Fortnight Publications Ltd.

Nail-Biter for McNultyAuthor(s): Sam ButlerSource: Fortnight, No. 272 (Apr., 1989), p. 4Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25551904 .

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BRIEFING

I-Blaming the messenger-. THERE IS good news and bad news for the RUC in the 1988 chief con stable's report?the last to bear the

imprimatur of Sir John Hermon.

The good news is that for the first time since the collapse of the

supergrass system in the mid-80s

the decline in the number charged with terrorist offences was reversed

last year?rising from 71 to 98. The

number of alleged republicans

charged was almost double the fig ure for the 1987 nadir.

The bad news is that fewer loy alists were charged?in a year when

both the UDA and UVF got their act together, to increasingly mur

derous effect in 1989. And, while

the strength of RUC support amongst Protestants has always ensured a relatively high absolute

rate of putting loyalist terrorists

away, the proportion of republi cans charged to offences commit

ted still remains disturbingly low.

While 436 explosions, murders and

attempted murders were carried out

by republicans in 1988, only 76

alleged republicans were charged last year.

At this rate it is unlikely the RUC will be able to do more in the short term at least than contain ter

rorist activity at its current, en

hanced, striking rate. Sir John more

or less concedes as much in his

introduction to the 1988 report: "The Provisional IRA in particular had

intended a year of seriously escalat

ing violence and only the dedicated

efforts of the police and the army

prevented their full plans from being realised. In the event the number of

deaths did not exceed those of the

previous year..." So, as in previous reports, Sir

John hints darkly that?despite the recent security package?police

powers are still inadequate and

known terrorists are still roaming the streets. "Whilst the detection

rate in respect of crime as a whole is

impressive, this achievement dis

guises the fact that there are con

tinuing difficulties specifically in

combating terrorist criminality. The

question of how a democratic soci

ety defends itself against such ruth

less assault remains open. In police terms it cannot be satisfactory that

terrorists too often escape or evade

justice and that all of us?the com

munity and the security forces?

pay the price," he writes.

Sir John also records his frustra

tions with the financial restraints

on the force, noting how he was

"saddened but compelled" to close

stations and redeploy 70 officers to

concentrate on the terrorist threat.

He also registers his "disappoint ment" that no progress was made

on a training college for the force.

And, while he reports that 41

major building projects were com

pleted during the year, he also notes

that 14 stations were damaged by the IRA campaign against the RUC infrastructure?and a further four

people were killed in the associated

campaign against contractors.

Otherwise, however, Sir Johnt

ends his last Mi year as chief con

stable in typically defiant style?

blaming an implicit conspiracy of

politicians and media for the RUC' s

public relations problems. On the Stalker affair he

presciently describes the disciplin

ary hearings against 20 officers last

month as "residual"?18 were rep rimanded and one cautioned. He

claims the Stalker/Sampson report vindicated the RUC's insistence that

there was no shoot-to-kill policy

(Mr Stalker actually said there was

"an inclination if not a policy" to

shoot to kill). And he goes on: "For

years the RUC has had to endure

distortion, inaccuracy and untruth

circulated by some politicians and

some elements of the media. At last

the allegation so harmfully and

sensationally publicised for so long has been proved false."

Quoting a poll which reported 70 per cent saying the RUC did a

good or very good job?while gloss

ing over the fact this covered 'nor

mal'crime as well, and the absence

of any sectarian breakck^wm,?Sir

John declares: "It appeaars to me

that the so-called alienaikm of the

police and the public is often a

political manipulation of the facts."

Combating thoughts, as Sir John

and his new wife look forward to

his retirement.

Robin Wilson

Nail-biter for McNulty

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We'd like to work on the FJX, please ROY McNULTY'S nightmare at Shorts appears to be developing just as, at Harland & Wolff, John

Parker's is drawing to an end.

Mr Parker has succeeded, after a

long campaign, in securing the fu

ture of the Belfast shipyard with his

management-employee buy-out

plan. But as we went to press Mr

McNulty was facing the possibility that his hard work to maintain Shorts

as an integrated aerospace design and manufacturing unit could be

wrecked by industrial trouble.

One, leg of Mr McNulty's tri

pod?aircraft manufacturing? faces a real threat. Aircraft product ion has been badly hit by the over

time ban by the 3,500 manual work

ers, with management forced to

switch employees to maintain the

aerostructures division schedules.

The decision last month by Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm to

withdraw from the bidding for Shorts was a severe setback which could

affect the FJX jet airliner project. MBB was regarded as the best hope of saving the FJX but the attempts

by Daimler Benz to pull the whole

German aerospace industry, includ

ing MBB, into a coherent struct

ure?to strengthen its grip on Euro

pean defence/aerospace spending and compete with the American

giants?have overtaken Shorts.

Significantly, in its eight require ments for a successful privatisation, Shorts did not mention the FJX?

the company merely insisted that

any future owner should produce an

aircraft programme to replace the

ageing 360 series. The proposals of

the remaining bidders?the GEC

Fokker consortium and Bombardier

of Canada?will be measured by Shorts against this requirement.

Fokker is said to be considering the transfer of production of its 50

seat turboprop to Belfast with some

additional work on the F100, one of

the most successful short-haul jets.

(Wings for the F100 are made in Belfast.) Bombardier, meanwhile, would be likely to switch much of the work on its 50-seat regional jet, the RJ100, to Belfast to accelerate

delivery into the market ahead of a

new generation of faster turboprops. Shorts is anxious about the role

of its R&D and design departments: it does not wish to see the Belfast

plant become a production satellite.

Such a development would have

far-reaching implications for the

province's skill base?Shorts has

an extensive commitment to the

training and high-technology exper tise which Northern Ireland needs

to make industrial progress. Shorts would probably feel more

at home with a company of Bom

bardier's size than the bigger GEC

Fokker marriage of convenience. A

Bombardier takeover would mean

development work for Shorts on the

RJ100 and the opportunity to gain

experience in small passenger jets, with the prospect of the FJX being reactivated later.

Shorts and Bombardier share the

conviction that the first manufact

urer to produce a sophisticated small

jet could spark a revolution. Fokker

has rejected a 50-seat jet, however, because of its turboprop programme.

The choice for Shorts, therefore, is between a production role in

Fokker's mature turboprop pro

gramme and the development of

Bombardier's new generation of

small passenger jetliners. Mr McNulty's immediate prob

lem is the threat posed to the aircraft

division by the industrial action,

arising from the company's need to

cut costs by 25 per cent to remain

competitive. If manufacture is un

dermined, maintaining the integrity of the operation could be difficult.

Aerostructures could then be sold

to Fokker and GEC could acquire the profitable missiles division?

with its highly portable intellectual skills which might ultimately be transferred from the province.

There's really only one option if

priority is to be given to maintaining the integrity of the company in

Northern Ireland. It's Bombardier.

Sam Butler 4 April Fortnight

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