant accidentT , , g , . A , x 900PBq , 1/6 C . T 1,800 q F P- qg 5S/ .

R g x . H, . A x x g x 14,000 (xg -) g g, 0.7 x 10S , 42.3 x 10S, 57 x 1S .W g , g g .

Chaotic evacuation ordersT C g -

, g, g- .

A g g , . B, g , - , g.

A 146,520 g . H, -. U , . E x g 3- 10 , 20 , . E x,

q . S g . H g 20- gg ; 60 M . F g .

O M 15, 20 30 --. S , - g . A , -- . Ag, g g, g . T C g- .

T 30- g - S P E Eg D I-

(SPEEDI) M 23. B g g q q ; .

Lack of preparation for a nuclear disasterT g g - , . A , g g .

T N S C (NSC) g - g- 2006 . H, NSC g , g

g g - g. NSC x , . Ag -g 2007, g.


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39NAIIC

A Ng Eq 2007, x . S, NISA g x . NISA - gg x .

M, g x . A x, , , .T g g g SPEEDI. Tg , .

T Eg R S S (ERSS) SPEEDI . T g g ERSS - , SPEEDI - ERSS. P ,g , .

I ERSS, SPEEDI g g . S , .

T g - .

T . T ERSS, g- SPEEDI g xg . A , NSC - . Tg NSC g- g , g g .T .

A , g g , g JCO 1999. N x

F. B , - , , .T g .

Current and future health damage from radiationO gg g . N-, g F P g gg g, , . W g -g.

T g x x, g . T g-

x , , . T g g g . T g , x, x x g , ,x , .

M C x,g g . Ag g g , g g q g g .

A x gg

- g-. Ag g , g :g , , , . Tg g


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40 N A I Ig C

, g . N g F P x .

TEPCO , g . I x , g g .

A , x . P F

g , g C . T C - , g. S F -, q q g .M . U, g g g .

Prolonged environmental and decontamination issuesO , , . O , C - . A

C , - , . W, .

R g

Bq/m2

3000K

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